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    THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME LXXxHI, NO. 7, JULY 1986 ees + FREE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING* ‘Tas been recognized for some time thatthe free-rider prob- Jems usuallyan N-party prisoner's dilemma. What has not been $0 clear, however, is whether its the only species ofthat di lemma, and, ifnot, hw it difers from other members of the genus. ‘This paper is addressed to those taxonomic problems. wish to argue that there are two significantly diferent types of ‘many-party prisoner's dilemma, one of which is exemplified by the paradigm free-rider problem and the other by a common predica- ment which I describe as the foul dealer. The significance of the dlistinction appears in a number of ways. It is a formally salient divide; it maths a difference in the possibilities of strategically re solving a many-pary dilemma; and it models, more oF less accurately, the distinction between the freetider and foul-lealer problems, "The free-rider problem isthe predicament, familiar from informal socal theory, of productive cooperation. It arises when everyone is better off if each contributes to 2 certain cause—by effort, finance, restraint, or whatever—than if no one does £0, but when no one’s ‘contribution i likely to make a difference sufficient to repay him for the cost involved, The problem is how to persuade people to contrib- tute when each may argue that others wll succeed in furthering the cause, or fail to further it, regardless of what he does, and that, therefore, he may as well save himself the trouble of contributing, * 1 wat moved othink aout the diction ace hereby caneration wth ‘ihr Tucks am unclear about whe ah proper what neato tea forte eacunons with Geiey Brenna tr ears ecesed hen ie paper ‘ez veto economist atthe Unheany of Ale aod the Univers of Mel ‘oume and fo pilvopert the 1961 Austalan Aurion mening a he Unie of New South Wales: and for comments set by ums of people wh ‘eal the manuntpe may Bob Gon aan = Grad, Jam Hane, Mae stew tc Nese Dv opie: Fed Si ost Sart a Ch (022-362%,/86/8307/0S01$01.90 © 1986 Te Jour of Pixopy, In 361 362 {THE JOURNAL OF PunLosoniy “The foul-dealer problem is also familiar from informal social theory, though not under that name: itis the predicament, in a banal phrase, of peaceful coexistence. This isthe problem of hov to per- Sade people individually to disarm themselves of some instrument ‘of offence when, albeit they are beter off under universal disarma- ment, sill they are each exposed by self-disarmament to the worst, prospect of all—that of being a defenseless victim of another's ag- fression; and, equally if they refuse to disarm they are each eligible {or the best possibility of all—that of being an unopposed aggressor. ‘Within formal socal theory, where such predicaments are usually modeled as games, in particular as prisoner's dilemmas, the differ~ tence between these problems has filed to appear." My paper will Serve to rectify this failure, identifying a salient formal analogue for the informal distinction. But the paper should do more than recover Jost ground; for, as already suggested, the formal analogue reveals something which sof independent interest and which i not obvious from the original contrast. This i tha there isa significant differ= cence in how far the two predicament are strategically resoluble ‘That willbe a salutary lesson for those who assume that what solves fone prisoner's dilemma solves all? In summary then, I have two aims: (1) to show that the formal distinction has material significance, answering to the difference be- tween free-rider and foul-dealer problems, and (2) 10 demonstrate that i also has strategic significance, so far ab the two types of di- lemma lend themselves to diferent sorts of resolution ‘My paper isin four sections. I begin with the formal distinction between two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive types of di- lemma, A and B (section 1), [plot the correspondence between type ‘Aand the fre-rider problem (section 1) and between type Band the fouldealer problem (ection 1). And then, finally, Texplain the strategic significance of the distinction between dilemmas A and B (section 1). ‘Before passing on to the main business, it will be convenient to mention three standard empirical assumptions that I make in my "homogenization mpi ithe dai formation f cece prec ‘ments Manat Olen, Th Loic of Collective Acton (Cambri, Mase Harare 160, isnot i th nine ca acho of stag Oe praca [pone lemma Se, for emp, Ramell Hardin, "Cale het 2a erect Nroners ein Beavinal Sen, wis Sepembet 971) SESGGI and Collective Acton move ohne Hoping UP To. "ihe sumpson i inp in Hardin which, having town tat Ole ole: ‘neattion problem 2 eonrs ema, he mrt “The sme of the ‘ehltstatd above that np aah pening oltion for Prone ns ‘Ra eet dst he tof on cto Clee {REE RIDING AND FOUL. DEALING 363 presentation, I mention them without further comment, since their "ignificance should be clear in the light of later discussion. "The first is that agents care sufficiently about the future 10 be «racted by the gains of cooperation in repeated prisoner's di- lemmas, The second is that they prefer a sequence of cooperative payols in such dilemmas to an alternation between cooperating Ivhen others defect and defecting when others cooperate. And the third is that the damage done to cooperators by a lone defection is not undone by extra defections. “The two-party prisoner's dilemma is characterized by two conditions: fist, that defecting isthe dominant strategy for each person; and, secondly, thatthe defect-defect outcome is Pareto-infrior to the Cooperate-cooperate outcome: itis worse for some—in fact, for all--and better for none * “The natural generalization ofthe dilemma to the many-party case prescribes a cofresponding st of constraints: fist, that defecting isa ‘Sominant strategy foreach party; and, secondly, thatthe outcome of ‘universal defection is Pareto-inferior to that of universal cooper tion. Other generalizations ate possible, but this is the one with, ‘which I shall work* “The most important feature ofthe generalization belongs to other ‘candidates aswell. Ths is that it introduces an indeterminacy which {s without counterpart in the two-party case. The definition stipa- lates that the outcome of universal cooperation is better for each than universal defection and that every outcome is better for defec- tors than for cooperators. Bu it says nothing about how partiaeo- ‘operation outcomes compare with one another, or indeed with the ‘uniform outcomes ‘We can formillate this point more perspicuously with the help of some symbols, Let ‘C" stand for “cooperate” and 'D' for “defect.” Tet (C.D) designate the outcome of a (¢wo-party) dilemma in which nec. a one sci eaeetanet resent ce ee oe Saosin ne anremmcen irc centuarmenamnomtrunee eae Sea ee errae emcee jens is eres rere ra Gera tiated pe hety opment toh ile vaca PR ts oe prc cari eatet cr See EN ees ec ecace Sedoevuinas cummin aniacoeras 364 {THE JOURNAL OF PiitosoPiy the first prisoner cooperates and the second defects, And let ">" ‘mean "preferred by all"; >,’ mean “preferred by person i.” "With these symbols in hand, we can reformulate the two condi- tions defining the two-party dilemma. Dominance means that, for the first party, @,.Co>1C.6) and Pareto inferiority means that (.e)> yD) Puwting these conditions together, then, we see that they define a ‘complete ordering of outcomes forthe frst party, as they also do, of ‘course, forthe second, We have (6) >1 ©,,@)>1(DeDa >i, D) “There is no indeterminacy allowed. [No such complete ordering of outcomes i fixed by the two defi ing conditions for the many-party dilemma, Dominance means that, from the point of view of persons, an outcome in which he defects is always preferable to the corresponding outcome in which he cooper ates. We can express that as follows (Cy Ge Dye G4, 6) >HI Ce +E Gee CD) (Dy Dye Dy Dyer, BQ > (Dy. Dye G + Des, DD Gye Dy G1. G)>1Dy CoG Ges CO ©, D) >), “The Pareto-nferioriy condition, on the other hand, means that the outcome in which all cooperate is better from the point of view of everyone than that in which all defect. Tat is, (Cx. C Get, 69> Dh, Dye Die Dy, DO “Together these conditions define a complete ordering of the four ‘outcomes that correspond tothe outcomes ordered in the two-party Ge De PCC >i Dy Dass sDe Dy Dy Ge But the conditions leave an important indeterminacy, because they sive us no information on how person i should rank outcomes in [FREE RIDING AND FOUL. DEALING 365 ‘which two oF more cooperate but one or more defect All he condi tions tell us is that, when two such outcomes differ only in how person # chooses, i should prefer that in which he defecs. Thus they leave open the question of where to place an outcome like (Dy, Cyr ++) Gy, G)ini’s ranking, We do not know whether it comes above universal cooperation, below universal defection, or in between the wo. “The indeterminacy allowed by these conditions enables us to ine roduce any number of distinctions between different types of ‘many-part dilemma. wish to avail myself ofthis opportunity and to press the case for distinction between what T shall call type A. Uilemmas and type B dilemmas. Ido not want to prejuadge against other distinctions, but, for the record, believe that none wll prove to be as important asthe A-B divide fa many-party dilemma is one in which no cooperator is made worse off by alone