DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, BM No. 1678, Dec 17, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and
he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Should Benjamin Dacanay be granted leave to practice law again?

RULING: Yes. But he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Khan vs Simbillo, AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS: Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo paid for an advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667."The Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Thus, Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Did Atty. Simbillo violate the Code and the Rules of Court through improper advertising?
RULING: Yes. There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal
business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath, BM no. 712, March 19, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide
along with 8 others in the Hazing of neophyte Raul Camaligan in Sept. 1991.
Argosino was discharged from probation and filed a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
As evidence of his good moral character, Petitioner submitted to the court, as requested, 15 letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious
orders and evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of the hazing victim.
On the other hand, the victim’s father, states that (1) the infliction of severe physical injuries which led
to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. (2)  He consented to the accused's plea of
guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity. And (3) As a
Christian, he has forgiven petitioner for the death of his son but still feels the pain. (4) He is not in a
position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the
matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
ISSUE: Is Argosino now morally fit for admission to the bar?

RULING: Yes. In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Ferdinand A. Cruz vs Judge Mijares

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his
behalf, before the RTC for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his
claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court
and conduct his litigation personally. During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner
to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as
counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a
Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay
naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?"
Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares.
The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial
could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that
the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the
belief that justice will not be served.Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality after a motion for
reconsideration. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit
the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions
under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-
A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A.
ISSUES:
1. May Cruz represent himself in a civil suit under Section 34 Rule 138 and not under Rule 138-A?
2. Should Judge Mijares be inhibited from the case?

RULING:
1. Yes. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney,
and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The
individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to
the termination of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted
to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a
lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore,
Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410.
He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself.
2. No.  A Motion for Inhibition must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she
should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Petition to Sign the Roll of Attorneys, Michael A. Medado, BM no. 2540, Sept 24, 2013
FACTS: Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 1979 and passed the same year's bar examinations. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at
the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled
date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar
Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, Medado found the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."

ISSUE: 1. Did Medado violate the Code of Professional Resopnsibility?

2. Should Medado be allowed to Sign the Roll of Attorneys?
RULING: 1. Yes. Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought
that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. In spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law violating Canon 9 of the
Professional Code of Responsibility : CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.”
2. Yes, But as Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000.
During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Vargas and Panes vs Atty. Ignes, et al, AC No. 8096, July 5, 2010
Facts: Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired
respondent Atty. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006
Two groups, Dela Pena and Yaphockun, claim to be legitimate BOD of KWD.
Dela Pena board filed Civil Case No. 1793 to annul the appointment of 2 directors alledly conniving with
Yaphockun. The board also adopted Resolution No. 009 appointing Atty. Viajar Jr. and Atty. Mann as
private collaborating counsels of KWD and it’s BOD under Atty. Ignes.
Feb 9, 2007 Atty. Viajar Jr. and Atty. Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of Court
representing KWD and March 9, 2007Civil Case No. 1799 representing KWD as well.
Feb 16, 2007 OGCC approved retainership of Atty Cuanan as new counsel of KWD stating Atty. Ignes
retainership expired Jan 14, 2007
March 2, 2007 OGCC stated that stipulation provided that :
(a) KWD or OGCC can terminate the contract anytime
(b) OGCC authority withdrawal under justifiable circumsances.
(c) Atty. Ignes termination was justified that because Local Water Utilities Administration
confirmed Yaphocukun board as new BOD and said board terminated Atty. Ignes’ services.
Complainants filed disbarment case against Atty Ignes, Mann, Viajar Jr. and Nadua before IBP alleging:
(a) they filed SCA No 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as KWD counsel without legal authority
(b) Atty. Ignes represented KWD after OGCC confirmed Atty Ignes contract expired
Defendants allege that : (a) They can represent KWD unti April 17, 2007 since Atty Ignes was not
notified of pre-termination
(b) Atty Mann stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007, the other Atty’s
the same echoed
Complainants filed before IBP attachments showing: (a) Jan 28, 2008 Steno notes showing Atty. Ignes
as counsel of KWD
(b) Feb 28, ‘08 Notice of Appeal signed by Atty.
Ignes
ISSUES: 1. Did Ignes, Mann and Viajar Jr. have valid authority to appear as KWD counsels?
2. Did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?
3. Are respondents deserving of disciplinary action?
RULING: 1. No. (a) Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as
collaborating counsel. No proof that OGCC and COA approved Atty. Nadua's
engagement as counsel
(b) Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD
under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
(c) Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD without authority after his authority as its
counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he
was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove
his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

2. Yes. (a) respondents admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and are
aware of our ruling in Phividec. They have full grasp that there are indispensable
conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with
the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have
no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of
KWD without complying.
(b) Despite the question on respondents’ authority as counsels of KWD which
question was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent
motion to disqualify KWD’s counsels26 dated February 21, 2007 and during the
hearing on February 23, 200727 respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in
the case on March 9, 2007.
3. Yes. In Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of ₱5,000 on the respondent for willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
respondent therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification
Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of ₱5,000 on each respondent.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Phil Assoc of Free Labor Union vs Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, CIR
FACTS : In case of PAFLU et. al. vs Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. et al. all appearances made in
behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning. The Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ....................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................... 5%
The award to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer is sought to be voided.
PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas),
their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

ISSUES 1. May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?
2. May a union appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members?
RULING: 1. NO.
(a) Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers.
(b) Sec. 5 (b) RA 875 cannot justify that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees. The same section adds
that “it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine…”
(c) Sec. 24 Rule 138 imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative
in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees.
(d) American Jurisprudence : that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in
hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
2. Yes. a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted
to institute an action in the industrial court, on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Verlita Mercullo vs Atty. Marie Ramon, AC No. 11078

FACTS: Carmelita Verdano authorized her children, Verlita and Raymond, to inquire and deal with
NHMFC (National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation) over the mortgage on her house. When they
found that their mother’s arrears amounted to P350,000 they sought Atty. Ramon who was in charge of
the mortgage for NHMFC.
After receiving a letter stating that the property would be auctioned on July 2013, they expressed their
intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption price and scheduled a meeting with Atty.
Ramon on August 30, 2013. When they met the children gave Atty. Ramon P350,000.00 who signed an
acknowledgement receipt. And issued two receipts for the recedmption price and litigation expenses
whilst showing her NHMFC identification card. Atty. Ramon promised to inform them as soon as the
documents for redemption were ready for their mother’s signature.
Despite several follow ups on September 9, 2013, November 27, 2013 they discovered that Atty.
Ramon had not deposited the redemption price and filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.
December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond handed Atty. Ramon a demand letter for the P350,000 to
which Atty. Ramon promised payment on December 16, 2013 but did not do so and failed to show to
subsequent hearings in Branch 145.
Verlita and Raymond filed a disbarment complaint with the IBP to which Atty. Ramon did not submit the
required answer and did not attend the mandatory conference by IBP despite notice.
The IBP board of governers recommends a 2 year suspension along with the order to return the money
Atty Ramon received.

ISSUE: 1. Is Atty. Ramon guilty of dishonesty and deceit?

2. Is the recommended penalty proper?

RULING:
1. Yes. (a) Atty Ramon transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants
after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's
behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the
NHFMC. She did not inform them that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency.
She concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that
she had assured them she would do.
(b) Atty Ramon violated Rule 1.01 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility : “Rule 1.01
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Evil intent is not
essential.
(c) Atty. Ramon disregarded several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could
only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP.
2. No. The recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She
merited a heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. The usual mitigation of
the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in
her favor considering that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case.
As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is
only fair and just.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Isdra Ting-Dumali vs Atty. Rolando Torres, AC no. 5161, April 14, 2004
FACTS: Isidra Ting-Dumali is one of six children of late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. One
of her siblings, Felicisima, is married to Atty. Torres. Their parents died intestate and left several
parcels of land. Isidira filed a complaint against Atty. Torres alleging:
1. Atty. Torres consented and failed to advise against perjury committed by his wife, Felicisima,
and sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where
the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of Lot No. 1586. Atty. Torres also resented
that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title in the names of his
wife and Miriam. The lot was sold, and payment made to Felicisima and Miriam.
2. That Atty. Torres consented to and failed to advise against, the forgery of Isidra’s signature in
the Deed of Extrajudicial over Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that. That Atty.
Torres even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the
title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. Lot 1603 was
then sold and payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. That Atty. Torres made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony in the Judicial
Reconstitution of title over Lot 1605 that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal
heirs of the late spouses. Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 and they profited
to the exclusion of their other siblings.
4. That Atty. Torres made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting
therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment
for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a
month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the
reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even
used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.

ISSUE : Should Atty. Torres be disbarred?

RULING: Yes. Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable
dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or
suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
(a) Atty. Torres. violated the Lawyer’s oath.
(b) Atty. Torres violated Canons 1,1.01, 1.02, Canon 7,7.03 and Canon 10,10.01 of the Code.
(c) There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of
the deceased. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings
(d) Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against
committing falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds.
(e) He did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law.
(f) He allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court when he did not
correct Marcelina’s testimony that they were only two children of the deceased spouses
violating Canon 10
(g) He offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized
by him when later Marcelina admitted that her statement that the was title in her possession
was false and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.
(h) He requested release of 50% of the remaining balance for sale of Lot 1605 assuring to Antel
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Holdings that the order directing reconstitution of title would be released in a month but it would
only have been released almost a year after the letter.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007
FACTS : Joselano Guevarra was introduced to Atty. Eala (married) by Guevarra’s then-fiance Irene
Moje. After Guevarra’s marriage to Irene, he noticed:
a. Irene had been receiving cellphone calls and messages from Atty. Eala reading "I love you,"
"I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
b. Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work.
c. Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
e. Guevara later found a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face containing
a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene sent by Atty. Eala.
f. Guevarra saw Atty. Eala and Irene’s car constantly parked in the same Street, that Irene and
Atty. Eala were at a concert and that Irene was pregnant.
Guevarra filed an action for disbarment against Atty Eala alleging that Atty. Eala was “FLAUNTING
THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together”. Stating that Atty.
Eala’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been
sworn to uphold, mocks the institution of marriage and degrades the legal profession. Guevarra also
alleges that Irene gave birth to a girl with the Birth Certificate naming Atty. Eala as father.
Atty. Eala denies having flaunted an adulterous relationship stating that “their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as
far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco”
and that his relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:

To the charge of grossly immoral conduct Atty. Eala reasons that his relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES: Is Atty. Eala guilty of grossly immoral conduct that deserves disbarment?

RULING: Yes. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman
who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. It is contrary to Sec 27
of Rule 138 as grossly immoral conduct.

Atty. Eala’s denial of the adulterous relationship as one that was “low profile” to be considered as
neither under fscandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct, and his denial of
personal knowledge of the birth certificate are NEGATIVE PREGNANTS.

He does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene. Atty. Eala also violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Atty. Casiano Laput vs Atty Francisco Remotigue, AM no. 219, Sept 29, 1962
FACTS: >May 1952 Laput was retained by de Barrera to handle her case “Testate Estate of Macario
Barrera.
>January 1955 de Barrera had contemplated the closing of the proceedings and prepared two
pleadings, one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir
and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final
accounting and partition of estate. However, administatrix de Barrera refused to countersign these two
pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file them.
>Laput then found in the records that Atty Patalinghug had filed a written appearance on January 11,
1955 as new counsel.
>February 5, 1955 Laput then voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel.
>February 7 Atty. Remotigue entered his appearance dated February 5, 1955.
>Laput alleges that (a) Atty Patalinghug and Atty. Remotigue’s appearances were unethical and
improper because they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney, intrigued against the
preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to Laput’s
decision to close the administration proceedings (b) that they brought de Barrera to their office before
their appearance and made her sign documents and sent the same by email to several corporations
disauthorizing Laput from receiving dividends of the estate when no SPA in fact was given to Laput by
de Barrera in order to embarrass Laput picturing him as a dishonest lawyer.
ISSUE: Did Atty. Patalinghug and Atty. Remotigue commit unprofessional and unethical conduct?

