Relief-Well Planning and
Drilling for a North Sea
Summary. This case history de-
scribes relief-well planning and exe-
cution for a deep, underground blow-
out. Key achievements include an
innovative relief-well strategy, locat-
ing and tracking the target casing
with electromagnetic ranging and
conventional surveying techniques,
and integrating kill pumping units
and associated equipment on a semi-
submersible. This was the first known
instance of relief-well intersection and
kill without a plug back and redrill after
ranging. The techniques and equip-
ment, plus good teamwork, provided
the necessary ingredients to place a
bit into a 215.9-mm open hole 5 km
away and to regain well control suc-
cessfully. This work also summarizes
a parallel kill effort with a snubbing
unit for surface intervention.
266
Underground Blowout
Frode Leraand, SPE, Saga Petroleum A/S; J.W. Wright, SPE,
John Wright Co.; M.B. Zachary, SPE, Eastman Christensen Inc.;
and B.G. Thompson, Vector Magnetics Inc.
Introduction
In Dec. 1988, Saga Petroleum A/S set
244.5-mm casing at 4437 m on Well 2/4-14
in the Ekofisk area of the North Sea. Saga
was drilling from a semisubmersible in 68
m of water to evaluate the Jurassic hydrocar-
bon potential 300 m deeper. This explora-
tory well was the first drilled to such a depth
in the prospect.
Drilling continued through the Cretaceous
with 215.9-mm bits and water-based mud.
A sharp transition occurred and formation
pore pressure increased from an estimated
1.65- to 2. 11-g/cm 3 equivalent mud weight
(EMW) near the reservoir top. Formation
integrity at the casing shoe was 2.18-g/cm 3
EMW. The hole penetrated several poten-
tially weak formations above the objective,
and while drilling near-balanced, narrow
margins between influx and lost circulation
were encountered.
On Jan. 11, 1989,the crew observed a
1-m drilling break at 4733 m. The well be-
gan to flow immediately. The upper annular
blowout preventer (BOP) was closed arid at-
tempts were made to establish circulation
with the driller's method and to bullhead,
but without success. After fighting simul-
taneous loss and influx for several days, the
bottornhole assembly (BHA) was cemented
at 4700 m, and a backoff and sidetrack
planned. The drillstring, however, became
plugged, requiring a coiled-tubing operation
to remove the obstructions. Well control was
lost on Jan. 20, making it necessary to shear
the 127-mm drillpipe with 4482 m of coiled
tubing inside. Wellhead pressure increased
to a maximum of 70.3 MPa.
An attempt was made to bullhead down
the kill line but the flex hose burst at the slip
joint. The well flowed for approximately 1
minute before being shut in by the fail-safe
valves. The crew disconnected the riser and
moved the rig offlocation (Fig. 1). The sub-
sea stack was vertical. No hydrocarbons
were discharging into the sea.
Saga, with cooperation from partners
Statoil A/S, Amerada Hess Corp., and Elf
Aquitaine, immediately formed an internal
task force to manage the operations and to
regain control. This task force studied proj-
Copyright t 992 Society of Petroleum Engineers
ect management, engineering, field super-
vision, rig mobilization, and blowout and
relief-well specialists.
Choosing the Kill Method
The flowing reservoir consists of fine- to
coarse-grained sandstone with an estimated
100-md permeability. The fluid was light oil
or gas condensate with a high GOR and a
reservoir pressure estimated at 98 MPa. Bot-
tornhole static temperature (BHST) was
167°C.
From data before the pipe was sheared,
the team decided that the annulus around the
BHA probably was sealed (by cement or set-
tled barite) and that flow was passing
through the bit and up the drill string to the
wellhead. The annulus contained 2.09-g1
cm 3 mud. The introduction of 70.3 MPa
on the surface might have fractured the for-
mation at the casing shoe. There was no sig-
nificant wellhead pressure drop (during the
16 hours from shearing the pipe to leaving
the location) that would indicate a casing
rupture and underground blowout. How-
ever, because a similar blowout in 1984 held
at 82.7 MPa for 6 days before rupturing its
casings, a rupture was anticipated. 1
Operators facing a blowout must choose
how many relief wells to start and how to
use them (Table 1). Two simultaneous,
redundant, intervention projects historically
prove sufficient. The team decided that a
single relief well, designed for a worst-case
scenario, would act as a backup to surface
intervention. The team designed two extra
relief-well geometries.
Surface Intervention. The task force, as-
sisted by Boots & Coots Inc., adopted a sur-
face intervention plan. The operation would
use the existing subsea BOP, combined with
a custom-built stack and high-pressure riser
system designed for a snubbing unit. This
stack and riser maintained pressure integrity
from the seabed to the jackup, Nedrill
Trigon.
The surface team intended to latch on to
the severed drillpipe with a custom-made
packoff overshot and to fish out the coiled
tubing. Afterward, they could examine
several kill alternatives.
March 1992 • JPT
Relief-Well Strategy
Table I gives the kill objectives and design
steps. The chosen method called for hydrau-
lic kill through a relief well into the blowout
near the reservoir. Novel methods have been
studied or tried. 5-\3 We considered dynam-
ic kill with seawater followed by mud, com-
munication with seawater followed by mud,
brine followed by mud, and mud as the only
kill fluid.
Establishing Kill Point. The team consid-
ered three kill points: one at the shoe with
direct intersection, another in the reservoir
within 10 m, and a third within 1 m of open
hole between the bit and the reservoir. Table
1 gives the key elements considered. The
team chose the last option as promising the
greatest chance for success under all
scenarios. We would refine placement after
setting casing.
The relief well had to stay at least 20 m
away from the blowout until passing its shoe
and potential weak zones above 4560 m.
Then a liner would be set and pointed at the
target, a minimum of 6 m from the open hole
of Well 2/4-14. This restriction aimed to
avoid premature communication before set-
ting the kill string.
Kill Program Design. Blount and Soeii-
nah 8 were the first to describe dynamic
kill. This method uses a frictional pressure
drop to supplement the hydrostatic pressure.
Kill occurs in two or more stages. The ini-
tial (dynamic) phase uses low-weight fluid,
such as seawater, which is then pumped at
a rate sufficient to balance the formation
pressure and to stop flow. Then mud, with
enough density, holds the reservoir statical-
ly. Pump-rate adjustments keep bottomhole
pressure (BHP) monitored at the drillpipe,
between reservoir balance and formation
fracture.
This technique is attractive because the kill
rate is only a function of the blowout pipe
dimensions, flow path, friction factors,
backpressure, and fluid properties. Com-
plicated multiphase-flow calculations are
avoided, mud volumes are estimated easily,
and the reservoir PI has no influence on the
kill rate because influx is stopped. Building
mud density in stages also reduces forma-
tion-fracture risk.
This technique, however, also has disad-
vantages. Dynamic kill with seawater might
require sizable horsepower and deck capac-
ity, constrain tubular choice, produce ex-
cessive surface pressures, or necessitate
multiple wells. For example, seawater could
kill this well only if it were blowing through
drllipipe, given casing constraints and deck
capacity. All other scenarios (friction
reducer considered) required flow rates over
casing-burst specifications and more pumps
than would fit on the rig's deck. We con-
sidered brines for dynamic kill, but surface
storage constraints favored seawater.
Flak and Goins, IO describe overbalance
kill as using heavy mud (heavier than re-
quired to hold static reservoir pressure) as
the primary kill fluid. This method report-
JPT • March 1992
Sheared Drill Pipe
and Coiled Tubing
655 Bar on Wellhead
No Hydrocarbon Discarge
to the Sea
Unknown if There
is Flow Down Annulus
4432 m of 1 112"Coiled Tubing
inside Drill Pipe
Unknown if casing
is Ruptured
Top of Cement
Behind 9 5/8" Casing
3050m
Fractured Shoe or Under
Ground Blowout Unknown
Cement Seal Between
BHA and Annulus Unknown
Loss Zone
Total Depth
Fig. i-Status of Well 2/4·14 after disconnect, Jan. 20, 1989.
edly has been used on many relief wells with
mixed results. Few early kill attempts were
made with quantifying calculations, and af-
ter poor well placement, formation fracture
occurred.
The team used current technology to study
overbalance and dynamic kills and deter-
mined that overbalance would control all
scenarios from a single relief well. Origi-
hal multiphase-flow calculations, done
manually, consumed time and led us to
modify the multiphase-pipeHne-flow simu-
lator. 14 Then, we could investigate many
more scenarios and sensitivities.
With overbalance kill, communication is
achieved and the kill mud pumped down the
relief-well annulus at the simulated rate.
BHP, monitored at the drillpipe, tells when
to slow injection to avoid fracture.
Seawater might be injected, ahead of mud
and below the dynamic kill rate, to ensure
good communication, to establish proper
equipment operation, and to reduce the mud
rate. We postponed this decision because it
Treasure Saga 15,000 psi
Blind/Shear Rams Closed
and BOP Stack Vertical
Sea depth 68 m
30"
214.5 m
20"
901 m
133/8"
2509m
95/8" V-150
4437m
8 1/2" Bit @ 4700 m
4709 - 4714 m
4734 m
required pumping away nearly 160 m 3 of
drilling mud upon intersection.
Well Design. The rig Treasure Saga, which
was drilling Well 2/4-14 when the pipe was
sheared, was immediately available to spud
the relief well (We1l2/4-15S). Fig. 2 shows
vessel placement.
We needed 4300 kW pump capacity to
control all likely scenarios with 2.13-g/cm 3
or heavier kill mud. The team chose 16
HT -400 high-pressure pumps with a com-
bined rating of 6400 kW. This rating in-
cluded 45 % redundancy for equipment
failures or contingencies. These units were
stacked tandem on the pipe deck.
We wanted several times the theoretical
volume of kill mud. Normal rig storage is
350 m 3 . We added three 80-m3 mud tanks,
one 70-m 3 seawater tank, and one 40-m 3
mixing tank on the pipe deck. This exhaust-
ed practical deck capacity. In addition, we
stored 122 m 3 on a supply vessel and 556
m 3 on a stimulation vessel. The pumping
267
 TABLE 1-CHECKLIST FOR RELIEF-WELL PLANNING

