UNIDAD POPULAR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: NI RAZON, NI FUERZA

by
Brian Loveman
The tragic death of Chilean democracy has led to as much theoretical soul-
searching on the Left as it has to relief the Right. Not unexpectedly, the
on
Chilean Communists have attempted to wash their hands of Socialist-MIR &dquo;ad-
venturism&dquo; while the militant Left blames the dead end on the road to socialism.
alternately on U.S. intervention and the lack of revolutionary commitment on the
part of the Communists and the &dquo;Allende Wing&dquo; of the Chilean Socialist Party.
In this dispute on the Left all are correct-for there are many reasons that the
Popular Unity (UP) coalition failed to lead Chile down the road to socialism.
U.S. foreign policy and the invisible blockade played a role as did the ambiguity,
dissension, corruption, and lack of concrete programmatic objectives by the mem-
bers of the UP coalition. A strong opposition, with multi-class support and a stra-
tegic hold on crucial posts in the existing state apparatus also played a role. Last,
but obviously of considerable import, the coercive apparatus of the state (military
and police) retained autonomy from the supposedly supreme executive authority.
The &dquo;government&dquo; lacked a reliable instrument for enforcing existing law; impos-
ing a revolutionary legal structure was, without a counterbalance to the armed
forces, out of the question. Other problems also exi’sted-lack of a vanguard party,
economic debility and vulnerability, and so on.
All this has now become grist for the theoretical mill. What has not been
dealt with, however, is the matter of whether the &dquo;road to socialism&dquo; as envisioned
by influential members of the Popular Unity coalition involved anything revolu-
tionary at all. And more particularly, whether the peasants and rural workers had
anything to gain by following the UP (road to socialism). Posed in this sense
(restricted to the countryside) the question is a narrow one. Yet the answer has
implications that go well beyond the countryside. The reason for this, simply put,
is that the UP program was an essentially conservative, statist, faithless path-
well-trodden by regimes of Right, Center, and Left with several things in common:
mistrust of the working class, disdain for &dquo;peasant mentality,&dquo; unwillingness to
concede that peasants might be a source of organizational ingenuity and produc-
tive work. It demonstrated an insistence on centralized decision-making (even
where regional or local councils were formed to &dquo;represent&dquo; the workers and
peasants) and, terror at the thought of real popular participation-uncontrolled
by intellectuals and party politicians. For despite the rhetorical commitment to
democratic socialism, Unidad Popular was a movement that patronized the work-
ing class and sought to impose bureaucratic solutions in the countryside in a
tradition as old as Hispanic America and as young as modem Eastern Europe.
There can be no democratic socialism without democracy. And there can
be no democratic socialism until intellectuals, party cadres, and bureaucrats are
brought under the control of the working classes. In the countryside this means
the peasantry and rural workers.
Chilean Socialism and Property in Rural Land
In great part the failure of Unidad Popular in the countryside was due to its
conservatism-its failure to go beyond Eastern European experience; its failure
to build on the innovations introduced by Chilean Christian Democrats; its rigid
Latin American Perspectives : Vol. I, No. 2, Summer, 1974

147
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interpretation of &dquo;property&dquo; in a modern society.

