445343

2012
CAC0010.1177/0010836712445343LödénCooperation and Conflict

Article
Cooperation and Conflict
47(2) 271­–284
Reaching a vanishing © The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836712445343
future of neutrality norms cac.sagepub.com

in Sweden and Finland

Hans Lödén

Abstract
This rejoinder article takes the contributions in the Special Issue of Cooperation and Conflict –
Vol. 46(3) – on Neutrality and ‘Military Non-Alignment’ as point of departure for a discussion
of some of the problems former neutrals face in shaping their foreign and security policies. The
author argues that current and future developments regarding neutrality norms are dependent on
internal factors such as national identity and public opinion, and on external factors such as the
military non-aligned states’ relationships to EU, NATO and, not least, the UN. The possibility of a
‘Second Option’ of full-scale military cooperation if a preferred neutral position fails is discussed.
Increased UN activism, for example, connected with the R2P concept and the tendency to
outsource major UN-mandated military operations to NATO, is touched upon as well as
the Libya crisis of 2011 and some of its implications for European foreign and security policy
cooperation. Special attention is given to current Swedish debates on military non-alignment and
NATO membership.

Keywords
CFSP, EU, Finland, military non-alignment, NATO, neutrality, Sweden, UN

Introduction
Is neutrality, as concept and practice, useful in our understanding what shapes the foreign
and security policy of former neutrals today and in the future? According to convincing
empirical and theoretical evidence in the Special Issue (SI) of Cooperation and Conflict
(vol. 46, no. 3, September 2011), the answer to this question is in the affirmative. The
issue thus contributes significantly to our understanding of changes in former neutrals’
foreign and security policies in reflecting on some of their prerequisites, both historical
and current. Attention is also paid to Ulrika Möller and Ulf Bjereld’s framework for

Corresponding author:
Hans Lödén, Department of Political and Historical Studies, Karlstad University, SE-651 88 Karlstad, Sweden
Email: hans.loden@kau.se
272 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

analysing policy transformation among European former neutrals introduced in an earlier

issue of the journal (2010).
Taking the 2011 Libyan crisis1 as the starting point for this discussion shows that:
the European Union (EU) is still far from reaching a common European foreign and
security policy, Europe remains, at least militarily-logistically, heavily dependent on
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deliver concrete results even in its
own neighbourhood, and European countries, large and small, behaved differently
before the crisis.2 All this has implications for the future of phenomena often described
as ‘neutral’, ‘military non-aligned’ or ‘post-neutral’.3 Indeed, some of these implications
are discussed at the end of the article.
External events and international institutions are obviously important for the future of
neutrality and non-alignment; two of them, NATO and the EU, are much discussed in
this SI and are identified by all authors as being central to any ongoing discussion on the
future of (post) neutrality. In this article, it is argued that, alongside these institutional
considerations, it should not be forgotten that the relationships of non-aligned countries
with the United Nations are of utmost importance in this connection and in a critical
transitional phase.
The article is in four parts. In the first, the usefulness of the concept of neutrality, as
suggested in the SI, is briefly stated. The second part touches on the relationship between
foreign policy and democracy. In the third part, the overriding question concerns the
norm of neutrality as dichotomous or continuous. The concluding part deals with the
future of neutrality.

Usefulness of the concept of ‘neutrality’ today

If concepts are viewed as tools for thinking and analysing variations in what can be
called ‘reality’, the question is: Do we really see such variations in foreign policy behav-
iour today that a concept such as ‘neutrality’ can be used to understand these appropri-
ately? The answers presented in the SI can be summarized in four points. First, that
neutrality has been a distinct way – with national variations – of state behaviour; second,
that neutrality is closely connected with national identity, with authors giving different
stress to the exact relationship between the two; third, that the changes in definition and
practice of neutrality have been driven by national elites, with stronger or weaker inter-
national connections, and contrary to beliefs held by public opinion; and fourthly, that
the general tendency of this change so far has been towards a more militarily inclined
agenda.
Yet, there is also different emphases among the authors on some issues, the most
important one perhaps what shape former neutrals’ foreign and security policies will
take in the future: Will the ‘neutrals’ be just as other EU and NATO members or will
they follow a more autonomous course? This Rejoinder will return to this aspect in the
last section.
Before turning to current and future situations, let us dwell upon what could be learnt
from the historical experience of Swedish Cold War foreign and security policy regard-
ing choices and problems for small states. As Jessica Beyer and Stephanie Hofmann
(2011: 287) establish in the SI, small states can, according to Realism, choose between
Lödén 273

