PRESCRIPTION

• Municipality of Dasmariñas v. Campos, G.R. No. 232675, July 17, 2019

[G.R. No. 232675. July 17, 2019.]

MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, petitioner, vs. DR. PAULO C.

CAMPOS, substituted by his children JOSE PAULO CAMPOS,
PAULO CAMPOS, JR., and ENRIQUE CAMPOS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 233078. July 17, 2019.]

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DR. PAULO C.

CAMPOS, substituted by his children JOSE PAULO CAMPOS,
PAULO CAMPOS, JR., and ENRIQUE CAMPOS, respondents.

FACTS:
Dr. Campos was the absolute owner of certain parcels of land
situated in Dasmariñas, Cavite. 7 On July 28, 1976, Dr. Campos executed a
Deed of Donation (First Deed of Donation) in favor of the NHA, involving a
parcel of land with an area of 12,798 square meters. 8
Under the Deed of Donation, the donee NHA WAS TO CONSTRUCT
A 36-METER-WIDE ACCESS ROAD from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project. It is also hereby stipulated that should the DONEE fail to
use the area or part of it for the 36-meter access road, or should its
development be delayed, the DONOR reserves the right to use it until such a
time that DONEE is in a position to use the said parcel of properties. 
In an attempt to comply with the provisions of the Deed of
Donation, the NHA constructed a 20-m-wide access road, in lieu of the
stipulated 36-m-wide access road.  The NHA reasoned that the volume of
the traffic at that time did not justify the outright construction of the 36-
m-wide access road, and that it had reserved the remaining 16 m for road
widening purposes. The NHA also promised that the property had not
been diverted or used for any other purpose. 
 However, on June 13, 1993, without any notice to Dr. Campos, the
NHA donated the subject property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas. This
was done allegedly pursuant to Section 31 of P.D. No. 957. 
Due to the failure of the NHA to fully comply with the provisions in
the Deed of Donation despite the long lapse of time, and due to the
foregoing transaction between the petitioners, on November 13, 2001, Dr.
Campos filed an action for Revocation of Donation against the NHA with
the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90.  Dr. Campos claimed that the NHA
failed to comply with the condition attached to the donation and construct
the 36-m-wide access road. He also alleged that the NHA further violated
the parties' agreement by subsequently donating the subject property to
the Municipality of Dasmariñas. 
Proceedings in the Trial Court

On June 2, 2007, Dr. Campos passed away. – SUBSTITUTED BY RES-

HEIRS
On March 16, 2011, the RTC handed its Decision,  partially granting
the action for Revocation of Donation against the petitioners. 
Proceedings in the CA

AFFIRMED RTC’s DECISION. That the donation is one that is onerous

in nature, as it contained a condition imposed upon the NHA.  Since the
donation was onerous, any action for the revocation of the same should
be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right of action. The CA held
that this was timely effected by Dr. Campos.
The CA also found that the NHA violated the terms of the Deed of
Donation and failed to fulfill its obligation to build a 36-m-wide access
road.  The CA stated that the evidence on record indisputably showed that
the NHA only built a 20-m-wide access road despite the more than 25
years since the donation was perfected. It was held, thus, that the NHA's
omission was not merely a casual breach as advocated by the petitioners,
but a substantial one.
The Arguments of the Parties
PETIONER
1. CA erred when it held that the action to revoke the Deed of Donation
had not yet prescribed. The petitioners allege that the reckoning point
should be at the time the late Dr. Campos discovered that the NHA
only constructed a 20-m-wide access road instead of the stipulated 36-
m-wide access road, 39 which means that the right to file had long
prescribed when Dr. Campos filed an action to revoke the donation on
November 13, 2001
2. the respondents-heirs, particularly Dr. Campos, are guilty of laches.  In
particular, Dr. Campos allegedly had known ever since that the NHA
constructed a 20-m-wide access road instead of one that was 36-m-
wide, however, he "slept on his rights and waited for a period of 25
years before filing the action for revocation." 
3. allege that the NHA actually complied with the condition imposed by
Dr. Campos as there was actual construction of the access road, albeit
only 20 m wide, and the remaining 16 m was reserved for road
widening purposes.  The petitioners state that the reason for this was
the high volume of traffic that, at that time, would not allow outright
construction and completion of the road. 
4. the donated property, up to the present, REMAINS TO BE PART OF
THE ACCESS ROAD
5. The petitioners likewise point to paragraph C of the Deed of Donation,
which states that any delay in the development for the avowed
purposes would only allow the donor (respondents-heirs in the case) to
reserve the right to use the property until such time that the donee
(NHA) is in a position to use the property, and not allow the revocation
of the Deed of Donation.
6. Constituted merely a CASUAL BREACH of the Deed of Donation, and
not a substantial breach that would warrant the rescission of the
same. 
RESPONDENTS
1. ACTION TO REVOKE THE DEED OF DONATION HAD NOT YET
PRESCRIBED. THE respondents-heirs agree with the CA that Article
1144 of the Civil Code is the applicable legal provision, pursuant to
jurisprudence that states that donations with an onerous clause are
governed by the rules on contracts and the general rules on
 prescription apply in the said revocation, and pursuant to the
aforecited Article 1144 which states that all actions upon a written
contract shall be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right
of action. 
2. NHA CLEARLY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT between the
parties as clearly stated in the Deed of Donation which can be readily
observed in the fact that a 20-m-wide access road was built instead of
the agreed upon 36-m-wide one. The 16 m difference is more than
substantial and would definitely warrant the revocation of the
donation.
3. Subsequent donation also contravenes the provision in the initial Deed
of Donation that "the donor (Dr. Campos) reserves the right to use it
until such time that the done[e] (NHA) is in a position to use the
property," such provision now being an impossibility because it was
not reproduced in the second deed. 53

The Issues
The issues in this case are as follows:
First, as to the procedural aspect of the case, whether or not the
action to revoke the Deed of Donation has prescribed and/or is barred by
laches.
Second, as to the substantial merits, whether or not the CA gravely
erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC that the NHA violated the
terms of the Deed of Donation, said violations authorizing the partial
revocation of the property donated, specifically the unused 16 m, and
whether or not petitioners have proffered any valid justification to show
any infirmity in the decision. 
ETHIDa

Ruling of the Court

After a perusal of the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the
Court finds that the CONSOLIDATED PETITION IS BEREFT OF MERIT.
As to the Issues on Prescription and
Laches
 There is no question that Dr. Campos properly filed the action for
Revocation of Donation within the allowable time under the law. The first
donation between Dr. Campos and the NHA was a donation of an
ONEROUS NATURE, as it contained the stipulation to build the 36-m-wide
access road. Jurisprudence, including the C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc. v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. 54 case cited by the petitioners
themselves, is clear that donations of an onerous type are governed by
the law on contracts, and not by the law on donations.  Being as such,
under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, all actions upon a written
contract shall be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right of
action, and herein, the respondents-heirs' right of action only accrued
when the NHA donated the subject property to the Municipality of
Dasmariñas, as this transfer effectively removed not only NHA's ability to
complete the access road based on the stipulation, but also precluded any
move on the part of the NHA to compel the transferee to finish the
same.Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the prescriptive period could
only start running from the time of the second donation between the
petitioners.
LACHES ISSUE
There is likewise no merit to the ASSERTION THAT THE LACHES
DOCTRINE applies as a ground to overturn the CA ruling. While laches is
principally a question of equity, and necessarily, there is no absolute rule
as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand, each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.  The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches
is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. 
Jurisprudence, however, has set established requisites for
laches, viz.:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) Delay in asserting the complainant's right, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice of defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
 (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
claim; and
(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 58
In this case, it cannot be said that Dr. Campos slept on his rights and
is guilty of laches, as the second requisite of delay is factually and legally
absent. Dr. Campos had shown patience in allowing the NHA the time to
finish its obligation despite the long period that was starting to elapse,
and filed the case only when it was clear that the NHA could no longer
fulfill its obligation. 
SDAaTC