Iterative systematic planning Borehole uncertainty

Define objectives and establish kill point Survey sensors
Design hydraulics for various scenarios Geographic location
Establish surface equipment requirements Borehole attitude
Detail kill procedures Instrument uncertainty model
Design casing program Instrument calibration data
Establish relative position uncertainty Field quality assurance
Establish number of relief welis Survey comparisons
Determine initial casing search depth
Establish surface locatlon(s) Initial search depth
Design reUef-well and drilling program Type of search instrument 2-4
Define special equipment requirements Blowout casing and sidetracked fish
Chemical and physical characteristics
Hydraulic design Drilling mud in blowout and relief well
Blowout fluid and reservoir properties Relative position uncertainty
Various kiii fluids and injection rates Formation drillability near detection point
Relief-well tubular sizes and strengths Well control considerations
Maximum predicted surface pressures Well path and dogleg considerations
Hydraulic horsepower requirements
Drillstring ejection pressure Surface location
Kill-fluid volumes and time to achieve kill Insurance and regulatory requirements
Surface/seabed hazards or obstacles
Surface equipment Hydrogen sulfide concentration
High/low-pressure pumping equipment Prevailing winds, currents, waves, and ice
Highllow-pressure manifolding Heat radiation or bubble plume
Tanks, mixing, and transfer equipment Shallow gas hazards and bathymetry
Water/diesel requirements and storage Geologic hazards
Rig specifications and deck layout Directional and survey considerations
Stimulation vassel as kill platform Rig type
Special and backup equipment
Relief-well geometry
Kill proCedures Kickoff point and build, drop and turn ratas
Communication and chain of command Formations
Decision tree and detailed scenarios Well control
Testing of equipment as a system Casing detection
Plugging blowout and relief wells Survey accuracy

