THIRD DIVISION

APRIL 11, 2018

G.R. No. 218255
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
JERRY BUGNA y BRITANICO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 17 December 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01055-MIN, which affirmed with
modification the 15 May 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 4613-S and
4614-S, finding accused-appellant Jerry Bugna y Britanico (Bugna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Qualified Rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information dated 28 March 2008, Bugna was charged with the Crime of Rape committed against his very own daughter, AAA. 3 The
accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about 7th day of April 2007 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, in their own house situated at Province of South
Cotabato and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one (AAA), 16 years old and his own biological
daughter against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In a separate Information of the same date, Bugna was charged with another count of rape against AAA. The accusatory portion of the information
reads:

That on or about 21st day of December 2007 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, in their own house situated at Province of South
Cotabato and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one (AAA), 16 years old and his own biological
daughter against her will and consent.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.5

During his arraignment on 16 July 2008, Bugna, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both counts of rape. 6

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Neil T. Crespo (Dr. Crespo) as witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

Sometime in April 2007, AAA and her four siblings were about to go to sleep when Bugna arrived drunk from a drinking session. At around 8:00
P.M., while they were sleeping, she felt her father removing her shorts.

Bugna then inserted his fingers into AAA's vagina. Unsatisfied, he removed his finger and decided to mount AAA and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Perturbed, AAA asked Bugna why he was doing this to her - to which the latter replied that if her uncle was able to use her why not her
father. During the incident AAA felt pain in her genitals and was nervous and scared of her father. Her mother was away during that time. 7

Thereafter, on 21 December 2007, AAA and her siblings were again left alone in their house with their father because their mother went to General
Santos City. At around 2:00 A.M. of the said date, she again felt her father pulling down her shorts. AAA attempted to run but Bugna was able to
grab her and instructed her to lie down. While on the floor, he went on top of her scared daughter and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Thereafter, Bugna went back to sleep and left AAA in pain, who felt a sticky watery substance come out of her vagina. AAA was able to report the
incident to her mother only after some time because Bugna warned her that her mother might send him to jail if she found out. 8

On 2 January 2008, Dr. Crespo conducted a physical examination on AAA, wherein he noted that AAA's genital area had healed lacerations.9

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Bugna as its lone witness whose testimony sought to prove the following:

On 4 April 2007, at around 8:30 A.M., Bugna travelled with his ducks to Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, and stayed there until 1 May 2007. Thereafter,
he went to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, until 31 December 2007, and was never able to go back home.10

The RTC Ruling

In its 15 May 2012 decision, the RTC found Bugna guilty of two counts of rape. The trial court noted that AAA positively identified her father as her
assailant; as such, Bugna's defense of denial and alibi deserved scant consideration. The dispositive portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and discussed, the court finds the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accused, Jerry B. Bugna, istherefore found GUILTY of the crime of two (2) counts
of Rape against his own daughter as charged in the above informations.

ACCORDINGLY, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the cases.

He is further ordered to pay the private offended party the amount of P50,000.00 in each case, as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved, Bugna appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed 17 December 2014 decision, the CA substantially affirmed the RTC judgment and modified only the damages awarded. The appellate
court found AAA's testimony to be credible considering it was straightforward and consistent. It expounded that Bugna's moral ascendancy
substituted the element of violence and intimidation. The CA explained that Bugna's unsubstantiated alibi has no leg to stand on in view of AAA's
positive identification of him. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, South Cotabato, Branch 26, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4613-S and 4614-S is hereby AFFIRMED, finding accused-appellant Jerry Bugna y Britanico GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape, with MODIFICATION of the award of civil indemnity, ordering accused-
appellant to pay AAA, in each case, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.12

Hence, this appeal raising:

ISSUE

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal has no merit.

There is qualified rape when a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the
common-law spouse of the victim has carnal knowledge with a minor through force, threat or intimidation. 13 In other words, the element of
qualified rape is as follows: (a) there is sexual congress; (b) with a woman; (c) done by force and without consent; (d) the victim is a minor at the
time of the rape; and (e) offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. 14

In the case at bench, all the foregoing elements are present to convict Bugna for two counts of rape committed against AAA.

It is axiomatic that the evaluation of the RTC judge of the credibility of the witness, coupled by the fact that the CA affirmed the trial court's
findings, is binding upon the Court, 15 unless it can be established that facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted, which
could materially affect the disposition of the case in a different manner.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the courts a quo.

It is settled that an accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the witness, provided that it is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 16 In her testimony, AAA unflinchingly recalled her harrowing experience at the
hands of her own father, who was supposed to be her protector but was instead the monster lurking in her nightmares. In addition, AAA's
testimony is rendered more credible and believable because Bugna neither alleged nor proved .that AAA was motivated with ill will or malice in
testifying against him. 17 She testified:

PROSECUTOR V ALDEZ-DAMO:
Q: And you filed two (2) cases of rape against your father, right?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Could you recall when was the first incident?
A: In April, 2007.
Q: What time when the alleged incident happened, if you could recall?
A: In the evening.
Q: Where were you then at that time?
A: I was at home.
Q: While you were at home, what were you doing?
A: We were about to go to sleep.
xxxx
Q: What happened on that night?
A: After they drank, he locked all the doors.
Q: And after he locked all the doors, what else did your father do?
A: We fell asleep already and I just felt that he removed my shorts.
PROSECUTOR VALDEZ-DAMO:
May we put it on record, Your Honor,
that the victim is already crying.
Q: You said that you felt that your father was removing your shorts, right?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What did you do then?
A: I did not move then he inserted his finger.
Q: Where did he insert his finger, will you tell the court?
A: Into my vagina.
Q: What did you feel at that time?
A: I was nervous.
Q: What did you do when your father inserted his finger into your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: And after that, what did your father do?
A: He removed his finger then he put himself on top of me.
Q: What else did your father do?
A: That was when he abused me.
Q: You said that your father abused you. Will you tell the court what do you mean by that?
A: He placed himself on top of me then he inserted his penis into my Vagina.
xxxx
Q: Was that the only incident that your father sexually abused you?
A: There were other incidents. The last sexual abuse happened on December 21, 2007.
xxxx
Q: And what happened while you were at home on that date?
A: Early morning, around 2:00 o'clock, I felt that my father was pulling my shorts.
Q: What did you do when you felt that your father was pulling down your shorts?
A: I was trying to prevent his hand and I seated.
Q: And after that, what happened next?
A: I attempted to run but he pulled me.
Q: And after your father pulled you, what happened next?
A: He held my hand, instructed me to lie down and then he put himself on top of me.
Q: What did you feel at that time when your father instructed you to lie down and then he put himself on top of you?
A: I was scared.
Q: And after that, what did your father do?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: For how long?
A: For only around one (1) minute.
Q: After that, what else did your father do?
A: He left and went back to where he was sleeping.
Q: What did you feel when your father put himself on top of you and inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: What else?
A: Then a sticky substance like water came out. 18

Based on AAA's testimony, it was established that she had sexual contact with Bugna and that the same was against her will or was done without
her consent. Her testimony was corroborated by the medical findings that she had healed lacerations on her hymen.  19 On the other hand, it was
admitted that AAA was Bugna's daughter and was only 16 years old at the time of the rape. 20 Thus, it is painstakingly clear that there is
overwhelming evidence to find Bugna guilty of the atrocities he had committed against AAA on two separate occasions.

Positive identification of the

accused with moral certainty

Bugna challenges that AAA's identification of him as her assailant was doubtful. He points out that that at the time of the incident, there were
several persons inside the room and that it was not well-illuminated. Bugna highlights that AAA merely inferred his identity when she concluded
that it was her father because there were no other tall persons inside the room and that she only saw a figure and assumed it was her father.

It is true that the identification of the accused in a criminal case is vital to the prosecution because it can make or break its case. This is so because
the prosecution has the burden to prove the commission of the crime and the positive identification with moral certainty of the accused as the
perpetrator thereof. 21 Here, AAA was able to identify Bugna as the assailant because while the room they were in was dark, the moon provided
sufficient illumination for her to see his face.

Further, even if AAA could not clearly see Bugna's face, the latter's positive identification still meets the standard of moral certainty. In  People v.
Caliso,22 the Court expounded on what constitutes moral certainty in the identification of the accused, to wit:

In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime. x x x The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or
characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other
physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity. 23

Being her daughter, AAA is intimately familiar with the physical features of Bugna, such as his voice or stature. She could easily distinguish her
father from other persons inside the room especially since only her siblings were with them during the rape incidents. Thus, AAA was adamant that
it was Bugna who raped her; according to her there was no other tall person inside the room. Further, she could identify him through his voice
because after the rape incident they still had a conversation. It is noteworthy that in one of the conversations, the assailant even identified himself
as AAA's father. AAA testified accordingly:

PROSECUTOR V ALDEZ-DAMO:

Q: What did you do when your father allegedly put himself on top of you and inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: I was asking him why he did it to me.
Q: What was the answer of your father?
A: Allegedly, my uncle was able to use me, so why not me being the father.
xxxx
Q: After that, what else did you father do?
A: He removed himself from me and slept beside me and he further asked me if I already have experienced a sexual intercourse. 24

Positive identification trumps

denial and alibi.

To defend himself, Bugna claims that he was not home from April until December 2007. It is settled that positive identification prevails over alibi
because it can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. 25 In People v. Dadao, 26 the Court explained that the defense of alibi must be
corroborated by disinterested witnesses, to wit:

It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated
and is inherently unreliable.1âwphi1 Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if
not, is fatal to the accused. x x x While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino
Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by
jurisprudence.27 (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, other than his testimony, Bugna failed to present disinterested witnesses to corroborate his claim that he was not at home from
April to December 2007. Faced with such appalling allegations, he could only muster a measly self-serving alibi to defend himself. Surely, such
defense fails to convince the Court of Bugna's innocence especially since AAA had positively and convincingly identified him as her abuser.

Resistance in rape committed

with force and intimidation.

Bugna assails that he cannot be guilty of rape through force and intimidation because it was never mentioned whether he had a weapon to
threaten AAA with. In addition, he argues that there could be no force and intimidation because after the incident, AAA slept beside him as if
nothing happened. Likewise, Bugna bewails that if AAA was indeed truly raped, she should have at least offered resistance or attempted to shout
for help to awaken her siblings who were in the same room at that time.
It is true that in rape cases, the prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the accused upon the victim because
failure to do is fatal to its cause.28 Nevertheless, in incest rape of a minor, the moral ascendancy of the ascendant substitutes force or intimidation.
In People v. Castel,29 the Court explained:

It is hornbook doctrine that in the incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the
victim into submission to his beastly desires. One should bear in mind that in incestuous rape, the minor victim is at a great
disadvantage. The assailant, by his overpowering and overbearing moral influence, can easily consummate his bestial lust with
impunity. As a consequence, proof of force and violence is unnecessary, unlike when the accused is not an ascendant or a blood
relative of the victim. 30 (emphasis and underlining supplied)

In the present case, actual force and intimidation need not be present to convict Bugna with rape. He was AAA's father and such relationship or
influence rendered her unable to resist her father's advances. Similarly, Bugna's insistence that AAA's lack of resistance belies her allegation of rape
deserves scant consideration.

In People v. Joson,31 the Court explained that resistance is not an element of rape and the lack thereof does not necessarily lead to an acquittal of
the accused, viz:

We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant's insistence that the absence of any resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as
to whether the sexual congress was without her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of
the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed and the victims submit herself to her attackers because of fear.

Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.
Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA's claim that the accused-
appellant consummated his bestial act. 32 (emphases supplied)

Like other forms of sexual abuse or assault, rape essentially boils down to the lack of consent on the part of the victim. In turn, consent should not
be implied from the lack of resistance of the abused. As is now seen of the recent Me Too Movement, women have been coming forward about
the sexual abuse they had suffered from prominent figures or persons of influence across all industries. What stands out among from these
allegations is that the victims failed to show resistance to the advances of their abusers precisely because of the influence the latter possessed.

As applied in the present case, it could be reasonably expected that AAA could not have offered any resistance considering that her very abuser
was her own flesh and blood. Bugna's influence and moral ascendancy over AAA had crippled her to such an extent that she succumbed to his
dastardly plans. How could AAA resist when the person she expects to keep her safe would ultimately be the one to violate her dignity and rob her
of her innocence?
Thus, where there is force and intimidation or in cases where the moral ascendancy or influence of the accused validly substitutes actual force and
violence, the lack of resistance should never be used as indicia of consent. For after all, such violence or moral ascendancy may have reduced the
victim to nothing more but an object, devoid of free will, to satisfy the abuser's ungodly desires.

Bugna also questions AAA's testimony claiming that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA because her siblings were in the room at the time
of the incident. It must be remembered, however, that it has been long settled that lust is no respecter of time and place.  33 The presence of AAA's
siblings does not necessarily contradict her allegations of rape especially since she· had categorically, consistently, and positively identified Bugna
as his abuser. Likewise, Bugna assails that AAA's actions during and after the alleged rape renders her credibility questionable. Nevertheless, it
must be remembered that there is no, expected uniform reaction from a rape victim considering that the workings of the human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable.34 In other words, a rape victim's survival instincts may trigger her attempt to fight her abuser or at least
to shout for help; or the victim may be rendered paralyzed or helpless or hopeless due to the trauma caused by the abuse.

Modification of damages to conform

to recent jurisprudence

The appellate court affirmed the conviction of Bugna but modified the damages awarded. It increased the award of moral damages to ₱75,000.00,
and awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years old and the offender is a parent.
In view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346,35 however, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed in lieu of the death penalty when the law
violated uses the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC. On the other hand, the Court in People v. Jugueta36 set the award of damages for
the crime of Rape, among others. There, it was held that when the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No.
9346, the victim is entitled to ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
conformity with the said ruling, all damages awarded to AAA should be increased accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the· 17 December 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01055-MIN is  AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Jerry Bugnay Britanico is ordered to pay AAA ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape with an interest at the rate of six percent (6%)  per annum computed from
the finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 122150            March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING
FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE
RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A
SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:

On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages 2 for the injuries and expenses he
sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985 .3 In answer thereto, respondent contended that
the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on
January 8, 1986,4 had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioner’s
lack of interest;5 and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent .6

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the
criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for
hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as
Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, 9 reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly
instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the
fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.  10

Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be filed and proceed
independently of the criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been made; 12 and that the requirement of reservation, as
provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.13

The petition must be denied. Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime ( ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
(quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.

Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved, as
required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be dismissed; 16 and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. 17

In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio Andaya that figured in a vehicular
accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case
for damages filed against him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil
action against the petitioner or his driver. The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On
appeal, the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages despite the absence of reservation;
 (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement
is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of the Court. 18

The Court expounded:

. . . §1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they
will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. … In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of
the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will
de deemed instituted with the criminal action.

Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not
impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the
offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be
brought separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous
determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":

‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the
trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.’20

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having
failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015

PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B.
SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007 decision1 and the March 14, 2008 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati City, finding Bernardo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).

The Factual Antecedents

In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag ( Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 payable
on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory note 3 Bernardo and her husband had executed,
whereby the couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default. 4 As
additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-1034) 151841.

Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In place of the title,
Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East Bank and Trust Company ( FEBTC) checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992,
covering the loan's aggregate amount:cralawlawlibrary

Check No. Amount Date

FEBTC No. 391033 Php 100,000.00 June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034 Php 100,000.00 June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035 Php 100,000.00 June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036 Php 100,000.00 June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037 Php 60,000.00 June 29, 1992
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed."
Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate
a criminal complaint against Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to indict Bernardo for the
offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment.

The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to present her defense evidence.

In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks were presented beyond
the 90-day period provided under the law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was essential to prove the
material element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash, which she claimed to have
done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the title to the property after payment,
Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks either.

Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to September 4, 1996. 6 That hearing, however, was
again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the April 3,
1997 hearing, and in view of the numerous previous postponements the defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to present additional
evidence waived.

Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10) days within which to submit her formal
offer of evidence, which she failed to do. As a result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.

RTC Ruling

On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22. 7 The RTC held that Bernardo failed to
substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that it is not the nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that
B.P. 22 punishes.

The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged and ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the
amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991, until full payment. 8

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a P460,000.00 fine. 9 The
CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution of the criminal
charges until full payment.10

In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA further held that the 90-day
period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an element of the crime.

The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in view of the RTC's order waiving her right to
present additional evidence.11 To the CA, Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her defense but did not avail of these opportunities.
Instead, she and her counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9) times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four (4) times
despite due notice of the scheduled hearings. These developments led the RTC to consider Bernardo's right to present additional evidence
waived.12

Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion; 13 hence, the present petition.14

The Petition and Comment

Bernardo insists in her present petition 15 that the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due process; she was denied the full opportunity
to present her defense and was thus deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the crime charged.

She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilities because the prosecution failed to prove her knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo, there was no violation of B.P. 22 because the checks were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day
period. Moreover, Bernardo claimed that these subject checks were issued without consideration as she had already paid the loan.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its Comment that Bernardo was given the opportunity to present her defense
evidence.16 Citing Wong v. CA,17 the OSG further points out that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense; 18 it is simply
one of the conditions to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds.19

The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her claim that she had settled the obligation. 20 In any event, the OSG asserted B.P. 22
penalizes the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the nonpayment of the obligation. 21

Subsequent Developments

On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and provided, as well, the names of her
heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address
(26 Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In due course, in our March 7, 2012 Resolution, 22 we required Bernardo's heirs to
appear as substitutes for the deceased Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil liability.

Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished her civil liability. In the
alternative, they contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case.

We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death as it is based on
contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require the
Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters

Classes of Civil Liabilities

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender. 23 If the conduct
constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code ( ex delicto).24 This particular civil liability due
the offended party is rooted on facts that constitute a crime. 25 Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged.26 It is not required
that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by
preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. 27 Moreover, the civil liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.28

The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b)
contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 32 29 and 3430 of the Civil
Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil Code. 31 For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code
likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of the criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on
contract or by laws other than the criminal law. 32 Such civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the criminal action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission. 34

Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.

As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the
offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor,
which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death prevents the court from making. 35 In a sense, death absolves the accused
from any earthly responsibility  arising from the offense — a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. 36 The
intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability arising
from the offense should be imposed on him.37

The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may be  generally pursued but only by filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. 38 This separate civil action may be enforced against
the estate of the accused.39

In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a
single suit is filed and tried.40 This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the
courts as collectors. As we observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary

Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for
criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is
to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.chanrobleslaw

As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for
violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The independent civil liability based on contract, which was
deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the present case. We thus rule on the present action
to determine Bumanglag's civil liability.

Substantive Aspect

Bernardo was not denied due process.

We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her day in court. She was afforded
ample opportunity to present evidence in her defense but she did not give this case the serious attention it deserved. For good reason -  i.e., the
repeated absences of Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court eventually considered her right to present defense evidence waived.

To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the discretion of the trial court;
but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view to doing substantial
justice.42 In the present case, the records show that the RTC took all the steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her the
opportunity to present whatever evidence she had in her defense.

In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through counsel, thereupon moved for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence prompting the RTC to reset the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994. 43 Bernardo
filed her demurrer to evidence on November 10, 1994,44 after previously requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.
The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several resettings until the RTC finally denied it on March 30, 1995. 45 The RTC then set the
initial presentation of defense evidence on April 11, 18, and 25, 1995, 46 but these were reset to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995, 47 at the motion of
Bernardo's counsel who expressed his desire to seek relief from the CA for the denial of the demurrer.

Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed to appear during the May 9, 1995 hearing as he was busy attending to the
canvassing of votes in Quezon City.48 Eventually, the initial presentation of defense evidence was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995. 49

Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel again moved for another resetting as he  was not prepared to conduct a direct
examination.50 Despite this flimsy ground, the RTC granted the request and allowed Bernardo to testify on August 3, 1995.

Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing despite due notice, prompting the RTC to waive their right
to present defense evidence.51 Bernardo moved for reconsideration and the RTC granted her motion in the interest of substantial justice. 52 Thus,
the hearing for the presentation of defense evidence was reset to November 28, 1995. 53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing, despite due notice,  prompting the RTC again to consider
that Bernardo had waived her right to present defense evidence. 54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground that it was the first time she and her counsel were absent at the same time .55 Despite
this hollow excuse, the RTC granted the motion in the spirit of compassionate justice and gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her
defense evidence.56 The parties mutually agreed to set the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence on April 18,
1996.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo did not offer any excuse for this absence, 59 RTC
exercised compassion and permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did in fact testify, on May 9, 1996, 60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the
prosecution had rested its case. At the conclusion of the cross-examination, the parties mutually agreed to adjourn the hearing for September 4,
1996, for redirect examination.61

Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, prompting the RTC to consider her failure as a
waiver on her part to present additional evidence. 62 Bernardo moved for reconsideration; she claimed that her counsel had to attend another
hearing in a different sala. Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another engagement on the same day, which was in conflict with the RTC's hearing
dates, was never properly explained. Nonetheless, the RTC granted the motion to give her the last chance to complete the presentation of
evidence on April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear at the April 3,1997 hearing .64 Instead, they filed a motion to reset
because Bernardo's counsel was to attend a wedding in the United States of America. 65 This time, the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to
postponements, ordered the case submitted for decision sans the presentation of evidence from the defense. 66
Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, without justifiable reason, to appear at the scheduled
hearing dates.67 The order considering Bernardo's right to present evidence waived, followed as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we
held in People v. Angco:68cralawlawlibrary

His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings
that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver to present evidence in his defense, and that the case would be deemed
submitted for judgment upon the evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to
proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it.chanrobleslaw

The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights as an accused. But Bernardo obviously did
not recognize the need for expeditious handling of her case and was already trifling with judicial process. 69

Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient

evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
liable.

Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In particular, the focal issue
in the present petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil liability, which is principally based on
contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22
defense (that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were no longer relevant.

Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it. 70 Indeed, once the existence of an indebtedness is established
by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment rests with the debtor. 71 After the
debtor introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again shifts
to the creditor, who then labors under a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment. 72

In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has sufficiently been established through the promissory note 73 and the
checks74 submitted in evidence. Notably, Bernardo even confirmed due execution of these instruments during her testimony. During the offer of
Bernardo's testimony, her counsel stated:cralawlawlibrary

ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting the witness for the following purposes: to x x x show that she borrowed
money from [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total obligation reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all the checks issued by the
accused were only as proof of her obligation to the private complainant x x x.75  [emphasis supplied]chanrobleslaw
In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory note. In particular, she
stated:cralawlawlibrary

ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2 for the defense. There appears a
signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the middle portion thereof, do you know whose signature is that?

A: It is mine sir.

xxxx

Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you tell us, Madame Witness, what is
covered by this promissory note?

xxxx

A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest and penalties, sir.

Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of June 1991 and includes all other
charges?

A: Yes, sir.

x  x x x

Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the checks subject of these cases?

A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76chanrobleslaw

Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she had settled the obligation, which settlement led Bumanglag to return to her the title
to the property.77 A meticulous review, of the records, however, firmly dissuades us from believing Bernardo's bare allegation.

At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that transaction, which was submitted by the prosecution in evidence, states
that:cralawlawlibrary
                                                                                                           10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to pay Mrs. Carmencita Bumanglag

                                                                                                           Sgd
                                                                                                          Paz T. Bernardo
                                                                                                         10/28/91
chanrobleslaw

The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests that she asked for the title from Bumanglag to obtain another loan whose proceeds
she would use to pay Bumanglag. Notably, the defense even admitted the genuineness of Bernardo's signature in this document. 79 When Bernardo
therefore failed to fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to request for checks to secure the obligation, which checks were eventually
dishonored upon presentment.

Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of payment was nothing more than an allegation unsupported by adequate proof. If indeed
there had been payment, she should have redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory note, in the ordinary course of
business.80 Instead, the checks and the promissory note remained in the possession of Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction of
Bernardo's obligation when the checks became due and were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of the
promissory note, coupled with the dishonored checks, strongly buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been extinguished. 81

We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo has not yet settled her
obligation.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR No. 28721
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount of P460,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum
from the time of the institution of criminal charges in court.

The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and interest due, from the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163879               July 30, 2014

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 165805
DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision 1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the
Decision2 dated February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon
(Dr. Ynzon) of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

The Information3 alleged –

That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
DR. ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old,
confederating and acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness
and imprudence to perform immediate operation upon their patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they, the said physicians,
should have been done so considering that examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so, causing by
such negligence, carelessness, and imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:

"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO
PALMA, JR. and other consequential damages relative thereto.

CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.

Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate these cases. 4 The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother,
Rosario Palma. At 5 o’clock that sameafternoon, Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr.
Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if
his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, 2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who
advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30 in the
morning.5

Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The complete blood count conveyed the following result: wbc – 27.80 x 10 9/L;
lymphocytes – 0.10 and neutrophils – 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist, Dr. Ricky
V. Querubin, with the following findings:

Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and urinary bladder.

There is no free peritoneal fluid.

There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.

There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm surrounded by undistended gas-filled
bowels. This is suggestive of an inflammatory process wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation is
essential."6

Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness, negative mass ." The initial impression was
Acute Appendicitis,7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the later part of the morning of June 15, 2000, Dr.
Ynzon went to the hospital and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JRwere ordered.
Thereafter, JR was placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours.

In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his scrotum. In the afternoon of the
same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to
Dr. Ynzon who merely gaveorders via telephone. 9 Accused continued medications to alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR
again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had
a running fever of 38°C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's
condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42°C, had convulsions and finally died.

The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:

Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST

Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY

Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)

Other significant conditions contributing to death:

CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)

No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that accused
were indeed negligent in the performance of their duties:

It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of his admission for confinement at the Nazareth General
Hospital until his death. Upon his admission, the initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused in the
consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the
CBC and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory process or infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process was
happening in the periumbilical region where the appendix could be located. The initial diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct
possibility. x x x.

Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be observed for 24 hours. However,
the accused, as the attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather, they left the
monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency training and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise,
skill and competence with those of physicians who are merely new doctors still on training. Not having personally observed JR during this 24-hour
critical period of observation, the accused relinquished their duty and thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real
condition of JR. In situations where massive infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the patient
is serious which necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.
xxxx

Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was the initial
diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing inside the
body of JR even when the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region where the appendix can be located. x x x

There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat disease exactly was plaguing JR. It
was their duty to find out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis,
according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused. But the accused could not have
found out the real disease of JR because they were treating merely and exclusively the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest
the manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the
graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body of JR unabated. The
infection obviously spread so fastand was so massive that within a period of only two and a half (2 ½) days from the day of admission to the
hospital on June 15, 2000, JR who was otherwise healthy died [of] Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17, 2000. 11

On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:

The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's attending physicians, appellants Dr.
Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively and sufficiently the developments/changes during the observation period and act upon
the situation after said 24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition even worsened with the appearance of more serious
symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross
negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to determine the real cause of JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to perform surgery
(appendectomy) had even been ruled out precisely because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake suchefficient diagnosis by process of
elimination, as correctly pointed out by the trial court. As has been succinctly emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working
diagnosis, and with the emergence of symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever, vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery,
not even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could have been made after the
result of the ultrasound test, considering that acute appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he had conducted a rectal
examination.

Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference and neglect of the patient's
condition as a serious case. Indeed, appendicitis remains a clinical emergencyand a surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr. Mateo, a
practicing surgeon who has already performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact, appendectomy is the only rational therapy for acute
appendicitis; it avoids clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and immediate
treatment of the disease prevent complications. Under the factual circumstances, the inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after
the day of admission and after being apprised of the ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal
examination and ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone – constitutes gross
negligenceleading to the continued deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in sofast a pace that he died within just two and a half
(2 ½) days’ stay inthe hospital. Authorities state that if the clinical picture is unclear a short period of 4 to 6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan
may improve diagnostic accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming that JR's case had an atypical presentation in view of the location of
his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis
should have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court, appellants had not taken steps towards correct
diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even when JR was already running a high fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with
diarrhea, his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the reason why private complainants were not even apprised of the progress of
appellants' diagnosis – appellants have nothing to report because they did nothing towards the end and merely gave medications to address the
symptoms.12

Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the following arguments:

WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION
UPON THE PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS;

II

WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED
DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY;

III

WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE
LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY
HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON, DR. CLENIO YNZON;

IV

WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;

WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S EXPERT WITNESSES EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED
THAT PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED
TO STATE/SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
 VI

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY
PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;

VII

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT
APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD FIRST PLACE
SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION;

VIII

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS; and

IX

WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE.

In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of factof the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the
need to make certain exception.

AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. 13 The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1)
that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that
material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.14
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence on record. The court a quo and the
appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care expected from doctors.

In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the
prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR:

ATTY. CASTRO:

Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the ultrasound result, with that laboratory would
you operate the patient?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"
A Yes, sir.16
xxxx
COURT:
Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do] surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to do surgery, what will happen?
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis and eventually septicemia, sir.
Q What do you mean by that doctor?
A That means that infection would spread throughout the body, sir.
Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
A It will result to death.17
xxxx
Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
A From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact time, would it be the same for all surgeons?
A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease, sir.
Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes on the condition of the patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are changes?
A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then, sir.
Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the observation period, sir.
Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in doubt that there is something else other than appendicitis, would you extend over a
period of 24 hours?
A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is a change not pointing to appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24
hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
xxxx
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending physician?
A. Yes, sir.18
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned, because if you will agree with me, you did not even touch the patient?
A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The records show that after the observation period, the abdominal pain is still there plus
there are already other signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of the patient, would you give a comment on that?
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the pain apparently was still there and there was more vomiting and there was diarrhea.
In my personal opinion, I think the condition of the patient was deteriorating.
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR’s condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what actually happened in the
present case. Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would perform a personal
and thorough physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia (sic), elevated white blood cell
count, physical examination of a positive psoas sign, observation of the sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound findings of the
probability of appendiceal (sic) pathology, what will you do if you have faced these problems, Doctor?
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my physical examination and that isprobably every 4 to 6 hours, sir. 20
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions made at that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C does not mean ruled out but rather
to consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says here, impression and T/C means to consider the appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as
JR, the primary consideration then is acute appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a fact that it has tobe ruled out in order to
consider it as not the disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate. 21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and
that he was vomiting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect
which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.22

Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of
cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. 23 From the testimonies of the expert
witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR by neglecting to
monitor effectively the developments and changes on JR's condition during the observation period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour
period when his abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to have visited JRbriefly only during
regular rounds in the mornings. He was not there during the crucial times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate until JR's
death. As the attending surgeon, he should be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering his
skills and experience to know if the patient's condition had deteriorated. While the resident-doctors-onduty could likewise monitor the
patient’scondition, he is the one directly responsible for the patient as the attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of duty to
relegate his personal responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the
emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent reason. We, likewise, note that the
records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy despite the initial diagnosis of
appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.

Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the
accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so
indispensable as tobring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference
to the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused. 24 Quasioffenses penalize the
mental attitudeor condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. 25 This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to
the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death.

To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. 26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded by
the circumstances.

AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime
for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the
prosecution failed to prove these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao is guilty of reckless imprudence as
the elements thereof were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the source of infection
which caused the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position to perform the
required appendectomy.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general practitioner specializing
in family medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he
referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the prosecution’s expert witness, emphasized the role of the surgeon during
direct examination, to wit:

ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the solution, would you have allowed then
a 24 hour observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided that there would be close monitoring of the
patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon, sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon attending to the case to have been the one to observe within the period of
observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of the patient during the period of
observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours, some centers will recommend hourly or every two hours but here in the
Philippines, would recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir. 28
Dr. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to have exerted all
efforts to monitor his patient and under these circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon’s competence and diligence. Expert
testimonies have been offered to prove the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr.
Villaflor, on cross examination testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate. 29
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and
that he was vomitting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. It’s possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect
which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.30

Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of his duty as a family
doctor. On the contrary, a perusal ofthe medical records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently
made orders on the administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon
as it appeared that he is suspecting appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that
appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise . This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to JR's
condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a surgeon who has sufficient
training and experience to handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient. 31

We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he left, he made endorsement and
notified the resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot be said that the finding of guilt on
Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of
culpa.32 Thus, the accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors
demonstratedan act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence
on record clearly points to the reckless imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr. Cabugao's case.

AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY

While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011 due to
"multiorgan failure" as evidenced by a copy of death certificate. 33 Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon
with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v. Bayotas ,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case
the accused dies prior to final judgment:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex delictoin senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended . This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused , depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitationson the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability.
However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based, 36 and in accordance
with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we quote:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish
the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is
instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused
after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may besubstituted for the deceased without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the
estate of the deceased. (Emphases ours)

In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained
of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. 37 If the same act or
omission complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:38

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debtor interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him. (Emphases ours)

Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of arising from contract, the filing of a
separate civil action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commencesan action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall
be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly beforethe court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.

As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the executor or administrator, or the estate. 39 The heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of
action for damages they will bring.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide.

Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however, his civil liability
subsists. A separate civil action may be filed either against the executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same are based.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166836               September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE
N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground
to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 1 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The
administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993
and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation
receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque,
containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00 . The transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs
covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and
for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty.
Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. 4

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256). 5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183), 6 praying to
compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256, 7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’
assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to
sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds
of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes
was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the
receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed
company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las
Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, 8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’
receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated
BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of the
receivership.9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the
implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a
prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be
no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF
Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling
on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the
HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal
on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established
jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory
Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus
HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific
reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for
non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB
shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. 13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that
respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with
the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183
presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and
ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was
considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after
termination of the administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.

In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein
to put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral
suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which
must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the
instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely
intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to
deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private
respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the
subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-
delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein public
respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public
prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and
no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001
and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY
SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27
JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES
CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO
INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
 IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE
FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB
CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE
TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
HLURB’S RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in
the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled
that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions
in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint
before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB
Arbiter’s decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other administrative, it
nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order. 18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the
proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Board’s ruling, holding thusly:

The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
"involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights
of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming – the issue on the authority
of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined
and the respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the
usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from
Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions. 19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the
HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel
Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly
suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631, 20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’
complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case
involved matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s competence and
expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation
of evidence.21

Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the
proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the
administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the
crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting
decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could
be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance
in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section
2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be
instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. 25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues
raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal
case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. 26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there
must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent
upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may
also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of
the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The
remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that
entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in
either case.28

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing
number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, 29 such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and
license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be
observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent
BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused . It is enough for
the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may
not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits
of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at
all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor
of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution . The Court has observed that one
thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely
judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts. 31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies
even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized
skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must
first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the
jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until
after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the
competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal
under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter
in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the
resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper. 33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum
prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the
suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every
court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural
law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application. 35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal
proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action. 1âwphi1 It
contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated
said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal
case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in
the negative. We sustain him civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N.
Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a
civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No.
E-02627. Said June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since
it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to
obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent
had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by
a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article
76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case
contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question
which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy.
Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in
the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid
down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.  4 A prejudicial
question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case
states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be
the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the
second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15,
1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists . Therefore, he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court
therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force
and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied
to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz
who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one
who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B.
Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in
the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than
five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one
day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action
for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28,
1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to
the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue
that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified
or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on
February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an
Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no
longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2cräläwvirtualibräry

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes
a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. 3 It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 4 It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. 5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately
related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. 6 Its two
essential elements are:7cräläwvirtualibräry

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. 9

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.
As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10cräläwvirtualibräry

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their
marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. 11 The issue in this
case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may,
suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of
their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 13 No matter how obvious, manifest or
patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a
"final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the
subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. 16 The contracting of a marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent
did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that
judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise
the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, 18 but that is a
matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may
be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case
for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It
was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious
intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying
his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can
not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. 19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of
its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. 20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December
29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSEDand SETASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELYproceed
with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611. SO ORDERED
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her.3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta
Santella (Santella).4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella,
an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the
ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage
and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner
and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private
respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
Santella that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to
inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted
because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for
lack of legal basis.10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge
Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by
denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to
comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering
license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the Board denied the said motion
in its Order dated July 16, 1991, 13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against
self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC
Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other
courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld
the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in
accord with law.15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth
persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of
bigamy.16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought
to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the
propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the
guarding and controlling precepts and rules.20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case
in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private
respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void  ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article
states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of
marriage exists.28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a
prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides
that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision
without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged
bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his
obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. 30 The
existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for
bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not
properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of
the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no
witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 31
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a  prima facie case
for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same . It has been
held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima
facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a  prima
facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court
of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s observation that there
was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that
petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said
declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial
court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge
exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the
motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and
was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a
medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge
characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards
petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased
and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized
as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39 Furthermore, since the grounds
raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. 40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the
denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his
claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to
ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of
the court’s business promptly. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159186               June 5, 2009
JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General
Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the Decision 2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner
issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses
Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the
drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses
Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6231.3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City . The criminal complaints were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I. 5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to
exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended
until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders 7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I. 9 The subsequent
motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 before the RTC, docketed as
SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 12 denying the
petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision 16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not
pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as
incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or
the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the
checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question,
but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the
sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom
why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale
be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 17

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF
SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT
WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the
petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from
the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the
court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for
value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for
the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the
bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which
would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases
is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the
checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The
checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing
on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending , and there exists in the former an
issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 22

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.24

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private
respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him,
and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
to support the checks is in itself an offense.25

In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by
respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos
mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing
check has been issued."

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law
is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt -
though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

xxxx

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt -  is malum
prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes
in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the
law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. 28

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground
of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising
from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the
defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of
the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether
petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of
sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and
merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better
ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their
respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be
invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO AND MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009, respectively of the
Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353 which effectively suspended the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-62784,
an estafa case against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City.

Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo),
Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated
as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for  estafa against Victoria and her
husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals
collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.

On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora recommended the filing of an Information against respondents. On 1 June 2001,
respondents were charged with estafa committed as follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994 to June, 1997, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, and with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence, after having received rentals from IMF International Corporation, in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT (P319,888.00) PESOS, under the express obligation of turning over or remitting the
same to ANAPED ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession of the said amount and far from complying with their obligation
aforesaid and despite notice [to] that effect, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply, and convert the said amount to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of ANAPED ESTATE, INC.,
in the sum above-aforementioned.3
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of two intra-
corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a petition filed by Victoria’s brother Oscar for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. 4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a
petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R.
Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation.5chanrobleslaw
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues of whether
of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for
remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.

On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The trial
court reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of the corporation, has a direct
link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in the [respondent’s] favor, they cannot be held liable for misappropriation for they
possess the authority to collect rentals and hold the same on behalf of the firm. They would then be justified in not remitting the
collections to the group of Jose Buban who would be then deemed as mere usurpers of authority. 6
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the trial court issued an Order dated 19 February 2004 setting aside its 28 August
2003 Order and setting the case for pre-trial. The trial court noted that respondents failed to file an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to file their Comment/Opposition to the motion for reconsideration and that
the pre-trial be held in abeyance. Respondents claimed that the Order of the trial court to file comment/opposition was served on respondents
themselves and not on their counsel.

On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents’ Omnibus Motion. The trial court stressed that even if the order was served upon respondents
and not upon their counsel, records show that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial
court stated that respondents’ counsel was well aware of the existence of the motion for reconsideration, thus he could have taken the initiative to
file his comment thereto without waiting for any directive from the court.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied them the opportunity to file their comment; when it ruled that respondents’ counsel should have filed the comment as he was
furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration; and when it granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge dated February 19, 2004 and July 23, 2004 are  REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and she is hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-6259.
The August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is hereby REINSTATED.7
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals pointed out that respondents were given the opportunity to present their side in
their motion to suspend proceedings. The appellate court treated respondents’ arguments in said motion as their Comment/Opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. That is correct.

The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

 [T]he issue is the legality of the election of Anaped Board of Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which include private
complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related to those
upon which the criminal case is based. The resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate dispute will ultimately determine
the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime of estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It must be remembered that one of the
elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is a demand
made by the offended party to the offender. A valid demand must therefore be made by an offended party to the offender. 8
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban’s demand to turn over or remit
the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be defective, it is as if no demand
was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated 27 February 2009.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the lone ground of whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a
prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC cases with respect to the question of who are the lawful officers or directors of
Anaped is not determinative of the liability of respondents to remit the rental collections in favor of Anaped. Petitioner proffers that a corporation
has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders. Petitioner emphasizes that at the time the demand for remittance of the
rental collections was made against respondents, Buban was an officer of Anaped and until such time that his authority is validly revoked, all his
previous acts are valid and binding. Moreover, petitioner avers that the duty of respondents to remit the collection still subsists even during the
pendency of the SEC cases as the money remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to the person who demanded the remittance. Finally,
petitioner opines that question pertaining to the authority of Buban to demand remittance may only be considered as a defense in the  estafa case
and not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 9chanrobleslaw

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a
prejudicial question, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 10chanrobleslaw

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for  estafa. It is an
action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. Even if said case will be
decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of
corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in
the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question exists. The Complaint in SEC
Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the
authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.

On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC,
the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.11chanrobleslaw

The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors and officers.
In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that since the alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity of the demand for the delivery rests
upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. If the supposed authority of the person making the demand is
found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court added that mere failure to
return the thing received for administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same or deliver the value
thereof to the owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa.13chanrobleslaw

It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not
necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion. 14 The phrase, “to misappropriate to one’s own use” has been said to include
“not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.” 15 In this case, the
resolution of the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that
the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to
Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.

In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA, that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the management
and collection of rentals of the real properties the Reyes siblings inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro Reyes. 16
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning the very
authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers, including Buban to act for and in
behalf of the corporation. We find this issue consonant with the provisions of the Corporation Code which provides in Section 23
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporations
formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the
board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members
of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and
qualified.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business and  affairs of the corporation must be governed by a board of
directors whose  members have stood for election, and who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis.
Only in that way can the directors’ continued  accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of their decisions that bind the 
corporation’s stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is critical to the theory that legitimizes the exercise of power by the
directors or officers over properties that they do not own.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself
or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the property
and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009 enjoining
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
.