SPE
SPE 20915
Relief Well Breakthrough at Problem Wen 2/4-14
In the North Sea
by B.S. Aadnoy, Rogaland U., and P. Bakay, Saga Petroleum AlS
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Abstract
After being out of ooutrol for a year, an underground
blowout in well 2/4-14 in the North lea was suc:ceafully
killed through & relief well. This paper amml maiDly
the breakthrough phase. A theory for relief' well break-
through is also presented along with the field caae.
Introduction
The underground blowout in Saga. Petro1euml problem
well 2/4-14 took nearly a year to get under control. This
paper will maiDly ~ the final phase of the well COD-
trol operation, where & relief well was drilled into 2/4-
14 and the underground blowout wall stopped. A rock
mechanics theory for relief well breakthrough was devel-
oped. The later well killing operation behaved in cloee
agreement with the new theory. This paper presents the
theory aa well aa the field expeI:ience gained during the
killing of the problem well. Failure mechanisms ue iden-
tified and the critical distances between the boreholes to
establish communication ue addressed.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper giving a the-
ory for relief well breakt;hrough. Therefore, the theory
and field results presented will improve the understand-
ing of relief well drilling.
Relief well breakthrough can be handled safely by
implementing proper field -procedures, 88 demonstrated
in well 2/4-14. These include rock mecha.n:ics conSider-
ations such as: fracturing and collapse of boreholes and
understanding of borehole breakthrough. In particular,
it is shown that breakthrough occurs aa the blowing well
collapses towards the relief well.
References and figures at end of paper.
Page 329
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Field Case
Well 2/4-14 was drilled on an upper Jurassic prospect in
production liceaae DO. 146, which covers the northern
part of Block 2/4. The license are& is situated in the
southern part of ~he N.orth Sea, approximately 300km
southwest of Stavanger. The location map is shown in
Figure 1.
The operation of the well started with the semiaub-
mersible drilling rig 'I.'teastae Saga in October 1988. No
particular problema were experienced until the 9-5/8
in. easing was run and cemented in the lower part of the
upper Cretaceua chalk section at 4437 mRKB. A leak-
off test (LOT) yielded 2.18 SG, and drilling of the 8-1/2
in. section CODtinu~ Pore pressure signals from the
well were spane until the base Cretaceous unconformity
waa penetrated at 4702 mRKB. Increasing gaa readiDga
indicated a rather rapid pore pressure increase, and the
mudweight was inc:reued correspondingly to 2.08 SG.
A drilling break WILl experienced at 4708.5 mRKB,
and drilling oontinued to 4TI3 mRKB where a negative
flow check WILl performed. Circulating bottoms up gave
gaa-cut mud (68% gaa), fiDe-grained sand, a.nd the well
was shut in and observed for 30 minutes. No pressure in-
crease wall observed, and the mud weight was increased
to 2.10 SG. The well was circulated until the gas read-
ings were less than 1%, and drilling continued to 4TI4
m where return was lost. Then return waa attempted
regained at different rates without success. The well was
stable when the pump was shut down. A total of 470
bbls was lost prior to pumping a 100 bbls LCM pill in
pIa.ce. The mud weight was cut back to 2.09 SG, and
the hole wall circulated clean, and the well wall stable.
The interval wall evaluated to be a thin sand string in
the upper Jur&llllic Mandal formation. Drilling contin-
ued with a mudweight of 2.09 SG (ECD: 2.12 SG) and
at a stable drilling rate of 2-3 m/hr. At 4733 mRKB
a drilling break occuted (20 m/hr) , and the drill bit
dropped to 4734 In. A rapid influx of 10 bbls
2 RELIEF WELL BREAKTHROUGH AT PROBLEM WELL 2/4-14 IN THE NORTH SEA
was recorded before the bit was picked up from bot-
tom and the pumps were stopped. A pit gain of 14
bbls in 145 seconds was observed before the well was
closed in on the upper annular preventer with a shut-
in casing pressure (SICP) of 600 psi, and zero shut-in
drillpipe pressure (SIDP), probably due to a float in the
