Strategic Culture

Foreign Policy Analysis (2017) 13, 741–759
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Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and
Foreign Policy: Finland’s Decision to Refrain
from Operation Unified Protector
FREDRIK DOESER1
Swedish Defense University
This article integrates literature on strategic culture with literature on

the domestic politics of foreign policy, illustrating how the interaction of
culture and domestic political calculation can influence government for-
eign policy on participation in international military operations.
Empirically, the article investigates the decision made by the
Government of Finland to refrain from participation in the military
intervention in Libya in March–April 2011. The Finnish decision-making
illustrates that domestic politics, in particular the factor of election tim-
ing, can strengthen the feeling among decision-makers that they should
follow the country’s strategic culture. The article ends with theorization
on the domestic political conditions under which decision-makers are
more or less likely to deviate from strategic culture.
The decision made by the government of Finland to refrain from participation in

Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya in 2011 illustrates a situation in
which foreign policy was influenced by the interaction of strategic culture and do-
mestic political calculation.2 As conceived here, strategic culture influences
decision-makers by informing them on what options are appropriate in a specific
situation. This article focuses on situations in which a state must decide on its par-
ticipation or non-participation in an international military operation. In the
Finnish case, strategic culture made a difference by informing decision-makers
that participation in OUP would be inappropriate, since, inter alia, it would entail
a deviation from Finland’s long-standing policy of refraining from military-de-
manding operations. However, before the decision was reached, the option of
Fredrik Doeser is Associate Professor in War Studies at the Department of Security, Strategy, and Leadership at
Swedish Defense University. His current research interests include the relationship between strategic culture and
foreign policy decision-making. He has recently published articles in Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
International Peacekeeping, and International Politics.
1
Author’s note: I would like to thank, in particular, Mikael Blomdahl, Linus Hagström, Björn Jönsson, Niklas
Nilsson, Kaisa Pulkkinen, Jan Ångström, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am also grate-
ful for financial support from the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation.
2
OUP was an international military operation under the leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) with the official purpose to enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973
regarding the Libyan civil war. Resolution 1970 was adopted by the UNSC on February 26, 2011. It condemned the
use of force by the Muammar Gaddafi regime against protesters and imposed a series of sanctions in response.
Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, approved by a vote of 10 in favor, zero against, and five abstentions
from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia. It authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone, an arms embargo,
and the use of all means necessary, short of foreign occupation, to protect civilians. OUP commenced on March 23,
expanding gradually during the following days, by integrating more and more elements of the coalition of the will-
ing, which was initiated in immediate response to Resolution 1973.
Doeser, Fredrik. (2017) Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy: Finland’s Decision to Refrain from Operation
Unified Protector. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1093/fpa/orx001
C The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
V
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742 Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy
participation was seriously considered, implying that a deviation from strategic

culture was not unimaginable. What seems to have settled the matter was the do-

mestic political situation. At the time of the initiation of the Libya intervention in
March 2011, the Finnish government faced impending parliamentary elections
(in mid-April) and an overwhelming majority of the public that was against na-
tional involvement in OUP. What happened here is that the domestic situation,
which made participation in OUP both hazardous and difficult from a practical
political perspective, reinforced the view among decision-makers that Finland
should follow its strategic culture. Thus, the decision was influenced by the inter-
action between culture and domestic political calculation.
This article intends to make three contributions. First, it sets out to provide an
in-depth investigation of the Finnish OUP decision. While there is plenty of re-
search on the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish decisions to join OUP, there is vir-
tually no research on the Finnish case. While the Danish and Norwegian decisions
were made extremely fast, leading to participation in the American-led Operation
Odyssey Dawn on March 19, Sweden joined OUP first on March 29. For
Denmark, participation was “business as usual,” aimed at aiding civilians, promot-
ing Danish values, and demonstrating commitment to NATO (Jakobsen and
Møller 2012; Olesen and Nordby 2014), based on a culture of “activism”
(Rasmussen 2005). For the Norwegians, the decision was more difficult, but was
ultimately made due to the humanitarian situation, the UNSC mandate, and be-
cause of a desire to show support for NATO (Heier and Høiback 2014).
Norwegian culture is based on multilateralism with emphasis on the UN (Græger
and Leira 2005). For Sweden, the decision was not taken lightly, but after days of
heated debate, Sweden joined OUP, because of the UNSC mandate, the humani-
tarian situation, and a desire to show support for NATO and increase interoper-
ability with the alliance (Doeser 2016). Swedish culture includes elements such as
military non-alignment, altruism, and a strong focus on international operations,
although the latter is downplayed in the 2016 defense decision. Why did Finland
not follow its Nordic neighbors?
Second, the article intends to integrate literature on strategic culture with lit-
erature on the domestic politics of foreign policy, illustrating how the interaction
of culture and domestic political calculation can influence decisions on participa-
tion in military operations. On the basis of the Finnish case, the article theorizes
on the domestic conditions under which decision-makers are more or less likely
to deviate from strategic culture, that is, choose a policy that contradicts parts of
the existing culture. How different domestic conditions can impact on continu-
ities and discontinuities in strategic culture has not been adequately addressed in
previous research. Thus, the article follows what Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412)
call analytic eclecticism, which attempts to generate “causal stories that forgo par-
simony in order to capture the interactions among different types of causal mech-
anisms normally analyzed in isolation from each other within separate research
traditions.”
Third, the article sets out to increase an understanding of how strategic culture
and domestic politics, respectively, can influence strategic choices. More specific-
ally, the article develops the concept of strategic culture by increasing its applic-
ability to studies of participation/non-participation in military operations. In add-
ition, previous research on strategic culture tends to focus on great powers
(Snyder 1977; Gray 1981; Lantis 2002; Malici 2006; O’Reilly 2013; Coticchia and
De Simone 2014), and not on small states.3 Furthermore, the article elaborates
on the ways in which domestic politics, particularly the factor of election timing,
can impact on strategic choices.
3
For a few exceptions, see the special issue on Nordic strategic culture in Cooperation and Conflict (40):1, McCraw
(2011), Ångström and Honig (2012), and Edström and Gyllensporre (2014).
FREDRIK DOESER 743
The remainder of the article is divided into three sections. In the first, the con-
cept of strategic culture is discussed, defined, and operationalized, and literature