In order to understand the failure of the UP’s rural program it is necessary to
be aware of the land reforms carried out by the Christian Democratic government
(1964-1970) that preceded the Allende coalition. For contrary to the assertions
of many critics of the Christian Democrats (see Kyle Steenland in this journal),
in practice the Christian Democratic agrarian reform program created a new form
of rural proprietorship centered on cooperative enterprises with substantial
amounts of collectively worked land. While deficient in many respects, these new
rural enterprises (asentamientos) provided a potential foundation for a viable
system of agricultural workers’ enterprises on a scale that could be managed
democratically by small numbers of campesino families.
The Christian Democratic Agrarian Reform
When the Christian Democrats took office in 1964 they committed them-
selves to a land reform program. For more than two years, however, opposition in
the Congress prevented passage of the agrarian reform legislation proposed by
the Frei administration (eventually modified and passed as Law 16.640). Under
these circumstances the Christian Democrats attempted to initiate their rural
program by (1) intensifying enforcement of existing labor law in the countryside,
(2) enacting new labor law to the benefit of campesinos (for example minimum
wage provisions increasing levels to those in urban areas and introduction of the
eight-hour day), (3) stimulating the organization of rural workers in legal and
illegal unions and assisting the peasants in carrying out illegal strikes, and (4)
applying on an increased scale the land reform law (Law 15.020) passed by the
previous administration.
The government made an effort to acquire land for redistribution under the
terms of the law. Fearing less favorable terms would soon be enacted in the
Christian Democratic legislation, some rural proprietors became &dquo;willing&dquo; to
dispose of their land before the new law could be put into effect. Other land-
owners responded by formally subdividing their farms, while often continuing to

operate them as a single production unit. Formal subdivision, in addition to

&dquo;protecting&dquo; the landowners from expropriation, served to destroy rural unions
by leaving less than 20 permanent workers in each new farm (20 being the
minimum required by existing law for a legal union).
In response to these threats to the land reform program and the existing
legal unions, the government pushed Law 16.465 (April 26, 1966) through the
Congress. This law prohibited the subdivision of all rural properties larger than
eighty hectares without prior authorization from the land reform agency, Corpo-
raci6n de Reforma Agraria (CORA). The government also introduced new
regulations regarding land rentals and sharecropping in an effort to protect the
campesinos.
Despite landowner resistance, from 1965 1967 the Christian Democratic to
government acquired some 495 properties with total of approximately 1.2 million
a

hectares.’I But the Christian Democrats had yet to define the character of the
land reform they meant to carry out. A majority sector of the party favored a
conventional expropriation/parcelization program that would have created a
numerous group of peasant smallholders. A vocal, influential group within the

party, led by Julio Silva Solar and Jacques Chonchol, favored establishment of
The estimate of 495 farms is CORA’S
1 (1965-1970:30). Other sources, citing earlier CORA
documents, set this figure at 478; see (Echeñique, 1970:96).

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 149

&dquo;communitarian enterprises&dquo;-multi-family farms in which the workers became

co-proprietors and worked most of the land of the expropriated farm collectively.
Failure to resolve this conflict prior to initiation of the land reforms meant that
when the land reform got under way the government had still not decided what
type(s) of production units would be created through the land reform process.
In practice, the production unit that emerged-the asentamiento-represented a
concession to the militancy of Marxist-dominated rural unions along with a grow-
ing influence of the &dquo;communitarianists&dquo; within the rural program of the Chris-
tian Democratic government.

The Asentamiento
Perhaps the epitome of the improvisation and eclectic pragmatism of the
Christian Democratic rural program, the asentamiento took shape in the course
of political struggle between the Christian Democratic government and the cam-
pesino unions in the valley of Choapa in the province of Coquimbo.
The National Health Service (SNS) and its predecessor, the Beneficiencia,
had controlled farms in the valley of Choapa for over one hundred years. From
the early 1920’s onward these properties had been the foci of a Marxist rural labor
movement. Between 1938 and 1964 various schemes for subdivision of these
properties were proposed; the hope of acquiring a parcel of land made campesinos
reluctant to leave the valley despite the miserable conditions in which the majority
lived.
After passage of Law 15.020 the Alessandri government (1958-1964) decided
that many government-owned rural estates would be subdivided for purposes of
land reforms. The government set April 1964 as the date for transfer of the farms
in Coapa to the land reform agency. The Health Service agreed to pay severance
benefits to the workers and CORA took on the responsibility for subdivision
(Pontigo, 1965:88). In response the unions in the valley farms called a strike.
Salaries and perquisites (regalias) were improved and transfer of the farms to
CORA postponed for a year. Subdivision in Choapa thus became a problem for
the Christian Democrats.
The Christian Democrats were well aware of the strength of the Socialists
and Communists in the unions in Choapa. A report by the government Corpora-
cion de Fomento (CORFO) noted that &dquo;It is obvious that the political parties
control the activity of the unions and, therefore, the conflicts and relations be-
tween workers and proprietor in the hacienda&dquo; (CORFO, 1965:112).
To April of 1965 the government had still not decided how to carry out the
land reform in the valley. Pressure from the unions forced the government into
action. As an interim measure CORA offered to rent the tarms to the campesinos.
This offer the unions rejected. Commenting on the government’s offer, the leader
of the Federacion de Campesinos e Indigenas, with which the unions in the valley
of Choapa were affiliated, declared:
The transfer of the land to the unions had been converted into a plan for individual
rentals, grouping the campesinos into committees evidently intended to replace the
unions-whose long tradition of struggle in the valley is a guarantee of the defense
of the campesinos’ interests....
CORA’s plan leaves the union leaders in the valley to one side and establishes that
administration of the sectors of the Hacienda will be carried out by CORA repre-
sentatives (Campusano and Conzalez, 1966:88).
The Federaci6n demanded transfer of the farms to the unions for collective
exploitation, temporarily respecting the rights of some campesinos to individual
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150

plots if
they so desired. In addition, the unions pressed for maintenance of all
social security and family allowance payments, as well as of individual pasture
rights and land allotments until the operation of the farms was modified. Most
importantly, the unions demanded freedom for each union to determine the type
of property system to be established on each farm. The unions intended to take
over administration of the farms and create collectives which maintained
garden
plots for the workers on an individual basis. CORA refused to turn the farms
over to the unions and
negotiations were stalemated.
In the meantime, government officials, technical advisers at ICIRA and
Marxist intellectuals (e.g. David Baytelman, the first director of CORA under
Allende) worked on a compromise solution. As worked out in negotiations be-
tween union representatives and government officials, the agreement reached
created a joint enterprise in which the workers provided their labor and CORA
the land, technical assistance, credit, and operating capital. In theory the value
of these inputs would be returned to CORA at the end of each contract year,
along with 5 to 25 percent of income. The remainder of any surplus would be
distributed among the workers. Management would be in the hands of a man-
agement council composed of five workers and two CORA officials. In practice
the role of CORA in most asentamientos came to be dominant, but formally this
arrangement provided workers as a collectivity much more influence in farm
administration than the government would have liked.
With the adoption of the Christian Democratic reform law the asentamiento
concept was officially introduced as a basic unit in the government’s land reform
program. Article 66 of Law 16.640 declared that &dquo;Upon taking possession of the
expropriated property, CORA shall install a campesino asentamiento.&dquo; The law
established a three-year minimum period for the asentamiento, extendable to five
years in special cases. As a general rule the law provided that at the end of this
transitional period the land would be subdivided and assigned to individual
campesinos (Article 67). But, in a partial victory for the &dquo;communitarianists&dquo;
the law also provided that when in the judgment of CORA individual parcels
were not desirable, CORA could assign the land in communitarian properties.
CORA was authorized to install communitarian properties when &dquo;technical neces-
sities dictated it&dquo; or when this solution was requested by the campesinos.
By July 14, 1970, CORA organized 910 asentamientos on 1,319 expropriated
properties. From the time of expropriation to the creation of the asentamiento
there existed a lag for the &dquo;toma de posesi6n.&dquo; The campesinos on these farms
considered themselves on &dquo;pre-asentamientos.&dquo; In practice CORA &dquo;found it tech-
nically necessary to stimulate communitarian assignments of land&dquo; (CORA, 1970:
48). In this respect CORA overtly defied the legislative intent of Law 16.640
(creation of smallholds) and imposed the communitarian solution in a clear
victory for the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party. CORA justified this
development, stating:
Cooperative tenancy ... permits a much greater flexibility and adaptability than a
traditional, rigid, individual system in which personal interest takes priority over that
of the community.
This system of land tenure greatly facilitates the creation of regional production coop-
eratives and commercialization, so useful and necessary in Chile.
Other reasons which support this decision are that the cooperative system allows great
economy in the management of machinery, water, pastures, and generally, the indi-
rectly productive infrastructure-like warehouses, silos, corrals, etc.
... The exploitation of a property in cooperative tenancy signifies that the campesino

