DHARMASHASTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

JABALPUR (M.P.)

B.A.LLB(Hons.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-II

TOPIC: CASE ANALYSIS

STATE OF GUJARAT
VS

SHRI AMBICA MILLS LTD.

SUBMITTED TO : SUBMITTED BY:

MR. ASHIT SRIVASTAVA NIKHIL SIKARWAR

(ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW) BAL/129/19

SECTION:- ‘B’

IV SEM, 2ND YEAR

 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank our Vice Chancellor Prof. Balraj Singh Chauhan Sir for presenting me with
this opportunity to analyze the case of State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. . I would like to
thanks Head of Department Dr. V.S. Gigimon sir, Mr. Ashit Srivastava sir for guiding me every
step of the way. The credit goes to all of them for the fact that this research has materialised the
way it did. A special thanks to them for assisting me at each step of my project.

I extend my heart-felt gratitude to my parents and my friends for supporting me and aiding me in
the accomplishment of this project.

DNLU, JABALPUR With Regards

April 03, 2021 NIKHIL SIKARWAR

2
 CASE ANALYSIS

STATE OF GUJARAT

VS.

SHRI AMBICA MILLS LTD.

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................5

BACKGROUNG OF THE CASE ........................................................................................6

ISSUE ...........................................................................................................................7

JUDGMENT ..................................................................................................................7

ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................8

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................15

4
 INTRODUCTION

The case of state of Gujarat vs. Shri Ambica Mills1 talks about the Doctrine of Eclipse which say
that any law inconsistent with fundamental rights is not invalid. It is not dead totally but
overshadowed by the fundamental right. The inconsistency can be removed by the constitutional
amendment so the eclipse vanishes and the entire law becomes valid.

The legal question in this case is that whether a law violating the fundamental rights under
Article 19 (1) (f)2 of the citizen employees can be challenged by the respondent, i.e. a non-citizen
employer, on the ground of law being void also against non-citizen employers under Art 13 (2)3.

Doctrine of Eclipse
The Doctrine of Eclipse is one such principle, based on the premise that fundamental rights are
prospective in nature. An existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right, though it becomes
inoperative from the date of commencement of the Constitution, is not dead altogether. In other
words we can say that till the time a law violates a fundamental right provided by the Indian
Constitution, it is asleep and inoperative. But if such fundamental right is amended and thereby,
the law no more violates the fundamental right, then in such situation the law becomes alive and
operative.

1
State of Gujarat vs. Shri Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300
2
Article 19 (1) (f) of The Constitution of India, 1950
3
Article 13 (2) of The Constitution of India, 1950

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 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

On may 1, 196, the State of Bombay was bifurcated into the state of Maharashtra and Gujarat.
the legislature of the State of Gujarat enacted the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat
Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961, making various amendments in the Bombay Labour
Welfare Fund Act, 1953.4 The 1953−Act was passed with a view to provide for the constitution
of a fund for financing activities for promoting the welfare of labour in the State of Bombay.5
The respondents were a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 impugned certain
provisions of the said Act, and the rules made there under.6 The High Court held that the
impugned provisions violated Art. 19 and was unconstitutional and void.7 The respondent
challenged the act before the hon’ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

4
Ambica mills case, supra note 1 at para 7
5
Ambica mills case, supra note 1 at para 4
6
Id.
7
Ambica mills case, supra note 1 at para 3

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 ISSUE

• The main issue in this case was whether a law violating the fundamental rights under Art.
19 (1) (f) of citizen-employees can be challenged by the respondent, i.e. a non-citizen
employer, on the ground of law being void also against non-citizen employers under Art
13 (2).

JUDGMENT
The case was decided by a constitutional bench comprising of A.N. Ray, C.J., H.R. Khanna,
K.K. Mathew, Y.V. Chandrachud and A. Alagiriswami, JJ. The judgment was delivered by
Mathew J, the supreme court in this case held that even though a law is void quo citizens, it will
be operative as against non-citizens for the reason being the law will be void only to the extent of
contravention.8 Non-citizens cannot take advantage of such voidness for the reason being they
have not been conferred such rights.