Establishing kill point Establishing fluid communication

Status of blowout casing and wellhead Direct intersection with bit
Flow path and tubing performance Low-pressure acid or water squeeze
Blowout and kill-fluid properties Hydraulic fracturing
Formation properties at kill point Perforating guns or explosives
Formation drillability. time Sidetracks
Directional constraints and control
Surface and special equipment
Risk analysis and success probability

supervisor controlled the 16 pumps from a
control house adjacent to the catwalk. A
computerized monitor on a skid tracked
pressures and flow rates within the pump-
ing system.
Mud transfer tests showed that we could
move only 0.7 m 3 /min of kill fluid from
the supply boats to the rig deck. We con-
tracted a stimulation vessel to provide a
pumping capacity of 5595 kWand additional
storage. This vessel also could act as an in-
dependent kill platform for either the relief
well or the surface operation, and it carried
318 m 3 of 2.75-g/cm 3 hematite mud and
238 m 3 of2.3-g/cm 3 ZnBr2. We soon dis-
covered that hematite could not be main-
tained in suspension for long, and it had to
be removed.
The vessel was loaded with a 400-m 3
tank of 2.25-g/cm 3 barite-weighted kill
mud. A cementing pump transferred the
fluid at rates up to 4.1 m 3 /min. This boat
served the Nedrill Trigon but could quickly
move to the relief well.
The team ordered a special two-outlet kill
spool that slips between the upper annular
and top blind shear ram on the subsea BOP
stack. Two additional high-pressure flex
hoses hung over the side ofthe rig, connect-
ing the spool to the surface system. These
afforded the primary flow path, with choke
and kill lines acting as backup.
We used conventional casing design af-
ter evaluating burst and collapse forces and
special conditions. The design gave adequate
diameter to pump at the required rate
without excessive pressure, allowed an ex-
tra string, and met environmental consider-
ations such as H 2S. Fig. 3 shows the final
plan.
The mud program followed offset wells
(including the blowout). We evaluated su-
percharging or drawdown, hole stability,
fluid effects on electromagnetic ranging, and
lost-circulation procedures.
Position Uncertainty. Because more than
one well has missed its target after muffing
the surface coordinates or the azimuth refer-
ence system,15 we ran redundant surveys
between the wellheads using different tech-
niques. Land surveying and the global po-
sitioning system (GPS) worked better than
other methods and achieved a relative posi-
tion uncertainty of about 1 m. We used land.
coordinates until the casing triangulation
bypass. A true north azimuth reference
helped eliminate any remote grid errors.
A borehole surveying specialist investigat-
ed models and offset data, while the serv-
ice company calibrated instruments. 16-18
Measurement-while-drilling (MWD) pro-
vided blowout well surveys to 4722 m. The
well basically is vertical, with inclinations
under 20. MWD instruments tested within
specifications.
Experience has shown that near-vertical
MWD surveys primarily exhibit systematic
errors. Errors become randomly distributed
from station to station. This results in
smaller position uncertainty than from a
purely systematic model. By combining the

268 March 1992 • JPT

surface uncertainty (using square-root, sum-
of-squares method) with that of the bore- N
hole, we estimated blowout horizontal un-
certainty to be within 3.6 m at 2000-m true
vertical depth (TVD), 5.1 mat 3000 m, and
8.6 m at 4733 m, (the reservoir top). The
uncertainty shape is conical.
The relief-well surface location was
placed at the cross of two seismic lines, 1182
m at 183.3° azimuth from the blowout
wellhead.

Novel Search Plan. The team wanted to lo-

cate the casing and drill to the kill point
without plugging back. Enough room had
to be left to make a bypass, set intermedi-
ate casing, and reach the kill point without
doglegs or excess motor work. After care-
ful analysis, the team decided to locate the
blowout with an electromagnetic instrument
(well spot tool) and cross below a side-
tracked fish at 3800 m in the blowout.
The basic strategy was a build (1.5 ° /30
m), hold (30°), and drop (1 ° /30 m) well
path to cross the blowout casing between
3800 and 3900 m, 10 m to the west. The
well path then would drop to vertical at 4100
m, 20 m northwest of the blowout casing.
The wellbore azimuth was 2 ° , which facili-
tated accurate surveying and avoided a
parallel path along the most likely fracture
plane. We hoped to keep the dogleg severity
low and deep, to minimize torque and drag,
and to use rotary drop assemblies when pass-
ing the blowout casing.
Near the point of closest approach, elec-
tromagnetic ranging could triangulate a rela-
tive position between the two wells to within
1 m. Our working coordinates would shift
accordingly. The relief well would continue
vertical to approximately 4575 m (depths are
TVD unless noted), through a potential weak
zone, and then be nudged back and aligned
to the kill target between 4670 and 4695 m.
The kill liner setting depth would have a
minimum proximity of 6 m (Fig. 3). The
length of the last open section, from liner
to target, would be :5 50 m to avoid pulling
more than two stands before pumping.
In most close-approach situations, a
bypass of the blowout casing is recom-
mended. Crossing the casing decreases the
relative position uncertainty between two
wells. Ranging instruments generally meas-
ure relative direction with greater confidence
than relative distance. If casing can be
passed, then direction can be triangulated.
Triangulation uncertainty is about 10 % of
the distance between the wells at closest ap-
proach. Because we aimed for a I-m assur-
ance, the wells had to pass within 10 m of
each other. Closer approach improves ac-
curacy but increases risk of accidential in-
tersection.
The sensor configuration and electrode
spacing gives higher uncertainty at approach
angles > 45 ° . Experience indicates that rela-
tive angles between 3 and 20° are ideal. The
planned low-approach angle (0 to 15°) al-
lowed good confidence that the relief well
could pass safely without too many surveys
or trips and provided enough vertical depth
to make wellbore corrections.
Anchor Chains
Pipelines Treasure Saga
2/4-155
Fig. 2-Relief-well surface location.
The 215.9-mm hole section was critical
because of well control, possible circulation
loss, high temperatures, and strict position
requirements. MWD and motors (all posi-
tive displacement type) for fmal alignment
would encounter temperatures up to 150°C.
This would require hand-picked tools, short
runs, and special procedures (circulating
while running in, so static temperature
would be lower) to avoid tool failures.
Ranging Procedures. The basic plan relied
on fixes at 50, 25, and 12.5 m before the
blowout casing. If Well 2/4-14 was closer
or farther than predicted, the second fix
would be at one-half the first distance and
the third at one-half of Fix 2.
Once we detected the blowout casing with
less uncertainty than the combined surveys,
we would restart triangulation. The absolute
position of both wells becomes unimportant.
Shifts and other uncertainties are assigned
to the blowout (about 20% of distance and
6° in azimuth). This ensures that the bypass
will achieve accuracy without intersection.
Drilling would progress to the Fix 3 posi-
tion without entering the Fix 2 uncertainty
zone. Azimuth change on Fix 3 will tell if
the path will miss the casing or if a course
correction is needed. Figs. 3 and 4 give sur-
vey locations.
Surveying Procedures. The first objective
was to place the relief well at the first rang-
ing point (3600 m) with a lateral uncertainty
within 10 m. An inertial gyro run in the
1182 m@ 183.2° Azimuth
from 214-14 Wellhead
casing would peg initial uncertainty at "" 3
m. The MWD survey, tied to the gyro coor-
dinates at casing depth, would have an un-
certainty of "" 5 m or a total lateral
uncertainty of 8 m from surface. This tight
fix relied on good quality assurance, repeat-
ability between tools, and good rotation and
earth field data.
The survey interval of primary interest
was from the casing shoe back to the cross-
point. The objective was to eliminate any
magnetic interference error the blowout
casing might have introduced during the
bypass. Additionally, it would help decrease
the position uncertainty before drilling the
215.9-mm hole. The low inclination and
short section made this survey ideal for a
gyrocompass.
MWD would be cross checked with heat-
shielded, drop-electronic-multishot (EMS)
and north-seeking gyros run inside drillpipe.
The fmal alignment would require check-
ing between the bit and MWD every 10 m.
This required a trip to remove the motor and
MWD and to go in with a rotary assembly
and survey landing ring. Survey intervals as
short as 2 m generated accurate data through
the doglegs.
No surveys were planned after the final
alignment because no directional work was
proposed for the final hole unless commu-
nication could not be achieved. The total
survey uncertainty from the triangulation
bypass to the kill point was estimated to be
1.7 m (3 m for worst-case scenario) (Fig. 4).

JPT • March 1992 269

 214-155 214-14
214-155 214-14

KOP915 m P & A Well 214-13

Emergency 13 318" Casing MWD Surveys to
@2500mTVD TO. 7 Different Tools
BUR 1.5°/30m 16" Unar, N-80.
751b1f1@2010m

Inertial Gyro to 2500 m TVD

Estimated Uncertainty +/- 3 m ~ "-
13318", P-110 ~ 1331S"@2500m
72 Iblft @ 2500 m
Sidetracked BHA
from 3191 m to 3538 m MWD Survey tied to
Gyro While Drilling to

V
Tangent Inclination, 30 0
First ranging Point

Estimated Position Uncertainty First Ranging

Start Drop @ 3360 m @3560mTVD
of 2/4-158 at First Ranging. +/- 8 m
Drop Rate 1°/30m
Cross Casing @
' " 3829 m, 6-10 m West
First Ranging Point @ 3559 m Estimated Position Uncertinty Casing Cross
of 2/4-14 at Casing Cross, +/- 8 m 3829 mTVD

Relative Position Uncertainty

Vertical@4100m Reduced to +/- 1 m After Bypass
20 m Northwest
North Seeking Gyro in
95/8", MW-155. 9518" to Casing Cross
53.5 Ibm @ 4248 m
2/4-14.95/8"@4437 m MWD. EMS, & North Seeking --+-!Ult~
8 112~ Hole Gyro in Drillpipe in 8 112- Hole
KOP#2@4557m
20 m North of 2/4- 14 BHA
7".S-125,35Iblft
@4673m
Bit@4700m Combined Uncertainty From Surveying at
N 0° E ..... Kill Point +1- 1.7 m RSS. +/- 3 m Worst Case Kill Point
Vertical Section Kill POlnt@4705 m 5 7/8 Hole
M
@4705m

Fig. 3-Relief-well geometry. Fig. 4-Relatlve position uncertainty.

