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Integrating new technology in established organizations: A

mapping of integration mechanisms

Article  in  International Journal of Operations & Production Management · June 2010

DOI: 10.1108/01443571011057290

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IJOPM
30,7 Integrating new technology
in established organizations
A mapping of integration mechanisms
672
Christer Karlsson
Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark, and
Received December 2008
Revised January 2010 Margaret Taylor and Andrew Taylor
Accepted April 2010
Bradford University School of Management, Bradford, UK

International Journal of Operations &
Production Management
Vol. 30 No. 7, 2010
pp. 672-699
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0144-3577
DOI 10.1108/01443571011057290
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine the various mechanisms that can be
used to integrate new technology into existing products, and to determine some of the conditions under
which specific integration mechanisms are most appropriate.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper adopted an exploratory theory-building approach
based on analysis of data from 12 case studies, each representing companies with varying levels of:
technological maturity of the organization and technological advancement of their products.
Informants were managers and engineers who had responsibility for, or a significant role in, the
integration of software and hardware. At least three interviews were conducted in each company and
all interviews were of at least two hours duration. In total, 41 interviews were conducted. The different
approaches used for technology integration were examined and subsequently mapped using the twin
dimensions outlined above.
Findings – Cross-case pattern analysis indicates that for technologically mature organizations,
mechanisms based on processes are most appropriate, while for less mature organizations an approach
based on structural mechanisms may be more suitable. Similarly, in cases involving high levels of
technology advancement in the products, integration mechanisms based on processes and culture are
preferable, whereas for low technology products the mechanisms are clustered around resource-based
approaches.
Research limitations/implications – Multiple cases do not permit as much depth as the classic
single case study and tend to yield “modest” rather than “grand” theoretical development. The use of
scaling to convert qualitative data into quantitative data, and the identification of patterns in
cross-case analysis are both based on interpretive judgements. Future research should examine the
proposed model and its constructs in different settings and using alternative research methods. There
is also an opportunity to explore the relationships between the integration mechanisms and the
outcomes of integration projects, and finally, it would be useful to extend the work to service settings
and to integration of process technology.
Practical implications – The findings provide guidance to managers in selecting alternative
approaches to managing the process of technology integration in different contexts. Examples are
given of practices associated with each integration mechanism, together with some of the tensions and
challenges which arise during implementation.
Originality/value – The paper provides clear guidance on the approaches that can be used for
technology integration for product development. It classifies these according to the level of maturity
and experience in the organization and the level of advancement of the product offered by the
technology.
Keywords Technology led strategy, Product development, Integration, Management strategy
Paper type Research paper
Introduction New technology
Integrating new technology into a company’s existing products is a significant and in established
increasingly commonplace challenge. Developing and exploiting enhanced functionality
by integrating new technologies into one’s products offers the prospect of tangible organizations
business benefits. However, we do not know enough about how to manage the process of
technology integration, particularly in cases where the new technology is sourced
externally. Moreover, while there are many studies which identify specific integration 673
mechanisms, we know little about how to harness them effectively in combination and in
different sets of circumstances.
Therefore, given that technology integration is a management challenge which
impacts on the success of the business as a whole, this research sets out to identify the
mechanisms which enable the integration process and to delineate the conditions under
which the use of each mechanism is appropriate. This knowledge will be invaluable for
managers with responsibility for technology integration, providing them with guidance
about how to manage the process in their own distinctive settings. The knowledge also
contributes to the literature by drawing together factors which have appeared in various
articles, showing how they coalesce in different contexts. This theory-building approach
provides a platform for subsequent testing and enhancement.
This paper investigates the technology integration process in 12 companies using a
multiple case-based research methodology. Using data from company documentation
and semi-structured interviews with 41 key informants the paper identifies the processes
and practices used by these companies to integrate software into their mechanical
products. Through cross-case analysis it then distinguishes patterns of utilization of
these mechanisms, contingent upon two factors. The first factor is the extent of the
organization’s prior experience of technology integration, i.e. its technological maturity.
The second factor is the degree to which the new technology provides a high or low level
of product advancement, i.e. whether the new technology renders the existing product to
have enhanced functionality beyond its original scope and which generates a strategic
advantage, or whether the new technology simply provides an additional support
function without changing the generic functionality of the existing core mechanical
product.
The next section of the paper elaborates the research gap in the literature and derives
a conceptual model which forms the basis for the subsequent fieldwork. The ensuing two
sections explain the empirical methodology and present the within-case and cross-case
analyses of the 12 companies. The remainder of the paper discusses the findings, their
implications for research and practice and opportunities for future research, and
presents a hypothesized model linking the twin dimensions of technological maturity of
the organization and technology advancement of the products to the methods by which
technology integration should be managed.

Literature review
In this review of the literature, we will argue that there remains insufficient consensus or
unequivocal understanding of the mechanisms by which technology can most
effectively be integrated into organizations. In particular, there is a lack of clarity over
what factors influence the integration process, and how these are related. Moreover,
there is a need to understand the applicability of such integration mechanisms in
different contexts and circumstances. The review is structured around these two central
IJOPM points, first dealing with the mechanisms which enable the process of technology
30,7 integration and second taking account of the conditions under which each mechanism is
appropriate.
The scope of the study is confined to consideration of product integration and
specifically to instances of the integration of software technology into traditional
mechanical products. This is an increasingly common phenomenon in many industrial
674 sectors; for example, George and Wang (2002) suggested that more than one-third of the
total cost of automobiles would eventually be accounted for by electronics and software,
while Adamsson (2007) noted that approximately 90 percent of new functions in cars are
electronics and software based.

Integration and differentiation

The study of integration mechanisms leads logically to the concepts of integration and
differentiation as originally articulated by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and this provides
the conceptual foundations for the review. By integration, Lawrence and Lorsch meant
the quality of the state of collaboration which exists among organizational departments
and units that are required to achieve a common purpose, through unity of effort as
dictated by the demands of the environment. In the same vein, they defined
differentiation in terms of differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among
managers in different functional departments, being manifest for example in specialized
language, different systems of meaning, alternative thought worlds and differences
in time orientation (Bradley, 1997; Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Nambisan and Wilemon,
2000).
Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) work drew upon earlier studies of how environmental
characteristics interact with organizational attributes, including Burns and Stalker’s
(1961) development of the concepts of mechanistic and organic organizations,
Woodward’s (1965) typology of production systems, distinguished according to their
degree of technical complexity and Chandler’s (1962) observations about how
organization structure follows from, and is guided by, strategic decisions. In the latter
case, Chandler (1962, p. 196) observed that where such decisions led to the creation of
new organizational units, these in turn caused problems of integration that required the
development of new integrative (or, in Chandler’s terms, administrative) structures.
Among their many findings, Lawrence and Lorsch highlighted the importance of
reaching an appropriate balance between differentiation and integration in any
organization; later studies emphasized that the greater the differences between goals
and tasks, functional departments, business units, product platforms, managerial levels,
organizational processes, and international markets the more difficult it is to achieve
effective integration (Dougherty, 2001; Sheremata, 2000).