drillpipe. The well was kept closed for 20 minutes be-
fore the annulus pressure was bled off on the choke line.
The pressure dropped to zero on the casing side. The
annular preventer was reopened, and the well started to
flow immediately. A total of 38 bbls were gained before
the annular preventer was closed again.
It was attempted to establish drillpipe pressure by
pumping down the drillpipe, but no response was ob-
served on the annulus side, indicating a potential cross
flow in the open hole. Periodic SIDP of 100 psi (when
the float was open) indicated a formation pressure gra-
dient of 2.11 SG (14200 psi). As no wireline logs were
available from the open hole the potential loss zone was
difficult to evaluate. However; several factors indicated
a loss zone between 4708 to 4713 meters:
* Surge pressure close to 2.20 SG during bit
change at 4707 m.
* Losses were first experienced in this zone.
* High Gamma Ray readings in this zone,
probably due to LCM material squeezed
into it. See Figure 2.
*General experience with weak sand zones
in upper Jurassic in this area.
The following week was spent attempting to reestab-
lish circulation in the well. Pumping LCM/HEC mate-
rial and baryte plugs as well as bullheading with 2.12 SG
mud were attempted to cure the problem, but without
success. During this period a maximum SICP of 1100
psi was observed. Extreme bad weather did also compli-
cate the operation. The bit was pulled to 4700 mRKB,
and the 16th of January 1989 the pipe was found stuck.
The next day it was decided to displace the open hole
with cement, and to back off the drill string. 50 bbls of
2.12 SG cement was squeezed into the formation. It was
attempted to locate the stuck point with a free point in-
dicator and sinkerbars, but the equipment was unable to
pass 3550 meters. Annulus pressure and drillpipe pres-
sure was bled off to zero, and the well was stable. It was
decided to run coiled tubing inside the drillstring to be
able to run the free point indicator.
On the 20th of January 1989 coiled tubing was used
to wash down to the cement wiper plug (4691 mRKB),
when suddenly the pop-off valve on the coiled tubing
unit opened. 0.5 bbls of gain was observed in the trip
tank, and gas came in the shaker room and on the drill
floor. The drillstring started to come out of the hole, and
the shear-ram was activated. A SICP of 8000 psi was
observed shortly after the pipe was cut. An attempt to
bullhead by 2.12 SG EMW failed due to leak across the
choke manifold. The SICP increased further to 9800 psi.
The next day the kill fiexhose bursted at the gooseneck
on the slip joint, and the well blowed through the kill
line for 1 minute before the fail-safe valves closed and
the well was shut in. The rig was thereafter pulled off
location.
Page 330
SPE 20915
Saga Petroleum immediately formed a task force to
manage the 2/4-14 well and the relief well control op-
erations. Boots and Coots Inc. was contracted for the
killing operation of the original well. Eastman Chris-
tensen were used to device the strategy for killing the
blowout with a relief well if the surface control opera-
tion failed. The jack-up rig Neddrill Trigon was used for
the surface intervention operations, while Treasure Saga
was used for the drilling of the relief welL
Relief Well 2/4-15s
The principal challenges associated with the relief well
were high temperatures, great depth, unknown reser-
voir parameters, and the drillpipe/coiled tubing fish. On
January 31, 1989, relief well operations commenced at
a location 1184 m to the south of well 2/4-14. The well
directional plan was to follow an S-curve, and to pass
the 2/4-14 well approximately 10 m to the west at ap-
proximately 3900 mTVD, and then to drop to vertical at
approximately 20 m distance from 2/4-14 to the north-
west. 20 meters horizontal distance was chosen to be
able to run electromagnetic ranging guns, but to avoid
potential fracturing at the 9-5/8 in ca.sing shoe in the
problem well.
The relief well was drilled to a depth of 4674 mTVD
(4930 mRKB), and to a horizontal distance of approxi-
mately 6.4 meters from well 2/4-14. The 7 in. liner was