Executing the
Blowout Intervention Plan
Relief Well. The relief well spudded Jan.
31, 1989, 11 days after disconnecting from
Well 2/4-14. The 508-rrun casing was set
at 900 m on Feb. 6, without detecting shal-
low gas, Treasure Saga's BOP stack re-
mained on the Well 2/4-14 wellhead, so the
rig moved to Lyngdal, Norway, for a
replacement.
On Feb. 21, the 444.5-rrun hole section
was started with steerable motors and a KCl
polymer mud system. This section had sta-
bility problems and required three side-
tracks. Shallow seismic indicated that the
relief well paralleled a possible fault through
the weak section. The 339.7-rrun casing was
set April 23 at 2500 m, with 26.7° inclina-
tion and 1 ° azimuth. The inertial gyro sur-
vey in casing shifted the bottomhole location
4.5 m east from that computed from MWD.
The 311-rrun hole was drilled with steer-
able motors down to the initial ranging point
at 3559 m without problems. The blowout
casing appeared in the predicted area, and
drilling continued through the second and
third ranging depths. The relative position
of the blowout casing changed from 24 m
at 18° azimuth at Fix 2 to 13 m at 45°
azimuth on Fix 3 _This showed that the pro-
jected well path would cross the blowout
casing between 6 and 10 m west. Drilling
continued past Well 2/4-14, with MWD
used as a pendulum and earth field data mon-
itored for interference. The Run 4 triangu-
lation survey fixed the relative location at
6.3 m ±0.7 m at 93.5° azimuth. Hence,
3829 m was the depth of closest approach.
No magnetic poles were observed during the
bypass. The coordinate shift was only 5 m
from the surveyed location at this depth.
Drilling continued with pendulum assem-
blies to the casing point at 4249 m, 4505 m
measured depth (MD). On June 16, the well
was vertical and 22 m away at 165 ° azimuth.
A fifth ranging survey back past the cross-
point helped calibrate intensity values to the
triangulated fix (Fig. 5).
Top Kill. The surface intervention team
reattached the riser to the Well 2/4-14 well-
head on May 1. Wellhead pressure had
dropped from 65.5 to 19.3 MPa, indicating
a change in the blowout circumstances. Fish-
ing for coiled tubing commenced. On June
8, a production logging tool (PLT) revealed
flow rates of 2900 m 3 /d, indicating a leak
in the overshot and an underground blowout
to an unknown zone. As a result of uncer-
tainty and an early team decision to perform
only one critical operation at a time, the
relief well went on temporary standby.
On June 30, the leaking overshot was re-
placed and the drillpipe bullheaded. Pres-
sure response indicated flow up the annulus
or through holes in the drillpipe below 3350
m. A PLT and noise log indicated a hole in
the casing at 1372 m_ Flow probably entered
a large Pliocene sand at 840 to 890 m, Fish-
ing for the coiled tubing continued to a depth
of 3623 m when the decision was made to
continue the relief well to the liner depth,
Relief Well Resumes. All surface pumping
equipment was assembled in Holland (in the
way it would be used offshore) for a high-
pressure-function test 2 weeks before the
244-rrun casing was set. The equipment was
mobilized and reassembled on the rig after
casing was set_ The offshore kill team and
equipment remained on standby during drill-
ing of the 215.9-rrun hole to guard against
uncontrolled corrununication. Detailed plans
for circulation loss included contingencies
for complete losses (>1.3 m3/min) with
a two-fluid (calcium chloride and Econo-
lite™) flow-check process followed by a
barite plug.
Team concern focused on six areas in this
section. The first zone was adjacent to the
Well 2/4-14 casing shoe. The other five
were thin, weak formations that might pro-
vide a 'flowpath to the blowout. To facili-
tate pumping lost-circulation materials, we
decided that these sections would be rotary
drilled without MWD or bit nozzles, Mo-
tor work would take place only between
these weak sections, making each tool run
critical for alignment purposes,
Drilling resumed Aug. 12. The 215.9-rrun
hole was rotary drilled from the shoe to 4557
m, 3 m below the first two weak zones. The
hole passed the blowout casing shoe 21 m
away _ Next, a motor run was made to start
the nudge toward the kill point. The motor
was pulled 3 m above the next weak zone
and this zone was rotary drilled, No major
problems were encountered,
A ranging survey showed that the Well
2/4-14 BHA (now adjacent to 165-rrun drill
collars) was at a relative azimuth of 187°
(±5°), The survey proximity was 16,3 m
(±1.6 m) at 177° (±6°). This azimuth

