1. X brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR.

He paid its freight charges and was issued Way Bill no. 1. The cargo
was loaded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any permission, X boarded the freight wagon and not the
passenger coach. Shortly after the trainstarted, it was derailed. The freight wagon fell on its side, killing X. There is no
evidence that X brought a ticket or paid his fare at the same time that he paid the freight charges for his cargo. Is X a
passenger of PNR?

A: No, X was not a “passenger.” X, who was a “stowaway,” was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier assumes no duty of
care in favor of X. (1989)

2. City Railways, Inc. (CRI) provides train service, for a fee, to commuters from Manila to Calamba, Laguna.
Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to the designated loading and unloading facilities to
board the train. Ricardo Santos purchased a ticket for Calamba and entered the station. While waiting, he had an
altercation with the security guards of CRI leading to a fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on the railway just as a train was
entering the station. Ricardo Santos was run over by the train. He died. In the action for damages filed by the heirs of
Ricardo Santos, CRI interposed lack of cause of action, contending that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos
boarded the train and that it was not guilty of negligence. Decide.

A: The contention of CRI that the heirs have no cause of action is untenable. There was already a perfected contract to
carry Ricardo Santos and the carrier already owed him extraordinary diligence. The obligation of the carrier to carry
Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached, hence, CRI is liable for culpa-contractual. (2008)

3. AM Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basis. It caters to only a few customers,
and its trucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have a certificate of public convenience. On
one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a fee, 100 sacks of rice from Manila to Tarlac. However, AM
failed to deliver the cargo, because its truck was hijacked when the driver stopped in Bulacan to visit his girlfriend.
May Reynaldo hold AM as a common carrier?

A: Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Article 1732 does not make any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. This is also consistent with the definition of public service under the Public Service Act. (De Guzman v. CA,
168 SCRA 612 [1988])

4. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus
principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. The couple had a
driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two weeks, His job was to take school
children to and from the St. Scholastica‟s College in Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word
for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its
Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of F3,000.00 through the petitioner‟s minibus. The group was scheduled to leave on
November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o‟clock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the party were late, the bus did
not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o‟clock in the evening. Petitioner
Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the
bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to
La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night,
petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as
“siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit theleft traffic steel brace and sign along the road
and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only
after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its
front portion. Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove
her from this portion. She was in great pain and could not move. The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see
the curve until it was too late. He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite
the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the
curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it
was too late. Are the petitioners operating as common carriers during the time of the accident?

A: Yes. It does not matter that the bus carried the passengers based on a special agreement and that the passengers are
limited to a certain group. Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
“a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,”
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. (Fabre, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996)

(Note that the driver was considered grossly negligence considering the fact that it was raining and the road was
slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was
only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain. In the same case, petitioners argued that they
were not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible by the congregation‟s delayed meeting) could have
averted the mishap and (2) under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. The Court
ruled that neither of these contentions holds water because the hour ofdeparture had not been fixed and that even if it
had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident.)

6. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as
charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1, 100 metric tons of silica quartz on
board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc. Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received
and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for Tagoloan the
next day. The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santo sank in the afternoon
of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of the cargo. MCCII filed a
claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine Home Assurance Corporation. Respondent
paid the claim in the amount of P211,500 and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII. Thereafter, it filed a case in the
RTC against CSC for reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII. CSC claims that it is not liable insisting that the
agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS).
Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and supervision over the vessel, its
master and crew. Thus, it could not allegedly be held liable for the loss of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship
it did not own. Will the action prosper?

A: Yes, the action will prosper. There is a contract of carriage of goods between CSC and MCCII; the cargo was loaded on
board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner failed to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure. The voyage charter
here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.

CSC was the one that contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it
would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that it did not own
the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a common
carrier. The MCCII (respondent‟s subrogor) could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the
vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the
general public to enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know whom the
actual owner of the vessel is. In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated the petitioner as the “owner/
operator” of the vessel.

The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had been received for
transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS. This is consistent
with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract
of carriage between the parties, it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and
petitioner executed.

Finally, petitioner cannot argue that MCCII should be held liable forits own loss since the voyage charter
stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer‟s account. This deserves scant consideration. This simply meant
that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the
breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary to public policy.

The idea proposed by petitioner is not only pre-posterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that enters
into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the vessel it chooses to use. MCCII
never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to
permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging
non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate from the carrier‟s duty of extraordinary diligence. It
would also open the door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of
liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages. (Cebu Salvage
Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 150403, January 25, 2007)

6. Tirso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the purpose of
transporting two tractors to his logging concession. The crane operator of the shipping company somehow negligently
puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other. During the trip, a strong wind hits the vessel, causing
severe damage to the tractors. Tirso Molina sues the shipping company for damages. The latter cites a stipulation in
the charter agreement exempting the company from liability for loss or damage arising from the negligence of its
agents. Tirso Molina countered by stating that the aforementioned stipulation is against public policy and therefore,
null and void. Is the stipulation valid? Would you hold the shipping company liable?

A: Yes. The stipulation is valid if there was bareboat charter. A common carrier that undertakes to carry a special cargo
or charter to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner
from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid, being not against public policy. Hence, Star Shipping Company is not
liable.

7. During the elections last May, AB, a congressional candidate in Marinduque, chartered the helicopter owned by
Lobe Mining Corporation (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid LMC the same rate normally charged by
companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering business. In the charter agreement between LMC and AB, LMC
expressly disclaimed any responsibility for the acts or omissions of its pilot or for the defective condition of the
plane‟s engine. The helicopter crashed killing AB. Investigations disclose that the pilot‟s error was the cause of the
accident. LMC now consults you on its possible liability for AB‟s death in the light of the above findings. How would
you reply to LMC‟s query?

A: I would reply to LMC that it may not be held liable for the death of AB. A stipulation with private carrier that would
disclaim responsibility for simple negligence of the carrier‟s employees is a valid stipulation. Such stipulation, however,
will not hold in case of liability for gross negligence or bad faith.

8. C Co. shipped 20,000 bags of soy beans through S/S Melon, owned and operated by X Shipping Lines, consigned to
the Toyo Factory and insured by the Surety Insurance Co., against all risks. C Co. hired the entire vessel, with the
option to go north or south, loading, stowing and discharging at its risks and expense. The owner and the shipper
agree on a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agents.

` When the cargo as delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to P10,500.00. The insurance
company paid for the damage and sought reimbursement from the X Shipping Lines as carrier. Is the carrier liable?

A: X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter. X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a special cargo or
chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. Hence, the New Civil Code provisions on common carriers
cannot be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation
exempting the ship owner from liability for the negligence of its agents is not against policy and is deemed valid.

9.While at sea, the captain of vessel A received distress signals from vessel B, and vessel A responded and found
vessel B with engine failure and drifting off course. Upon acceptance by vessel B of vessel A’s offer, vessel A
connected two lines to vessel B and towed it safely to port. There was no grave marine peril because the sea was
smooth and vessel B was far from the rocks. In a suit for compensation for towage, who are entitled to recover, the
owner, the crew, or both? Give brief reasons. (1979 Bar)

A: The shipowner of the towing vessel is entitled to compensation. What is involved in the present case is towage and
not salvage. Hence, contract is between the owner of the towing vessel and the shipowner of the vessel that is being
towed. Services are rendered by the towing vessel for which it is entitled to compensation. It would be different if the
case involves salvage where the members of the crew of the vessel that performed the salvage are entitled to
compensation. However, there is no salvage in the present case but a contract of towage.

10. A is the registered owner of a truck for hire. He sold the truck to B and possession was immediately delivered to B
who operated the same. The truck however, remained registered in the name of A. While operating the truck, B‟s
driver ran over a child who died thereafter. The heirs of the child sued A for damages. A‟s defense is that he cannot
be held liable as he had already sold the truck to B and it was B‟s driver who was responsible for the accident. Decide
with reasons.

A: A is liable to the heirs of the victim. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to be liable to
third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true
owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.

11. A was driving a jeepney registered in the name of B. The jeepney, while being driven negligently by A, hit and
injured X, so X sued B for damages. The defense of B was that he sold the jeepney to C and that X should sue C. Rule
on B‟s defense, with reasons.

A: The defense of B is untenable and he is liable to X. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to
be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle. Hence, B, being the registered owner,
continues to be the owner of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons. (1979)

12. Mr. Villa, a franchise holder and registered owner of a truck for hire, entered into a lease contract with Mrs.
Santos for the lease by the latter of said truck. The lease contract was not brought to the knowledge of the LFTRB and
was therefore not approved by the Land LFTRB. One stormy night, the said truck was speeding along EDSA, skidded
and ran over X who died on the spot. The parents of X brought an action for damages against Mr. Villa for the death
of their son.

a) Will the action against Mr. Villa prosper? Reasons.

b) What recourse, if any, does X have?

A: a) Yes, the action against Mr. Villa will prosper. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to be
liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is
its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle. This is especially true in cases involving holders of
franchises. The holders of franchises are liable to the public even if their vehicles are leased to another without prior
approval of the appropriate government agency. (MYC Agro-b) An action for quasi-delict can also be maintained by the
heirs of X against Mrs. Santos and/or the driver of the vehicle. The driver may also be charged criminally liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

13. Johnny owns a Sarao jeepney. He asked his neighbor Van if he could operate the said jeep under Van‟s certificate
of public convenience. Van agreed and, accordingly, Johnny registered his jeep in Van‟s name.

On June 10, 1990, one of the passenger jeepneys operated by Van bumped Tomas. Tomas was injured and in
due time, he filed a complaint for damages against Van and his driver for the injuries he suffered. The court rendered
judgment in favor of Tomas and ordered Van and his driver, jointly and severally liable, to pay Tomas actual and
moral damages, attorney‟s fees and costs.

The sheriff levied on the jeepney belonging to Johnny but registered in the name of Van. Johnny filed a third-
party claim with the sheriff alleging ownership of the jeepney levied upon and stating that the jeepney was registered
in the name of Van merely to enable Johnny to make use of Van‟s certificate of public convenience.

May the sheriff proceed with the public auction of Johnny‟s jeepney?

A: Yes, the sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney. The vehicle remains to be the property of the
registered owner despite the alleged transfer to another. As regards the public and third persons, the vehicle is
considered the property of the registered operator. (Santos v. Sibug, 104 SCRA 520 [1990])

14. A, in Manila, shipped on board a vessel of B, chairs to be used in the movie house of consignee C in Cebu. No date
for delivery or indemnity for delay was stipulated. The chairs, however, were not claimed promptly by C and were
shipped by mistake back to Manila, where it was discovered and reshipped to Cebu. By the time the chairs arrived,
the date of inauguration of the movie house passed by and it had to be postponed. C brings an action for damages
against B claiming loss of profits during the Christmas season when he expected the movie house to be opened.
Decide the case with reasons.

A: C may sue B for the loss of his profits provided that ample proof thereof is presented in court. The carrier is obligated
to transport the goods without delay. The carrier is liable if he is guilty of delay in the shipment of cargo, causing
damages to the consignee. (1979)
15. If a shipper, without changing the place of delivery changes the consignment of consignee of the goods (after said
goods had been delivered to the carrier), under what condition will the carrier be required to comply with the new
orders of the shipper?

A: Article 360 provides that if the shipper should change the consignee of the goods without changing their destination,
the carrier shall comply with the new order provided the shipper returns to the carrier the bill of lading and a new one is
issued showing the novation of the contract. However, the shipper must pay all expenses for the change. (1975)

16. Maria boarded a passenger truck owned by Metro Transit and driven by Juan. While the truck was proceeding to
its destination, it fell into a ravine and several passengers, including Maria were killed. The truck was insured under a
Common Carrier‟s policy with Island Insurance Company. State the liabilities, if any, of Metro Transit to the heirs of
Maria.

A: Metro Transit is liable to the heirs of Maria for breach of contract of carriage. It is clear that there was breach of
contract of carriage because the passenger died while riding the carrier. The fact that death or injury was caused gives
rise to the presumption of negligence. (1968)

17. A shipped 100 pieces of plywood from Davao City to Manila. He took a marine insurance policy to insure the
shipment against loss or damage due to “perils of the sea, barratry, fire, jettison, pirates and other such perils.” When
the ship left the port of Davao, the shipman in charge forgot to secure one of the portholes, through which sea water
seeped during the voyage, damaging the plywood. A filed a claim against the insurance company which refused to pay
on the ground that the loss or damage was due to a peril of the sea or any of the risks covered by the policy. It was
admitted that the sea was reasonably calm during the voyage and that no strong winds or waves were encountered
by the vessel. How would you decide the case? Explain.

A: The insurer validly refused to pay because the proximate cause of the damage to the plywood was not the perils or
risks insured against but rather the negligence of the shipman in charge in forgetting to secure one of the portholes of
the ship. However, A can recover his damages from the shipowner or ship agent of said vessel, for not having exercised
extraordinary diligence on vigilance over goods. (1983)

18. Peter hailed a taxicab owned and operated by Jimmy Cheng and driven by Hemie Cortez. Peter asked Cortez to
take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab collided with a passenger jeepney, as a result of
which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured his left leg. Peter sued Jimmy for damages, based upon a contract of
carriage, and Peter won. Jimmy wanted to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that the
trial court erred in not making an express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was responsible for the collision and,
hence, civilly liable to Peter. He went to see you for advice. What will you tell him? Explain your answer.

A: I will counsel Jimmy to desist from challenging the decision. The cause of action of Peter is culpa contractual, hence,
the carrier‟s negligence is presumed. The presumption arises because there is no question that there was a contract of
carriage between Peter and the carrier and Peter was injured while under the care of the said carrier. Consequently, the
burden of proof rests on Jimmy to establish that despite an exercise of utmost diligence the collision could not have
been avoided. (1990)

19. In an action grounded on the contract of carriage, is there a need for the court to make an express finding of fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it liable for claims in behalf of the injured or deceased
passengers? Explain.
A: No, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in the case of death or injuries
to passengers. The burden is upon the carrier to prove that he observed the utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
with due regard for all circumstances. (1982)

20. In a court case involving claims for damages arising from death and injury of bus passengers, counsel for the bus
operator files a demurrer to evidence arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs did not
submit any evidence that the operator or its employees were negligent. If you were the judge, would you dismiss the
complaint?

A: No, I will not dismiss the complaint provided that there was proof of the death of and/or injury to passengers.
Negligence on the part of the carrier is presumed the moment the passenger with whom the carrier had a contract is
injured. The burden is on the common carrier to prove that he has a valid defense. (1997)

21. Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good order and condition at
New York, U.S.A., on board the defendant‟s steamship President Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff in
the City of Manila, all freight charges paid. The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order and
damaged condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a partial loss of the other. The loss in one case is
PI,630.00, and the other P700.00, for which he filed his claims, and defendant has refused and neglected to pay, giving
as its reason that the damage in question “was caused by sea water.” Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff?

A: Yes, the defendant is liable. The defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to
deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the
defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and
supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes
were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the
defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from
liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the
knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require
the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees
of the defendant‟s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That
is not the law.

Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when
goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad
order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the
reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress,
no matter what may have caused the damage.

And the evidence for the defendant shows that the damage was largely caused by “sea water,” from which it
contends that it is exempt under the provisions of its bill of lading and the provisions of the Article 361 of the Code of
Commerce.

In the final analysis, the cases were received by the defendant in New York in good order and condition, and
when they arrived in Manila, they were in bad condition, and one was a total loss. The fact that the cases were damaged
by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause
beyond the defendant‟s control. The words perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant‟s brief apply to “all kinds of marine
casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals,
icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the
shipowner is excused.” “Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or
‘accident.’ ” (Amado Mirasol v. The Robert Dollar Co., G.R. No. L- 29721, March 27, 1929)

22. It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose Marcial
K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire owned and operated by
defendant corporation under the business name “Avis Coupon Taxi” (Avis) and driven by its employee and authorized
driver Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher‟s Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At about 11:00 p.m., the
taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high
speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to
pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the
flyover and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla) was
unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram
the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the
vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla
who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the accident. The death certificate issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his death as vehicular accident. G&S argues that it is not liable
because the collision was allegedly unforeseen since its driver had every right to expect that the delivery van would
just overtake him and not hit the side of the taxi. Is G&S liable?

A: Yes, G&S is liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial. What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of
carriage between G & S , as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said
vehicle. As a common carrier, G&S “is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” However, Jose
Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. “In a contract of carriage,
it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is
even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.”
Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome this presumption because it is clear that the accident which led to Jose
Marcial‟s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of G&S‟ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G&S liable
to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage. (Heirs of Marcial K. Ochoa v. G&S Transport Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 170071 and 170125, March 9, 2011)

23. S shipped goods from Australia on board a foreign vessel owned and operated by X shipping company, based in
Australia and represented in the Philippines by R. The goods were consigned to T of Manila and insured by U against
all risks. Upon arrival in Manila Bay, the goods were discharged from the vessel to a lighter owned by the Bay
Brokerage Co. When delivered to and received by T, the goods were found to have sustained losses or damages.
Evidence disclosed that the damage occurred while the goods were in the custody of the carrier. The insurance
company paid the amount of the loss but sought reimbursement from X and/or R. R disclaimed any liability alleging
that he is a mere agent of X, and having acted as agent of a disclosed principal is, therefore, not liable. What is the
liability, if any, of Bay Brokerage Co.?

A: Bay Brokerage Co. has no liability. The facts indicate that the goods were not yet delivered to the brokerage company
when they were damaged. Even if the said company can be considered a common carrier, its duty starts only upon
delivery of the goods.

24. Star Shipping Lines accepted 100 cartons of sardines from Master to be delivered to 555 Company in Manila. Only
88 cartons were delivered, however, these were in bad condition. 555 Company claimed from Star Shipping Lines the
value of the missing goods, as well as the damaged goods. Star Shipping Lines refused because the former failed to
present a bill of lading. Resolve with reasons the claim of 555 Company.

A: The claim of 555 Company must prosper. The carrier breached its obligation to safely transport the goods to its
destination. The fact that the shipper was not able to present the bill of lading is not a bar to recovery. The contract of
carriage was already perfected and effective despite the absence of the bill of lading. (2005)

25. Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment consisting of 1,986.627 k/1 Automotive Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at
the Bataan Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to the bulk depot in Bacolod City of Caltex Phils., Inc.
(Caltex). On August 7, shipment arrived in Bacolod City. Immediately thereafter, unloading operations commenced.
The discharging of the diesel oil started at about 1:30 PM of the same day. However, at about 10:30 PM, the
discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port bow mooring of the vessel was intentionally
cut or stolen by unknown persons. Because there was nothing holding it, the vessel drifted westward, dragged and
stretched the flexible rubber hose attached to the riser, broke the elbow into pieces, severed completely the rubber
hose connected to the tanker from the main delivery line at sea bed level and ultimately caused the diesel oil to spill
into the sea. To avoid further spillage, the vessel‟s crew tried water flushing to clear the line of the diesel oil but to no
avail. In the meantime, the shore tender, who was waiting for the completion of the water flushing, was surprised
when the tanker signaled a “red light” which meant stop pumping. Unaware of what happened, the shore tender,
thinking that the vessel would, at any time, resume pumping, did not shut the storage tank gate valve. As all the gate
valves remained open, the diesel oil that was earlier discharged from the vessel into the shore tank backflowed. Due
to non-availability of a pump boat, the vessel could not send somebody ashore to inform the people at the depot
about what happened. After almost an hour, a gauger and an assistant surveyor from the Caltex‟s Bulk Depot Office
boarded the vessel. It was only then that they found out what had happened. Thereafter, the duo immediately went
ashore to see to it that the shore tank gate valve was closed. The loss of diesel oil due to spillage was placed at
113.788 k/1 while some 435,081 k/1 thereof backflowed from the shore tank. As a result of spillage and backflow of
diesel oil, Caltex sought recovery of the loss from Delsan, but the latter refused to pay. Delsan‟s argued that it should
not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to backflow because the same had already been actually and legally
delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore tank. Is the argument tenable?

A: No. Delsan‟s argument that it should not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to backflow because the same had
already been actually and legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore tank holds no water. It had been
settled that the subject cargo was still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging thereof has not yet been
finished when the backflow occurred. Since the discharging of the cargo into the depot has notyet been completed at
the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred, there is no reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the
cargo to the consignee. Delsan is straining the issue by insisting that when the diesel oil entered into the tank of Caltex
on shore, there was legally, at that moment, a complete delivery thereof to Caltex. To be sure, the extraordinary
responsibility of common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to a person who has the right to receive them. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk Depot has not
yet been finished, Delsan still has the duty to guard and to preserve the cargo. The carrier still has in it the responsibility
to guard and preserve the goods, a duty incident to its having the goods transported.” (Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v.
American Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 149019, August 15, 2006, 530 Phil. 332)

26. On April 4, 1989, BM shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by CO Shipping Co. represented
by its agent WALLEM. 3,500 boxes of watermelons valued at US$5,950.00 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99012
and exported through Letter of Credit No. HK 1031/30 issued by National Bank of Pakistan and 1,611 boxes of fresh
mangoes with a value of US$14,273.46 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99013 and exported through Letter of Credit
No. HK 1032/30 also issued by PAKISTAN BANK. The Bills of Lading contained the following pertinent provision: “One
of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order. The shipment
was bound for Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great Prospect Company of Kowloon, Hong Kong
(hereinafter GPC) as notify party.” The goods were delivered to GPC without the bills of lading.

a) Can carrier validly deliver the goods to GPC?

b) Did the common carrier validly deliver the goods without the bill of lading or bank guarantee?

a) Yes, the goods can be validly delivered to GPC. The extraordinaryresponsibility of the common carriers lasts until
actual or constructivedelivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. However, in the
export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter
to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery
of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Article 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right
to receive them was proper.

b) Yes. The carrier submitted in evidence a telex dated April 5, 1989 as basis for delivering the cargoes to GPC without
the bills of lading and bank guarantee. The telex instructed delivery of various shipments to the respective consignees
without need of presenting the bill of lading and bank guarantee per the respective shipper’s request since “for prepaid
shipt ofrt charges already fully paid.” Petitioner was named therein as shipper and GPC as consignee with respect to Bill
of Lading Nos. HKG 99012 and HKG 99013. To implement the said telex instruction, the delivery of the shipment must be
to GPC, the notify party or real importer/buyer of the goods and not the Pakistani Bank since the latter can very well
present the original Bills of Lading in its possession. Likewise, if it were the Pakistani Bank to whom the cargoes were to
be strictly delivered, it will no longer be proper to require a bank guarantee as a substitute for the Bill of Lading. To
construe otherwise will render meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the cargoes consist of perishable fresh fruits
and immediate delivery thereof to the buyer/importer is essentially a factor to reckon with. Besides, GPC is listed as one
among the several consignees in the telex (Exhibit 5-B) and the instruction in the telex was to arrange delivery of A/M
shipment (not any party) to respective consignees without presentation of OB/L and bank guarantee. (Benito Macam u.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125524, August 25, 1999)

27. X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To disembark, the passengers
have to walk through a gangplank. While negotiating the gangplank, X slipped and fell into the waters. X was saved
from drowning and was brought to a hospital but after a month died from pneumonia. Except for X, all passengers
were able to walk through the gangplank. What is the liability of the owner of S/S Tamaraw?

A: The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X. Failure to exercise utmost diligence in the safety of passengers
is presumed the moment the passenger did not reach his destination. In the presentcase, X was still a passenger when
he fell into the waters because he was only disembarking from the vessel. Hence, the presumption against the carrier is
operative. It is up to the carrier to prove its exercise of utmost diligence.

Moreover, it is well-settled that if, in the use of a gangplank, a passenger falls off and is injured, the carrier is
liable for the injuries sustained irrespective of the cause of the fall if a sufficient gangplank would have prevented the
injury. (1989)

28. A bus of GL Transit on its way to Davao stopped to enable a passenger to alight. At that moment, Santiago, who
had been waiting for a ride, boarded the bus. However, the bus driver failed to notice Santiago who was still standing
on the bus platform, and stepped on the accelerator. Because of the sudden motion, Santiago slipped and fell down,
suffering serious injuries. May Santiago hold GL Transmit liable for breach of contract of carriage?
A: Yes.Santiago may hold GL Transit liable for breach of contract. It is well-settled that, motor vehicles like passenger
jeepneys and buses are duty bound to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers
an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the
sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they do so. (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 95582, October 7, 1991, 202 SCRA 574) Obviously, the driver of the bus did not exercise utmost diligence in affording
Santiago reasonable opportunity to board the bus. (1996).

29. On October 14, 1993, about half an hour past seven o‟clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station (operated by LRTA) after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
(who was an employee of Prudent Security Agency) approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fistfight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the
fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. The moving train
struck Navidad, and he was killed instantaneously. Are LRTA and Prudent liable?

A: Yes,LRTA is liable but Prudent is NOT liable. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed
to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.

The foundation of LRTA‟s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or
avail itself of the services of an outsider or an carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

With respect to Prudent, if at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer‟s liability
is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable
on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee. Unfortunately, there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. Hence, Prudent
cannot be made liable. (Light Railway Transit Authority v. Marjorie Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003)

30. On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito
Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged
that on March 25, 1985, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner
corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately
to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought
his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital
where he expired.
 The place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses
53 and 54, hence the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. The victim fell from the platform of the
bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by
thephysical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped.

The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride
on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same. Is the argument tenable?
Is the carrier liable?

A: The carrier is liable. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim
would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same is not tenable.
When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.

Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would
have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature
acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or
motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board
and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or
jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be
considered negligent under the circumstances.

In this case, the bus had “just started” and “was still in slow motion” at the point where the victim had boarded
and was on its platform.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving
slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt to board the moving conveyance under the same or
similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common
experience and both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is
entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty
which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom. Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured
victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It
defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. (Dangwa Transportation Co. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991)

31. On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No.
352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggage
containing their personal belongings. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a halfbrother of plaintiff
Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare
was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the
appellant’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor,
among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano
Beltran, then carrying some of their baggage, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children.
Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away
from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind,
but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near
the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start,
since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was
again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten
off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board
without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a
child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

Is the carrier liable?

A: Yes, the carrier is liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it
is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the
bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to
return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of
the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong
which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For,
the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the
carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. The issue to be determined here is whether as to
the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for
her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person
who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company’s premises, but
before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith
and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily
delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its
agents.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when
they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father
was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to
run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who
must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had
exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautions person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by
a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the
bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held
liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the
culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that “the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs‟ daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent.” This allegation was also proven when it was established
during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still
persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the
negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of
Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for the
death of the child Raquel Beltran. (La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

32. The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel MTV Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in
the sum of P23.10 (Exh. „B‟). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers
therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using
said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel
had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. „21) between the third party defendant
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.

The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed
alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by
unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already
disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went
back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where hiscargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to
the hospital where he later expired three days thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the
Death Certificate being “hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the
urinary bladder.” Is the carrier liable? Was Viana still a passenger at the time of the accident?

A: Yes, the carrier is liable for the death of the victim. The victim was still a passenger at that time. The rule is that the
relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the
victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated,
a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable
time to claim their baggage. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner’s premises
was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived
since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the unloading operations shall start
only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

There is no showing that petitioner was extra-ordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the
forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the “utmost diligence of very
cautious persons” to be exercised “as far as human care and foresight can provide” which is required by law of common
carriers with respect to their passengers. (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84458, November 6, 1989,
179 SCRA 95)

33. JRT, Inc. Entered into a contract with C Company of Japan to export anahaw fans valued at $23,000.00. As
payment thereof, a letter of credit was issued to JRT, Inc. by the buyer. The letter of credit required the issuance of an
on-board bill of lading and prohibited transshipment. The President of JRT, Inc. Then contracted a shipping agent o
ship the anahaw fans through O Container Lines, specifying the requirements of the letter of credit. However, the bill
of lading issued by the shipping lines bore the notation “received for shipment” and contained an entry indicating
transshipment to Hong Kong. The President of JRT, Inc. Personally received and signed the bill of lading and despite
the entries, he delivered the corresponding check in payment of the freight.The shipment was delivered at the port of
discharge but the buyer refused to accept the anahaw fans because there was no on-board bill of lading, and there
was transshipment since the goods were transferred in Hong Kong from MV Pacific, the feeder vessel to MV Oriental,
a mother vessel. JRT argued that the same cannot be considered transshipment because both vessels belong to the
same shipping company. a) Was there transshipment? b) JRT, Inc. Further argued that assuming there was
transshipment, it cannot be deemed to have agreed thereto even if it signed the bill of lading containing such entry
because it has made known to the shipping lines from the start that transshipment was prohibited under the letter of
credit and that, it had no intention to allow transshipment of the subject cargo. Is the argument tenable? Reason.

A: a) Yes, there was transshipment. Transshipment, in maritime law, is defined as “the act of taking cargo out of one ship
and loading it in another,” or “the transfer of goods from the vessel stipulated in the contract of affreightment to
another vessel before the place of destination named in the contract has been reached,” or “the transfer for further
transportation from one ship or conveyance to another.” Clearly, either in its ordinary or its strictly legal acceptation, it
does not matter whether both vessels belong to one and the same person.

b) No, the argument is not tenable. JRT, Inc. accepted the bill of lading, hence, it is bound by the terms and conditions
thereof. Since the bill of lading allows transshipment, JRT can no longer complain that such transshipment occurred.

34.Marino was a passenger on a train. Another passenger, Juancho, had taken a gallon of gasoline placed in a plastic
bag into the same coach where Marino was riding. The gasoline ignited and exploded causing injury to Marino who
filed a civil suit for damages against the railway company claiming that Juancho should have been subjected to
inspection by its conductor. The railway company disclaimed liability resulting from the explosion contending that it
was unaware of the contents of the plastic bag and invoke the right of Juancho to privacy. a) Should the railway
company be held liable for damages? b) If it were an airline company involved, would your answer be the same?
Explain your answer briefly.

A: a) No. The railway company is not liable for damages. This is subject to the qualification that the company should
prove that it, through the exercise of extraordinary diligence, cannot detect the presence of gasoline. It should be noted
that in overland transportation, the common carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the
contents of packages or bags particularly those hand carried by passengers.

b) No, my answer would not be the same. If an airline company was involved, it is duty bound to inspect each and every
cargo that is brought into the aircraft (R.A. 6235, infra). Exercise of extraordinary diligence would therefore result in the
discovery of the gasoline. (1992)

35. A, as a paying passenger, boarded a plane of X & Co., a duly authorized air carrier bound from Manila to Cebu.
On the way, the plane exploded in mid-air, and crashed, causing the death of all persons on board. It was determined
that the mid-air explosion was due to the explosive device contained in the suitcase by another passenger in the ill-
fated aircraft. If you are the judge, how will you rule?

A: Iwill make the carrier liable. The carrier is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying its passengers. It is
presumed to be negligent when its passengers died when the aircraft exploded. Moreover, the negligence of the carrier
is apparent because an explosive device was brought into the carrier without being detected by the employees. Under
R.A. 6235, the carrier is bound to inspect and investigate suspicious packages that are being brought into the aircraft.
This duty was not complied with because the explosive device was not detected by the carrier’s personnel.

36. On the night of October 5,1963, plaintiffs-appellees attended a birthday party inside the United Housing
Subdivision in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11 o’clock that evening, the plaintiffs-
appellees proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks,
finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle
from any coming train, Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train
bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. The impact threw plaintiffs-
appellees out of their car which was smashed. One Benjamin Franco, who came from the same party and was driving
a vehicle right behind them, rushed to their aid and brought them to San Juan de Dios Hospital for emergency
treatment. Later, the plaintiffs-appellees were transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. A week later, Mrs. Cusi
transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital where Dr. Manuel Rivera, head of the Orthopedic and Fracture Service of
the Philippine General Hospital performed on her a second operation and continued to treat her until her discharge
from the hospital on November 2, 1963. Thereafter, Dr. Rivera treated her as an out-patient until the end of February,
1964, although by that time the fractured bones had not yet healed. Mrs. Cusi was also operated on by Dr. Francisco
Aguilar, Director of the National Orthopedic Hospital, in May, 1964 and in August, 1965, after another operation in
her upper body from the chest to her abdomen, she was placed in cast for some three months and her right arm
immobilized. Is the railway company liable?

A: The railway company is liable because the circumstances attendant to the collision shows negligence on the its part.
“Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were manually operated; there were only two shifts
of guards provided for the operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. shift, and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to
11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During
that precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as observed by the lower
court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: “... he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of
blowing his whistle from a distance of 10 to 50 meters from the crossing. That the train was running at full speed is
attested to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes, the train did not stop until it
reached a distance of around 100 meters.” These facts assessed together show the inadequacy, nay, the absence, of
precautions taken by the defendant-appellant to warn the travelling public of the impending danger. It is clear to Us that
as the signal devices were wholly manually-operated, there was an urgent need for a flagman or guard to man the
crossing at all times. As it was, the crossing was left unattended to after eleven o‟clock every night and on the night of
the accident. We cannot in all reason justify or condone the act of the defendant-appellant allowing the subject
locomotive to travel through the unattended crossing with inoperative signal devices, but without sending any of its
employees to operate said signal devices so as to warn oncoming motorists of the approach of one of its locomotives. It
is not surprising therefore that the inoperation of the warning devices created a situation which was misunderstood by
the riding public to mean safe passage. Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad
crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the
necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A need, therefore, exists for the railroad company to use reasonable
care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order, or to give notice that they are not operating, since if
such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace. Thus, it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling
device at a crossing to give warning of the approach of a train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the circumstances of the case in determining whether the
railroad company was negligent as a matter of fact.” (Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, G.R. No. L-29889, May 31,
1979)

37. The incident involved transpired on May 10, 1931. At about 7’o clock in the morning of the same day, the
plaintiff Aleko, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left Manila in their
Studebaker car driven by said plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius - for the municipality of Pagsanjan, the Province of Laguna, on a
sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he made said trip although he has already been to many places, driving his
own car, in and outside the Philippines. Prior thereto, he had made the trip as far as Calauan, but never from Calauan
to Pagsanjan via Dayap. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and had no
knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was
nothing to indicate its existence inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs, and trees along the road, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the
plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the
truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the
people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short
whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive
No. 713 of the defendant company’s train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive truck struck
the plaintiff’s car right in the center. After dragging the car a distance of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it
upon siding. The force of the impact was so great that the plaintiff’s wife and daughter were thrown from the car and
were picked up from the ground unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer Andres Basilio, he
was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had gone about 70 meters from the crossing. Aleko, Sonja and Brita
Marianne suffered extensive injuries as a consequence of the incident. Is the train operator liable?

A: Yes,The Court concluded that railway company was negligent explaining that "prior to the accident, there had been
no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The
flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the station with a red flag in one hand and a green one in
the other, both of which were wound on their respective sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times
absented himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and
therefore traveled at great speed.

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties presented at the trial in
support of their respective contentions, and after taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, this court is
of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company, for not having
had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in
order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees —
the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passersby of the
approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on time; and the
engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said flagman
and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the
crossing. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family
in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the
discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous
occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at the
crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid
damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of
their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.” (Lilius u. The Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-39587,
March 24, 1934)

38. Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a
visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia,
travelled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It
was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to
Tutuban, Metro Manila, as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda
Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac.
Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr., drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that
they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed
into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda
Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from
arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was
transferred to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. Is PNR
liable?

A: Yes, PNR is liable. “It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage or injury
as a result of the collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation.” An
examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would
yield the following: (1) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3)
lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR
(petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena.

A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train
because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to
provide adequate safety equipment in the area.

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or
signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of
the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment
be installed. (Philippine National Railways v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006; Note that the Supreme Court
ruled that the liability of PNR should be mitigated because there was contributory negligence)

39. X boarded an airconditioned Pantranco Bus bound for Baguio. X was given notice that the carrier is not liable
for baggage brought in by passengers. X kept in his custody his attaché case containing $10,000.00. In Tarlac, all
passengers, including X, were told to get off and take their lunch, he discovered that his attaché case was missing. A
vendor said that a man picked the lock of the door, entered the bus and ran away with the attache case. What, if any,
is the liability of the carrier?

A: The carrier may be held liable. Hand-carried luggage of passengers are governed by the rules on necessary deposits.
Under Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of depositary shall among other cases, include the loss of
property of the guest cause by strangers but not that which may proceed from force majeure. Article 2001 of the same
Code considers an act of a thief as not one of force majeure unless done with the use of arms or through an irresistible
force. (1989)

40. X took the Benguet Bus from Baguio going to Manila. He deposited his maleta in the baggage compartment of
the bus common to all passengers. He did not declare his baggage nor pay its charges contrary to the regulations of
the bus company. When X got off, he could not find his baggage, which obviously was taken by another passenger.
Determine the liability of the bus company.

A: The bus company is liable for the loss of the maleta. The carrier had

the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence over the baggage that was turned over to the carrier or placed in the
baggage compartment of the bus. The fact that the maleta was not declared nor the charges paid thereon would not be
material so long as it was received by the carrier for transportation (Article 1754, Civil Code). (1989)

41. Antonio, a paying passenger, boarded a bus bound for Batangas City. He chose to sit at the front row near the
bus driver and told the bus driver that he had valuable items in his hand carried bag which he then placed beside the
driver’s seat. Not having slept for 24 hours, he requested the driver to keep an eye on the bag should he doze off
during the trip. While Antonio was asleep, another passenger took the bag away and alighted at Calamba, Laguna.
Could the common carrier be held liable by Antonio for the loss?

A: Yes, the common carrier is liable to Antonio for the loss of his bag. Hand-carried luggages of passengers are governed
by the rules on necessary deposits. Under Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of depositary shall among
other cases, include the loss of property of the guest caused by strangers but not that which may proceed from force
majeure. Article 2001 of the same Code considers an act of a thief as not one of force majeure unless done with the use
of arms or through an irresistible force. (1986)

[An alternative answer has been suggested that the carrier is not liable because the bag of Antonio was never turned
over by him to the common carrier under a bill of lading or similar arrangement and Antonio’s mere request to the bus
driver to keep an eye on the bag while Antonio dozed off (without even the driver acceding to the request) could not
possibly make the common carrier liable for the loss.]