run and cemented to bottom, and the well put on stand-
by for further progress in the operations on well 2/4-14.
Figure 3 shows the status prior to drilling out the 7 in.
liner. During the operation, several complicating factors
were discovered. In June 1989, an underground blowout
of 18 000 bbls/day of oil/gas was discovered, charging a
shallow sand bed at approximately 850 meters depth. In
October 1989, the 9-5/8 in. casing bursted in well 2/4-
14. The fishing operation for the lost drillstring/coiled
tubing showed slow progress, and minor but increasing
amounts of reservoir gases leaking to the surface were
also detected. Due to the fact that another winter sea-
son with generally bad weather was coming up, it was
decided in December 1989 to go for a combination kill
by the use of the relief well 2/4-15s.
The plan was now to intersect well 2/4-14 below
the bit at about 4700 mTVD. As soon as communica-
tion between the wells was obtained, and based on PLT
readings in well 2/4-14, flow was controlled by pumping
down 2/4-15s and into 2/4-14 in an optimal way. Of pri-
mary concern in this process was good communication
between the wells.
Two meters of new formation was drilled, and a LOT
of 2.25 SG EMW was measured. A high LOT was essen-
tial as kill mud of 2.25 SG was planned for the final kill
phase. A Christensen S725 drill bit was run with a new
bottom hole assembly(BHA) in order to perform drilling
until communication was established between the two
wells. The bit was specially made concerning the nozzle
flow area. The flow area was increased from 0.7 to 1.3
in 2 to possibly avoid any plugging if pumping of LCM
material was needed. Formation was drilled with a mud
SPE 20915 B. S. AADNOY AND P. BAKOY
weight of 1.95 SG and an average ROP of 8 m/hr down
to 4704 mTVD. A steadily increase in the ROP was ex-
perienced, causing a reduction in the WOB from 5 to
3 tons to keep the ROP at a desired level of 6-7 m/hr.
Even if this section was drilled underbalanced relative to
virgin pore pressure, no gas signals were observed from
the well when compared with the original well, as seen
[rom Figure 4. This could imply a pressure draw-down
in the vicinity of the bottom of the blowing well.
At 4704 mTVD a change in the torque pattern in-
dicated a possible change in the formation (base Creta-
ceous unconformity), so the general idea was that if no
communication was indicated down to 4704 m, bottoms
up would be circulated to possibly verify the formation
change through cuttings examination. Based on the re-
sults of this analysis the further strategy would be cho-
sen. However, when drilling at 4706 mTVD, the weight
was suddenly lost and the drill string clearly dropped.
The kelly was picked up and the drill pipe pulled into
the 7 in. liner shoe. A loosing rate of 9-10 bbls/min
indicated a complete communication situation between
the two wells. This has also been verified by changes
in the PLT readings observed in well 2/4-14. Figure 5
shows the situation at breakthrough. The well was kept
full by 1.95 SG mud until losses decreased to a stable
rate around 2-3 bbl/min. At that time the total amount
of mud lost was estimated to be 1350 bbls. A dynamic
kill by the use of seawater and Halliburton pumps was
originally planned. Due to the complete communication
situation, this plan was abandoned, and a new kill pro-
cedure was invoked. The well was killed by pumping
2.25 SG kill mud prior to changing to 2.13 SG mud.
A temperature degradable mud plug was finally set in
well 2/4-14. This worked successfully, and the well was
killed. Figure 6 shows the fluid losses at the time im-
mediately following breakthrough. Note that the high
loss rate indicated good communication between the two
wells.
Estimation of the Fracturing
Gradients
Since fracturing is a primary factor, will in the following
the borehole integrity be outlined. This analysis is appli-
cable for the depths/phases at which the boreholes are
located at a distance, where no interaction is expected
between the two wells. That is, they can be handled as
two separate holes. Near breakthrough adjacent effects
come into play, as outlined later in this paper.
