SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634            June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x           x x x           x x x

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan
de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to
secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he
subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount
of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the
instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed
in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my
last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case
and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at
about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building
and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within
the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk
of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there
 told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the
Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not
at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes
D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

x x x           x x x           x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2 respondent filed
his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The
latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the
former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the
latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's
law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise
agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the
Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach
of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about
his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for
the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be
filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint
because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had
offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the
parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent
reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed
first before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because
their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint,
a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to
fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to
cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the
respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year."4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on
behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's
failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his
office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the
client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client,
but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant,
because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then
the professional employment is established.7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer
and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a
personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of
their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on
January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel
of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should
have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. 14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law
office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees
and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short
of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to
file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach
of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila
THIRD DIVISION
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M.
Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-
55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934,
where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property
situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty.
Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case
Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for
their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by
a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the
same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and
Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent
Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-
88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of
the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case
No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is
a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on
aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and
annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October
18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a
superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and
abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and
her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their
pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently
thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent
and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after
Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in
her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and
in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays
his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by
the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that
expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record
of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)

R E S O L U T I O N 

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which
the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as

the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
 exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice —
as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a
body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a
ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the
Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila
EN BANC
 B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed
the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with
the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to
do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken
belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial
to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and
was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13 The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification
for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of
a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than
30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo,
you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s
gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law, 17 which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.
For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of
the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the
Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was
the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he
willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is punishable by
fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be
reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH
EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.

RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's Oath, Caesar Z. Distrito,
petitioner.)

Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys dated  April 22, 2002 filed
by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.
The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang
Airport, BacolodCity.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or Official Function under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code[1]cralaw was filed against him which read:

That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of the Bacolod City Sangguniang Kabataan
Federation, a government agency, did then and there under pretense of official position and without being lawfully
entitled to do so, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously preside over the special session of the said Federation, in
violation of the aforestated law.[2]cralaw

The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations [3]cralaw and passed the same.He could
not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the above-
mentioned case.

On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter [4]cralaw from a certain Mr. Benjie
Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed against the petitioner which were not duly
disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar examinations, to wit:

1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, docketed as B.C.I.S. 99-6735
and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod;

2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, Bacolod, in which an adverse
decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;

3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC, Bacolod.

Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer before the Supreme Court nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:

The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal and civil case filed against
him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same when he applied for the Bar Exams
sometime in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY and that should be acted upon by your respectable office to protect
the integrity of our present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors, Judges, Justices or even High Ranking
Cabinet or Government Officials or even President of our country.

The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member before a testimonial dinner
tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed not only by it's Officials, present members and
honored guests but by thousands of Television viewers not only in Bacolod City but the whole of Western Visayas if
not the whole country, despite also of his personal knowledge that he is not qualified to do so for the same reason
above-stated, is tantamount to IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted upon by the said body who will be
furnished a copy of this information and to also protect their integrity and to avoid similar incident that may
happen in the future for lack of proper screening.

Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision in Civil Case No.
26837.

On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie M. Espinosa, then SK
Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:

Your Honor:
May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in view of the pending
criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr. Caesar
Z. Distrito , SK Federation, Bacolod City Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has not taken his
oath due to the pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for Usurpation of Power charge
against him by the undersigned.

Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang Panglungsod committee hearing

dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name appeared to have been signed, along with the word "Atty."

On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys
alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting
him in Criminal Case No. 99609. [5]cralaw Attached thereto was a certified true copy of the decision in the said
criminal case and a certificate of finality of judgment. [6]cralaw The OBC informed the petitioner of the above-
mentioned charges and required him to comment on the same.

In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to take the 2001 bar
exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function was the only pending case against him at
the time.He did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in his petition because
he was of the honest belief that it was no longer necessary for him to do so, considering that the cases had long
been settled and dismissed without even reaching the arraignment stage. [7]cralaw The said criminal cases
apparently stemmed from the debts of some 50 fish vendors at Magsungay Village.The petitioner's father, as
the punong barangay, had guaranteed the same in order to help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two
checks, the complainant filed the action against the petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.

As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans that he, along with
other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit and Asset Management Inc. and SWIP
Lending Corporation on January 13, 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he was Barangay SK
Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment for the said loans until such time
when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on January 31, 2001 and for SWIUP Lending on April 30,
2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a certification of complete payment. [8]cralaw When the petitioner
came back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that their  barangay officials and employees
were facing cases for sum of money filed by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending because apparently, their payments were
not duly remitted.He received summons only on October 22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the
MTCC, Bacolod City.The finance officer and the treasurer promised to settle everything, but they failed to do so
until their term expired on August 15, 2002.After the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the
plaintiffs in the said cases, as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169 [9]cralaw and 9019[10]cralaw issued by Fil-Global
and SWIP Lending respectively datedMay 7, 2003.Thereafter, an order of satisfaction of judgment [11]cralaw was
correspondingly issued by the court in civil cases 26837 [12]cralaw and 27447.[13]cralaw

Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation [14]cralaw was sent to him by the IBP Negros
Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence awarding ceremonies, but
that there was no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully passed the bar
examinations and was being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the occasion.He admitted that during
the occasion, all those who just passed the bar exams were called for the induction of new members, and that he
was left with no choice but to join the others onstage when his name was called.However, the petitioner did not
intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in the dark, as he in fact informed them of his status.To prove the absence of
malice on his part, he did not sign any document that night.

The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in the Letter-complaint
dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-existing person who cannot claim to be a
"guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" considering that he is not even a registered voter of Bacolod City and
that he could not be located in the address given, as indicated in a Certification issued by the Commission on
Elections, Bacolod City[15]cralaw and the Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay Singcang Airport. [16]cralaw

Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the attendance sheet in a
committee hearing of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned that he was of the notion that a
bar passer can be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is to practice law, such as appearing in court
and notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-taking before the Supreme Court and signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact executed an affidavit of
desistance[17]cralaw to attest that there was indeed no misrepresentation on his part.

The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have committed.

On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:

Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against herein petitioner, he may
now be admitted as a member of the Bar.

Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be now allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees. [18]cralaw

There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of which would
materially affect the fate of the present petition:

First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to take the 2001 bar examinations.

Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do so as yet.

The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and prospective applicants to the bar.

The petitioner's non-disclosure of a

Criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
to take the 2001 bar examinations.

The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases that had already been
dismissed.[19]cralaw This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa:[20]cralaw

The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take the Bar Examination,
the following is written clearly:
"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you and attach pertinent
documents:____________________________."

If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending case for Usurpation of
authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written in the middle of the form, so if petitioner
had not really read the same, he was not mindful of what he was doing which should not be the case of a Bar
applicant.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar, to wit:

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion
of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to
practice law.[21]cralaw The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it.Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. [22]cralaw

It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[23]cralaw

Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were filed against him, in his petition to take the bar
examinations.He should have known that the said petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made under oath.The
petitioner, in so doing, violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [24]cralaw which requires of
every applicant candor and truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine the
applicant's moral character.[25]cralaw The petitioner should have realized the implication of any omission on his
part, even if inadvertently made.

In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26]cralaw the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense
which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and considered the same an offense involving moral
turpitude.The erring lawyer was consequently suspended from the practice of law.

In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even reach the arraignment
stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it was a material fact which could affect
his application for admission to the bar.

It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false statement in his application is
not of good moral character. [27]cralaw The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an applicant
has been charged with or indicated for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of the applicant to take the
bar examination, or for revocation of the license to practice, if he has already been admitted to the bar.If what the
applicant concealed is a crime which does not involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of concealment and not the
commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.It should be noted that the
application was made under oath, which he lightly took when he made the concealment. [28]cralaw

The petitioner's attendance and

participation in an IBP testimonial
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and simple testimonial
dinner for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony for judges.It was only later when he
discovered that the program was actually a testimonial for new lawyers. [29]cralawHowever, a perusal of the
invitation[30]cralaw sent by the IBP to the petitioner reveals that there was an express mention that the affair was
for new lawyers, to wit:

Dear Atty. Distrito:

The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of Excellence to Outstanding Judges
and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new lawyers on June 28, 2002, 7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-A,
Business Inn, Lacson Street, Bacolod City.

In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am inviting you to attend said
after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please come in formal attire.

Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.

The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he attended an affair, believing in good faith that it
was meant for those who recently passed the bar, when the invitation he himself attached to his petition states
otherwise.The petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave much to be desired.

The petitioner's admitted use of the

Appellation "Atty." When he had no
Authority to do so as yet.

The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow himself to be called an
attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required examination or has been otherwise found
to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath
of office.[31]cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of
the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to practice. [32]cralaw The clerk
of the Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person
admitted when he receives his certificate.. [33]cralaw

The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the Roll is the last act
that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to call himself "attorney".Continued
membership in the IBP and regular payment of membership dues and other lawful assessments that it may levy
are conditions sine qua non to the privilege to practice law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.[34]cralaw
The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
[35]
cralawThe Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave misconduct, such as
calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in courts even before being admitted to the bar.
[36]
cralaw Although the evidence in this case does not include that the petitioner actually engaged in the practice of
law, the fact is that he signed in an attendance sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney"
knowing fully well that he was not yet admitted to the bar.[37]cralaw

Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become a member of the
bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral requirements before he can be admitted to
the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.

(Sgd.)LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila
EN BANC
Resolution             March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; 
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were
graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per
cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent
was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-
seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any
bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and
fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be
admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally
to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified,
affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended
to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168,
classified as follows:

1946     (August) 206 121 18

1946     (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
 1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953   2,555     968     284
               TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions
for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, —
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who
have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and
Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for
a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of
the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in
the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious
social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made
available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines
and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad
have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have
been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which
continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out
from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which
has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United
States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of
more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the
validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is
expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-
one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability,
shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with
the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
 which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of
granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of
a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the
legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals
said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in
which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates,
the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination
by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot
suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only
rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)

xxx     xxx     xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function
and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these
facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial
function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone
as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose
of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs
to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its
respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of
justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers
of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of
 government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the
courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If
the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted
to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say
with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the
judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of
not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who
should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative
control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature
might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard
of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must
make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars
persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that
the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so
far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as
members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
 exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that
State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members
of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of
the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this
country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to
be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred
authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those
to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from
the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been
well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of
the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving
their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys
and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties
become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office
during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or
their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has
been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court,
"are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the
 latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial
power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action
or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction
of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law
is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of
its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by
this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
 power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on
the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or
take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill
up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits,
are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few
points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of
this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
 justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court
of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney
for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was
examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the
performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the
deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in
the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right
to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme
Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought
to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act
No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or
of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to
that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to
believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never
had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at
the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
 In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence
of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the
consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule,
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him
by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so
to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña,
pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect
of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and
had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies
after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment,
so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And
every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or
office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent
changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899,
this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two
years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing
that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law
for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school,"
and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and
 privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission
to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right
to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and
creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and
has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal
Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this
state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law
office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision
there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions
of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed.
No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any
sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which
will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could
qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in
the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend
three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on
the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and
the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking
of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
 Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said:
"It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age,
sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued
as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue
their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them,
any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities.
Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on
the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of
those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional
because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110,
99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that
he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning
and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War
Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must
be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition,
must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation
as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their
rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp.
151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a
minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been
given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it
is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to
1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69
per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were
all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does
not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is
that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient
to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured,
and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years
1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law
attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of
simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to
the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds
to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the
first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955,
the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article
VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it
is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and
who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity
to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter
them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative
of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion
of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court,
and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force,
in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief
Justice may set. So ordered

[BM No. 1099. January 21, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

Gentleman:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Bane dated JAN 21 2003.

Bar Matter No. 1099. (IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE. ROLL OF ATTORNEYS (RANDY
P. BARENG, Petitioner).)

Before us is the Petition of Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III in Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC), to
take his oath as a member of the . Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The antecedent facts of this case are:

Among the cases raffled to the MTC were People of the Philippines vs. Nympha Isaac, Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-
322948 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Court set the trial on October 25, November 4, and 22, 1999,
at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. During the October 25, 1999 hearing, Nympha Isaac, the accused in said case, failed
to appear without any justifiable reason, prompting the public prosecutor "to move: (a) for the cancellation of the
bail bond of the accused; (b) for the arrest of the accused; and (c) for the MTC to proceed with the trial  in
absentia. The MTC. granted the motion over .the objection of the private prosecutor.1

On November 4, 1999, the next scheduled date of hearing in the. aforementioned criminal -cases, Atty. Arnold F.
Españo, the private prosecutor, and the private complainant arrived at the MTC to attend said hearing. The lawyer
checked the court's calendar for the day and was surprised to learn that Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 were
not included. The accused was in the courtroom. Atty. Españo then inquired from petitioner why Criminal Cases
Nos. 322928-322948 were not calendared for the day when the same were previously scheduled for the said day.
He also asked if the hearing for the day was .cancelled and if so, why was he not notified of such cancellation.
Petitioner replied "May warrant of arrest, di ba pina-aaresto mo kaya hindi sine-set for trial yan." Atty. Españo
retorted that in the previous hearing, the prosecution already moved for trial in absentia and the court ruled that
trial should proceed on said date [November 4], as scheduled. Petitioner answered back "Wala
kaming hearing rig criminal cases ngayon dahil Thursday." Atty. Espano responded "Kayo ang nag-
set nito." Petitioner quipped back "Abogado ka, eh hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa mo, eh ikaw ang abogado at
hindi mo pala alam dng ginagawa mo eh ako, clerk ako dito, ikaw, abogado, hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa
mo" Irked by petitioner's reply, Atty. Espano shouted "Masyadong matalas and dila mo ha, ang tinatanong ko
bakit hindi naka-set for trial at bakit hindi ako inabiso at huwag mong sasabihin na di ko alam ang ginagawa
ko!" Atty. Españo started walking. Out of the courtroom, while his client, still inside the courtroom, heard Annie
Grace A. Arreola, the Clerk of Court of the MTC, say: "Masyadong high blood ang lawyer mo, anglalakas n'yo
magpa-aresto eh hindi pala ninyo a/am ang,ginagawa n'yo."2

On November 15, 1999, Atty. Españo filed, with the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative complaint
against Judge Leonardo P. Reyes, Annie Grace A. Arreola and petitioner for unilaterally canceling a previously
scheduled trial date for Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 and for disrespectful remarks. The complaint was
docketed as OCA-IPI-No. 99-820-MTJ.
In the interim, petitioner took the Bar Examinations on September 2, 9, 16 and 23, 2001. Petitioner was one of the
successful examinees therein. However, due to the pendency of the aforementioned administrative complaint filed
against him, he was not allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On March 6, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a report with the following recommendation:

"4.That respondent Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III, same court, be likewise found GUILTY of Discourtesy in the Course of
Official Duties -and that he be REPRIMANDED therefor with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely."3

Upon the Court Administrator's recommendation, the administrative case was docketed as em>Arnold  F. Españo
vs. Annie Grace A. Arreola, et a/., A.M. No. P-00-1385. Thereafter, a formal investigation ensued.

On April 04, 2002 the Office of the Bar Confidant received a Letter-Petition from petitioner requesting that he be
allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On April 23, 2002, this Court issued a Resolution holding in abeyance the oath taking of petitioner pending the
resolution of the administrative charge against him.

On October 21, 2002, a Resolution was issued in A.M. No. P-00-1385 reprimanding Annie Grace A. Arreola and
petitioner for inefficiency and conduct unbecoming, of a court personnel with a stern warning that the commission
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.4

On November 11, 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or Compliance renewing his request that he be
allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. Petitioner averred that he has "already ingrained
in his heart the mandate of the Lawyer's Oath and the Canon of Professional Ethics as well."

On November 19, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

On December 10, 2002, the Bar Confidant submitted a Report recommending that petitioner be allowed to take
the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In her Report where she recommended that the petition be granted, the Bar Confidant stated that:

"As found by the Court, petitioner is guilty of inefficiency and conduct unbecoming of a court, personnel. As such,
the Court resolved to reprimand petitioner with a stern .warning that the commission of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

This petition to take the Lawyer's Oath requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing petitioner's admission
to the noble profession of law. The 'inefficiency' of petitioner and his disrespectful utterances towards a lawyer
while in court are conduct unbecoming of a would-be lawyer. However, petitioner should be given a chance
considering that the Court had already reprimanded and warned him. Moreover, the almost one year deprivation
of the privilege to practice law would be considered-enough penalty for petitioner's misconduct."5

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the Bar Confidant. However, it must be stressed that the practice of
law is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
but who are also known to possess good moral character.6 In "In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., 285 SCRA 5.9 [1998]"
the Court held that insofar as the general; public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, the
requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance than the possession .of legal learning; thus
all aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the bar.
Even as petitioner is allowed to take his oath as a lawyer, he must take heed of and pay obeisance to the caveat
that:

"x x x a lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. As a would be
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right,
exacted from him are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility. To achieve such end, he
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession. He shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues. He shall not use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper."7

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Randy P. Bareng is allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign, the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of
appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to the Petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

Very truly yours,

LUZVlMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

[B.M. No. 890.April 2, 2002]

RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH, GINGOYON
EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 2 2002.

B.M. No. 890(Re: Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon.)

On August 4, 1998, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant his petition to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations.In said petition, he stated that "he has been charged with the crime of Grave Threats
(Criminal Case No. 9693) now already submitted for decision" in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City,
Branch 3.Apparently, when petitioner filed a similar petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant in 1994, he had
already submitted all pertinent documents relevant to the criminal case so he was no longer required to submit
the same in 1998, relying mainly on his allegation that the case was still pending.

On September 1, 1998, the Court allowed Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take the bar examinations subject to the
condition that should he pass the examinations, he shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath until he is cleared
of the charge against him.Victor Rey T. Gingoyon passed the bar.

On April 21, 1999, he filed a petition with the Court praying that he be allowed to take the Layer's Oath scheduled
on May 4, 1999 at the PICC together with the other successful examinees.Attached to his petition were duly
authenticated copies of the Decision dated April 8, 1998 of the Municipal Trial Court, Mandaue City, Branch 3,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of Grave Threats.The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is hereby rendered finding accused, Victor Rey Gingoyon, Guilty
Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Grave Threats, and the Court sentences said accused
the penalty of arresto mayor medium which is an imprisonment of Two (2) months and One (1)
 day and to pay a fine of Pesos: Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and the civil liability of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.Failure on his part to pay said fine, he shall be subjected to a subsidiary imprisonment
equivalent to P8.00 per day.
SO ORDERED.
Mandaue City, Philippines, April 8, 1998.

Likewise, petitioner submitted to the Court the Order of the trial court dated December 2, 1998, granting his
application for probation; and several certifications of Good Moral Character issued by responsible members of his
community.

On May 6, 1999, the Office of the Bar Confidant received a sworn letter-complaint from the Spouses Andres and
Avelina Taran, the private complainants in Criminal Case No. 9693.They alleged that they were the next door
neighbors of petitioner and his family at Cabancalan, Mandaue.The complainants, with their ailing mother and
children have become constant victims of petitioner's threats, harassment and stoning.Because of petitioner's
oppressive acts, they were eventually forced to sell their land, leave the neighborhood and live far away from the
petitioner in order to avoid his regular shooting, stoning and harassment.They pray that petitioner be prevented
from taking his oath as member of the Philippine Bar considering that he does not possess the good moral
character required from a member of the Bar, owing to his criminal conviction for grave threats.

In a Third Motion for Early Resolution filed with the Court on December 28, 1999, petitioner reiterated his prayer
that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath on the basis of the Order of the trial judge dated December 9, 1999
terminating Criminal Case No. 9693 after having satisfactorily fulfilled all the terms and conditions of his probation.

The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation.In a Report dated June 23,
2000, the OBC recommended the denial of the petition.The OBC significantly observed that the decision of the
MTC was dated April 8, 1998 which was clearly four (4) months before he filed his petition to take the bar in
August, 1998.If the criminal case was indeed promulgated on said date, petitioner committed perjury in falsely
stating in his petition that the criminal case filed against him was allegedly still pending.Moreover, petitioner's
criminal conviction involves moral turpitude, unfit for admission to the Bar.

In a Resolution dated July 25, 2000, the Court required the petitioner to present proof of promulgation of the
judgment against him.Pursuant to the resolution, petitioner filed a Certification issued and signed by Clerk of Court
Salvacion Acabodillo of the MTC, Mandaue City, Branch 3 stating that Criminal Case No. 9693 for Grave Threats
against Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was promulgated on August 10, 1998 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

As to whether or not petitioner had actual notice of his conviction for grave threats prior to his filing of the petition
to take the bar examinations, his Eighth Motion for Early Resolution contained the following explanation:

A.The "Notice of Promulgation" of said case was Personally received by Eva Gingoyon-Abarca
(sister of petitioner) on 06 July 1998 and not by herein petitioner.Copy of her affidavit is attached
as Annex "A".
B.Petitioner was made aware of the then scheduled promulgation sometime in the first week of
August 1998 only when he returned home in Cabancalan, Mandaue City from his boarding house
in Cebu City (pls. See Annex A).
C.Further, petitioner is attaching herewith the last page of the decision of the above-mentioned
case where his signature appeared (Annex "B").It can be clearly determined that it obviously
differs with that signature appearing in the notice of promulgation (attached to Annex A).
 D.If petitioner's memory is right (facts are on file at the Office of the Bar Confidant), he stated in
his petition to take the 1998 Bar Examinations mailed in the third or last week of July 1998, the
following entries, among others appeared, "pending case for Grave Threats at Branch 3, MTCC,
Mandaue City."
E.Moreover, assuming for the seek (sic) of argument that petitioner was already aware of the
scheduled promulgation at the time he mailed his petition, he was telling the truth under the
"Doctrine of Colorable Truthfor the word "pending case" is all encompassing and, he did not
know then of the decision.For it is a matter of fact and law that parties in a criminal case would
only be aware of its outcome DURING PROMULGATION andnot before.

The foregoing allegations especially the fact that it was petitioner's sister who received the notice of promulgation
of judgment and not the petitioner himself was confirmed upon an inquiry made from Executive Judge Galicano C.
Arriesgado, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City.

Given these facts, it is safe to assume that petitioner did not yet have actual knowledge of the judgment against
him, which was promulgated on August 10, 1998 when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations on August
4, 1998.But the more important question is whether or not petitioner possesses the good moral character required
for admission to the bar considering his criminal conviction for grave threats.Undoubtedly, the crime is one
involving moral turpitude.

With the termination of the criminal case against him, petitioner wishes to impress upon the
Court that he now possesses the good moral character required for those seeking admission to the
bar.To attest to his righteous and religious character, petitioner submitted several certifications from
responsible members of his community, to wit:

1. Fr. Aloysius "Love" Alojipan Associate Parish Priest Casuntingan, Mandaue City
     

2. Fr. Sindulfo "Sin" Iriarte, VF Parish Priest Casuntingan, Mandaue City

     

3. Herminigildo "Eddie" M. Pastor Cabancalan, Mandaue City

Liston
   
 

4. Atty. Crestito Mandolado Asst. Dean Southwestern Univ., Cebu City

     

5. Dr. Mercy Rose Montalban P/Sr. Inspector Camp Sotero Cabahug Cebu City
     

6. Jose Ronnie Ranile Barangay Councilor Casuntingan, Mandaue City

     

7. Leonardo Saavedra Lay Minister Cabancalan, Mandaue City

     
 8. Atty. Victor C. Biano Lawyer Bascara Bldg. Centro, Mandaue City
     

He also submitted the order of discharge from his probation officer which states that he has complied
with all the terms and conditions of his probation without any infractions.In a span of two (2) years, petitioner has
filed eight (8) motions for early resolution asking the Court to accept him to this noble profession.
It must be understood that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be given
to everyone who demands it.It is a personal privilege granted to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. [1]cralaw Thus, the letter-complaint of the Spouses
Taran objecting to petitioner's oath-taking is validly noted considering that petitioner's violent temper for which he
was consequently convicted is certainly unbecoming of a would-be lawyer.
However, after a careful evaluation of the case, we are prepared to give petitioner the benefit of the
doubt that he is morally fit for admission to the bar.In a personal letter of appeal to the Court dated May 3, 2000,
petitioner appears to be sorry and remorseful for his reckless actuation which resulted to his criminal
conviction.He prays to be a full-fledged member of the bar in order to be of help to his septuagenarian parents.He
promises "to be a productive member of society, true to the tenets of the legal profession, of service to the
country and God-fearing." It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer's
oath.Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some
introspection.
Finally, it is important to stress to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited
for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of selected witnesses.Petitioner is
exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[2]cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to allow Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take the lawyer's oath and to sign
the Roll of Attorneys on a date set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees.Let this resolution be
attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.(Puno and Vitug,  JJ.,are abroad on
official business)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Acting Clerk of Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 135 January 29, 1987
PETITION OF SOCORRO LADRERA, 1954 SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar examinations. Before he could participate in the scheduled oath taking of
successful bar examinees, an administrative complaint for immorality was filed against him by Lucila C. Casas.
Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on May 23, 1944 and that when she married him he represented
himself to be single. Sometime in 1948, Lucila learned that her husband had been previously married on March 23,
1936 to Florencia Orticio by whom he had a child called Monserrat. Lucila filed a case for annulment of her
marriage to Ladrera on October 5, 1949. A decision was rendered on February 13, 1950 annulling the marriage and
ordering Ladrera to give P40.00 a month for the support of his three minor children with Lucila.

In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare his first wife, Florencia Orticio as presumptively dead, In a
November 24, 1951 decision, the Court of First Instance of Davao stated that Ladrera and Orticio were married on
March 23, 1936 in the Roman Catholic church of Capul, Samar. The couple had a daughter, Monserrat Ladrera,
who lived with the petitioner from birth up to the date of the decision. It appears that, while the couple were living
in Cebu, Florencia Orticio eloped with a certain Ramon E steban and left the conjugal home without the
petitioner's knowledge. Inspite of allegedly determined searches by the petitioner in Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and
Manila, Florencia could not be located or her whereabouts ascertained. The court therefore ruled "that the
petition to declare Florencia Orticio presumptively dead for all intents and purposes of law has satisfactorily been
established."

Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second wife, Lucila C. Casas.

Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera married his third wife,
Socorro Santos by whom he has five children. After Ladrera married a third time, his first wife showed up and filed
a bigamy case against him with the Court of First Instance of Davao. According to the immorality complaint filed by
Lucila, the second wife, this bigamy case was later dismissed as a result of alleged monetary concessions which
Ladrera made in favor of Orticio. Incidentally, the latest information about Florencia Orticio is that she is quite well
off, having inherited properties from her parents and that she teaches Spanish at the University of Eastern
Philippines in Catarman, Samar.

On the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Ladrera, this Court suspended his oath taking and
directed him to file an answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Ladrera alleged that:

... [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was
already dead; that complainant in fact knew that respondent was previously married because
respondent's child with Florencia Orticio lived with respondent and complainant after the latter's
marriage and until its annulment; that respondent has paid all the monthly pensions to
complainant's three minor children; that respondent later discovered that complainant's motive
in suing for annulment of her marriage to respondent was to get a share of the properties
acquired by respondent, and as a matter of fact, complainant has squandered and sold the
properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. 470, and the money realized from the sales was
not used for the benefit of their children; that the value of the properties adjudicated to the
complainant in the case for liquidation of conjugal properties was approximately P37,000.00;
that respondent married Socorro Santos and still lives with her in view of the decision in Civil
Case No. 501, dated November 24, 1951, declaring respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio
presumptively dead; that respondent's admission in Civil Case No. 399 for annulment of
complainant's marriage, that Florencia Orticio was alive and residing in Manila was made in good
faith, he having then received information from his brother, Fr. Emerardo Ladrera, that Florencia
Orticio was in Manila; that subsequent search and inquiries, however, led the respondent to
believe that Florencia Orticio was not alive and this resulted in the filing by respondent of the
petition in Civil Case No. 501, praying that Florencia Orticio be declared presumptively dead; that
Criminal Case No. 1863, against the respondent for bigamy, was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Davao upon motion of the City Attorney of Davao; that the mere filing of civil cases
against respondent does not necessarily reflect immorality on his part, not to mention the
circumstances that said cases were settled or otherwise dismissed; that complainant's charges
were motivated by hatred and revenge, intended as a ruse to compel respondent to give to
 complainant another ten hectares of first class agricultural land located in Monteverde, Calinan,
Davao City, plus complainant's desire to put respondent down politically.

The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la Cruz, was ordered to investigate the administrative charge
and to submit his report.

On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report, the salient portion of which reads:

It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen not to testify in the investigation, and that by
merely presenting documentary evidence consisting of copies of the complaint for annulment of
marriage in Civil Case No. 399; the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in said case
annulling the marriage between complainant and respondent; the decision in Special Case No.
501 wherein the Court of First Instance of Davao declared respondent's first wife, Florencia
Orticio, presumptively dead; the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case
No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing said case, the complainant is basing her
charges of immorality against respondent upon the latter's bad faith arising from the fact that,
while in the annulment proceedings respondent and his attorney admitted that Florencia Orticio
was alive, in Special Case No. 501 filed in 1951 by respondent, the latter claimed that said
Florencia Orticio could not be located and was unheard from for several years, and from the fact
that he married for the third time Socorro Santos while respondent's first wife was alive, and
who, as a matter of fact, filed a case for bigamy against respondent.

Upon the other hand, the respondent testified during the investigation and declared that he
acted in good faith, first, in marrying complainant; secondly, in instituting Special Case No. 501;
and, thirdly, in marrying Socorro Santos. He explained that when he married complainant in
1944, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already dead; that he had to
admit in the annulment proceedings, Civil Case No. 399, that Florencia was alive because of a
letter he received from his brother, Fr. Ladrera; that he filed the subsequent Special Case No. 501
after suspecting that complainant's purpose in annulling her marriage to respondent was merely
to obtain her snare in the conjugal properties, and in order also to establish definitely his civil
status; and that he married his third wife, Socorro Santos, after the decision in Special Case No.
501, declaring his first wife Florencia presumptively dead, had become final.

While the complainant's charges are based upon inferences or assumptions, the testimony of
respondent is unrefuted that he acted in good faith In the first place, the fact that no annulment
proceeding was instituted by complainant until after three children were born to her marriage
with respondent, at least shows that Florencia Orticio was not generally known to be alive. In the
second place, the admission by respondent and his counsel in the annulment proceeding that
Florencia was alive, is explained by respondent's receipt of a letter from his brother, Fr. Ladrera,
to the effect that she might still be living, which at any rate was the very fact alleged in the
complaint for annulment. In the third place, respondent was constrained to file Special Case No.
501 because he subsequently realized that complainant annulled her marriage to respondent
mainly to get her share of their conjugal properties, and because he also wanted to respondent
settle his own civil status after failing to locate the whereabouts of his first wife, Florencia Orticio;
and the respondent undoubtedly had the right to look for Florencia after his marriage to
complainant was judicially set aside on the ground that Florencia was alive. It is very significant
that no opposition whatsoever was interposed in Special Case No. 501 either by complainant or
by Florencia inspite of due publication of the proceedings; and the final decision therein can be
said to have legally paved the way for respondent's third marriage to Socorro Santos. As a matter
of fact, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy case against
respondent, it was in effect held that respondent married Socorro Santos without fraudulent
intent, and said order had become final.
 Complainant's allegation that respondent has failed to comply with his obligation to pay the
monthly support of his three children with complainant as ordered in the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 399, is neither touched nor pressed in complainant's
memorandum. At any rate, complainant may avail herself of any appropriate civil remedy for the
collection or enforcement (or even increase) of said support; and respondent has presented
evidence to show that he had complied with his obligation at least to the date of this
investigation in March, 1955. The claim that respondent is immoral because of the filing against
him of several civil cases, deserves no serious consideration since, according to respondent's
evidence, said cases, aside from having been dismissed or otherwise settled, do not necessarily
imply moral perversity.

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath.

The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding, this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued a resolution
disqualifying Ladrera from taking the lawyer's oath, to wit:

Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by Lucila Casas against Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 1954
successful bar candidate; the answer filed by the latter; the evidence taken during the
investigation; the report of the investigator; as well as all the circumstances surrounding the
case, the Court RESOLVED to disqualify respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera from taking the lawyer's
oath

A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was denied in another resolution issued on October
11, 1955.

Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he passed the bar examinations, Ladrera has not been allowed to
take the lawyer's oath. All his motions to allow him to take the oath filed every year without fail beginning on May
23, 1956 up to September 7, 1982 have been denied. Before us, now is Ladrera's April 15, 1985 urgent motion, to
wit:

NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and unto tills Honorable Supreme Tribunal most
respectfully stated:

That your petitioner has been deprived from taking his Lawyer's Oath as member of the
Philippine Bar since January 20, 1955, because of a petition of Lucila C. Casas who has long ago
withdrawn her complaint and has in fact attested to the good reputation and character of the
herein respondent;

That considering the time that has elapsed which is already more than thirty (30) years is more
than sufficient punishment, your respondent now prays this Honorable Tribunal to grant him the
privilege to take the Lawyer's Oath together with the new successful candidates scheduled to
take their oath on April 25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention Center, Manila.

On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time to the Court Administrator asking for the approval of his
petition of nearly 32 years.

An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2). What constitutes good
moral character within the meaning of the rule has been elucidated in precedent cases.

In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinataca (127 SCRA 218), this Court cited various precedent cases and ruled:
 One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must
be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral
standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest
and to possess good moral character. (Martin, Ruperto G., "Legal & Judicial Ethics," 5th ed., p. 15,
citing In Re Parazo, 82 Phil 230) As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. (Planza v. Archangel 21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an
example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living.
(Martin, supra, p. 36) Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and
passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon
the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has
measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.

The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual petitions of Ladrera that he be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath. He claimed that when he married his second wife, he sincerely believed that his first wife was already dead.
He married his third wife only after the first wife had been declared presumptively dead and after his second
marriage-e had been annulled. There may have been compliance with a strict or narrow interpretation of the letter
of the law but the Court was of the view that Ladrera had failed to live up to the high moral standards required for
membership in the Bar.

All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states that if he has committed an act which justified the
suspension from taking the lawyer's oath, the time that has elapsed is more than sufficient punishment. He
submits that "he humbly believes with all candor and sincerity that he has more than atoned for it by living a very
moral and exemplary life since then."

Apart from his marital misadventures, there is nothing in the records to warrant a permanent denial of Ladreras
petition, He worked as a janitor-messenger in Cebu City while pursuing his college education at night. He has also
served in fairly important positions in the government such as Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay,
Special Assistant to President Carlos P. Garcia, and member and later Chairman of the Board of People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation. He has served as Treasurer of the Escolta Walking Corporation and Director of the
Foreign Affairs Association of the Philippines.

As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes endorsed Ladrera's petition stating that the latter was "honest,
dependable, and trustworthy" and followed this up with another endorsement in 1966.

In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the withdrawal or dismissal of her complaint. Casas stated as her
"considered opinion" that Ladrera has been sufficiently punished by the then 12-year suspension of his oathtaking
as a lawyer. Casas stated that her children by Ladrera — Teresita, graduating with AB and BSC degrees; Belen,
preparatory medicine student; and Socorro, Jr. an engineering student — were suffering from the stigma of the
punishment which arose from her complaint. Casas observed that Ladrera was "behaving well and leading an
exemplary life."

The records show various indorsements of good character from lawyers, a law professor in Davao City, a
congressman, and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano Sabandal attested that Ladrera "is a man of high moral character,
humble and possessed with an innate religious quality; as a consequence thereof he is a daily communicant of the
blessed sacrament."

In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar examinations, he has supported and sent through college all his
children by the three women he married — a daughter by Florencia Orticio, three children by Lucila Casas, and five
children by Socorro Santos. Some of the children have joined their father in his many petitions asking for the
privilege of taking his lawyer's oath.
Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war, he was elected head of
the Davao War Veterans Association and led the veterans' movement to acquire some of the lands left by
Japanese-owners. He became a successful businessman in Davao, acquiring a gasoline station, three corn and rice
mills, and a transportation line called "Ladrera Overland Transit".

There was moral deliquency in Mr. Ladrera's younger days but he has made up for it by observing a respectable,
useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting his petitions are enough for chastisement and
retribution. Considering that the respondent has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and demonstrated a
sincere willingness to make up for that moral lapse, the Court has decided to admit him to membership in the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 887.August 21, 2001]

IN THE MATTER OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW et al.
EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 21 2001.

B.M. No. 887(In the matter of Admission to Practice Law of Henry R. Onia, 1998 Bar Examinations passer, spouses
Agripino and Francisa de Vera vs. Henry R. Onia.)

Respondent Henry Rada Onia took and passed the 1998 Bar examinations. After the release of the results of the
said examinations, or on April 16, 1999, a complaint was filed by the Spouses Agripino and Francisca de Vera
against the respondent averring that the latter does not possess the moral qualification expected from a member
of the Bar. They, thus, prayed that respondent be forever barred from becoming a lawyer. Considering that at that
time, respondent was already issued a clearance to take the oath as lawyer together with the other successful
examinees, the Court in a Resolution dated May 3, 1999 allowed respondent to proceed with his oathtaking but
ordered the deferment of his signing of the Roll until the resolution of the instant complaint.

In the complaint dated April 15, 1999, the Spouses de Vera charged respondent with usurpation of authority and
falsification relative to the ejectment case filed against them by Hildergarda Rada-Onia and Laurenlino Rada,
respondent's mother and uncle, respectively, with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The plaintiffs
were represented by the law firm, Casino, Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices through Atty. Manuel Pagdanganan
Casino, with office address at 910 San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila. During the pre-trial conference of the case,
respondent appeared as counsel of the plaintiffs when he has not yet passed the bar examinations at that time;
and categorically stated that he is a member of the law firm which was allegedly fictitious and non-existent. Upon
verification of the address given, complainants' found out that the same was the address of respondent's boarding
house in Manila. Complainants further alleged that in some of the pleadings filed in court in the civil case, Atty.
Manuel P. Casino used IBP No. 658724, when the IBP number issued to him for that year was IBP No. 417185.
Complainants concluded that the falsehood and falsification were done with the help and control of respondent.

In the Resolution dated May 18, 1999, the Court En Banc referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for investigation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, hearings were conducted on June 14, July 17 and 18,
September 6 and 7, 2000. The complainants presented four (4) witnesses: Angelina Mendoza, Jose Luis, Agripino
de Vera and Julius De Vera. Exhibits "A" to "H" were presented as documentary evidence but were, however, not
formally offered. The respondent, on the other hand, testified on his own behalf and presented his mother,
Hildegarda Rada-Onia, as his other witness. Documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits "1" to "19" were also
presented and formally offered, which were not opposed by the complainants.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted its report and findings, as follows:

Sometime in 1996, Laurentino C. Rada and Hildegarda C. Rada-Onia (plaintiffs), uncle and mother, respectively, of
herein respondent, filed a complaint for ejectment against herein complainants, spouses Agripino and Francisca De
Vera, with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Representing the plaintiffs in the said case was the
Casino Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices, through Atty. Manuel Pagdanganan Casino, with office address at 910
San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila. During the pre-trial conference of the case, however, it was respondent who
appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs. Herein complainants, through their counsel, objected to the said appearance
of respondent, as he had not yet passed the Bar examination, let alone admitted tq the Philippine Bar. The trial
court required respondent to submit a legal justification for his appearance as counsel. Respondent cited Sec. 34,
Rule l38 of the Rules of Court in support of his claim that he was eligible to appear as counsel before the trial court.
In its Order of October 11, 1996, the trial court found the legal justification of respondent to be insufficient. It
thereby denied the motion of respondent to appear as counsel. With the said order, respondent ceased to appear
as counsel for the plaintiffs. It was, however, the contention of complainants that respondent continued to handle
the case for the plaintiffs by resorting to falsification. The falsification allegedly consisted of forging the signature
of Atty. Casino. The said forgery allegedly became more manifest when the IBP number used in the pleadings
submitted in connection with the said case did not match the IBP number actually issued to Atty. Casino by the IBP,
Tarlac Chapter, of which Atty. Casino is a member.

The complaint must be dismissed.

Respondent cannot be held liable for usurpation of authority or misrepresentation by appearing as counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Civil Case No. 1674. Nothing in the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, which
complainants presented show that respondent held himself out as a lawyer. The most that they could show to
substantiate their accusation of usurpation of authority or misrepresentation against respondent was the latter's
appearance during the pre-trial conference of the said case, where he declared himself to be the counsel for the
plaintiffs. Such appearance, however, was not completed, as complainants, through their lawyer, questioned the
same considering that respondent has not yet been admitted to the Philippine Bar at the time. Respondent
explained that he made the said appearance in the honest belief that he could do so pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. The OBC is inclined to give respondent the benefit of the doubt. Respondent is no stranger to
the plaintiffs in the case, they being his mother and uncle. Hence, as a law student, he took it upon himself to assist
them in the litigation. The same is not devoid of any basis, though, as the said provision under the Rules of Court
allows a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer before
municipal courts in relatively simple litigation. Besides, there was no evidence presented by complainants showing
that respondent further appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs before the trial court or any other courts after the
trial court issued an order disallowing his appearance as counsel.

On the alleged falsification being imputed to respondent, complainants again failed to present any convincing
evidence that respondent ever perpetrated the said offense. True, complainants were able to show that the IBP
number appearing in the pleadings purportedly filed by Atty. Casino does not match the actual IBP number issued
to him in the year the said pleadings were filed. Complainants, however, did not present any evidence, which
would clearly show that respondent was responsible for the forgery. At best, their allegation that it was
respondent who did the falsification was speculative. Neither can the similar address of the Casino Creencia and
Baldovino Law Offices and that of respondent be used as a basis to hold the latter liable for falsification. In the
course of the investigation, complainants and respondent stipulated that the said law firm used as its office the
residence of respondent at 910 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila. This belies their claim that the said law office is
non-existent and fictitious.
In fine, complainant failed to prove that respondent is morally unfit to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. Even
assuming, however, that the appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1674 during the pre-trial
conference may be considered as unethical or inappropriate, the period (almost two years now) that he has been
deprived to practice law is enough punishment therefor.

As the sixty-day period within which those who took the lawyer's oath on May 4, 1999, including respondent, must
sign the Roll of Attorneys had already elapsed, it is necessary that respondent must take the lawyer's oath anew
before he signs the Roll of Attorneys.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that Henry R. Onia be now allowed to take the lawyer's
oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 1 Bongalonta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310
(1995).And one of these requirements which is given importance, far greater than the acquisition of knowledge
and proficiency in law is the possession of good moral character. It is said that all aspects of moral character and
behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. 2 In Re: Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14
(1995).The charges hailed against the respondent, if really true, certainly undermine his qualification for admission
and is a ground for refusal to admit him to the bar. However, the circumstances of the case readily show that there
is no sufficient basis for the Court to deprive the respondent this privilege to practice the profession which he had
worked hard for.

The alleged deception of the respondent is belied by the records which clearly disclose that he never concealed the
fact that lie was not yet a lawyer when he appeared during the pre-trial conference in the ejectment case. His
appearance as a non-lawyer representative or agent of his mother and uncle in said case was, in fact, questioned
and put to issue before the municipal trial court. In the Order dated October 11, 1996, the municipal judge found
the legal justification for his appearance as counsel of the parties insufficient and thus, denied respondent's
manifestation and motion to appear as counsel. The order reads as follows:

ORDER

Pending before this court for resolution is the legal justification filed by counsel for the
plaintiffs on September 16, 1996 in compliance with the Order of this court dated August 29,
1996, who not being a member of the bar, was required to submit legal justification for his
appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs.

Said counsel again filed a Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 praying
that he may be allowed by this court to submit some proceedings in connection with this case
before his qualification to appear as counsel is finally resolved by this court.

The justification relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs is the provision of Section
34, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 138A of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 34, Rule 138, said law provides that a party may conduct litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney.

Section 1, Rule 138A provides for a law student who has successfully completed his third
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
 compensation in any civil criminal and administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Finding that the said counsel for the plaintiffs does not qualify to appear as counsel
pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions of law, this Court finds his legal justification to be
insufficient.

Accordingly, the Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 should also be
denied as a consequence of his failure to qualify as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the counsel for the plaintiffs is hereby denied by this
Court to appear as counsel in the aforementioned case and his Manifestation and Motion dated
September 26, 1996 is hereby also ordered denied.

SO ORDERED. 3 Exhibit "3."

While we may not fully agree with the trial court's ruling on the matter and despite respondent's honest belief that
there was no prohibition for him to appear as such pursuant to Rule 138, Section 34, suffice it to say, that
respondent showed his adherence to the orders of the trial court and thereby, ceased to appear as counsel for his
relatives. Such alleged infraction may even be mitigated by the fact that the parties which respondent represented
in the ejectment case are no strangers to him, as they are his mother and uncle. It is quite understandable that
after being sent to law school and finally, passed the bar examinations, respondent was expected to assist his
family members in litigation. His appearance is not without basis as the rule explicitly provides that:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conduction. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

We also note that the instant complaint is the only instance where respondent's appearance in court was
questioned. There is no evidence to show that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law by holding
himself out as a lawyer when he is not yet a member of the bar 4 See Tan vs. Sabandal, 126 SCRA 60 (1983).or
continued to appear as counsel in the ejectment case.

With respect to the other charges of falsification, we agree that the evidence presented is not sufficient to
substantiate the charges leveled against the respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the complaint; respondent Henry R. Onia is allowed to take the
lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Very truly yours,

LUZMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EN BANC

July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant 
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming
complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take
the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio 2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is
the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both
of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in
19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he
obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997. 6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. 7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was
promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa. 9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in
1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children. 11 Since then,
respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree. 12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a
law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that
he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's
College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. 14 Complainant brushed these aside as
he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig
City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and
had a family to support.17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the
head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 18 Accordingly, on May 18,
2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was
interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and
respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of
Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña
& Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative,
schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On the other hand, a fellow
church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost
victimized his (church-member's) relatives. 23 Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L.
Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of
land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running
activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a
fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which
eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC. 27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to
stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-
2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed 30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and
which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074. 32 Moreover,
according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to
humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal
complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015. 35 On such date, however, both paiiies
again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his
Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name,
identity, and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him
and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan." 41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of respondent when he
was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in
the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that
respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations. 45 Since respondent
falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither
obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.46He also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being
admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed
to institute appropriate actions against respondent. 47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607, 48 adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's
name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree,
and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself
also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 51 Moreover, the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as
the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted
numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of
records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph; 53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his
photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it; 54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity,
and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the
Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left
a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has
not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn
a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the
2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good
moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a
lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to
be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the
filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity. 63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of
falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to
obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil
and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the
Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that
he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of
"Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage
of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house
on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits
the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty
of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but,
also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character.  1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room
for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to
be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.