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 151

community freely decides by common accord of its own members the form in which
the land is exploited, deciding that each campesino works individual parcels or ex-
ploiting sections in common (CORA, 1974:45).
While many deficiencies existed in asentamiento proprietorship, the Christian
Democratic land reforms had decidedly not produced the minifundia so character-
istic of Latin American agrarian reforms.
By 1970 rather systematic critiques of the asentamiento system existed. The
political Right insisted that the asentados had not became property owners, but
rather &dquo;inquilinos of the State.&dquo; Many on the Left saw the asentados as a new
privileged group in the countryside whose members maintained individualistic
spirit and contributed to increasing stratification in the rural sector (Echenique,
1970:105-106). Critics of all political currents agreed that CORA’s role had been
highly paternalistic, inefficient, and partisan. However well justified most of these
criticisms were, the fact remained that when the Popular Unity coalition came to
power, an ongoing land reform process was underway. This process included
rather impressive levels of mobilization of rural labor and peasants and, in contrast
to previous Latin American reforms, had created an innovative production unit
in the rural sector based upon collective farming on much of the expropriated
land.
Production Units for Socialist Agriculture?
Like the Christian Democrats, the Popular Lfnity coalition came to power
without any concrete program f or the countryside. A commitment to eliminate
the hacienda once and for all from rural Chile was shared by the political parties
of the coalition; but they did not have in common any program for construction
of socialist agriculture. This meant that the government’s massive expropriation
of large farms during the first year was unaccompanied by a program for reorgani-
zation of the rural sector. Some new asentamientos were created, but the govern-
ment soon (May 1971) announced publicly that no new asentamientos would be
formed.s Instead some sort of regional campesino enterprise would take its place.
There is no doubt that this announcement both lost the government support of
many peasants and rural workers while providing political ammunition for the
opposition and that the policy announced by the government violated the formal
terms of the existing land reform law. Meanwhile, the members of the government
coalition debated over what type of production unit should replace the asenta-
miento (See Partido Socialista, 1971; Lazo, 1971; MAPU, 1971).
For many campesinos the asentamiento was the agrarian reform. For the
government, in contrast, the asentamiento was seen as a deficient rural enterprise,
an obstacle to social justice in the countryside, a source of new class cleavages and
a basis for a &dquo;kulak&dquo; class in rural Chile. Perhaps most importantly, the asenta-
mientos already in existence were recognized as opposition (Christian Democratic)
strongholds in the countryside. Though some asentamientos contained elements
loyal to the Popular Unity government (for example, &dquo;9 de Julio&dquo; in San Esteban,
Aconcagua), the leadership of the federations of asentamientos and of the na-
tional confederation maintained close alliances with the Christian Democrats.
In August 1971 Jacques Chonchol, Allende’s Minister of Agriculture, an-
nounced that the government had decided to adopt a new transitional form of
rural proprietorship in order to &dquo;avoid the defects of the actual system.&dquo; The new

2
F or example, ( El Siglo, 1971), describes the establishment of Asentamiento Santa Rosa in the
first property expropriated by the Popular Unity government of Cautín.

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152

arrangement was to be called Centro de Reforma Agraria (CERA). In the news

report of Chonchol’s declaration it was reported that the minister had delivered
to the campesino leaders
(Consejo Nacional Campesino) a document in which
the organization of these CERA was already fully elaborated. Thus while the
asentamiento originated in a conflict between campesino unions. Marxist parties
and the Christian Democratic government, the CERA was the product of debate
within the Popular Unity coalition and modifications introduced, directly and
indirectly, by foreign intellectuals. Campesino participation in this process was
notably absent. Campesino resistance to the government’s proposal, however,
indicated that bureaucratic imposition of the CERA on the campesinos would
be no easier for Allende than had the Christian Democrats’ initial efforts to
by-pass the unions in the valley of Choapa.
The new production units, the CERA, aimed not only at replacing the
asentamiento with a larger scale enterprise, but at creating a &dquo;classless society&dquo;
in the countryside. The CERA were to be not only production units but also
governmental units. Unfortunately, the CERA concept originated more in im-
mediate political expediency and compromise between political parties of the
government coalition than from critical analytical efforts to evaluate the economic,
technical and political feasibility of alternative production units along with their
implications for social justice.
Minor criticisms of the CERA regarding restrictions on individual land allot-
ments and pasture rights, and participation of women and teenagers in the
assembly and as officers, accompanied the major source of opposition to the
CERA-belief that it was a barely disguised effort to introduce State and Collec-
tive farms.
With plans for the CERA out in the open, the opposition parties intensified
the campaign against the government’s rural program. The Christian Democrats
(led by Rafael Moreno, Director of CORA during the Frei Presidency) declared
that &dquo;in creating the centros de reforma agraria the government does not intend
to make campesinos owners of the land-because according to CORA this would
be to create a privilege&dquo; (La Prensa, 1971). Subsequently the Consejo Nacional
Campesino rejected the CERA as defined by the government, insisting that prop-
erty in rural land should be assigned to the campesinos in cooperatives with the
campesino’s house and garden plot of two hectares assigned as private property.
(The Consejo Nacional Campesino, formed by the UP government to provide
participation of the rural workers and peasants in rural policy-making, did not
participate in the formulation of the CERA concept-a silent commentary on
the Unidad Popular’s willingness to allow real participation of the rural working
classes on fundamental questions of rural policy.)
Resistance to the CERA became intense almost immediately. By June 1972
the government had only managed to constitute twenty-two, while leaving several
thousand expropriated farms without any formal organization. In some farms
campesinos independently established asentamientos in open violation of govern-
ment policy. Several national campesino organizations (El Triunfo Campesino,
the Confederacion de Asentamientos, Provincias Agrarias Unidas) supported this
tactic in order to resist the imposition of the CERA model. The president of El
Triunfo Campesino announced that this tactic would be employed by campesinos
on a national scale when confronted with CORA’s refusal to organize asentamien-
tos as required by law (Centro de Estudios Agrarios Boletin, 1972:23).
In response the Popular Unity government assured the campesinos that they

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 153

would be granted private titles to their own house and a garden plot, while the
remainder of the enterprise would belong, collectively, to the campesinos. At the
same time Chonchol sought to speed
up assignment of land titles to asentamien-
tos emerging from the asentamiento period. This provided some confirmation
of government intent to comply with promises made to the existing asentamientos,
but did nothing to clarify how the confirmation of &dquo;kulaks&dquo; in property rights
could be made consistent with the eventual establishment of a &dquo;classless society&dquo;
in the countryside. Introduction of the CERA concept in order to create &dquo;a single
class of campesinos with equal rights and obligations&dquo; did nothing to overcome
this dilemma.
The Popular Unity government’s initial definition of the CERA, contrary
to the declarations of some coalition ideologies, did not eliminate proprietorship
and therefore, &dquo;privilege;&dquo; it merely transferred more prerogatives of proprietorship
to bureaucrats while removing from individual enterprise or group of campesino
enterprises control over the surplus generated in the rural sector. The scale of
operation of the CERA (commune or sub-commune region) provided organiza-
tional problems without compensating benefits, especially in the short run, and
created political difficulties including loss of support or intensified resistance by
many campesino organizations. Jacques Chonchol had recognized that
the fundamental problem ... is to create campesino enterprises of scale that permit
a relatively specialized agriculture ... the productive and must be organized cooper-

atively, not in individual properties. Within the framework we must give a large
participatory role to the campesino in the direction of the enterprise (Chonchol,
1971:11).
But the intellectuals and politicians within the government coalition, including
Chonchol at times, seemed to forget this advice and to pursue a policy consistent
with a long Chilean tradition of bureaucratic centralism, of glorification of &dquo;the
people&dquo; or &dquo;the campesinos&dquo; in the abstract accompanied by a profound mis-
trust of effective popular participation in decision-making. The Allende govern-
ment thus failed to break out of a most traditional Hispanic paternalism, cen-
tralism, and mistrust of autonomous workers’ organizations and rural labor or-
ganizations. In this respect, orthodox Marxism combined neatly with Hispanic
elitism to produce, from the peasants’ point of view, a most reactionary rural
policy that attempted to substitute a return to government imperiousness for the
newly-won self-respect and beginnings of autonomy for numerous peasant collec-
tive enterprises.
Thus, despite the Allende government’s view of the President of the Na-
tional Confederation of Asentamientos as a spokesman for the opposition and
especially the Christian Democrats, Juan Chac6n’s opinion represented those of
many campesinos and campesino organizations.
[the government] speaks of collective farms or state farms without consulting the
campesinos.... We have engaged in a struggle to liberate ourselves from the yoke of
the patron.... We believe that the land should belong to the campesinos and we want
a Chilean agrarian reform planned in conjunction with the campesinos (Chac6n, 1971).
The government itself added fuel to the conflict when a spokesman (subsecretaria
de econorma) announced that the government opposed workers’ enterprises (em-
presas de trabajadores) &dquo;because workers’ enterprises are the last bastion of
capitalism since they cause the workers to lose their solidarity and unity and
create in them a capitalist mentality oriented toward competition and markets&dquo;
(El Mercurio, 1971). This declaration gave credibility to opposition claims that
the CERA represented an ill-disguised effort to introduce State Farms to Chilean

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154

agriculture.
Emilio Lorenzini, the Christian Democratic deputy who had led the large
campesino strikes in the region of Molina (1953) and who had, over the years,
been affectionately called &dquo;el loco&dquo; by his Christian Democratic colleagues for
his interest in the campesinos and his willingness to adopt unconventional tactics,
accurately depicted the intellectual sterility and political implications of the
government’s rigid conception of property and proprietorship. In reading Loren-
zini’s remarks it is well to remember that like Marxist rural organizers he had been
insulted, beaten and imprisoned for his active support of campesino labor organi-
zations.
The government does not understand workers’ enterprises because it begins with an
antiquated concept of property.... We believe that property in the means of pro-
duction can be divested of the abusive privileges conferred in it by traditional capitalism
and neo-State-capitalism....
The government has been unable to understand that in a new world in which the
rules of the game experience revolutionary change, it docs not matter who is the owner
ofcapital, but rather who has the power to decide, to obtain the fruits ofthe enterprise,
and to orient national production.
We achieve nothing if we merely change the group which exploits the workers in
the capitalist system for ... an &dquo;interventor&dquo; designated by bureaucrats.... That is,
those who control State property-the bureaucrats-control the management of
production, receive the fruits of production and orient production to serve the political
party of the government.
The workers continue to sell their personal labor to those who control the capital....
Before they were stockholders, now they are bureaucrats (emphasis added) (Lorenzini,
1971).
Lorenzini’s comments focused precisely on the contradictions of the government’s
rural program: how can a theoretical commitment to social justice, political
democracy and rising production be operationalized in an agriculture that fails to
break out of antiquated conceptions of proprietorship? How can a democratic
socialism be created when the government takes a step backward in the creation
of effective workers’ enterprises in which peasants (in the countryside) or urban
workers effectively participate in local decision-making and, through their repre-
sentatives, radically reform the State apparatus so that it is responsive to the
general population-instead of an elite of &dquo;revolutionary&dquo; intellectuals?
In an effort to totally reject the &dquo;reformist&dquo; Christian Democrats the Popular
Unity government refused to build upon the innovations of the previous regime
and to recognize that they were not, in 1970, beginning &dquo;from scratch.&dquo; Agrarian
reform was, in 1970, a legitimate public policy; landowner resistance to expropria-
tions was legal and administrative-but lacked any serious counterrevolutionary
potential as long as the Popular Unity government maintained the support of the
campesinos. Instead, the government rejected campesino participation in practice
(despite rhetoric to the contrary) and introduced an agrarian reform program
that unified many land reform beneficiaries and even rural workers with the land-
owners. The program came to have many of the superficial characteristics of
Stalinist agricultural policy, including government monopolies on buying certain
farm products, but without any capability to carry out collectivization through
force. The government neither reasoned with the campesinos, attempting to
modify the program so as to consolidate the land reform and begin to develop
functioning rural enterprises nor did it have the capability to impose its &dquo;solution&dquo;
through force. As the chaos this produced in the countryside led to declines in
production, increasing imports of food (including massive imports of wheat), and
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exacerbated the shortages in the cities (which were in part due to redistributive
policies-but only in part), the costs of the &dquo;road to socialism’ ’in the countryside
became ever more clear.
With the coup of 1973 a different sort of reactionary policy was introduced
in the countryside. The rural unions that came alive after 1964 were repressed.
There is a threat that many farms will be returned to their previous owners. The
military’s initial proposals for parcelization, if carried out, would undo the inno-
vations introduced after 1964 and put Chile in the same situation as the rest of
those few Latin American nations who have carried out extensive land reforms-
only to see the result be thousands of minifundia plots alongside a government-
subsidized capitalist agriculture. But what the military and the Allende govern-
ment have in common is a profound mistrust of the masses, of the workers and
peasants, of autonomous workers’ organizations and an economy founded upon
workers’ enterprises. Unfortunately for the peasants and workers, however, while
the Popular Unity coalition lacked &dquo;raz6n y fuerza,&dquo; the military lacks only
&dquo;raz6n.&dquo; Thus the repression of the workers and peasants that has occurred and
is yet to come must be blamed in great part on the reactionary policies of those
who claimed to lead Chile down the road to socialism-for socialism was never
on the agenda. Rather the working classes were &dquo;offered&dquo; statism and elitist rule
that blended Hispanic traditionalism with a bastardized East European Marxism.
REFERENCES
Miguel González
Campusano, José y
1966 "El Valle de Choapa y la reforma agraria," Principios, XXVI (March-April)
Centro de Estudios Agrarias Boletin
1972 (Citing La Prensa
) No. 3 (June 11)
Chac6n, Juan
1971 "A campesinos no les gusta el estado de patrón," La Prensa (January 23)
Chonchol, Jacques
1971 Via Chilena
, I (November)
CORFO (Corporacíon de Fomento)
1965 Informe referente a recursos y equipamiento Hacienda Choapa en relación al plan de
reforma agraria de CORA, Santiago: Secretariado Técnico de Planeamiento y Vivienda
Rural
CORA (Corporación de Reforma Agraria)
1970 Reforma agraria chilena, 1965-1970, Santiago
Echeñique, Jorge
1970(?) ’Las expropriaciones y la organización de asentamientos en el periodo 1965-1070,"
"Reforma agraria chilena: seis ensayos de interpretación," Santiago: ICIRA
Lazo, Jaime
1971 "Informe Prelimina de la Commissión Política del Partido Communista," (mimeo),
Santiago
Lorenzini, Emilio
1971 "Que son las empresas de los trabajadores," La Prensa (November 26)
MAPU
1971 El primer o ñ del Gobierno Popular, Santiago
a
El Mercurio
1971 "Gobierno se opone a las empresas de trabajadores," (November 18)
Partido Socialista
1971 "Síntesis de la política agraria del partido socialista," (mimeo), Santiago
Pontigo, Cipriano
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La Prensa
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