As defined by Aadnoy and Chenevert (Ref.1), the
in-situ stress state is probably the most important fac-
tor regarding borehole integrity. We assume that the
overburden is a principal stress acting downwards, and
that two equal (but smaller) principal stresses act in the
horizontal plane. That is, we assume a hydrostatic hori-
zontal stress state. The leak-off tests for both wells have
been used to estimate the horizontal stresses, as defined
in the following equation from Ref.l:
Page 331
3
The horizontal stress is simply the average of the
leak-off pressure and the pore pressure at a given depth.
The overburden stress increases with depth, indicat-
ing an increased overall stress state. Therefore, the hor-
izontal stresses are also expected to increase with depth.
Figure 7 shows the estimated horizontal stress divided
by the overburden stress for the two wells. At shallow
depth this ratio is low, increasing towards one at about
4700 m depth. The horizontal stresses are according to
experience elsewhere, no particular abnormality is ob-
served.
In Figure 8, the £rac. grad';overburden grad. ratio is
shown for the two wells. Reference 2 adresses a similar
situation. From this reference, competent shale forma-
tions are defined to give high fracture pressures, while
sand, chalk and coal stringers often give lower fracture
pressures. This situation is modelled by constructing
two fracturing curves.The lithology at a particular depth
will then define which one of the curves applies.
In Figure 8, the high and low fracture curves are es-
timated. Down to about 3300 m the formation is mostly
clay, and the high fracture curve applies here. Between
3300 m and 4700 m there is mostly chalk, and the low
fracture curve applies here. Although a competent chalk
often gives high fracturing pressure, weak zones may ap-
pear. We therefore use the low curve to be safe. At
about 4250 m repeated leak-off tests were performed in
well 2/4-15s, yielding values varying between 2.06 and
2.22 SG. This is indicated with a horizontal line in the
diagram. A similar set of repeated testing is also seen
at about 900 m. In the interval between 3300 m and
4633 m we can assume that certain depths have a low
fracture gradient due to the lithology present.
Figure 9 gives more details over the near reservoir
area. In addition to the prognosed pore pressure and
overburdent stress gradient curves, the predicted irac.
grad. curve is shown. We see that the 7 in. liner has
been set in a competent rock, but that there is a poten-
tial lost circulation zone just below. Actually it is this
zone that initially created the blowout by causing loss
of circulation. Any further drilling activity will depend
on this loss zone.
Performing Leak- Off Test Be-
fore Drilling Out?
The situation before drilling into 2/4-14 is shown in Fig-
ure 10. With the 7 in. liner set at 4673 mTVD, the dis-
tance between the boreholes was estimated to 6.4 meters
±1.7 m based on borehole proximity surveying (Ref. 5).
From Ref. 3, the theoretical distance between the holes
before adjacent effects starts is about 5 borehole radii,
or about 1 meter in this case. At this distance, a col·
lapse phenomena is expected to be likely. A leak··off test
was performed to test the strength of the liner shoe be-
fore drilling out. The question asked beforehand was;
Is it likely that communication occur between the two
wells if 2/4-15s is fractured at the 7 in. liner shoe? To
4 RELIEF WELL BREAKTHROUG~AT PROBLEM WELL 2/4-14 IN THE NORTH SEA
answer this, let us study the stresses around the bore-
holes. From Ref. 1 the hoop stress, or the tangential
stress around a borehole can be written as:
We observe that if the borehole pressure is lowered, the
hoop stress will increase the same amount. Figure 11
shows the stresses at the boreholes when testing the
7 in liner shoe. Well 2/4-15s is approaching fractur-
ing, resulting in a very low hoop stress. Well 2/4-14 is
flowing with a low bottomhole pressure (approximately
7500 psi). Therefore the hoop stress is large around this
well. The conclusion is tha.t if welI2/4-15s fractured, the
fracture would propagate away from 2/4-14 because the