defector than he would be under universal de- fection, then we have a type A dilemma. IFitis one in which the lone defector plunges some cooperator of cooperators below that base- line, then iis type B dilemma. Take the outcome described above, ‘where only the fist party defects: (Dy, Cy>+*Cy+**Cyy Ca) We have a type A dilemma if none of the cooperators is worse off in this outcome than he is under universal defection: that is, under ©, DD, 'D.). Otherwise we have a type B dilemma “The A-B distinction is formally unambiguous, and what I want to show i that it has material and strategic significance. The next two Sections deal with the question of material significance, the final fection with that of strategic. ‘Before leaving this ection however, I would just lke to mention that the A‘B distinction is hardly ever noted in the literature on prisoner's dilemmas and that one influential writer, Thomas C. Schelling, atualyelides the possibility ofa type B dilemma. Schelling defines a many-party dilemma in a manner which pre- serves dominance but broadens the Paretorinferiority condition.” Not ony is universal defection Paretosinferor to universal coopera- tion. It is inferior to the cooperation of some number K, where K ‘may be less than the total population, N. So far I have no objection * See “Hotkey Helmets, Dag Saving and Otte Binary Che” reprinedin Micomotioes ond Mocrbeetour (New Yor: Norton 1978) Node that fo ‘Sim wou ne to purge al conpertny teow te tacos of unit ‘efcton”Pertap te te uncinood fac a een wich len in 0 ‘ham tne pe Bene 366 ‘Tr JOURNAL OF But then, in the course of introducing an influential mode of representing payofs in the prisoner's dilemma, Schelling goes on to assume thatK will never be greater than N ~ 1: see the figure below. Schelling’s diagram has 2 horizontal axis measured from Oto N~ 1 [A curve labeled represents, on the vertical axis, the return to ‘cooperators for each number cooperating hetween 0 and N~ I Another curve labeled depicts, for each such number of cooper ‘ators, the return to the defectors at that level of cooperation. Schelling assumes thatthe R curve will ross the baseline of universal defection somewhere between O and N’~ 1. More importantly, since less remediably, his mode of representation enforces the assumption that the Nth cooperator cannot be the one who causes the curve cross the baseline, This assumption defines the type B dilemma out ‘of existence Scling’s Diagram ‘There is not much challenge in the ask of shoving thatthe type A clilemma is exemplified in social life; afterall, mach contemporary analysis of collective action, asin the Schelling cas, is devoted 10 revealing the presence of the A structure. What I hope to doin this section, however, goes some way beyond this goal. I wil set out a Aefintion of what I call the paradigm fre-rider problem, and 1 will show, first, that every such problem, so far as itis a prisoner's dh lemma, is type A dilemma and, secondly, that under normal ci cumstances every type A dilemma constitutes a paradigm free-rider pproblem. For practical purposes this will establish a coincidence between the type A dilemma and the free-ider problem Before presenting my definition ofthe problem, itis worth men: REE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING 367 ‘ioning three ways in which instances may vary this wll keep us alive tothe range ofthe predicament. One concerns the nature of contr butions, which may vary, not justin requiring effort oF restraint or finance, but aso in more foraally significant ways. Each party may be presented with the same contributory demand ora different one [And in ether case the demand may be to select a single contributory ‘option oF to select any of a number of such options: it may be to pay rather than not, or it may be to pay this or that or the other amount, rather than not I assume in my analysis that problems can always be broken down so that each person faces just a binary choice, and, moreover a choice between the same alternatives “The second way in which freerider problems may vary concerns the cost that contributors ave to bear. These may be the same from, Party to party, oF they may differ: this, because their individual con- tnibutions are’ more onerous for some partes than for others oF because the good they collectively seek does not have the same at- traction foreach, Inthe analysis that follows Ileave open the ques tion of whether costs ate the same or different the account is de- signed to apply to both cases, "The third way in which free-rider problems may vary isin the nature of the goods on offer. Goods may be lumpy or smooth. The Tumpy good, whether it lumps atone level or many, has this charac- teristic: that an individual's contribution need not benefit anyone in any degree; i will do so if and only if it eames atthe threshold where 4 lump is achieved. Smooth goods differ in regard to that feature. ‘They are such that everyone's contribution makes some beneficial difference, however smal, In what follows I make no presumption a8 to whether goods are lumpy or smooth; again, I believe that my analysis applies in both cass. ‘The paradigm free-rider problem, a1 shall cll four conditions. They are: aries under 1. There is a nonexcludable good attainable for a groups that is, a good enjoyed by all, though perhaps with diferent intensities, ‘enjoyed by any.” renga cere percentage a income? Tha exc yy amp I ‘ull contac nthe on tat ows may have’ deren es or Alii none, the ood need not be joint of spy an, wherefore, eed nti be» pbc gon On the sefaiion of the aie see Teor ‘rary and Coopradon ppt 368 “THE JOURNAL OF PiiLosoPiy 2. It can be attained, and rationally attained—whether at one of many levels, however smoothly related, o a the only level possi- ble—by K members of the group, where K isles than all: the reward to each contributor ina subgroup K wil exceed the cost (oF his contribution, though not necessarily by the same margin 3. Te cannot be attained, or at least not rationally attained, by just ‘one member of the group: the reward tothe lone contributor will Inot cover the cost he has to bear 4. The fear of contributing when the good isnot produced, and the hope of not contributing when i is, make i rational for each person not to contribute tothe production of the good: specf- cally it means that the strategy of not contributing maximizes expected utility We get from the paradigm ffee-rider problem to various periph- ‘eral versions by relaxing any one oF any combination ofthe lst three clauses. The last clause may be relaxed, for example, so that what is ‘ecjuited is just that not contributing is the maximin or maximax strategy" The second and third clauses may be relaxed so that K may be Lor N, where N isthe total number in the group. ‘My definition of the paradigm problem is not arbitrary: I believe that it identifies the main sort of collective-action predicament with Which recent social theorists have been concerned. The three vari able clauses all have the backing of contemporary authority.” And ‘ot without reason, since they serve to define a homogeneous and, ‘common class of socal predicament. In any ease, what I shall mean, henceforth, when I speak ofthe free-rder problem isthe paradigm, just defined, "Examples ofthe fre-rider paradigm abound. Consider the situa- ‘ion of team in tug of war, of community that wishes to keep the local park fre of iter, or of group of television users who want to invest in equipment to boost certain signals in their area. In each case, the fre ider threatens to strike. He will eck to enjoy the fruit * suc x conception ofthe fceser problem appeats in Michael Tanor and ugh Ward, "Chena, Whaies an Lumpy Goo Aeratve Models of Publ rnin," Pati! Stain Xe (1082) ain jean Hampton, "Freee Fron rf Cie Gon and pea sendy sae he tide the supp of oye he nk te Kea 0 ‘Thtntere a prempeton ta he clecne god wl be prove iy 44) The lan cae supe by the rea of Oon mpc in Brian Bar. Swoop Eemomins tnd Demoracy (Loto: Caer Sieraan, 1970) FREE RIDING AND FOUL. DEALING 369 of the labors of others, evading the burden of effort oF restraint or finance which they have to bear. He will do this, despite the risk that there will not be enough contributors, because that is the way for him to maximize expected utility ‘What I want to show is that any free-ider problem that constitutes, ‘prisoner's dilemma willbe a dilemma of type A and that any type A ‘bilemma that meets certain plausible assumptions willbe afree-tider sm, The fist part ofthis clam is stronger than it sounds, for it {s normally and reasonably supposed that most free-rider problems constitute prisoner's dilemmas. I will begin by defending that as sumption “The free-rider problem will be a prisoner's dilemma if and only if universal defection i Pareto-inferior to universal cooperation and defection isa dominant strategy. The Pareto-inferirity condition is Clearly fulfilled in the free-rider predicament, But what ofthe domi- ‘nance condition? Does the fact that defection has higher expected ‘alue than cooperation as clause 4 stipulates, mean that it dominates ‘cooperation? And this, not just for the case covered by clause ‘where no one else cooperates, but in the different cases defined by different numbers of cooperators? 'Not strictly, since there is one situation under which anyone will prefer to cooperate. Ths s when K isa determinate number; when bbe knows that K~ 1, and only K ~ I, others have contributed or are going to contribute; and when the good is such that no one receives ny benefit until K contsbutors have done their bit: that ito sa, the good is lumpy at level K.! But this situation need not inhibit the Sssimilation of the fre-rider problem to the prisoner’ dilemma, The ‘eason is that, even with lumpy goods, the case envisaged is usually improbable hat c can be discounted or else is downright impossible. til be improbable under a variety of circumstances: for exam ple, if Kis a large number, or iti a small number relative o the {otal population. It wll be impossible if Kis not so much a number as an indeterminate range: in that case °K’ will be not a numeral but an txpresion lke “slot” or “a good many”. The first sort of case is familar. The second arises when the collectively produced good i, characterized by a vague predicate which, as Richard Tuck has ob served, generates something lke the paradox ofthe heap." Just asa ote a eats SENS SSH Pll wo 370 ‘THE JOURNAL OF PHILosoPnY pebble never makes the diference between a heap and a nonheap of pebbles, so one contribution in such a ease eannot make the difer- fence beiween the realization and nonrealization of the good: sy, ‘between a ltered park and an unlitered park. ‘Assuming that usually collective goods afe nonlumpy or that Kis fof a kind to generate one or other of the cases just described, I shall tae i thatthe dominance condition aswell as the Pareto-inferiority concltion is normally satisfied by the freesider problem, That the concltions are satisfied means thatthe problem ian instance of the prisoner's dilemma, and the question then is whether my specific ‘hams hold Is every free-ider problem a ype A dilemma in particu lar? And is every type A dilemma a free-nder problem? It is demonstrable tha the problem is type A dilemma, because the lone fre rider has exactly the effect ofthe lone defector in th sort of dilemma. Ashe is alone in his defection, N’~ 1 others must have contributed tothe good. But V~ | isthe upper bound on Ki #0 Kor more must then have contributed. That means tht the collec. tive good must have been achieved and that everyone is better off than under universal defection. Thus the lone free rider does not plunge anyone below the baseline of universal defection, The free- rider problem isa type A prisoner's dilemma, ‘The reverse claim is substantiated by showing tht, in any ype A dilemma, the causes defining the fre-rider problem are more or less certain to be fulfilled. I shall show this for each clause in turn. ‘The N~ 1 cooperators in a type A elilemma must have created 3 {good that they enjoy regardless of the lone defection, since they are better off than if they had all defected too, More strongly, this good ‘must be available to all, including the defector, since otherwise his “deprivation would presumably motivate im to cooperate too. Thus the first clause in the definition ofthe free-rider problem is sure to be satisfied. “The second and third clauses put limits on K: that is, on the minimum number of cooperators who can rationally provide the ‘good. K must not be more than N ~ 1, where N isthe total popula: ‘ton, but it must be more than I. These limits are bound to obtain in type A dilemma. There certainly ae no more than N'~ 1 cooper- ators required to produce the good in such a dilemma, since the lone efector does not make cooperators worse of than winder tniversal ‘atinal Action (New York. Cambie, 1979). See ako Janes Sain, The {ims of Obligation (New Hsven, Ca: Yale, 183), Tad Devek Bath ‘Reson ond Herons (New York Oxtord, 1086 ee 8 REE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING 37 Aefection. And there must be more than one required, forifa single ‘cooperator does better than he would do under universal defection, then defecting does not dominate cooperation. “The last clause is also almont certain to be fulfilled. In a ype A dilemma defecting dominates cooperating, and under normal ci ‘cumstances that means that the expected value of defecting will be higher than that of cooperating. Normal circumstances obtain so Jong as no one can think that fhe cooperates its more probable that others cooperate, and suliciently more probable to raise the ex- pected vale of cooperating above that of defecting. No one can, think this on the grounds ofa causal connection with others, since agents in a one-shot dilemma act independently. Nor can anyone plausibly argue such a case on the grounds that others ate similarly Constitted.* Atleast in real-world type A dilemmas, the fact that defecting dominates cooperating means that defecting maximizes expected ut conclude thatthe free-rider problem and the ype A dilemma can ‘be taken as effectively one and the same predicament. The paradigm free-rider problem is usually a type A dilemma, and every plausible type A dilemma isa paradiga free-rider problem. ‘Since the freerider problem is the standard illustration of the ‘many-patty prisoner's dilemma, the question remaining is whether the type B dilemma has any substantive significance. Can we find interesting examples, ori it just a formal possibiliy? “The type B dilemma contrasts with the other varity in regard to the significance of the lone defector. Here the lone defector makes fthers—or atleast one other—worse off than under universal de- fection; there he does not make others worse off at all. Here he is seriously injurious, there he is merely an iritan ‘What sort of examples are likely oilustrate the type B dilemma? Te ‘must be that by cooperating all can make themselves better off than ifall defect. And it must be that the extra return tothe lone defector ‘causes at least one other to do worse than under universal defection. David Lewis angus the case fr some two party lemmas whic ae ain ily fa igh oat wea ha roe’ Dic Réscom Prati” Phslouphy and Public Afatrs vie (Spring 1979) S1E-240: Bathe conning cue many party ermal ea treo ine we shi ale atone npr, Uther So On teed ater sect pp 286/In ay cree ave doubts ‘Sou he 'egument which ae velaed to GE comdrations raed in my rice ‘Preseng te Ponoers lemma Sythe, forthcoming an “THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY ‘That benefit therefore must be enjoyed, not just by the efforts of others, a in the free-ider case; it must be enjoyed directly at some other's expense. ‘One situation that would fit these constraints i a imit ease, $0 to speak, ofthe free-ider problem. Its an instance of that peripheral version ofthe problem which arises when the second cle in ot ‘original deinition is removed: that i, when K can be N, Suppose that the collective good on offer is smooth, so that each individual's contribution benefits each member of the group to some degree ‘And suppose that all members are compensated for ther individal efforts only when all have contributed. In such a case the lone de- fector wil hold at least some cooperators below the bateline of universal defection, since itis only atthe point where he contributes too that each makes a net gain ‘On its own, this sort of ease would hardly establish the material ‘significance of the type B dilemma, for its not clearly more than a theoretical possibilty. Any genuinely smooth good that pays dive ‘dends for some only at the point of universal cooperation is not sing to be much of good for those parties. Its dificult to envis- age examples, and iti not certain that there are any. If we are to show that the ype B dilemma s materaly significant, then we must look beyond the sorts of eases that generate free-rider problems. A feature that characterizes al freerider problems, pars: ddigm and peripheral, is that the good on offer is one-dimensional hholding out the same kind of reward for each: vz, share in the ‘common benefit. So long as we remain with such problems, the only possibilty of finding an example of the type B dilemma will be in the Sort of peripheral case just considered. And there, as we have seen, the prospect is not promising Tnorder to stand a chance of establishing the material significance ‘of the type B dilemma, we must be abe to identify collective goods that have a two-dimensional aspect. They must be ich that, from the perspective of the lone defector, there is more to be enjoyed by Sefecting than just the share ofthe good procured by the efforts of others, Axwell sor instead of providing such a share of a com ‘mon good, the efforts of others must make another particulatly tempting sort of good available to him. They must present the lone ‘defector withthe opportinity to exploit one oF more of the cooper- ‘ators, letting him enjoy some predatory advantage. ‘What we have to look for then if we ate to find examples ofthe type B dilemma, is a predicament with the following features. A number of parties are in a postion to make themselves better off FREE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING 373 than they are, by universally adopting a certain cooperative strategy However, the very fct of cooperating create the opportunity for 3 defector, or at least for alone defector, to take advantage of cooper ators, achieving a benefit which is superior toa share inthe reward of “universal cooperation. That reward constitutes only one dimension fof the collective good on offer; the benefit avalable to the tone defector constitutes second. ‘These remarks immediately suggest one sort of example. This is the state of nature, in more or less its Hobbesian form. Let everyone defect and we have the war ofall against all Let everyone cooperate, ‘sy by beating their swords into ploughshares, and we have the rather more desirable state of universal peace. But lt just one party defect, nd his vitims-—all others, potentially vill be worse off even than in the war of all against all. He, on the other hand, wil have the spreme prize: unopposed superiority In this example, the collective good on offer isthe cesation of a pursuit in which one part's gain is another's loss. In a Hobbesian phrase, iis the eschewal of eminence, where eminence is something enjoyed atthe direct expense of others. The lone defector's payofis the atainment of such eminence in the absence of opposition from those who cooperate Ic is not the costess enjoyment of the peace procured by others, asin a free-rider dilemma. isthe enjoyment of War under conditions where others, in their desire for peace, have Teftshemselves undefended and vulnerable. ‘This i the predicament that I call the foul-dealer problem, since the lone defector does such mischief. Examples ofthe foul-dealer problem are as various asthe different sorts of eminence tha attract Individual and institutional agents, The eminence pursued may con: ‘Skt in a certain sort of contro, physical, psychological, financial, oF ‘whatever. Alternatively, it may be constituted by the achievement of some damaging advantage. The advantage may be immediate a8 in ‘queue jumping or price cutting or it may come from repute in the ‘ees of others, This repute will involve the attainment of a higher standing on some comparative metric, whether a metric with abso- Ite significance, lke beauty or strength oF virlue, or one of an intrinsially relative kind such a8 status We find fou-dealer problems, then, in a great range of contexts. ‘Among individuals and gangs and governments and businesses, since ecules ma etn eres na ape cana ‘oti follows rom section v below am “THE JOURNAL OF PItILosoPHY all of those are regularly bent on mutual control. Among the ‘members ofa panicking crowd, or among the partes in any situation ‘where each is tempted to seize an opportunity in a way that damages ‘others. And among prima donnas and poltchins, advertisers and advocates, and any agents to whom success consists in making. a superior impression Ttis a great oversight inthe recent literature on collective action, that the foul-dealer problem has dropped out of view. Itisacommon, ‘sort of predicament; i is distinctive in exemplifying the type B di Jemma; and it stands in stark contrast to every version of the free rider problem. Where recent theory seems to assume that collective {goods are one-dimensional, the sort of good involved here has a ‘double aspect. At the point where the last party has to choose—and almost certainly before that it shows a second face: not now the aspect of a good tobe shared with others rather that ofan advantage that others cede. “The free rider aspires to a share in a one-dimensional collective ‘good which the cooperation of others has created. The foul dealer spires to enjoyment ofan advantage over others which their cooper ation i seeking a two-dimensional collective good allows him to take. “The free rider seeks to benefit by the efforts of others, the foul dealer to benefit at their expense In the last section we began from an independent characterization of the fre-rder problem, and we argued that, s0 characterized, the problem was more or less coextensive withthe type A dilemma, Our Approach in thi section has been different, since the foul-dealer problem was introduced and characterized only in the process of identifying the sort of predicament required to exemplify the type B dilemma. ‘The upshot, however, is very similar. It appears that, for practical purposes, the foul-lealer problem and the type B dilemma tay be taken to be coextensive. ‘The importance of the two sections taken together is that they show thatthe A-B distinction has material significance. Each type af ‘lemma is exemplified, and is exemplified in a familiar sort of pre- ‘icament. With the material significance of the distinction extab- lished, the next task is to show that iti strategically significant to. To that task [now turn, Suppose that two people find themselves in recurrent prisoner's slilemmas, The iteration involved makes it possible foreach to let his choice of whether to cooperate or defect depend on how the other ‘chooses. Tht is to say, it makes it possible for each to choose state- FREE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING 375 cally. Inthe supergame constituted by the iterated first-order pre- “dicaments, for example, they might each select the strategy of tt for tat. Under this strategy, each begins by cooperating and thenceforth ‘does exactly as his partner did in the previous round." is lear that in an indefinite iteration of two-party dilemmas, the participants would do better by each titforsatting than by each ‘permanently defecting Joint titfor-tating would give the coopers tive result in each encounter and would yield a series of outcomes Paretossuperior to those of permanent defection ‘Ought we then to expect joint ti-for-ttting among rational partc- Jpante? Not if each assumes the worst ofthe other and expects im to defect permanently, since tit for tat will do worse than permanent defection against permanent defection: it wil ease a loss in the Fist round, But suppore that each assumes that the other is rational ‘Ought we then to expect joint ti-fortating? Te would seem so. The outcome of join tiefortating isan equilib- rium, and indeed a coordination equilibrium. Te isan outcome sich that nether can do better by unilaterally departing from it and more- ‘over this is what makes it coordination equlibrium—an outcome such that neither ean do better by the other's unilaterally departing from it either, To depart unilaterally would be to invite the punish- ‘ment of the other's defecting, and it would be to ave to suffer the ‘outcome of cooperating when the other punitvely defects before igetting back to joint cooperation, To have the other unilaterally fefect would be to incur the obligation to defect in retaliation, Either way one is worse off than under continuing tit for ta ‘Because itis Paretosuperior to the outcome of permanent defec- tion and in particular because itis an equilibrium, indeed a coordina- tion equilibrium, we may expect rational parties to be able to con- verge on the ttfor-tat solution. Or, ifnot on that solution, on some Similar one. ll that is necessary is that one can make it credible to the other, that he intends to titforta, The joint tiefor-tat outcome "On efor ttn the rw-p cae see Hardin, Collective Action, p.165/6 ti he luo cnr pt To Anarey an Cpr whe quan tha the eran poor on indefinitely f ou and Lat cto engage In what ne Anow willbe emma, then ne each Know ha the ‘onal hing to do them game defer since here spo psshne Propet Ba in tat oer fn pment prospec citer fr game = ‘ay mara pc te Or toe ea Fors Fre 1083) pp 11-78 e a ‘ne ut atrese in Taylor, the second in Hadi, 376 “THE JOURNAL OF PItILOSOPHY isan equilibrium, and so if either believes thatthe other ti-fortats, then he knows that he had better do s0 too.”” Ian iterated two-party dilemma, it for tat ought to be a credible strategy. Either party can test that it i indeed the strategy of the ‘other: he need only vary his behavior and wath for the response. ‘And each party can see that itis rational for the other to tit-for-at: the other's most realise hope of reward is to match cooperation with cooperation and defection with defection. ‘So much forthe solution of the iterated two-party prisoner's dic Jemma. The question to which we must now turn is whether we can ‘equally expect the participants in an indefinite iteration of many- party dilemmas to reach a strategic resolution oftheir predicament: ‘whether in particular we ean expect them to converge on a strategy Tike tit for tat. I shal argue that our expectations ought to be differ~ ‘ent in the type A and type B cases. This difference constitutes the strategie significance of the distinction ‘Given the iteration ofa many-party dilemma, whatever the species, there willbe conditional strategies of choice available such that unk ‘ets compliance with them would be better for everyone than pet ‘manent defection all ound. An example is generalized tt for t tunder which each begins by cooperating: cooperates inthe second ‘ound if everyone else cooperated in the fist, and defects otherwise; Cooperates in the third round if everyone else other than those Punishing earlier defection cooperated in the second, and defects ‘therwise and so on If everyone tit-for-tats in tis sense, then each twill get the cooperative result in every round and will be better off than under universal permanent defection." ‘Ought we to expect participants in many-party dilemmas to reach the solution represented, for example, by universal tit for tat? Per- haps. It is tue here, as inthe two-party case, thatthe outcome of ‘universal compliance with that strategy san equilibrium, and indeed 4 coordination equilibrium, Each would do worse by unilateral de- parture, since he would then be punished next time around. And ‘ach would do worse by anyone else's urlateral departure, since he ‘would have to punish next time around. ‘tec ao cna eri ie ego aherstyipabieisioareal Near etoneof she tence, Rtg RS feeds aes congee forex See eter one Mar Cl anc 8 Fe eto speror equa tbe than coranation Anarhy and Cooper ‘eer he sgniteance of [FREE RIDING AND FOUL DEALING 377 ‘The question remaining to be answered is whether tit for tat is

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