LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus

MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY

FACTS:

Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned
to the area approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a
fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages
against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidad’s wife and against the defendants Prudent
Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA held LRTA and Roman
liable, hence the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage between Navidad and LRTA

HELD:

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability

Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. The appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
Calvo V. UCPB Gen Insurance Co. (2002)
G.R. No.148496     March 19, 2002
Lessons Applicable: Legal Effect (Transportation)

FACTS:
 At the time material to this case, Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(TCTSI) owned by Virgines Calvo entered into a contract with San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and
124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC's warehouse at
the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. 
 The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
 July 14, 1990: arrived in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa Maru" and later
on unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator,
Manila Port Services, Inc
 July 23 to July 25, 1990: Calvo withdrew the cargo from the arrastre
operator and delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila
 July 25, 1990: goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who
found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were
"wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn
 SMC collected payment from UCPB the total damage of P93,112 under its
insurance contract 
 UCPB brought suit against Calvo as subrogee of SMC
 Calvo: Art. 1734(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers
 spoilage or wettage" took place while the goods were in the custody of
either the carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru," which transported the
cargo to Manila, or the arrastre operator, to whom the goods were
unloaded and who allegedly kept them in open air for 9 days
notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed,
cracked, or otherwise damaged
 Trial Court: Calvo liable
 CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Calvo can be exempted from liability under Art. 1734(4)

HELD: NO. CA AFFIRMED.

 mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier, and of their
arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a prima facie
case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the
injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible
 extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered actually or constructively by
the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive
the same
 Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public."
The above article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . .
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
 concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide
neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code
 Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public
service" includes:
" x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done
for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street
railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its
classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged
in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine
repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal,
irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and
power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications
systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services. x x x" 
 when Calvo's employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator,
they did so without exception or protest either with regard to the
condition of container vans or their contents
 Calvo must do more than merely show the possibility that some other
party could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that it used "all
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods
tendered for transport and that it exercised due care in the handling 

 G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996

 MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC.,
AMYLINE ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V. QUE, JR.,
ICLI CORDOVA, ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD
BAUTISTA, JOCELYN GARCIA, YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN,
ERNESTO NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPES, JULIUS
CAESAR, GARCIA, ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C. CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL,
ROSARIO MARA-MARA, TERESITA REGALA, MELINDA TORRES, MARELLA
MIJARES, JOSEFA CABATINGAN, MARA NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA,
MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO, CARLOS RANARIO,
ROSAMARIA T. RADOC and BERNADETTE FERRER, respondents.

  

 MENDOZA, J.:p

 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR No. 28245, dated September 30, 1992,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and
severally to pay damages to private respondent Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

 Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus.
They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they
operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after
trying him out for two weeks, His job was to take school children to and from the St.
Scholastica's College in Malate, Manila.
 On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
 The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
However, as several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut
at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Petitioner
Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
 The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge
at Carmen was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it
being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the
highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as "siete." The road was
slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50
 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace
and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and
landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to
rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
 Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the
floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came down by a wooden seat
which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this
portion. She was in great pain and could not move.
 The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he
was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took
in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he
saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to
30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.
 The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the basis
of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was
later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
P1,500.00 for the damage to the latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit of
desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
 Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro
Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently
paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent
and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after
the accident, she was taken to the Nazareth Hospital in Baay, Lingayen. As this hospital was
not adequately equipped, she was transferred to the Sto. Niño Hospital, also in the town of
Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An x-ray was taken and the damage to her spine was
determined to be too severe to be treated there. She was therefore brought to Manila, first to
the Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati Medical Center where she underwent
an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
 In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
 No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a
long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being
admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act
of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
 Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
 Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline
Antonio were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim for damages, the
Court is therefore not in a position to award damages to the other plaintiffs.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendants
Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
 1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
 2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff Amyline
Antonio;
 3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
 4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
 5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees;
 6) Costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio
but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their
respective claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
 1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
 2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
 3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
 4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
 5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
 6) Costs of suit.
 The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to exercise
due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the place of
the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves presumptively
negligent. Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issues:
 I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
 II. WHETHER OF NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
 III WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP TO
WHAT EXTENT.
 Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages in the amount of
P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable an award of
P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that she
was a casual employee of a company called "Suaco," earning P1,650.00 a month, and a
dealer of Avon products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that
as casual employees do not have security of tenure, the award of P600,000.00, considering
Amyline Antonio's earnings, is without factual basis as there is no assurance that she would
be regularly earning these amounts.
 With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
 First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on
the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals held, for although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature," nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort."   In either
2

case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.
 The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned
the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual
findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the
evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and
as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to justify
his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that Cabil
drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when he noticed
the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead.   By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the
3

road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil's first one
outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is
testimony   that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20
4

kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high
speed.
 Considering the foregoing — the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was
dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal
speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was
grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent
Amyline Antonio.
 Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and
supervisions of their employee.
 Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant
possessed a professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant
 for his qualifications, experience and record of service.   Due diligence in supervision, on the
5

other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees
and issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with the rules. 6

 In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did
not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to
the St. Scholastica's College in Metro Manila.   They had hired him only after a two-week
7

apprenticeship. They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested
him for certain matters, such as whether he could remember the names of the children he
would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long
distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union was his first. The existence of
hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the
presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.  8

 Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible
by the congregation's delayed meeting) could have a averted the mishap and (2) under the
contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of these
contentions hold water. The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the
delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident. With respect to the second
contention, it was held in an early case that:
 [A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the
driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for
injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the
negligence or the automobile driver.  9

 As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres,
did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the
Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held:  10

 Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
 The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
 As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for the safe
transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by
proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
 Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
 This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
 The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial court and of the
appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully
justify findings them guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759
of the Civil Code.
 Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we think
the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages because
private respondents did not question this award as inadequate.   To the contrary, the award
11

of P500,000.00 for compensatory damages which the Regional Trial Court made is
reasonable considering the contingent nature of her income as a casual employee of a
company and as distributor of beauty products and the fact that the possibility that she might
be able to work again has not been foreclosed. In fact she testified that one of her previous
employers had expressed willingness to employ her again.
 With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are
nevertheless supported by evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action
for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the
payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable
for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad faith.  Amyline
12

Antonio's testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and copassengers, fully
establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries
caused by petitioners' negligence.
 The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was also properly made. However, for
the same reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the award of
compensatory damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral
damages and reduce the award of attorney's fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in
whose favor the awards were made, have not appealed.  13

 As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the theory
of quasi delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts
below held, petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond
jointly and severally to private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa
Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals,   on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held
14

the bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered
by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals   a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers
15

when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the
speeding bus and suffered injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus
company to the injured passengers.
 The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the
bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the
driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño,   Batangas Laguna
16

Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  7 and Metro Manila Transit Corporation

1

v. Court of Appeals,   the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
18

driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the
latters' heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of
Appeals,   thus:
19

 Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from
contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-
delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case
of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are
jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view
that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.  20

 It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals   this Court exonerated
21

the jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families while holding the
owners of the jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was
 expressly tried and decided exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court
there explained:
 The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo (the driver) and spouses Mangune
and Carreon (the jeepney owners) were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses
Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is
between the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).  22

 As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her coplaintiffs did not stake out
their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of
breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of
action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action   so long as
23

private respondent and her coplaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear
from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the
driver, thus, justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally
liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
to award of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private
respondent Amyline Antonio the following amounts:
 BASCOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO
 G.R. No. 101089
 April 7, 1993
 FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise
(CIPTRADE for short) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair
Shipping Agency Corp whereby the former bound itself to haul the
latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba,
Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Cipriano,
subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya
bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner
failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure,
Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in
accordance with their contract.
 Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter
refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of
money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a
contract of carriage. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary
attachment.
 In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no
contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the
cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck carrying the
cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner
from any liability
 After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and
against Bascos ordering the latter to pay the former for actual damages
for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
 The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment” Bascos is
DENIED for being moot and academic.
 Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
 Hence this petition for review on certiorari
 ISSUE:
 (1) WON petitioner a common carrier
 (2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure
 HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
 1. YES
 In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that
petitioner was a common carrier, she alleged in this petition that the
contract between her and Cipriano was lease of the truck. She also
stated that: she was not catering to the general public. Thus, in her
answer to the amended complaint, she said that she does business under
the same style of A.M. Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to
those who have cargo to move, not to the general public but to a few
customers only in view of the fact that it is only a small business.
 We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a
common carrier.
 Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) person,
corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.” The test to
determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part
of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the
general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the
business transacted.” 12 In this case, petitioner herself has made the
admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to
those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no
evidence is required to prove the same. 13
 But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they
offer their services only to a select group of people. Regarding the first
contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
14 is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held
thus:
 “The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
 who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a
“sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,”
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.”
 2. NO
 Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of
the goods was not due to force majeure.
 Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods
are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when
the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances are
enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases where the presumption is
applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence in order to overcome the presumption.
 In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure
which exculpated her from liability for the loss of the cargo. In De
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being
included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the
provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability
arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers
acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in
accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
 “Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be
considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy; xx
 (6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or
of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violences or
force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx
 NOTES:
 1.  She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract
as “lease”. These affidavits were made by Jesus Bascos and by petitioner
herself and Cipriano and CIPTRADE did not object to the presentation
of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a
lease contract. Both the trial and appellate courts have dismissed them
as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound by
 the appellate court’s factual conclusions. Yet, granting that the said
evidence were not self-serving, the same were not sufficient to prove
that the contract was one of lease. It must be understood that a contract
is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. Furthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of
the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it.
 2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the
substantial issues involved, We find no reason to disturb the conclusion
that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment has
been rendered moot and academic by the decision on the merits.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION v. G.P.

SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION, GR
No. 141910, 2002-08-06
Facts:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty units of Condura
white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the
plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan
City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway, it
collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in
damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of
the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the
amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the
claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS
and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the case on
the basis that GPS is not a common carrier  . Thus, the laws governing the contract
between the owner of the cargo to whom the plaintiff was subrogated and the owner of
the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and contract of the
Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to whom the
plaintiff was subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the
laws on obligation and contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a common carrier
and defendant's driver was the one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the
damages of the subject cargoes."
Issue:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER AS DEFINED
UNDER THE LAW
Ruling:
Defendant GPS is not a common Carrie. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or
entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering
their services to the public whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in
particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the
carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves
of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls
within the term common carrier.
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.

Planters Products, Inc. v. CA

Facts:

Planters Products, Inc. purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation 9,329.7069 metric
tons of Urea 46% fertilizer, which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum on
June 16, 1974. Prior to its voyage, a time-charter party was entered into between Mitsubishi as
shipper, and Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha as shipowner. Before loading the fertilizer aboard
the vessel, four of her holds were presumably inspected by the charterer’s representative and
found it fit to take the load. After loading the cargo, the steel hatches were closed with heavy
iron lids, covered with 3 layers of tarpaulin then tied with steel bonds. It remained sealed
throughout the entire voyage.

Upon arrival of the vessel, petitioner unloaded the cargo, which took 11 days. A private marine
and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company, Inc. (CSCI) was hired by petitioner to
determine the outturn of the cargo shipped. CSCI reported shortage of 106.726 metric tons, and
contamination of 18 metric tons due to dirt. PPI sent a claim letter against Soriamont Steamship
Agencies, the resident agent of KKKK. The request was denied, hence, PPI filed an action for
damages before the CFI Manila. The lower court sustained the petitioner’s claim, but such
decision was reversed by the appellate court, which absolved the carrier from liability. The
appellate court ruled that the vessel was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of
the charter party.

Issues:

(1) Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter party

(2) Whether the ship owner was able to prove the exercise of the diligence required under the
circumstances

Held:

(1) A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part
thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; Charter parties are of
two types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping space on vessels
leased by the owner in part or as a whole, to carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or
bareboat charter, by the terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to
him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, including
the master and the crew, who are his servants. Contract of affreightment may either be time
charter, wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter,
wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage.

Upon the other hand, the term "common or public carrier" is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil
Code. The definition extends to carriers either by land, air or water which hold themselves out as
ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or both for compensation as a
public employment and not as a casual occupation. The distinction between a "common or
public carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the business, such that if
the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation,
although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation offering such
service is a private carrier. Article 1733 of the New Civil Code mandates that common carriers,
by reason of the nature of their business, should observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods they carry. In the case of private carriers, however, the exercise of ordinary
diligence in the carriage of goods will suffice. Moreover, in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on them. On the contrary, no such
presumption applies to private carriers, for whosoever alleges damage to or deterioration of the
goods carried has the onus of proving that the cause was the negligence of the carrier.

When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and
compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its
direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew
and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control
of the means in doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the
ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other
technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were
screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. It is only when the charter includes both the
vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least
insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.

(2) In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped, the
shipper or consignee should first prove the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or damage
while the same was in the possession, actual or constructive, of the carrier. Thereafter, the
burden of proof shifts to respondent to prove that he has exercised extraordinary diligence
required by law or that the loss, damage or deterioration of the cargo was due to fortuitous
event, or some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability. To our mind, respondent
carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of
negligence.

Before the fertilizer was loaded, the four (4) hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried and
fumigated. After completing the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship's holds, the steel
pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids, then covered with three (3) layers of
serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained close and tightly
sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a
person to open without the use of the ship's boom. It was also shown during the trial that the
hull of the vessel was in good condition, foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the cargo into
the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel. When M/V "Sun Plum" docked at its
berthing place, representatives of the consignee boarded, and in the presence of a representative
of the shipowner, the foreman, the stevedores, and a cargo surveyor representing CSCI, opened
the hatches and inspected the condition of the hull of the vessel. The stevedores unloaded the
cargo under the watchful eyes of the shipmates who were overseeing the whole operation on
rotation basis.

The period during which private respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required of it
as a public carrier began from the time the cargo was unconditionally placed in its charge after
the vessel's holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and until the
vessel reached its destination and its hull was re-examined by the consignee, but prior to
unloading. A shipowner is liable for damage to the cargo resulting from improper stowage only
when the stowing is done by stevedores employed by him, and therefore under his control and
supervision, not when the same is done by the consignee or stevedores under the employ of the
latter.

Common carriers are not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods if
caused by the character of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers. The
primary cause of these spillages is the clamped shell which does not seal very tightly. Also, the
wind tends to blow away some of the materials during the unloading process. The probability of
the cargo being damaged or getting mixed or contaminated with foreign particles was made
greater by the fact that the fertilizer was transported in "bulk," thereby exposing it to the
inimical effects of the elements and the grimy condition of the various pieces of equipment used
in transporting and hauling it. If there was loss or contamination of the cargo, it was more likely
to have occurred while the same was being transported from the ship to the dump trucks and
finally to the consignee's warehouse.

Bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage,
more so, with a variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading, as was the case at
bar. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. Clearly, respondent carrier
has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to
deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss.
On the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was remiss
in the exercise of due diligence in order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.

.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC., v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION

447 SCRA 427 (2004)

A common carrier is liable to the resulting damage to the goods if the improper
packaging is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary
observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception.

Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) brought an action for reimbursement

against petitioner A.F. Sanchez Brokerage Inc. (Sanchez Brokerage) to collect the
amount paid by the former to Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories Inc. (Wyeth-Suaco) as
insurance payment for the goods delivered in bad condition.

A.F. Brokerage refused to admit liability for the damaged goods which it delivered from
Philippines Skylanders, Inc. (PSI) to Wyeth-Suaco as it maintained that the damage was
due to improper and insufficient export packaging, discovered when the sealed
containers were opened outside the PSI warehouse.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the said complaint; however, the decision
was subsequently reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals, finding that Sanchez
Brokerage is liable for the carriage of cargo as a ―common carrier‖ by definition of the
New Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the FGU Insurance is liable for the delivery of the damaged goods

HELD:

As defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public. It does not distinguish between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity. The contention therefore of Sanchez Brokerage that it is not a common carrier
but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs
declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It
suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration.

In this light, Sanchez Brokerage as a common carrier is mandated to observe, under

Article 1733 of the Civil Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it
transports according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods
are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.

The concept of ―extra-ordinary diligence‖ was explained in Compania Maritima v. Court

of Appeals. The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for
shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution
for avoiding damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and
delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and
foresight and ―to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of
goods tendered for shipment and to exercise due care in the handling and storage
including such methods as their nature requires.

It was established that Sanchez Brokerage received the cargoes from the PSI warehouse
in good order and condition and that upon delivery by petitioner some of the cargoes
were found to be in bad order as noted in the Delivery Receipt and as indicated in the
Survey and Destruction Report.

While paragraph no. 4 of Article 1734 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from
liability if the loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the
packaging or in the containers, the rule is that if the improper packaging is known to the
carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless
accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not
relieved of liability for the resulting damage. If the claim of Sanchez Brokerage that
some of the cartons were already damaged upon delivery to it were true, then it should
naturally have received the cargo under protest or with reservation duly noted on the
receipt issued by PSI but it made no such protest or reservation.

Crisostomo v. CA
G.R. No. 138334, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 528

FACTS:

Petitioner contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to
arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe.
Pursuant to said contract, the travel documents and plane tickets were delivered to the petitioner
who in turn gave the full payment for the package tour on June 12, 1991. Without checking her travel
documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of
her journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight she was
supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She learned that her plane ticket was for
the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain. Subsequently, Menor
prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour- the British Pageant. Upon petitioner’s return from
Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of the difference between the sum she
paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she owed respondent for the British Pageant tour.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and damages
alleging that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was due to respondent’s fault since it did not clearly
indicate the departure date on the plane, failing to observe the standard of care required of a
common carrier when it informed her wrongly of the flight schedule. For its part, respondent
company, denied responsibility for petitioner’s failure to join the first tour, insisting that petitioner was
informed of the correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The
travel documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip. Respondent further
contend that petitioner had only herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to read
or confirm her flight schedule as printed on the ticket.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caravan Travel & Tours International Inc. is negligent in the fulfilment of its obligation
to petitioner Crisostomo thus granting to the petitioner the consequential damages due her as a
result of breach of contract of carriage.

RULING:

Contention of petitioner has no merit. A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a

certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news
from one place to another for a fixed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as
carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers. Respondent
is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore,
neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from
one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in
their behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel
permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.

The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the service of arranging and
facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the
object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that
the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of
carriage. Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. The
evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in performing its obligations
under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to petitioner. As
correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the
departure date and time, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The travel documents, consisting of the
tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered to petitioner two days prior to the
trip. Respondent also properly booked petitioner for the tour, prepared the necessary documents
and procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioner’s hotel accommodation as well as food, land
transfers and sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking. The evidence on
record shows that respondent company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any
contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage.