LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus

MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY

FACTS:
 
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later
fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidad’s wife and
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA
held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage between Navidad and LRTA

HELD:

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo
Roman is absolved from liability

Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of
the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. The appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
While the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard
for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence
or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. The liability of the common carrier and
that of the independent contractor is solidary.

A. COMMON CARRIERS (Arts. 1731 to 1766 NCC)

1. Definitions of “domestic shipping” under R.A. No. 9295 and of “public service” under Commonwealth Act No. 146
2. Common Carriage

Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. vs. CA, et al.

259 SCRA 426

Facts:

Petitioners Fabre and his wife were owners of a minibus which they used principally in connection with a bus service for school
children which they operated. The couple had a driver, Porfirio Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. His
job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College.

On November 2, 1984, private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. arranged with petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which they paid P3,000 to petitioners.

The group left at 8:00 in the evening, petitioner Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through
Carmen, Pangasinan.  However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area
(it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan.  At 11:30 that
night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction. The road was slippery
because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder.  The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts.  The bus came to rest off the road.  A coconut
tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.

Several passengers were injured.  Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a
wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed.  It took three persons to safely remove her from this position.  She was in
great pain and could not move.
A case was filed by the respondents against Fabre and Cabil. Amyline Antonio was found to be suffering from paraplegia and is
permanently paralyzed from the waist down. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Mr. & Mrs. Fabre and Cabil were ordered to
pay jointly and severally actual, moral and exemplary damages, and as well as amount of loss of earning capacity of Antonio and
attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification on the award of damages.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners were negligent.
2. Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by private respondents.
3. Whether or not damages can be awarded and in the positive, up to what extent.

Held:
SC affirmed the decision of the CA but reverted the amount of the award of damages to that ordered by the RTC.

1. The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence
on record. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a consequence, the road was
slippery, and it was dark. However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. Given the conditions of the road and considering that
the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony
that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers
per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed. Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries
suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.

Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the
Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee. Due diligence in selection of
employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license.  The employer should also
examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing
Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only,
from their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a two-week
apprenticeship.

2. This case involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.
Art. 1732.  Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination.  This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.

CALVO VS. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002
Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a sole
proprietorship customs broker. Petitioner entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the
Port Area in Manila to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. On July 14, 1990, the shipment, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived
in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa Maru" and were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the
arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc. Pursuant to her contract with SMC, petitioner Calco
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila.
After inspection, it was found that some of the cargoes were damaged. SMC collected payment from
respondent UCPB under its insurance contract for the said amount. Respondent UCPB, as subrogee
of SMC, brought suit against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, which rendered the petitioner
liable for damages to the cargo handled. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
appeal. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/s:
Whether the petitioner is a common carrier or a private or special carrier who did not hold its
services to the public.

HELD:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Hence, the Supreme Court
ruled that petitioner is a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of
her business. It was further held that as such, she is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
carriage of goods as provided in Article 1733; that to prove

extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility that some other
party could be responsible for the damage; and that improper packing of the goods could be a basis
to exempt petitioner from liability, but petitioner accepted the cargo without exception despite the
apparent defects in some of the container vans.

De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals et. al.

G.R. No. L-47822, December 22, 1988

FACTS:
Respondent Cendena was engaed in buying bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. He utilized two
(2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. In 1970, petitioner De
Guzman, an authorized dealer of General Milk Company in Pangasinan, contracted with respondent
for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse in Makati, Rizal, to the
petitioner’s establishment in Pangasinan. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent
himself while 600 cartons were loaded to the other truck which was driven by respondent’s driver.
Only 150 boxes of milk were delivered and the other 600 boxes never reached the petitioner because
the said truck was hijacked on its way to Pangasinan. Petitioner commenced an action againts
respondent Cendena demanding payment of the value of the lost merchandise plus damages and
attorney’s fees. Respondent however denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could
not be held liable for the lost goods since it was due to force majeure. The trial court found
respondent Cendena to be a common carrier and held him liable. The Court of Appelas, however,
reversed the decision of the trial court and held that Cendena is not a common carrier because he
just entered into a “sideline” only in delivering the goods. Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUES:
(1) WON respondent Cenmdena may be properly characterized as a common carrier.
(2) WON the absence of a certificate of public convenience concludes that respondent is not a
common carrier.

HELD:
(1) YES. According to Art. 1732 of the Civil Code, “Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
or Associations engaged in the businedd of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public”. The said article makes no
distinction between one whose PRINCIPAL business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying as and ANCILLIARY or “sideline” activity. Nor does the article
make any distinction between a carrier offering its services on a REGULAR BASIS or on an
OCCASSIONAL BASIS. The meaning of “public service” under the Public Service Act was used to
supplement the concept of “common carrier” which inludes “xxx every person that now or hereafter
may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general pr
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional, or accidental, and done for general business
purposes xxx”. It appears that respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though
he merely “back-hauled” goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, althoughsuch was
done on an occasional manner and even though respondent’s principal occupatiuon was not the
carriage of goods for others.

(2) NO. The Court ruled that a certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment
a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also
complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations
and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private
respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary
certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy. Ruling: The hijacking
cannot be considered an exception to the liability of the common carrier because Article 1734 is a
closed list. However, due to the grave or irresistible force by the thieves, the occurrence of the loss
must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly
regarded as a fortuitous event. Hence, Cendena was not held liable for the loss of the merchandise.

BASCOS vs. CA and CIPRIANO DIGEST

MARCH 26, 2011   ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
BASCOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 101089
April 7, 1993
FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE
for short) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby
the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the
warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through
Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya
bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver
the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping
Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with their contract.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of
preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court granted the
writ of preliminary attachment.
In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage
since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to
Laguna and that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure,
exculpated petitioner from any liability
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos
ordering the latter to pay the former for actual damages for attorney’s fees and cost of
suit.
The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment” Bascos is DENIED
for being moot and academic.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioner a common carrier
(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
1. YES
In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner was a
common carrier, she alleged in this petition that the contract between her and Cipriano
was lease of the truck. She also stated that: she was not catering to the general public.
Thus, in her answer to the amended complaint, she said that she does business under
the same style of A.M. Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to those who
have cargo to move, not to the general public but to a few customers only in view of
the fact that it is only a small business.
We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a common carrier.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) person, corporation or
firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.” The test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a
part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general
public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.”
12 In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking
business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are
conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same. 13
But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their
services only to a select group of people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of
the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive. In referring to Article
1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus:
“The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.”
2. NO
Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was
not due to force majeure.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are
very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these
instances are enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases where the presumption is
applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in
order to overcome the presumption.
In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure which
exculpated her from liability for the loss of the cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Article
1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from
liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted
with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in accordance with Article
1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy; xx
(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers
who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or
diminished;” xx
NOTES:
1.  She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract as “lease”.
These affidavits were made by Jesus Bascos and by petitioner herself and Cipriano
and CIPTRADE did not object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the
transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Both the trial and appellate courts have
dismissed them as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound
by the appellate court’s factual conclusions. Yet, granting that the said evidence were
not self-serving, the same were not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of
lease. It must be understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not
what it is called by the contracting parties. Furthermore, petitioner presented no other
proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.
2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the substantial issues
involved, We find no reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve
the writ of preliminary attachment has been rendered moot and academic by the
decision on the merits.

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corp

G. R. No. 141910, August 6, 2002

FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the
plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the
Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road
along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU Insurance Corporation
(FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered
cargoes. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company
failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage
against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
plaintiff did not present any single evidence that would prove that defendant is a common carrier.
Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not warranted and the presumption of
fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of goods
during transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing. The Court of Appeals rejected the
appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor of GPS. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON GPS is a common carrier.

HELD:
NO. The Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be amply justified.
GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its
services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers
are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services
to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an
exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing
space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier. However, GPS cannot escape from
liability. Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between
it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or
damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the
obligation – in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives
rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual
obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so. Respondent driver,
on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to
pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal
and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties
who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical
position. In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory
force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance
of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

SORIAMONT STEAMSHIP AGENCIES AND KYOSEI KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA
G.R. No. 101503 September 15, 1993

FACTS:

Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of New York, U.S.A.,
9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk on 16 June 1974 aboard the cargo vessel
M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska, U.S.A., to Poro
Point, San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. KP-1 signed by the master of the vessel and
issued on the date of departure.

Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum" pursuant to the Uniform General Charter   was entered into
between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan. 

Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four (4) of her holds were all presumably inspected by the charterer's
representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk pursuant to par. 16 of the charter-party . After the Urea fertilizer was
loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids,
covered with three (3) layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout
the entire voyage.

Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steelbodied dump trucks which were parked alongside the berth, using metal
scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the charter-partly (which provided for an F.I.O.S. clause).
However,  the hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge. Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of
Urea was covered with tarpaulin. The port area was windy, certain portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and the
weather was variable, raining occasionally while the discharge was in progress.
 

It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo. A private marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc.
(CSCI), was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped, by taking draft readings of the vessel prior to and after
discharge. The survey report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI) revealed a shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that
a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt, sand and rust and rendered unfit for commerce.

Consequently, PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK,
representing the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped and the diminution in value of that portion said to have been
contaminated with dirt. Respondent SSA was not able to respond to this consignee’s claim for payment because according to
them, they only received a request for shortlanded certificate and not a formal claim.
 Hence, PPI filed an action for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendant carrier argued that the strict
public policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have become private carriers by reason of the
provisions of the charter-party. The court a quo however sustained the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant carrier for the
value of the goods lost or damaged.

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and absolved the carrier from liability for the value of the cargo
that was lost or damaged. Relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co.v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.,  the appellate
court ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common
carrier by reason of the time charterer-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a
presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party.

HELD: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, is affirmed.

A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another
person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part
of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of
freight; Charter parties are of two types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased
by the owner in part or as a whole, to carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by the terms of which
the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its
navigation, including the master and the crew, who are his servants. Contract of affreightment may either be time charter,
wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single
voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single
or consecutive voyage, the shipowner to supply the ship's stores, pay for the wages of the master and the crew, and defray the
expenses for the maintenance of the ship.
Upon the other hand, the term "common or public carrier" is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code.  The definition extends to
carriers either by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or
both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation. The distinction between a "common or public
carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction,
not a part of the general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation
offering such service is a private carrier.

It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and
compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control.
Hardly then can we charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the
charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the
ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation
were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. 

It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel
by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is
only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at
least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer.

Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, supra, is misplaced for
the reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation in the charter-party exempting the shipowners
from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent, and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. At any rate,
the rule in the United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier, does not find
application in our jurisdiction, for we have observed that the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and
/or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws, more particularly, the rules governing
common carriers.

In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped, the shipper or consignee should first prove
the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or damage while the same was in the possession, actual or constructive, of the carrier.
Thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to respondent to prove that he has exercised extraordinary diligence required by law or that
the loss, damage or deterioration of the cargo was due to fortuitous event, or some other circumstances inconsistent with its
liability.  To our mind, respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption
of negligence. Verily, the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has been efficaciously overcome by the
showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised by the carrier in the care of the cargo. The period during which private
respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required of it as a public carrier began from the time the cargo was
unconditionally placed in its charge after the vessel's holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and
until the vessel reached its destination and its hull was reexamined by the consignee, but prior to unloading.

Article 1734 of the New Civil Code provides that common carriers are not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of
the goods if caused by the charterer of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers. The Code of Commerce also
provides that all losses and deterioration which the goods may suffer during the transportation by reason of fortuitous
event, force majeure, or the inherent defect of the goods, shall be for the account and risk of the shipper, and that proof of these
accidents is incumbent upon the carrier. The carrier, nonetheless, shall be liable for the loss and damage resulting from the
preceding causes if it is proved, as against him, that they arose through his negligence or by reason of his having failed to take the
precautions which usage has established among careful persons. 
Thus, the petition is dismissed.

 Exercise of Extraordinary Diligence and Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

 Fortuitous Event

First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner, First Phil. Industrial Corporation (FirstPhil for brevity) is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No.
387, as amended, to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. FirstPhil applied for a mayor's permit, but before the mayor's
permit could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax pursuant to the Local Government
Code. Petitioner filed a letter-protest addressed to the respondent City Treasurer, but the latter denied the same contending that
petitioner cannot be considered engaged in transportation business, thus it cannot claim exemption under Section 133 (j) of the
Local Government Code.

FirstPhil filed with the RTC Batangas a complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents, contending that the imposition of tax upon them violates Sec 133 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand,
respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term "common carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as
trucks, trains, ships and the like. Respondents further posit that the term "common carrier" under the said code pertains to the
mode or manner by which a product is delivered to its destination.
RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that exemption granted under Sec. 133 (j) encompasses only "common carriers" so as not to
overburden the riding public or commuters with taxes. And that petitioner is not a common carrier, but a special carrier extending
its services and facilities to a single specific or "special customer" under a "special contract."

The case was elevated by the petitioner to the CA, but CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue:

WON the petitioner is a "common carrier" and, therefore, exempt from the business taxc

Held: Petition was granted. CA decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SC ruled in this case that petitioner is a common carrier and thus, exempt from business tax.

A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of
transporting persons or property from place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public generally. Art. 1732 of
the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public." The test
for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads; and
4. The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

The definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by
land, water or air. It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In fact, in the
United States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.

Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387), petitioner is considered a "common carrier.", and at the same
time, said act also regards petroleum operation as a public utility. BIR likewise considers the petitioner a "common carrier." In
so ruling, it held that, since petitioner is a pipeline concessionaire that is engaged only in transporting petroleum products, it is
considered a common carrier under Republic Act No. 387. Such being the case, it is not subject to withholding tax prescribed by
Revenue Regulations No. 13-78, as amended.

Section 133 (j), of the Local Government Code, provides:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by
hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code.
SC held that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of business tax
against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called "common carrier's tax."

Schmitz Transport and Brokerage Corp v Transort Venture Inc., GR 150255 April 22,2005

Facts:

On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V “Alexander
Saveliev” 545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil weighing 6,992,450 metric tons. The cargoes, which were to be discharged at the
port of Manila in favor of the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were insured against all risks with
Industrial Insurance Company Ltd. (Industrial Insurance) under Marine Policy No. M-91-3747-TIS. The vessel arrived at the
port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South
Harbor.

Schmitz Transport, whose services the consignee engaged to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the
shipside, and to deliver them to its (the consignee’s) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, in turn engaged the services of TVI to send a
barge and tugboat at shipside. TVI’s tugboat “Lailani” towed the barge “Erika V” to shipside. The tugboat, after positioning the
barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. Arrastre operator Ocean Terminal Services Inc. commenced to
unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge. By 12:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991 during which the weather condition
had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No tugboat
pulled the barge back to the pier, however. At around 5:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to strong waves, the crew of the barge
abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge pitched and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the 37
coils into the sea.

Little Giant thus filed a formal claim against Industrial Insurance which paid it the amount of P5,246,113.11.  Little Giant
thereupon executed a subrogation receipt in favor of Industrial Insurance. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against
Schmitz Transport, TVI, and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of Manila,
they faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading of the cargoes while typhoon signal No. 1 was raised. The RTC
held all the defendants negligent. Defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI filed a joint motion for reconsideration assailing the
finding that they are common carriers. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto,
finding that all the defendants were common carriers — Black Sea and TVI for engaging in the transport of goods and cargoes
over the seas as a regular business and not as an isolated transaction, and Schmitz Transport for entering into a contract with
Little Giant to transport the cargoes from ship to port for a fee.

Issue:

Whether or not Black Sea and TVI are common carriers

Held :

Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, this Court, as did the appellate court, finds that petitioner is a common carrier.  For it
undertook to transport the cargoes from the shipside of “M/V Alexander Saveliev” to the consignee’s warehouse at Cainta,
Rizal.  As the appellate court put it,  “as long as a person or corporation holds [itself] to the public for the purpose of
transporting goods as [a] business, [it] is already considered a common carrier regardless if [it] owns the vehicle to be used or
has to hire one.” That petitioner is a common carrier, the testimony of its own Vice-President and General Manager Noel Aro
that part of the services it offers to its clients as a brokerage firm includes the transportation of cargoes reflects so.

It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker may be regarded as a common carrier.  Thus, this Court, in A.F.
Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[44] held:
The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a customs broker, to be also a common carrier, as defined under
Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to wit,
Art. 1732.  Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to
the public.
xxx
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity.  The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker
whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft
of merit.  It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration.

And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc.,[46] this Court held that as the transportation of goods is an integral part of
a customs broker, the customs broker is also a common carrier.  For to declare otherwise “would be to deprive those with
whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its]
customers, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business.”

AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA
(Dec 21, 2004)

Facts:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage
fees for the cargoes. Part also of the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the consignee upon the
instruction of the shipper.

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of
Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out that at least 44 cartons containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett claimed
insurance from FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims damages against AF Sanchez who delivered the damaged
goods. AF Sanchez contended that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.

Issue: Is AF Sanchez a common carrier?

Held:

SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does not distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a
principal activity or merely as an ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF Sanchez is principally engaged as a
broker, it cannot be denied from the evidence presented that part of the services it offers to its customers is the delivery of the
goods to their respective consignees.

Note:
AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is improper packing. Under the CC, improper packing of the goods
is an exonerating circumstance. But in this case, the SC held that though the goods were improperly packed, since AF Sanchez
knew of the condition and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or reservation, the defense is deemed waived.

Crisostomo vs. CA
G.R. No. 138334 August 25, 2003

FACTS:

In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc.
to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed “Jewels of Europe”. The package tour
included the countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein, Switzerland and France at a total cost of
P74,322.70.Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the amount, which included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived
because petitioner’s niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent company’s ticketing manager.

Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunt’s residence on June 12, 1991 – a Wednesday – to deliver petitioner’s travel
documents and plane tickets.Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package tour.Menor then told her to be at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday,two hours before her flight on board British Airways.

Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of
her journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight she was supposed to take had already
departed the previous day.She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up
Menor to complain.

Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour – the “British Pageant” – which included England, Scotland
and Wales in its itinerary. For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then
prevailing exchange rate of P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip in
July 1991.

Upon petitioner’s return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61,421.70, representing the
difference between the sum she paid for “Jewels of Europe” and the amount she owed respondent for the “British Pageant” tour.
Despite several demands, respondent company refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same was non-
refundable.Petitioner was thus constrained to file a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and damages,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-133 and raffled to Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Estela Crisostomo.
But it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the Caravan Travel and Tours liable for reimbursement and damages?

HELD: Petition DENIED.

By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.Such person or association of persons
are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers.A common carrier is
defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.

It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers
or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one
place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services
as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company, this does not mean that the
latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately
contracted for her carriage to Europe. Respondent’s obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner
was properly booked with the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination, meanwhile,
pertained directly to the airline.

The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the latter’s service of arranging and facilitating petitioner’s
booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage is
the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one
for services and not one of carriage. Petitioner’s submission is premised on a wrong assumption.It is thus not bound under the law
to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.

Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good
father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily
prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended
the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that Menor’s negligence concurred with the negligence of petitioner and
resultantly caused damage to the latter. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the evidence on record shows that respondent exercised
due diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to
petitioner. As correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket. issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and
time, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were
likewise delivered to petitioner two days prior to the trip. Respondent also properly booked petitioner for the tour, prepared the
necessary documents and procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioner’s hotel accommodation as well as food, land transfers
and sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking. Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed its
prestation under the contract as well as everything else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour.

Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage.

3. Distinction from towage, arrester and stevedoring

4. Governing Laws
5. Registered Owner Rule and Kabit System

B. OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES AND DEFENSES

1. Duties of Common Carrier

Sps. Pereña vs. Sps. Zarate

G.R. No. 157917, August 29, 2012

FACTS:
Sps. Zarate, parents of Aaron Zarate, engaged the services of Sps. Pereña for the adequate and safe
transportation carriage of the former spouses’ son from their residence to his school. During the
effectivity of the contract of carriage, Aaron Zarate died in connection with a vehicular/train collision
which occurred while Aaron was riding the contracted carrier. At the time of the said collision, there
were no safety warning signs and railings at the site commonly used for railroad crossing. The site of
the collision was not intended by the railroad operator for railroad crossing at the time of the
collision. PNR refused to acknowledge any liability for the collision. In Sps. Pereña’s defense, they
adduces evidence to show that they had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Alfaro, the driver, by making sure that Alfaro had been issued a driver’s
license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to the collision. The RTC ruled in
favor of Sps. Zarate and held the Pereñas and PNR jointly and severally liable for the death of Aaron
plus damages. The CA upheld the award for the loss of Aaron’s earning capacity, plus damages, and
the award for Attorney’s fees was deleted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Pereñas and PNR are jointly and severally liable for damages.

HELD:
YES. The defense of the Pereñas that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family has no
merit because they operated as common carriers and that their standard of care was extraordinary
diligence, not the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. The Pereñas, acting as a common
carrier, were already presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident because death had
occurred to their passenger. The presumption for negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the
burden of evidence on their shoulders to establish that they had not been negligent. There is no
question that the Pereñas did not overturn the presumption of their negligence by credible evidence.
Their defense of having observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their driver was not legally sufficient. PNR was also found guilty of negligence because
it did not ensure the safety of others through the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs,
and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there. Hence,
the Pereñas and PNR should jointly and severally be liable for the death of Aaron Zarate.

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1997)

Facts:

NSC hired MV Vlasons I, a private vessel owned by VSI. They entered into a contract of voyage charter hire wherein the contract
states that NSC hired VSI's vessel to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor,
Manila. On arrival and upon opening the three hatches containing the shipment, nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled
sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. NSC filed a complaint for damages but RTC dismissed the complaint

Issues:
1. whether VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or as a private carrier
2. Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on common carriers pursuant to which there exist[s]
a presumption of negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable to a
private carrier.

Held:

1. VSI was not a common carrier but a private carrier. It is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general
public. The extent of VSI's responsibility and liability over NSC's cargo are determined primarily by the stipulations in
the contract of carriage or charter party and the Code of Commerce. The burden of proof lies on the part of NSC and
not the VSI.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public." It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods,
provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does not
qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. "Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement
and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. . . ."

2. Because the MV Vlason I was a private carrier, the shipowner's obligations are governed by the provisions of the Code
of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a
common carrier.

IN A CONTRACT OF PRIVATE CARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASE OF ACCIDENT IS ON THE

CARRIER but the court exempts VSI due to force majeure.

NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by VSI's willful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in
making MV Vlason I seaworthy and fit for holding, carrying and safekeeping the cargo. The burden of proof was placed on NSC
by the parties' agreement.

Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA

Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the consignee's warehouse at
Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in
damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer, indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought
recovery from petitioner. Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the Court ruled in the affirmative.
The principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its barges to the public, although for limited
clientele, for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in its care and custody of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. The barge completely sank after
its towing bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate and only
cause of the loss and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence. HCISED

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.

RULING: YES.

Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an
only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain
terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a common carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The
test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he
has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the case at
bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its barges to the public, despite
its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation..offering their services to the public.
Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route,
maintains no terminals, and issues no tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not
bound to carry goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs. Court
of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. They are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the
presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, deterioration of the goods, the common
carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil
Code enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible
for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood,
storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its cargo. Petitioner claims
that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the loss of the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove
that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during
and after the occurrence of the typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that, even before the towing bits of
the barge broke, it had already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked at the Engineering Island. It
even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its
hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to sail
safely. Thus, when petitioner persisted to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.

AIR FRANCE vs.

CARRASCOSO and COURT
OF APPEALS [G.R. No. L-
21438, September
28, 1966]
Facts

          On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a “first
class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager
of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the “first class” seat that
he was occupying because there was a “white man”, who, the Manager
alleged, had a “better right” to the seat. When asked to vacate his “first
class” seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man” and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his “first class” seat in the plane.

Issue

Whether there is a breach of contract of carriage between Air France and

Carrascoso that would hold Air France liable for damages.

Ruling

Yes. Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public

duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Air France v. Carrascoso

Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA (1966) / Sanchez

Facts

Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to
Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at
Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because a "white man" had a "better
right" to it. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by
fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.

     Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the
parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the
availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.

Issue and Holding

WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES

On the seat issue

If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a passenger have?
It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there was a contrary verbal
agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first class seat before coming
to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a better right to it.

Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.—A writtendocument speaks a uniform language; the spoken
word could benotoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relationsbetween passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the terms of aticket is desirable.

BOOK:
CHAPTER IV
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIERS
May the injured passenger file also a case of culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict against the common
carrier even if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship between them. It seems that the
injured passenger may opt also to file a quasi-delict case if the act that breaks the contract
resulted in tort. (Air France v. Carrascoso, September 28, 1966) However, in cases of culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict, the injured passenger has the burden of proving the negligence of the
common carrier and his driver, and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employee is a complete defense of the common carrier as employer to avoid civil liability.

Carlos Singson v. Court of Appeals and Cathay Pacific Airways, Inc.

G.R. No. 119995, November 18,1997

CHAPTER IV
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIERS

FACTS:
The instant case is an illustration of the exacting standard demanded by the law of common
carriers. On 24 May 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought
from Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), at its Metro Manila ticket outlet two open-dated,
identically routed, round trip plane tickets for the purpose of spending their vacation in the
United States. Each ticket consisted of six flight coupons corresponding to this itinerary: flight
coupon No. 1 — Manila to Hongkong; flight coupon No. 2 — Hongkong to San Francisco; flight
coupon No. 3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles; flight coupon No. 4 — Los Angeles back to San
Francisco; flight coupon No. 5 — San Francisco to Hongkong; and finally, flight coupon No. 6
— Hongkong to Manila. The procedure was that at the start of each leg of the trip a flight coupon
corresponding to the particular sector of the travel would be removed from the ticket booklet so
that at the end of the trip no more coupons would be left in the ticket booklet.
On June 6, 1988, CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino Tiongson left Manila on board
CATHAY’s flight No. 902. They arrived safely in Los Angeles and after staying there for about
three weeks they decided to return to the Philippines. On June 30, 1988, they arranged for their
return flight at CATHAY’s Los Angeles Office and chose July 1, 1988, a Friday, for their
departure. While Tiongson easily got a booking for the flight, SINGSON was not as lucky. It
was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight coupon No. 5 corresponding to the San
Francisco-Hongkong leg of the trip. Instead, what was in his ticket was flight coupon No. 3 —
San Francisco to Los Angeles — which was supposed to have been used and removed from the
ticket booklet. It was not until July 6, 1988 that CATHAY was finally able to arrange for his
return flight to Manila.
On August 26, 1988, SINGSON commenced an action for damages against CATHAY before the
Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. He claimed that he insisted on CATHAY’s
confirmation of his return flight reservation because of very important and urgent business
engagements in the Philippines. But CATHAY allegedly shrugged off his protestations and
arrogantly directed him to go to San Francisco himself and do some investigations on the matter
or purchase a new ticket subject to refund if it turned out that the missing coupon was still
unused or subsisting. He remonstrated that it was the airline’s agent/representative who must
have committed the mistake of tearing off the wrong flight coupon; that he did not have enough
money to buy new tickets; and, CATHAY could conclude the investigation in a matter of
minutes because of its facilities. CATHAY, allegedly in scornful insolence, simply dismissed
him like an impertinent “brown pest.” Thus, he and his cousin Tiongson, who deferred his own
flight to accompany him, were forced to leave for San Francisco on the night of July 1, 1988 to
verify the missing ticket.
CATHAY denied these allegations and averred that since petitioner was holding an “open-dated”
ticket, which meant that he was not booked
on a specific flight on a particular date, there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that
CATHAY’S refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of
carriage. Moreover, the coupon had been missing for almost a month; hence, CATHAY must
first verify its status, i.e., whether the ticket was still valid and outstanding, before it could issue
a replacement ticket to petitioner. For that purpose, it set a request by telex on the same day, July
1, 1988, to its Hongkong Headquarters where such information could be retrieved. However, due
to the time difference between Los Angeles and Hongkong, no response from the Hongkong
office was immediately received. Besides, since July 2 and 3, 1988 were a Saturday and a
Sunday, respectively, and July 4, 1988 was an official holiday being U.S. Independence Day, the
telex response of CATHAY Hongkong was not read until July 5, 1988. Lastly, CATHAY denied
having required SINGSON to make a trip back to San Francisco; on the other hand, it was the
latter that informed CATHAY that he was making a side trip to San Francisco. Hence, CATHAY
advised him that the response of Hongkong would be copied in San Francisco so that he could
conveniently verify thereat should he wish to.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty
of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay
petitioner P20,000 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from
August 26, 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid; P500,000 for moral damages;
P400,000 for exemplary damages; PI00,000 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs.
On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that there was
gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by
deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s fees as well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees for failing to book petitioner on his return flight to the
Philippines.

HELD:
With regard to the second issue, the Court is of the firm view that the appellate court seriously
erred in disallowing moral and
exemplary damages. Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of
a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the
negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which
case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages.
However, the P500,000 moral damages and P400,000 exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court have to be reduced. The well- entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages
depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion
is limited by the principle that the “amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive” as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
court. Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason
of the defendant’s culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what
would be fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
facts.
As regards attorney’s fees, they may be awarded when the defendant’s act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It
was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court;
consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney’s fees and the amount of P25,000, instead of
PI00,000 earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable.

BA Finance Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992

 
Facts:
Amare, the driver of an Isuzu truck was involved in an accident which caused the death of
three persons. Amare was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence. BA
Finance was found liable for damages since the truck was registered in its name. BA Finance
contends that it should not be held liable since it was not Amare’s employer at the time of the
accident. It also contends that the Isuzu truck was in the possession of Rock Component Phil,
by virtue of a lease agreement. Hence, BA Finance wants to prove who the actual/real owner is
at the time of the accident, and in accordance with such proof, evade liability and lay the same
on the person actually owning the vehicle.

Issues:
1 WON BA Finance should be held liable.
2 WON BA Finance can escape liability by proving the actual/real owner of the truck.

Held:
1 Yes, BA Finance is liable.
The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the
injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said
vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. Under the same
principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should
primarily be responsible to the public or to the third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.

2 No, the law does not allow him. The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him
directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or
consequence of registration. This may appear harsh but nevertheless, a registered owner who
has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the
same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee
or transferee of the vehicle.
While the registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused, he  has a right to
be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as
damage for the injury caused.

Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court

(G.R. No. 70876 July 19, 1990)

FACTS:
Greenhills Wood Industries - bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue StarMahogany, Inc.
100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the understanding thatan initial delivery would be made.
Greenhills resident manager in Maddela, Dominador Cruz, contracted VirgilioLicuden, the
driver of a cargo truck, to transport its sawn lumber to the consigneeBlue Star in Valenzuela,
Bulacan; this cargo truck was registered in the name ofMa. Luisa Benedicto, the proprietor of
Macoven Trucking, a business enterpriseengaged in hauling freight the Manager of Blue Star
called up Greenhills’president informing him that the sawn lumber on board the subject cargo
truckhad not yet arrived in Valenzuela, Bulacan; because of the delay in delivery BlueStar was
constrained to look for other suppliers
Greenhill’s filed criminal case against driver Licuden for estafa; and a civil casefor recovery of
the value of the lost sawn lumber plus damages against Benedicto
Benedicto denied liability as she was a complete stranger to the contract ofcarriage, the subject
truck having been earlier sold by her to Benjamin Tee; butthe truck had remained registered in her
name because Tee have not yet fullypaid the amount of the truck; be that as it may, Tee had been
operating the saidtruck in Central Luzon from that and Licuden was Tee’s employee and not hers

ISSUE:
WoN Benedicto, being the registered owner of the carrier, should be held liable for thevalue of
the undelivered or lost sawn lumber

HELD:
YES. The registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of thecarrier,
even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred toanother person.
This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehiclesregistered under the Public
Service Law, the public has the right to assume that theregistered owner is the actual or lawful
owner thereof It would be very difficult and oftenimpossible as a practical matter, for members
of the general public to enforce the rightsof action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the
vehicles being negligentlyoperated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is.
Greenhills is notrequired to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the
owner of thecarrier.

Equitable Leasing vs. Suyom

Facts:
A Fuso Road tractor driven by Tutor rammed into the house cum of Tamayo which resulted in
the death of Tamayo’s son and Oledan’s daughter. Failure to claim from a criminal case finding
Tutor guilty of reckless imprudence, respondents filed a civil case based on quasi delict against
Equitable Leasing Corp, the registered owner of the tractor, among others. Equitable contends
that it should not be held liable for such damages which arose from the negligence of the
driver Fuso Road. That such tractor was already sold to the owner of Fuso Road at the time of
the accident. Thus, not having employed driver Tutor, it could not have controlled or
supervised him.
Issue: WON Equitable should be held liable for damages in an action based on quasi delict for
the negligent acts of a driver who was not its employee.
Held: Yes, Equitable should be held liable because it was the registered owner at the time of
the accident.
The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if
the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.
-----------------
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
 

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Lucila Viana, Sps. Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, and Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation G.R. No. 84458, November 6,1989

FACTS: The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10. On May 12,1975, said vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck, which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel
had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation.

The crane owned by the third-party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one
(1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was
being operated, Anacleto Viana, who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded
in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded
that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired
three days thereafter, on May 15, 1975.

ISSUE: Whether or not the victim’s presence in the vessel after one hour from his disembarkation was no longer reasonable and he consequently
ceased to be a passenger.

HELD: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain
on the premises for a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable
delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to look after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if,
for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
“In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggage which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel,
the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running

board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down
from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot
be claimed that the carrier’s agent had exercised the ‘utmost diligence’ of a ‘very cautious person’ required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to
be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers, x x x The presence of said passengers near
the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage.” The presence of passengers at the carriers’ premises is reasonable.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger’s reasonable presence
within the carrier’s premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind
of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element
per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable
interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier’s premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or
near the petitioner’s vessel. It is submitted that there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner’s business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of
time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of
passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter
bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour, as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and

claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner
cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger’s cargoes, that the ruling
in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, [W]e
cannot in reason doubt that the victim, Anacleto Viana, was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only
to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this.
What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with
common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had
just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in
petitioner’s premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage, which was possibly only one hour after the vessel, arrived
since it was admittedly a standard procedure in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim, Anacleto Viana, is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic
death.
Common carriers required to exercise extraordinary diligence in contract of carriage of passengers; Reasons.