Factors influencing success in technology integration

One of the most central lines of research on technology integration is that of Stock and
Tatikonda (2000, 2004, 2008) wherein they hypothesize and empirically verify a
conceptual framework based on information processing theory for what they call
external technology integration (ETI). They define ETI as the process of managing the
acquisition and incorporation of technology from external sources, arguing that it
must be managed purposefully in ways that take account of the nature of the technology
to be integrated. Stock and Tatikonda assert that prior literature generally does not
“adequately address detailed characterization of the type of technology to be transferred New technology
and detailed project-level organizational (source-recipient) processes in technology in established
integration” (Stock and Tatikonda, 2004, p. 645).
Stock and Tatikonda (2004) introduce technology uncertainty (i.e. a lack of organizations
knowledge of how to acquire and implement it) as one of the factors influencing the
technology integration process. They sub-divide this into three related components viz.:
(1) the novelty of the technology to the recipient firm; 675
(2) the level of complexity inherent in the technology; and
(3) the tacitness of the technology and the degree to which it is physically
embodied, codified and complete.

Another influencing factor they introduce is the nature of the source-recipient

relationship in terms of the level of inter-organizational interaction. This is also
sub-divided into three component dimensions as follows:
(1) the methods, magnitude and frequency of communication and the nature of the
information exchanged;
(2) co-ordination of the process of interactions and decision making between source
and recipient; and
(3) the willingness of the partners to cooperate in the pursuit of mutually
compatible interests instead of acting opportunistically (Stock and Tatikonda,
2004).

Stock and Tatikonda’s central thesis is that, in order for technology integration to be
effective, there must be an appropriate fit between technology uncertainty and
inter-organizational interaction. Thus, with high levels of technology uncertainty there
is a need for greater inter-organizational interaction and conversely, where the recipient
organization understands the new technology, a less intensive inter-organizational
interaction is warranted (Stock and Tatikonda, 2004). In their most recent paper (Stock
and Tatikonda, 2008), three further contextual factors are introduced. The first of these
is the recipient firm’s level of experience with the process of technology integration (as
distinct from its experience of the technology to be integrated). The second additional
factor is the extent of user participation in the ETI process and the final factor is the
criticality of the project to the recipient firm. While their empirical analysis provided
support for the two hypotheses that user participation and project criticality are
positively linked to project success, they found no support for the hypothesis that prior
experience with the process of technology integration was similarly linked. They
postulated that this in turn may suggest a potential new factor, i.e. the degree of
similarity or dissimilarity between successive integration tasks. In other words, if each
ETI project is unique it will therefore provide little or no opportunity for the firm to learn
from past experience.
Other studies have built upon the concept of technological uncertainty in the context
of technology integration, for example in relation to the dimension of technology novelty
introduced earlier. In this vein, Karlsson and Lovén (2005) uncovered differences in the
obstacles to integration between inexperienced and experienced firms, although they
also observed that the strategic role of the new technology had a significant bearing on
which obstacles were most salient, and by implication, which integration mechanisms
IJOPM should receive most emphasis. Technology novelty can be a “two-edged sword” because
30,7 on the one hand if a firm has had prior experience of the specific technology then that can
be a positive benefit in building upon prior learning; on the other hand, however, earlier
experience can generate organizational inertia towards change (Ansoff, 1990)
particularly when the new technology renders obsolete the expertise it is replacing
rather than building upon know-how already embodied in the core product (Anderson
676 and Tushman, 1990). Hence, for example, legacy systems can be a blessing or a curse:
prior company investments in previous generations of a technology might inhibit the
adoption of later, more radical, or complex alternatives (Ettlie et al., 2005). As Anderson
and Tushman point out, if firms must abandon existing know-how and acquire a new
skill-base as a consequence of the introduction of a new technology, then they are likely
to defend their outmoded technology quite stubbornly – “old orders seldom vanish
quietly” (Ettlie et al., 2005, p. 611).
Another facet of this issue is discussed by Verganti and Buganza (2005), albeit in
relation to services rather than products. They observe the importance of path
dependency in relation to design decisions whereby choices made earlier in the service
lifecycle can hinder future possibilities to innovate. They cite examples relevant to this
current paper such as the choice of software operating systems or databases, both of
which are scarcely reversible decisions and therefore have much longer-term
implications for product architecture and future product development.
MacCormack et al. (2001) echo the same theme, observing that experience can, in
some instances, lead to inertia and rigidity in problem solving, especially in uncertain
and dynamic environments when technology-specific knowledge can rapidly become
obsolete.
This last point encapsulates the main focus of these two papers by MacCormack et al.
(2001) and Verganti and Buganza (2005) namely that in environments where the rate of
change of both the technology and the market requirements is high, it is essential to build
flexibility not only for the integration stage, but also for the whole of the development
process, including the period after product or service launch. Flexible development
projects permit acceptance of new information for a longer period of time, whether this
information concerns new technology developments or new customer demands or both.
Flexible processes are contrary to the sequential stage-gate type approach which is
thought to be unsuitable in uncertain and dynamic environments (Iansiti and
MacCormack, 1997). Flexibility in this context means that development stages overlap
and become iterative, embodying a philosophy of learning and adaptation (Tushman
and O’Reilly, 1997). In practice this means that the design specification is not completely
finalized before the technology integration phase begins, generating the advantage of
extended flexibility, which in turn lowers the risk of a firm “getting locked into an
incorrect definition and launching a product that is unattractive to the customer and
unprofitable to the firm” (Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 51). However, this is not without
drawbacks and trade-offs since, especially in risk averse firms, the need to achieve a
highly accurate design specification can result in so much time being devoted to this
stage that insufficient time is available for downstream integration.
In order to realize such a flexible process which is able to handle new information for a
larger proportion of the development cycle, MacCormack et al. (2001) offer three practical
suggestions. First, firms must allocate greater resources to the design of the product
architecture to ameliorate the tensions between maximizing product performance while
facilitating process flexibility. In other words, the product architecture must be able New technology
to accept new functionality in ways that minimize changes to the rest of the system, i.e. a in established
loosely coupled or modular approach. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) extend this idea by
adding that the flexibility of the development team is also crucial, since by being able to organizations
anticipate and absorb changes in specification, more time is made available for
integration activity. Second, firms must generate early feedback on how the product
performs as a system by adopting an architecture in which the main components can be 677
integrated at an early stage. Finally, firms should build teams which can harness their
past experience of previous generations of the technology in order to “frame and direct
effective experimentation strategies to resolve the project uncertainties that arise”
(Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 137).
Following the same theme, Augustine et al. (2005) provide further insight into the
practicalities of achieving a flexible or agile process which is founded on the premise that
more volatile environments require less rigid formal controls and less mechanistic
management. They advocate six practices for achieving agility throughout the
development process, viz.:
(1) having organic teams of between seven and nine members;
(2) communicating a clear statement of project purpose to all participants, allowing
them to act more autonomously;
(3) providing simple rules which avoid restricting the creativity of team members;
(4) facilitating free and open exchange of information about plans, progress,
objectives, and organization;
(5) adopting a lighter touch management style which accepts that managers are
unable to know everything in advance, and which acknowledges that skilled
professionals do not respond well to micromanagement; and
(6) practising adaptive leadership which understands the effects of mutual
interactions among a project’s various parts and which stimulates continuous
learning and adaptation.