joining an alliance or declare neutrality, hope being left alone. This division is, of course,
partly true (Hakovirta 1988). Yet, the Realist perspective obscures the possibility of
having neutrality as a first option and alliance as second, i.e. what Sweden tried during
the Cold War. Choosing this ‘Second Option’ track, Sweden reserved the right to become
a belligerent if attacked by a party to the war (Bjereld et al., 2008; Kronvall and Petersson,
2005). Several of the authors in the SI touch on the topic. Yet, since the choice also sheds
light on the difficulties of reconciling foreign policy and democracy and this contradiction
presents an important backdrop to the current Swedish debate on the future of military
non-alignment, it will be dealt with in the next section.

The relationship between foreign policy and democracy

Foreign policy can be characterized by what has been called the ‘incompatibility hypoth-
esis’ (Goldmann, 1986), according to which democratic control of foreign policy is
restricted by the principles of bargaining, supreme interest and remoteness. The three
principles taken together describe a general, democratic deficit, problem regarding for-
eign policy. During the Cold War, the issue of incompatibility between foreign policy
and democracy was put to a test in Sweden. It is thus worthwhile perhaps exploring the
Swedish case at this point.
Beginning in the early 1950s, Sweden developed secret (to the public, yet also to the
elite with few exceptions) understandings with Western powers. This rapport had the
strong potential to develop into a full-scale military partnership if Sweden was duly
attacked by the Soviet Union. The extent and motives of the understandings between
Sweden and NATO powers have been the subject of much discussion in the past two
decades and indeed were scrutinized by two official commissions (Om kriget kommit,
1994; Fred och säkerhet 2002), and by scholars (see, for instance Dalsjö (2006); Widén
(2009)). Even in 2011, there remains an ongoing general debate fuelled by new ‘expo-
sures’ of what took place during the Cold War years, such as, the discussion articulated
by journalist Mikael Holmström (2011).
No one today denies the extent of the secret understandings between Sweden and the
NATO powers during those years; rather the debate in Sweden focuses on the extension,
meaning and implications of them. What can be seen today in Sweden represents, in
Agius’s words, that ‘there is a politics of post-neutrality at work which relies on privileg-
ing certain narratives and discourses about neutrality, identity and security over others’
(2011: 371). Certainly, the outcome of these politics will have repercussions for Sweden’s
future security policy.
Despite the outcome of that struggle, a core issue is whether the second option track
is defendable from a democratic perspective? An obvious answer is that it must be
deemed acceptable to aim at neutrality as a first position and, at the same time, prepare
for something else should neutrality fail. Yet, at least two aggravating circumstances are
at hand, one general, one specific, for the Swedish context. The general is how to remain
credible in the eyes of all contending large powers as a neutral while still preparing to
accept, and planning for, military help from one side in order to fight the other? Secrecy
is of course the answer to that, and thus it can be argued that the Swedish behaviour in
this regard represents nothing more that practical politics and policy pragmatism. Of
274 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