on strategic cultural change is reviewed. This is followed by an analysis of how stra-
tegic culture influenced Finnish decision-making on OUP. In the second section,
literature on the relationship between domestic politics, especially election tim-
ing, and foreign policy is discussed, and then related to the willingness of
decision-makers to deviate from strategic culture. This is followed by an investiga-
tion of how domestic politics influenced the Finnish decision-making. In the con-
cluding section, the findings are summarized and then elaborated on, by compar-
ing the Finnish case with the Swedish OUP decision, by theorizing on the
domestic conditions under which decision-makers are more or less likely to devi-
ate from strategic culture, and by discussing some cases for further research.
Strategic Culture
The concept of strategic culture aims at capturing a country’s core beliefs and as-
sumptions in matters of foreign, security, and defense policy. Originating in the
1970s, the concept challenged perspectives that were based on the assumption
that the external actions of states are largely determined by material factors
(Zaman 2009). It was Snyder (1977) who first took arguments about political cul-
ture into the study of foreign policy by developing a theory of Soviet military strat-
egy. Another pioneering work from this period belongs to Gray (1981, 35), who
introduced the idea that differences in national style, which can have “deep roots
within a particular stream of historical experience,” represent a robust explan-
ation of states’ long-term external behavior. However, it is from the mid-1990s
that theoretical and empirical work on strategic culture has surged (Desch 1998).
Studies of Germany’s strategic culture, for example, have demonstrated the ex-
planatory relevance of the country’s anti-militarist culture in shaping its foreign
policy (Duffield 1998, 1999; Lantis 2002; Malici 2006). According to Duffield
(1999), German culture includes elements such as skepticism about using force
and a strong dislike for assuming a leadership role in international security
affairs.
In spite of several contributions, a well-recognized definition of strategic culture
does not exist. While some researchers see strategic culture as an independent
variable, separable from material and non-cultural factors, which generates a set
of ranked preferences to guide behavior (Johnston 1995), others see strategic cul-
ture as a “shaping context for behavior” (Gray 1999, 50). According to the latter
view, a distinction between dependent and independent variables is impossible to
make (Ångström and Honig 2012, 671).4 The problem with Johnston’s work, ac-
cording to Gray (1999, 50), is that it considers culture as one among many com-
peting explanations for strategic behavior. Gray argues that behavior cannot be
separated from culture, since behavior is carried out by actors who are
“encultured” (ibid.). Thus, strategic culture can be seen as “an interpretive prism
through which decision-makers view the strategic landscape. It is always there,
both within individuals and institutions” (Poore 2003, 281).
This article takes as its point of departure the idea that strategic culture is a
“shaping context for behavior.” However, as Gray (1999, 68) admits himself, cul-
ture does not determine a particular choice; indeed, domestic and external
4
Another way of presenting this literature is to divide the scholarship into three different generations. The first
applied the concept as a means of understanding why different states approached strategic affairs in different ways
(Gray 1981). The second generation perceived culture as an instrument of hegemony, establishing orientations as
to how the state could use violence against its enemies in a legitimate way (Klein 1988). The third generation
focused its attention on the development of falsifiable theories of culture, claiming that earlier theories were untest-
able (Johnston 1995).
factors can influence action as well, although culture always matters more or less.
As conceived here, strategic culture structures what options are considered to be

appropriate, effective, and productive by a specific actor in decisions to partici-
pate in military operations, thereby influencing, but not determining, the actor’s
behavior. As eloquently put by Duffield (1999, 772):
The overall effect of culture is to predispose collectivities toward certain actions and
policies over others. Some options will simply not be imagined. Of those that are
contemplated, some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate, ineffective, or
counterproductive than others.
Who, then, are the keepers of strategic culture? This article focuses on the key
strategic decision-makers in a country. In Finland, the strategic leadership is com-
posed of the president of the republic, the prime minister, the minister for
foreign affairs, and the minister of defense. According to the Finnish
Constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The
president also makes the ultimate decision on participation (and on ending) par-
ticipation in international military crisis management, but on the basis of a pro-
posal put forward by the cabinet (Kerttunen 2014, 107). The article also builds on
the idea that there may be multiple cultures at play in each country; for instance,
the elite strategic culture may differ from popular strategic culture (see below).
In addition, the article is delimited to four distinct elements of strategic culture,
namely those that arguably have the greatest impact on participation in military
operations:5
Core task(s) of the armed forces: What are the core task(s) of the armed forces?
Should the armed forces give priority to the task of territorial defense, or should the
participation in international operations be considered equally important to, or
even be ranked above, territorial defense?
Operational mandate(s): When the state does participate in international oper-
ations, which types of operations (civilian, peacekeeping, and/or peace enforce-
ment) are perceived as the most appropriate, effective, and productive to participate
in?
Willingness to use force: For what purposes is the state willing to use armed force?
Should armed force be used in self-defense only, or also for offensive purposes?
Does the state impose any (moral) obligations upon itself to use force in humanitar-
ian interventions?
Organizational frameworks and strategic partners: When the state does participate
in military operations, what types of organizations, the European Union (EU),
NATO, and/or the UN, are viewed as the most appropriate to participate in?6
Which are the preferred partners when it comes to cooperation in military
operations?
By delimiting strategic culture to these elements, the concept becomes more

applicable for studies of participation in military operations. However, in Heikka
(2005), Finnish grand strategic culture is described in a different way. He argues
that it is characterized by “republican realism,” that is, the idea that Finland
should defend an anti-hegemonic order in Europe. In explaining a state’s pos-
ition on a particular operation, however, we need to move down from the level of
grand strategy and look at the more delimited aspects described above.
Furthermore, the article builds on the notion that strategic culture can change
over time (Gray 1999, 51–52). Many scholars seem to think that strategic cultural
5
The author operationalizes strategic culture in a similar way in Doeser (2016). In addition to these four elem-
ents, strategic culture can consist of elements such as the role of conflict in human affairs, sensitivity to external
dangers, and civil-military relations.
6
This element is adapted to the organizational context of European states. For a state in Africa, for instance,
possible frameworks would, in addition to the UN, include the African Union and other regional organizations.
FREDRIK DOESER 745
changes are the result of alterations in the international system, geopolitical re-
configurations, or technological advances (Gray 1999; Basrur 2001; Lantis 2002).

Other sources of change might be traumatic events experienced by the state,
which would “discredit thoroughly core beliefs and values” (Duffield 1998, 23). In
their study of Australia’s strategic culture, Lantis and Charlton (2011, 295) em-
phasize both external shocks and domestically driven change, in which strategic
culture is challenged by elites who “perceive that primary tenets of strategic
thought have come into direct conflict with one another.” McCraw (2011) finds
that changes in the strategic culture of New Zealand were partly brought about by
ideological changes within the Labor Party. Elite-driven change is also empha-
sized by Libel (2016), who studies the influence of epistemic communities on
Israel’s strategic culture. Finally, Hilpert’s (2014) study of strategic changes in
Germany’s Afghanistan deployment is based on factors such as experiences from
the deployment, generational change, political leadership, and technological
changes. Thus, previous research has not investigated how domestic factors such
as election timing can influence the strategic cultural context in which actors be-
have. As demonstrated below, the timing of the next election can influence the
willingness of decision-makers to change strategic culture.
The subsequent empirical investigation is based on a multitude of different
sources, including government communication and press releases, speeches and
remarks made by key decision-makers, media coverage, blog entries, and semi-
structured interviews. A total of fourteen interviews were conducted. The respond-
ents are cabinet ministers, politicians, and advisors from the ruling parties and
the opposition, senior civil servants from the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and
researchers with in-depth knowledge of Finnish foreign policy.
In order to establish an empirical relationship between culture and the Finnish
OUP decision, we should find that Finland prioritizes territorial defense; Finland
finds it inappropriate, ineffective, and unproductive to participate in peace en-
forcement operations; Finland perceives that armed force should be used for self-
defense only while not imposing any obligations upon itself to join humanitarian
operations; and Finland finds it more appropriate to participate in EU and UN
operations while Finland’s strategic partners do not participate in OUP.
Furthermore, contemporary statements from politicians and retrospective ac-
counts from the respondents should explicitly link Finland’s decision to key
phrases/words such as “culture,” “way of doing things,” “previous experiences,”
“habits,” “profile,” and so forth. Examples of this are provided in the form of
quotations throughout the empirical section. In addition, evidence of this kind
should be found in multiple sources from different contexts. Finally, alternative
explanations should be ruled out; for instance, the article should demonstrate
that Finland had the military capabilities to participate in OUP in one way or the
other. If these analytical conditions are met, it can be argued that an empirical re-
lationship between culture and the Finnish OUP decision has been established.
Finnish Strategic Culture and OUP7

The Libyan crisis started with demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime in
Benghazi on January 13, 2011. As the protests developed into armed rebellion in
mid-February, Gaddafi responded with systematic attacks by air and ground
forces, often against non-combatant civilians. Finland was one of the first EU
members that called for EU sanctions against Gaddafi (Stubb 2011b).8 The
7
This section is a modified version of an earlier work by the author (Doeser 2016).
8
The government (Council of State) led by Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi was appointed by President Tarja
Halonen on June 22, 2010. It was a coalition government comprising the Center Party, the National Coalition Party,
the Greens, and the Swedish People’s Party.
Finnish government also perceived that the humanitarian situation in Libya was
very alarming, and that Finland should send humanitarian aid to the region

(Foreign Ministry 2011a). Furthermore, the government provided political sup-
port to UNSC Resolution 1973 of March 17, which authorized the no-fly zone
(Foreign Ministry 2011b; Stubb 2011a, March 18).
Shortly after NATO had assumed responsibility for the no-fly zone on March
27, the Swedish government decided that it would participate in monitoring the
no-fly zone by means of tactical air reconnaissance. However, the Swedish planes
would not engage in combat actions against ground targets (Doeser 2014). The
strategic leadership in Finland, on the other hand, was lukewarm on sending
fighter jets to Libya already from the start. As stated by Foreign Minister
Alexander Stubb on March 22: “I would exclude the possibility that Finland’s
fighter jets participate in the no-fly operation” (quoted in Sipil€a 2011). One offi-
cial explanation for the decision was that NATO never requested Finnish mili-
tary aid (Gestrin-Hagner 2011; Lindqvist 2011). However, this was most likely a
rationalization, since NATO could have provided Finland with such a request, if
Finland had expressed its desire to join the military effort.9 As stated by former
Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn: “Of course Finland did not receive an invita-
tion, because Finland declared at an early stage that it was not willing to take
part in any military operation” (quoted in Yle Uutiset 2011c). Furthermore,
none of the respondents emphasized absence of a NATO request as a contribu-
ting factor.
Another official explanation was that the Finnish F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets
could not add any military value to the air campaign (Huhta and Raeste 2011;
Raeste 2011; Yle Uutiset 2011a). One problem was that these planes were struc-
tured for air-to-air combat and not air-to-ground combat. According to several
experts, however, the planes could have participated in the monitoring of the
no-fly zone (Respondents 4, 12, 14). For this kind of mission, the interoper-
ability of the Hornets was equal to that of the Swedish JAS Gripen planes (Yle
Uutiset 2011c). According to Colonel Juha-Pekka Ker€anen, the Finnish Rapid
Deployment Force Fighter Squadron of six F/A-18 was in 2009 evaluated for
air policing tasks by NATO and could have coped with monitoring the no-fly
zone (Huhta and Raeste 2011). This is also confirmed by a senior civil servant
at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: “It did not come down to the lack of capa-
bilities or lack of belief in our capabilities” (Respondent 6). As noted by
Rehn: “I thought it was for being able to participate in operations like this I
suffered all the trouble,” referring to her 1992 decision to buy Hornets from
the United States (quoted in Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå 2011). It thus seems
reasonable to assume that, in order to avoid making a commitment to OUP,
the strategic leadership made its non-participation a technical issue
(Respondent 12).
A stronger explanation seems to reside with strategic culture. The traditional
view is that Finnish culture has been shaped by its geostrategic position and that
Finland conducts foreign affairs on the basis of realpolitik, hence downplaying
value-based considerations (Pentill€a 1994). This is manifested in the core tasks of
the armed forces, which place primary emphasis on territorial defense. Finnish
culture is built on the notion that the armed forces should be kept fully oper-
ational within Finnish borders, while their presence in international operations is
a second priority, although international operations have increased in importance
in recent years (Seppo and Forsberg 2013; Respondents 4, 8). In contrast with the
other Nordic states, Finland has maintained a strong territorial defense capability,
9
According to the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, NATO had already asked the Finnish government if it
was interested in participating in the no-fly zone. However, this was denied by Defense Minister Jyri H€ak€amies
(Huhta and Raeste 2011).
FREDRIK DOESER 747
based on conscription.10 According to Finnish culture, participation in interna-

tional operations should not occur at the expense of territorial defense, and

when Finland does participate in such operations, the main aim is to strengthen
its own position (Seppo and Forsberg 2013, 115; Respondent 13).11 As concisely
put by Defense Minister H€ak€amies regarding the Finnish OUP decision: “our pri-
ority is the defense of Finnish territory” (Yle Uutiset 2011c). However, the em-
phasis on territorial defense is not sufficient for explaining why Finland refrained
from OUP. After Finland’s EU membership in 1995 and an increasing involve-
ment in NATO operations (see below), Finnish strategic thinking has been
Europeanized (Palosaari 2011), implying, among other things, that the view that
international operations serve territorial defense has gained stronger ground
(Respondents 6, 10, 11). “Some operations, however, which are somehow felt sen-
sitive in international politics, have been, and might become, exceptions to this
general approach” (Respondent 11). This was the case with OUP.
The operational mandate of OUP, that is, the enforcement of Resolutions 1970
and 1973 by the use of offensive weapons, was perceived as an obstacle for
Finnish participation. As noted by one observer: “When it comes to demanding
military operations, the Finns become cautious” (Respondent 13). The Finnish
strategic leadership finds it more appropriate to participate in civilian and peace-
keeping operations (Respondents 6, 11, 12).12 A historical lesson is that in main-
taining Finnish security, political instruments should be prioritized over military
means, and this notion also applies to involvement in international operations
(Seppo and Forsberg 2013, 119). Hence, conflict prevention through develop-
ment aid and traditional peacekeeping, in which the conflicting parties have ac-
cepted the operation, are the appropriate ways to act, according to Finnish think-
ing. Furthermore, Finland tends to perceive itself as a great power in peace
mediation, mirroring the success of former President Martti Ahtisaari for his role
in resolving many conflicts (Palosaari 2013, 370). Thus, instead of taking part in
peace enforcement in Libya, Finnish culture predisposed the key decision-makers
toward contributions such as political support, economic sanctions, humanitarian
aid, and possibly, in a later phase, the provision of peacekeeping troops or the
participation in an EU-led force (see below) (Gestrin-Hagner 2011; Lydén 2011).
As noted by a senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry:
I think it was basically a question of division of labor. Because when you look at our
involvements with Libya and the kind of support we gave, it is quite a lot. And it
began with humanitarian assistance, which increased rapidly, but then expanded to
political support, the UN resolution and the sanctions decisions, and then to civilian
crisis management, especially to the EU. And we were also ready to participate in a
UN peacekeeping mission. That was quite a lot in addition to the possibility of join-
ing the NATO operation. (Respondent 7)
One reason for the Finnish focus on political, humanitarian, and civilian efforts
was that the key decision-makers perceived that such tasks suited Finland better
and were more appropriate on the basis of the country’s strategic culture (Sipil€a
2011; Stubb 2011a, April 4). President Tarja Halonen, for instance, noted that the
10
This almost dogmatic view of territorial defense can be seen as a result of the country’s historical experiences
from sharing borders with the Soviet Union and Russia, in particular from the legacy of the Winter War in 1939–
1940 (Kerttunen 2014, 103).
11
Although Finland has been very active in UN peace operations since the 1950s, measured by per capita contri-
butions on a global level, Sweden and the other Nordic states are way ahead of Finland, in absolute as well as rela-
tive terms.
12
In comparison with Finland, the other Nordic states find participation in peace enforcement as more appro-
priate, effective, and productive (Doeser 2016). For example, the Finnish contribution of approximately one hun-
dred personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was considerably smaller than
the Swedish, and the Finnish troops operated in the Swedish-led Provincial Reconstruction Team.
decision is “a logical continuation from what we have done previously in interna-

tional politics. We have our own profile and role” (quoted in Yle Uutiset 2011d).

She also said that “if we want to specialize and be involved, I believe it is best to
be involved in those areas which we have experience in” (ibid.). In response to
critiques claiming that Finland was passive regarding Libya, Foreign Minister
Stubb said: “The fact that we are not sending two Hornets to maintain the no-fly
zone does not make us passive. Each part has its own role to play in an operation
like this” (quoted in Yle Uutiset 2011b). Prime Minister Kiviniemi added that:
We have been consistent in our foreign policy. We supported an UN-sanctioned op-

eration and we have taken part in it through the provision of humanitarian assist-
ance. That we are not participating in the no-fly zone is in line with our long-
standing foreign policy posture. (quoted in Simula 2011)
In addition, Finnish decision-makers stated on several occasions that it was un-

clear what role the Finnish planes would have in OUP and that it “felt unnatural”
for Finland to take part in such an operation (Lindqvist 2011; Sillanp€a€a and
Huhta 2011; Sipil€a 2011). They were also of the opinion that participation would
have been unproductive and inefficient; that is, the Finnish planes would not
have made any difference to the outcome of the operation (Lindqvist 2011;
Respondents 7, 8). As noted by President Halonen: “we did not send any Hornets
[to stop the massacre in Srebrenica] in 1995 either. I believe that it would not
have helped the situation, rather the opposite” (quoted in Yle Uutiset 2011d).
According to one high-level civil servant: “Finnish participation in peacekeeping
in general has mainly been with ground forces, where our capabilities can best be
brought to bare” (Respondent 7). Thus, Finland could have dispatched its planes
to Libya, but the strategic leadership believed that such an endeavor would have
been inappropriate, inefficient, and unproductive.
Furthermore, the Finnish willingness to use force is delimited to defensive pur-
poses only, since “the historical lesson is that defensive but not offensive fighting
pays off. Yet, the historical lesson is also that in providing for one’s security, polit-
ical measures should be prioritized” (Seppo and Forsberg 2013, 119). The old
phrase of President Urho Kekkonen, that Finland should be a “physician rather
than a judge,” is still maintained in collective memory (Palosaari 2013, 372). In
the Finnish decision-making on Libya, one argument for OUP participation was
the humanitarian situation, and that participation may strengthen the
Responsibility to Protect principle (Respondents 2, 5, 6, 7). However, the strategic
leadership was not convinced by the humanitarian argument. The reluctance to-
ward the use of force was mainly symbolized by President Halonen, who said that
the use of force to stop violence always “has strong side effects, since sooner or
later people start discussing whether there were civilian victims and whether too
much force was used” (quoted in Yle Uutiset 2011a). In contrast with the situation
in the other Nordic states, there is no strong pressure on Finnish politicians to
participate in interventions for moralistic reasons (Respondents 8, 13). The
liberal-internationalist school of thought, advocating humanitarian interventions,
is relatively weak in Finland (Respondent 10). As summed up by one cabinet
minister:
We Finns are rather cynical about this kind of situations. We do not very easily buy
the, let’s say, humanitarian motivation that is given, because, in many cases, behind
those humanitarian motivations there are some other motivations. (Respondent 1)
With regard to organizational framework, the Finnish strategic leadership pre-

fers to participate in operations led by the UN or EU (Respondents 6, 10, 13).
Finland has a strong tradition of participating in UN operations, and Finland is a
full member of the EU. Therefore, it makes more sense to participate in EU
FREDRIK DOESER 749
operations, in contrast to NATO operations (Respondent 13). As noted by one

civil servant: “NATO is not our playing field to the same extent as the EU”
(Respondent 6).13 However, Finland had previously taken part in NATO missions

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and a reason for this has
been to develop Finnish interoperability and crisis management capabilities
(H€ak€amies 2008, 135). This argument was also made in relation to OUP
(Respondents 2, 7, 13). As noted by Forsberg and Vaahtoranta (2001, 75): “with
regard to the cooperation with NATO, everything else seems to be acceptable ex-
cept the mutual security guarantees of Article 5.” Another argument for participa-
tion was that Finland “would have been in the board room and the core group of
countries assisting Libya. To sit at the tables where the decisions are made [is im-
portant for us]” (Respondent 7). However, in the final analysis, NATO seems to
have been more of a discouraging than a motivating factor, according to the stra-
tegic leadership. In the words of one observer, “when NATO is involved, many
Finnish politicians become suspicious” (Respondent 5). As noted by one cabinet
minister:
I think that the role of the United States and NATO, and the offensive character of
OUP, in combination with the risk for Finland being perceived as participant in an
offensive against Libya, worried the foreign policy leadership. (Respondent 2)
President Halonen, in particular, was negatively oriented toward participation

in a NATO-led peace enforcement operation, in which the United States played a
central role (Respondents 2, 5, 9, 13). The political reluctance toward NATO can
to some extent be explained by Finland’s experiences from the protracted
Afghanistan campaign (Respondents 4, 5, 7). Instead of participating in OUP, the
Finns decided on April 5 that they would take part in the planning and prepar-
ations for the EUFOR Libya, the name of the EU’s military-humanitarian mission,
which was announced on April 1 (Foreign Ministry 2011c; Lydén 2011).
According to one Foreign Ministry official, “this is where it makes sense for us to
put our resources and, therefore, we do not have to be involved in the NATO op-
eration” (Respondent 7). However, the EU mission was never launched, since it
was dependent on a request from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, which never came (Council Decision 2011).
With regard to strategic partners, the decisions made by Germany and the other
Nordic states were closely followed in Finland (Respondent 11). Since Germany
abstained in the vote on Resolution 1973, there was no consensus on OUP at the
EU level. As a result, the Finnish strategic leadership became a bit puzzled what
to do, whom to follow, which contributed to its OUP decision (Respondent 11).
However, the Swedish participation was a clear incentive for Finnish participation
(Respondents 2, 4, 12). The two countries often follow each other in crisis man-
agement, and they usually participate in the same operations (Jakobsen 2007,
465). The Swedish participation was, however, not sufficient for leading Finland
into OUP, since the other aspects of Finnish culture was more in line with non-
participation.
To sum up the argument so far, Finnish culture predisposed the key decision-
makers toward the option of not participating, by emphasizing territorial defense,
by finding it inappropriate, ineffective, and unproductive to participate in peace
enforcement, by perceiving that armed force should be used for self-defense only,
and by prioritizing participation in EU and UN operations. However, the Finnish
decision was “contested,” and it was “far from a no-brainer” (Respondent 6). The
pro-OUP voices could mainly be found within the military and the Defense
13
In contrast with Finland, Swedish culture does not distinguish between EU, NATO, and UN operations
(Doeser 2016, 288).
Ministry, which do not always share the strategic culture of the politicians
(Respondents 6, 9). The Finnish military “wanted to participate and were confi-

dent that Finland had the capability” (Respondent 6). As demonstrated above,
the strongest arguments for participating were the humanitarian situation, the
UNSC mandate, Sweden’s participation, and the opportunity to increase Finnish
interoperability with NATO and to gain political influence within the alliance.
However, the president, the prime minister, and the defense minister came to the
conclusion that non-participation was the best alternative. Among the key
decision-makers, only Stubb, who later regretted the decision (Suomen Tietotoimisto
2011), was clearly in the participation camp (Respondent 1). Looking back at the
decision-making, one cabinet minister remembered that:
It was quite clear from the beginning that we were not going to participate. Here
you can see the tradition of Finnish foreign policy. We have been very reluctant to
interfere militarily outside our borders. Of course, if there is a UN mandate it is pos-
sible, but we are still very hesitant in that respect. (Respondent 1)
As noted by another respondent: “We are really careful in our thinking when
we are making decisions to get involved in crises which are outside our own bor-
ders. That is part of our tradition” (Respondent 4).
The preceding analysis seems to provide support for the explanatory relevance
of culture. However, a skeptic might argue that the factors portrayed as cultural
here might just as well be rational strategic calculations driven by Finland’s exter-
nal environment. This article is, however, based on the logic that culture and real-
ism are not in opposition. Decision-makers are all encultured and pursue their
interests on the basis of their culture. Furthermore, in the analysis, both political
statements and respondent accounts explicitly linked Finland’s decision to
phrases/words such as culture and experiences. In addition, these data were
found in multiple sources from different contexts.
Domestic Politics and Strategic Culture

When making foreign policy, political leaders are not only influenced by strategic
culture, but also by events on the domestic arena of politics. The reason for this is
that their foreign policy, under certain circumstances, may have consequences for
their political power and the political stability in their country. As noted above,
strategic culture does not determine action; other factors can influence behavior
as well, although culture as a “shaping context for behavior” always matters more
or less (Gray 1999, 68). This article suggests that election timing may influence
the willingness of decision-makers to follow strategic culture.
As understood here, foreign policy perspectives that take domestic politics as
their point of departure are based on the Downsian assumption that the primary
desire of political leaders is to remain in office (Downs 1957). This literature con-
sists of domestic factors such as political party opposition (Hagan 1993), interest
groups (Radcliffe Ross 2013), public opinion (Chan and Safran 2006), govern-
mental politics (Allison and Zelikow 1999), personal characteristics of decision-
makers (Mintz 2004), and election timing (Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Auerswald 1999;
Huth and Alee 2002; Baum 2004; Forsberg 2005; Williams 2013; Doeser and
Eidenfalk 2016). This article has found that the timing of the next election mat-
tered for the Finnish decision-making regarding OUP. This factor has not been
adequately addressed in the strategic culture literature. According to the research
on election timing, electorally motivated leaders make foreign policy decisions
“with an eye toward the next election” (Williams 2013, 449). It has, for instance,
been documented that liberal democratic governments are less likely to involve
themselves in a military conflict in the period before Election Day than afterward.
FREDRIK DOESER 751
Thus, election timing has the potential to influence the strategic cultural context
in which strategic actors behave.

There are basically two reasons for the importance of election timing for stra-
tegic behavior: political survival and political stability. The political survival argu-
ment has been presented in previous foreign policy research, and it is often
related to the state of public opinion (Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Huth and Alee 2002;
Williams 2013). According to this research, the closer a general election draws
near, the more important public opinion becomes in the minds of politicians.
Thus, as the next election approaches, governments will be less likely to conduct
a foreign policy to which the public is opposed. According to Williams (2013), in
the period before Election Day, governments are less aggressive because of fear of
electoral retribution by the public, who is typically more risk averse than their
leaders. The empirical record shows that impending elections were a contributing
factor to the US decision to not intervene in the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Auerswald
1999), and to President George H. W. Bush’s decision to not send ground troops
to Somalia in the summer of 1992 (Baum 2004). In addition, distant parliamen-
tary elections allowed the governments of Australia and Poland to ignore strong
anti-war opposition from the public in their decisions to go to war in Iraq in
March 2003 (Doeser and Eidenfalk 2016). Thus, on the basis of previous research,
the closer a general election draws near, the more prudent decision-makers be-
come in making decisions that go against the majority opinion among the voters.
This leads to the following hypothesis: the closer a general election draws near, the less
likely decision-makers become in deviating from strategic culture, given that the public shares
the culture of decision-makers.
The political stability argument, which has not been addressed in previous for-
eign policy research, builds on a different logic. According to this logic, in order
to maintain political stability, liberal democratic governments refrain from mak-
ing controversial decisions before Election Day. There are two reasons for this.
First, governments tend to avoid controversial decisions before the elections,
since in many parliamentary systems these decisions have to be implemented by a
caretaker government. Caretaker governments are only expected to handle daily
issues, hence preserving the “policy status quo,” but they are not expected to
introduce new or controversial legislation (Schleiter and Belu 2015, 231).14 In
addition, if a change of government is likely, “it is considered inappropriate to
bind the incoming government by committing to significant new initiatives”
(ibid.). Second, in the period before Election Day, political leaders are preoccu-
pied with their election campaigns and, therefore, tend to avoid controversial pol-
icies that may divert their (and the public’s) attention from their campaign work.
On the basis of these two reasons, the following hypothesis can be formulated: the
closer a general election draws near, the less likely decision-makers become in deviating from
strategic culture, given that decision-makers have an interest in maintaining political
stability.
The investigation of the relationship between election timing and Finnish stra-
tegic thinking on OUP is based primarily on the interview material (see above).
These data can help identify whether and how key decision-makers took domestic
politics into account in their decision-making. Examples of relevant phrases from
the respondents are provided in the form of quotations throughout the empirical
section. In addition to the interviews, supplementary sources such as media cover-
age, including contemporary remarks and observations, and public opinion polls
are used.
14
A caretaker government is put in place when Parliament is dissolved (for instance, after parliamentary elec-
tions), in order to rule the country for an interim period until a new government is formed. In Finland, the care-
taker government is simply the incumbent government, which continues to operate in the interim period.
Table 1. Finnish public opinion on the Libya operation
Question: Should Finland participate in the Libya operation? Percent

Yes, for instance by sending fighter jets 6
Yes, by participating in the alliance, but without a military contribution 14
No, by participating in crisis resolution later on, for example in the 47
protection of evacuations and humanitarian aid
No, Finland must not participate in the operation in any way 25
Cannot tell 8
N ¼ 1,307. Source: TNS Gallup, adapted from Himanen (2011).
Finnish Domestic Politics and OUP

Except for some critical remarks against “Finnish passivity” in the Libyan crisis
from former ministers Elisabeth Rehn and Matti Vanhanen, and from a few
Finnish researchers and journalists, there was no domestic pressure on the stra-
tegic leadership to participate in OUP.15 All of the parties in Parliament adopted
the position that Finland should not participate in military actions in Libya
(Silfverberg et al. 2011).
Several of the respondents were of the opinion that Finnish decision-making
on OUP in late March and early April 2011 was influenced by the impending par-
liamentary elections, scheduled for April 17 (Respondents 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10,
12, 13). A political advisor to the Social Democrats, for instance, said that the elec-
tions were a “concrete issue which was part of the background [to the political de-
liberations on OUP]” (Respondent 4). A member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee said that the elections “certainly had been in the minds of ministers
and decision-makers” and “that participation in OUP would be quite complicated
under those circumstances” (Respondent 3). A cabinet minister also admitted
that the political consequences of OUP for the upcoming elections had been
debated within different parliamentary committees and that the elections could
have influenced the OUP decision (Respondent 2). For others, the impending
election was even the primary factor for the Finnish “no” (Respondents 9, 12). As
stated by a director at the Defense Ministry: “The reason for Finland not partici-
pating in OUP was the upcoming parliamentary elections” (Respondent 9).
Former Defense Minister Rehn also suspected that the government refrained
from participation in OUP because of the upcoming elections (Helsingin Sanomat
2011).
Both political survival and political stability seem to have been present in the
decision-making. In order to demonstrate empirically the relationship between
political survival and foreign policy, let us first look at the state of public opinion
through polling. In the polls conducted by the Advisory Board for Defense
Information (ABDI), it is clear that the Finnish public, by and large, shares the
strategic culture of the strategic leadership, with the exception of Foreign
Minister Stubb (Defense Information 2010).16 The support for military non-
alignment, for instance, has varied between 79 and 58 percent since 1996, while
the support for military alignment has varied between 34 and 16 percent. In 2010,
67 percent of the respondents believed that Finland should remain militarily non-
aligned. With regard to NATO, only 25 percent believed that Finland should seek
membership, while 68 percent opposed it. The most important single reason
15
Vanhanen questioned why Finland was taking part in the EU-led intervention against sea pirates off the coast
of Somalia and was involved in ISAF but not in Libya (Yle Uutiset 2011c).
16
ABDI is a parliamentary committee set up by the government. It conducts annual surveys on the opinions of
Finns regarding security and defense policy. A total of 1,017 respondents were interviewed for the 2010 survey. The
interviews were conducted between September 24 and October 11.
FREDRIK DOESER 753
given for not seeking NATO membership was that Finnish soldiers would be sent
abroad to take part in foreign wars. Furthermore, 97 percent of the respondents