RULING: No. No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby
dismissed and the case closed.
(1) Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance after de Barrera already filed with the court a pleading
discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said
pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug. We see no irregularity in the appearance of
respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an
actual grabbing of a case from petitioner.
(2) Laput’s voluntary withdrawal as counsel after Atty. Patalinghug enterd his appearance and his
simultaneous filing of a motion for the payment of atty’s fees amounted to an acquiesence and should
estop Laput from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug unprofessional.
(3) Atty. Remotigue is not guilty of unprofessional conduct as he entered his appearance after
Laput’s services were dispensed with and after Laput had already voluntarily withdrawn.
(4) The preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney does not appear to be
prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the
administratrix
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Renato Maligaya vs Atty. Antonio Doronilla Jr, AC no. 6198, Sept 15, 2006
FACTS: Atty. Doronilla Jr. of the Judge Adocate’s General’s Service represented several military
officers in an action for damages filed by Maligaya. During one of the hearing’s Atty. Doronilla said
“We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the
cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension”
to which Atty. Doronilla did not put the same statements in writing as requested by the Judge.
Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. charging
Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting obstruction of
justice. Maligaya sworde that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.
Atty. Doronilla Jr. explained that : (a) his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial. (b) that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath. And that (c) it caused no actual prejudice to the
Maligaya.
The investigating commissioner recommended suspension from the government military service as
legal officer for a period of three months

ISSUE: Did Atty. Doronilla Jr. act unethically?

RULING: YES. Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice
of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension
from the government military service. Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby suspended. from the
practice of law for two months

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's
oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01
are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.

Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded by his refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of
what he had done.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Valentin Miranda vs Atty. Macario Carpio

FACTS: After Miranda’s Atty. had an accident, he hired Atty. Carpio to handle his complaint at the Land
Registration Commission for the registration of his parcel of land. According to Miranda, it was agreed
that he would pay P20,000 as acceptance fee and P2000 appearance fee. He paid as evidence by
receipts but during the last hearing of the case, Atty. Carpio and additional P10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the
case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his
services.

Miranda refused because it was contrary to their agreement. Furthermore, the property was co-owned
with his siblings and he could not have agreed to the demand without approval of the co-heirs.
After the LRC decision granting Atty. Carpio claimed the OCT ahead of Miranda and refused to turn it
over insisting that Miranda first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent
to 378 square meters to which Miranda refused.

Atty. Carpio then registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the
agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. 
Atty. Carpio alleges that he has a retaining lien over the OCT and admitted that he did not turn over to
Miranda the owner's duplicate of OCT.

ISSUES: Did Atty. Carpio engage in unethical conduct?

RULING: YES.  Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and
failing to deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged
entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Macario D. Carpio is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the
property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus,
is invalid. An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements
concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers;
and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees

In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their
agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

The Conjugal Partnership of The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo And Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo vs
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, GR no. 173188, January 15, 2014
FACTS Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over a lot in Zamboanga del Norte. They then
sold it to Spouses Ames with TCT issued to them. The Spouses Calvedo then filed an action against
the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after spouses
Ames failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the
services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of the TCT as
gross violation of public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired
Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis: “That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were
forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar,
they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees”
RTC ruled in favor of spouses Ames. Then Atty. Lacaya appealed the case to the CA. Pending appeal
the spouses Ames sold the lot to their children and mortgaged it to DBP in the names of their children.
CA rules against spouses Ames and declared the sale void and directed the RoD to cancel the Ames’
TCT and reiusse the title in the name of spouses Calvedo. Meanwhile the spouses Ames defaulted in
their obligation to DBP which issued a notice of foreclosure on the lot. Atty. Lacaya immediately
informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim.
Upon finality of judgment in the civil case, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
The RTC granted the motion and spouses Cadavedo gained possession. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-
half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal
portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned
the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Atty. Lacaya filed a suit for foriclbe entry against Vicente Cadavedo which ended in an compromise
between them. Eventually, the spouses Cadavedo filed before RTC assailing the MTC-approved
compromise agreement praying respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot;
that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981; and that
the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that
Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
Spouses Cadavedo argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services,
especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees to
which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreementsThis agreement was clearly
stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the
expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their
contract. They contend that the one-half portion of the lot as contingent fee is excessive and
unreasonable.
ISSUES: Was the attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya proper instead of the
contingent attorney’s fees of P2000?
RULING: NO. (1) The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail over
the oral agreement providing for one- half of the subject lot.  the alleged contingent fee agreement
consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement
between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary
rules governing contracts in general.
(2) The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the
latter one-half of the subject lot, is champertous. Champerty is "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of
the litigation by the intermeddler” which is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to
"conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom
and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law.
Also, “a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of
litigation” Rule 42 Canons.
(3) The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable
(4) Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, this does not apply in the present case. The
transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot
was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses
Cadavedo. 