course, the jury remains out on whether this pragmatic approach actually worked, and
whether the Soviets had confidence in the Swedish position in reality. What is known is
that the Soviets acquired a general appreciation about Sweden’s Western military coop-
eration, although perhaps without detailed knowledge and expertise (Petersson, 1994).
Soviet conclusions, especially in the event of war, can only be guessed. Certainly, Bo
Petersson, who explored Soviet archives at the beginning of the 1990s, concludes that
the Soviets nevertheless preferred to handle and deal with (Sweden as) an unorthodox
neutral before an orthodox NATO member (Petersson, 1994: 144).
The rather specific circumstances gradually changed the way ‘neutrality’ was
officially described and, perhaps, understood by the Swedish public during the Cold War.
Starting in 1949 and up until the end of the 1960s, Swedish doctrinal statements quite
clearly said that the country, if attacked, would need, and hoped for, outside military
assistance, i.e. from the West (Dalsjö, 2006: 103). Two changes made such official
statements more problematic. First, during the 1970s, the help-from-abroad option was
replaced by the doctrine of marginality, saying that an attack upon Sweden would be part
of a bigger Soviet assault on Western Europe, thus making it more probable that Sweden
could defend itself without outside assistance. Second, increased foreign policy activism
during the late 1960s and the 1970s, prescribed an international role for Sweden where
neutrality was the prerequisite for the high profile. Officially, Sweden followed a ‘Third
Way’ between and independent of the two super-power alliances and developed
close ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (Lödén, 1999). Thus, the distance increased
between ‘the public face of policy and the maintenance of preparation [for military help
from abroad] … [and] … raised the political cost, to the Social Democratic government,
of an exposure of the preparations that it had secretly authorised’ (Dalsjö, 2006: 280–283).
Sweden found itself in a situation where those involved in the secret understandings
knew that neutrality would be a lost cause if Sweden was attacked and understood
that preparations for outside assistance did not exclude strict neutrality in the event of
war (Bjereld et al., 2008: 223). In the absence of an open debate on these issues, the
public might have had quite a different view of what was acceptable and defendable
within the realm of neutrality.
The democratic problem is thus intertwined with the lack of norm overlap between
elite and public opinion. In order to maintain a policy of neutrality, with strong sup-
port among the public, the elite, for reasons of secret bargaining and national interest,
kept the same public unaware of what the policy actually looked like, thus creating
different understandings between elite and public of how the policy of neutrality was
executed.
In the current security policy landscape, with no military threats to Sweden, there
should be less need for secret understandings. Foreign policy’s democratic deficit could
thus look different. But democratic control in this field still seems to be restricted as the
EU constitutional development shows with, as Devine describes it, ‘a near-zero degree
of norm overlap’ between elite and public opinion. This, in turn, raises relevant questions
‘about the internal legitimacy of EU constitutional development and defence integration
with respect to neutral states’ (Devine, 2011: 360). Of course, this has been a long-
standing challenge for Swedish (and Finnish) policy-makers (see Miles, 1998, 2005)
Lödén 275

– yet one, that has even greater prominence as the EU continues to develop its foreign
and defence capabilities with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.
To this, it could be added that current domestic debate on Cold War experiences
almost exclusively focus on useful arguments for or against continued military non-
alignment, not what to learn from these experiences to strengthen democratic control
of foreign policy.

How to understand the norm of neutrality –

the examples of Sweden and Finland
The authors of the SI see the norm of neutrality as continuous, between countries and
within each country over time. But is the norm to be revised to the point of actually
vanishing?
Certainly the Lisbon Treaty represents a step towards a further integration of, inter
alia, the foreign policies of member states. How important this step will be remains
to be seen. Yet, it is necessary to be aware of the risk of ‘methodological constitution-
alism’: Everything states actually do is not accurately described in constitutions, be
they national or supra-national. Likewise, the interpretational skills of diplomats and
officials in foreign departments should not be underestimated, especially when it
comes to managing tensions between expected behaviour prescribed in legally bind-
ing documents (and treaties) and what is considered to be the pursuit of national
interests as part of pragmatic diplomacy. As Miskimmon (2011: 124) notes, contro-
versies ‘such as the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 have shown that in matters related
to defence, the rules that define security governance can be put to one side when no
commonality of views exists’.
Norm revision can take different ways among neutrals, and this can be, albeit to a
limited extent, illustrated by the variations in Swedish and Finnish reactions to the
2011 Libya crisis and the passing of the Security Council resolution 1973. Sweden was
positive to the respective UN resolution, although Swedish diplomats emphasized that
no decision would be taken until a formal request from NATO had been given. When
such a request was delivered, the Swedish government immediately sent a proposition
to parliament detailing a contribution to the Libyan mission of eight Gripen fighter
jets. The proposition received almost universal parliamentary support, with right-wing,
nationalist Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) as only parliamentary party
voting against (Riksdagsbeslut om svensk Libyeninsats, 2011). Nonetheless, Swedish
participation was restricted to upholding the no-fly zone, excluding attacks on ground
forces in Libya. This restriction was the result of negotiations between government and
parliamentary opposition, where the government wanted to include the protection of
civilians in the Swedish operational mandate for contributing to the Libyan mission,
while the opposing Social Democrats were against this. Social Democratic foreign
policy spokesman Urban Ahlin stated that ‘allied air attacks could develop into something
Sweden couldn’t stand for’ (Svenska Dagbladet, 30 March 2011). The government
chose to prioritize domestic political unity on the issue and, thus, the restriction was
implemented. Finland, also positive to the UN resolution, decided not to participate
militarily at all in Libya. Finnish support would take the form of humanitarian aid,
276 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