So far in this review, it has been shown that the process of managing the acquisition and
incorporation of technology is a complex activity involving inter-dependencies and
interactions between markets and customers, technologies and products, organizational
systems and processes, managerial styles and levels of employee involvement, and
source-recipient relationships and their respective attitudes towards co-operation. The
work of Grote et al. (2009) reveals further factors which influence technology integration,
specifically in the context of organizations with a multi-divisional structure.
In particular, they draw attention to the value of integration mechanisms which
enhance the social structure of the organization (Kleinbaum and Tushman, 2007) and
which foster informal networks between personnel from different parts of the
organization. Chief among these are:
.
job rotation (Galbraith, 1994; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000);
.
information technology (Persaud, 2005; Barczak et al., 2008) both of which
provide enhanced communication channels; and
.
reward systems which stimulate employees to collaborate (Björkman et al., 2004)
especially across departmental and functional boundaries.
IJOPM Grote et al. provide empirical evidence which suggests that non-financial and symbolic
30,7 incentives also have a significant impact in this regard (Ellingsen and Johannesson,
2007). Additional human resource-based integration mechanisms include boundary
spanning individuals or technology integrators who enhance inter-group
communication (Richter et al., 2006) and who create inter-organizational linkages and
import external knowledge about technology and customer demands (Gemünden et al.,
678 2007).
The process of managing technology integration, as with many efforts to introduce
change to organizations, is often beset by obstacles to progress (Brown and Duguid,
1992). We have already touched upon the contrast between competence-enhancing and
competence destroying technologies and their concomitant consequences, wherein the
latter tend to induce social and political dynamics of defence and resistance from those
whose competences will be rendered obsolete (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). We have
also considered the need for a more flexible development and integration process, yet
Verganti and Buganza (2005) also remind us that previous design choices can lead to
several forms of inertia and resistance to flexibility. Moreover, in reviewing a major
development project, Augustine et al. (2005) allude to the resentment of some senior
developers towards the more egalitarian nature of the flexible process which was
introduced. They also mention the added stress encountered by conventional managers
when having to operate in such an agile environment.
Such friction and conflict was of course, anticipated by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
over four decades ago. They discussed at length the need for appropriate conflict
resolution processes when faced with highly differentiated specialist groups and units.
Their proposed conflict resolution processes included confrontation (bringing the
differentiated groupings together to work through their differences) and training (to
learn more about one another and the reasons for their differences). These remedies seem
equally pertinent today, yet so too does their observation that many people have a
personality-based aversion to confronting differences, i.e. they lack the interpersonal
competence to do so (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, pp. 222-3). Equally relevant are their
comments concerning the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among
managers in different functional departments which subsequently manifest as obstacles
to integration. These differences in cultures or “thought worlds” are common and no less
so in the context of this current study involving software and mechanical hardware
specialists who operate with different norms, attitudes, time orientations, technical
languages, patterns of interaction, work traditions, and practices (Ranft and Lord, 2002;
Brown and Duguid, 1992; Nambisan, 2002; Karlsson and Lovén, 2005).
In summary, this review of the literature has identified several factors which are
believed to influence the process of managing technology integration. The factors have
been gathered from several disparate studies with little consensus emerging about the
mechanisms by which technologies can be effectively integrated into organizations.
Furthermore, the list is probably not exhaustive. In addition, this review has delineated
several contextual dimensions which impinge upon the applicability of technology
integration mechanisms in different circumstances, namely:
(1) the level of technology uncertainty, i.e. the extent of knowledge residing in the
recipient firm about how to acquire and implement the technology in question;
(2) the extent to which the technology is new to the firm;
 (3) the level of complexity inherent in the technology; New technology
(4) the tacitness of the technology; in established
(5) the criticality of the integration project to the firm; organizations
(6) the degree of similarity between successive integration tasks in the recipient
firm;
(7) whether the new technology is competence-enhancing or competence-destroying; 679
(8) previous design choices about the product and the degree to which they hinder
future integration opportunities;
(9) the degree of fit between the level of technology uncertainty and the level of
inter-organizational interaction;
(10) the degree of market turbulence and market dynamism;
(11) the degree of risk aversion of the firm;
(12) the firm’s prior experience of managing technology integration; and
(13) the strategic role of the new technology.

Research gaps and research model

The research gaps which emerge from this review are centred upon the need to identify
more clearly the technology integration mechanisms which are used in practice in
various organizational settings and to remove some of the ambiguity about which
mechanisms apply under different sets of contingencies, i.e. what factors influence the
integration process. The research seeks to build upon the work of Karlsson and Lovén
(2005) using the two dimensions of organizational technology maturity and product
technology advancement. Technology maturity is defined based on the level of
organizational expertise and prior experience with new technology integration. Product
technology advancement is defined in terms of the functionality of the product which
arises as an outcome of the integration process, i.e. whether the new technology renders
the existing product to have enhanced functionality beyond its original scope and which
generates a strategic advantage, or whether the new technology simply provides an
additional support function without changing the generic functionality of the existing
core mechanical product.
The conceptual model by which this study is structured derives predominantly
from the literature review and is shown in Figure 1.
The research model in Figure 1 formed the basis for the fieldwork of this current
study. Inherent in the model is the rationale that, for instances of technology
integration, existing mechanical technology and the new technology are to a greater or
lesser extent differentiated in the organization, thereby creating a need for integration.
Alternative mechanisms leading to integration were explored and both obstacles
(differentiating forces) and sources of support (integrating forces) that influence the
process were identified. An established framework was used to code and classify the
potential integration mechanisms (Harrison, 2004). Harrison’s classification system
groups interventions by the part of the organizational system that they most directly
target, resulting in categories of “organizational structures,” “processes,” “resources,”
and “cultures”. These categories were adapted and defined for use in this research as
follows:
IJOPM Existing
30,7 technology Differentiating
forces (obstacles)
Technological
maturity
(organizational)
Integration Performance /
680 mechanisms outcome
• Structures • Time
• Processes • Cost
• Resources • Quality
• Culture
Integrating Technological
forces advancement
Figure 1. (sources of (product)
Research model support)
New technology

.
Structures. Examples of structural interventions take the form of changes to jobs
such as job rotation, procedures, reward systems including non-financial and
symbolic incentives, and work allocation.
.
Processes. Process-related interventions include actions to develop and manage
systems and processes relating to technology integration. These could take the
form, for example, of processes for decision making, leadership, communication,
or action planning.
.
Resources. Taking a resource-based view, interventions may involve actions
relating to internal human resources (e.g. recruitment, selection, training, and
appointment of technology project champions) or to finding, managing, and,
developing relationships with external resources.
.
Culture. Interventions within this category include mechanisms that change and
manage corporate culture in terms of attitudes, values, norms and beliefs, and
reactions to change.

Finally, particular attention was paid to the twin influences of the dimensions of
organizational technology maturity and of product technology advancement as defined
in the first paragraph in this section. It should be noted that while Figure 1 includes
performance outcomes, these are only shown for completeness as part of the overall
research design, but performance outcomes are not measured specifically in the current
study.

Research methodology
Following Eisenhardt’s (1989) protocol, the scope of the study was focused by defining
the unit of analysis as instances of the introduction of a specific new software-based
technology into mechanical products in each company. Eisenhardt also recommends the
specification of tentative research questions to assist in the data collection process and in
the choice of organizations to be approached. Thus, the research questions were
articulated as follows:
RQ1. What are the mechanisms used in practice by organizations in order to manage
the process of the integration of software technology into mechanical products?
 RQ2. What are the factors which affect this process of managing technology New technology
integration in organizations, i.e. which mechanisms apply under specific in established
contexts?
organizations
Given the exploratory, theory building nature of the research a case-based methodology
was chosen; the process followed the steps outlined by Eisenhardt (1989), Leonard-Barton
(1990) and Voss et al. (2002).
681
Case selection
Organizations were chosen according to two central criteria (both defined in the earlier
section dealing with the research model):
(1) the degree of technological advancement of the product which arises from the
technology integration process; and
(2) the level of organizational expertise and prior experience with new technology
integration.

Cases were chosen to represent all extremes along these two dimensions as shown in
Figure 2 whereby technological advancement of the product is the y-axis and
organizational technology maturity is the x-axis. Theoretical sampling was employed
in order to have theoretically useful cases that filled the conceptual categories while
literal replication logic was also used to enable the findings to be extended to other
settings (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993).
The identities of the companies have been withheld for reasons of confidentiality;
nonetheless the product types that they each represent are used for identification purposes.

Quadrant A Quadrant C
High
strategic 1 Silicon 7 Advanced equipment
functionality
2 Telecommunication 8 Craft

3 Printing equipment 9 Precision cutting

Technological

of the product
advancement

Quadrant B Quadrant D

4 Home tools 10 Automotive

5 Office machines 11 Domestic appliances

Low
support
6 Food processing 12 Power generation
functionality
equipment

Low High
novice experienced Figure 2.
Technological maturity Empirical taxonomy
of the organization
IJOPM Cases were identified using the researchers’ contacts and prior knowledge of the
30,7 organizations which was gained through a combination of consulting experience,
previous research projects and contacts with former students who had subsequently
become employees. The positioning of these cases within Figure 2 was initially a
subjective judgement but was verified subsequently by discussion with relevant company
informants before proceeding.
682 In this study, multiple investigators were used, thereby increasing the likelihood of
reaping the benefits outlined by Eisenhardt (1989), i.e. that multiple investigators can:
.
enhance the creative potential of the team by combining complementary
experience and insights;
.
enhance confidence in the findings wherever there is convergence of
observations; and
.
prevent the research team from reaching premature closure through the
identification and discussion of conflicting perceptions and interpretations.

Moreover, multiple investigators permitted the allocation of different combinations of

team members to cover different research sites thereby providing some “triangulation
of investigators” Pettigrew (1988).

Data collection
Data collection proceeded in three phases. Phase 1 involved five organizations
(telecommunication, automotive, advanced equipment, home tools, and domestic
appliances). Phase 2 added a further four organizations (silicon, craft, office machines,
and power generation) while Phase 3 encompassed the final three organizations (food
processing equipment, printing equipment, and precision cutting), yielding 12 cases in
total. While Eisenhardt’s (1989) often-quoted recommendation is that the number of
cases should be between 4 and 10 since this usually works well, there is no ideal number,
and indeed she advises that one should only stop adding cases when theoretical
saturation has been reached. The three-phased methodology also allowed a much more
iterative approach to the data collection and analysis.
In each case organization, mixed methods were used for data collection (Jick, 1979).
Data were collected through a combination of semi-structured interviews and analysis of
company documentation. The interviewees were managers and engineers who had
responsibility for, or a significant role in, the integration of software and hardware. At
least three interviews were conducted in each company and all interviews were of at least
two hours duration. In total, 41 interviews were conducted. Respondents were asked
questions about the process by which technology was integrated into their products, and
their respective experiences of these mechanisms. By seeking respondents’ perspectives
on the obstacles to integration, critical incidents were identified, and this allowed for
exploration of the specific approaches taken to deal with these. The semi-structured
interview protocol was structured around the following topics:
.
Data about the company, its products and its experience of technology integration:
specific data was sought on the number of employees, the product portfolio, the
company organization, and the level of experience of integrated products.
.
Data about how integrated products are developed from the stage of initial idea
to final product.
 .
For specific critical incidents and examples, data were collected about how New technology
technology integration was managed, e.g. how resources were used, what in established
organizational and administrative structures were put in place for technology
integration, what processes were employed and what reliance was placed upon organizations
cultural mechanisms?
.
Data about obstacles to this process of technology integration and whether these
related to structures, resources, processes or culture. 683
Methods of data analysis
Detailed notes were taken during the interviews which recorded the interviewees’
responses to the questions and their general discourse. These case notes were sent to the
respondents for validation. Subsequently, the data were examined in iterative cycles of
coding and analysis, centred primarily on the categories of structures, processes,
resources, and culture. As advocated by Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt and Graebner
(2007) a two-stage process was adopted, firstly conducting within-case analysis with a
focus on identifying and classifying integration mechanisms, and secondly performing a
cross-case analysis of organizations in the four quadrants of the research taxonomy
(Figure 2). The aim was to develop theory through this emergent and interpretative
process by recognizing patterns within and across the cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner,
2007; Flynn et al., 1990). For within-case analysis, data reduction techniques advocated
by Jick (1979) were used to convert qualitative data into quantitative data on the basis of
usage of each of the four categories of integration mechanism. This was subsequently
extended into the cross-case analysis of patterns emerging in each quadrant. We then
iterated back to each individual case to check that the emergent patterns fitted with the
evidence in each case, seeking for “a good, although not necessarily perfect fit with the
data” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 548).

Results
The results are reported below with firstly the within-case analysis, followed by
cross-case consideration. According to Eisenhardt, within-case analysis typically
involves detailed write-ups for each site and these often take the form of pure
descriptions which are essential for the generation of insight (Eisenhardt, 1989). Each
case description was validated by the relevant respondents. The use of a multiple-case
protocol inevitably raises challenges for the depth of insight that can be reported in a
typical journal article, such that “we cannot expect as much insight about a particular
case in a journal-length article” (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 616).

Quadrant A: low organizational maturity – high product advancement

Case 1 (silicon). This company was coming to the end of the start-up phase of its
lifecycle. It was in the business of development and production of semiconductor devices
for advanced network applications. As a consequence, of its early stage of development
there were few well-defined processes; moreover, staff had unclearly demarcated roles.
Development processes were informal and undocumented. The company had been
formed as a spin-out from a research project based in a university; consequently many of
the employees were researchers or recently qualified engineers with little or no
experience of industry or commercial practice. The university provided a ready source of
IJOPM new staff as the company grew in size, thus there was little or no need to focus on
30,7 resources.
A consequence of its university origins was that a keen sense of minimizing waste
was lacking although attitudes were believed to be changing gradually towards a more
market-focused orientation. The need to concentrate on production and sales of their
first-generation products was resulting in a lack of innovation and a dearth of
684 second-generation products. The company recognized the need to be more organized
and formalized and was working towards installing adequate structures, methods and
procedures as it grew from being an entrepreneurial, organic company, to one with more
defined structures and processes. It had experimented with a matrix structure but had
not yet settled on an established organizational/management structure.
There was a pronounced divide between the cultures and mindsets of the production
engineers and semiconductor hardware specialists on the one hand and the software
engineers and programmers on the other; this was also something being given much
greater emphasis in order to generate better understanding and culture-change.
Case 2 (telecommunication). This company was a well-established global
business with a strong technology focus. It produced advanced control systems for
telecommunications products. These products were a combination of hardware and
software systems and the product structure was reflected in strong functional groupings
of hardware and software specialists with high levels of technical competence.
Resources were therefore not a problem. These groupings tended to have their own
traditions and procedures for development and their separate organizational structures
cemented these distinctions which were also embodied in disparate cultures.
The company reported that one major project was discontinued after seven or eight
years because of differences of opinion and conflicts between the people developing the
new system and those who were maintaining the old system. There were major obstacles
with regard to lack of shared understanding due in part to the diversity of concepts and
language used by the groups. Nonetheless, this time period was also viewed positively
as being one where there were many product spin-offs and a high degree of creativity
and innovation.
Some attempts had been made to integrate the hardware and software development
organizations since this was widely acknowledged to be an important and necessary
thing to do, but it was found to be very difficult because of the strong cultural differences
and the persistence of legacy structures. Some success had been achieved with the
integration of various tasks and activities such as product and process requirements
specification, quality assurance, supply chain changes, and so on, but in general such
integration was easier said than done, being contested and resisted by the two sets of
specialists. Thus, structural development and cultural change remained very much on
the corporate agenda as did process development, albeit to a lesser extent.
Case 3 ( printing equipment). This company had been in business for 40 years and
had a long track record of supplying high quality printing presses to several market
sectors. It had begun to incorporate advanced software into its mechanical products to
enhance the functionality, for example to permit more sophisticated printing on
customized packaging, or to facilitate printing on more complex packaging shapes and
on a wider range of packaging materials. In effect this enabled the company to move into
new markets in the electronics, retailing and food packaging sectors.
 The company had decided to develop its own resources in-house for software New technology
enhancement of its products and was fortunate to be able to draw upon its existing in established
skill-base in the departments which handled the computer numerical control (CNC)
machining centres and the computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing organizations
(CADCAM) systems for design and manufacture, although it also employed a few
experienced software developers from rival firms. Thus, resources were not problematic.
Conversely, despite the in-house CNC programming and CADCAM expertise, the 685
creation of a new software development group created considerable tension particularly
among the traditional mechanical engineers who felt that the core mechanical product
was still the most important part of the company’s business. To address this issue, a lot
of stress was placed upon communicating the company’s technology and business
strategies throughout the organization. To this end, a two-way (top-down and
bottom-up) communication process was being established using an external consulting
firm which also developed the notion of “connected leadership” where managers are
encouraged to “walk and talk” the company’s vision, values and strategic objectives.
To foster closer integration between the departments there was a vibrant programme
of job rotation between the design, manufacture and software groupings, supported by a
reward (financial) and recognition (non-financial) system to encourage knowledge
sharing and improvement identification. There was also a project underway to examine
how to re-organize these functions into a more coherent department including
re-locating the groups into one new building.

Quadrant B: low organizational maturity – low product advancement

Case 4 (home tools). This was a traditional manufacturing company producing tools for
the domestic market. It did not have any experience of software integration in its
existing products; consequently they employed a lot of traditional mechanical engineers
who had been with the company for a long time. Few personnel had degree-level
qualifications. These personnel had difficulty adapting to the new type of product which
was being proposed. The company had been very production-focused for many years
but was gradually trying to move to a more market-driven structure which would also be
reflected in their development process.
The introduction of software was to provide an enhanced control function to the
products. Given that there was no in-house software competence the company had
charged a team of three individuals to take responsibility for championing the new
integrated hardware and software products. They had conducted a thorough, albeit
informal, process to pursue this objective; this involved risk analysis, strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis, idea-generation, searching for
new ideas at exhibitions, prototype development and efforts to find software partners
who could provide the necessary software expertise. They had formed a project
organization to take this forward by using software consultants as project team
members. However, there were structural problems to be resolved which related to
dealing with software resources which were not located in-house. Resource development
was therefore still a key issue for the future and concomitantly, organizational structure
problems were a consequence of these resource issues. Unfortunately, the project did not
proceed beyond the concept phase. It was discontinued largely because management
were not convinced and found it daunting to take the first steps with the new technology.
IJOPM Case 5 ( office machines). The fifth case company was a manufacturer of office
30,7 machines, wherein there was some use of electronics and software in the mode of a
support function within their existing mechanical products. The company relied
primarily upon one or two specialists with software competence who could be regarded
as technology integrators, and to a lesser extent on processes and structures for
technology integration. These individuals had been with the company for a long time
686 and could therefore communicate and explain to their colleagues without engendering a
culture clash of terminologies and mindsets. Moreover, as a consequence of not having
much experience of technology integration, processes generally were not problematic,
yet. Rather it was the development of an in-house resource base which was the primary
focus to move beyond reliance upon a few key individuals. In order to achieve this
resource base, structures were also being designed to provide integration across the
various departmentalized sources of expertise.
Case 6 ( food processing equipment ). The company manufactured food processing
equipment primarily for the dairy products sector. Its traditional product portfolio
included heat exchangers and pasteurizers, but increased demands from regulatory and
statutory bodies and heightened consumer awareness had created a need for more
process monitoring and recording of key parameters such as temperature, cooling times,
mixtures, quality control measures, and so on. To meet this need they had begun to
develop equipment with integrated software which would fulfil these requirements.
They had no prior experience of software integration and encountered significant
difficulty in securing the necessary skills and resources. Recruitment proved
problematic since few people seemed willing to join the company and it was difficult
to fit potential software recruits into the existing salary structure because they had
expectations of much higher salaries. Equally there appeared to be a shortage of contract
or consulting personnel who could be utilized in this regard. Eventually, they entered
into a partnership with an external supplier of process monitoring software but the
contractual arrangements proved difficult and the company underestimated the costs
associated with these product developments and they also underestimated the amount
of interaction required between them and the supplier. They appointed an internal
project champion to liaise with the supplier but due to “personality clashes” this did not
seem to work well.
Eventually, they found that re-organizing around a project structure which involved
representatives from the company, the supplier and the customer base led to a better
modus operandi and they are now trying to roll-out this structure for subsequent
technology integration projects. The early stage of their exposure to software
integration and the lack of in-house resources meant that they experienced few
problems with processes or culture and these were not seen as the central integration
mechanisms.

