War avoidance and Prevention Measures

The world faces an increasingly disorderly world where the risk of conflict—and
with it, the possibility of military engagement—is growing. The most worrisome
source of concern is the increasing geopolitical friction among major powers,
particularly between the United States and Russia, but with China as well. While
the prospect of outright war among these countries still seems improbable, the
number of conceivable flashpoints has risen in recent years. Moreover, several
regions of the world continue to be riven by armed conflict, notably the Middle
East, much of Africa, and parts of South Asia. These conflicts are causing
immense humanitarian distress with destabilizing spillover effects into
neighboring regions. Meanwhile, a variety of threats from non-state actors—
whether they be terrorist groups, cyber-hackers, or organized criminal gangs—
also appear to be multiplying.
War Avoidance
For decades now, the default approach to addressing these threats has
been to rely on national military strength to deter and, if necessary, defeat
adversaries. Yet, while nations will always need to maintain the ability to use
decisive military force, relying so heavily on the nation’s armed forces to promote
peace and security has proven to be extremely costly , both in terms of lives lost
and resources expended. At a time of constrained national budgets and
competing domestic investments it is imperative that countries increasingly look
to effective non-military solutions to manage the various security challenges that
one now faces. National strength, in other words, can best be secured by
avoiding war and keeping the peace. 

Strategies

(i) Arms Control and Diplomacy: The usual strategies suggested by

political scientists and international relations experts to prevent war include arms
control and diplomacy. Approaches to arms control and diplomacy vary in their
actual and potential effectiveness. The historical and research literatures on
these approaches are vast (Daase & Meier, 2012; Garcia, 2012). Regardless of
the specific approaches taken, suffice it here to say that arms control and
diplomacy will always remain essential strategies to prevent war, especially in
the nuclear age when humanity is only minutes away from possible destruction.

(ii) Roots of war must also be addressed : Beyond these two essential
strategies, the roots of war must also be addressed. As discussed earlier, war
is a social, not biological, phenomenon and arises from decisions by political and
military leaders to go to war. There is ample evidence that deceit accompanies
many of these decisions, as leaders go to many wars for less than noble
purposes. To the extent this is true, citizens must always be ready to question
any rationales given for war, and a free press in a democracy must exercise
eternal vigilance in reporting on these rationales. According to critics, the press
and the public were far too acquiescent in the decision to go to war in Iraq in
2003, just as they had been acquiescent a generation earlier when the Vietnam
War began being waged (Solomon, 2006). To prevent war, then, the press and
the public must always be ready to question assumptions about the necessity of
war. The same readiness should occur in regard to militarism and the size of the
military budget.
In this regard, history shows that social movements can help prevent or end
armament and war and limit the unchecked use of military power once war has
begun (Breyman, 2001; Staggenborg, 2010). While activism is no guarantee of
success, responsible nonviolent protest against war and militarism provides an
important vehicle for preventing war or for more quickly ending a war once it has
begun.

(iii) International and donor approaches

International organisations and donor agencies have developed their own

approaches and guidelines to conflict prevention. They include the use of aid to
address the structural causes of conflict as well as joined-up approaches to a
range of development, trade, foreign policy and security issues involving
coordination across departments.
(iv) Early warning and early response systems

Conflict prevention requires careful monitoring of indicators of rising tensions and

taking measures to ease them. Early warning consists of data collection, risk
analysis, and the transmission of information with recommendations to targeted
recipients. Early response systems refer to timely and appropriate prevention
initiatives, usually undertaken during latent stages of perceived potential violent
conflict. Early warning and early response systems have been adopted by
international organisations, bi-lateral agencies, research institutions and NGOs.

There is much critique, however, that early warning has not translated into early or
effective response. While the formulation of accurate predictions is challenging, the
more difficult aspect has been persuading political leaders and the public to act upon
warnings. Often civil society organisations end up playing the dual role of warning as
well as implementing measures in response.
2. Direct prevention mechanisms
(i) Preventative diplomacy
The term, ‘preventive diplomacy’ was coined by UN Secretary General ammarskjöld
in the 1960s and referred to preventing the escalation of Cold War proxy wars in
developing countries into global confrontations. After the end of the Cold War,
attention shifted to the threat of internal wars. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali
adapted the term then to mean not simply keeping regional conflicts from going
global, but using diplomatic techniques (i.e. diplomatic persuasion, sometimes
combined with military intervention) to prevent armed conflict between or within
nations from arising in the first place.
(i) Incentives and sanctions

International policy makers often use incentives, sanctions and conditionality as tools
to influence the behaviour of key conflict actors and to alter conflict dynamics.
Incentive-based measures include economic incentives (e.g. development aid),
political incentives (e.g. diplomatic relations, recognition in international/multilateral
institutions such as the EU), and security guarantees. Targeted sanctions, which
have been the subject of increasing attention, focus on applying direct pressure on
individuals who have political decision-making power in governments and groups
that are parties to the conflict. This is considered to be an effective mechanism, and
avoids the infliction of harm on the broader civilian population.
Some conflict analysts argue that incentives and sanctions, on their own, are unlikely
to be sufficient to shift parties into the constructive problem-solving mode that is
usually necessary for successful prevention. As such, they should be regarded and
enforced as part of a comprehensive peacemaking strategy.

(i) International Organizations like UNO, ASEAN, SARC,

(ii) NOGOs
(iii) Special Envoys and Political Missions
(iv) Military / Nuclear Deterrence
(v) Balance of Power
(vi) Political/economic measures

2. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS)

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) or confidence- and security-building

measures (CSBMs) are actions taken to reduce fear of attack by both (or more)
parties in a situation of conflict. The term is most often used in the context of armed
conflict, but is similar in logic to that of trust and interpersonal communication used to
reduce conflictual situations among human individuals. [1]

Objectives of Confidence-Building Measures

Limiting or reducing the level of fear among parties in conflict is essential for
building confidence and a sense of security. Confidence-building measures
(CBMs) aim to lessen anxiety and suspicion by making the parties' behavior
more predictable.

CBMs are agreements between two or more parties regarding exchanges of

information and verification, typically with respect to the use of military forces
and armaments. Some measures attempt to make military capabilities more
transparent and to clarify the intention of military and political activities. Others
establish rules regarding the movement of military forces, as well as mechanisms
for verifying compliance with such rules.[1] Such agreements are meant to build
trust among the conflicting parties and limit escalation. While a single CBM is
unlikely to prevent conflict or contribute to peacebuilding, a series of such
agreements can allow for an increased sense of security. In time, such measures
may even lead to changed understanding of a country's security needs.

Some common CBMs are agreements meant to give each party assurance that
the other is not preparing for surprise military action or pursuing policies
associated with such future action. Such agreements provide a way to avoid
misunderstandings about ambiguous events or perceived threats, and play an
important role in instilling a sense of stability and security. Mutual confidence is
crucial to reducing the likelihood of violent confrontations. In addition, such
measures can allow for new institutional arrangements that pave the way for
more peaceful relations.
Finally, confidence-building measures can be crucial tools in preventive
diplomacy. Parties who mutually recognize existing boundaries and work
together to build confidence are far less likely to enter into deadly conflict.

CBMs typically rely on tools for maintaining direct and quick communication and
monitoring among governments and military forces. Such communication
measures include hotlines, regional communication centers to assist parties in
crisis management, and regularly scheduled consultations among officials of the
armed forces. These measures can be initiated by individual governments, non-
state actors, or third parties such as the U.N., regional organizations, or other
states. They are useful in both interstate and intrastate conflict, and are most
effective during the early stages of a conflict. However, they can be helpful at
any stage of conflict to the extent that they reduce tension and limit any further
escalation.

Military and Diplomatic CBMs

Confidence-building measures can be military, diplomatic, cultural, or political.

However, military and diplomatic measures are the most commonly used in
building confidence among parties involved in protracted conflict.

In the short term, CBMs aim to alter the parties' inaccurate perceptions of each
other's motives and to avoid misunderstandings about military actions and
policies that might otherwise provoke violent conflict. Over time, CBMs can pave
the way for more stable political and diplomatic relations, transform the parties'
ideas about their need for security, and even encourage moves to identify shared
security needs.

Some CBMs create points of contact and interaction between parties, allowing
for greater "openness" with regard to their military capabilities and activities.
These information-exchange mechanisms increase transparency, which in turn
reduces the risk of violence caused by miscalculation or miscommunication. If
parties have extensive knowledge about the activities of the other side, they are
unlikely to go to war unnecessarily.

Such efforts to increase transparency often pertain to the size, composition,

movements, and use of the parties' respective military forces and armaments.
These military and diplomatic CBMs include the systematic exchange of
information about military missions and arms buildup, as well as prenotification
requirements for military movements, troop exercises, or missile tests.[4] The
opportunity for firsthand observation of the other party's equipment or military
exercises might also help to increase transparency.

For example, the Helsinki Final Act inaugurated a series of East-West

confidence- and security-building measures from 1975 to 1990. These included
notification and access agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attacks,
increased restraints on military maneuvers, and regulation of dangerous nuclear
activities.
Once treaties have been made, there must be mechanisms in place to make
parties feel confident that the other side is upholding their side of the agreement.
Such verification includes on-site arms inspections and aerial inspections to
monitor military deployment. Other measures that might be used are technical
monitoring systems placed at or near sites, radar and satellite surveillance
systems located outside the monitored country, and monitored checkpoints
through which weapons must pass.

Such verification processes bring the parties who have signed a treaty into a
cooperative relationship with each other. This can lead to a new sense of mutual
trust and increased understanding.

Hotlines and Crisis Control

In addition to prenotification of upcoming military activities or training exercises,

parties might build confidence through the use of direct telephone lines between
military commanders. Hot lines can help to improve communication between the
adversaries and prevent crises. Such communication allows for openness and
transparency, both of which are essential to building confidence and trust
between parties.

Many countries have implemented programs for increased communication. For

example, in 1991, North and South Korea adopted hot lines and made
agreements for prior notification of military maneuvers. In that same year, India
and Pakistan reratified an agreement for a communications hot line between
military troop commanders.

William Ury has advocated a joint crisis-control center where trained staff from
each nation would communicate by telephone, computer, or face-to-face, and
would work together to forestall or monitor crises.[9] These diplomatic and
military officers would exchange and clarify information, and would have the
opportunity to question the authenticity of the data presented by the other side.
Such a center could clarify the meaning of suspicious events, coincidences, or
military movements. It could also allow parties from each side to engage in
dialogue and get to know each other. Finally, it could serve as a powerful symbol
that the parties are cooperating with each other and could ease public hysteria in
times of crisis. The joint crisis-control center is based on the idea that as the
conflict escalates, communication between the involved parties must also
"escalate."[10] Such communication helps to provide reassurance and avoid
dangerous misunderstandings.

Parties can also develop emergency safety procedures to reduce uncertainty

about what to do in crisis situations. Agreed-upon procedures for handling
accidental air intrusions, ground intrusions, and incidents at sea can help to keep
situations from escalating out of control.

Through "hands off holsters" actions, parties can make it clear to each other that
they are not positioning themselves to strike.[11] For example, they can refrain
from raising their level of alert or from taking direct military action. In addition,
each side can exchange lists of what they perceive to be threatening activities.
This enables each side to better understand what actions the other side finds
particularly frightening. They can then avoid those actions, or explain what they
are doing in a way that reduces fear.

Gradual Reduction in Tension (GRIT)

Confidence building measures can also aid in de-escalation. Gradual Reduction

in Tension (GRIT), a term coined by Charles Osgood, refers to those strategies
whereby mutual tension and fear can be interrupted and the de-escalation
process begun through conciliatory moves. One of the parties announces and
initiates a series of small cooperative moves, and invites the other side to
reciprocate. These moves are continued whether or not there is immediate
reciprocity.[12] If the opponent does respond positively, the first party can make
a second concession, which sets a "peace spiral" in motion. If the first initiative is
ignored, on the other hand, it can be followed by a second or even a third
attempt. These concessions should be designed to build trust and indicate a
willingness to cooperate, but should not be terribly costly. These disarming
moves can allow for a step-by-step process of conflict de-escalation.

Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 is an example of confidence building

through GRIT. Before his trip, hostility and suspicion between Egypt and Israel
was very high, and several wars had already occurred. Sadat announced that he
wanted to visit Jerusalem to increase trust and to diminish tensions between the
two nations.While this conciliatory move cost him very little, it greatly improved
his image and helped to reduce tensions between the two countries. It also
helped pave the way for the historic Camp David Accords a year later.

Cultural and Political CBMs

Cultural and political CBMs can help to promote stability and inspire confidence
in the established government. This is especially important in the context of
intrastate conflict or civil war.

Cultural CBMs aim to demonstrate a government's sensitivity to local cultures

and show respect for traditional authorities. Such measures might include
refraining from repressive laws on language or religion, allowing traditional
authorities some role in local affairs, and demonstrating respect for local
practices.
Political CBMs build confidence in the political system through such measures as
power sharing, electoral reform, and power decentralization. Such
democratization methods foster political inclusion and allow for political
exchange and learning among parties in conflict.

3. Escalation Control and Escalation Dominance

Escalation Control or War control is the deliberate actions of war leaders to limit
or restrain the outbreak, development, scale, intensity, and aftermath of war. The
objective of war control is to forestall the outbreak of war, or when war cannot be
avoided, to control its vertical and horizontal escalation, to strive to minimize the
consequences of war, or to strive to achieve the greatest victory for the smallest
cost. War control includes arms control, crisis control, control of armed conflict,
etc., and is a major component of contemporary strategic research and strategic
guidance. Containing war is not only a task in peacetime; the issue exists in
wartime as well. In wartime, it generally takes the form of containing enlargement
of the scope of the war, restraining escalation of the war’s intensity, and so forth.
Sometimes it even finds expression in the war aim of “using war to restrain war,”
particularly by countries with a defensive strategy. War control stresses the
comprehensive employment of political, economic, diplomatic, and all other
instruments of national power, but military means of course figure largely in the
strategic equation.
War control includes many factors.

(i) Measures to Shape the International Security Environment, Peacefully

Resolve Disputes, and Reduce the Threat of War.
These range from mediation and negotiation of economic and territorial
disputes, through “military diplomacy” and confidence- building measures, to
arms-control and arms-reduction treaties and formal international security
mechanisms.

(ii) Measures to Manage Crises and Prevent or Postpone the Outbreak of

War. Crises should be contained both geographically and in terms of their
subject matter and intensity. Allowing a crisis over one issue to expand and
include other political, economic, or territorial issues is a sure way of losing
control. Such horizontal escalation increases the risk of vertical escalation
toward higher-intensity political or military confrontation. It also increases the
risk of the crisis becoming internationalized, attracting unwelcome intervention
by other concerned parties or, even worse, by great powers and international
organizations. This could limit country’s freedom of action and ability to control
the crisis to its advantage. In some cases, however, deliberately enlarging the
crisis may be a useful tactic to gain control and seize the initiative.9
(iii) Measures Taken During War to Control the Scale, Pace, Scope, or
Intensity of the Conflict. This includes efforts to prevent escalation, minimize
destruction, and shape the course of the war to serve larger political and
foreign policy objectives. The main principle underlying Chinese thought on
war control is that military operations must be firmly subordinated to the larger
national interest and broader political, diplomatic, and economic objectives.
This may sometimes require halting military operations short of their intended
objectives, or modulating the pace and intensity of operations to create the
proper climate for pursuing political ends.
MILITARY MEASURES TO CONTAIN WAR
Containing war requires comprehensive application of political, economic,
diplomatic, and military capabilities. The military part of this effort encompasses a
wide range of actions to shape the overall situation.
(i) Military Intimidation and Deterrence. One of the first contributions the
military can make to controlling a fast-developing crisis is the existence of a
highly visible and capable military force obviously ready to take action.
“Preparedness for war and containment of war are a dialectical unity.” Overt
shows of force and vigorous deployments toward a crisis zone put pressure
on the opponent, helping gain the initiative and control development of the
 crisis. Depending on the situation, this may include moving strategic nuclear
forces or elite conventional units. In other cases, it may be necessary to limit
visible deployments so the opponent does not over-react and escalate more
than one wants. Even then, however, clandestine deployments usually are
necessary in case the crisis does escalate, because in modern high-
technology local war, the first battle is often decisive. One way or another, the
proper posture (and posturing) of China’s forces is seen as a central aspect of
early crisis management.
(ii) Control of Overall War Objectives. Unless fundamental national interests
are at stake, military objectives in the conflict should be constrained to stay in
consonance with political objectives. The history of warfare reveals many
instances where military war aims outstripped the guiding political objectives,
resulting in uncontrolled escalation and complete loss of the political initiative.

(iii) Control of Military Targets. A limited war requires careful balance in the
selection of military targets. On the one hand, one must attack vital targets
that have a decisive effect on the enemy’s military capability and will to fight.
On the other, the targets must be such that the opponent can endure the loss
without being driven to an implacable quest for vengeance and that the
international community can tolerate without being moved to large-scale
political or military intervention. Failure to strike the right balance can cause
unwanted escalation, or put one on the political defensive and cause it to lose
control of the overall situation.
(iv) Control of Military Operational Parameters. Having decided on overall war
aims and the general nature of the target set, there is still a decision of what
“form of warfare” the military operation should embody. This theory can be
grouped into the two broad categories of offensive and defensive warfare,
each expressed in various “forms of operations”—mobile, positional, or
guerrilla warfare; protracted war versus wars of quick decision; wars of
annihilation versus wars of attrition or modern effects-based operations;
whether the conflict should be high- or low-intensity, symmetric or
asymmetric. A correct decision on these operational parameters at the outset
has a significant effect on the ability to maintain control of the conflict.
(v) Control of Warfighting Techniques. The increased killing power of modern
weapons, and the increased “transparency” of the battlefield due to modern
news and information media, require strict control on the selection of weapons
and tactics. Inflicting excessive damage on the enemy, especially on the
civilian population or vital infrastructure, will stir up intense resentment and
bring into play political factors that make it much more difficult to control the
situation. This is not to say extreme measures are not sometimes necessary,
of course; merely that they are inherently difficult to control, and should be
carefully considered. The military commander must not succumb to the
temptation to use whatever means is available to achieve the military
objective. As always, the warfighting techniques should serve the overall
political objectives of the war.
(vi) Control of the Pace, Rhythm, and Intensity of the Conflict. AMS
specialists studying U.S.-British operations in Iraq in 2003 concluded that they
represented the epitome of “highly- contained warfare.” Allied forces tightly
controlled the degree to which military operations interacted with political,
economic, and psychological aspects of the situation, in addition to the more
 visible and unprecedented control over military targets and the overall pace
and rhythm of the conflict. Careful modulation of the pace and intensity of the
fight can create favorable conditions for the political and diplomatic struggle.
The side that holds the initiative can press the offensive and bring the conflict
to a resolution while its advantage still holds; the side that lacks the initiative
can slow and drag out the conflict while it seeks an opportunity to reverse the
situation.
(vii) Control the End of the War. Purely military considerations must not
be allowed to determine when and how the conflict comes to an end.
Throughout most of human history, wars were for national or societal survival,
and political war aims could not be achieved without the complete
achievement of military objectives. In an era of limited war, on the other hand,
it is quite possible that political objectives may come within reach before the
military operation has played out to its intended end. In such a case,
continued conflict could harm rather than serve the national interest, and the
wise leader will either terminate or prolong the conflict if it is politically
advantageous to do so.
(viii) Control the Post-Conflict Situation. The military’s role in war control
does not end when the shooting stops. Continued military pressure may be
needed to make the enemy abide by terms of the settlement, potentially
including a resumption of military conflict to make the enemy return to the
agreement.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INITIATIVE

Seizing and holding the initiative requires rapid reaction to an incipient crisis,
including immediate deployment of sizeable forces as early as possible. It requires
clear, quick, and correct decision-making. It requires strong standing forces, as well
as thorough contingency planning and rapid mobilization of societal resources. It
requires a resolute and principled political stance, firmly asserted at the outset and
throughout the confrontation. It requires a rapid transition to war when events reach
that level, and employment of formidable military power at every stage, particularly
when settlement talks seem near. And it requires avoiding internationalization of the
problem or outside political and military intervention, especially by hegemonic
powers.
2. Escalation Dominance