including help with the evacuation of refugees, according to foreign minister Alexander
Stubb (Vasabladet, 21 March 2011). Again it can be argued that domestic factors were
prevalent in influencing government thinking since Finnish hesitance was probably
partly due to considerations relating to its (potential) impact on the campaigns for the
upcoming parliamentary election (17 April 2011).4 Further arguments that help explain
Finnish reluctance to military participation in Libya are contributed by Ulrika Möller
and Ulf Bjereld (2010) in their framework for analysing policy transformation among
European former neutrals.
Möller and Bjereld make a distinction between ‘military non-alignment’, which they
see as the core of neutrality, and an ‘active policy of neutrality’, which they see as an
extended version of neutrality and, thus, using variation between the two in order to
explain current policy. According to Möller and Bjereld, Sweden had to drop its active
policy of neutrality in order to keep its military non-alignment (2010: 377). The reasons
given for this are that the strategic dimension of territorial integrity is more significant to
Finnish neutrality than to Swedish. Swedish neutrality, on the other hand, is, to a greater
extent, founded on normative, identity dimensions. This, in turn, made Swedish neutral-
ity more sensitive to domestic and international accusations of selfishness. Continued
Swedish military non-alignment is upheld for reasons of national autonomy, especially
towards the US, while Finnish military non-alignment still has a strong element, built on
a substantial national defence, of protecting territorial integrity towards Russia. ‘To
appease the critics’, Möller and Bjereld argue, ‘Sweden must show that it is not a free-
rider, but willing to contribute to make international peace and security’ (2010: 374 ff.,
quotation p. 377). Different Swedish and Finnish behaviour in the Libyan crisis confirm
Möller and Bjereld’s predictions. The Swedish decision to participate militarily can be
seen as yielding to pressure, domestically and internationally, in order to make its posi-
tion of military non-alignment credible; while Finland, with its distinct attitude towards
Russia, could choose to abstain without risking international criticism.
Yet, it should not be forgotten that norm variation and change takes place as well on
the part of international institutions, thus providing a new, and changing, contextual basis
on which norms are constructed. The establishment, for example, of the idea of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) within the United Nations framework represents such a
change, altering the prerequisites for neutrals to elaborate their own norms and behave in
accordance with them.5 This is discussed further in the next section.

The future of neutrality

The question asked initially – Do we really see such variations in foreign policy behav-
iour today that a concept such as ‘neutrality’ can be used to understand these appropri-
ately? – can be answered with ‘Yes, so far’. However, what if the question is extended
with ‘in the future’? Without any claims to providing a comprehensive answer, this
reflective article can consider some of the most pertinent pro- and con- arguments, and
five points are presented regarding the continued appropriateness of a term connoting a
security and foreign policy position somewhat different to that of NATO membership.
The first point has to do with identity. Libya shows that the socializing effects of the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have been limited when attempting
Lödén 277