(5) The compromise agreement could not validate the void oral contingent fee agreement; neither did it
supersede the written contingent fee agreement. Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis- entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot),
with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall
return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Elesio C. Pormento Sr vs Atty. Alias Pontevedra, AC no. 5128, March 31, 2005
FACTS: Atty. Pontevedra was Pormento’s family legal counsel in all legal proceedings and that they
had a family’s relationship with him beyond mere lawyer-client relations. In one Civil case, Pormento’s
counterclaim was dismissed which, Atty. Pontevedra, the lawyer in said case, deliberately failed to
inform Pormento of the dismissal despite receipt of the order. As a result, Pormento was deprived of his
right of appeal.

Pormento asserts that he only came to know of the existence of the trial court's order when the adverse
party in the said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land which is
the subject matter of the suit. In order to recover his ownership over the said parcel of land,
complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action for
the recovery of the subject property. Pormento was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified thefts
against relatives of the new owner and Atty. Pontevedra used pieces of confidential information he
obtained from complainant while the latter is still his client.

In another case, Pormento bought a parcel of land and that the deed of declaration of heirship and sale
of land was prepared and notarized by Atty. Pontevedra. Atty. Advised Pormento to build a small house
to allow Pormento’s nephew to occupy the same and establish possession of the property. When
Pormento was forced to file an ejectment case against his nephew, Patty. Pontevedra acted as counsel
of the nephew.
ISSUES: 1. Is Atty. Pontevedra guilty of malpractice and and misconduct by representing clients with
conflicting interests and taking advantage of the information and knowledge he obtained from
Pormento?
2. Is Atty. Pontevedra guilty of malpractice for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of his
counterclaim?
3. Should Atty. Pontevedra be disbarred?
RULING: 1. Yes, but only in the criminal case.
In the ejectment case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein
complainant's nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 528, and in the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed by herein
complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the parcel
of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said
land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any information from
herein complainant that can be used to the detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.

In criminal case, even if there was no direct evidence to prove that Atty. Pontevedra took advantage of
the information,  it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant in Civil
Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that complainant possessed with
respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent
utilized against complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of
their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. 
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

2. NO. we find that Pormento failed to present substantial evidence to prove that respondent did
not inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. On the contrary, we find
sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has been properly notified of the trial court's order of
dismissal.
3. NO. considering respondent's honest belief that there is no conflict of interests in handling
Civil Case No. 1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that this is respondent's first
infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of suspension to be disproportionate to the offense
committed. respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Ariel Palacios vs Atty. Bienvenido Braulio Amora, Jr., AC no. 11504

FACTS: Palacios is the owner/developer of 312 hectares of land estate property. Palacios retained
Amora’s services as legal counsel. One of the investors in Palacios’ Riviera project was PhilGolf.
Amora’s legal services were engaged to (1) in connection with the Riviera project (2) Register
trademarks (3) reclassify agricultural land in Cavite. It was alleged that the resolution reclassifying the
land was dated before Amora’s services were engaged to reclassify the land and thus Amora should
return the P1.8M fee. As Palacios’ legal counsel, Amora was privy to highly confidential information
regarding the Riviera project 
After complainant terminated respondent's services as its legal counsel, respondent became Phil Golf’s
representative and assignee. Respondent began pushing for the swapping of Phil Golf’s properties with
that of complainant. Respondent sent swapping proposals to his former client, herein complainant, this
time in his capacity as Phil Golf’s representative and assignee. These proposals were rejected by
complainant for being grossly disadvantageous to the latter. After complainant's rejection of the said
proposals, respondent filed a case against its former client, herein complainant on behalf of a
subsequent client (Phil Golf) before the BLURB for alleged breach of contract (
ISSUES: Should Atty. Amora be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the complaint?
RULING: Yes. While the Court cannot allow a lawyer to represent conflicting interests, the Court
deems disbarment a much too harsh penalty under the circumstances. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Atty. Amora Jr. is guilty of :

(a) representing conflicting interests contrary to the lawyer’s oath and Rule 15.01 and 15.03 of the
Code. A lawyer must secure the written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the
facts. Respondent, however, failed to present any such document. He points to the fact that
complainant approved several transactions between him and the complainant. This purported approval,
however, is not the consent that the CPR demands. A lawyer's failure to acquire a written
consent from both clients after a full disclosure of the facts would subject him to disciplinary action
Atty. Amora was acting for and in behalf of Phil Golf. Worse, at Phil Golf’s instance, he caused the
filing of a complaint against the duly authorized representative and assignee of Phil Golf.
(b) using confidential information against his former client. by causing the filing of the complaint
before the HLURB, Atty. Amora must have necessarily divulged to Phil Golf and used information that
he gathered while he was complainant's counsel in violation of Rules 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR
However he there is no basis to return the PHP 1.8 Million the mere fact that the contract was
executed after the issuance of the resolution does no tips of acto mean that respondent did not have
any hand in its issuance. Verily, complainant failed to overcome the above mentioned disputable
presumption. Mere allegations can not suffice to prove that respondent did not render any service to
complainant and, therefore, not entitled to the payment of PhPl.8Million.
And Atty. Amora did not acquire client property subject of litigation For the prohibition to apply,
the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving
the property.
DAN PERSEUS RUBIO JD-4A LEGAL COUNSELLING

Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III vs CA, Hon. Dela Peña, GR no. 216425, November 11, 2020
FACTS Anacleto Ballaho Alanis Ill sought to change his name to Abdulhamid Ballaho by filing a Petition
with RTC. His certificate indicated Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III and wanted to retain only his mother’s
maiden name of Ballaho and remove his father’s surname. He presents evidence of his continued use
of “Abdulhamid Ballaho” in all his records and documents. RTC denied the petition holding that
petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant change of name. a month before the trial court
rendered this Order, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Johny Boy Dialo (Atty. Dialo), had figured in a shooting
incident and failed to report for work. Thus, petitioner was only able to file a notice of appeal on
September 2, 2008—months after Atty. Dialo's law office had received the Order, beyond the filing
period. He invoked his counsel's excusable neglect for a belated appeal, alleging the shooting incident.
Thereafter, with a new counsel, petitioner filed a Record on Appeal and Notice of Appeal on September
3, 2008 reiterating his counsel's excusable negligence. The RTC denied his appeal for having been
filed out of time. The CA denied his petition for certiorari for the same reason which he then brings to
the SC via Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUES 1. Whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals;
2. Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers' surnames as their surnames;
3. Whether or not petitioner has established a recognized ground for changing his name.
RULING 1. No. in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may choose to apply procedural rules
more liberally to promote substantial justice. BUT petitioner would ordinarily be bound by this
negligence because (1) petitioner did not adduce evidence to prove the alleged shooting of his former
counsel; (2) petitioner was represented by counsel belonging to a law office which had more than one
associate; and (3) petitioner was a law graduate and should have been more vigilant.
Generally, clients are bound by the negligence of their counsels. Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake
or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so
long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. Petitioner failed to respond
to the assertion that Atty. Dialo's law office, Dialo Darunday & Associates Law Office, is a law firm with
more than one lawyer, as well as legal staff, who must have been aware that Atty. Dialo was not
reporting to office or receiving his mail sent there. The law firm was certainly negligent in how it dealt
with the Order.
2. YES. The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the
provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally"
does not mean "exclusively. Courts must ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before
the law. ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames. ARTICLE 364.
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
3. YES. Under the ground that “when the change will avoid confusion” as provided in the Rules of
Court. That confusion could arise is evident. The court likewise ruled In Republic v. Bolante, where the
respondent had been known as "Maria   Eloisa"   her   whole   life, as   evidenced   by   scholastic  
records, employment records, and licenses, this Court found it obvious that changing the name written
on her birth certificate would avoid confusion: