Defence Studies

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Countering hybrid threats: does strategic culture

matter?
Defence Studies

Kim Wijnja

To cite this article: Kim Wijnja (2022) Countering hybrid threats: does strategic culture matter?,
Defence Studies, 22:1, 16-34, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2021.1945452

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1945452

Published online: 26 Jun 2021.

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DEFENCE STUDIES
2022, VOL. 22, NO. 1, 16–34
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1945452

ARTICLE

Countering hybrid threats: does strategic culture matter?

Defence Studies
Kim Wijnja
Department of War Studies, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates once again that hybrid Received 17 December 2020
threats are increasingly challenging European countries. Although Accepted 16 June 2021
there is international cooperation on the conceptual level, individual KEYWORDS
countries are responsible for the actual implementation of counter Strategic culture; hybrid
hybrid measures. This article compares the approaches of Finland, warfare; security policies;
Germany and the Netherlands to counter hybrid threats, while taking European security
into consideration their strategic culture. It shows that the countries
differ in their approach to counter hybrid threats in terms of their
organisation of security and the scope of measures taken to deter
adversaries. These differences are mainly rooted in historical, institu­
tional and political processes. The countries are rather similar in
detecting hybrid threats and responding to hybrid attacks, which
can be explained by the nature of hybrid threats. Consequently,
strategic culture is a context that shapes but not ultimately deter­
mines how Finland, Germany and the Netherlands counter hybrid
threats. The results of this article suggest that our current under­
standing of strategic culture is insufficient to describe and explain an
actor’s security policy in the contemporary security environment. It is
recommended that the concept of strategic culture should be
revised and has to be examined more broadly by including national
security issues and a broad spectrum of instruments of power.

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic once again demonstrates that hybrid threats are increasingly
challenging Western countries. While some countries are employing disinformation
campaigns to ensure they are not blamed for the pandemic, others are focused on
creating polarisation and tension (Gamberini and Moodie 2020).
Since 2016, NATO and the European Union have identified countering hybrid threats
as a priority for cooperation. While most of the NATO-EU cooperation is focused on
achieving a common understanding and providing conceptual and policy guidance to
counter hybrid threats, individual European countries are responsible for the practical
implementation of counter hybrid measurements. Nevertheless, national vulnerabilities
can reach beyond borders (Hagelstam 2018). It is thus crucial to have insight in the
approaches of European countries to counter hybrid threats.

CONTACT Kim Wijnja kim@wijnja.com Department of War Studies, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda,
The Netherlands
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 DEFENCE STUDIES 17

The aim of this research is to explain differences between national approaches to

counter hybrid threats. This is done by analysing the approaches of Finland, Germany
and the Netherlands. To explain these approaches, this article takes into consideration
the concept of strategic culture as it is often used to analyse a particular actor’s security
and defence policy and to explain what constrains strategic actors from making certain
types of decisions.
This article first elaborates on the academic debate on strategic culture. The research
of Biehl et al. (2013) provides the framework which forms a basic understanding on
strategic culture and leads to the selection of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands as
comparative cases. Each of these three cases represent one of Biehl et al.’s three strategic
culture categories. The article then draws upon literature on hybrid threats to establish
a framework with which governmental documents, media publications, secondary
resources and relevant legislation on the respective countries are analysed. This frame­
work also lays the foundation for interviews with two experts of each country to deepen
the document analysis. Interviewees are selected based on their work experience at the
Ministry of Defence or another ministry that is responsible for countering hybrid threats
to get insights from different governmental perspectives.
The analysis demonstrates that the approaches of Finland, Germany and the
Netherlands to counter hybrid threats are not as different as the research of Biehl et al.
(2013) might suggest. The findings suggest that our current understanding of strategic
culture is insufficient to describe and explain an actor’s security policy in the contem­
porary security environment. Therefore, it is recommended that the concept of strategic
culture should be revised and has to be examined more broadly by including national
security issues and a broad spectrum of instruments of power.

Strategic culture
The concept of strategic culture is often used to analyse national policymaking as it
suggests that different security communities think and behave differently about strategic
matters. Knowing and understanding strategic cultures is important as it is likely to be
a factor in overall strategic effectiveness. Lantis (2002) argues that as the international
security environment evolves, new developments are assessed through the perceptual
lenses provided by strategic culture. If this is the case, countering hybrid threats would
also be assessed through strategic culture.
The strategic culture debate originates from the Cold War as a state-centric approach
and was further developed in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s when military missions were
mainly expeditionary in nature. Jack Snyder’s publication from the RAND study in 1977
triggered the debate about strategic culture (Gray 2007, 6). According to Snyder, histor­
ical, institutional and political processes that are particular to a specific country form
a perceptual lens through which strategic issues are processed and thereby affect policy
choices (Snyder 1977, 9). Moreover, Gray (2007, 6) argues that differences in strategic
cultures stem from communities’ distinctive histories and geographies. Although there
are many definitions of strategic culture available, they all reflect in some way the
respective cultural, normative and historical foundations, as well as the nationally shared
values and practices in security and defence policy (Biehl et al. 2013, 8). These factors lead
to how a society thinks strategic issues should be tackled and what the role of the military
18 K. WIJNJA

should be. This article mainly focuses on the nationally shared values and practices in
security and defence policy.
Another important characteristic of strategic culture is that it is semi-permanent
(Korteweg 2011, 49). External shocks may fundamentally challenge existing beliefs and
undermine past historical narratives (Lantis 2009, 33–52). The problem of the persistence
of strategic culture over time is that embedded strategic cultures can become an impedi­
ment to conceptual and policy innovation when the strategic environment changes
(Hyde-Price 2004, 324–325).
It is important to note that strategic culture understanding is difficult to achieve and
complex to operationalise (Gray 2007, 6). The strategic culture debate knows two main
competing generations of scholars. This article perceives strategic culture as a context
within which states form their security policies, which is in line with the first generation
of strategic culture research. These scholars argue that strategic culture is not ultimately
determining behaviour, but that it shapes the context for behaviour. Other explanations
play a greater or lesser role in particular circumstances (Booth 2005, 25). Furthermore,
cultural awareness and understanding is helpful, but it is not a magic bullet for strategic
dilemmas (Gray 2007, 17). Overall, this generation sees strategic culture as
a supplementary factor to better understand a state’s strategic behavior (Korteweg
2011, 48). The second generation argues that strategic culture is an independent variable
that determines a specific actor’s foreign and security behaviour. Hence, strategic culture
is falsifiable and can provide empirical predictions about strategic choices which can be
tested against other models of choice (Biehl et al. 2013, 10).
Several authors have developed frameworks through which strategic cultures can be
studied. The most extensive work on European strategic cultures is the research by Biehl
et al. (2013), which is in line with the first generation of strategic culture research. The
research of Biehl et al. has provided an interesting framework to study strategic cultures
and covers important aspects of security policy making. They systematically mapped 28
European countries in three categories of strategic cultures based on four areas that
reflect essential facets of national security and defence policies (Figure 1). The first area
they identified is the level of ambition in international security policy to gain insight in
the country’s main objectives in the security realm and how much and why a country
deploys troops. The second dimension is the scope of action for the executive in decision-
making. This includes the identification of key players in security and defence policy and
the decision-making process for the deployment of forces. The third dimension concerns
whether a country has a European or a transatlantic focus as their preferred forum of
security and defence cooperation. The fourth dimension is the willingness to use military
force as an instrument of security policy. Biehl et al. concluded that there are three
categories: “countries whose security and defence policy is driven by the attempt to
manifest their own presence in the international system, countries whose strategic
cultures lead them to attempt to shape their multilateral security milieu through inter­
national bargaining, and countries who focus their security and defence policy on the
protection and projection of state power.” As Finland, Germany and the Netherlands are
each assigned to a different strategic culture category, these cases may provide more
insight into how differences between counter hybrid approaches are rooted in national
strategic cultures.
 DEFENCE STUDIES 19

Figure 1. Mapping strategic cultures by Biehl et al. (2013)

Based on the research of Biehl et al., Finland’s strategic culture consists of a strong
belief, based on historical experience, in the nation’s capability to defend itself and
scepticism towards the offensive use of military force in international crisis management.
Territorial defence is seen as the main purpose for having armed forces and international
crisis management is only seen as a secondary, though increasingly important, objective
of security and defence policy (Seppo and Forsberg 2013, 113–123).
The strategic culture of Germany is influenced by many factors that lead German
foreign and security policy to be reactive, passive, and reluctant. The German strategic
culture can only be understood if one considers a deep societal, administrative, and
political reluctance to the use of force outside its boundaries. Therefore, an executive-
driven and more interventionist policy is heavily constrained (Junk and Daase 2013,
139–152).
The strategic culture of the Netherlands is both based on the ambition to
improve the world, as well as national interests and economic gains. There is strong
support of NATO within the government, but reluctance to use military force is
growing. Over the years, the Netherlands were actively engaged in developing
20 K. WIJNJA

a comprehensive approach that made the military just one part of a mission (Noll
and Moelker 2013, 255–267).

The nature of hybrid threats

Hybrid tactics such as propaganda, deception and other non-military tactics are not new.
However, rapid developing technologies, the increased speed with which information
travels through (social) media and our changing perception towards the nature of war are
driving the speed, scale and intensity of hybrid threats (Treverton et al. 2018). Besides
that, technological tools that may be used to enhance the impact of hybrid strategy are
relatively inexpensive and easily accessible, the current international order is not yet fully
equipped to respond to hybrid threats, and states have an aversion to engage in conven­
tional threats (Torossian et al. 2020).
Despite subtle differences in definitions, hybrid threats are often described as
a combination of military and non-military as well as covert and overt means,
including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular
armed groups and use of regular forces (NATO 2018). They are designed to be
difficult to detect or attribute, target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create
confusion to hinder swift and effective decision-making (EU 2018). Hybrid methods
are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to achieve strategic
outcomes without actual war while targeting societies, not combatants. This breaks
down the distinction between combatants and citizens, which is blurring for dec­
ades, almost entirely (Treverton et al. 2018). In the public debate there is consider­
able attention for disinformation, fake news and social media manipulation since
they are the most visible aspect of hybrid threats. However, undisclosed and
unattributed assets to weaken one’s adversary go far beyond these elements
(Gressel 2019).
By using diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and
legal (DIMEFIL) instruments state and non-state actors may influence other actors to
pursuit objectives, leading hybrid threats to have a broad impact across societies (NATO
StratCom 2018, 9). These instruments of power can be used on the entire spectrum from
peace to war (Bekkers et al. 2019). Through a hybrid strategy, adversaries combine and
synchronise different instruments to strengthen each other. On the one hand, a hybrid
actor may increase the intensity of one or many of the instruments of power, while
avoiding the threshold that would lead to open (military) conflict. On the other hand, the
actor may synchronise multiple tools to create effects greater than through increasing
intensity alone. The instruments of power used will depend on the capabilities of the
hybrid threats actor and the perceived vulnerabilities of its opponent, as well as the
political goals of the hybrid threats actor and its planned ways to achieve those goals
(MCDC 2019, 9).
Identifying the instruments of power alone fails to predict what a hybrid campaign will
look like or what its effects will be. The function of each tool and the degree to which it is
employed is also dependent on the objectives of the actor state and the vulnerabilities
present in the target state (Treverton et al. 2018, 59). Major targets are where the greatest
asymmetry between the target’s weaknesses and the hybrid actors’ strength are found
(Bekkers, Meessen, and Lassche 2019, 7). Vulnerabilities and weaknesses are distributed
 DEFENCE STUDIES 21

across the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII)

spectrum which, if discontinued, could lead to a disruption of services that a state or
society depends on.

Countering hybrid threats

The wide range of instruments and target vulnerabilities make hybrid threats a complex
phenomenon to counter. Consequently, several scholars and policymakers have aimed to
develop recommendations for nations to counter them. These recommendations can be
assigned to four categories and lead to the framework in Figure 2, which is derived from
the framework of the MCDC (2019), through which the countermeasures against hybrid
threats of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands are analysed.

Organisation of security
The most recommended strategy is that countering hybrid threats should be a whole of
society approach. The society’s security is not only dependent on traditional security
providers such as police and military, it demands that defence planners engage all parts of
society in defensive efforts (Cederberg and Eronen 2015, 2). Unlike traditional threats,
most of the tools against hybrid threats, such as rule of law, governance- and institution
building, traditionally reside in non-military governmental agencies, intergovernmental
agencies, nongovernmental organisations and the private sector (Aaronson et al. 2011,
118). To protect critical infrastructure, private actors are on the front line as they own full
or partial stakes in key capacities. The role of defence remains significant in this regard
because of the unique contributions it can make to detecting hybrid threats, deterring
hybrid aggressors and responding to hybrid attacks (MCDC 2019, 44).

Detecting hybrid threats

A solid strategy to counter hybrid threats depends on shared situational awareness with
access to reliable intelligence and high-quality analysis and by robust counterintelligence
efforts (Treverton et al. 2018, 6). Situational awareness supports understanding the
current situation, recognising any subtle changes to the threat landscape, enables warn­
ing of the adversary’s operations before they are carried out, and helps to formulate an

Organisation of security
Detect Deter Respond
• Available vulnerability assessment • Measures to increase resilience • Selected treshholds
• The role of intelligence • Measures across the PMESII • Agreement on possible ways to
• Investments in early warning spectrum response
• Shared intelligence • Preference for a national or
• Adjustment of laws for more international response
authority to collect data • Chosen DIMEFIL powers to
respond

Figure 2. Framework to counter hybrid threats

22 K. WIJNJA

appropriate response to the unfolding situation (European External Action Service 2015).
Additionally, a vulnerability assessment should be made to understand the potential
pressure points in one’s own society (Cederberg and Eronen 2015, 6).
Since hybrid threats are designed to be difficult to detect and predict, monitoring
should be thorough to detect deliberately low-visibility and low-intensity hybrid attacks.
This requires both the monitoring of open-source information as well as collecting
intelligence to bolster defences against active subversion (Tan 2019, 72; Radin 2017,
43). Giegerich (2016, 70) pleas for serious investment in the area of intelligence analysis,
security foresight, and weak signals and findings and for sharing results of national
intelligence service work with international partners. Laws may also be changed to give
intelligence services more authority to collect information, both inside and outside the
country (Treverton et al. 2018, 6). However, it often takes time to fully comprehend the
extent of a hybrid threat (Bekkers et al. 2019, 19).

Deterring hybrid threats

Another step to counter hybrid threats is deterrence. Measures to counter hybrid threats
may be taken across the PMESII spectrum. A key component of hybrid deterrence is
increasing resilience, which describes the ability of a state and society to withstand
pressure and recover from crises or shocks which may be the result of a hybrid threat
(NATO StratCom 2019, 12). Civil preparedness arrangements, a free press, an educated
public, resilient vital infrastructures and an effective legal framework are key in this
regard (Hagelstam 2018).
Though, resilience is important but insufficient to change behaviour. Building resi­
lience is a long-term approach which requires building strong and adaptive infrastructure
(NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2019, 12). To deter hybrid
threats, it requires a balance between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.
Traditional deterrence remains vital to deter adversaries both from resorting to armed
aggression as well as engaging in hybrid attacks (MCDC 2019, 40). Similar to traditional
deterrence, a hybrid deterrence posture must be credible to convince an adversary.

Responding to hybrid attacks

Measures should be taken to respond adequately whenever deterrence has failed. First, it
is important that nations set clear thresholds for response and that they stick to them,
while ensuring consistency in rhetoric and actions. Determining thresholds on why and
when to respond will ensure that responses are justified, appropriate and consistent.
Next, nations should make policy choices to define the character of the response. For
example, whether the attack is acknowledged and confronted, whether the response is
aimed at the own population or to the adversary, whether the response is overt or covert
and whether the response is focused on taking assertive measures to coerce the adversary
or taking inducement measures to promote cooperation (MCDC 2019, 51–55).
Additionally, a decision should be made on whether the responsive measures are taken
on a national of international level. Various actors argue that defensive efforts against
hybrid threats have a strong international component, as international collaboration
offers direct political, economic and military support, but also helps in covering some of
the missing national capabilities and support in developing capacities in areas that have
fallen behind (Cederberg and Eronen 2015, 7). Finally, a nation may select its
 DEFENCE STUDIES 23

instruments of power to target the adversaries target vulnerabilities or to strengthen one’s

own society. Those responses should be combined with inducement and reassurance
measures (MCDC 2019, 60).

National approaches to counter hybrid threats

Based on the counter hybrid framework (Figure 2), the approaches of Finland, Germany
and the Netherlands are analysed on their organisation of security and the measures
taken to detect, deter and respond to hybrid threats.

Organisation of security
The analysis shows that the three countries differ in the way security is organised to
counter threats or hybrid threats in particular. The Finnish organisation of security is
based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society
are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens
(The Security Committee 2017, 7). The ministries that are involved in a certain hybrid
threat or attack are responsible for countering it. The Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the intelligence services play a significant
role in countering hybrid threats (interview with Finnish colonel, 4 May 2020). In
general, existing security structures are capable to deal with hybrid threats. Among
these structures is the National Security Committee, that, according to its website,
coordinates proactive preparedness related to comprehensive security and consists of
experts from a number of administrative branches, authorities and the business
community.
Since 2014, Finland made some changes to the way security is organised. Finland
created two ambassador functions, on hybrid threats and cyber threats, that fall under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview with Finnish colonel, 4 May 2020). Also, an
analysis centre was established in the Prime Minister’s Office, among others to counter
hybrid threats, and the heads of communications of the ministries regularly meet to
discuss information influencing (interview with Finnish advisor of the Ministry of the
Interior, 14 May 2020). The government has also established the National Cyber Security
Centre and the Hybrid CoE (Cederberg and Eronen 2015, 9; Hybrid CoE 2020).
Germany especially tends to intergovernmental cooperation. In its white paper, which
describes the cornerstones of Germany’s security policy and sets the basis for the future
course of the armed forces, the German Federal Government (2016, 8) advocates
a whole-of-government approach as a crucial approach to protect the sovereignty and
integrity of the German territory and German citizens. The aim of the government is to
intensify the cooperation between government bodies, citizens and private operators of
critical infrastructure, as well as the media and network operators.
The Ministry of the Interior coordinates cooperation within the Federal Government
to counter hybrid threats (BMI 2019, 5). In the last years, awareness has grown that also
other ministries may be confronted with security issues, e.g. ministries dealing with the
economy, health or energy. This has led to more intensive networking. At the moment,
an intergovernmental structure is being established that is dealing with hybrid threats,
wherein traditional security ministries are represented. Experts from different branches
24 K. WIJNJA

of society may be invited depending on current needs and expertise (interviews with
German experts, 24 April, 30 April 2020).
Most of the cooperation on hybrid threats is intergovernmental. There are a few
institutionalised collaborations with the private sector to counter hybrid threats. Most of
these structures existed prior to 2014, such as the Alliance for Cyber Security that
strengthens Germany’s resilience to cyber-attacks and the public-private collaboration
UP KRITIS, in which operators of critical infrastructure, their associations and the
responsible government agencies are represented and share information about among
others cyber threats (BSI 2020a, 2020b). In general, the German government supports
non-governmental institutions to be more aware of hybrid threats as information sharing
is a key challenge of which the responsibilities are spread over different authorities. The
sharing of information is nevertheless limited. This mainly stems from privacy issues and
hesitations to share information that are culturally related. Also, the issue of hybrid
threats has not yet fully arrived in the overall societal discussion due to the sensitive
nature of hybrid threats. However, an openness is growing towards working together
with partners within the society (interviews with German experts, 24 April,
30 April 2020).
In the Netherlands, the government is in the lead to counter hybrid threats and is
working closely, and is strengthening and extending its partnerships, with actors of
different layers of society to counter state threats, including hybrid threats. It can be
described as a networking model, in which different parties cooperate closely. The
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) coordinates countering
hybrid threats. Other important governmental actors include the Ministry of Defence, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and Security. Hybrid threats,
among other state threats, are discussed in intergovernmental structures in which all
ministries take part. Other stakeholders can be invited to temporarily join when necessary.
Furthermore, the NCTV has established five programs on respectively hybrid warfare,
foreign interference, disinformation, economic security and vital infrastructures in which
the industry is actively involved (interview with advisor of the NCTV, 17 May 2020).
The Dutch government also reaches out to private organisations, civil society and the
technical and academic community to cooperate on cyber security to protect vital
infrastructures (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018, 29). For example, a Cyber Security
Council exists which is a national, independent advisory body of the Dutch government
and the business community composed of high-ranking representatives from public and
private sector organisations and the scientific community. Measures are carried out by
close public-private partnerships (NCSC 2020). Subsequently, cooperation on cyber
security is sought in several sectors. For example, an integrated approach will be devel­
oped by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, the NCTV, the national
police, public transporters and infrastructure managers for a secure railroad system
(MinI&W 2020, 9).

Detecting hybrid threats

All countries are well aware of their vulnerabilities and the possible threats they are
facing. Moreover, most of the threats are rather similar. In the Finnish National Risk
Assessment and its security strategy, the Finnish government argues that the underlying
motive of most of the described risk scenarios can be hybrid influencing or preparing for
 DEFENCE STUDIES 25

future hybrid influencing (The Security Committee 2017, 25; Ministry of the Interior
2019a, 11). Therefore, the focus of both documents is on the readiness to adapt to
unexpected changes and to prepare for different types of hybrid influencing and cyber
threats affecting society and to strengthen the capacity to deal with those threats. Finland
focuses particularly on information operations, political, financial and military pressure,
the disruption of critical supply chains and its shared border with Russia.
For Germany, threats are posed by terrorism, the cyber and information domain,
interstate conflict including hybrid threats, threats to information and communication
systems, supply lines, transportation and trade routes as well as to the secure supply of
raw materials and energy, and uncontrolled and irregular migration (German Federal
Government 2016, 16). As such, a particular focus is on foreign interference and actors
that have interests that compete with German security interests (interviews with German
experts, 24 April, 30 April 2020). As a crucial player in the EU and due to its specific
relationship with Moscow, Germany is notably vulnerable to Russia’s tactics (Sahin
2017).
Threats to the Netherlands are posed by cyberattacks, undesirable foreign intervention
and subversion, military threats, attacks on vital processes and chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018, 18–21). The poten­
tial digital disruption of vital infrastructure and essential conduct of business is one of the
biggest cyber threats to the Netherlands (Ministry of Defence 2020, 9). A unique aspect of
the Netherlands is that its water management is crucial to the country’s physical security.
Therefore, tunnels, bridges, locks and dams should be protected from cyber threats
(Algemene Rekenkamer 2019).
In addition, intelligence services play a large role in all countries to detect hybrid
threats at an early stage. Each country invested more in intelligence services over the last
few years, though this is related to the changed security environment as a whole and not
only as a result of upcoming hybrid threats. Additionally, some laws have been reformed
or adopted to give intelligence agencies more authority. Finland adopted new legislation
on military intelligence in 2019 to keep up with new technologies and to be able to
conduct human intelligence, information system intelligence, radio signals intelligence,
and telecommunications intelligence (Ministry of Defence 2018). Also, Finland adopted
new legislation to build its civilian intelligence capabilities. The new legislation also gives
possibilities for intelligence services to warn private companies with regard to cyber
defence (interview with Finnish colonel, 4 May 2020). The Dutch government altered the
law of intelligence, since the previous law from 2002 posed technical restrictions due to
which the intelligence agencies were not able to detect cyber-attacks at an early stage. The
altered law provides the intelligence agencies with the authority to intercept data from
data cables (Rijksoverheid 2020). Each country shares results of intelligence work volun­
tarily within the EU to bundle analyses to come to a European counter hybrid product
(Interviews Finland, Germany and the Netherlands).

Deterring hybrid threats

The three countries differ in the extent to which they have taken measures to increase
resilience and deter adversaries. Overall, Finland includes all sectors to deter adversaries,
including the population, and the Netherlands increasingly as well. Germany seems to be
mainly focused on governmental actors and the industry.
26 K. WIJNJA

Finland has taken many actions to increase resilience across the whole of society. This
includes amending nearly 20 legislations to minimise the possibility of the adversary to
exploit the legal environment (interview with Finnish advisor of the Ministry of the
Interior, 14 May 2020). Finland increases its resilience and raises awareness by arranging
training, exercises and education that are tied to the comprehensive security concept.
This includes the National and Regional Defence Courses in which people, ranging from
members of parliament to individual citizens, acquire an understanding of how their own
work is connected to the security of Finnish society and to indicate how all sectors of
society work together during different crises (Eronen et al. 2019, 3). Also, Finland
organises awareness-heightening events for editors and individual journalists from the
media sector which cover information operations (Eronen et al. 2019, 6). In addition,
Finland’s traditional deterrence is based on high-performance weapons and a large
reserve (The Security Committee 2017, 38). Finland has a conscription model which
contributes to the Defence Forces’ readiness for military national defence duties. If the
situation so requires, troops of the Finnish Border Guard will be incorporated into the
Defence Forces (The Security Committee 2017. 38). The Finnish parliament improved
the powers of the Finnish Border Guard in 2019 to quickly and effectively intervene in
hybrid threats (Ministry of the Interior 2019a).
The German government is especially focused on protecting key infrastructures,
taking measures in the cyber domain, countering disinformation and protecting the
German industry against undesirable foreign interference. To counter disinformation,
the German government introduced a law that obliges internet platform to introduce
complaint procedures to report illegal content, and to block access to content that is
unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint (BMJV 2017). Also, the German
government increased contact with social media platforms and with fact finder institu­
tions (interviews German experts). Notably, both experts argue that the German people
are self-responsible to estimate whether something they read online is false or misleading
information. However, when confronted with false and misleading information, the
government aims to provide trustworthy facts for the public (interviews German
experts). To protect and maintain industrial core capabilities, the Federal Government
performs investment reviews, and has advanced an EU regulation to create a Europe-
wide framework for the review of foreign direct investment. To achieve digital sover­
eignty and resilience against hybrid threats, Germany aims to reduce the dependency on
foreign information technologies, particularly key technologies (BMWI 2020). Also,
Germany increases defence budgets regarding its responsibility to NATO. This includes
taking responsibility on a rotational basis as the lead nation for rapidly deployable forces,
commitment as part of reassurance measures as well as enhanced forward presence (The
German Federal Government 2016, 70).
The Netherlands has created an approach last year with several measures to build
resilience and a credible deterrence posture. First, the strategy includes the establishing of
structural coordination regarding interests, threats and resilience. For example,
a taskforce economic security was established that focuses on vulnerabilities and control
measures of the 5 G network. Second, the Dutch government aims to improve the
information position and information sharing between and with like-minded parties,
both nationally and internationally, to obtain timely insight into and interpretation of the
(potential) threats. Third, the government aims to raise awareness among actors from all
 DEFENCE STUDIES 27

layers of society (MinJ&V 2019). This policy focuses on limiting the impact of disin­
formation rather than actively contradicting or disproving existing disinformation. The
Dutch government aired a campaign in 2019 to raise awareness among Dutch citizens
about disinformation and to give them tips and tools to recognise fake news
(Rijksoverheid 2019). Fourth, the government aims to develop and share knowledge on
threats and resilience. Fifth, it takes measures to deter by diplomatic and political
measures, including securing elections. Also, the Netherlands is investing in capabilities
that may contribute to collective defence and deterrence. For example, by investing in
cyber capabilities to deter state and non-state actors in the digital domain and by
establishing a Counter Hybrid Unit within the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2018, 33). The Netherlands is also investing more in its Ministry of
Defence so it is able to address international security threats within international
alliances (VVD, CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie 2017, 48). However, the Netherlands is
mainly focused on defensive capabilities (Torossian et al. 2020). Traditional deterrence
mainly takes place within the EU or NATO context. Sixth, it aims to secure the Dutch
economy by developing an investment test with regard to takeovers and investments, and
to develop policy and guidelines for procurement and tendering within the government
and within the vital infrastructure (MinJ&V 2019). The Netherlands builds on digital
resilience with an approach that raises awareness for the risks and the necessary level of
digital resilience, strengthens digital resilience and the supervision thereof and makes
sure that all involved parties take their responsibilities (National Coordinator for
Counterterrorism and Security 2019, 35).

Responding to hybrid attacks

Finland, Germany and the Netherlands all argue that a response is dependent on the
context of a hybrid attack as one needs to consider all dynamics and consequences before
responding. Also, possible thresholds are not openly communicated as adversaries would
know the level under which they could operate. Each country sees the initial respond to
a hybrid attack as a national responsibility, though an international approach may follow
if necessary.
In Finland, the responsible ministries are taking care of the first response. As such,
a response would at first be on a national level. However, the EU and Nordic partner
countries may come to assistance when its needed. Especially when an attack would be
coordinated and targeted at multiple EU nations. However, this does not mean that
Finland is not considering possible responses. At the moment, the newly appointed cyber
director is working on a roadmap, determining the role of each player in case of a cyber-
attack (interviews Finnish experts). Additionally, the new legislation clarifies the options
available to the Border Guard to give and receive executive assistance from other
authorities. This gives them clearer thresholds on when and how to respond (Ministry
of the Interior Finland 2019b). Yet, Finland may have established further thresholds
though it is not publicly available.
In German documents, there is little information on measures that are taken in
response to hybrid threats. However, Germany is continuously developing strategies on
how to respond to hybrid threats or whether to respond at all. Germany does not use
propaganda itself. Most ministries take a preventive and reactive approach, using their
public relations department to monitor social media and make sure that facts are
28 K. WIJNJA

checked. According to German experts on hybrid threats, setting thresholds is a difficult

matter since there is a risk to lose credibility if a government does not stick to earlier
announcements. Furthermore, the initial respond to hybrid attacks is seen as a national
responsibility for Germany. Both experts argue that after a hybrid attack, a nation could
cooperate with international partners to learn from experiences, find out who is behind
the attack and respond internationally (interviews with German experts).
In general, in Dutch policy papers ways to respond are often drafted very broad. For
example, the Dutch government argues that the Netherlands is able, if necessary, to
respond with the full range of instruments at its disposal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2018, 33). An exception to this is countering disinformation. The Dutch government
provides several responses to counter disinformation which include fact-checking by
publicly contradicting disinformation and moderating content on online platforms
(MinBZK 2019). Moreover, countering hybrid attacks is in the first place a national
task, albeit the Dutch government may decide to take the respond to an international
level (Interview Defence). Also, the Netherlands is in favour of close cooperation between
the EU and the UK, including joint responses to hybrid threats. The Dutch government
argues that cyber threats call for a clear international response based on international
agreements. Therefore, the government is focusing on achieving a greater agreement and
better application of existing international legal frameworks in the digital domain
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017, 32–33).

Conclusions
The aim of this research was to explain the differences in national approaches of Finland,
Germany and the Netherlands to counter hybrid threats. The research was conducted
under the assumption that a country’s national strategic culture could be of influence on
these approaches. Overall, it can be concluded that the countries are rather similar in
their approaches to detect hybrid threats and to respond to hybrid attacks. Of course, the
measures taken are not completely similar, though in general, they all have a high
situational awareness with a major role for intelligence services, and the same point of
view with regard to responding to a hybrid attack. However, there are significant
differences in the way they organise security and the scope of the measures taken to
increase resilience and to deter adversaries. These conclusions can be summarised into
the following overview (Figure 3).
Following these observations, it can be concluded that strategic culture is only partly
of influence on a national approach to counter hybrid threats as it depends on the aspect
of the approach and what definition and operationalisation of strategic culture is used to
examine cases.
Strategic culture can explain how Finland, Germany and the Netherlands organise
their security and deter adversaries with regard to hybrid threats when considering
a common used and broadly defined description in which historical, institutional and
political processes that are particular to a specific country form a perceptual lens through
which strategic issues are processed and thereby affect policy choices (Snyder 1977, 9). In
this regard, Finland’s organisation of security and its deterrence measures can be
explained by its main objective to defend its own country and to strengthen its national
security. Also, it has a strong national unity. This stems from historical experiences and
 DEFENCE STUDIES 29

Finland Germany The Netherlands

Organisation Comprehensive whole of Whole of government Society wide
of security society approach approach networking approach
Detect High situational awareness High situational High situational
and an important role for awareness and an awareness and an
intelligence important role for important role for
intelligence intelligence
Deter High amount of measures High amount of High amount of
in all levels of society in measures, specifically measures in many
progress focused on the levels of society (is
government and expanding)
industry
Respond Context-dependent, Context-dependent, Context-dependent,
initially national initially national initially national

Figure 3. Overview similarities and differences in national counter hybrid approaches

from its geography, as Finland has always been located between the West and Russia, and
is therefore used to the fact that both parties try to influence their politics.
In the case of Germany, it’s organisation of security can be explained by a hesitation
from the government to share information and a focus on privacy issues that are
culturally related. This stems from the historical experience of World War II. This also
explains why the issue of hybrid threats has not yet arrived in the overall societal
discussion as the German government is hesitant to take it to a broader level, and leads
to the assumption that the German government is particularly focused on increasing
resilience with regard to governmental parties and the industry, as German citizens are
expected to be self-responsible. However, an openness is growing towards working
together with partners within the society.
As a trading country from origin, The Netherlands is used negotiate with different
parties, and it has a political system that is based on consensus based economic and social
policy making. Hence, the government is used to network with non-governmental parties
when necessary, which makes it easier to connect with society-wide partners to counter
hybrid threats. However, for the Netherlands it may be somewhat harder to increase
resilience among the population as there is no direct noticeable threat (which is the case
for Finland and Germany). As such, geography may be of influence to the extent to which
a government can encourage the entire society to take measures to counter hybrid
threats.
However, these differences cannot be explained when considering the framework of
Biehl et al. Although the framework provides good insight into security policy decisions,
it is insufficient for explaining the national approaches in countering hybrid threats for
two reasons. First, the framework of Biehl et al. is particularly focused on foreign oriented
security policies, since it examines international ambitions and a foreign orientation
towards the EU or NATO. Meanwhile, countering hybrid threats is mostly a matter of
national security. Second, the framework of Biehl et al. especially focuses on the use of
military means and how decisions are made in this regard. Since the military domain is
only one aspect of hybrid threats, the dimensions of Biehl et al.'s framework do not
30 K. WIJNJA

provide sufficient context to explain the broad approach needed to counter hybrid
threats.
The above-mentioned differences aside, this research also concludes that the three
countries are rather similar in the way they detect hybrid threats and in how they would
respond to a possible hybrid attack. Hence, strategic culture does not influence these
aspects of countering hybrid threats. The main reason for this is the nature of hybrid
threats. First, the underlying patterns of hybrid threats are rather similar, since they are
designed against a way of life. Since the countries examined are all sophisticated
European societies with an open economy, it is to be expected that they are faced with
the same kind of hybrid threats and have rather similar vulnerabilities in that regard.
Second, hybrid threats have a multidimensional character and are designed to be difficult
to detect and attribute. This explains why a possible response would be dependent on the
context, and why the approaches of the examined countries are similar.
Overall, this research concludes that Finland, Germany and the Netherlands differ in
their approach to counter hybrid threats when it comes to the organisation of security
and the scope of measures taken to deter adversaries. They are rather similar in detecting
hybrid threats and responding to hybrid attacks. It depends on the definition and on how
one examines strategic culture whether it is an explanation for a national approach to
counter hybrid threats. However, in general, the differences are mainly rooted in histor­
ical, institutional and political processes whereas the similarities can be mainly explained
by the nature of hybrid threats. Strategic culture is therefore a context that shapes but
does not ultimately determines how Finland, Germany and the Netherlands counter
hybrid threats.

Relevance for the strategic culture debate

Initially, this research was conducted under the assumption that the national strategic
culture of a country would lead to significant differences between the approaches of
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands to counter hybrid threats. The research of Biehl
et al. provided a framework to examine these cases. However, the findings of this research
suggest that our current understanding of strategic culture is insufficient to describe and
explain an actor’s security policy in the contemporary security environment.
A significant geopolitical shift has occurred since the establishment of Biehl et al.’s
framework. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, European states are confronted with
a broad spectrum of threats across all aspects of society. This geopolitical shift has caused
the framework of Biehl et al. to be incomplete to study the national approaches in
countering hybrid threats. The dimensions of this framework do not provide
a comprehensive insight into contemporary aspects of security policies as they are
particularly focused on international policy making. Meanwhile, the willingness to
conduct expeditionary missions has declined and the focus has shifted towards national
and collective defence. In addition, the dimensions of Biehl et al. only include the
decision-making process and the willingness to use military means as an instrument of
one’s security policy. However, countering hybrid threats requires diplomatic, informa­
tional, military, economic, financial, intelligence and legal instruments of power.
Therefore, the dimensions of the strategic culture framework should be adjusted or
expanded with national defence issues and a broad spectrum of instruments of power
 DEFENCE STUDIES 31

to be of value in analysing contemporary national security policies. Overall, the frame­

work of Biehl et al. might still be relevant to examine a country’s position regarding
military affairs on the international stage. Nevertheless, it is too narrow to be applicable
to security policies concerning hybrid threats.
As a result, Biehl et al.’s classification of the three types of strategic cultures in Europe
cannot be applied to countering hybrid threats. According to the framework of Biehl
et al., Finland has the most reserved security policy, whereas the Netherlands is the most
active and involved nation and Germany’s security policy is somewhere in between. On
the contrary, when analysing the counter hybrid approaches, Finland is a leading exam­
ple for other European countries. In the meantime, Germany is still somewhat careful to
include new sectors and the approach of the Netherlands can be positioned in the middle
of those two approaches.
This illustrates the difficulty of taking the concept of strategic culture as an explanatory
factor for security policy making. This research suggests that when it concerns national
security, strategic culture appears to be a much less distinctive factor than when it
concerns power projection as an instrument of one’s security policy. At the same time,
the main differences between the national approaches stem from the governance of
security and not particularly the steps taken or the instruments used to counter hybrid
threats. These differences in governance seem to be the consequence of a historically
grown institutional reality.
Based on the findings of this research, the explanatory value of strategic culture is
influenced by current threats in the security environment. The concept might have had
a bigger impact in the time of expeditionary missions, though current threats have
reduced differences in security policies. Subsequently, it is possible that in ten or fifteen
years, when the security environment is again different, the above-mentioned suggestions
for the framework of Biehl et al. also will be outdated. In general, policy makers either fall
back on pre-existing approaches or, in cases of real novelty in policy developments, look
for novel responses. Strategic culture is thus a valuable concept to get insight in security
policies, but the explanatory value is shaped by the strategic reality of the moment. This
also implicates that the academic debate regarding the semi-permanent character of
strategic culture is relatively valid. On the one hand, it seems that historical and institu­
tional experiences will have a permanent influence on security policies. On the other
hand, the extent to which these processes are of influence are not permanent as they are
subject to current threats. This implies a temporal aspect to security policies as well as
trade-offs between evolution and falling back on traditional views.
These findings not only give more insight into the explanatory value of the concept of
strategic culture, they also shed light on the arguments of the two competing generations
within the academic debate on strategic culture. The findings validate the arguments of
the first generation of strategic culture research and indicate that, in the context of this
research, strategic culture in its broadest definition is indeed a context within which
states form their security policies. Strategic culture is therefore a supplementary factor to
other explanations. These findings also undermine the arguments of the second genera­
tion, as strategic culture is not a “limited ranked set of grand strategic preferences over
actions that are consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time”
(Johnston 1998, 38) or an independent variable that determines a specific actor’s foreign
and security behaviour.
32 K. WIJNJA

Finally, based on current geopolitical threats in Europe, it is recommended that the

concept of strategic culture should be revised and has to be examined more broadly.
Moreover, future strategic culture research should examine the role of non-governmental
organisations andcitizens in tackling security issues. Also, to validate whether security policies
are indeed influenced by current threats and less by strategic culture, it would be interesting
to examine the strategic policies and strategic cultures of countries with a different threat
assessment. For example, whereas the examined countries in this research are mainly
threatened by Russian influence, it would be interesting to examine western-oriented,
democratic countries such as Japan and South-Korea with a main threat coming from China.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor
Kim Wijnja is a strategic advisor for the Royal Netherlands Army. One of her core tasks is advising
on military-strategic opportunities through European military cooperation. She has a Master’s
degree in both Military Strategic Studies and Public Governance and Organisation Studies.

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