to handle conflict situations. This observation is in line with what Elfriede Regelsberger
and Mathias Jopp have noticed; namely that during peaceful conditions the ‘concertation
reflex’ or ‘socialization’ works rather well: yet ‘(w)hen the question of peace or war
arises and transatlantic relations are at stake … CFSP decisions are difficult if not impos-
sible to achieve’ (2011: 405). Libya in 2011 also shows that, first and foremost, NATO
(as an international organization), is still by far the strongest actor when handling con-
flict situations. This implies that future military action on the part of the European Union
will involve a strong US presence. Thus, all countries have to decide on their respective
relationship to the US, and this applies to non-aligned states as well. Some of these coun-
tries will, for political, economic or diplomatic reasons, be reluctant to be too close to the
US. Countries where neutrality (in some form) is an ingrained part of national identity
will be most keen to uphold a policy of autonomy towards the US as a core value.
Therefore, it can be expected that some continued resistance will continue from Sweden,
and perhaps other countries, towards getting too involved with the US. Or, as Agius for-
mulates the issue: ‘However, neutrality is not simply a foreign and security policy
option – it contains deeper resonance and meaning that have implications for how states
understand themselves as actors in the international system and what their identity is
about’ (2011: 384). Nevertheless, identities, even if stable, are not unchangeable. This
means it is necessary to be observant of changes in identity since these probably precede
changes in behaviour.6 It could also be expected that countries with comparatively lim-
ited identity content-based neutrality would leave their non-aligned position sooner than
those with much invested in identity. In the Nordic case, this points in the direction of
Finland being more prepared to change its position regarding NATO membership
than Sweden.
The second point concerns the elite–public opinion gap, as highlighted by Beyer and
Hoffmann and also by Devine in details in the SI, and the existence, at least in Sweden, of
an elite division on the question of military non-alignment. Among political parties in
Sweden in 2011, the conservative Moderate Party (Moderaterna) and the Liberals
(Folkpartiet) are in favour of NATO membership. However, the leading government party
Moderaterna has also made clear publically that NATO membership will not be consid-
ered as a viable option as long as the Social Democrats are against it. The remaining
parties in the four-party Alliance for Sweden governing coalition, the Centre Party
(Centerpartiet) and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna), are both against
Swedish NATO membership. Within the Left-Green (Rödgröna) opposition, all three
parties, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna), Greens (Miljöpartiet) and Left Party
(Vänsterpartiet), are outspoken opponents of Swedish NATO membership, and so are the
right-wing, populist, Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). This ‘non-aligned’ elite
interact with a public opinion where polls in 2010 indicate that more than twice as many
are negative to Swedish NATO membership (50%) as compared to 23% who are positive
(Svenska Dagbladet, 2011b). These interactive dynamics point in the direction of a con-
tinued cautious and military non-aligned foreign policy for Sweden.
The third point deals with the relationship between the EU and NATO. Given the
muscles that NATO can, and does, flex in the fields of conflict management, military
intervention and collective defence, there is often little understanding and/or appetite
among NATO supporters for developing an EU-based common defence. UK Defence
278 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

Secretary Liam Fox expressed this clearly at the 2011 Conservative conference, saying
that ‘any attempt to deepen EU defence integration must be resisted’ and dismissing as
‘nonsense’ suggestions that EU nations should develop a separate joint military capacity
(The Guardian, 2011b). The same view, regarding Sweden, has been articulated by Mike
Winnerstig in a 2011 article about Swedish participation in Libya, arguing for Swedish
NATO membership. Winnerstig (2011) interprets Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty,
saying the article clearly points at NATO, not the EU, as the organization for actual
defence for ‘the 75 per cent of EU members who are also NATO members’. There seems
very little to indicate that the EU will replace NATO as the security organization in the
foreseeable future. And since there is strong opposition to NATO membership among
several military non-aligned states, the future of a tighter, strongly powered CFSP looks
uncertain. Future socializing effects on EU member states consequently look uncertain,
meaning that the possibility for non-aligned countries to, at least partly, go their own
ways is still there.
Nonetheless, European military non-aligned states have to respond to new contexts
evolving around them. Their relationships to the CFSP and to NATO have attracted much
attention in the SI. Another relationship in perhaps need of further attention is the chang-
ing role of the United Nations and the military non-aligned’s cooperation with the organ-
ization. Two features with implications for the non-aligned are especially in need of
consideration; the Responsibility to Protect idea and the mission creep problem.7
Thus, the fourth point focuses on the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) idea which calls for increased activism on behalf of the UN (see Chandler, 2010).
In the Libyan case, R2P was used to argue in favour of an UN-mandated operation.8 The
military non-aligned countries’ internationalist tradition makes it difficult for them to
refuse participation in UN-mandated operations. Yet participation also creates problems
for them. One is the outsourcing of UN operations. Large-scale operations as Libya and
Afghanistan require a powerful actor, and this actor is often NATO. In the form of
UN-mandated but NATO-led operations, the commitments of the non-aligned to UN
sanctions operations are placed under NATO leadership and command via their UN obli-
gations. Paradoxically, the UN mandate, which historically has been used by neutrals as
a necessary condition for taking part in international military operations, now tends to
place them in close contact with NATO; the actor that their respective governments have
tried to keep at a certain distance – often for domestic political reasoning.
Mission creep, which is the fifth point, is another challenge, for non-neutrals and
military non-aligned. UN-mandated operations can develop in directions not foreseen
when the mandate was established. The Libya case is illustrative also in this regard.
During the crisis there were several accounts of NATO and US actions going beyond
what was stated in UNSC resolution 1973. Among these were US around-the-clock air
surveillance, including Predator drones, used to gather information delivered to rebel
ground forces, deployment of British and French special forces on the ground to train
and arm the rebels and shifts in air strike targeting policy (The Guardian, 2011a and
2011c; The New York Times, 2011). Such examples of mission creep are problematic to
non-neutrals, as can be seen in UK debates (The Guardian, 2011a; The Telegraph,
2011). It is even more sensitive in countries where military operations for decades have
been synonymous with UN operations and these, in turn, have been synonymous with
Lödén 279