270 March 1992 • JPT


N 4437 m TVD
2/4-158 Vertical
at 4120m TVO
t
Horizontal Vtew
Surveyed Position of Casing
at 3829 m. 3.5m E &3.2 mN
Fix 4, Casing Trianulation
9300g AZM. +/- 0.7 m
Crossing
Blowout Casing
Fig. 5-Electromagnetic triangulation of Well 2/4-14 casing.
swing was greater than anticipated but still
within the estimated uncertainty values.
Drilling continued with a bent sub and
motor to 21 m above the fourth weak zone.
A hard tum put the well over to align to the
latest ranging fix. If drilling continued as
originally planned, there would be too little
vertical depth to correct direction without
a plugback. The team decided to survey at
this important depth with different tools.
Tools agreed, Well 2/4-14 coordinates were
shifted, and the relief-well geometry was
replanned accordingly. During this run, we
observed electromagnetic intensity readings
that were lower than predicted. Lower in-
tensity may have resulted from parted drill-
pipe or from oil around the pipe causing
electrical insulation.
At 40 m above the liner setting depth, the
motor was changed for a rotary assembly
to ream the new section and to run a north-
seeking gyro and EMS in drillpipe. During
this run, we noted a lO-m difference be-
tween wireline and driller's depth. Most of
the difference could be attributed to drill-
string stretch and temperature expansion.
Because the MWD log correlated with the
depths from Well 2/4-14, we decided to
match wireline and EMS depths to the
driller's depth. This small point prevented
a depth mismatch and misalignment to the
target.
Rotary drilling continued below the fifth
weak zone, and then motor drilling con-
tinued to 4673 m (4930 m MD), the 178-mm
liner setting depth. The final ranging sur-
vey indicated the Well 2/4-14 casing to be
JPT • March 1992
2I4-15S
r-
_ 21m@171°
Fix 3 Position ofCasing
and Uncertainty@ 13 m
of Triangulation Fix 4
@ 3829 ,no 6.3m @
4623 m TV~ 137m@ 189° Ranging
Rotary Drill
~~~sl~e LO~~ ~~nes.~ ~
• •••••••
CasingPoint4673mTVD
9.10inci.&1910Azimuth
Fig. 6-Well 2/4-15S' 8.5-in. hole section.
7.1 m (±1.7 m, 3-m worst-case scenario)
0
at 188.5 (±4°) relative azimuth at 4668 m.
The 178-mm liner was set without problems
on Sept. 17. Inclination was 9. 1 with a 0 multiple parts in the casing between 850 and
191 0 azimuth.
The target was at 4711 m, a 39-m drill-
ing distance. The projected proximity to the
Well 2/4-14 open hole at the kill point was
30 cm (Fig. 6). The relief well was put on
standby to wait for progress from the sur-
face operation. The target could be reached
within 48 hours if required.
Top Kill Unsuccessful. When the relief-
well liner was set, coiled tubing had been
fished to 41 ()() m and no further progress
could be made. A noise log run in the relief
well indicated a hole in the blowout drill-
pipe at 4110 m. The surface team decided
to cut the drillpipe at 4062 m and snub it
out. The team proposed to set a special pack-
er above the cut drillpipe and snub 60-mm
tubing inside the 127-mm string to tie back
to the surface. Flow now would go through
the packer and up the tubing to the surface.
The well then could be bullheaded or the
tubing used as a choke for a combination kill
with the relief well.
Drillpipe recovered from the blowing well
showed scale buildup that thickened with
increasing depth. This prompted a decision
to run a taper mill to the packer setting
depth. The assembly stuck at 3816 m on
Oct. 20, and while attempting to pull free,
the pipe parted. The well flowed up the drill-
pipe. Attempts to stab a safety valve failed
and the shear rams were activated. This left
6 112" Drill Collars
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
~--,:::=':::"::~-:::-;::=-:-:'f----ir- Fix. 6
137m@178°Survey
Fix.7
-
107 m@ 189 0
@ 4642 m TVD
Fix'8
Zone 4
Zone 5
~
n 7.1m@192.00
@4668mTVD
-
Fix 119
-
two fish in the hole. Four days later there
were indications (later verified) that casing
had parted. A PLT indicated flow through
869 m.
The mechanical condition of the blowout
well steadily deteriorated after this, making
further attempts to fish impractical. On Nov.
28, the relief well became the primary kill
vehicle. The surface kill team would snub
89-mm tubing to 1469 m. A wireline PLT
tool would be set just out of the tubing to
monitor pressure, temperature, density, and
flow rate during the kill (Fig. 7).
Relief Well. Extensive rock-mechanics
analysis gave the most desirable kill point
as an impermeable claystone at 4705 m. This
location, 4 m above the lower weak zone,
should minimize fluid loss during kill. The
study also suggested breakthrough was like-
ly if the wellbore centers were within 1 m
because of pressure drawdown and proba-
ble enlargement in the blowout. 19 Updated
hydraulic simulations indicated that seawater
could kill the well dynamically and that
2.25-g/cm 3 mud would ensure static kill.
The basic plan was to drill a 149-mm hole
with 1.95-g/cm 3 mud to 4705 m, a distance
of 32 m. The proximity at this depth was
estimated to be 0.5 m (-2.5- and +3.5-m
worst-case scenario). The uncertainty in dis-
tance meant communication might be
achieved any time after 4700 m (Fig. 8). If
breakthrough did not occur by the planned
depth, we would attempt to fracture at less
than the liner test pressure. If communica-
271

9 5/S" csg. parted
from 850 m to S70 m
20"
Hole in 9 5/S" csg. at 1372 m
3 1/2" DP with mule shoe
at 1463 m
lI---tHI5t-- PLT during kill operation
133/S"
i\I[--iH--
31/4" plug lost in hole
Fish left in hole
(S 3IS" mill and 5" drillpipe)
4062 m-----\7.lthu
9 5/S" 4437 m
Bit at 4700 m
TO at 4734 m _ _ _.L.--fr:---.L.._ _ _ _ _ __
Fig. 7-Condition of Well 2/4-14 at kill time.
tion still could not be obtained, drilling
,-,'ould continue into the Intra Mandal sand-
stone at 4711 m. If communication failed
there, additional contingencies included acid
squeeze and a sidetrack as a last resort.
.Kill Procedure. After communication, we
planned to pull the bit back inside the liner
and open the fail-safe valves on the injec-
tion spool. A cementing tree would replace
the kelly. If losses exceeded 1.6 m 3 /min,
the HT -400 pumps would inject seawater
through the kill spool. With the annular
preventer closed, the drill string would be
displaced with seawater. The seawater in-
jection rate would be increased to the dy-
namic kill rate, but not over the shoe-test
pressure of less than 2 MPa.
PLT data from the blowout would help to
estimate the downhole fluid losses, the time
when oil and gas cleared the fish, and when
the well was dynamically dead. Then,
pumping the static kill mud would start. The
drillpipe simultaneously would be filled with
1.95-g/cm 3 mud (to limit differential pres-
sure) to monitor BHP during the static kill
pumping. When the PLT showed that Well
2/4-14 was statically dead, the 2.25-g/cm 3
mud in the relief-well annulus would be dis-
placed with 1.95-g/cm 3 mud. A 2.25-g1
cm 3 temperature-unstable mud would then
be pumped through the drillpipe into the
blowout and allowed to set. Plug and aban-
donment would follow.
Well Intersection. All kill and safety equip-
ment was tested for pressure and function.
272
2I4-15S
7" liner set @ 4673m TVD
9.10 Inc'!, 191 0 Azimuth
Projected Wellpath of 2/4-15
to Target at 4705 m TVD
Bottom part of
outsider cutter
Projected Wellpath Enters
+/- 3 m (worst case) Zone at
4692m TVO and the +/- 1.7 m
Top at 1470 m zone at 4700 m TVD
1910 ....
Vertical Section
Fig. a-Projection of Well 2/4-15S from liner to kill pOint.
Communication and procedure drills were
held. Nedrill Trigon (Well 2/4-14), Treas-
ure Saga (Well 2/4-15S), Big Orange 18
(stimulation vessel), and the Far Scotsman
(kill mud supply vessel) were prepared for
simultaneous operations. The command
center on Safe Britannia coordinated work .
On Dec. 12,1989, the 178-mm shoe was
tested to 2.25-g/cm 3 EMW. The kill team
and equipment went on hot standby while
drilling to intersection.' At exactly 4705 m
(4962 m MD), complete loss of returns was
experienced and the drill string fell 1 m.
There was an immediate pressure and spin-
ner response on the PLT, indicating direct
communication. The bit was pulled back to
the liner shoe and the cementing test tree
connected as planned. The annulus was kept
full of 1.95-g/cm 3 drilling fluid with the
riser booster pump. The initial loss rate was
1.6 m 3 /min. After 10 minutes, the loss rate
had fallen to 1.1 m 3 Imin, and after 3 hours
to 0.5 m 3 /min, for a total loss of 215 m 3 .
PLT pressure response indicated that mud
was filling the blowout with little or no loss
to the formation. The low flow rate implied
a choking effect by the old BHA and bit.
With these positive results, the team aban-
doned the dynamic kill approach and chose
to pump the 2.25-g/cm 3 kill mud down the
drillpipe. The bag preventer was closed and
the annular pressure was used to monitor
BHP. The initial injection rate was 1
m 3 /min, slowing to <0.15 m 3 /min after
160 m 3 . Injection continued at this low rate
. through the next day, circulating out trapped
hydrocarbons. Treated seawater was
2/4-14
+/- 1.7 m Cylinder around 2/4- 14
Bit@4700mTVD
8 1/2" Open Hole
4734 m TVD
pumped continuously down the blowout an-
nulus at 0.3 m 3 /min during this operation.
The relief annulus pressure indicated that the
BHP was above the reservoir pressure, and
PLT data indicated that the kill mud had suc-
cessfully V-tubed up the blowout. The Well
2/4-14 blowout was statically dead.
A 16-m 3 , 2.25-g/cm 3 temperature unsta-
ble pill pumped into Well 2/4-14 and under-
displaced by 4 m 3 formed a solid barite
plug from the top of the drillpipe fish, fill-
ing the BHA and open hole. PLT monitoring
during this operation was sensitive enough
to detect 1-m movements of the Treasure
Saga drillstring and thus determined when
the plug settled. After 35 hours, pipe move-
ment no longer could be detected. At 72
hours, an integrity test reached the 2.25-g1
cm 3 EMW. A noise log run in the relief
well showed previous anomalies were gone.
A balanced cement plug then was set in Well
2/4-15S, and the well was abandoned tem-
porarily with two bridge plugs.
Remarks and Conclusions
Relief-well planning strategy proved a com-
plete success. Despite the minor stability
problems in the top hole, the relief-well plan
was executed flawlessly. The 119 days on
standby, while disappointing, were justified
to avoid unnecessary risk.
This was the first time a relief well was
designed to cross a blowout casing for locat-
ing purposes and then to drill to the kill point
without plugging back. This approach avoid-
ed losing the accuracy gained in the trian-
gulation bypass and was dictated by the
March 1992 • JPT
relief-well geometry constraints below.
Avoiding plugback and redrill saved 4 to 5
weeks' time. The blowout casing was fixed
as planned, and the liner was aimed to the
target with a precision that provided direct
intersection with the blowout's open hole at
a relief-well depth of 4962 m. This remark-
able feat indicates that the current elec-
tromagnetic ranging, MWD, steerable
motor, and surveying techniques were ade-
quate for the demanding accuracy required
and the conditions encountered.
A semisubmersible rig proved to be an
adequate kill platform under the circum-
stances and at this water depth. With the ad-
dition of a kill spool and redundant injection
flex hoses, the semisubmersible provided a
satisfactory flowpath for high-rate kill-fluid
injection. The stimulation vessel provided
a versatile backup, kill-pumping, and fluid-
storage platform. . Oct. 9-12.
The modified multiphase-pipeline-flow
simulator 14 proved extremely useful in
evaluating the kill requirements under differ-
ent scenarios. This, along with the ability
to monitor the fluid-injection progress with
a PLT , proved instrumental to our success.
Without this key information, pumping
would have been based strictly on BHP ob-
servations and educated guesswork.
The use of a temperature-unstable mud to
replace cement and to form a sealing barite
plug was quite successful. We avoided the
risks of plugging the relief well or channel-
ing in the blowout.
We attribute the project achievements to
three preliminary steps.
1. The dedicated internal task force to
plan, execute, analyze tasks, and perform
risk analysis for both the relief-well and sur-
face intervention operations was crucial.
2. In an operation this big, with hundreds
of people, written and oral communication
must be a top priority. The key to good com-
munication is to weigh the effects of one
group's plans on another's constantly.
Tradeoffs can then be made so that the most
efficient overall strategy is maintained.
3. The repetitive steps of replanning and
re-engineering gave successful relief-well
design.
Acknowledgments
We, along with management of Saga Petro-
leum AIS, acknowledge the many people
who gave their time and expertise to plan-
ning and executing this most difficult proj-
ect. The project's success largely resulted
from excellent teamwork and cooperation of
all involved.
References
1. Booth, J.E.: "Use of Shallow Seismic Data
in Relief Well Planning," World Oil (May
1990) 39-42.
2. Morris, FJ., Walters, R.L., and Costa, J.P.:
"A New Method of Determining Range and
Direction From a Relief Well to a Blowout,"
paper SPE 6781 presented at the 1972 SPE
Annual Meeting, Denver, Oct. 9-12.
3. Haanschoten, G.W. and Gaatschappij, B.V.:
"Ulsel System Performs on Brunei Blowout
Under Tough Conditions," Oil & Gas J. (Jan.
17, 1977) 77-79.
JPT • March 1992
4. Kuckes, A.F.: "An Electromagnetic Survey
Method for Directionally Drilling a Relief
Well Into a Blown Out Oil or Gas Well,"
SPEl (June 1984) 269-74.
5. Bruist, E.H.: "A New Approach in Relief
Well Drilling," paper SPE 3511 presented
at the 1971 SPE Annual Meeting, New
Orleans, Oct. 3-6.
6. Nelson, R.F.: "The Bay Marchand Fire,"
JPT (March 1972) 225-33.
7. Lewis,J.B. Jr.: "New Uses of Existing Tech-
nology for Controlling Blowouts: Chronology
of a Blowout Offshore Louisiana, " JPT (Oct.
1978) 1473-80.
8. Blount, E.M. and Soeiinah, E.: "Dynaruic
Kill: Controlling Wild Wells a New Way,"
World Oil (Oct. 1981) 109-26.
9. Barnett, R.D.: "A Logical Approach to Kill-
ing an Offshore Blowout West Cameron 165
Well No.3-Offshore Louisiana," paper SPE
6903 presented at the 1977 SPE Annual Tech-
nical Conference and Exhibition, Denver,
10. Flak, L.H. and Goins, W.C.: "New Relief
Well Technology is Improving Blowout Con-
trol," World Oil (Dec. 1983, Jan. 1984)
57-61.
11. Grace, R.D.: "Case History of Texas' Larg-
est Blowout Shows Successful Techniques on
Deepest Relief Well," Oil & Gas J. (May
20, 1985) 68-76.
12. Voisin, J.A. etal.: "Relief Well Planning and
Drilling for SLB-5-4X Blowout, Lake
Maracaibo, Venezuela," paper SPE 16677
presented at the 1987 SPE Annual Technical
Conference and Exhibition, Dallas, Sept.
27-30.
13. Ely, J.W. and Holditch, S.A.: "Conventional
and Unconventional Kill Techniques for Wild
Wells," paper SPE 16674 presented at the
1987 SPE Annual Technical Conference and
Exhibition, Dallas, Sept. 27-30.
14. Rygg, O.B. and Gilhus, T.: "Use of a Dy-
namic Two-Phase Pipe Flow Simulator in
Blow-out Kill Planning," paper SPE 20433
presented at the 1990 SPE Annual Technical
Conference and Exhibition, New Orleans,
Oct. 23-26.
15. Wright, J.W.: "Directional Drilling Azimuth
Reference Systems," paper SPE 17212
presented at the 1988 IADC/SPE Drilling
Conference, Dallas, Feb. 28-March 2.
16. DeWardt, J.P. and Wolff, C.M.: "Borehole
Position Uncertainty-Analysis of Measuring
Methods and Deviation of Systematic Error
Model," JPT (Dec. 1981) 2339-50.
17. Thorogood, J.L.: "Instrument Performance
Models and Their Application to Directional
Surveying Operations," SPEDE (Dec. 1990)
294-98.
18. Stephensen, M.: "Program Challenges Direc-
tional Survey Accuracy Claims," Oil & Gas
J. (Aug. 20, 1984) 39-42.
19. Aad~y, B.S. and Ba~y, P.: "Relief Well
Breakthrough at the Problem Well 2/4-14 in
the North Sea, " paper SPE 20915 presented
at the 1990 SPE European Petroleum Con-
ference, The Hague, Oct. 22-24.
SI Metric Conversion Factors
bar X 1.0' E-Ol = MPa
bbl X I. 589 873 E-OI = m'
ft X 3.048' E-OI = m
OF (OF-32)/1.8 = °C
in. X 2.54' E+OO = em
Ibm/ft X 1.488 164 E+OO = kg/m
Ibmlgal X 1.198 264 E-OI = g/em'
E-04 = I'm2
md X 9.869233
psi X 6.894 757 E+OO = kPa
·Conversion factor is exact.
.. .Authors
Leraand Wright
Z::Jchary Thompson
Frode Lerund Is a drilling engineer
with Saga Petroleum A/S In Stavanger,
where he works with the predrllling of
the Snorre field. He worked with the
planning of Rallef We1l2/4-15S and the
re-entry operation. He holds a BS
degree In petroleum engineering from
Rogaland Regional C. Joh.n W. Wrlgh.t
began his career In 1979 with Schlum-
berger Offshore Services and later
worked for Eastman Christensen Inc.,
where he managed the relief-well team
from 1986. In 1989 he started the John
Wright Co. In Houston to specialize In
relief-well planning, execution, and
general contracting. He has been In-
volved In 13 relief-well projects. WrIght
holds a as degree In mechanical engi-
neering from Tex.as A&M U. Martin B.
Zachary Is an operations coordInator
for Eastman Christensen In ParIs. He
has worked In the directional drilling
business InternatlonaUv for the la.st 15
years and has been Involved In eight
relief-well projects. He holds as de-
grees In education and petroleum engi-
neering from the U. of Southern
MIsSIssippI. Bruce Q. Th.ompaon holds
a aA degree In phvslcs from the U. of
Colorado and a PhD degree in geophvs-
Ics from Cornell U. After several years
of teaching and electromagnetic explo-
ration rasearch at Cornell, he cofounded
Vector Magnetics Inc. In 1985 to provide
011- and gas-well proxlmltv-detectlon
services. Since then he has worked on
more than 14 relief wells worldwide.
Provenance
Original SPE manuscript, Relief Well Plan-
ning and Drilling for a North Sea Under-
ground Blowout, received for review Sept.
23, 1990. Revised manuscript received Oct.
14, 1991. Paper accepted for publication
Dec. 5, 1991. Paper (SPE 20420) first
presented at the 1990 SPE Annual Technical
Conference and Exhibition held in New
Orleans, Sept. 23-26.
JPT
273