1

William E. Kovacic, “Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust
Policy”, 74 (2), St. John’s Law Review 361-405 (2012).
2
Goldman Sachs, “Dreaming with BRICs: the Path to 2050”, Global Economics Paper No. 99 (2003) at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/brics-dream.html.
3
Mark R.A. Palim, “The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis”, XLIII (1)
The Antitrust Bulletin Spring (1998).
4
Vinod Dhall, “Seminar on Competition Law and Policy”, Jointly organized by Competition
Commission of India and FICCI, Hyderabad, (2006) at
http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/speeches/10competion_law_policy_20080411095635.pdf?dow
nload=1.
5
Augustine Peter, “Re-imagining Competition Policy and Law in the Era of Disruptions,” World
Competition Day, India Islamic Cultural Centre, (December, 2017) at
http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/speeches/Address- World%20Competition%20Day
%20Speech.pdf?download=1.
6
Supra 1.
7
Roger W. Mastalir, “Regulation of Competition in the „New‟ Free Markets of Eastern Europe: A
Comparative Study of Antitrust Laws in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic, and their
Models”, 19 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg, (1993).
8
For instance, “in 2004, Chile was required to reform its Competition Act in order to sign a free trade
agreement with the U.S. In 2011, the Trade Agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru
required the parties to ban through their national and regional legislation the most harmful anti-
competitive practices”.
9
Eleanor M. Fox, “Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries”, 79(4)
Law and Contemporary Problems 69-84 (2016).
10
Tim Buthe and Cindy Cheng, “The Effect of Competition Law on Innovation: A Cross-National
Statistical Analysis”, A Step Ahead: Competition Policy for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth,
pp. 183-220 (Washington: World Bank and OECD, Conference ed., 2016). See also Tim Buthe and
Shahryar Minhas, “The Global Diffusion of Competition Laws: A Spatial Analysis”, 6th meeting of the
UNCTAD Research Partnership Platform on Competition and Consumer Protection, Geneva (July
2015).
11
William E. Kovacic, “Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in
Emerging Economies,” 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1075-1090 (1997-1998).
12
Predeep S. Mehta & Simon J. Evenett, “Promoting Competition Around the World: A Diversity of
Rationales and Approaches”, in: Mehta P.S. Competition Regimes in the World: A Civil Society Report.
CUTS International, (2006).
13
Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, “Competition Law and Competition Policy: What Does Egypt Really Need?”,
Working Paper, 0239, Economic Research Forum, (Dec. 19, 2002).
14
Michal S. Gal, Mor Bakhoum, Josef Drexl, Eleanor M. Fox and David J. Gerber, The Economic
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law, (Edward Elgar,
2015).
15
Pierre Horna, “David and Goliath: How Young Competition Agencies Can Succeed in Fighting Cross-
Border Cartels,” Working Paper CCLP (L) 45, (2017) at
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/david_goliath_how_young_competition_agencies_can_succ
eed_in_fighting_cross-border_cartels_-_cclp_l_45.pdf.
16
OECD Economic Surveys, India, (February, 2017) at http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/INDIA-2017-
OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf.
17
The term newly industrialised country (NIC) is an economic classification used by economists to
represent economies that fall somewhere between a developed country and a developing country. NICs
 are characterised by rapid export-driven economic growth and a secular migration of workers from rural
to urban areas.
18
John F. Terzaken and Pieter Huizing, The Globalisation of Antitrust Enforcement: More Authorities,
Increased Coordination, Higher Stakes, Allen & Overy, (2013) at
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Global%20Trends%20in%20Antitrust%20PDFs/
globalisation_of_antitrust_enforcement.PDF.
19
The World Bank Report 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/10/31/india-
jumps-doing-business-rankings-with-sustained-reform-focus.
20
Martha Martinez Licetti, “Combating Cartels in Developing Countries: Implementation Challenges on
the Ground”, Competition Policy International, (2013).
21
Ibid.
22
Supra 15.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Payel Chatterjee and Simone Reis, “Private Enforcement of Competition Law Issues Competition
Commission of India vis-à-vis Alternate Forums - Is it actually an option?”,
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Private_Enforcement_of_Competition_Law_I
ssues.pdf.
26
Ibid.
27
Deepankar Sharma, “Dimensions of Leniency Policies in BRICS: A Comparative Analysis of India,
South Africa, Brazil and Russia”, 3(2) BRICS Law Journal, 6-20 (2016).
28
Ibid.
29
Farhad Sorabjee and Amitabh Kumar, “The Cartels and Leniency Review”, The Law Reviews, ed. 5,
(2017) at http://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-cartels-and-leniency-review-edition-5/1140486/india.
30
Ibid.
31
See Vijay Kumar Singh, “Competition Law and Policy in India: The Journey in a Decade”, 4 NUJS L.
Rev. 523-566 (2011).
32
Id. at 554.
33
Id. at 562.
34
See K. K. Sharma “India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant
Position” Competition Policy Journal (September 3, 2013).
35
Ibid.
36
See Aditya Bhattacharjea, “India's New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment”, 4(3) Journal of
Competition Law and Economics, 609-638 (September 2008).
37
See Dorothy Shapiro Lund, “A Competition Act by India, for India: The First Three Years of
Enforcement Under the New Competition Act,” 5 Indian Journal of International Economic Law 59
(2012).
38
Ibid.
39
See Smriti Parsheera, Ajay Shah and Avirup Bose, “Competition Issues in India‟s Online Economy”,
NIPFP Working paper series, Working paper No. 194 (2017).
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
See G R Bhatia, “Combating Cartel in Markets – Issues and Challenges”, Executive Chartered
Secretary 654-657 (July 2006).
43
Ibid.
44
See Xiaoye Wang, “Highlights of China‟s New Antimonopoly Law”, Global Competition Policy,
Competition Policy International, (August, 2008) at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/0d358061e11f2708ad9d62634c6c40ad/Wang,%
20GCP%20Aug-08(1).pdf.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
John M. Connor, “Cartels Costly for Customers”, A presentation at the World Bank Conference on
Income Distribution, Washington, DC, (June 23, 2015) at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988489.
48
Ibid.
49
See Umut Aydin and Tim Buthe, “Success and Limits of Competition Law & Policy in Developing
Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits”, Paper for the
Kenan/Rethinking Regulation Workshop, Duke University, (May 2015) at
http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-
content/blogs.dir/2/files/2015/04/AydinButhe_SuccessAndLimits_2015-04-27.pdf.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
See Lawrence J. White, “The Role of Competition Policy in the Promotion of Economic Growth,”
Competition Policy Research Center, Fair Trade Commission, (March, 2008).
53
Ibid.
54
See Yong Huang & W. Baiding, “China‟s Fair Competition Review: Introduction, Imperfections and
Solutions,” 3 Antitrust Chronicle, CPI (March 2017).
55
Ibid.
56
See Preetam Kaushik, “The Importance Of Being Competition Commission Of India”, Business Insider
India, (January 2015) at http://www.businessinsider.in/The-Importance-Of-Being-Competition-
Commission-Of-India/articleshow/45728183.cms.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
See Susan Ning, Kate Peng, Sibo Gao & Ting Gong, “NDRC‟s Enforcement In 2016”, China‟s New
Dawn of Antitrust, 3 Antitrust Chronicle, CPI (March 2017).
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
D. Daniel Sokol, “The Future of International Antitrust And Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity”,
103 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1087–96 (2009).
63
Ibid.
64
Pradeep S. Mehta & Udai Mehta, “CCI v. TRAI: The Difference Between Promoting Competition
and Curbing Anti-Competitive Practices,” The Wire, (August, 2017) at https://thewire.in/163410/cci-
trai-promoting-competition-anti-competitive-practices/.
65
Ibid.
66
Eva Lachnit, “Compliance Programmes in Competition Law: Improving the Approach of Competition
Authorities”, 10(5) Utrecht Law Review (December, 2014).
67
Ibid.
68
Id. at 45.
69
Maurice E Stucke, “Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?,” 81 (5) Fordham Law Review,
2575-2644 (2013) at
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.in/&httpsredir=1&arti
cle=4891&context=flr.
70
Ibid.
71
Shubha Ghosh and D. Daniel Sokol, „FRAND in India‟, OUP (India), Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 1374; University of Florida Levin College of Law, Research Paper No. 16-46,
(2016) at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718256 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2718256.
72
Ibid.
73
Karan Singh Chandhiok, Vikram Sobti and Kalyani Singh, “India's Leniency Program 2.0,” Mondaq,
(September 2017) at
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/626516/Antitrust+Competition/Indias+Leniency+Program+20.
74
Ibid.
75
See Dhanendra Kumar, “Be in sync with developments in other jurisdictions”, Business Standard,
(February 21, 2016).
76
Ibid.
77
Udai S Mehta, “A competition law alone is not enough”, The Hindu Business Line, (June 24, 2014).
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Deeksha Manchanda, “Liability of individuals under the Competition Act, 2002”, 46(11) Chartered
Secretary, 52-54 (November 2016).
81
Ibid.
82
M. M. Sharma, “Competition Law And Policy- Essential Tools For Free Markets”, Mondaq, (May,
2014) at
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/310868/Antitrust+Competition/Competition+Law+And+Policy+Essen
tial+Tools+For+Free+Markets.
83
Ibid.
84
Manas Kumar Chaudhuri, “New Challenge To Competition Regime Of India”, Linkedin, (December 9,
2016), at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/new-challenge-competition-regime-india-manas-kumar
chaudhuri?trk=portfolio_article-card_title.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Cyril Shroff & Nisha Kaur Uberoi, “The Future of Competition Law in India: Reading The Portents”,
CPI Antitrust Chronicle (January, 2013).
88
Ibid.
89
Clare Gaofen Ye, “Combating Monopoly Agreements Under China‟s Anti-Monopoly Law: Recent
Developments and Challenges”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (February, 2014).
90
Ibid.
91
Mel Marquis & Shingo Seryo, “Japan‟s Consolidated Anti-Monopoly Act: Recent Developments and
Non-Developments”, CPI (October, 2015).
92
Gal, Michal S. and Fox, Eleanor M., “Drafting competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning
from experience,” New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 374, (2014) at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/374.
93
Ibid.
94
Ankesh Jain, “Extra-territorial jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India”, 19(1), Journal of
Financial Crime 112-119 (2012).
95
John Davies and Ania Thiemann, “Competition law and policy: Drivers of economic growth and
development”, 4 Coherence for Development, OECD (January 2015).
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Fels, Allan and Ng, Wendy, “Rethinking Competition Advocacy in Developing Countries” in D Daniel
Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, (Stanford
University Press, 2013) at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674421.
99
Ibid.
100
See Bachmann, Sascha Dov and Afrika, Sashalee Stephanie, “Cartel Regulation in Three Emerging
BRICS Economies: Cartel and Competition Policies in South Africa, Brazil and India - A Comparative
Overview”, 45/4 The International Lawyer (22 May 2011) at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1869963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1869963.
101
Ibid.
102
See “Competition Law Update”, 1 Economic Law Practices (2016).
103
D. Daniel Sokol, “Competition Law Compliance in India”, 41(2) Vikalpa, Sage (April-June 2016).
104
See Manu Kaushik and Sarika Malhotra, “Still a long haul”, Business Today, (November 2014).
105
Ibid.
106
See Aprrova and Shreeja Sen, “Multiple court stays hold up CCI investigations”, Live Mint, (November
2014).
107
Vinod Dhall, Competition Law today, concepts, issues, and the law in practice, (1st Edition, Oxford
University Press, India, 2007).
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
See Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang, (ed.); The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: New Developments and
Empirical Evidence, (Edward Elgar, 2013).
111
T. Ramappa, Competition Law in India-Policy, Issues and Developments, (Oxford University Press,
New Delhi, 2009).
112
Ibid.
113
See Ioannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol, “The Global Limits of Competition Law” in Sokol D. Daniel
(eds), Global Competition Law and Economics, (Stanford University Press, 2012).
114
Ibid.
115
Nigel Parr & Catherine Hammon, “Cartels Enforcement, Appeals & Damages Actions,” Global Legal
Insights, 1st ed., Global Legal Group, (November 15, 2012).
116
Ibid.
117
Huang Yong and Richean Zhiyan Li, “An Overview of Chinese Competition Policy: Between
Fragmentation and Consolidation” in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds), China’s Anti-Monopoly
Law: The First Five Years, (Kluwer Law International, 2013) 259-261.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
“Sixth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices”, See TD/RBP/CONF.7/3,
UNCTAD secretariat, (August. 30, 2010).
121
CUTS, “Pulling Up Our Socks (A study of competition regimes of seven developing countries of Africa
and Asia: the 7Up Project)”, CUTS International, India, (2003).
122
Ibid.
123
See Rijit Sengupta and Cornelius Dube, “Competition Policy Enforcement Experiences from
Developing Countries and Implications for Investment”, OECD, (2008) at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/55/40303419.pdf.
124
World Bank, “World Development Report”, Washington, D.C., (2001).
125
See Noland, M., “Competition Policy and FDI: A Solution in Search of a Problem?”, Institute for
International Economics, Working Paper 99-3, (1999).
126
Ibid.
129
Supra 1.
130
Jiro Tamura, “Trade and Competition at the WTO: Domestic Regulation and Competition Policy for
Market Access Development”, (2000) at
http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/CGP/Oct2000Papers/Tamura.pdf.
131
Ibid.
132
Supra 1.
133
Ibid.
163
See S.K. Myneni, Legal Research Methodology. (Poineer Books. Delhi. P.61, 1997).
164
See Longmans, Green and Co., Social research: A study in methods of gathering data, (1929. Reprinted
1942 and 1953. 2nd ed., Greenwood Press, 1968).
165
See Oscar G. Chase, “Legal Processes and National Culture,” 5(1), Cardozo Journal of International
and Comparative Law 1-24 (1997).
166
See Rodolfo Sacco, “Legal Formats: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law”, 39 (I) American
Journal of Comparative Law 3-4 (1991).
167
See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (2nd ed., University of
Georgia Press, 1993).
168
See J. Michael Rainer, Introduction to Comparative Law, (Wien, Manz 2010).
169
Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham and
Northampton, 2012).
.

1
See Armando E. Rodriguez and Ashok Menon, The Limits of Competition Policy: The Shortcomings of
Antitrust in Developing and Reforming Economies (Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business,
2010).
2
See D.V. Cowen, “Ancient Origin of Competition Law: A survey of the law relating to the control of
monopoly in South Africa”, The South African Journal of Economics, (1950) at
http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2007/august/2007-august-vol020-no2-pp38-41.pdf.
3
“Lex Julia de Annona stipulated that any attempt to hinder ships from delivering grain would invite
severe penalties during the time of Julius Caesar”. See http://www.qhzp.club/what-is-an-antitrust-
law.htm.
4
See Supra 2. See also Howardullman, “Ancient Rome Had Competition Law”, My Distribution Law,
(2012) at http://www.mydistributionlaw.com/2012/03/ancient-rome-had-competition-law/.
5
See Iain Farquhar, “Competition Law and the New Slavery”, (August, 2011) at
http://makefruitfair.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/competition_law_and_slavery_from_blnationalcoordinatorpc.pdf.
6
Ibid.
7
Supra 2.
8
Id. at 39.
9
Id. at 40.
10
Supra 5.
11
“Competition Law”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_law#cite_note-14.
12
Supra 5.
13
Supra 2.
14
See R.S Naidu, “Cartels Vis-a-Vis Competition Law: Judicial Analysis,” 7 (1) NALSAR Law Review
(2013).
15
(1894) AC 535.
American gun-maker on condition that he would not make guns or ammunition anywhere in
the world, and would not compete with Maxim in any way for a term of 25 years.”16
73
See Mitsuo Matsushita, “Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System”, 44 (4)
DePaul Law Review, Symposium - Cultural Conceptions of Competition, (1995) at
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1835&context=law-review.
74
Article 46 of the Charter imposed an obligation on member countries to prevent firms from engaging in
activities that “restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control whenever
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade”. See UN Doc. E/Conf.2/78
(1948).
75
Restrictive business practices included: “(a) price fixing or agreements on terms and conditions of
supply of a product; (b) agreements to exclude suppliers or allocating markets between suppliers; (c)
discrimination against particular enterprises; (d) limiting production or fixing production quotas; (e)
agreements preventing the development of particular technologies; and (f) unjustified or unlawful
extensions of patent or intellectual property rights.”
76
Under “Article 51 of the Havana Charter, member nations would have been entitled to complain to the
ITO about prohibited restraints. The ITO would have been authorised to investigate and to demand
information in the course of its investigation, and to recommend remedial action to the governments of
member nations. Upon finding a complaint valid, the ITO would have been required to publish its
findings and request full reports from the offending member state about the progress of its remedial
measures.” See UN Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/4 (1948).
77
Supra 73.
78
“The GATT system was designed to provide a general framework to encourage free trade between
contracting nations by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common
mechanism for resolving trade disputes. The explicit aim of GATT is to eliminate all trade restrictions.
Article III (para 4) of GATT provides that the products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin.” See Working Paper, International Competition Law
Harmonization and the WTO: Past, Present and Future, at the IALS, (24-26 June 2008).
79
“In June 1959, one group of experts, appointed by the Executive Secretary, met in Geneva to work on
restrictive business practices. The group noted that the activities of international cartels and trusts may
hamper the expansion of world trade and interfere with the objectives of GATT.”
80
See Freidl Weiss, “From World Trade Law to World Competition Law”, 23 (6) Fordham International
Law Journal (1999) at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj.
81
Ibid.
82
“The Group of Experts reported on harmful restrictive business practices in international trade and
considered it “unrealistic to recommend at present a multilateral agreement for the control of
international restrictive business practices.” The members of a Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices ("Group of Experts") “felt that sufficient evidence was not available to judge the extent of the
actual damage to world trade which results from these practices.” See Restrictive Business Practices-
Arrangements for Consultations, June 2, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 170, 170-71, 4 (1961); See
“Extract from a Speech by Sir Leon Brittan to the Centre for European Policy Studies: The Future of EC
Competition Policy”, Commission Press Release, IP/92/1009 (Dec. 7, 1992).
83
See Stuart E. Benson, “The U.N. Code on Restrictive Business Practices: An International Antitrust
Code is Born”, 30 The American University Law Review 1031 (1981).
84
UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive anti-
competitive Practices, TD/RBP/CONF/10/REV.1, (Geneva: UNCTAD, 198).
85
See “Objectives, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The United Nations Set of
Principles and Rules on Competition”, Td/Rbp/Conf/10/Rev.2, United Nations, Geneva, (2000).
86
See “UNCTAD Model Law on Restrictive Business Practices”, (1998) at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tbrbp81r5.pdf.
87
Ibid.
88
“WP3 was established in 1964 to deal with topics related to cooperation and enforcement. Participants
in it were member states and the following non-members: Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Lithuania, Russia,
Taipei, UNCTAD, and WTO, among others. Its objectives are related to two main topics: 1. Merger
Control Procedures: • Increase the effectiveness of cooperation in the review of transnational mergers;
• Identify gaps, differences, convergences and possible areas of development; • Identify and try to
reduce unnecessary regulatory costs for companies and regulatory authorities 2. Classic cartels
(Hardcore Cartels): • Increase cooperation and exchange of information between competition agencies; •
Develop and promote practices and effective instruments of enforcement; • Increase public awareness of
the harm caused by cartels.” See http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/multilateral_cooperation_/multilateral-
cooperation/organizacao-para-cooperacao-e-desenvolvimento-economico.
89
The OECD Recommendation focuses on national enforcement and excludes export cartels: “the hard
core cartel category does not include agreements, concerted practices, or arrangements that (i) are
reasonably related to the lawful realization of cost-reducing or output-enhancing efficiencies, (ii) are
excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a Member country‟s own laws, or (iii) are
authorized in accordance with those laws”. See “OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning
Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels”, C (98)35/FINAL, (March 25, 1998), Articles A.2.b.
90
OCED, “Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement”, (2014) at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf
91
Ibid.
92
“In 1997, a Working Group was established in the WTO to investigate the relationship between trade
and competition policies. In addition to this, in 1999, the Group along with few delegations address
concerns of implementing competition policy on their national economies and the particular
implications that a multilateral framework on competition policy might have for development-related
policies and programmes; continue to explore the implications, modalities and potential benefits of
enhanced international cooperation, including in the WTO, in regard to the subject-matter of trade and
competition policy; and continuing focus on the issue of capacity building in the area of competition
law and policy.”
93
“Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Briefing Notes”, Trade and Competition Policy, Working group set
up by Singapore Ministerial at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief13_e.htm.
94
“Cancun WTO Ministerial 2003: Briefing Notes”, Trade and Competition Policy dealing with cartels
and other anti-competitive practices, at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief08_e.htm.
95
“The 1997 Kodak-Fuji case made it clear that competition laws are covered by the National Treatment
obligation, explicitly by subjecting Japanese competition law to the national treatment obligation and
implicitly by accepting that the term “affecting” extends to national competition laws” at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art3_e.pdf.
96
Article III: 4 of GATT states: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation
charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product.” See https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art3_e.pdf.
97
Article XI states: “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained
by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party
or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.” See https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.
98
See Jiro Tamura, “Trade and Competition at the WTO: Domestic Regulation and Competition Policy for
Market Access Development”, Conference paper, Keio University, (October 2000) at
http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/CGP/Oct2000Papers/Tamura.pdf.
99
GATS “Article VI (4) is being strengthened with the aim of requiring member states to show that they
are employing least trade-restrictive policies. The legal tests under consideration would outlaw the use
of non-market mechanisms such as cross-subsidisation, universal risk pooling, solidarity, and public
accountability in the design, funding and delivery of public services as being anti-competitive and
restrictive to trade.” See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction9_e.htm.
100
GATS Article VIII: “Each Member shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in its territory
does not, in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with
that Member‟s obligations…. This Article shall also apply to cases of exclusive service suppliers, where
a Member, formally or in effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service suppliers and
(b) substantially prevents competition among those suppliers in its territory.” See details at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm
101
Members recognise that certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those falling under
Article VIII, may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services. “Each Member shall, at the
request of any other Member, enter into consultations with a view to eliminating practices referred to in
paragraph 1. The Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such a request
and shall cooperate through the supply of publicly available non-confidential information … and to the
conclusion of satisfactory agreement concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting
Member.” See details at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm.
102
Article 40 states: “Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual
property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the
transfer and dissemination of technology …).”
103
See Eleanor M. Fox, “Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change”, Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal, vol. 41, 473, (2010) at https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss3/6/.
104
“The concept of ICN originated out of recommendations made by the International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee (ICPAC), a group formed in 1997. ICPAC was commissioned to address global
anti-trust problems in the context of economic globalisation and focused on issues such as multi-
jurisdictional merger review, interface between trade and competition, and the future direction for
cooperation between antitrust agencies”.
See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/history.aspx.
105
“Press Information Bureau”, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, GoI, (November 9, 2016) at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=153454.
106
ICN, “A Statement of Achievements Through April 2010”, 3–4 (Apr. 2010) (discussing impact of ICN‟s
merger related recommended practices), at www.internationalcompetition
network.org/uploads/library/doc630.pdf.
 regulatory authorities, the courts and the private sector, and the attainment of adequate resources for
regulatory institutions, including competition institutions”. See APEC, “APEC Principles to Enhance
Competition and Regulatory Reform” (1999) at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/52/2371601.doc.
121
Supra 119.
122
“The agreement covered anti-cartel, merger control and, in the case of the EC, actions under Articles 90,
92 and 93 (EEC). Article V of the US-EC agreement provided for „positive comity‟. Requests under
positive comity must be seriously considered, but the responses to such requests are still voluntary”.
123
See “Chapter Eleven, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of India
and Korea”, August 7, 2009. (came into effect on 1 January 2010), at http://commerce.nic.in/trade/india
%20korea%20cepa%202009.pdf.
124
See “Chapter Eleven, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of India
and Japan”, February 16, 2011 (came into effect on 1 August 2011).
125
Article I (2), Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation Between the United States
Department of Justice and the United States Federal Trade Commission, and the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs (Government of India) and the Competition Commission of India, 27 September 2012 (entered
into force on 27 September 2012).