high hoop stress would prevent communication. There-
fore, communication due to fracturing between the two
wells is not likely. On the other hand, collapse is likely
when the two holes get closer, as shown later. Assum-
ing that the overburden is the maximum principal stress,
the fracture would not propagate up or downwards, but
as a standing fracture away from both wells.
Relief Well Breakthrough
Now we will discuss what happened when communica-
tion was established between the two boreholes. As seen
in the previous section, the high stress concentration
(hoop stress) around well 2/4-14 will prevent a fractur<,
from the relief well to propaga.te into 2/4-14. Fracturing
is therefore ruled out as the mechanism of brea.kthrouJ!;h.
Figure 12 is taken from Reference 3, and it shows
that when the two holes get very close, the stress field
changes in such a way that the critical collapse pres-
sure increases. In other words, two holes might be sta-
ble at a distance, but when they get close collapse may
occur. For our case, the hoop stresses are largest in
well 2/4-14, causing high shear stresses. The way break-
through occured can be described as follows: Well 2/4-
15s was drilled towards 2/4-14. At a critical distance
of about one meter the stress field was altered so much
that collapse was initiated in well 2/4-14, as exempli-
fied in Figure 13. Fragments fall into the hole, resulting
in a shortening of the distance between the two wells.
Again referring to Figure 12, we see that once collapse
is initiated, the distance shortens more, moving towards
left in the diagram. That is, once the breakthrough is
initiated, it becomes an unstable process that continues
until complete communication is established. Figure 13
shows physically what happens. Well 2/4-15s has almost
twice the borehole pressure as the flowing well 2/4-14.
At a critical distance 2/4-14 starts to collapse. This
process continues rapidly until full communication is es-
tablished. This rapid breakthrough was also observed
during the well control operation, as discussed later.
Page 332
SPE 20915
Rock Drillability Analysis
There are few measurements available to analyse the
problem well and the relief well. However, since both
wells are drilled adjacent to each other, the rock prop-
erties and the in-situ stresses can be assumed to be con-
stant. Any difference between the two wells can be as-
sumed to be caused by well interference. The rock drill-
ability study was mainly carried out to evaluate whether
the theoretical distance of five borehole radii before ad-
jacent effects starts, seems correct or not. Figure 14
shows the distances between the two wells when drilling
out. The distance just below the 7 in. liner was about
6.4 meters. The distance at breakthrough at about 4702
mTVD was estimated to be about 1 meter, or about five
borehole radii as discussed earlier.
The drillabilities were computed from mud log data,
and the following relationship:
ROP = K *N * WOB/D
The results are shown in Figure 15. The drillability
for well 2/4-14 was nearly constant down to about 4709
m. Here a sudden increase is believed to be caused by
drilling into a weak sand. A few meters below, loss of
circulation occurred. Below the sand, the drillability
went back to the earlier level until a kick was taken at
the top of the reservoir at 4733 m. For well 2/4-14,
the drillability record may indicate competent rock in
the whole section except through the sand zone at 4709-
4714 m.
The solid line in Figure 15 shows the drillability for
well 2/4-15s. The bit size was 8-1/2 in. to just below
the 7 in. liner shoe. Down to 4660 m. the drillabil-
ity was nearly constant. Also at the 7 in. liner shoe
the drillability was low. However, the interval between
4660-4673 m. can be interpreted two ways. Either the
rock drillability is constant and an appearent difference
is due to operational effects, or an appearent increase is
due to adjacent well interference. That is, at 4660 m.
we are inside the influence region of well 2/4-14. Below
4674 m., the drill bit was smaller (5-7/8 in.). Here an
obvious change in drillability has taken place. A max-
imum drilling rate of 23 m/hr was observed. Although
operational effects may explain some increase, it seems
like a valid conclusion to define the two wells to inter-
fere below the 7 in. liner. The two wells have been
subjected to a number of operations which by pressure
variations may have weakened the holes. The increased
drillability starts at the 7 in. liner shoe. From Figure
14, the distance between the wells is about 6.4 meters,
beyond the theoretical five borehole radii for adjacent
borehole effects.It seems likely that the critical distance
between the holes before adjacent effects starts is well
beyond the theoretical five borehole radii. Possible ten
times this figure was present in our case.
SPE 20915 B. S. AADNOY AND P. BAKOY
Observations During Break-
through
The final phase started when drilling out below the 7 in.
liner at 4673 m. A distance of about 22 m. was planned,
with an inclination between the two boreholes of about
9.5 degrees. A 5-7/8 in. PCD drill bit was used, and
the flow rate was set at 2000 l/min. In addition were
procedures invoked with back reaming to the casing shoe
every 3 meters.
The drilling rate was abnormally high. At most it
was 23 m/hr. Drilling proceeded without problems to
about 4704 mTVD where a sudden drilling break re-
sulted in a nearly instant 1 m. drop of the drill bit.
Simultaneously, mud return ceased, showing tha.t break-
through had occurred. The distance between the holes
were estimated to about 1m.
Breakthrough occurred nearly instantly, and at less
than five borehole radii distance between the wells, as
predicted by theory. There seems to be a good agree-
ment between the theory and the field experience.
Conclusions
A rock mechanics theory for borehole breakthrough was
developed during the successful handling of the blowout
on well 2/4-14. Evaluation of the experience gained and
the model resulted in the following conclusions:
-Borehole breakthrou~h occured when the relief well
was closer than one meter away from the blowing well.
-It is not likely to establish communication between
the two wells with fracturing. Due to the high hoop
stress around the flowing well, a fracture from the relief
well will bypass it.
-Breakthrough occur as the flowing well collapses.
Within a distance of five borehole radii, collapse may
suddenly take place, establishing good and rapid com-
munication.
-Drillability analysis indicated that adjacent bore-
hole effects starts beyond the theoretical five borehole
radii distance. However, breakthrough occurred actu-
ally within the five borehole radii. Here is an discrep-
ancy that is not presently understood.
Page 333
5
References
1. Aadnoy, B.S. and Chenevert, M.E.: "Stability of
Highly Inclined Boreholes." SPE Drilling Engineering,
Dec. 1987.
2. Aadnoy, B.S. and Larsen, K.: "Method for Frac-
ture Gradient Prediction for Vertical and Inclined Bore-
holes." SPE Drilling Engineering, June 1989.
3. Aadnoy, B.S. and Froitland, T.S.: "Stability of Ad-
jacent Boreholes." To be published in the Journal of
Petroleum Science and Engineering.
4. Aadnoy, B.S.: "Effects of Reservoir Depletion on
Borehole Stability." To be published in the Journal of
Petroleum Science and Engineering.
5. Wright,J., Lerand, F., Zachary, M. and Thompson,B.:
"Relief Well Planning and Drilling for a North Sea Un-
derground Blow-Out." Paper SPE 20420 to be presented
at the SPE Fall Meeting, New Orleans, Sept. 1990.
Nomenclature
O'TI = Horizontal in-situ stress.
0'0 = Overburden stress.
0'0 = Tangential borehole stress (hoop stress).
pw / = Borehole fracturing pressure.
p/ m = Pore pressure.
ROP = Rate of penetration.
K = Rock drillability.
N = Rotary speed.
WOB = Weight on bit.
D = Diameter of the drill bit.
SG = Specific gravity.
ECD = Equivalent circulating density.
EMW = Equivalent mud weight.
mRKB = Total distance measured from the drill floor.
mTVD = Vertical distance from the drill floor.
SICP = Shut-in casing pressure.
SIDP = Shut-in drillpipe pressure.
P LT = Production logging tool.
LOT = Leak-off test.
LC M = Lost circulation material.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Saga Petroleum, Statoil, Am-
erada Hess and Elf for permission to publish this paper.
 S~E 2091 5

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 seE 2091 5

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DEPTIl
(mTVD)

,. wa.l2l~·I' ..00
1.5 1.' I.' to 1.1 '.0 1111-
o WB.ltJ~·'1

II ~~ ,~t
1C·214·'4

''It I
o· 2f~·t!l

I
..00
PORE
PRESSURE
GRADIENT
llllOO
.

~1 ~
"tJ
Q)
coCD ~ ~~ <800

}~
;:: 3DGO
to.)
to.)
0>
=;~ 30
v:,-r
! .." l,"_

m-
4700
}~.
4000+ I i
I .... I
II
ZaE

-:
0° I I I 1'I~1 f
CAP ROCK
MANDAI.. ..00
1\
0.... t.02
I
(mTVD)
, , '" DEI'TlI
ImTVDj

Fig. 7: Horizontal Stress I Overburden dala lrom LeB~ 0'" Losl eire, dats. Fig. 8: F,ac1uf" g,denls and LIIhology. Fig. 9: Esllma1ed Graclents at reservoir.
 seE 20915

HORIZONTAL DISTANCE
02 4 68101214(m)
, I I I I well: 214·14
DEPTM
(mTVD)
WELL: 214·14 WELL: 2I4·lSS
I
4570

~~
7kt liner al4673m TVO

-
4680
~~
.1 Cotapst I"illaton

Fracture propagates

g
•••y frOl .. II 214-14

Fig. 11: 1 .ng.ntl.'lor hoop) alr..... at In'.rgr!ty ,.atlng.

~bI C<>llaoso p<opagIIIon

i
Cb
UJ
UJ
.....,
uS
DISTANCE N RADI
tlCAEASE N CIlI1lCAl.
COlLAPSE PAEBSlJ'E

c-=
--. 4720
., ..........,q,

• .1

Fig. 10: Plan for bottom se clion before drilling out of r Uner. FIg. 13: The Brealdhrough process.

e
DISTANCE N IIOIlEHOlE RADI

FIg. 12: Incr.... In collapse pressure when dri~ng .n adjacent hole lor
Pw·l.2g1cm'. lRef.3)
 SfE 2091 5

4600Dr-_ _--15 '-Dt '+-5.,. 2,..D__DISTANCE BETWEEN

WELLS(m)

HIDRA

R0DBY

SOLAI
VALHALL

CLAY
-'
~
:,,:SAN~::.:.:=: " .....::
z
<
::E CLAY

.: : :. '. : ':. : ': ~.;~.

: 0" • • • •

"
• , " U:,JURASSIC SS. ':: :
. :lVD
(m)

Fig. 14: Well Distances,

. .--=:::?"r-_--......:20;;....._ _.....:.30;;......_ _.....:.:.....- SO:,:..._ _.......;60;;..,~k(x'25x1D~~Iiri..... )

DRLLABUTY

4620 ......... WELL 214·14

HIDRA
- - WELL 214,'55

4640
R0DBY

DEPTH OF CHANGE IN
:.;; 01660 ~ ORIu.ABILITY IN
<.>
214-155
0
a:
II.
'SOLAI
4673
7inj
< VALHALL
<.>
4680

<i.
o
z
<
:;
CLAY
4700

4720
~==
".:',:.,;.; ", '." .::.! .... :.~''''.':.': .;:.::::.:; :.:.:<.~:~ ~

LOST CIRCULATION
.
COMMUNICATION
LOST FLUID.
BIT DROPPED 1M.

", ",_ .. :. . .
.. :. : '.~O
. U.
.
JURASSIC
.
5S.'· ".:'.
. . . . . TVD
'. . '. .••.• (m)

Fig. 15: Drillabilities.

Page 338