Quadrant C: high organizational maturity – high product advancement

Case 7 ( advanced equipment ). This company produced advanced software-based
control systems. In earlier days, it had been driven by innovators and operated in a very
unstructured way. At one time several key employees had left the company and
to ameliorate this problem they began a systematic process of documenting work
processes. As the company has grown it has gained considerable experience in
managing projects which integrate software and hardware. Thus, there were no
resource problems. The company had also taken other steps to secure its resource base, New technology
for example by reducing reliance on consultants and internalising their expertise into in established
people and procedures.
The company had clear strategies including what they called a “project realization organizations
strategy to make real the complete product at all stages”, including development,
production, marketing, logistics, and service. It also had a clear organizational structure
with explicit responsibilities and decision-making channels. They had experimented 687
with a pure project organization but did not find that this facilitated an appropriate focus
on personnel, so now they used a structure based on a combination of project and line
organization.
Their main focus was now on developing support systems and processes for projects
and project management. The other area of improvement related to the culture
differences between the hardware and software staff where there was a noticeable
generation difference in ages, with the software organization having an average age
around 30 years while the hardware organization’s average age was around 47 years.
This was not a major problem but they were nevertheless trying to improve the
integration between these sub-groups.
Case 8 (craft ). This company had a long tradition of the development and integration
of hardware and software products and was structured around systems departments.
It was continually working on processes and procedures for these activities to support
the organizational structure. For example, some managerial initiatives included the
provision of easier access to information and knowledge, utilization of modelling and
simulation, and efforts to simplify vertical and horizontal communication both
internally and externally. It is now focussing on the development of processes to
integrate new innovations from suppliers and how to open the product for new
technologies. There was also an emphasis on handling co-operation and co-ordination
between projects with differing time perspectives.
Most of the employees had at least a master of science degree with both software and
hardware competence existing in-house. Thus, there were no resource problems or
obstacles. The company had experienced considerable challenges associated with
differences in beliefs, languages and cultures between the hardware and software
developers and they were now placing substantial focus on reconciling these cultural
differences and enhancing mutual understanding.
Case 9 ( precision cutting equipment ). This company has originally been a producer
of conventional mechanical press tools and dies and it had a high reputation for precision
engineering and knowledge of materials processing. Around 30 years ago, it began to
build a capability in the use of industrial laser technology to solve problems not
achievable with conventional hydraulic die cutting techniques, and thereafter it has been
highly active in product development, harnessing technologies for high speed
hydraulics, machine vision, microprocessor control, and software algorithms to
penetrate new markets in the automotive, aerospace and medical devices sectors.
This technology strategy has resulted in the company employing a large number of
specialists in these technologies, with staff holding technical degrees in mechanical
design and engineering, electronics, electrical engineering, computer science, software
engineering, chemical engineering, industrial engineering, laser technology, laser
physics, physics, metallurgical engineering, and welding technology. They were
satisfied that their resource base was not problematic, although this diversity
IJOPM of specializations had caused some cultural difficulties with regard to terminology and
30,7 differences in time orientation.
The company had clear structures which had evolved and adapted over time. They
used a local university academic to advise them on organizational development on a
consultancy basis and this had been found to be very effective. Their main focus was on
the process of managing technology integration and especially how they might learn
688 from past integration projects. This was organized in two strands around materials and
applications, respectively. For example, in developing laser-cutting systems for
non-metallic materials, there was a process to feed forward lessons learned from metal
cutting applications. Similarly, there was a process to gather lessons learned from
projects in one application, in for example gasket manufacture, and these were formally
part of subsequent projects in new applications such as pressure sensitive adhesives and
flex circuits.

Quadrant D: high organizational maturity – low product advancement

Case 10 ( automotive). This was a global automotive company employing a
multinational workforce. The company was very experienced in work which involved
integrated hardware and software and believed it possessed appropriate software
competence. One of their integrated departments could develop a new product variant
with the new software being ready for production within two days. This kind of
responsiveness was attributed to being able to maintain the notion of a small company
within the bigger entity.
The manager of the integrated departments was skilled in assessing and
communicating the competences which were required. There was low turnover
among key personnel. The integrated department had a low average age among its
employees which contributed to a vibrant and dynamic environment and an atmosphere
of entrepreneurial spirit. People were rewarded for sharing their knowledge with others
and this structural mechanism was regarded as quite effective; managerial policies also
encouraged the delegation of responsibility (rather than hierarchical management), and
the importance of respect for people.
The company did not perceive any technical obstacles impeding the integration
process; rather, they felt that the obstacles, if any, were largely related to maintaining the
resource base and having both hardware and software competences in-house, in fact
they placed most emphasis upon developing specialist resources possessing integrative
skills. They had well-established processes and structures with integrated departments.
Moreover, no cultural issues or problems were observed.
Case 11 ( domestic appliances). This is another global company with activities in
many countries across the world. In particular, software development was carried out in
one country, product development in a second country and manufacturing in a third.
While the company had a strong resource base, this distribution of resources across
countries created challenges for co-ordination, communication and co-operation. Thus,
the company was focussing on processes which would support improvement in this
area. There were also difficulties in finding external partners with whom they could
co-operate effectively. Underlying this difficulty were issues of lack of trust.
Clear organizational structures existed so there were no specific difficulties in this
regard. In terms of culture there were few, if any, cultural obstacles to integration. All had
been dealt with as the company had matured in its experience of integration projects.
However, there were residual issues with the integration process which were being New technology
addressed. These related to some early choices about product functionality, for example, in established
interfaces, usability and ease of navigation which were now understood to be more
important that at first thought. Having realized that these choices had slowed their organizations
time-to-market they were now developing a process which facilitated better
technological choices.
Case 12 (power generation). This is one of the largest companies in the world, and 689
could be regarded as a traditional mechanical engineering company. Several products
had been developed which integrate mechanical hardware and software, but difficulties
had been encountered with a few products which delayed their launch in the marketplace.
In particular, the company had struggled with the process of product realization, and
how to transfer embedded system competence from the research department to
manufacturing and maintenance. The company had strong competence in mechanical
engineering but had problems in finding appropriate software expertise, both within
their own organization and outside it. Moreover, they encountered difficulty with
support and maintenance of both electronics and software. Organizational structures
were mature and although clear cultural differences had existed in the past, the company
had been able to overcome these such that culture was now not at all problematic.

Case analysis
The mechanisms for integration that were observed in each case were extracted from the
interview material following the case protocol. Each instance of observation of an
integration mechanism was recorded and coded according to the four dimensions of the
research model, i.e. structures, processes, resources, and culture. Each investigator
carried out this process independently, and where there was disagreement the instances
were discussed and consensus reached. In Tables I and II, the appearance of integration
mechanisms are coded as follows.
Meaning of observation (code):
.
No observed use of the mechanism (– ).
.
Some use ( *).
.
Major mechanism ( * *).
.
Key or very dominant mechanism ( * * *).

This quantification of qualitative measures, or “scaling” (Smith, 1975), is only a fairly

primitive triangulation technique, nonetheless it serves as an effective way to reduce the
volume of qualitative data at the initial stages of analysis (Jick, 1979). Thus, for each of
the 12 individual cases, Table I shows the analysis of the use of each of the four
integration mechanisms.

Cross-case analysis
For the cross-case analysis, observations of technology integration mechanisms were
mapped to the research taxonomy (Figure 2) which categorized the cases into the four
quadrants (as defined earlier), namely:
Quadrant A. High technological advancement (products) and low technological
maturity (organization).
 30,7

690

Table I.
IJOPM

Within-case analysis
Case no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Technological advancement: high/low H H H L L L H H H L L L

Technological maturity (high – experienced, low –
novice) L L L L L L H H H H H H
Integration mechanisms
Structures ** ** ** ** ** ** – * – * – –
Processes ** * ** – * – *** *** ** * ** **
Resources – – – ** *** *** – – – *** ** ***
Culture ** ** ** – – – * ** * – – –
 Quadrant B. Low technological advancement (products) and low technological New technology
maturity (organization). in established
Quadrant C. High technological advancement (products) and high technological organizations
maturity (organization).
Quadrant D. Low technological advancement (products) and high technological 691
maturity (organization).
The results of this analysis are shown in Table II.
What the analysis in Table II seems to suggest is that the cases within each
quadrant tend to place similar emphasis on particular integration mechanisms, yet the
emphasis differs across the quadrants, i.e.:
.
Cases 1-3 in Quadrant A have a combined focus on structures, processes, and
culture.
.
Cases 4-6 in Quadrant B rely upon structures and resources.
.
Cases 7-9 in Quadrant C use processes mainly, with some emphasis on culture.
.
Cases 10-12 in Quadrant D focus on resources mainly, with some reliance on
processes.

In terms of the cases, which demonstrated high levels of technological advancement in

their products (Quadrants A and C), the cross-case analysis suggests that these cases
favour integration mechanisms based on processes and culture. Conversely, cases with
low levels of technological advancement in their products (Quadrants B and D) rely
primarily on resource-based mechanisms.
Turning to the second dimension in the research model, i.e. technological maturity or
level of experience of the organization with technology integration, there are other
patterns in the data. First, for technologically mature organizations with experience of
technology integration (Quadrants C and D), the use of processes as the integration
mechanism is most prevalent, whereas for the inexperienced organizations
(in Quadrants A and B) it is structural mechanisms which are most common. The
next section will consider these findings in more detail.

High technological advancement Low technological advancement

(products) (products)
Low maturity High maturity Low maturity High maturity
Quadrant A C B D

Integration mechanisms
Structures ****** * ****** *
Processes ***** ******** * *****
Resources – – ******** ******** Table II.
Culture ****** **** – – Cross-case analysis
IJOPM Discussion
30,7 This research set out to explore the process of software integration into mechanical
products and specifically to address two research questions relating:
(1) to the mechanisms which enable the process of technology integration; and
(2) to the conditions under which each mechanism is appropriate.
692 This theory-building study was predicated on a literature review comprised of several
disparate studies which displayed insufficient consensus about either the mechanisms
by which technologies can be effectively integrated into organizations, or the
applicability of technology integration mechanisms in different circumstances.
This paper has endeavoured to make a contribution to meeting this gap by examining
the mechanisms currently used by companies and by exploring how the choice of
mechanism is influenced by the level of technological maturity of the company and the
level of technology advancement in its products. The patterns observed are shown in
Figure 3.
Our results indicate that different kinds of integration mechanisms are used by
companies and that their use is linked to different strategic situations. With reference to
Figure 3, from the perspective of the level of advancement of the relevant technology it
seems that, for high-technology scenarios, the use of processes was the dominant
approach, supported by culture-based mechanisms. By comparison, in companies where
the product technology is less advanced (i.e. the integrated software is less strategic to
the functionality of the product), resource-based approaches, such as adopting a focus on
competence development were more important. This supports recent findings by Stock
and Tatikonda (2008) who also considered characteristics of the technology in relation to
factors which influence the success of technology integration. In particular, they
examined technological uncertainty and found that higher levels of technological
uncertainty on the part of the acquiring organization require processes to facilitate
greater information processing and closer interaction with the technology source.
Figure 3 also shows that in organizations with greater experience of technology
integration (i.e. greater technological maturity), the observed mechanisms again tended
to be systematic with a process focus, for example the greater use of information systems
and effective communication management. Few of the experienced organizations used
integration mechanisms which fitted either the culture or the structures categories.

The use of integration mechanisms

Processes and culture Processes

(Quadrants A & C) (Quadrants C & D)
High High

Technology Technological
advancement maturity

Figure 3. Low Low

Observed patterns of Resources Structures
integration mechanisms (Quadrants B & D) (Quadrants A & B)
By comparison, for companies with less experience of technology integration, structural New technology
approaches seem to be more important.
in established
Hypothesized model organizations
Therefore, for the practitioner, the question remains as to what are the most
appropriate and effective management approaches to take for technology integration
in alternative situations. The exploratory approach taken to this research, involving 693
in-depth interviews with relevant respondents, has led to the collection of rich data.
The analysis of the data has increased our knowledge and understanding of the
alternative management mechanisms that are used in practice, and of how these might
be most appropriately applied in different situations. In summarizing our findings it is
now possible to hypothesize a model which shows how the twin dimensions of product
technology advancement and organizational technology maturity, representing the
independent variables, are linked to the methods by which technology integration
should be managed (the dependent variable). This is shown in Figure 4.
The model proposes the following guidance for practice, based on each of the four
conditions below.

In less advanced technology conditions

The implications of the model suggest that if the new technology is not very advanced as
in Cases 4-6 and 10-12, then an appropriate initial approach would be to seek out those
resources that can help with understanding the new technology. In Case 4, a team had
built a project organization and used consultants as team members. Case 6 was
pre-occupied with building an appropriate resource base but was having difficulty due
to recruitment problems and the challenges of building an effective relationship with
their chosen external partner. Case 10 had a strong focus on having specialist resources
with integrative skills while in Case 11, integrating development resources was a major
challenge both across this global organization and also in relation to its external
partners. In Case 12, the organization struggled with how to transfer embedded

High
Processes
culture

Technology
advancement of Structures Processes
products

Resources
Low
Figure 4.
Low Technological High Hypothesized model of
maturity of integration mechanisms
organization
IJOPM competence in integrated technology systems from the research department to
30,7 manufacturing and maintenance. Specific approaches that seem appropriate in
scenarios of lower technology advancement include the use of project champions with
the skills of being an integrator between the technologies, building alliances and
partnerships or finding other kinds of external resource such as consultants. Making
considerable up-front investments in the projects also seems to be an appropriate route
694 for ensuring that the development process keeps on track.

