IB Related

QnA
 Intelligence Bureau
The Intelligence Bureau (IB), considered the oldest surviving
intelligence organization in the world, serves as India’s
internal security agency responsible for mitigating domestic
threats. IB technically falls under the authority of Ministry of
Home Affairs. However, the IB director is part of the Strategic
Policy Group as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
of the National Security Council, and can report directly to the
prime minister. Although the exact functions of the agency
remain unidentified, it is known that the agency is responsible
for counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence
collection in border areas, infrastructure protection, and anti-
secession activities. IB works with other Indian intelligence
and law enforcement organizations, particularly RAW
(Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence
agency) and the newly created Defense Intelligence Agency.
The agency also maintains partnerships with foreign agencies,
including security agencies in the U.K., U.S., and Israel.
 World’s Intelligence Agency
1. UK
2. USA
3. ISRAEL
4. PAKISTAN
5. AFGANISTAN- NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
6. NEPAL – NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
7. BANGLADESH – BANGLADESHI INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
8. SRI LANKA
9. MYANMAR
10.CHINA
11.MALDIVES
12.RUSSIA
 Intelligence Bureau
IB traces its history to the British colonial rule. The exact
lineage, though, is subject to debate. The unsuccessful Sipoy’s
Mutiny in 1857 created a need for an intelligence organization
that could keep tabs on signs of potential unrest and monitor
the various rulers in different parts of India. IB was founded on
December 23, 1887, as the “Central Special Branch” by the
Secretary of State for India in London. Some claim that IB’s
origins can be traced back to India’s first intelligence unit
established in 1885 by Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe
MacGregor, the quartermaster general and head of the
intelligence department of the Indian Army. However, this unit
later morphed into a separate military intelligence unit. Yet
another group claims that IB dates back to 1835 when a police
organization called the Thuggee and Dacoity Department was
founded.
 Intelligence Bureau
The Central Special Branch was established with the intention of collecting timely information on political,
economic, and social conditions of India, monitoring social sentiment and overseeing the security situation. Special
branches of the police department were also established at the headquarters of each provincial government. The
job of the Central Special Branch was to analyze information sent by the provincial special branches. In due time,
collection of political intelligence was also assigned to the Central Special Branch.

Acting on the recommendations of the Police Commission of 1902-1903, Central Special Branch was restructured
and renamed the “Central Criminal Intelligence Department.” The department was responsible for internal security
affairs in addition to criminal activities. National security activities became the central focus of the new
organization, and it was renamed the “Central Intelligence Department” (CID) in 1918. It later changed its name to
“Intelligence Bureau” (IB) in 1920.

Indian politicians headed provincial governments starting 1935. It was decided then to expand IB’s reach into the
provinces to strengthen intelligence collection efforts. This resulted in the creation of IB field units, each under
the leadership of a central intelligence officer. After India’s independence in 1947, these units subsequently
evolved into State IB units that are today known as Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus.

Some intelligence and security organizations operating today trace their origin to IB. Up until 1968, IB was
responsible for internal as well as external intelligence gathering. However, after its failure in the war against
China in 1962, India created an external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1968. The
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), in charge of protecting India’s vital infrastructure, came from the
industrial security focus of IB. Similarly, the Border Security Force (BSF), the Indo-Tibet Border Police, and the
Special Services Bureau all trace their existence to IB’s border security duties. The Special Protection Group (SPG),
in charge of protecting VVIP’s, including the prime minister, was born out of IB’s VIP security wing.
 Intelligence Bureau
The Intelligence Bureau, as the internal security
and intelligence organization, is tasked with
intelligence collection and dissemination and acts
as a security advisor to the state and federal
governments as well. Personnel are not recruited
into IB directly; rather they come from law
enforcement agencies throughout India, with
Indian Police Service cadres making up the bulk of
the organization. Below is a list of tasks that the
IB is known to be involved in:
 Intelligence Bureau
Counterterrorism: India faces threat from Islamist terrorism as well as
separatist and communist violence. Major groups include Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-
e-Mohammed, Harkat ul-Mujahideen, the Communist Party of India (Maoist),
Indian Mujahideen, and the United Liberation Front of Assam. IB collects
intelligence inside India, which includes keeping track of individuals, groups, and
organizations suspected of terrorist ties, monitoring movements and
communications of known individuals, cultivating sources, and analyzing and
disseminating collected information. IB’s counterterrorism mandate also involves
countering separatist and violent political movements in the northeast and
elsewhere.

The state Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus play an important role in IB’s efforts,
especially in the northeast. IB also heads a Multi-Agency Center to coordinate
and share intelligence with different agencies and branches of government.
However, with the spike in deadly attacks since 2005, IB has come
under criticism for failing to carry out its duties. The bureaucratic culture and
turf wars also prevent fast and effective coordination.
 Intelligence Bureau
Counterintelligence: IB is responsible for effectively countering foreign and hostile
intelligence organizations operating in India. Almost all of the counterintelligence work
inside India is conducted by IB. While not much is known about IB’s work, a report
indicates that the Indian intelligence community has incorporated remote viewing
techniques and satellite technologies in its counter-intelligence efforts. A former
intelligence official called India’s counterintelligence record both a success and a shame.
A well-known counterintelligence failure is the defection of Rabinder Singh, head of
RAW’s Southeast Asia department, to the U.S.

Border Intelligence Collection: India shares porous land borders with Pakistan, Nepal,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, and China. Following the 1951 Himmatsinhji Committee’s
recommendation, IB tasked with intelligence collection in the border areas. In this area
IB works closely with border protection forces.

VIP Security: IB’s VIP security unit is charged with the safety of VIPs. While it is not
known whether IB provides actual physical bodyguards, it does provide a threat
framework and security guidelines (“blue book”) to be used for the actual protection of
VIPs. It is assumed that IB shares known threats and intelligence with and advises the
Special Protection Group, Delhi police, and other state police organizations. IB’s security
guidelines have come under scrutiny after 350 complaints were filed with the National
Human Rights Commission against VIP security practices.
 Intelligence Bureau
IB is tasked with critical infrastructure protection, especially
aviation. In this area, it works closely with the Central
Industrial Security Force and the National Technical Research
Organization’s (NTRO) Infrastructure Protection Center. IB also
performs background checks for security clearances for
diplomats, judges, and other individuals.

The Indian Telegraph Act coupled with the Indian Post Office
Act grants the bureau broad and sweeping powers to monitor
all forms of communications. IB reportedly wiretaps phones
without warrants and is believed to open as many as 5,000
letters a day. It also tries to influence public opinion by writing
op-eds and letters to editors in support of government
policies.

It is also worth mentioning that STRATFOR, a Austin, Texas

based private geopolitical intelligence firm, has rated the
Intelligence Bureau as one of the top 5 intelligence outfits in
the world when it comes to conducting surveillance.
 Where Does the Money Go:
The classification of the budget as well the operational activities means that there are no
official public records indicating how IB spends its money. However, based on the threats
that India currently faces as well the overall mission of the bureau, one can draw certain
reasonable inferences regarding its spending.

The high volume of Islamist terrorist attacks that India faced in the last few years along with
others that have been foiled makes it very likely that some significant portion of the IB
budget is spent on its counter-terrorism activities.

In addition to Islamist terrorism, India is also confronting violent left-wing extremism. As

recently as 2010, PM Manmohan Singh singled out Naxalism as the single greatest internal
security threat to India. In light of this, it can be assumed that IB invests money and
resources in this problem.

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in India heated up tensions between India and Pakistan.
India holds Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI responsible for the attacks. Therefore, it can be
inferred that intelligence collection in the Indo-Pak border areas as well counterintelligence
activities vis-à-vis Pakistan are also top priorities for the bureau.

A large part of IB is often used by the ruling party to conduct political surveillance on the
opposition. It can be assumed that a significant portion of the IB budget is used for
operational activities aimed at keeping the current political party in power.
 IB’s Domestic Wiretapping
The ability of the bureau to wiretap phones and listen in on almost all
forms of communication without the need for a warrant is a cause of
concern for many. While the use of sophisticated monitoring equipment
has no doubt played a crucial role in enabling IB to better perform its job,
the total lack of any oversight or regulations makes it worrisome. IB keeps
call data records, without any legal backing or cause, of select individuals
for the Ministry of Home Affairs. Additionally, IB reportedly taps phone
lines of every minister and prominent opposition figures. It also taps some
civil servants as well journalists and other activists. This creates a
situation where democracy is possibly undermined by those very
individuals who are tasked to safeguard it. Furthermore, following the
November 2008 Mumbai attacks, IB ordered all communications companies
to discontinue the use of VoIP call service to and from the country till a
way to track these calls was established. While warrantless wiretapping
has been declared illegal, it is unlikely that the practice will cease to exist
in the absence of strong regulatory and oversight mechanisms.
 Political Surveillance
Despite having a clear national security role to play, IB personnel and resources
are often used to monitor the activities of political opposition by the ruling party.
A lack of clear oversight mechanisms and a lethargic bureaucratic culture enables
this practice. Use of IB personnel and resources for political surveillance greatly
affects the ability of the bureau to do its job as well as the morale of IB personnel.
It was recently reported that less than a third of the IB’s workforce conducts
national security related duties. This would mean that about two-thirds of the
personnel and vast amounts of resources are being spent on political surveillance
and opposition research. As mentioned in the “wiretapping” section, IB keeps
tracks of all ministers as well as opposition figures. This is done solely for the
purpose of gathering political intelligence for the ruling party. IB’s inability to
break free from this politicization undermines its credibility and threats Indian
national security. Confirmed examples of political snooping come from the tell-all
book of a formed IB operative – “In 1979, Dhar was brought back to Delhi to head
the IB's ‘Election Cell.’ Prime Minister Charan Singh ordered him to assess “what
was required in each constituency to influence the electorate.” When Gandhi rode
back to power, she asked him to assist the Puri Committee, a tool of political
vendetta, “to blacken the faces of her opponents.”
 Suggested Reforms
Coordination
One of the most stringent criticisms leveled at the Indian intelligence community
is the lack of coordination between the different organizations and agencies.
While technically supposed to work together, IB and RAW frequently engage in turf
wars and intelligence sharing gets held up in bureaucratic red tape. The Task Force
on National Security, lead by former cabinet secretary Naresh Chandra, has
recommended the appointment of a National Intelligence Coordinator (intelligence
czar) to oversee all the various intelligence agencies and facilitate effective
coordination.

Intelligence Agencies (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011

Given the messy state of the Indian intelligence community, the proposed bill is
considered to be a step in the right direction. IB, in particular, can benefit from it.
The bill specifies that IB work only national security tasks, and refrain from
political surveillance. It also restricts IB’s reach to internal intelligence collection,
thereby delineating its geographical reach (and making it distinct from RAW). The
bill would also extend much needed oversight and accountability, and provide a
legal cover for IB’s operations.
 Suggested Reforms
Government Oversight
The three major intelligence agencies of India (IB,
RAW, and NTRO) currently operate without any
formalized oversight mechanisms or regulations.
Cases of corruption at NTRO and IB along with the
failures of intelligence agencies and misuse of
classified funds have prompted a sincere effort by
the Indian government to address these issues. The
centerpiece of this strategy is an oversight power
over intelligence agencies.
 Suggested Reforms
IB Should be Subject to Government Oversight
A committee of several secretaries headed by National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon formulated
oversight mechanisms in mid 2011. Manish Tewari, a Congress spokesperson and MP, introduced the
“Intelligence Agencies (Powers and Regulations) Bill, 2011” in the Lok Sabha in August 2011. The bill seeks
to provide and establish, among other things, a “legislative and regulatory framework for IB;” “a National
Intelligence Tribunal for the investigation of complaints against these agencies;” “a National Intelligence
and Security Oversight Committee for an effective oversight mechanism of these agencies;” and “an
Intelligence Ombudsman for efficient functioning of the agencies and for matters connected therewith.”
The bill requires that IB function under the Office of the Prime Minister and work for national security
purposes alone.

A significant impetus for the oversight recommendation came from the Institute for Defense Studies and
Analysis’s Task Force on Intelligence Reforms. The task force, led by Rana Banerji, a 37-year veteran of the
Indian Administrative Service, published a report titled A Case for Intelligence Reforms in India. The report
argues for fundamental changes in the Indian intelligence apparatus. One of the changes advocated is
institutionalized oversight. The report argued that the “functioning (of IB) must be under Parliamentary
oversight and scrutiny.” To this end, it recommended that the government:
•Strengthen financial accountability of intelligence agencies; annual reports to go to Comptroller & Auditor
General (CAG)/NSA;
•Provide for an in camera audit of Secret Service Funds;
•Have a separate intelligence ombudsman for IB, R&AW & NTRO;
•Examine the option of having a Minister for National Security & Intelligence who could exercise
administrative authority on all intelligence agencies;
•Set up a Parliamentary Accountability Committee for oversight of intelligence agencies through
legislation.
 Suggested Reforms
Further, in anticipation of potential resistance from within the intelligence
community as well as politicians, the report stated:
“We are mindful of reservations within the intelligence
community, especially among police officers in the profession,
that excessive harping on accountability could damage operational
efficiency and jeopardize secrecy. Yet, it has been felt, on
balance, that there can be no getting away from introducing some
sort of external supervision and control, including legislative
oversight to improve efficiency and to build in self-correcting
mechanisms.”

Intelligence oversight, by its proponents, is seen as a natural requirement

in light of India’s democracy as well as the recent debacles. This view,
however, does not extend to the practitioners and some of their political
backers.
 Suggested Reforms
IB Should Not be Under Government Oversight
The issue of an oversight committee as well as a tribunal
does not sit well with the intelligence community. Safety
of sources, misuse of intelligence information, and
bureaucratic hassles are cited as the reasons opposing the
passage of the bill. Some believe that efficiency will be
not increased, but rather hurt as a result of oversight.
Some also fear that the autonomy required for intelligence
operations will be affected as well. These concerns are
reflected in the current status of the bill: almost ten
months after its introduction, it has yet to lead anywhere.
As one newspaper reporter observed, “A detailed report
with specific recommendations for intelligence reforms in
India, submitted by a Task Force led by a former Assam
cadre IAS officer Rana Banerji is gathering dust for a year.
The same has been the fate of a bill placed in parliament
to regulate Indian intelligence agencies.”
 Suggested Reforms
Constitutionality of the Intelligence Bureau
The lack of clear oversight and accountability
mechanisms stem in part from a nebulous legal structure
that supports IB’s existence. The report of the Task Force
mentioned above observed that as early as 1975, “L.P.
Singh Committee had gone into the working of the IB and
recommended a written charter for it.” It further noted
that even “the Kargil Review Committee “took note of
the legal vacuum in which both IB and the R&AW
[Research & Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence
agency) were working.” This issue came to head when a
case was filed against IB to protest its
unconstitutionality.
 Suggested Reforms
IB is Unconstitutional
A Public Interest Litigation filed in mid 2011 in Karnataka High Court
alleges that the Intelligence Bureau operates in a “constitutional
vacuum.” The petition was filed by R.N. Kulkarni, a former joint
assistant director of the IB who served the bureau for over three
decades. The court admitted the petition in June and the hearing
was adjourned on November 10, 2011. Kulkarni’s petition points out
that the IB was “not set up as an Act of Parliament, has no charter
of duties, no framework of policies, no rules and regulations relating
to personnel, recruitment, training, promotion and transfers.”
Another question raised is whether IB is a civilian or police
organization. Moreover, Kulkarni contends that IB’s broad powers,
secret budget, and no accountability and transparency threatens the
rights of Indian citizens and the democratic structure, thereby
violating Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In March 2012,
Karnataka High Court ordered Center to explain the issue of IB’s
existence.
 Suggested Reforms
IB is Constitutionally Justified
The central government has conceded that IB is a
civilian organization with no police powers and that
the Group of Ministers (a committee formed after the
Kargil War to assess India’s security apparatus) noted
that IB operates with a formal charter. However,
according to the government, this does not
necessarily mean that IB’s existence is
unconstitutional. In response to the court, the
government has pointed to that “the Intelligence
Bureau finds mention at S.No.8 in the Union list under
the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India.” As the
Task Force report, points, this makes the IB not a
statutory body but rather “an ad hoc administrative
arrangement by the Executive.” As of June 7, 2012,
the court has been adjourned and the next hearing
date is June 29, 2012.