In addition, the fact that the case was filed within the prescriptive
period of 10 years aptly removes the case from the clutches of possible
laches.
To note, the petitioners themselves point out that nothing in the
Deed of Donation gives an exact timeline for the NHA to complete the
building of the access road, saying that "[t]he construction of the exactly
[36-m-wide] access road is NOT TIME-BOUND," 61 which means that, for
the time NHA was in control of the property, the respondents-heirs' cause
of action could not have arisen. This would explain the relatively long
period before which the late Dr. Campos filed a complaint for
Revocation of Donation, because before the subsequent donation to the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, the respondents-heirs, in their generosity,
gave the NHA leeway to hopefully deliver on its pledge to complete the
construction. Unfortunately, the second donation completely eradicated
any vestiges of hope that would be fulfilled, prompting respondents to
take action, well within the time allowed by the statute.
As to the Revocation of the Deed of
Donation

. At the onset, the Court notes that the factual findings that the NHA
failed to comply with the express stipulations contained in the Deed of
Donation are consistent and parallel with that of the trial court, as well as
the CA. Thus, these findings of fact are binding on the Court of last resort
unless there was an oversight or misinterpretation on the part of the
lower courts. 
The Court finds that the petitioners were unable to prove the
presence of any possible oversight that would create doubt on the
findings of fact of the trial court and the CA. The Court's own review of the
evidence on record will show that indeed, a SUBSTANTIAL BREACH, and
not just a slight breach, was committed by the NHA that would validate a
revocation of the donation and a rescission of the subject contract
between the NHA and the respondents-heirs necessitating the immediate
return of the unused property back to the respondents-heirs.
Axiomatically, the general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat
the object of the parties in making the agreement.  Substantial breaches, unlike slight or casual
breaches of contract, are fundamental breaches that defeat the object of the parties in entering into
an agreement,    and the question of whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely determined
by the attendant circumstances. 

Based on the foregoing, and for a myriad of reasons, a

SUBSTANTIAL BREACH of contract was committed by the NHA when it
only built a 20-m-wide access road, and not a mere casual breach which
the petitioners allege would render nugatory the revocation of the
donation.  acEHCD

The NHA's contention that outside factors, such as the VOLUME OF

TRAFFIC AT THAT TIME,  WERE TO BLAME for any apparent breach do
not offer a semblance of validity. Even assuming that this was true,
almost two decades had lapsed from the time the property was
donated, to the subsequent donation from the NHA to the Municipality of
Dasmariñas. The NHA's failure to do so indicates the lack of prioritizing on
its part to comply with the agreement, and it cannot now use extraneous
factors as justification for its own lack of diligence.
In the case herein, the NHA FAILED TO SHOW ANY CONCRETE
PROOF that it was bent on fulfilling its obligation to complete the
construction of the access road. The mere allegation that it "reserved"
the remaining portion is inconsistent with its simultaneous and
concurrent acts, which include failing to build despite the long period with
the opportunity to do so.
 Clearly, bad faith is attendant on the part of BOTH THE
PETITIONERS. The NHA showed bad faith by donating the property
without substantially complying with the condition that was the purpose
for the donation in the first place, as well as failing to reproduce the
condition in the second donation contract. The Municipality of
Dasmariñas showed bad faith in the acquisition and its overall conduct in
this case, by introducing structures and developing the land even with the
knowledge that there was not only a pending appeal, but with the
understanding that both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of revoking the
donation. If this Court were to reward the Municipality of Dasmariñas with
the granting of its petition solely because existing structures would be
affected, then it would encourage entities to build in bad faith hoping that
the impracticality would sway the Court towards ruling in favor of keeping
the status quo. Suffice it to say, that sort of precedent cannot and will
never be set by this Court in the interest of justice, law, and fair play. 
AcICHD

There is, however, an equitable recourse, which the petitioners

themselves recognize. To save the developments already made, the
petitioners may choose to exercise the powers of eminent domain to keep
the subject property and continue their infrastructure-based
improvements. But the Court, in the interest of justice, will not grant the
petitioners an easy way out of the hole they are in, when it was they who
opened it in the first place.
• Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. 222614,
March 20, 2019

[G.R. No. 222614. March 20, 2019.]

HEIR OF PASTORA T. CARDENAS AND EUSTAQUIO

CARDENAS, namely REMEDIOS CARDENAS-TUMLOS,
represented by her Attorney-in-fact JANET TUMLOS-
QUIZON,petitioners, vs. THE CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY
ALLIANCE CHURCHES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,represented
by REO REPOLLO and LEOCADIO DUQUE, JR.,respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA,  J  : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari 1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
petitioner Heir of Pastora T. Cardenas (Pastora) and Eustaquio Cardenas
(Eustaquio) (collectively the Sps. Cardenas), namely Remedios Cardenas-
Tumlos (Remedios), who is represented by Janet Tumlos-Quizon (Janet)
(referred to as the Heir of Sps. Cardenas), assailing the Decision 2 dated
February 16, 2015 (assailed Decision) and Resolution 3 dated December 2,
2015 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
02948-MIN.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

 As narrated by the CA in its assailed Decision and as culled from the
records of the instant case, the essential facts and antecedent
proceedings of the case are as follows:
On October 26, 2009, [Remedios],heir of [Sps.
Cardenas],represented by her attorney-in-fact, [Janet], 4 filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Use of Real Property and
Damages against [respondents] The Christian and Missionary
Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP),Reo Repollo
[(Repollo)] and Leocadio Duque, Jr. [(Duque, Jr.)] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 24,
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-033.
Janet is the daughter of [Remedios],a widow and a resident
of 610 Winthrop Avenue, Glendale Heights, Illinois 601239, United
States of America (USA).
CAMACOP is a religious corporation, organized and existing
pursuant to the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines. It is
represented by [Repollo and Duque, Jr.]
In her Complaint, Janet alleged that her mother Remedios is
the heir of the late [Sps. Cardenas],who are the registered owners
of Lot 90, Psd-37322, with an area of 410 square meters, located at
Poblacion 6, Midsayap, Cotabato [(subject property)],covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-6097 and Tax Declaration
No. K-019938 with a [m]arket [v]alue of P550,220.00; and that the
subject property is adjacent to Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-013791 owned
by CAMACOP where its church is located and constructed.
Janet further alleged that sometime in the year 1962,
CAMACOP unlawfully occupied the subject property for their
church activities and functions; that CAMACOP continues to
unlawfully occupy the subject property to the damage and
prejudice of [Janet];that their repeated oral and written demands
fell on deaf ears; and that CAMACOP failed to accede to the
demands and continues to occupy the subject property. Thus, her
mother Remedios, through her, was constrained to file the case
before the court a quo.
For their part, [the respondents] admitted in their Answer
that [Cardenas] is the registered owner of the subject property,
which is adjacent to Lot No. 3924-A, Psd-12-013791 owned by the
 CAMACOP. They further aver in their Answer that their occupation
of the subject property is not illegal since they had lawfully
purchased it from its registered owners [(referring to
Pastora)],who surrendered the owner's duplicate copy to the
representative of the church.
[The respondents] alleged that on May 31, 1962, Atty.
Rodofolo T. Calud (Calud),counsel and representative of CAMACOP,
sent the owner's duplicate copy of the subject property to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and four (4) copies
of the Deed of Sale, signed by the registered owners, for the
Secretary's prior approval, pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
141. They further asseverate that their continued occupation of the
subject property for a period of forty-seven (47) years had reduced
the claim as barred by prescription and the inaction of [Janet] for
such period of time had rendered their claim as a stale demand
which is barred by laches.
After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, on June 6, 2012, the [RTC] rendered the assailed
Decision 5 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. [In sum,
according to the RTC, CAMACOP was able to provide sufficient
documentary and testimonial evidence that the subject property
was indeed sold to it by Pastora. Hence, the RTC found as a fact the
existence of a sale transaction between CAMACOP and the
predecessor-in-interest of Janet and Remedios, i.e.,Pastora.]
[On June 27, 2012, Janet filed a Notice of Appeal before the
RTC. The appeal was then heard by CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
02948-MIN.] 6 (Emphasis supplied)

The Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied Janet's appeal for lack of

merit. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June
6, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch
24, rendered in Civil Case No. 09-033 is AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED. 7
The CA held that the Heir of Sps. Cardenas "failed to overcome the
burden of proving her claim by preponderance of evidence [and found]
that the court a quo did not err in its appreciation of the evidence and in
ruling that there was in fact a sale of the subject property by the late
spouses in favor of [CAMACOP.] The failure of [Janet] to prove her claim
makes [the] appeal vulnerable to denial." 8
Heir of Sps. Cardenas filed her Motion for Reconsideration 9 dated
March 30, 2015, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed
Resolution.
Hence, the instant Petition.
CAMACOP filed its Comment/Opposition 10 to the instant Petition on
July 20, 2016, to which the Heir of Sps. Cardenas responded to with her
Reply 11 filed on August 10, 2016.

Issue

Stripped to its core, the critical issue is the determination of who

between the Heir of Sps. Cardenas (Remedios, as represented by Janet)
and CAMACOP has a better right to possess the subject property.

