VI.

Choice of Law - General Theories

A. Provisions (*Memorize)

1. *Articles 15, 16 (par. 2), 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50 and 51 of the Civil Code 

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal

relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost. (n)

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,

prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity

to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the
Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of
religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be

considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus
had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
(30a)

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision
does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be
the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise
their principal functions. (41a)

2. *Articles 1489, 1490, 1491 of the Civil Code

Article 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves,
may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the
following articles.

Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without
capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those
referred to in article 290. (1457a)

Article 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:

(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or

(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under article 191.
(1458a)

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public

or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;

(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession;

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)

3. *Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code 

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened. (n)

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years. (n)

4. *Articles 364 to 366 of the Civil Code 

Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname
of the father.

Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child
shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

5. *Article 376 to 378 of the Civil Code 

Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action
for damages and other relief.

Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives

a right of action to the latter.

6. Sec. 146 of the Revised Corporation Code 

Section 146. Law Applicable. – A foreign corporation lawfully doing business in

the Philippines shall be bound by all laws, rules and regulations applicable to
domestic corporations of the same class, except those which provide for the
creation, formation, organization or dissolution of corporations or those which fix
relations, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of stockholders, members, or
officers of corporations to each other or to the corporation.

B. Renvoi

1. Concept

A procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the Conflict of laws

rules of the forum to a foreign state, the Conflict of laws rule of which in turn
refers the matter back to the law of the forum or a third state.

2. Definition

It is a French word which means “refer back” or “return”. In Anglo-American

countries, the term used is “remission”, meaning to refer a matter for
consideration or judgment.

3. Cases

a. Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963 

Doctrine: Choice of Law – Renvoi

In accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of
the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to
the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

Summary:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where

he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of
nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in
this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his
will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor
of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen
claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied,
the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately
applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional
rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel
for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the New Civil
Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law
of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs
and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion.

Facts: Edward Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner
Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to Helen
Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter Lucy
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar
as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an
earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California

when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen
of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Ruling: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in
effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which
should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California
conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where
personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and
is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside
California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.
Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to
both country back and forth. Thus, the decision appealed is reversed and case is
remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that
of the Philippine law provides.

b. Llorente v. CA, G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000

Doctrine: Choice of Law – Renvoi

While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven,
in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
"American law follows the 'domiciliary theory, hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzo's will.

Summary: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in

1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy.

Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US
Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his
brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name
of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3
children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be
given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be
terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the
judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co- owner of whatever properties,
she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court.

Facts: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the

United States Navy from 1927 to 1957 and a naturalized American citizen. On
February 22, 1937, Lorenzo married petitioner Paula Llorente. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. When
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines to visit his wife in 1945, he discovered that
his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the
United States and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel,
John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The Superior Court of
the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.

The divorce decree became final in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together
as husband and wife and produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will,
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On
December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate. The trial court admitted the will to probate. On
June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary.

The trial court denied Alicia's petition and ruled that the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente was void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore, her marriage to Lorenzo was likewise void. The trial court appointed
Paula Llorente as legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. Respondent Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied. Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court. The trial court declared Alicia as co- owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased Lorenzo may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. Petitioner Paula moved for
reconsideration, but was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.

Issue/s: Whether the applicable law is the Philippine Law or American Law.

Ruling: It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American

citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is
already an American citizen.

Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family

rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the
divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to
determine the effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and
his heirs.
C. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law

1. Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Revised Rules of Court

Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred

to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)

2. Rule 130, Section 46 of the Revised Rules of Court 

Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet

on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness
expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject. (40a)

D. Theories on Personal Law

This is known as the law which attaches to a person wherever he may go and
generally governs his status, capacity, condition, family relations, and the
consequences of his actuations.

It allows courts to exercise jurisdiction or determine the governing choice-of-

law rule on a specific situation or transaction involving a person wherever he
may be.

The Theories of Personal Law:

1. Nationality Theory/Personal Theory – The status and capacity of a

person is determined by the law of his nationality or national law.
(Philippines follows this)
2. The Domiciliary Theory/Territorial Theory – The status and capacity
of a person is determined by the law of his domicile. (The United States
follows this, like other common law countries)
3. The Situs /Eclectic Theory – The particular place or situs of an event or
transaction is generally the controlling law.

E. Nationality Theory (relate to Art. 15 and 16 of Civil Code) 

It is the theory by virtue of which the status and capacity of an individual are
generally governed by his nationality.

The personal law of an individual is his national law. This is adopted mostly by
civil law countries like the Philippines where the identity and legal position of
their citizens are guaranteed by a consistent application by their national laws
on status and family relations wherever they may go.

Nationality refers to the membership in a political community, one that is

personal and more or less permanent. In Conflict of laws, nationality and
citizenship are used interchangeably.

F. Domiciliary Theory

Follow the Law of the person’s domicile (place where he permanently

resides/where he intends to return to)

Domicile - It is the place wherein a person has a settled connection for certain
legal purposes, either because his home is there or it is the place assigned to him
by law.
It is a fixed, permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention
of returning to.

Residence – It is a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary.

1. Articles 50 and 51 of the Civil Code

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual
residence. (40a)

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision
does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be
the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise
their principal functions. (41a)

2. Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, 18

September 1995 

Doctrine: Choice of Law – Domicile

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places.

Summary: Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in

Tacloban, Leyte, ran for Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her
adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that,
among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban and therefore
she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the
Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided
“in the constituency where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”.
She later claimed it to be an honest mistake brought about by confusion and
asserted that it is in fact her domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC
resolved in favor of Montejo and contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be
any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. In its
resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as
places where she resided and served certain positions. Mention was even made
of her residence in Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995,
providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as
she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she
lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed

seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed
itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue/s: Whether Imelda Marcos satisfies the one year residency requirement to
be eligible to run as representative.

Ruling: Yes.

The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of

residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that
when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means
only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban, Leyte was in fact the domicile of
origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her
parents (which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously
referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal
residence). An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Successfully changing residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment,* and Imelda has clearly always
chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos
Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal milestones
there, instituting well-publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power always with either her influence or consent.

G. Personal Status and Capacity

1. Definition

Nationality – It refers to the membership in a political community, one that is

personal and more or less permanent. Nationality and Citizenship are used
interchangeably in Conflict of Laws.

Status – It refers to the place of an individual in society and consists of more or

less permanent personal qualities and relationships with which the state and
community are concerned.

Capacity – It is part of one’s status and is the sum total of one’s rights and
obligations.

a. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Frank, G.R. No. L-2935, 23

March 1909 

Doctrine: Choice of Law – Personal Status and Capacity

Since the contract was made in the US and US law considers the defendant of
legal age, he has the legal capacity to enter into a contract and therefore making
the contract enforceable against him.

Summary: Through a contract executed in the US, Frank agreed to work for
Plaintiff in the Philippines. The plaintiff paid Frank an advance payment upon
arriving in the Philippines as stipulated in their contract.

While in the Philippines Frank left the service of the Government. Since Frank
abandoned the contract, the Government filed a case against him to collect the
remaining money that was paid in advanced.
Frank in his defense contends that he was an adult in the US but he is a minor in
the Philippines. So the contract cannot be enforced against him.

The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to
pay the amount in question. The Court affirmed the decision.

Facts: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for
a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as
a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to
be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the
part of Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended
by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary
from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands. Thereafter,
Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance
with the terms of the contract. The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-
Manila to recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff
claimed had been paid to Frank a expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago
to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80
and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his
special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract,
and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was
therefore not responsible under the law. The lower court rendered a judgment
against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars.

Issue/s: Whether the defendant can allege minority

Ruling: NO.
The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore
the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the
time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under
the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by
reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the
contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach their majority
until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract,
contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time
and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters
bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place
of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.

2. Juridical Capacity v. Capacity to Act

Juridical Capacity – Is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is

inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.

Capacity to Act – Is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may
be lost.

3. Beginning and End of Capacity

Juridical Capacity is acquired upon birth and lost only through death

Capacity to Act is not inherent in a person; it is attained or conferred and,

therefore, it can likewise be lost not only by death of the person but by any valid
cause provided by law.

a. Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961 

Doctrine: Choice of Law – Personal Status and Capacity

Even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from one that lacked juridical personality.

Summary: Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her
husband before their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva.
After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant and since she was
employed in the Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was inconvenient and
she had herself aborted again by Geluz. In less than two years, she again
became pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum
of fifty pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was
aware and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the
award of damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated the award of
damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral damages. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision.

Facts: In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married,
Villanueva became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents and
upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by Antonio Geluz, a physician.
After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the second
time. As she was an employee of the Commission on Elections and found it
inconvenient, she had her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less
than two years, she again became pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva
went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by her sister and her niece.
Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had an abortion for the third
time, an abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos.
At that time, Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board.

On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: Whether the husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her

abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

Ruling: No.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights
and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations. In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to
the previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and expectations.

4. Absence

a. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code 

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not

the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened. (n)

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel
or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years. (n)
5. Name

a. Articles 364 to 366 of the Civil Code 

Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the

surname of the father.

Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural
child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

b. Article 376 to 378 of the Civil Code 

Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.

Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action

for damages and other relief.

Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname

gives a right of action to the latter.

-coverage until here for now-

Choice of Law in Family Relations

A. General Provisions

1. Article 15 of the Civil Code

2. Article 2 of the Family Code

3. Article 3 of the Family Code

4. Article 26 of the Family Code

5. Article 80 of the Family Code

B. Extrinsic Validity of Marriage

1. Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, G.R. No. 18081, 3 March 1922 

 C. Recognition of Foreign Divorce

1. Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985

2. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989

3. Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October

2005

4. Republic of the Philippines v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018 

D. Status of Children

1. Articles 163-165 of the Family Code 

E. Parental Authority

1. Articles 176 and 211 of the Family Code

F. Adoption

1. Statutes

a. Domestic Adoption; Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption

Act of 1998 

b. Intercountry Adoption; Republic Act No. 8043 or the Intercountry

Adoption Act of 1995 

2. Cases

a. Suzuki v. Solicitor General, G.R. No. 212302, 2 September 2020 

b. Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-

21951, 27 November 1964 
Choice of Law in Property

A. Provisions

1. Article 16 of the Civil Code

2. Article 414 of the Civil Code

B. Cases

1. Asiatic Petroleum v. Co Quico, G.R. No. 46529, January 23, 1940

2. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company v. Collector of Internal

Revenue, G.R. No. 46720

28 June 1940

3. Leon v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., G.R. No. L-3677, 29

November 1951 

4. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)

5. Collector of Internal Revenue v. Anglo California national Bank, G.R.

No. L-12476, 29 January 1960 

Choice of Law in Wills and Succession

A. Extrinsic Validity

1. Article 17 of the Civil Code

2. Articles 815-817 of the Civil Code

3. Babc0ck v. Babc0ck, G.R. No. L-28328, 2 October 1928 

B. Instrinsic Validity

1. Article 16 of the Civil Code

2. Article 1370 of the Civil Code

3. Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967

4. Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 (1984) 

C. Revocation

1. Articles 828-830 of the Civil Code

D. Probate

1. Allowance of Will Executed Outside the Philippines 

 a. In re Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011 Vda. De Perez v.

Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, 2 June 1994 

2. Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines 

a. Suntay v. Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, 31 July 1954 

3. Administration of Estates 

a. Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. L-23145, 29 November

1968

Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts

A. Provisions

1. Article 17 of the Civil Code

2. Article 1306 of the Civil Code

3. Article 1319 of the Civil Code

B. Cases

1. Choice of Forum Clause 

a. Compagnie de Commerce v. Hamburg Amerika, G.R. No. L-10986, 31

March 1917

b. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Sherman, G.R. No.

72494, 11 August 1989 

2. Contracts with Arbitration Clause 

a. Puromines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91228, March 22, 1993.

b.  Korea Technologies v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008 

3. Adhesion Contracts 

a. Pan An World Airways v. Rapadas, G.R. No. 60673, May 19, 1992

b.  Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119706, March 14,

1996

C. Foreign Tort Claims 

1. Asahi Metal Industry Co vs. Superior Court, 480, U.S 102 (1987) 

2. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp vs. Woodson, 444 U.S. 28 (1980)

3.  Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996) 

D. Philippine Rule on Foreign Torts; Vested Rights Theory v. English Rule 

1. Time Inc. V. Reyes, G.R. No. L-28882, May 31, 1971