thought that the primary military task of the Finnish Defense Forces was to safe-
guard the territorial integrity of Finland; 56 percent believed that participation in
preventing crises in various parts of the world belonged to the tasks of the defense
forces. However, as many as 40 percent took a negative view on this. Regarding
the Afghanistan operation, 48 percent thought that Finland should end its mili-
tary presence, whereas 46 percent thought it should continue (ibid.).
Furthermore, on April 5–7, 2011, a TNS Gallup poll showed that only 6 percent
of the respondents supported military participation in OUP, while as many as 86
percent thought that Finland should not participate with military forces at all.
These data are presented in Table 1.
As seen in Table 1, 47 percent of the respondents adopted a position very simi-
lar to that of the key decision-makers (not including Stubb); that is, Finland
should only participate in the management of the Libyan crisis in a later phase,
and as many as 25 percent regarded even the provision of humanitarian aid as
too much. In their opinion, Finland must not be involved in Libya in any shape
or form. Voters of the National Coalition supported the sending of planes most
enthusiastically; however, only 13 percent of the party’s supporters were fully in
favor. Thus, regardless of party affiliation, Finns were strongly against involvement
in OUP (Himanen 2011), and were clearly not mentally prepared for changes in
strategic culture. This created a situation in which there were very few votes to be
won by arguing for participation, but, potentially, many to be lost, especially since
the Libya issue had the potential of becoming a “public issue” (Respondents 8,
12).
That a majority of the public was against participation in OUP was recognized
by several of the respondents. One cabinet minister, for instance, noted that there
probably were different opinions, but that the majority of the public “understood
the position of the government” (Respondent 1). Another respondent noted that
the public probably “felt a bit relieved” by the government’s decision: “When
there is a question of participating in some kind of activity which could contain
elements of war, Finns, especially the older generation, are worried” (Respondent
4). Furthermore, a Foreign Ministry official noted that “I think the general public
basically agreed with the decision-makers on this added-value question. What we
were contributing with was the proper thing to do” (Respondent 7; also
Respondent 5).
Furthermore, a cabinet minister admitted that the elections could have influ-
enced the Finnish decision, since the strategic leadership had an interest in avoid-
ing making OUP a “contentious issue” prior to Election Day (Respondent 2; also
Respondent 5). Another respondent believed that the elections made participa-
tion in OUP more difficult, because OUP participation would have divided the
voters of all of the major parties (Respondent 13). This was also recognized by an-
other respondent: “it was in the middle of the election campaign, and then there
is always need for parties to try to avoid very controversial things which could
scare away supportive citizens” (Respondent 4). A Finnish researcher noted that
the impending elections “would have exposed the people who would have pushed
for OUP to political risks of being clearly labeled as militant, aggressive. All bad
things, as far as the voting population would be concerned” (Respondent 12).
Furthermore, the leadership might have been afraid of committing to OUP, be-
cause the OUP issue could be used in an election debate by the opposition parties
(Respondent 10). This respondent also noted:
However, if there had been no impending elections, the government might still
have opted for non-participation. But, on the other hand, without the upcoming
elections, the government would have had more time, which could have created bet-
ter circumstances for leading Finland into OUP. (Respondent 10)

The question of time was also pointed out by other respondents, who said that
the upcoming elections reduced the time needed for the government to “sell”
Finnish OUP participation to the people (Respondents 9, 12). Thus, several of
the respondents believed that the strategic decision-makers had taken into ac-
count the public and the timing of the next election in their OUP decision, due
to considerations of political survival. However, they were also of the opinion that
this was not a sufficient configuration of factors for the Finnish OUP decision.
The political stability argument also seems to have played a role in the calcula-
tions of the key decision-makers. President Halonen stated in an interview that
the assembling of Parliament in order to debate participation in Libya would
have been difficult, yet she did not consider it as the only reason for Finland’s
non-participation (Yle Uutiset 2011d).17 Several of the respondents noted that
the upcoming elections made participation in OUP more difficult, because the
decision would have to be implemented by a caretaker government (Respondents
2, 7, 8, 13). As noted by a director at the Foreign Ministry:
While events were unfolding in Libya, we held parliamentary elections in Finland.

The new government was formed only in June 2011. This may have affected the
decision-making, since a caretaker cabinet is not supposed to make far-reaching pol-
itical decisions, only run the day-to-day business of government. (Respondent 7)
Political stability was also highlighted by other respondents, noting that the
decision-makers most likely took into account the problem that Finnish OUP par-
ticipation would have to be implemented by a caretaker government and then
bind the incoming government (Respondents 2, 8). As it turned out, a new gov-
ernment coalition was formed with Jyrki Katainen (National Coalition) as prime
minister, which also included the Social Democrats and four smaller parties.
Furthermore, a political advisor to the Left Party added that the elections
implied that many members of Parliament were away from the capital, conducting
work in their electoral districts. “Many parliamentary members were relieved [by
the government’s decision], since it meant that they would not have to debate the
decision in Parliament and they could instead concentrate on the upcoming elec-
tions” (Respondent 5). As noted by a director at the Defense Ministry: “The
[international] decision-making process regarding OUP was exceptionally fast,
and we had no possibilities to take the issue into the national political decision-
making process” (Respondent 9). The major reason for this was the upcoming
elections, which implied that Finnish politicians were occupied with domestic af-
fairs (ibid.).
Thus, the upcoming elections seem to have been taken into account by the stra-
tegic leadership, partly because of political survival, partly because of the desire to
maintain political stability. As summed up by several of the respondents: The im-
minent elections strengthened the feeling among decision-makers that Finland
should follow its long-standing policy of refraining from military-demanding oper-
ations (Respondents 4, 8, 13). Thus, the decision was influenced by the inter-
action between culture and domestic politics, and the two hypotheses presented
in the previous subsection evaded falsification. However, a critic might argue that
Finland would have refrained from OUP, even if there had been no upcoming
elections. Although it is impossible to provide a definitive answer to this question,
the evidence presented above suggests that the likelihood for participation would
17
In case of particularly demanding military operations, the government must, before submitting its proposal,
consult Parliament by providing it with a report on the purpose, objectives, risks, and costs of the operation
(Kerttunen 2014, 108).
FREDRIK DOESER 755
have increased if there had been no elections. As demonstrated in the cultural

analysis, the Finnish OUP decision was contested, even within the strategic leader-

ship, and there were external factors pushing for participation. As shown in the
domestic political analysis, the upcoming elections raised the political risks
involved in joining OUP and made decision-makers preoccupied with political sta-
bility. However, whether Finland eventually would have joined the operation, in
case there had been no elections, is impossible to know for sure.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the Finnish OUP decision was influenced by
the interaction of strategic culture and domestic political calculation. This means
that an eclectic approach, based on literature on strategic culture and on litera-
ture on the domestic politics of foreign policy, is necessary in order to provide a
nuanced explanation of this case. By developing four elements of strategic cul-
ture, the article has also increased the applicability of strategic culture to studies
of participation/non-participation in military operations. Furthermore, by discuss-
ing two different domestic political reasons, survival and stability, the article has
also elaborated on the importance of election timing.
What, then, are the implications for the study of strategic cultural change?
Since imminent general elections can strengthen the feeling among decision-
makers to follow strategic culture, as illustrated by the Finnish case, domestic pol-
itics may also have the potential to strengthen the feeling that the time is ripe for
changes in culture. Turning to the Swedish OUP decision, some interesting obser-
vations can be made. First, parts of Swedish culture can be said to have changed
when Sweden joined OUP, since, inter alia, the Swedish Air Force had not been
involved in military action since 1963, in a UNSC operation in the former Belgian
Congo (Doeser 2014). In contrast with the Finnish situation, the Swedish govern-
ment’s decision was supported by a broad parliamentary consensus and by a posi-
tively oriented public, and the decision was made by a newly installed govern-
ment, with over three years to the next election.18 Thus, Sweden’s domestic
situation can be said to have strengthened the feeling among decision-makers
that the time was suitable for changes in culture, while Finland’s created the op-
posite feeling among decision-makers.
On the basis of this two-case comparison, it seems reasonable to assume that
when governments are close to deviating from their strategic culture, such as con-
sidering participation in a military operation that contradicts parts of the existing
culture, governments might turn their attention to the domestic situation for fur-
ther information on what course to choose. The likelihood that a government will
deviate from strategic culture can be hypothesized to be affected by a combin-
ation of three domestic factors: the view of opposition parties regarding strategic
cultural change; the view of public opinion regarding strategic cultural change;
and the timing of the next election. The effects of these variables, given that there
are external incentives to change strategic culture, can be illustrated by six
hypothesized situations (situation (a) is identical to the Swedish decision, while
situation (f) is identical to the Finnish decision):
a. Parties for change in culture þ Public for change in culture þ No elec-

tions in the near future ¼ Very high likelihood for deviations from
culture
18
A case that would be similar to Finland is Germany’s position on the Iraq War in 2002–2003, which can be ex-
plained by the combination of German culture and the timing of the Bundestag elections (Forsberg 2005).
b. Parties for change in culture þ Public against change in culture þ No elec-

tions in the near future ¼ High likelihood for deviations from culture19

c. Parties against change in culture þ Public for change in culture þ
Elections in the near future ¼ Relatively high likelihood for deviations
from culture20
d. Parties against change in culture þ Public for change in culture þ No
elections in the near future ¼ Relatively low likelihood for deviations
from culture21
e. Parties for change in culture þ Public against change in culture þ
Elections in the near future ¼ Low likelihood for deviations from culture
f. Parties against change in culture þ Public against change in culture þ
Elections in the near future ¼ Very low likelihood for deviations from
culture
It should be noted that if a state “deviates,” it is unlikely that a complete cul-

tural reorientation will occur, but rather that culture changes incrementally, since
“the effects of strategic culture will be more or less strongly stamped upon stra-
tegic behavior of all kinds” (Gray 1999, 68). Culture as a “shaping context for be-
havior” can never be relegated to the sidelines, not even in the face of strong do-
mestic and external pressures for cultural change. Furthermore, policy choices
can contradict culture without leading to a long-term change in the culture. For
instance, Britain acted as a major continental power between 1916 and 1918, “but
that brief continental performance did not cancel or deny the contrary character
of Britain’s dominant strategic culture [as a maritime power]” (ibid.).
Since the theoretical relationships above are based only on the investigation of
a single case, with comparison to a reference case, the empirical reach of these
should be examined further in other cases. Examples can be found in the bomb-
ing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, in which states
such as Denmark, Germany, and Norway deviated from their cultures when con-
tributing to the military effort. Another operation is the ongoing campaign
against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, in which most participating states seem
to have contributed in a way that is consistent with their previous behavioral pat-
terns in military operations. How did opposition parties, public opinion, and elec-
tion timing matter for these continuities and discontinuities in strategic culture?
Interviews22
Respondent 1 (Center Party, Cabinet Minister), December 10, 2014, Helsinki.
Respondent 2 (Swedish People’s Party, Cabinet Minister), November 27, 2014,
Helsinki.
19
The high likelihood for deviation is the result of the absence of upcoming elections, which creates opportuni-
ties for the government to ignore public opinion without risking immediate electoral retribution. As for the long
run, the public tends to forget what their politicians do relatively quickly (Doeser and Eidenfalk 2016, 577).
20
The relatively high likelihood is the result of the combination of public demands for change and upcoming
elections, which creates opportunities for the government to strike political points among the electorate just before
Election Day, while at the same time delivering a blow against the political opposition. The reason for putting this
situation after situation (b) in terms of likelihood is that imminent elections always have the potential to decrease
the willingness to deviate from culture, due to the imperative of political stability.
21
The relatively low likelihood is the result of the absence of incentives for the government to follow public
opinion, since there are no general elections in the near future. In addition, political parties are against cultural
change.
22
The position of the respondent at the time of the Finnish decision-making on OUP (March–April 2011) is
given. Interviews from 2014 were conducted by MA student Björn Jönsson, while interviews from 2015 were con-
ducted by the author.
FREDRIK DOESER 757
Respondent 3 (National Coalition Party, Foreign Affairs Committee), November

26, 2014, Helsinki.

Respondent 4 (Social Democratic Party, Political Advisor), November 25, 2014,
Helsinki.
Respondent 5 (Left Party, Political Advisor), November 28, 2014, Helsinki.
Respondent 6 (Special Advisor, Foreign Ministry), June 8, 2015, Helsinki.
Respondent 7 (Director, Foreign Ministry), December 4, 2014, Helsinki.
Respondent 8 (Advisor, Defense Ministry), June 9, 2015, Helsinki.
Respondent 9 (Director, Defense Ministry), October 7, 2015, by e-mail.
Respondent 10 (Professor, Tampere University), August 22, 2015, by telephone.
Respondent 11 (Researcher, Tampere University), March 22, 2015, by telephone.
Respondent 12 (Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs), December
17, 2014, Helsinki.
Respondent 13 (Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs), June 8,
2015, Helsinki.
Respondent 14 (Lecturer, National Defense University), August 26, 2015, by e-
mail.
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Strategic Culture

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Foreign Policy Analysis (2017) 13, 741–759

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This article integrates literature on strategic culture with literature on

The decision made by the government of Finland to refrain from participation in

participation was seriously considered, implying that a deviation from strategic

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By delimiting strategic culture to these elements, the concept becomes more

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Finnish Strategic Culture and OUP7

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based on conscription.10 According to Finnish culture, participation in interna-

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decision is “a logical continuation from what we have done previously in interna-

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We have been consistent in our foreign policy. We supported an UN-sanctioned op-

In addition, Finnish decision-makers stated on several occasions that it was un-

With regard to organizational framework, the Finnish strategic leadership pre-

operations, in contrast to NATO operations (Respondent 13). As noted by one

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President Halonen, in particular, was negatively oriented toward participation

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Domestic Politics and Strategic Culture

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Table 1. Finnish public opinion on the Libya operation

Question: Should Finland participate in the Libya operation? Percent

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N ¼ 1,307. Source: TNS Gallup, adapted from Himanen (2011).

Finnish Domestic Politics and OUP

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While events were unfolding in Libya, we held parliamentary elections in Finland.

have increased if there had been no elections. As demonstrated in the cultural

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a. Parties for change in culture þ Public for change in culture þ No elec-

b. Parties for change in culture þ Public against change in culture þ No elec-

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It should be noted that if a state “deviates,” it is unlikely that a complete cul-

Respondent 3 (National Coalition Party, Foreign Affairs Committee), November

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