Aggression and Violent Behavior

Manuscript Draft

Manuscript Number: AVB-D-16-00082

Title: An Examination of Thwarted Mass Homicide Plots and Threateners

Article Type: SI: FBI/U.S. Marshals

Keywords: Averted Mass Homicide; Foiled Mass Homicide; Attempted Mass

Homicide; Mass Homicide Threats; Explicit Threats

Abstract: Thwarted mass homicide events derived primarily from news media
sources were examined. This study describes who was responsible for
uncovering these near-acts of violence, the intended targets, planning
details, weapons, outcomes (legal or other) and the accompanying
demographic factors associated with each event. Cases were divided into
two groups: high-credibility and low-credibility. The majority of cases,
across both groups, were characterized by threateners who were male,
acting alone, in their mid to late twenties, and who targeted academic
institutions. When compared to threateners in the low-credibility group,
high-credibility threateners were more likely to have mental health
problems and to have created materials suggesting the premeditation of a
planned mass homicide event. Plots were most commonly discovered by two
groups: (1) friends, family and acquaintances of threateners and (2)
members of the general public. The findings of this study suggest that
some threats should be taken more seriously than others and in the
absence of a reliable early-warning system, tips from friends, family
members, acquaintances of threateners and the general public, could serve
as a valuable asset in the prevention of mass homicide.
*Manuscript
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AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 1

An Examination of Thwarted Mass Homicide Plots and Threateners

Christine M. Sarteschi1

1
Dept. of Social work & Criminology, Chatham University, Pittsburgh PA, Corresponding
Author: csarteschi@chatham.edu
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 2

ABSTRACT

Thwarted mass homicide events derived primarily from news media sources were examined.

This study describes who was responsible for uncovering these near-acts of violence, the

intended targets, planning details, weapons, outcomes (legal or other) and the accompanying

demographic factors associated with each event. Cases were divided into two groups: high-

credibility and low-credibility. The majority of cases, across both groups, were characterized by

threateners who were male, acting alone, in their mid to late twenties, and who targeted academic

institutions. When compared to threateners in the low-credibility group, high-credibility

threateners were more likely to have mental health problems and to have created materials

suggesting the premeditation of a planned mass homicide event. Plots were most commonly

discovered by two groups: (1) friends, family and acquaintances of threateners and (2) members

of the general public. The findings of this study suggest that some threats should be taken more

seriously than others and in the absence of a reliable early-warning system, tips from friends,

family members, acquaintances of threateners and the general public, could serve as a valuable

asset in the prevention of mass homicide.

KEYWORDS

Averted Mass Homicide

Foiled Mass Homicide
Attempted Mass Homicide
Mass Homicide Threats
Explicit Threats
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 3

An Examination of Thwarted Mass Homicide Plots and Threateners

1. Introduction

Researchers consistently note that the literature base of mass homicide, and mass

shootings in particular, is underdeveloped (Fox & DeLateur, 2013; Knoll, 2013), primarily due

to the lack of access to data (Huff-Corzin, et al., 2014) and perhaps because of the relative rarity

of these events (Fox & DeLateur, 2013). Even more limited, than the base for completed events,

is the research base for thwarted mass homicide events (Knoll, 2013; Madfis, 2013) and people

who threaten violence (Barnes, Gordon, & Hudson, 2001; Warren, Mullen, & Ogloff, 2011). To

date, only a handful of researchers have investigated "near-miss" incidents and virtually all of

them have focused on students who have targeted their respective K-12 schools or their fellow

classmates and peers (O'Toole, 2000; Newman, Fox, Roth, Mehta, & Harding, 2004; Daniels,

Buck, Croxall, Gruber, Kime, & Govert, 2007; Larkin, 2009; Daniels et al., 2010; Madfis, 2013).

A comprehensive review of the literature indicates that there is an absence of thwarted mass

homicide studies dealing with events other than K-12 school-based events.

Broadly speaking, the systematic investigation of communicated threats and threatening

behavior is known as threat assessment (Cornell, 2011). The Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) contends that threat assessment rests upon two fundamental premises: (1) not all threats are

created equal and; (2) most people who make threats are unlikely to carry them out (O'Toole,

2000). Despite these facts, they believe that all threats must be taken seriously and their

seriousness must be evaluated accordingly.

It might be said that threat assessment has more recently evolved into threat management,

at least in the case of school-based threats. Threat management views threats as possible

intervention opportunities aimed at preventing targeted violence (Cornell, 2011). Likewise, the
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 4

study of averted mass homicide incidents might serve as a unique opportunity for the generation

of intervention strategies.

1.1. The Importance of Studying Thwarted Plots

The Congressional Research Service recently studied 78 completed public mass

shootings in the United States (Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finklea, & McCallion, 2013).

They noted that with regard to prevention “…potential perpetrators [of public mass shootings]

cannot be identified accurately, and no systematic means of intervening are known to be

effective (p. 21).” Because every thwarted plot was interrupted by something or someone,

knowing more about these failed efforts could teach us about what works (Dahl, 2011). It might

also help to enhance our limited knowledge base (Knoll, 2013), and highlight common targets,

trends, unknown threats, and methods of attack that can make the mass homicide threat picture

more complete (Clayton, 2013).

The study of thwarted plots might also further our understanding of leakage, a concept

first identified by the FBI in their analysis of school shooters. Leakage occurs when an individual

"...intentionally or unintentionally reveals clues to feelings, thoughts, fantasies, attitudes, or

intentions that may signal an impending violent act" (O'Toole, 2000, p.14). Leakage can be

expressed in a variety of different forms including threats, boasts, innuendos, predictions, or

ultimatums (O'Toole, 2000; Meloy & O'Toole, 2011). Individuals can also communicate threats

through videos, tattoos, writings, and drawings. Among school shooters, leakage is considered

one of the most important clues that precedes an adolescent's act of violence (Meloy & O'Toole,

2011). These pre-attack behaviors might be characteristic of non-student threateners but this has

yet to be thoroughly investigated (Warren, Mullen, & Ogloff, 2011).

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 5

1.2. Difficulties Studying Averted Plots

In the only known published study of failed terrorism plots, Dahl (2011) outlines some of

the difficulties with studying these events. One problematic issue is their hypothetical nature. It

is difficult to quantify events that some may perceive as never having occurred (Dahl, 2013;

Madfis, 2013). Another difficulty involves classified cases not available for study. Despite

exhaustive open records searches, there may remain classified cases which are only available to

law enforcement, threat assessment teams and or select others, resulting in cases which may be

missed. A good example of the limitations of using news media accounts to collect data

comes from the book The Gift of Fear by Gavin de Becker. He and his associates have consulted

on an estimated 20,000 cases yet less than 50 have made the news (1997/ 2010). A similar data

collection challenge also exists for the study of thwarted mass homicide plots. For instance, a

CBS article stated that 148 mass shootings had been prevented by the FBI in 2013. The article

noted that “The FBI would not provide specific details of [the cases] they've consulted on

because many are ongoing and involve people who have not been charged with crimes ("FBI:

We've Prevented 148 Shootings, Attacks This Year," 2013, p. 2). Even though, unclassified and

thus publicly available thwarted mass homicide cases may be fewer in number than those

contained among classified materials, they are still worthy of study.

1.3. Purpose of the Present Study

The following research explores cases of thwarted mass homicide plots and how they

were revealed, using content analysis of media and legal sources. It describes who was

responsible for uncovering these near-acts of violence, the intended targets, planning details,

weapons, outcomes (legal or other) and the accompanying demographic factors associated with

each event. The exploratory nature of this work is intended as preliminary and is guided by the
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 6

premise that the study of thwarted events can assist in the development of effective prevention

strategies for targeted violence.

2. Methods

Following the basic search methodology outlined by (Daniels, et al., 2007) and Madfis

(2013) in their studies of foiled school shootings, cases were located by entering specific

keywords and phrases into the LexisNexis newspaper database. Additional searches included

repeating those same searches in Google News and by searching the Internet, including scanning

academic and government-sponsored publications to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the

search results. The search terms and phrases included: foiled, averted, rampage plot, mass

shooting averted, murder averted, murder plan, killing spree averted, thwarted attacks, thwarted

rampages, killing spree foiled, attempted mass shooting, attempted rampage, tragedy averted

gunman, foiled mass shooting, threatened to kill, threatened mass shooting, rampage threat,

thwarted murder, murder foiled, and planned to kill.

2.1. Freedom of Information Act Request

An additional information-gathering strategy was employed in an attempt to collect all

extant thwarted mass shootings events. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was made

in May of 2014 in response to a news report (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-weve-

prevented-148-shootings-attacks-this-year/) regarding the FBI having disrupted or prevented

approximately 150 mass shootings and violent attacks in 2013. The article goes on to say that

hundreds more had been prevented in the time span previous to 2013 and extending to 2011.

Requested FBI documents were those specifically dealing with the 150 averted events of 2013.

Also requested was any and all information regarding the other hundreds of events similarly

averted prior to 2013. They were unable to supply the requested materials.
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 7

For the purpose of this study, a mass homicide threatener is defined as an individual who

expressed through his or her actions or words, the desire to kill multiple victims. Cases were

excluded if they were: (1) outside of the United States; (2) one-person targets; (3) those that

involved K-12 students whose current school was the desired target (see Daniels, et al., 2007;

Daniels et al., 2010 and Madfis, 2013 for reviews); (4) those that appeared to be international

terrorism-based; (5) those where the violent act was prevented due to an accident (i.e. gun

jammed); and (6) those which resulted in death or injuries to the targeted victims. Using the

aforementioned search criteria, 57 cases of mass homicide threats and attempts occurring in the

United States between January 1993 to June 2014, were identified.

Next, following the methodology of Allely, Minnis, Thompson, Wilson, and Gillberg

(2014), in their review of perpetrators of extreme violence, the name of the individual(s)

suspected of plotting an attack was entered into the search engine "Google." The resulting

information (i.e. articles and when available court documents), was then reviewed. For each case,

a minimum of five resources was examined and a coding form was developed to document seven

specific categories of information about each case. The categories were: (1) characteristics of the

suspect (i.e. age and gender); (2) intended targets; (3) planning; (4) weapons; (5) mental health

problems of suspect (s); (6) means of plot revealment; and (7) outcomes (legal or other).

2.2. High-credibility Versus Low-credibility Threats

Because "all threats are not created equal" (O'Toole, 2000, p. 5), the final step involved

categorizing the 57 cases into two groups: high-credibility and low-credibility. Cases were

judged as having high-credibility, and thus "actionable" (O'Toole, 2000; Cornell, 2010), when

the threatener was found to have the means necessary to carry out the threat (i.e. bombs, guns,

etc.) or if not in possession of the means necessary to carry out the threat, the threatener
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 8

possessed plans or materials (i.e. manifesto, etc.) to secure the means necessary to carry out the

threat.

3. Results

Of the 57 cases, 35 threats (61%) of mass homicide were deemed to have high-credibility

and the remaining 22 (39%) were considered to have low-credibility. Between 1993 and June

2014, mass homicide had been plotted in 30 states; the majority of incidents (n=34, 59.7%)

occurring between 2012 and 2013. The states having the most plots were: California with nine,

Washington with five and Nevada with three. Thirteen other states each had two plots: Colorado,

Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,

Texas, Tennessee, and Utah. The remaining 14 states each had one plot: Alabama, Arizona,

Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Louisiana, Oklahoma,

Oregon, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.

3.1. Characteristics of Suspects

Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the plots and perpetrators2. Fifty-

seven cases involved 61 total suspects. Of the 57 cases, two plots involved two suspects (one pair

of self-proclaimed Neo-Nazis and one pair of co-conspiring coworkers) and one involved three

suspects (a trio of three teenagers). All multiple suspects were in the high credibility group. The

rest of the cases involved one suspect. Seven (12%) of the 57 cases involved female suspects and

the remaining 50 cases (88%) involved male suspects. There were no instances of mixed-sex

suspect teams in either group. The mean age of all of suspects (n=61) was 27.37 years

(SD=11.38). Suspects in the high-credibility group were four years younger than suspects in the

low-credibility group (25 years old versus 29 years old). Suspects aged in range between 14 and

2
In line with other researchers studying averted incidents, Daniels and colleagues, 2007; 2010 and Madfis, 2013, the
results to follow summarize a variety of sources including newspaper articles, police reports and court records.
Preserving anonymity requires that these sources not be explicitly cited.
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 9

60; 75.4% were between the ages of 14 and 30. Female suspects tended to be older than male

suspects by approximately five years (31 years old versus 26 years old). None of the

aforementioned age differences between groups were statistically significant. Most sources did

not identify the race of the suspect.

Table 1: Summary Characteristics of the Thwarted Plots and Threateners

High-credibility cases (n=35) Low-credibility cases (n=22)

Mean age of threatener¹ M=25.54 (SD=12.76) M=29.54 (SD=12.77)

Mean age of female threateners (3, 8%) (4, 18%)

(n=7) M=34.33 (SD=16.01) M=29.25 (SD=12.15)

Federal law enforcement 15 (43%) 3 (14%)

involvement

Mental health problems2* 17 (44%) 4 (18%)

References infamous mass 14 (40%) 4 (18%)

shooters (i.e. Eric Harris, etc.)
in writings or threats

Electronic threats (i.e. social 11 (31%) 12 (55%)

media, chat room or email)

School as target 19 (54%) 15 (68%)

Manifestos, diaries, notes, etc., 11 (28%) 1 (5%)

detailing plan3*

Number of suspects who were 19 (49%) 5 (23%)

sentenced to prison4
Plot Aversions

Family, friends or 14 (40%) 6 (27%)

acquaintances

Members of the public 13 (37%) 11 (50%)

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 10

Confessed to mental health 3 (8.5%) 0 (0)%

professionals

Law Enforcement 3 (8.5%) 3 (14%)

Victims 2 (6%) 2 (9%)

Note: ¹There are 35 cases but 39 total suspects in the high-credibility group; 2 17 out of 39 high-
credibility subjects; 3 11 out of 39 high-credibility subjects; 4 19 out of 39 high-credibility subjects;
*p<.05

3.2. Intended Targets

Table 1 shows that the majority of both the high-credibility (54%) and low-credibility

groups (68%), targeted academic institutions, including universities, colleges, community

colleges, high schools, and elementary schools. High-credibility group targets (several included

multiple targets) also included movie theaters (n=2), specific cities (n=4), ex-employers (n=3),

malls (n=2), a Wal-Mart (n=1), a church (n=1), a bus station (n=1), a train station (n=1), and a

St. Patrick's Day parade (n=1). Several suspects (n=3) had "hit lists" of targeted groups; one for

an unknown number of U.S. legislators, one for at least seven people and another for at least 100

people. Low-credibility group targets, excluding the academic settings, included a bar (n=1), a

specified city (n=1), a mall (n=1), and a temp agency (n=1). Three low-credibility plots involved

targeting specific groups.

3.3. Planning

Details about the planning of mass violence were available for the majority of high-

credibility cases (n=30, 86%) but only for a minority of low-credibility cases (n=7, 32%). In the

high-credibility group, four out of the five plans involved individuals whose presence and actions

posed an imminent threat, as determined by the authorities. Table 1 indicates that suspects in the

high-credibility group (28%) were statistically more likely to have created manifestos, diaries,
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 11

journals, web pages, notes or checklists about their plots, than were suspects in the low-

credibility group (5%) (z=2.23, p<0.05).

Fourteen suspects (40%) in the high-credibility group referenced wanting to outdo or re-

create infamous school shootings (in their threats or writings) including those at Virginia Tech,

Columbine, Newtown and Aurora, Colorado whereas only four (18%) of the low-credibility

group plots referenced infamous school shootings. Two high-credibility group plots, included the

assassination of the president of the United States, Barack Obama. Low-credibility case plots

tended to be nonspecific and vague (i.e. "I am going to shoot up a kindergarten") whereas high-

credibility plots were often specific and unique (i.e. put on a gorilla suit and kill at least 15

women and police officers with an AK-47). Compared to the high-credibility plots, low-

credibility plots also tended to include more bomb threats.

3.4. Weapons

Details about the weaponry of threateners were available in 89% of the cases (n=51). In

six (11%) cases, it was unclear whether the suspect was in possession of a weapon. Fifty-four

percent (n=31) of the cases involved suspects having weapons in their possession at the time of

the incident. Seven percent (n=4) had plans to acquire needed weapons. The majority of cases

involved the possession of at least one firearm (n=30, 53%). Forty-seven percent (n=27) had

more than one firearm. Of those with weapons, 55% (n=17) had guns only; 16% (n=5) had a

combination of firearms and bladed weapons (e.g. swords, bayonets or machetes); 13% (n=4)

had a combination of firearms, bombs and or incendiary devices or materials and 10% (n=3) had

a combination of firearms, bladed weapons, bombs and or incendiary devices or materials. One

suspect (3%) was in possession of knives, surgical gloves, sponges and a shovel. One (3%) was

in possession of poison (cyanide).

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 12

3.5. Mental Health of Suspects

Table 1 indicates that suspects in the high-credibility group had a significantly higher

percentage of mental health problems (44%) than suspects in the low-credibility group (18%)

(z=2.01, p<0.05). Of the 17 suspects in the high-credibility group, who were identified as having

known mental health problems, specific diagnoses were available for eight (47%). Four suspects

were identified as having bipolar disorder, one had schizophrenia, one had both an autism

spectrum disorder and antisocial personality disorder, one had depression, and one had a

combination of depression and other mood disorders and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

Among the suspects in the low-credibility group, one had posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

and the other three had unspecified mental health problems.

3.6. Plot Identification

To best understand how the plots were uncovered and thwarted, categories were created

based upon the answers to two questions: Who revealed the threat and or the suspect to the

authorities and what was their relationship to the suspect? Five categories emerged: (1) members

of the general public; (2) friends, family and acquaintances; (3) intended victims; (4) law

enforcement; and (5) mental health professionals.

3.7. Most Common Plot Identification

In both the high-credibility and low-credibility groups, table 1 notes that the two most

common methods of identification were category (2) (a suspect's family, friends or

acquaintances) and category (1) (members of the general public). In the high credibility group, a

suspect's family, friends or acquaintances reported the threat to authorities in 14 instances (40%).

These included: four instances of family members who made a report to police, four friends, two

acquaintances, two roommates and two coworkers. Among the low-credibility group, a suspect's
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 13

family, friends or acquaintances reported the threat to authorities in six instances (27%). These

included: one instance where family members were the reporters, one coworker as well as two

fellow students, and two friends.

Members of the general public (category 1) (in the high credibility group) included a

woman whose daughter made her aware of a student's behavior, an FBI informant, a gun dealer,

a drugstore clerk, a U.S. postal customer, concerned persons viewing threats on social media

websites (n=4), a faculty member, a receptionist in a healthcare facility, a school book keeper,

and an employee of an Internet service provider. In the low-credibility group, members of the

general public, who reported the threat to authorities, included people who read the threat online

in a chat room, an online gaming website, on Facebook or on Twitter (n=5), a temp agency

employee, school employees (n=4) and one anonymous tip from a man unknown to the police.

3.8. Less Common Plot Identifications

Planned attacks were discovered by law enforcement (category 4) three times in both the

high and low-credibility groups (8.5% and 14% respectively). There were three (9%) occasions

where suspects voluntarily told mental health professionals or crisis workers (category 5) about

their plans in the high-credibility group and none in the low-credibility group. Two hospitalized

suspects revealed their plans to the mental health staff. Another suspect told his longtime

therapist about his plans to kill children while they were trick-or-treating. He also planned killing

teenagers at a nearby school and intended to be the "guy who killed Obama." In both the high

and low-credibility groups, there were two instances (6% and 9% respectively) where intended

victims reported the plot to police (category 3).

3.9. Legal Outcomes

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 14

Details about the legal outcomes were provided in 44 (77%) of the 57 cases. Generally, it

was easier to identify the legal outcomes for suspects in the high-credibility group than is was for

suspects in the low-credibility group. As shown in table 1, federal law enforcement was involved

in the high-credibility cases at a higher rate (43%) than in low-credibility cases (14%). Table 1

also notes that suspects in the high-credibility group were also more likely to be sentenced to jail

or prison than in the low-credibility group (49% versus 23% respectively), the longest sentence

being 80 years. Only five suspects in the high-credibility group received probation as their

primary sentence, three were still awaiting sentencing and three cases resulted in no charges

being filed. Among the low credibility group, two suspects received probation, one was awaiting

trial and in five cases, the charges were dismissed or not pursued. Three of the high-credibility

group suspects are deceased, two having committed suicide and another who died of cancer

before trial. There was no indication that any of the low-credibility suspects were deceased.

4. Discussion

This study is mainly exploratory in nature. While it contains interesting trends about an

understudied phenomenon, these findings have to be interpreted in light of several limitations.

This study's primary sources were media accounts. Media source material is often the only

source available to those outside of law enforcement but media reports are not always accurate

(Huff-Corzine, et al., 2014). Media accounts are also disproportionally focused on

sensationalized events (Duwe, 2000).

An unexpected finding of this study was that nearly 60% of mass homicide threats

occurred between 2012 and 2013. It is possible that the more recent increase in news coverage

about completed mass homicide incidents (Fox & DeLateur, 2013) is creating a copycat-like
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 15

effect. It might also be that certain databases remove older news stories and these cases are no

longer accessible.

Unreported cases must also be considered. For instance, Duwe (2000) found that only

45% of completed mass murder incidents were reported in the New York Times. It is reasonable

to believe that unsuccessful plots of mass murder are even less likely to be reported than are

completed mass murders. Like similar studies of thwarted events, the present sample may not

constitute the total number of available cases (Daniels et al., 2007) and thus might not be

generalizable. Future research is being planned to expand upon the ideas and findings generated

from this descriptive study.

Despite the study's limitations, there is utility in studying thwarted events. An exhaustive

search for instances of domestic mass homicide threats and thwarted plots resulted in the

identification of 57 cases, the majority of which were deemed to be high-credible threats. The

distinctiveness of this study is that it studied threats made by those other than students, an area

which had not yet been examined. This study went a step further than previous studies of averted

threats by comparing high-credibility threats and low-credibility threats. Although there are

fewer cases in this review than would be available to law enforcement, this study begins to fill in

the gaps of this under-researched area.

Predominantly, in the high-credible group, mass homicide threats were made by male

suspects in their mid-twenties. They targeted academic institutions, by a slight majority (52%),

even though they were not in any way affiliated with those institutions. It is unclear why

academic institutions were often the targets but explanations might include the high human toll

that was possible (large numbers of people in one place), shock value or the desire for fame and

glory (Lankford & Hakim, 2011). Most suspects were also acting alone, operating without an
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 16

apparent support structure or group affiliation. These types of "homegrown" terror threats by

elusive "lone-wolf style actors" might have in part spurred the resurrection of the Domestic

Terrorism Task Force proposed by Eric Holder of the Department of Justice in June 2014

(McClam, 2014; Phelps, 2014).

Of those possessing a weapon, the majority had at least one firearm. Thirty-nine percent

(n=12) of those with weapons had more than one type including high-powered firearms, bladed

weapons, bombs and or incendiary devices. Of particular interest is the finding that some of

those possessing weapons had what might be considered an arsenal. An example was revealed by

a drugstore clerk when developing photographs. She noticed a man posing with an arsenal of

weapons, including a propane bomb, 34 pipe bombs, 19 Molotov cocktails, a semi-automatic

rifle, two sawed-off shotguns, a sniper rifle, a bolt-action rifle and collectively nearly a thousand

rounds of ammunition. The clerk first alerted her store supervisor concerning the photos. The

supervisor failed to contact the police. Unsatisfied with the actions of her supervisor, the clerk

told her father, a police officer, who then secured a warrant to search the home of the suspect.

Police uncovered extensive details of the suspect's plot to engage in a "Columbine-style" attack

at a nearby college.

The possession and creation of manifestos, diaries, journals, web pages, and other

materials regarding aspects of planning also proved to be common among the high-credibility

group of threateners when compared to the low-credibility group of threateners. These written

materials are strong evidence of planning and implied intentionality on the part of the threatener

and are often left behind by successful rampage shooters (Lankford & Hakim, 2011). It was also

more common for high-credibility threateners to want to outdo or recreate previous infamous

school shootings when compared to the low-credibility threateners.

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 17

Mental health issues emerged as an important characteristic of the high-credibility group

of threateners. Studies by Warren and colleagues found similarly elevated rates of mental

disorder among people who made explicit threats to kill though this finding did not hold when

they examined eight people who threatened mass homicide (Warren, Mullen, Thomas, Ogloff, &

Burgess, 2008; Warren, et al., 2011; Warren, Mullen, & McEwan, 2014). The fact that the high-

credibility group was more likely to have mental disorder than the low-credibility group would

suggest that in cases where mental disorder information is available, these threats should be

taken more seriously.

Warren and colleagues (2008) also documented a higher than average rate of death by

suicide among people who made threats to kill. It is noteworthy that 5.4% of their sample died

by suicide. Similarly, five percent of mass homicidal threateners in this study died by suicide,

which is higher than the expected rate of 1.5% (Levi, et al., 2003).

Friends, family and acquaintances of threateners (category 2) and members of the general

public (category 1) were those who most commonly discovered the mass homicide plots. Their

reporting of these threats to authorities potentially prevented a number of mass homicide events.

This result is consistent with Dahl (2011) who studied foiled terrorism plots and concluded that

human intelligence, gathered from tips from the general public and informants, proved to be the

"most effective counterrorism tool" (p. 630) in his study. Similarly, Gill, Horgan, & Deckert

(2014) reviewed the characteristics of 119 lone-actor terrorists and found that friends, family and

coworkers were frequently aware of the individual's intent to engage in a terroristic activity. A

2011 study by White, Lester, Gentile, & Rosenbleeth, about the apprehension of serial killers,

found that the majority (71.5%) were captured as a result of information provided to authorities

from citizens, surviving victims and family members of offenders. These findings are also
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 18

consistent with previous research about leakage which has found that many people intentionally

or unintentionally reveal important information to third parties about their plans to commit

violent acts.

This study also revealed that information about mass homicide plots did not typically

originate from law enforcement. In fact, there was only one occasion in this study where

information about a potential plot originated with law enforcement. The remaining occasions

involved suspects surrendering to or approaching law enforcement or when plots were

inadvertently discovered after a suspect had been arrested for a different crime. An example of a

discovery occurred when a suspect was arrested after placing a severed dog's head on his

neighbor’s porch. An investigation of the suspect's residence revealed a manifesto which detailed

his intentions to shoot students at a local college, to shoot acquaintances and to sexually abuse a

minor child.

5. Conclusion

The study shows the importance of heeding information from the family, friends and

acquaintances of persons threatening mass violence and from members of the general public. A

case illustrative of the importance of tips from the general public involved a witness at a post

office who observed a suspect wearing rubber gloves and placing powder into envelopes from a

canister marked with a skull and crossbones and labeled as "poison." The witness left the

building and called the authorities. Investigators later identified the substance as being cyanide

that was being repackaged as a nutritional supplement. The poison was to be sent to people on

the suspect's "hit list." Another case involved the mother of a suspect who called the police after

she found, in her son's pants pocket, a purchase receipt for semi-automatic firearms. Upon his

arrest, he confessed his plans to randomly shoot people in a movie theater and then at a Wal-
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 19

Mart. Despite having been previously hospitalized at least seven times in psychiatric facilities,

the suspect was not in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). In the

absence of reliable early-warning systems, tips from the general public and from family

members, could serve as an invaluable asset in preventing mass homicides.

There are many future research opportunities in the area of thwarted events. One idea

involves using the Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) as a model to explore

the root causes of persons planning or threatening mass homicides. The fact that many "near-

miss" threateners are not deceased (unlike many people who carry out mass homicides) presents

a unique opportunity to more definitively ascertain motives. Lankford and Hakin (2011) suggest

that certain counterterrorism strategies might be useful in preventing mass attacks, including

behavioral analysis checks and invasive questioning both of which could help identify people in

need of mental health treatment. Helping people access mental health services proved to be a

highly useful intervention strategy when used by the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit ("FBI:

We've Prevented 148 Shootings, Attacks This Year," 2013). Eric Dahl (2011) notes that the

Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained at the University of Maryland, is mostly

comprised of completed attacks and only certain types of failed attacks (those in which an attack

was attempted and failed rather than attacks that were threatened but no action was taken).

Though there is not an empirical database that tracks completed mass homicides (to the best of

this author's knowledge), perhaps one could be created where failed, foiled and threatened plots

would be documented. Given the scarcity of peer-reviewed research about extreme forms of

violence (Allely, et al. 2014), a central database could fill significant gaps in our understanding

of the threat of mass homicide. The availability of such a resource might help lead to the

development of interventions that can effectively prevent mass homicide events.

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 20

Law enforcement agencies receive an enormous number of crime tips, most likely more

than can be realistically handled (Ku & Leroy, 2011). For instance, between 2001 and 2009, the

FBI received more than 2.3 million tips via their Internet tip line (Federal Bureau of

Investigation, 2009). Other law enforcement agencies also have limited resources and likely

cannot give equal time to the investigation of all threats. No threats should be ignored but this

study would suggest that some threats might be taken more seriously than others including those

made by persons with the means to carry out their stated threat, those with mental health

problems and those who have created materials suggesting the premeditation of a planned event.
AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 21

Disclosure statement

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

AN EXAMINATION OF THWARTED MASS HOMICIDE 22

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