The Court's Ruling

While it is a well-established rule that the Court is not a trier of facts

and will not delve into evidentiary matters, the Court can exercise its
discretion in undergoing a close examination of the testimonial and
documentary evidence on record where the findings of fact of the lower
courts are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion. 12
While both the RTC and CA arrived at a similar finding of fact that a
contract of sale was indeed entered into by the Heir of Sps. Cardenas'
predecessor-in-interest, i.e.,Pastora, and CAMACOP, a review of the
evidence on record behooves the Court to carefully reexamine and
reconsider the factual finding of the lower courts.
 At the outset, it must be stressed that the instant case is one
for recovery of possession and use of real property.Early on, the Court has
held that an action for the recovery of possession must be founded on
positive rights on the part of the plaintiff and not merely on negative ones,
as the lack or insufficiency of title, on the part of the defendant. 13 Hence,
it was incumbent upon the Heir of Sps. Cardenas to establish her positive
right of possession over the subject property.
Upon review of the records of the instant case, the Court holds that
such positive right of possession over the subject property was sufficiently
established by the Heir of Sps. Cardenas.
As borne by the Pre-Trial Order 14 dated April 12, 2010, it is
an admitted fact that "the property Lot 90, Psd-37322 covered by TCT
No. T-6097 is still registered in the names of Pastora T. Cardenas and
Eustaquio Cardenas." 15 In relation to the foregoing admitted fact, it is
also not disputed by any party that Remedios, who is being represented
by her daughter Janet, is the only daughter and compulsory Heir of Sps.
Cardenas.
As a general rule, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. 16
To further support the existence of the Heir of Sps. Cardenas' right
of possession over the subject property, it is also an admitted fact that
"the same lot is still declared for tax purposes in the name of the plaintiffs
Pastora Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas." 17 Certified copies of Tax
Declaration No. K-019938 18 dated August 14, 2007 and Real Property Tax
Clearance 19 dated December 11, 2009, both in the name of Pastora, were
presented by the Heir of Sps. Cardenas. Aside from the foregoing, copies
of official receipts 20 showing that real property taxes were paid upon the
subject property in 2009 and 2010 under the name of Pastora were
offered into evidence. While Tax Declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, at the very least they are proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property and serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession. 21
 Hence, given the foregoing admitted facts, the burden has then
shifted to CAMACOP to provide sufficient evidence establishing that, while
the certificate of title covering the subject property is still registered in the
names of the Sps. Cardenas, the ownership of the subject property had
not remained with the Sps. Cardenas and had been validly transferred to
it through a contract of sale in 1962.
In asserting that the subject property was sold by Pastora to
CAMACOP, the latter relies on the existence of a Deed of Sale purportedly
executed in 1962. CAMACOP however maintains that, since all of the
copies of this alleged Deed of Sale had been supposedly lost, it had to
resort to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of
this Deed of Sale.
According to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by presenting secondary evidence. These secondary evidence
pertain to: (1) a copy of the lost document, (2) by a recital of the contents
of the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a testimony of
a witnesses, in the order stated.
Hence, in order for respondent CAMACOP to prove the existence
and contents of the purportedly lost Deed of Sale, it was incumbent upon
it to present either (1) a copy of the purported Deed of Sale, or (2) an
authentic document containing a recital of the contents of the purported
Deed of Sale, or (3) a witness who can testify as to the existence and
contents of the purported Deed of Sale, in that order.
Upon close examination of the evidence on record, the Court holds
that CAMACOP was not able to provide any sufficient secondary evidence
to establish the existence and contents of the supposed 1962 Deed of
Sale covering the subject property. In other words, CAMACOP failed to
present sufficient evidence proving that a sale indeed occurred between
Pastora and CAMACOP over the subject property.
First, CAMACOP was not able to present even a photocopy or any
other copy of the purported Deed of Sale.
 It is alleged by CAMACOP that no copy of the document is available
because its counsel, Atty. Calud, submitted to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (DANR),now Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR),all the copies of the Deed of Sale. To say the least, it
is quite unbelievable and extraordinary that not even a single copy of the
purported Deed of Sale was retained by CAMACOP or its counsel,
considering the grave importance of such a document. If it is indeed true
that the purported documents of sale are in the possession of the then
DANR or now the DENR, then it would have been easy for CAMACOP to
ask for the issuance of a subpoena to compel the presentation of the said
documents before the RTC. Yet, the evidence on record suggest that
CAMACOP did not even attempt to do so; it merely relied on the letter
correspondence of Atty. Calud.
Second, according to CAMACOP, the purported Deed of Sale is
"denominated as Doc. No. 491; Page No. 100; Book No. I; Series of 1962 of
the Notarial Register of [Atty. Calud] acting as a notary public." 22 If this is
true, then Atty. Calud would have easily been able to produce a copy of
the purported Deed of Sale, considering that he was allegedly the notary
public who notarized the said document. As a notary public, it was Atty.
Calud's duty to keep a record of all the documents that he has notarized.
Yet, CAMACOP could not even provide a single shred of credible evidence
as to the existence of the purported Deed of Sale in the notarial register
of Atty. Calud.
Hence, the Court finds CAMACOP's explanation as to the complete
absence of any available copy of the purported Deed of Sale farfetched
and implausible.
Third, the secondary evidence presented by
CAMACOP, i.e.,Letter 23 dated May 31, 1962 of Atty. Calud addressed to
the DANR Secretary; Sworn Affidavit 24 of Rev. Leodegario C. Madrigal
(Madrigal) dated November 20, 1962; Letter 25 dated May 6, 1963 of Atty.
Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary; Letter 26 dated July 23, 1963 of
Atty. Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary; Letter 27 dated January 13,
1964 of Atty. Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary; Letter 28 of Aurora
B. Marcos (Marcos),Assistant Chief Legal Officer, for DANR Secretary,
addressed to the Director of Lands dated March 2, 1964; Letter 29 dated
May 19, 1964 of Atty. Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary;
Letter 30 dated July 27, 1964 of Atty. Calud addressed to the Editor of the
Philippine Free Press; Letter 31 dated November 21, 1966 of Atty. Calud
addressed to the DANR Secretary; Letter 32 dated December 23, 1968 of
Atty. Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary; and Letter 33 dated
December 2, 1999 of Repollo addressed to Rev. Ferdinand Pabrua
(Pabrua),EVP-DAF, are all unavailing.
None of these documents contains a recital of the contents of the
purported Deed of Sale, as required under the Revised Rules on Evidence.
At most, the documents presented merely mention that copies of the
purported Deed of Sale were supposedly transmitted to the DANR.
As for the several letters of Atty. Calud, addressed to the DANR
Secretary, such documents are grossly insufficient to prove both the
existence and contents of the purported Deed of Sale. These letters are
completely self-serving documents. As held by the Court in Villanueva v.
Balaguer,34 a man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter
authored by himself containing the statements that he wishes to prove.
Aside from the wholly self-serving letters of Atty. Calud, there is no
concrete and believable evidence showing that there were indeed copies
of the purported Deed of Sale that were transmitted to the DANR
Secretary.
As supposed proof of the transmittal of the copies of the purported
Deed of Sale to the DANR Secretary, CAMACOP presented the supposed
Letter dated March 2, 1964 authored by one Marcos, Assistant Chief Legal
Officer for the DANR Secretary, addressed to the then Director of Lands.
However, there is nothing in the said document that mentioned or
acknowledged the transmittal of the documents to the DANR Secretary.
The letter merely showed that the DANR Secretary asked the then
Director of Lands to look into the matter. In fact, this letter
is unsigned,creating much doubt as to its authenticity.
With respect to the Sworn Affidavit of Madrigal dated November 20,
1962 and Letter dated December 2, 1999 of Repollo addressed to Pabrua,
EVP-DAF, not only are they in the nature of self-serving statements coming
from representatives of CAMACOP, it must also be stressed that they are
clearly hearsay evidence with respect to the purpose of proving the
existence and contents of the purported Deed of Sale. These individuals
have absolutely no personal knowledge as to the preparation and
execution of the purported Deed of Sale itself. In fact, these persons do
not even claim that they have personally seen the purported Deed of Sale.
Particularly striking is the fact that in the Sworn Affidavit of
Madrigal, he mentioned that the property purchased by CAMACOP is the
one "particularly described in Original Certificate of Title No. 1759 of
the Province of Cotabato." 35 It must be emphasized that the subject TCT
covering the subject property pertain to the area covered by "Original
Certificate of Title No. 1674." 36 This glaring discrepancy further puts into
doubt the position of CAMACOP.
To make matters worse, the secondary evidence presented by
CAMACOP are all inauthentic and inadmissible documents.
The records show that the secondary evidence presented by
CAMACOP are all mere photocopies. According to the Revised Rules on
Evidence, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. 37 CAMACOP did not provide any sufficient justification as
to its failure to present the original copies of the documents.
Furthermore, the documents were not properly authenticated.All of
CAMACOP's documentary evidence, from Exhibits 1 to 11, were identified
and authenticated by its first witness, Repollo,who is a member of
CAMACOP.
According to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written or (b) by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In the instant case, it is readily admitted that Repollo did not
personally witness the execution of any of the documents he identified. In
fact, Repollo testified that these documents were merely turned over to
him by his mother. 38 Nor was Repollo knowledgeable as to the
genuineness of the signatures or handwritings found in the documents.
Truth be told, Repollo had no participation and knowledge whatsoever as
to the preparation, execution, and authenticity of the documents he
identified. Otherwise stated, Repollo was totally incompetent to present
and testify on these documents. Hence, without proper identification and
authentication, the documentary evidence of CAMACOP should not have
been admitted into evidence by the RTC.
Thus, without any copy of the purported Deed of Sale and any
authentic document containing a recital of the contents of the purported
Deed of Sale, CAMACOP should have provided a credible, convincing
witness to prove the existence and contents of the purported Deed of
Sale.
No such witness was provided by CAMACOP.
With respect to CAMACOP's first witness, Repollo, he readily
admitted on the witness stand that he did not personally see any copy of
a deed of sale covering the subject property. 39 With respect to
CAMACOP's third witness, Pastor Jerry Juarez (Juarez),he testified that he
has no personal knowledge as regards the subject property and that
certain files were merely handed down to him when he became the
Resident Pastor of CAMACOP sometime in May 1992. 40 It is clear that
Repollo and Juarez are mere hearsay witnesses who have no personal
knowledge as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged contract of
sale entered into between CAMACOP and Pastora.
The sole witness presented by CAMACOP who allegedly acquired
personal knowledge as to the purported sale transaction between
CAMACOP and Pastora is the second witness of CAMACOP, i.e.,Eudecia M.
Repollo (Eudecia).
According to Eudecia, as the then Secretary-Treasurer of CAMACOP,
she was the one who paid One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P120.00),with Ten
Pesos (P10.00) allotted for attorney's fees, to Pastora as consideration for
the sale of the subject property and co-signed the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale. 41
Aside from the testimony being self-serving and uncorroborated, it
is highly significant to point out that according to the testimony of
Eudecia, the lot purchased by CAMACOP from Pastora refers to a lot
measuring One Hundred Ten (110) square meters only,located beside
Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-01379, which is currently owned and possessed by
CAMACOP. To stress, the subject property is a Four Hundred Ten (410)-
square meter lot.
On cross examination, when asked if she was sure that the property
purchased by CAMACOP from Pastora is only One Hundred Ten (110)
square meters, Eudecia unequivocally answered: "Yes, sir." 42 The
statements made by Eudecia on cross examination leave absolutely no
doubt that, if indeed there was a sale that occurred between CAMACOP
and Pastora, such was only limited to One Hundred Ten (110) square
meters:
Q When you paid the amount of P110.00, you did not see the title?
A We received the title from Mrs. Pastora Cardenas, it was given to
us.
Q Did you see the area?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the area?
A 110 square meters.
Q What you have purchased is 110 square meters?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that, only 110 and not 410?
A I am sure 110 square meters only because the other portion was
donated by Mr. Pascual Cocal and when it was resurveyed
maybe it was already included.
xxx xxx xxx
Q As far as you know, you only purchased 110 square meters of
Lot 90?
A Yes, that's all what I know.43
Hence, the very witness of CAMACOP itself confirmed under oath
that if ever there really was a sale covering the subject property entered
into by CAMACOP and Pastora, such sale did not cover the entire subject
property which they are currently occupying, but only One Hundred Ten
(110) square meters out of the entire Four Hundred Ten (410) square
meters, which is adjacent to Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-01379 currently owned
and occupied by CAMACOP.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds the Heir of Sps. Cardenas'
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Use of Real
Estate 44 meritorious.
Having said that, the Court does not find that the Heir of Sps.
Cardenas has the right to recover possession of the entire subject
property.
In the instant Petition, the Heir of Sps. Cardenas unequivocally
stated that "the decision should have been to award to respondent
CAMACOP the 110 square meters and the remaining area after
deducting the 110 square meters to be retained by petitioner." 45 In
addition, Janet unambiguously and unmistakably admitted in the instant
Petition that "the 110 square meters x x x rightfully may be ruled as
owned by respondent CAMACOP." 46 In fact, in her prayer for relief, the
Heir of Sps. Cardenas even asks that the One Hundred Ten (110) square
meters of the subject property be adjudicated to CAMACOP. 47 Hence, by
express admission by Janet as to the sale of the One Hundred Ten (110)-
square meter portion of the subject property to CAMACOP, the Court
allows the latter to retain possession of the said portion of the subject
property.
Lastly, neither can it be argued that CAMACOP has acquired the
right to possess the subject property by virtue of prescription or laches.
According to Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529, "[n]o
title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." There can be no
acquisitive prescription with respect to a titled parcel of land. 48 The Court
has explained that, by express provision of Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession:
x x x. By express provision of Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. To declare
that the decree and its derivative titles is valid but only with respect
 to the extent of the area described in the decree not possessed by
occupants with indefeasible registered titles or to possessors with
such lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership is to
undermine the people's faith in the torrens titles being conclusive
as to all matters contained therein. The certificate serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose names appear therein. x x x 49
In Umbay v. Alecha,50 the Court explained that the right to recover
possession of registered land is imprescriptible on the part of the
registered owner because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership. 51 Moreover, the Court also explained that prescription is
unavailing, not only against the registered owner, but also against his
hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor-in-interest. 52
With respect to the application of laches, the Court disagrees with
the CA in its holding that the doctrine of laches precludes the Heir of Sps.
Cardenas from instituting the instant action to recover possession over
the subject property.
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a
right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.
Laches is different from and applies independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with
the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on a fixed time; laches is not. 53
While a person may not acquire title to the registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the
original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his
right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto,
by reason of laches. 54
 In Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. CA,55 the Court enumerated the
essential elements of laches, namely: (1) Conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to
sue; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4)
Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant.
In the instant case, according to the CA, the doctrine of laches finds
application because Janet "did not transfer the title of the subject property
in her name despite the passage of more than forty (40) years since the
demise of her late parents [and] admitted the fact that [CAMACOP] has
been in possession of the subject property since 1962 [;but] no formal
action was taken by her except in 2009 when she sent demand letters to
[ CAMACOP]." 56
However, when asked by the RTC as to when was the first time she
gained any knowledge as to CAMACOP's act of constructing a building on
the subject property, the Heir of Sps. Cardenas testified on the witness
stand that it was only in the year 2000 that she discovered CAMACOP's
construction activities on the subject property. 57 Janet also testified under
oath that since 2000, "we were meeting already with the barangay
regarding this problem" 58 and that since 2000, Janet had already been in
contact and had engaged into negotiation with CAMACOP with respect to
the dispute. On cross examination, Janet testified that CAMACOP
intimated to her in 2000 that they are supposedly in possession of a Deed
of Sale. Hence, Janet decided to give CAMACOP sufficient time to produce
this document. 59 When it was apparent to Janet that CAMACOP would not
be able to produce the purported Deed of Sale, it was then that a formal
action for recovery of possession was instituted. Such testimony was left
unrebutted by CAMACOP.
Hence, based on the unrebutted testimony of Janet, the Court is not
convinced that there was considerable delay on her part and that she
slept on her rights so as to successfully invoke the doctrine of laches.
 WHEREFORE,the instant appeal is GRANTED.The Decision dated
February 16, 2015 and Resolution dated December 2, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02948-MIN are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.Necessarily, the Decision dated June 6, 2012 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato City, Branch 24 is
likewise REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The respondents The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of
the Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP),Reo Repollo and Leocadio Duque, Jr. are
hereby ordered to TURN OVER POSSESSION of the subject property to
the Heir of Pastora T. Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas, namely
petitioner Remedios Cardenas-Tumlos, as represented by petitioner Janet
Tumlos-Quizon. The respondents are allowed to RETAIN POSSESSION of
the One Hundred Ten (110) Square Meters portion of the subject property
adjacent to Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-013791 currently owned by CAMACOP.
SO ORDERED.
  (Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the
|||

Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 222614, [March 20, 2019])

• Tomakin v. Navares, G.R. No. 223624, July 17, 2019

[G.R. No. 223624. July 17, 2019.]

HEIRS OF LEONARDA NADELA TOMAKIN, namely: LUCAS

NADELA, OCTAVIO N. TOMAKIN, ROMEO N. TOMAKIN, MA.
CRISTETA * T. PANOPIO, and CRESCENCIO ** TOMAKIN, JR.
(deceased), represented by his heirs, BARBARA JEAN R.
TOMAKIN RAFOLS *** and CRISTINA JEAN R.
TOMAKIN, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF CELESTINO NAVARES,
namely: ERMINA N. JACA, NORMITA NAVARES, FELINDA N.
BALLENA, RHODORA N. SINGSON, CRISTINA N. CAL ORTIZ,
ROCELYN N. SENCIO, JAIME B. NAVARES, CONCHITA N.
BAYOT, PROCULO NAVARES, LIDUVINA N. VALLE, MA.
DIVINA N. ABIS, VENUSTO B. NAVARES and RACHELA N.
TAHIR, respondents.
 DECISION

CAGUIOA,  J  :
p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 (Petition)

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) assailing the Decision 2 dated
October 28, 2014 (CA Decision) and the Resolution 3 dated March 23, 2016
of the Court of Appeals 4 (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03806. The CA
Decision granted the appeal of respondents Heirs of Celestino Navares
(respondents Navares) as well as reversed and set aside the
Decision 5 dated May 6, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-30246, which
was in favor of petitioners Heirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin (petitioners
Tomakin). The CA Resolution dated March 23, 2016 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration 6 filed by petitioners Tomakin.  EcTCAD

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The CA Decision narrates the factual antecedents as follows:
The property in dispute is Lot No. 8467  originally owned by
the late Jose Badana who died without issue. He was survived by
his two sisters Quirina Badana and Severina Badana. The property
was then covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2230 (O-
7281) in the name of Jose Badana.
On 18 May 2004, [Heirs of Celestino Navares (respondents
Navares)] filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against
[Heirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin (petitioners Tomakin)] before
the RTC x x x.
In their complaint, [respondents Navares] alleged (a) that on
23 February 1955, Quirina Badana, as heir of her brother Jose
Badana, sold one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 8467 to the late spouses
Remigio Navares and Cesaria Gaviola, which portion, as claimed, is
known as Lot No. 8467-B as evidenced by Sale with Condition; 8 (b)
that as successors-in-interest of the late spouses [Navares],
[RESPONDENTS NAVARES] INHERITED LOT NO. 8467-B; (c) that
they and their predecessors had been religiously paying realty
taxes on Lot No. 8467-B since 1955; (d) that most of them had been
occupying and residing on the property adversely and openly in the
concept of an owner; (e) that on 6 December 1957, Severina
Badana sold the other half of Lot No. 8467 known as Lot No.
8467-A to spouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca, the
predecessors-in-interest of [petitioners Tomakin]. 9
On 30 October 1991, [petitioner] Lucas Nadela, together with
Leonarda N. Tomakin, sold a portion of Lot No. 8467 with an area
of 1,860 square meters out of what they inherited from [s]pouses
Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca to spouses Alfredo Dacua, Jr. and
Clarita Bacalso. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. 10 [Respondents Navares] alleged that on the basis of this
Absolute Sale, x x x Alfredo Dacua, Jr. 11 caused Lot No. 8467-A to
be titled in his name. [Respondents Navares] further alleged that
on 10 January 1994, [petitioners Tomakin] made it x x x appear that
one Mauricia 12 Bacus (a complete stranger to the property)
executed a document denominated as Extra Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Jose Badana with Confirmation of Sale; and that on the
basis of this document, x x x Alfredo Dacua, Jr. maliciously caused
Lot No. 8467-B to be titled in the name of Leonarda Nadela
Tomakin and Lucas J. Nadela under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
131499. 13 Oral demands were made by [respondents Navares]
upon [petitioners Tomakin] to reconvey the title of Lot No. 8467-B
which remained unheeded.
In their Answer, [petitioners Tomakin] claimed that they are
the heirs of the late Leonarda Tomakin; that Lot No. 8467 was
purchased by [s]pouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca from
Severina Badana, sister-heir of the late Jose Badana, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 December 1957; 14 that the
heirs of [spouses] Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca, namely Leonarda
N. Tomakin and her brother Lucas J. Nadela executed a Deed of
Partition conveying x x x Lot No. 8467 in favor of Leonarda N.
Tomakin; that before Leonarda Tomakin died, she and her brother
Lucas Nadela sold the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 8467 in
favor of [s]pouses Alfredo Dacua, Jr. and Clarita Bacalso evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale; 15 that [s]pouses Aaron Nadela and
Felipa Jaca, their heirs Leonard[a] N. Tomakin and Lucas Nadela
and, thereafter, [petitioners Tomakin] have been exercising acts of
ownership over Lot No. 8467 and Lot No. 8467-B. Lastly,
 [petitioners Tomakin] averred that [respondents Navares] are
barred by prescription and laches — 49 years having elapsed since
the alleged sale of the 1/2 portion of the property in 1955. 
HESIcT

On 6 May 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in

favor of [petitioners Tomakin] and against [respondents Navares].
It ruled that [respondents Navares] failed to prove that they are the
rightful owners of Lot No. 8467-B. x x x 16
[The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as
follows:]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered directing [respondents
Navares]:
1) to return the owner's copy of TCT No. 131499
to [petitioners Tomakin];
2) to pay [petitioners Tomakin] [a]ttorney's fees
in the amount of P30,000.00;
3) to pay [petitioners Tomakin] litigation
expenses in the amount of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 17
Aggrieved, respondents Navares appealed to the CA. 18
Ruling of the CA

The CA in its Decision dated October 28, 2014 granted the appeal.
The CA held that the defense of prescription could not be sustained.
Respondents Navares' complaint for reconveyance was not barred by
prescription because of their actual possession of Lot No. 8467-B based
on petitioners Tomakin's admission that most of respondents Navares are
living in the said Lot and leasing portions thereof to tenants. 19
The CA disagreed with the RTC's negation of the transfer of 1/2 of
Lot No. 8467 in favor of respondents Navares based on their alleged
failure to adduce evidence that the condition contained in the 1955 Deed
of Absolute Sale with Condition (1955 Deed of Sale) in their favor was
complied with. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the CA did not construe
the proviso on the reservation of the right to the fruits or products of the
property conveyed by Quirina Badana to respondents Navares'
predecessors during her lifetime as a condition on the ground that the
1955 Deed of Sale did not in express terms provide that the non-
fulfillment of the obligation to deliver the fruits would prevent the transfer
of ownership of the property in question. 20 Even if petitioners Tomakin's
argument that the proviso partook of the nature of a condition were to be
sustained, the CA stated that they lacked personality to assail the same
because they were not privies to the 1955 Deed of Sale. 21 According to
the CA, only Quirina Badana, as the vendor, had a cause of action to assail
the non-fulfillment of the condition, and her failure to institute any action
regarding the alleged condition during her lifetime constituted a waiver of
whatever cause of action she might have had thereon. 22
The CA upheld the validity of the February 23, 1955 sale covering
the 1/2 portion of Lot No. 8647 (known as Lot No. 8647-B and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131499) executed by Quirina Badana in
favor of respondents Navares' predecessors and the December 6, 1957
sale executed by Severina Badana in favor of petitioners Tomakin's
predecessors but only to the extent of her 1/2 share of Lot No. 8647. 23  caITAC

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision, dated 6 May 2010, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City in CIVIL CASE NO.
CEB-30246 for Reconveyance and Damages is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE, to wit:
(a) DECLARING the Deed of Sale dated 6 December
1957, insofar as Lot No. 8647-B [now covered by TCT
No. 131499] is concerned, as null and void; and
(b) DECLARING TCT No. 131499 in the name of
Leonarda Nadela Tomakin and Lucas J. Nadela as null
and void and ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City to cancel said title and to issue, in lieu thereof,
new title in the name of the Heirs of Celestino
Navares.
SO ORDERED. 24
 Petitioners Tomakin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution 25 dated March 23, 2016.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition. The Court in its July 4, 2016
Resolution 26 required respondents Navares to comment on the Petition
within 10 days from notice thereof. To date, they have not filed any
Comment. As such, respondents Navares are deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file any Comment on the Petition.
The Issues
The Petition raises the following issues:
1. whether the CA failed to appreciate that respondents Navares'
possession was not in the concept of an owner;
2. whether the CA failed to appreciate the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title;
3. whether the CA failed to appreciate that respondents Navares in
not previously filing a case for declaration of heirship as heirs of spouses
Remegio Navares and Cesaria Gaviola have no cause of action against
petitioners Tomakin; and
4. whether the CA failed to appreciate that respondents Navares are
guilty of laches. 27 
ICHDca

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.
Review by the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 certiorari petition is not a
matter of right, but involves sound judicial discretion because it will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. 28 Petitioners Tomakin have failed to convince the Court that
their Petition is justified by special and important reasons to warrant the
granting thereof.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners Tomakin in the Petition are
the very same arguments that they raised in their Motion for
Reconsideration 29 before the CA, which the latter found to be without
merit in its Resolution 30 dated March 23, 2016.
 Anent the first issue, the Court quotes with approbation the CA's
explanation why it was not persuaded by petitioners Tomakin's argument
that respondents Navares' possession of the subject property is not in the
concept of an owner, viz.:
[Petitioners Tomakin] assert, [respondents Navares']
possession of the property is not in the concept of an owner.
We are not persuaded.
In [Sps.] Alfredo v. [Sps.] Borras, 31 the Court ruled that
prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession
of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before
initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the
plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the
subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect an
action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.
The action for reconveyance was filed by [respondents
Navares] precisely because they deemed themselves owner of the
litigated property prior to the claim of [petitioners Tomakin]. The
filing of such action was an assertion of their title to the property.
Thus, the question of whether or not [respondents Navares] are in
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner is a
question of fact; and such question of fact has already been
resolved by this Court in Our Decision. 32
Regarding the second issue, petitioners Tomakin argue that the
complaint for reconveyance filed by respondents Navares involves a
collateral attack on the subject certificate of title covering Lot No. 8647-B.
They invoke Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
 Contrary to petitioners Tomakin's postulation, respondents Navares
availed themselves of the correct remedy of reconveyance. The Court
in The Director of Lands v. The Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal 33 stated that: "[t]he sole remedy of the land owner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree x x x,
but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages." 34
Proceeding to the third issue, petitioners Tomakin belatedly raised
the same in their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA. 35 They never
raised in their Answer 36 the ground that respondents Navares have no
cause of action against them because the former had not previously filed
a petition for declaration of heirship as heirs of spouses Remigio Navares
and Cesaria Gaviola.
The third issue may no longer be raised by petitioners Tomakin on
appeal.
Firstly, it is well-settled that a party may not change his theory of the
case on appeal and this is expressly adopted in Section 15, Rule 44 of
the Rules, which provides:
"SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. — Whether
or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court
below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of
law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties." 37
The Pre-Trial Brief 38 of petitioners Tomakin raised only the
following issues: (1) whether respondents Navares are the owners of Lot
No. 8467-B; (2) whether the present action is barred by prescription; and
(3) whether petitioners Tomakin are entitled to their counterclaims. 39 The
RTC Decision 40 dated May 6, 2010 framed the issues to be resolved as
follows: (1) whether the present action is barred by prescription; (2)
whether respondents Navares are the owners of Lot No. 8467 by right of
succession; and (3) whether petitioners Tomakin are entitled to their
counterclaims. 41 cTDaEH
 Clearly, the third issue was not raised by petitioners Tomakin before
the RTC. As such, this may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.
Secondly, defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. Citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation, 42 Remedial Law Author and Reviewer Willard B.
Riano explains:
x x x A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the
nature of the issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a
certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse
party. Accordingly, "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power
to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes
beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which
the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets
of fair play[, justice and due process 43 ]. 44
Thirdly, it is also well-settled that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by
estoppel. 45
Given the foregoing, the Court cannot pass upon the third issue.
On the fourth issue, respondents Navares, having been in
possession of and exercising acts of dominion over the subject property
as found by the CA, cannot be deemed to be guilty of laches because they
cannot be said to have omitted or neglected to assert and exercise their
rights as owner thereof. Pursuant to Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras 46 cited by
the CA in its Resolution dated March 23, 2016, the undisturbed possession
of respondents Navares give them the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners
Tomakin and its effect on their ownership of Lot No. 8467-B. 47
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
October 28, 2014 and the Resolution dated March 23, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03806 are AFFIRMED.  cSaATC

SO ORDERED.
• James v. Eurem Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 190650, October 14, 2013

The petitioners cannot be expected to file the action after the issuance of
Lopez's title since at that time, the appeal in Civil Case No. 1447, the case
between their predecessor Gorgonio and his siblings as against their other
sibling Primitivo, WAS STILL PENDING and was only resolved with finality by
the CA only on November 7, 1978.

[G.R. No. 190650. October 14, 2013.]

ANTONIO JAMES, GERTRUDES JAMES, BEATRIZ JAMES, JERRY

JAMES, CECILIA JAMES and HEIRS OF GORGONIO JAMES, JR.
namely: BOND JAMES, SAINT JAMES and MAY JAMES
VARGAS,  petitioners, vs. EUREM REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,  respondent.

DECISION

REYES,  J  :p

Facts of the Case

On September 17, 2003, the heirs of Gorgonio James (Gorgonio),
namely, Antonio, Gertrudes, Beatriz, Gorgonio, Jr., Cecilia and Jerry (herein
petitioners) filed Civil Case No. 5877 against Eurem Realty Development
Corporation (respondent).
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners and possessors of a property in Dipolog City containing
an area of 448 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-18833 (Lot 1, Pcs-09-002753); (2) the respondent, on the other hand,
is the registered owner of a 344-sq.m. portion of the same property
owned by the petitioners, and covered by TCT No. T-10713 (Lot 1, Pcs-
8080); (3) the respondent derived its title from Eufracio Lopez (Lopez) who
executed in its favor a Deed of Assignment and Exchange on September 6,
1990, as annotated in TCT No. (T-19539) 12386 in the name of Lopez; (4)
Lopez, in turn, derived his title from Primitivo James (Primitivo), who was
Gorgonio's brother; (3) in the same title, TCT No. (T-19539) 12386, there is
an annotation made on April 20, 1992 of a final decision by the CA in CA-
G.R. No. 50208-R (Civil Case No. 1447), declaring TCT Nos. T-6272 and T-
6273 in the name of Primitivo as null and void, and ordering the
partition of Lots 854-C-1 and 854-C-2 among the heirs of Butler James in
accordance with the terms of "Partition Extrajudicially" executed on
October 21, 1949; (4) said annotation was not carried on to TCT No. T-
10713 in the respondent's name; (5) the respondent's title is void ab
initio as its predecessor-in-interest Lopez derived his title from Primitivo's
void title; (6) Lopez acted in bad faith in assigning the property to the
respondent as he knew fully well that he had no right or interest over said
property; (7) the respondent has knowledge of Lopez's bad faith since it is
a corporation organized by Lopez; and (8) there is a need to declare TCT
No. T-10713 in the respondent's name as null and void and the petitioners
be declared as the lawful owner of the entire Lot 1, among others. 5  CITSAc