peace-keeping. When R2P is suspected to develop into involvement in civil war the
political problem is obvious. The Swedish reluctance to fully engage in air operations
in Libya can be seen as a way to try to prevent such a problem. However, what conclu-
sions can be drawn from these points is far from self-evident. This is clearly shown in
current domestic debates in Sweden (and Finland) in 2011.
‘Active internationalism’, which historically is connected to the policy of neutrality,
has rather appeared in the 2011 debates in Sweden, where it was argued as a means to
bring Sweden into line with the more interventionist UN policy and, probably, closer
to NATO. Official spokespersons of the liberal Folkpartiet, for instance, demanded ‘an
active foreign policy’ including regime change in Libya. The word ‘neutral’ was used
to connote an irresponsible or even cynical position when they claim that ‘Sweden
cannot remain neutral between the Arab people’s urge for freedom and the barbarism
that takes place close to European borders’ (Malm et al., 2011). A call for Swedish
NATO membership was formulated by, among others, Johan Forssell, MP for
Moderaterna and member of the parliamentary committee for defence (Forssell, 2011).
Another MP of the parliamentary defence committee, Staffan Danielsson, representing
the traditionally non-alignment friendly, Centerpartiet, called for a parliamentary
investigation on Swedish NATO membership (Danielsson, 2011). When the Social
Democrats said that the Swedish air mission to Libya should not continue beyond the
end of June 2011, the date decided by parliament (Ahlin and Hultqvist, 2011), this was
called ‘a betrayal to the principles of Swedish foreign policy’ by conservative daily
Svenska Dagbladet (Svenska Dagbladet, 2011a). The Social Democratic position was
criticized also by the chairman of the NGO United Nations Association of Sweden,
who called it a ‘betrayal of important UN principles’ (Gabelic, 2011). Following heavy
internal criticism by, among others, former foreign minister and senior diplomat Jan
Eliasson (2011), the party leadership later ‘clarified’ its position, saying that the
Swedish air mission to Libya should end by June 2011 but that other forms of Swedish
military action would be possible (Dagens Nyheter, 2011). The so-called ‘betrayal’ at
the same time seemed to be of rather limited importance to many Swedes, according to
a May 2011 poll (SVT, 2011).9
What takes place is a clear-cut fight to establish hegemonic narratives not only of
the past but of the current. Interpretations of external developments – especially Libya,
but also Afghanistan – have decisive influence on the structuring of the debate. These
interpretations are part of a ‘politics of post-neutrality’ (Agius, 2011: 371) where tra-
ditional key words, such as ‘neutral’, are used, in the Swedish case, in new contexts,
and even implying it represents an immoral position. Which narrative is victorious
within domestic debates is important for the continued construction of national iden-
tity and, thus, for the long-term construction of normative ideas in former neutral
states. This, in turn, will show whether the revision of neutrality norms is reaching a
point where they are actually vanishing or whether they are ‘reverting away’ from such
a point, i.e. being reinvented in the face of changing behaviour.10 Two main alternative
outcomes can be envisaged in this light; on the one side, the securing of the question
of NATO membership for one, several or all of the former military non-aligned, and,
on the other, the continuation of military non-alignment, with national variations
regarding political and military involvement in international conflicts.
280 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