Mathew J, further held that the author, has correctly interpretated the phrase to the extent of
contravention which is enshrined in article 13 (2) of the Constitution in this case. Methew J,
substantiated his reasoning by referring to the proposition laid down in Keshava Menon case9
and held that:

“…even though a law which is inconsistent with fundamental rights under Article 19 would
become void after the commencement of the Constitution, the law would still continue in force in
so far as non-citizens are concerned…..the word 'void' in Article 13 (1) would not have the effect
of wiping out pre-Constitution laws from the statute book, that they will continue to be operative
so far as non-citizens are concerned, notwithstanding the fact that they are inconsistent with the
fundamental rights of citizens and therefore become void under Article 13 (1)”.10

8
Ambica mills case supra note 1
9
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128
10
Ambica mills case supra note 1 para 29

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 ANALYSIS
Doctrine of Eclipse evolved through different cases the Supreme Court’s interpretation of article
13 (1). The Doctrine was inherited implicitly in the ruling of the Supreme Court in Keshavan
Case,11 it was further qualified by the dissenting opinion of Das J. in Behram Case12 and was
subsequently propounded as law in Bhikhaji Case.13

In Keshavan Case

The origin of this doctrine can be traced back to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay,14 where the Court dealt with the questions
regarding the retrospectivity of fundamental rights and the interpretation of the word "void" in
Article 13(1) of the Constitution. However, there was no express wording by the Court on
Doctrine of Eclipse but the opinion of the Court laid down the founding stone for the doctrine.

In Behram Case

In this case their was clash between the opinion of Mahajan C.J. and Das J. in Behram Khurshid
Pesikaka v. State of Bombay.15 Mahajan C.J. after referring to the ruling of Keshavan Case in
relation to word “void” in article 13 (1), held that a pre-Constitutional law which is declared void
should be notionally obliterated from the Statute book for the purposes of determining the rights
and obligations of citizens. However, the same remains good law when a question arises for
determination of rights and obligations incurred before 26 January, 1950. Das J. dissented and
said that to hold that the invalid part was obliterated would be tantamount to saying covertly that
the judicial declaration had to the extend amended the section.

In Bhikhaji Case

The prospective nature of Article 13(1), and the limited connotation accorded to the word "void"
in Keshavan Case, which was further expounded by Das, J. in his dissenting opinion in Behram
Case, delivery of the Doctrine of Eclipse in the leading case of Bhikhaji Narain Dhakras v. State

11
Supra note 9
12
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay (1955) 1 SCR 613
13
Bhikhaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955) 2 SCR 589
14
Supra note 9
15
Supra at 12

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of Madhya Pradesh.16 In this case, the provisions of a pre-Constitutional law17 became void after
the commencement of the Constitution as they violated article 19 (1) (g). However, Article 19(6)
was amended in 1951, so as to permit such reasonable State actions.

It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act, being void under Article 13(1),
was dead and could not be revived by any subsequent amendment of the Constitution, but had to
be re-enacted. This contention was rejected by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court,
which laid down that after the amendment of Article 19(6) in 1951, the constitutional
impediment was removed. The Act, therefore, ceased to be unconstitutional, and became
revivified and enforceable.

The crux of the decision was the observation that an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental
right, though inoperative from the date of commencement of the Constitution, is not dead
altogether. It continued to exist in respect of rights and liabilities which had accrued before the
date of the Constitution and remain operative as against non-citizens. This ratio, in substance
overruled the judgment of Mahajan J. in Behram Case. The Court, speaking through Das A.C.J.,
formulated the Doctrine of Eclipse, in the following words-

“The true proposition is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being,
by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to
remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity.18

He reiterated that such laws remained in force qua non-citizens, and it was only against the
citizens that they remained in asleep and dying condition. This case was thus the foundation of
the doctrine.

Ambica Mills Case

In the case of ambica mills19 K.K. Methew J., proceeded with assumption that the impugned
provisions abridged the fundamental right of citizen-employers and citizen-employees under
Article 19 (1) (f), to decide on the main issue. The Court held that Ambica Mills, being a non-

16
Supra note 13
17
The C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947
18
Supra not 13
19
Supra note 1

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citizen could not claim the law to be void as against them by application of Art 13 (2). The Court
reasoned that if a law takes away or abridges the fundamental rights of citizens under Art 19 (1)
(f), it would be non est and void as against citizens who have been conferred such right but it will
be operative in regard to non-citizens as the law is void only to the extent of contravention of the
rights conferred on citizens.20 Based on the aforesaid contentions, the Court came to the
conclusion that the impugned provisions were not non est but were valid laws as respect to non-
citizens and thus the respondents cannot take the plea that its right to property are being taken
away or abridged without the lawful authority.

It was submits that although the Court failed to look out the difference between the word „void‟
as provided in article 13 (1)21 and article 13 (2)22 but this construction will not affect its
reasoning that the law shall be applicable as against non-citizens. Although the meaning of word
„void‟ for all practical purpose is same in both clauses of the article but there is one vital
difference between voidness arising out of pre-Constitutional law and post-Constitutional law.
the Supreme Court decision in Mahendar lal jaini v. the state of U.P. and others23 The voidness
of the pre-Constitutional laws is not from inception. Such voidness supervened when the
Constitution came into force; and so they existed and operated for sometime and for certain
purposes; the voidness of post-Constitution laws is from their very inception and they cannot
therefore, continue to exist for any purpose. The voidness of post-Constitution law emerges due
to the prohibition which is incorporated in article 13 (1) that the State shall not make any law. In
the words of the Supreme Court in Mahendralal Case,

“The prohibition contained in Article 13 (2) makes the state as much incompetent to make a law
taking away or abridging the fundamental rights as it would be where law is made against the
distribution of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution between Parliament
and the Legislature of a State”.24

20
Ambica mills case, supra note 1 para 36-38
21
Article 13 (1) of The Constitution of India.
22
Supra note 3
23
Mahendar lal jaini v. the state of U.P. and other: AIR 1963 SC 1019
24
Id.

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If the wording of article 13 (2)25 makes a legislature incompetent and yet it makes a law
abridging the rights of the citizens, it shall be rendered void only to the extent of contravention.
It is submitted that the incompetency is delving as against citizens only (to the extent of
contravention) as the state was prohibited to make laws which takes away their rights, and thus
to that extent they will not be applicable to them and will stand as still born law. As regard to
non-citizen, the State is competent as the incompetency is only to the extent the law contravenes
the rights of the citizens. Thus, the law which is non est for the citizens can be validly applicable
to non-citizens.

The interpretation laid down by the Court, is correct proposition of law in relation to the
applicability of law which abridges the rights of one section of people who has been conferred
such rights and as against other section who has not been conferred such rights. The phrase to the
extent of contravention when read with first part of clause 2 of article 1326, “State shall not make
any law”, which clearly indicates that incompetency and voidness shall exist only to the extend it
contravenes the rights of citizens as they have been conferred article 19 27 rights. The law will be
perfectly valid as against those whose rights are not violated and legislature has competency to
enforce such laws as against them as they have not been conferred article 1928 rights and as such
they cannot claim the violation of such rights in the Court of law.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF ECLIPSE TO POST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

There are three question which must be answered in order to for the applicability of the doctrine
of eclipse to the post constitutional law.

1. First, can a post-Constitutional law be revived by a subsequent Constitutional amendment

removing the Constitutional bar to its enforceability or the post-Constitutional laws
which are inconsistent shall be void ab initio and thus cannot be revived?
2. If a post-Constitutional law violates rights conferred on citizens alone, (and thus becomes
void qua them), does it remain valid and operative qua non-citizens like foreigners and

25
Supra note 3
26
Supra note 3
27
Article 19 of The Constitution of India.
28
Id.

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 companies, or the law will be completely null and void by the strict application of Article
13 (2)?
3. Can amending the Act in question so as to remove the blemish revive the law in question,
or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole?

In the first question it is submitted that a post-Constitutional law which abrogates or takes away
fundamental rights will be void ab initio as against the persons on whom such rights have been
conferred. The author also contends that a post-Constitutional law cannot be revived by a
subsequent Constitutional amendment. The author rests his contention in the light of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Sagir Ahmed v. State of U.P29in this the court held that, the
Doctrine could not be applied to the impugned post-Constitutional law. A legislation that
contravened Article 19(1) (g)30 and was not protected by clause (6) of the Article 1931, when it
was enacted after the commencement of the Constitution, could not be validated even by
subsequent Constitutional amendment. As regard to the operation of such law which takes away
rights of citizens, as against non-citizens we can partially agree with the following proposition by
Das, C.J. in Behram Case-

But apart from this distinction between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws on which,
however, we need not rest our decision, it must be held that these American authorities can have
no application to our Constitution. All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of Part III of our Constitution, are, by the express provision of Article 13, rendered
void 'to the extent of such inconsistency.' Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed
for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after
the Constitution, as against non citizens.32

The "American authorities" referred to in this case by the Supreme Court involved only post-
Constitutional laws which were inconsistent with the provisions of the American Constitution,
and which were held to be "still born", as it were. Thus, these American rulings clearly could not

29
AIR 1954 SC 728
30
Article 19 (1) (g) of The Constitution of India,1950
31
Article 19 (6 ) of The Constitution of India,1950
32
Supra note 12

12
apply to the case of pre-Constitutional laws that were perfectly valid before the Constitution's
provisions took effect. Nevertheless, this observation has been used to contend that the Court has
not drawn any distinction between pre-Constitutional and post-Constitutional laws. in the latter
part of the observation, the Court had in mind only the pre-Constitutional laws; otherwise it
could not have stated that the laws existed for the purpose of pre-Constitutional rights and
liabilities and that they remained operative even after the Constitution as against noncitizens.

In Deep Chand v. State of U.P.33 it was held that there is a clear distinction between the two
clauses of Article 13. Under clause (1) a pre-Constitutional law subsists except to the extent of
its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, whereas as per clause (2), no post-Constitutional
law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent,
though made, is a nullity from its inception.

Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P.34 is the most authoritative decision for the impossibility of
reviving post-Constitutional laws by a Constitutional amendment. The Court based its finding on
the two grounds. First, the language and scope of Article 13(1) and 13(2) are different. Clause
(1) clearly recognizes the existence of pre-Constitutional laws which were valid when enacted,
and therefore could be revived by the Doctrine. Second, "contravention" takes place only once
the law is made. This is because the contravention is of the prohibition to make any law, which
takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. It is no argument to say that simply because the
Amendment removes any subsequent scope for contravention, the law is no longer in conflict
with the Constitution.

However, the scope of the principles established above stands drastically curtailed in view of the
Supreme Court decision in State of Gujarat v. Shree Ambica Mills,35 wherein Matthew, J. held
that like a pre-Constitutional law, a post Constitutional law contravening a fundamental right
could also be valid in relation to those, whose rights were not infringed upon. For instance, when
a post Constitutional law violates a fundamental right like Article 19 which is granted to citizens
alone, it would remain valid in relation to non-citizens. Thus the term "void" in both the clauses
of Article 13 makes a law only relatively void, and not absolutely void.

33
Deep Chand v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 648
34
Supra note 23
35
Supra note 1

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This judgment has been used to contend that the Doctrine has finally been extended to all post-
Constitutional laws as well, since it recognizes that the law is not an absolute nullity and can
operate against non-citizens. However, as regards citizens whose rights were infringed, the law
must be regarded as stillborn and void ab initio, and therefore, in order to make it apply to
citizens, the law would have to re-enacted afresh.

The final question, can amending the Act in question so as to remove the blemish revive the law
in question, or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole? In the case of The Delhi High Court in
P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna36 it was held that the legislation will have to be re-enacted and that it
cannot be revived by mere amendment. This view appears to the author to emanate logically
from the position adopted by the Supreme Court in treating such a law as void ab initio. There is,
therefore, no need to apply the Doctrine of Eclipse to post-Constitutional laws. In the case of
Shama Rao v. State of Maharashtra37 wherein an Act was challenged on the ground of excessive
delegation, and pending the decision, the Legislature passed an Amendment Act seeking to
remove the defect. The Supreme Court ruled by a majority that when an Act suffers from
excessive delegation, it is stillborn and void ab initio. It cannot be revived by an amending Act
seeking to remove the vice, and must be re-enacted as a whole. It is submitted that this ruling
supports the proposition that an Act held invalid under Article 13(2) would not be revived
merely by amending it, but would have to be re-enacted. We may infer the ambica mills but it
should not destroy the force of the judicial pronouncements in Deep Chand and Mahendra Jaini,
but merely limits the scope of their operation, and that the Doctrine, as of now, cannot be
extended to post-Constitutional laws.

36
A.I.R. 1971 Del. 1.
37
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 480.

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 CONCLUSION
The doctrine of eclipse is used in exceptional circumstances, to save unconstitutional statutes
from being totally wiped off from the statute book, and merely render them asleep or inoperative
for the time being. a statute under eclipse is revived by obliteration of the limitations generating
the taint of unconstitutionality. The question of whether the Doctrine can be extended to revive
post Constitutional laws as well, has engendered acrimonious debate among jurists and judges.
such as the exact connotation of the word "void" in Article 13(1) and (2), and whether the
Americannotion of "relatively void" is applicable to the Indian scenario. The fact of the matter is
that there has been no unambiguous pronouncement by the Supreme Court on this issue
following Ambica Mills, and thus far, the Doctrine of Eclipse has not been applied to post-
Constitutional laws, Ambica Mills has, thus helped in removing the contradictions involved in
the Supreme Court judgments we have been considering. We can concludes that the proposition
laid down by Ambica Mills Case is a sound logical foundation which is based on the correct
interpretation of Article 13 clause 1 and 2.

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