In more advanced technology conditions

On the other hand, if the new technology is advanced, as in Cases 1-3 and 7-9, our results
suggest that it is more appropriate to use integration mechanisms that focus on the
development of processes and also of cultures through communication and management
development. In Case 1, more defined processes and structures were being developed as
the company grew from being an entrepreneurial start-up; they were also addressing the
different cultures and mindsets of the different technical groupings. In Case 2,
mechanisms for handling product and process requirements, reference models,
information models, product identity, change processes, quality assurance, and supply
chain changes had already been developed but they were still striving to achieve smooth
and effective processes to integrate the hardware and software organizations. It is
interesting in Case 2 that the differentiated cultures were seen somewhat positively as
generating a high degree of creativity and innovation – a kind of creative tension (Senge,
1990).
Case 3 was using a newly introduced communication process to improve buy-in to its
technology and business strategies. Case 7 demonstrated a strong focus on processes
and support systems for projects and project management; they were also wrestling to a
lesser extent with the cultural challenges created by the age differences in the hardware
and software groups. In Case 8, processes that supported integrated development dealt
with co-operation between projects with different time perspectives, while for Case 9
they were mainly interested in processes to encourage learning from past integration
projects. We conclude that the most appropriate integration mechanisms for situations
where technology is more advanced should focus on communication, coordination, and
cultural development between the new and the old technologies. Over time new and
more rigorous processes should be developed and implemented. By using such
mechanisms, the new technology will gradually be “internalized” into the organization
and ways of working and cultures will homologize.

In less technology mature organizations

A less technologically mature organization, as in Cases 1-6, may create a new product
function, either as a project-based or more permanent organizational unit. In Case 1,
clearer defined structures were being developed, although the most effective structural
form has not yet been identified. In Case 2, structural development was being pursued to
integrate strong and well-established hardware and software organizations, while to a
similar end, Case 3 was employing job rotation and rewards/recognition to foster closer
integration between the design, manufacture and software groups. Case 4 was challenged
by trying to achieve a project-organization structure, while in Case 6, re-organizing
around a project structure was found to be very effective, particularly with the inclusion
of representatives from the supplier and customer base. Our observations suggest that
the most relevant integration mechanisms for less technologically mature organizations New technology
are based upon structures and project management. in established
In more technology mature organizations
organizations
Finally, in the more technologically experienced company, as in Cases 7-12, they may
already have been through the phase of structural development and will more probably
find integration mechanisms that focus on processes to be most appropriate. Case 7 had 695
a strong focus on processes for project management. Case 8 had already developed the
necessary resource base and was developing processes to support integrated
development through easier access to information and knowledge, utilization of
modelling and simulation, and more effective communication. As noted earlier, Case 9
wanted processes to facilitate learning from past experience, while Case 10 made some
use of processes but less than any of the other cases in this category. In Case 11, the
emphasis was on processes for improving co-ordination, co-operation, and
communication among resources in different locations, and improvement of the
development process to facilitate better technological choices, especially in the earlier
stages. Finally, for Case 12 processes for finding and integrating new technologies was
the major issue. Thus, we suggest that more technologically mature organizations
should focus on internal process mechanisms for developing competence in the
integration of new technology into their products.

Limitations and future research

Most if not all research studies have limitations and this study is no exception. First,
while Eisenhardt’s approach to building theory from multiple cases has considerable
support, it must be recognized that it has also some critics who point out that mini cases
lead to descriptions which are rather thin and which do not delve as deeply as the classic
single-case study (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). Indeed, Eisenhardt acknowledges that many
of the studies which have been based on her multiple-case method have only yielded
modest contributions, rather than the “paradigm-challenging or paradigm creating
theoretical advancements that follow the efforts of traditional case study researchers”
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 617). Second, the multiple-case method creates spatial
constraints for reporting the data in all its richness while at the same time recognizing
the trade-off between data transparency and parsimony of emerging theory (Eisenhardt
and Graebner, 2007; Pratt, 2009). Third, the process of within-case and cross-case
analysis is ultimately a process of judgement and interpretation based on intuitive and
firsthand knowledge of the data and its field sources, as was the scaling process used to
translate the qualitative into quantitative data. Therefore, it seems appropriate to
conduct future studies which examine the proposed model and its constructs in different
settings and using alternative research methods.
A further opportunity for future research is inherent in the research design in Figure 1
which showed a need to measure the outcomes of integration projects and explore the
relationships between the integration mechanisms and this dependent variable. While
this was not part of the current study, it does nevertheless represent an opportunity
to extend the model, identifying contingent variables (technology advancement
and technological maturity), decisional (independent) variables which leverage
processes, structures, resources and cultures, and dependent variables (integration
performance: cost, time, and quality). Finally, it would be interesting to consider the
IJOPM same issues in product development in service settings, and in the context of other forms
30,7 of technology integration, for example process technology.

Theoretical and managerial implications

As a contribution to knowledge, the paper has drawn together many of the factors
associated with technology integration in various articles and shown how they can
696 coalesce under different contexts. The hypothesized model provides a basis for future
research. The results of this investigation also have clear managerial implications. They
provide greater insights into the practice of technology integration and identify patterns
which suggest alternative approaches to managing the process of technology
integration in different contexts. They clarify the types of mechanism which exist for
companies needing to integrate technology into their organization, and they categorize
these into a framework which incorporates the perspectives of structures, processes,
resources, and culture/values. Examples are given of practices associated with each
category, together with some of the tensions and challenges inherent in their
implementation. We have further examined how the adoption of particular approaches
is linked to the specific circumstances of the company, as characterized by the level of
technological advancement in the products and by the level of maturity of the
organization in technology integration. Hence, a firm may map its own situation
according to these twin dimensions and thereby determine the most appropriate
approaches to technology integration in their case.

Conclusions
This paper has contributed to our understanding of the processes by which
organizations integrate new technology into their products. It has classified these
mechanisms using a conceptual framework which categorizes such mechanisms as
relating to structures, processes, resources and culture/value systems. It has examined
the mechanisms used in 12 different companies and related these to the level of
organizational maturity in technology integration and to the level of advancement of the
technology concerned. It has concluded by presenting a hypothesized model in which
these variables are linked. A central lesson is that managers need to understand and
tenaciously manage the factors which impinge upon the technology integration process
in different contexts.

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Corresponding author
Christer Karlsson can be contacted at: ck.om@cbs.dk

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