The global political landscape is complex, offering surprises like the Arab Spring
of 2011. New international powers will emerge adding new patterns of conflict and
cooperation to the old. It remains uncertain as to how their future forms and patterns
will look. However, it is likely that small states in the future will see the need for
keeping some distance in relation to larger powers. Clearly, former neutral states
certainly will then use their ‘history, values, culture and past foreign policy practices’
(Agius and Devine, 2011: 271) when defining their roles in the future. On pondering
what these roles might be, two lines of thought should be kept alive simultaneously:
one that remains aware or even beware of changes in identity preceding new behaviour,
and another that does not consider such changes as predetermined.

Notes
 1. Following uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in January 2011, opponents of Libyan leader
Colonel Muammar Gadaffi tried to topple him in mid-February. Protests began peacefully,
but soon escalated into violent confrontation. Early in March, rebels formed the National
Transitional Council (NTC), claiming it as the sole, legitimate representative of Libya. After
some weeks of rapid advances by rebel forces from the eastern part of the country, Gadaffi
struck back with superior firepower, including air strikes, threatening the eastern rebel
stronghold of Benghazi. On 17 March, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973
demanding by ‘all necessary measures’ the protection of civilians, the establishing of a no-
fly zone and an arms embargo on Libya (UNSC, 2011a). Two days later, an international
alliance started military operations against Gadaffi’s forces, halting their eastern advance.
The international operation was put under NATO command. During March and April fight-
ing continued. From mid-May 2011 and for several months, the military situation could be
described as a stalemate. On 27 July, the NTC was recognized by the UK government, soon
followed by other EU and NATO member states. In August, military successes for the rebels
were reported, alongside accounts of more direct NATO and US involvement, including
training and equipping rebel forces, than previously known (New York Times, 2011). At the
beginning of the autumn, Gadaffi’s forces suffered a series of defeats. The regime was fur-
ther isolated militarily and politically. On 21 October, Gadaffi was reported killed in his
native town of Sirte. A few days later, the NTC declared Libya ‘liberated’. On 31 October,
NATO concluded its military operations in Libya.
  2. ‘CFSP died in Libya – we are just looking for a sandbank where we can bury it’, an anony-
mous diplomat in Brussels told Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet in March 2011 (2011c).
Another diplomat, who also requested anonymity, was quoted by news agency DPA as saying:
‘It took NATO five days to start the first operation, patrolling the Libyan coast line to uphold
the arms embargo. We (the EU) could have done it, but the truth is that if we had tried it would
have taken three months to come up with a decision on an operational plan’ (Svenska
Dagbladet, 2011c). When flight operations over Libya had to be coordinated ‘it was obvious
that only US air forces in Europe or NATO can lead such an operation. NATO took responsi-
bility with the US playing an important role behind the scenes’, according to a ‘high ranked
European NATO source’ quoted in Svenska Dagbladet (2011e). An important part of the
problem with Europeans behaving differently was the German decision to abstain on the
Security Council vote on resolution 1973 (Reuters, 2011) and German non-participation in
the military operation in Libya (Embassy, 2011), in sharp contrast to the active involvement
shown by the UK, France and several smaller EU members.
  3. ‘Neutrality’ has been defined and understood within a wide spectrum. At one end can be
placed the legal definition of ‘neutrality’, which falls back on the rights and duties of neutral
Lödén 281

powers as prescribed in the Hague Convention of 1907, sections 5 and 13 (Hague Convention).
At the other end, there is the political position (cf. Agius and Devine, 2011: 269). In the latter,
pragmatic interpretations of how these rights and duties have been implemented in practice
are permitted. Sweden during the Second World War and the Cold War is an example of this.
According to af Malmborg, the Swedish ‘aim was to avoid war, not compliance with the
clauses of the lawbook, and to meet this aim it was sometimes necessary to deviate from a
strict application of the rules of neutrality, but in order to maintain credibility the laws of
neutrality must always serve as a basic code of conduct’ (af Malmborg, 2001: 200). Here,
‘neutrality’ is used to depict not merely the war-time role prescribed in international law but
a peace-time, political, position where a state aims at keeping a distance to big powers. The
latter endeavour is sometimes also described as a ‘policy of neutrality’. ‘Military non-alignment’
is used as a generic term connoting the present policies of the former neutral states. ‘Post-
neutrality’ here represents a condition beyond military non-alignment.
  4. The Finnish decision not to take part in the Libya operation was criticized by, among others,
former Minister of Defence Elisabeth Rehn. Rehn was quoted as saying ‘I thought it was for
being able to participate in operations like this I suffered all trouble’, referring to the domesti-
cally much disputed 1992 decision to procure US-built Hornet jets for the Finnish air force
(Svenska Dagbladet, 2011d).
  5. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept was introduced in a report to the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 (ICISS, 2001). The report’s
central theme is presented as: ‘“The Responsibility to Protect”, the idea that sovereign states
have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when
they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader com-
munity of states’ (ICISS, 2011). For a critical account of the concept, see Chandler (2010).
  6. There are no self-explanatory connections between identity and behaviour. The connections
suggested by Alexander Wendt appear as reasonable: ‘Identities refer to who or what actors
are. They designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors want. They
designate motivations that help explain behaviour. (I say ‘help’ because behaviour also
depends on beliefs about how to realize interests in a given context). Interests presuppose
identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is’. /…/ ‘However,
identities by themselves do not explain action, since being is not the same thing as wanting,
and we cannot “read off” the latter from the former´ (Wendt, 1999: 231).
  7. For R2P, see Note 5. ‘Mission creep’ is a term used to describe the expansion of a military mis-
sion beyond its originally stated goals. One of the first to use the term was NYT reporter John
H. Cushman Jr, in an article on the US mission to Somalia in 1993 (New York Times, 1993).
 8. Interestingly, the R2P argument was mentioned in an official Security Council press
statement on 22 February 2011 (UNSC, 2011b), several weeks before the UNSC resolu-
tion on Libya. UN commentator Mark Leon Goldberg noticed that: ‘I’m fairly certain that
this is the first time that R2P, as it is known, was mentioned in a formal Security Council
statement in reference to an ongoing crisis’ (Goldberg, 2011).
  9. In a poll conducted among 1000 persons by the SIFO institute in May 2011, and presented by
Swedish Television (SVT), about continued Swedish involvement in the military operation
beyond 30 June 2011, 41% answered ‘Uncertain/Don´t know’, 30% ‘Continue’ and 29% ‘End
by the summer’. Among non-socialist voters, 49% answered ‘Continue’ and 16% ‘End by the
summer’ and Left-Green voters 16% ‘Continue’ with 41% in favour of ‘End by the summer’
(SVT 2011).
10. However, Conservative Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt showed what can be seen
as a ‘neutrality reflex’ in the context of the euro crisis (2011–2012). He and his non-Socialist
government in this were joined by the Social Democrats. In December 2011 the European
282 Cooperation and Conflict 47(2)

summit rejected a Franco-German proposal on a treaty change to include, inter alia, tightened
rules on member states’ budgetary discipline. Instead, the majority of summit participants
agreed on a bilateral stability pact including euro-zone members and open to non-members to
join (The Guardian, 2011d). Sweden placed itself in a middle position, between, on the one
hand, euro-zone members and positive non-members and, on the other, the British veto position.
Reinfeldt commented on the stability pact saying that ‘it is written for the euro zone members
and they must submit to certain restrictions and do certain things. This a non-member of the
euro zone reasonably can´t join’ (Svenska Dagbladet, 2011 f.). When the euro-zone members
in January 2012 declared that amendments to the pact were possible, the Swedish government
changed its ‘no’ to a ‘yes’, soon to be followed by the Social Democrats. From both camps,
however, it was emphasized that Sweden wanted to join the pact while maintaining independence
and have no binding obligations (SVT, 2012).

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Author Biography
Hans Lödén is Associate Professor in political science at the Department of Political and
Historical Studies at Karlstad University, Sweden. His research interests include foreign
policy analysis and the formation of collective identities. He is currently working on a
research project focusing on regional action in the European Union.