RESPONDENT, in its answer, argued that the complaint is barred by

prior judgment (res judicata) and that PRESCRIPTION HAS ALREADY SET
in. On the ground of res judicata, the respondent argued that: (1) the
petitioners are the heirs of Gorgonio who was the defendant in Civil Case
No. 2503 for recovery of possession and damages filed by Lopez; (2) the
RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 1, in its Decision dated November 27, 1975,
declared Lopez as the lawful and absolute owner and possessor of Lot 1,
Pcs-8080; and (3) Gorgonio's appeal was dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R.
 No. SP-05553 and said dismissal became final on August 17, 1978; entry of
judgment was already made in due course. The respondent also argued
that since the petitioners filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 5877 on
September 17, 2003, or more than thirty (30) years after its
predecessor-in-interest Lopez bought the property from Primitivo way
back in April 25, 1972. Hence, such action was barred by prescription,
which under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code provides for a 30-year
period for the filing of a real action involving an immovable property. 
RTC’s DECISION – FOR RESPONDENT
According to the RTC, res judicata does not apply because the causes
of action involved in Civil Case No. 2503 and Civil Case No. 5877 ARE
DIFFERENT. As to the ground of prescription, however, the RTC agreed
with the respondent that the petitioners' action had already prescribed.
The RTC noted that the title of the respondent's predecessor-in-interest,
Lopez, was issued on October 11, 1972 and has not been judicially
declared null and void by any competent court up to the present, while
the complaint for the declaration of nullity of the respondent's title was
filed only on September 26, 2003. Hence, more than 30 years have lapsed
before the petitioners decided to question the legality of the respondent's
title over the property.
CA DISMISSED THE APPEAL. The CA ruled that the issues of res
judicata and prescription, and the determination of the nullity of the
respondent's TCT No. T-10713 are questions of law that should have been
raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before
the Supreme Court.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners posed the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether or not the issues raised by the petitioners in their appeal
are purely questions of law or mixed questions of facts and
law;
2. Whether or not petitioners' action is barred by prescription; [and]
 3. Whether or not the summary dismissal of the case constitutes a
denial of due process. 

The Court's Ruling

Propriety of the dismissal of the
petitioners' appeal
The question of whether res judicata serves as a bar to the filing of a
case is unquestionably one of law. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
pertinent evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 12 All the
court has to do in resolving the applicability of res judicata is apply the
undisputed facts of the two cases pitted against each other and
determine whether: (a) the former judgment is final; (b) the court which
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it is
a judgment on the merits; and (d) there is as between the first and second
actions identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 13 But the
question of whether prescription is applicable can be either one of law or
fact. In  Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, 14 the Court stated that it is a question
of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of an
allegation of fact; it is a question of law when there is doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a given state of facts. 15 
cSTCDA

In this case, the RTC dismissed the petitioners' complaint with the
bare statement that "the title of the [respondent's] predecessor Eufracio
Lopez was issued on October 11, 1972 and the same has not as yet been
judicially declared null and void by any competent court up to the present,
as against [petitioners'] complaint which was filed with [the RTC] only on
September 26, 2003, or more than thirty (30) years have lapsed before
[petitioners] instituted [the] present action." 16 The RTC simply reckoned
the commencement of the prescriptive period on the issuance of Lopez's
title on October 11, 1972, as alleged by the respondent in its answer. In
their complaint, however, the petitioners disputed the validity of the
respondent's title, alleged bad faith on the part of Lopez and the
respondent, and reiterated the existence of the final and executory
decision of the CA in Civil Case No. 1447. The petitioners also alleged in
their complaint and appellants' brief that they are holders of TCT No.
18833 issued on September 20, 1999 pursuant to the CA decision in Civil
Case No. 1447. 17 Thus, the petitioners prayed, both in their complaint and
in their appellant's brief, that the respondent's title be set aside and their
own title upheld. While the existence of different titles over the same
property is an established fact, the allegations in the petitioners'
complaint and appellants' brief as to the antecedent facts that led to the
issuance of the titles create an uncertainty regarding the applicability of
prescription and call for a calibration of the evidence on hand. This
constitutes a question of fact and not a run-of-the-mill question of law as
the CA would like to present it; more so since the petitioners charge the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest with bad faith. "[T]he
question of whether a person acted with good faith or bad faith in
purchasing and registering real property is a QUESTION OF
FACT, . . . ."18 It is evidentiary and has to be established by the claimant
with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an examination
of the evidence of all the parties. 19 In  Macababbad, Jr., the Court also
ruled that prescription is a question of fact where there is a need to
determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the
period to bring the action commenced to run. 20
Given the mixed question of fact and law raised, the petitioners
properly elevated the RTC decision to the CA on ordinary appeal
under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. 21 The CA, therefore,
committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners' appeal.
Normally, the Court would remand the case to the CA for proper
disposition of the petitioners' appeal. Considering, however, that a
remand would further delay Civil Case No. 5877 which is yet to reach the
trial stage, the Court will resolve the issue of whether the RTC committed
a reversible error in dismissing the same on ground of prescription
without touching on the substantial merits of the case. 22
The period for the filing of Civil
Case No. 5877 has not yet
prescribed
THERE WAS YET TO BE A TRIAL ON THE MERITS but the RTC
merely relied on the averments in the complaint and answer and
forthwith dismissed the case. While trial courts have authority and
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may only
do so when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred.  "If the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters REQUIRING A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL on the merits, it
cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss." 
Parenthetically, there are TWO KINDS OF PRESCRIPTION provided in the  Civil Code. One is
acquisitive,  i.e., the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time; the other is extinctive, whereby rights
and actions are lost by the lapse of time.  26  The kind of prescription raised by the respondent pertains
to EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION.  aTcIEH

Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is essentially one for

QUIETING OF TITLE. An action to quiet title is a common law remedy
designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. 28 The pleadings filed in this case show that
both the petitioners and respondent have title over the same
property, albeit the petitioners' title covers 448 sq.m., while that of the
respondent's covers a 344-sq.m. portion thereof. It likewise appears from
the records that both parties are in possession of their respective portions
of the property.
An ACTION TO QUIET TITLE is a real action over immovables, which
prescribes after thirty years. 30 Thus, even assuming that the petitioners'
action is subject to extinctive prescription, it was ERROR for the RTC to
reckon the date when prescription began to run solely on the date of the
issuance of Lopez's title on October 11, 1972. The petitioners cannot be
expected to file the action after the issuance of Lopez's title since at that
time, the appeal in Civil Case No. 1447, the case between their
predecessor Gorgonio and his siblings as against their other sibling
Primitivo, WAS STILL PENDING and was only resolved with finality by the
CA only on November 7, 1978. The appeal in Civil Case No. 2503 between
Lopez and Gorgonio, meanwhile, was dismissed by the CA with finality
only on August 17, 1978. It should also be noted that what is being
attacked is the respondent's TCT No. T-10713, which was issued on March
2, 1992. Thus, reckoning the prescriptive period from said date, the 30-
year period clearly has not yet lapsed since the complaint was filed only
on September 17, 2003.  IDaCcS

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January

29, 2009 and Resolution dated November 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00119-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 5877 is REINSTATED. Let records of the case
be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6, which
is DIRECTED to proceed with the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.