PH133 Summative: Explain and assess one response to Gettier’s counterexamples to the justified true

belief analysis of knowledge.

Student ID: 2103036

Introduction

Knowing is a factive mental state, where only truths are known (Timothy Williamson, 2002);

therefore, the analysis of knowledge is an investigation aimed at elucidating how we can get to the

truth (Ichikawa, J.J. & Steup, 2018) through specifying the conditions that are individually

necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge. While the traditional (tripartite)

analysis posits that justified, true belief (JTB) is necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge,

Gettier (1963) argues otherwise through his counterexample; hence triggering a succession of

increasingly complex analyses. This essay however will only focus on the amendment of JTB

through the addition of defeasibility conditions while analysing its limitation before concluding that

knowledge is unanalysable. (Ichikawa, J.J. & Steup, 2018)

The analysis of knowledge through justified true beliefs

The first component of the tripartite analysis consists of belief; intuitively, we can only know

something if we are inclined to believe in something. Nevertheless, beliefs can be mistaken; if a

belief is not true, it cannot constitute knowledge, hence truth is the second component of the

analysis [David A. Truncellito, 2022]. True belief despite being necessary, remained insufficient for

knowledge as Colin Radford (1966) in his examples argued that a belief can be true by luck. Such

necessitates justification as a third condition for the analysis of knowledge, where this essay will

take an internalist approach towards justification. Therefore:

S knows P IFF (i) P is true

(ii) S believes that P, and

(iii) S is justified in believing that P.

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PH133 Summative: Explain and assess one response to Gettier’s counterexamples to the justified true
belief analysis of knowledge.
Student ID: 2103036

Gettier’s counterexample

Gettier (1963), however, refutes the tripartite analysis of knowledge. By assuming that (i) humans

are fallible beings, capable of having justified beliefs in a false proposition [David A. Truncellito,

2022] and that (ii) justification is closed under deduction, such that if S is justified in believing that

P, and P entails Q, and S deduced Q from P, then S is justified in believing Q, Gettier (1963)

proposed the following counterexample:

‘Suppose that the president of the company assured Smith that Jones is the man who will get the job and

Smith had counted the coins in Jone’s pocket 10 minutes ago. Therefore, Jone competently deduced that the

man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. However, the president was wrong and Smith got the

job. Unbeknownst to him, he also has ten coins in his pocket. Consequently, Smith’s belief that the man who

will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is true’

(Gettier, 1963:122)

Gettier’s counterexample shows that S justifiably believes in a false premise; this implies that S will

correctly deduce something true from something that S falsely, but justifiably believes. Since

justification is close under deduction, the belief S deduced is justified, so S will have a justified,

true belief in the virtue of epistemic luck, and hence cannot be knowledge (Ichikawa, J.J. & Steup,

2018). Indeed, the role of justification has circumstantially led us to falsehood instead of the truth,

where false beliefs are justified, yet we arrived at a true belief due to a second accidental feature of

the situation which is independent of the cognitive activity (Zagzebski, 1994).

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PH133 Summative: Explain and assess one response to Gettier’s counterexamples to the justified true
belief analysis of knowledge.
Student ID: 2103036

Responding to Gettier’s counterexample using defeasibility condition

As a response, the JTB analysis could be amended by adding defeasibility as the fourth condition:

(IV) There is some statement H that completely justifies S in believing that P, and no other

statement defeats this justification (Lehrer & Paxson 1969:227). Therefore, if S were to learn of

alternative truth, Q, or to be advised of the false beliefs, the belief will be undermined by such new

information (Zagzebski, 1994). However, this response is undermined by Lehrer & Paxson (1969)

using the example of Tom Grabit:

I am sure that the man who steals a book from the library is Tom Grabit. However, Mrs. Gabit, the mother of

Tom, has declared that on the day in question, Tom was not in the library, [...] and that Tom’s identical twin

brother, John Grabit, was in the library. The statement that she has said these things would defeat any

justification I have for believing that Tom Grabit removed the book, according to our present definition of

defeasibility. This might seem acceptable until we realise that Mrs. Grabit is a compulsive liar and that John

Grabit is a fiction of her demented mind, and that Tom Grabit took the book as I believed.

(Lehrer & Paxson, 1969: 228)

The weakness of the defeasibility condition is therefore exposed when the justification we have for

believing that it is Tom Grabit that stole the book is defeated by Mrs. Grabit’s truth statement.

Indeed, it is still possible for us to know that something is the case even if there are alternate truth,

Q, where the addition of misleading defeaters have resulted in the loss of the initial justification and

knowledge. Accordingly, Lehrer & Paxson (1969) argued for further amendments of the

defeasibility condition as a resolution to the problem.

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PH133 Summative: Explain and assess one response to Gettier’s counterexamples to the justified true
belief analysis of knowledge.
Student ID: 2103036

The limits of defeasibility condition

Nevertheless, increasing the strength of the defeasibility condition doesn’t guarantee that the

analysis is sufficient for knowledge, but threatens the assumption of independence between truth

and justification condition (Zagzebski, 1994). The former is metaphysical, while the latter is

epistemological, where truth is a matter of how things are, instead of how they can be shown to be

(Ichikawa, J.J. & Steup, 2018). Indeed, a defeasibility condition, if strong enough, implies a

complete justification condition that entails truth, such that S is justified in believing P will entail P

(Zagzebski, 1994). This suggestion of full or complete justification thus necessitates that

justification occurs at the highest possible degree, which is rarely attainable in everyday cases that

we consider as knowledge (Baergen, 1995); for instance, the evidence for a belief may not support

it conclusively, but only well enough (Zagzebski, 1994:73). Such is also very demanding as it

implies that one must disqualify alternate truths with an inexhaustible amount of defeater before the

objective truth prevails. Conversely, an account of knowledge with weak defeasibility conditions

wouldn’t withstand Gettier’s objection (Zagzebski, 1994). Ultimately, the degree of justification

sufficient to obtain truth is uncertain hence serve as a limit to the analysis of knowledge.

Conclusion and implications

Overall, the inviolable independent relationship between justification and the acquisition of truth

meant that justified true belief will never be sufficient for knowledge regardless of the additional

elements added to the analysis, but will at least place the believer in the best, yet imperfect position

to obtain truth (Zagzebski, 1994). Such views are echoed by Timothy Williamson (2002) who

claimed that knowledge is among the most fundamental psychological and epistemological states,

hence couldn’t be broken down into more basic concepts. (Ichikawa, J.J. & Steup, 2018)

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PH133 Summative: Explain and assess one response to Gettier’s counterexamples to the justified true
belief analysis of knowledge.
Student ID: 2103036

Bibliography

1. Baergen, R. (1995) ‘Contemporary epistemology’ Harcourt Brace College Publishers pp.120

2. Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Matthias Steup (2018), "The Analysis of Knowledge", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/
3. David A. Truncellito [2022] “Epistemology,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ISSN 2161-0002, https://iep.utm.edu/
4. Linda Zagzebski (1994) ‘The inescapability of Gettier Problems’ The philosophical
Quarterly Oxford University Press pp. 65-73
5. Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson Jr. (1969) ‘Undefeated Justified True Belief’ The Journal
of Philosophy pp. 225-247
6. Edmund L.Gettier (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge’ Analysis Oxford University
Press pp. 121 - 123
7. Timothy Williamson (2002) ‘Knowledge and Limits’ Oxford Scholarship Online DOI:
10.1093/019925656X.001.0001