History of Rwanda by Nsanzineza

4/1/2022
EPHRAIM
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[HISTORY OF RWANDA SUMMARY. NEVER AGAIN
April 1, 2022 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA]
Table of Contents
POST-COLONIAL RWANDA ...................................................................................1
Part 1: First and Second Republics of Rwanda ............................................................................ 4
Achievements and failures of the First Republic, 1962–1973 ..........................................5
Reasons for the Fall of the First Republic ......................................................................................21
Achievements of the Second Republic (1973–1990) ........................... 30

Reasons for the Fall of the Second Republic ....................................................................48
Part 2: Genocide Denial and Ideology in Rwanda and Abroad ........... 60
Forms and channels of Genocide Denial and Ideology. ....................... 61
Definition of the concept “genocide ideology” .................................... 62
Some ways used to deny the 1994 genocide against Tutsi ..................... 63
Forms of Genocide Denial and its manifestation in Rwandan society

and Abroad............................................................................................ 65
Ways of Fighting Against Different Forms and channels of Genocide

Denial and Ideology .............................................................................. 86
LIBERATION WAR IN RWANDA ................................................. 103
The course of the Liberation War (19901994).................................... 111
Eight points programme of RPF......................................................... 115
The effects of the Liberation War (19901994) .................................... 145
Email: nsanzinezae100@gmail.com Page 1

The challenges faced by Rwanda after the Genocide against the Tutsi
............................................................................................................. 151
The achievements of the Government of National Unity (1994-2003)

............................................................................................................. 165
ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS ............................................ 198

POST-COLONIAL RWANDA
In the post colonial period, the government of
Rwanda was led by two republics which
successively replaced one another. The first was led
by Grégoire Kayibanda whereas Major General
Juvénal Habyarimana was the head chief of the
second one. The two regimes had the common
feature of poor governance, the main root of the
1990 Liberation War. This war fought by Rwanda
Patriotic Front against the Habyarimana’s regime
had had very negative effects such as loss of lives
and destruction of properties, decline of the
Rwandan economy, displacement and exile of many
people,etc. When this armed conflict was about to be
peacefully settled, the peace process was however
broken by the former Government of Rwanda which
prepared and implemented the 1994 genocide
against the Tutsi. The genocide was stopped by the

RPF troops and this action simultaneously marked

the end of the Liberation War.
In the after math of the 1994 genocide against the

Tutsi, the country of Rwanda faced a number of
challenges including lack of shelter for refugees and
other vulnerable people, a broken judicial system,
suspicion and mistrust among the Rwandan
population, political and administrative vacuum,
problems of insecurity, economic challenges, etc.
The Government of National Unity set up in July
1994 tirelessly strived to take different strategies so
as to find appropriate remedies to these challenges.
In so doing, security was safeguarded and unity
and reconciliation were strengthened. Besides, the
rule of law was established and the
democratisation process was emphasised. Many
other actions were also initiated such as the
implementation of decentralisation, politico-

administrative reforms and fight against injustice,

reconstruction of the national economy through the
planning, human resource development,
privatisation of the government enterprises,
construction of infrastructures such as roads, water,
electricity, promotion of education, health and
gender equality, environment protection, assistance
to the most vulnerable people and promotion of
agriculture and animal husbandry.
Part 1: First and Second Republics of

Rwanda
This unit is about the history of Rwanda during the
First and the Second Republics. This period deals
with the history of Rwanda from 1962, the year
during which the country of Rwanda regained its
independence up to 1990, the year that was marked
by the beginning of the Liberation War. This war

opened a new era which would be marked by many

political and socio-economic changes and would be
won by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994
after stopping the genocide that was perpetrated
against the Tutsi. This victory contributed to the
collapse of the Second Republic and Rwanda opened
a new page of its history with the coming of RPF to
power.
This unit will examine various achievements of the

First and the Second Republics in Rwanda in
political and socio-economic areas. At the same time,
it will focus on the failures of the two regimes and
factors that led to their collapse.
Achievements and failures of the First

Republic, 1962–1973

 Political evolution: The new institutions of the

Republic of Rwanda
 From multipartism to monopartism
 Management of the problem of Inyenzi
incursions: the beginning of genocide against
the Tutsi.
 Economic evolution: Perpetuation of the colonial
economic model
 Development of economic infrastructure
 Socio-cultural evolution: Education and health
systems
 Failures and reasons for the fall of the First
Republic.
Achievements and failures of the Second Republic

1973–1990
 Political evolution: New political institutions

 Economic evolution
 Priority investment in infrastructure

 Socio-cultural evolution: Health and education

 Failures and reasons for the fall of the Second
Republic
 Political evolution
Rwanda just after independence At the time of
recovering Rwanda’s independence, Grégoire
Kayibanda bullied his way into political prominence
and was more than willing to use ethnic terror and
divisions to maintain his rule.
By independence day on July 1st, 1962, Rwanda had

no constitution. PARMEHUTU leaders had
prepared a document to be used as a constitution
during the coup d’état of Gitarama. But this text was
not published in the official Gazette of Ruanda-
Urundi. Moreover, the colonial authority continued
thereafter to dictate laws for the new authorities.

A constitution project was proposed by

PARMEHUTU and the Association pour la
Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA). The
vote took place during the meeting of November
23rd, 1962; 33 votes for, no vote against and 4
abstentions (3 from UNAR and 1 from
APROSOMA). The final text was signed on
November 24th, 1962 by 40 deputies.
Rwanda had a government headed by a president of

the republic and a parliament. According to the
constitution, the power of the government was
allocated to the president of the republic who was at
the same time head of state and head of government.
Grégoire Kayibanda, President of

Rwanda from October 1961 to July 1973.

The parliament had the power to supervise the

actions of the president of the republic and his
government (Article 73). Under the First Republic,
three legislatures were elected: in 1961, 1965 and
1969, until the dissolution of the parliament
following the July 5th, 1973 coup d’état.
From Multipartism to Monopartism

The 1962 constitution devoted its article 10 to a
multiparty system. However, the ruling party, MDR
PARMEHUTU, turned itself into a ‘state party’,
behaving just like a single party from 1963 after
eliminating and assimilating other political parties.
MDR PARMEHUTU fused with the state and the

two institutions became one and the same at all
administration levels. It means that the president of
the republic was at the same time the president of
MDR PARMEHUTU party. At the level of

prefectures, the préfets were leaders of

PARMEHUTU. The same applied in communes and
the lower administrative levels.
MDR PARMEHUTU used different mechanisms to

monopolise political power. The party utilised
intimidation tactics, arbitrary arrests and violence
against opponents. At times although not often, it
also tried to negotiate. In fact in such circumstances
that APROSOMA disappeared in 1961, after the
defection of its leaders to MDR PARMEHUTU.
These included Aloys Munyangaju and Germain
Gasingwa.

Rwagasana Michel (19271963). (Source:

Google/image)
RADER and UNAR on the other disappeared due to

the killing of their leaders. These included Prosper
Bwanakweli, Ndazaro Lazare and Karinda Callixte
from RADER; and Michel Rwagasana, Afrika,
Burabyo, Joseph Rutsindintwarane, Gisimba,
Mpirikanyi and Ndahiro Denis from UNAR who
were murdered in 1963. They were executed in the
prison of Ruhengeri when Inyenzi had just launched
major attacks and had penetrated Bugesera up to
Kanzenze.
After recruiting some opposition leaders in its ranks

and killing others, MDR PARMEHUTU transformed
itself into a single party. In 1965, MDR
PARMEHUTU was the only party which presented
candidates for presidential and legislative elections.
The Inyenzi incursions

The first challenge faced by the First Republic was

the problem of refugees. The attitude of the
government of the First Republic varied with time.
At the beginning of the 1960s, the provisional

government had shown concern and established a
state secretariat for refugees. But after every Inyenzi
attack, the Tutsi inside the country would be killed.
Survivors would seek asylum outside the country.
The major attacks of Inyenzi were the

following:
࿤ The December 21st, 1961 attack from Uganda via
Kinigi targeting individuals in Ruhengeri, Kigali
and Gitarama.
࿤ The April 1962, attack from Uganda targeting the

eastern parts of the country.

The July 3rd to 4th, 1962, attack from Goma by

approximately 80 to 100 Inyenzi. Four of the
captured Inyenzi, were executed in Ruhengeri
prison.
The December 24th, 1963 attack in Bugesera.

Attackers came from Burundi, via Kirundo and
Nemba. After some successes, the Inyenzi were
stopped and defeated by the National Guard
commanded by two Belgian officers Dubois and
Florquin. After the Bugesera attacks (1963–1964),
President Kayibanda warned the Inyenzi that:
‚If they try to conquer Kigali by fighting, it
would be the total and quick end of the Tutsi‛.
The last main Inyenzi attacks took place in Cyangugu
and Gikongoro prefectures (Bugarama in 1964, Nshili
in 1966 and Bweyeye in 1966) and in Kibungo
prefecture (Butama in 1966). After the Bugesera
attack, many Tutsi were killed at Gikongoro
prefecture and the deaths were estimated between

8,000 and 10,000. In the same period,

Kayibanda ordered the execution of 27 leaders of
UNAR and RADER who had been imprisoned in
Ruhengeri prison without any form of legal
procedure whatsoever.
The attack on Rwanda launched in Bugesera was under
the command of François Rukeba, one of the main UNAR
activists. This ill-prepared attack failed, and many Tutsi
fell victim to the massacres which were organised in
retaliation. The word Inyenzi, which literally translates to
cockroach, was first used in the 60s. It was initially used
to designate UNAR movements as they organised
incursions into Rwanda. Its meaning later extended to
the entire Rwandan Tutsi population. Occasional
incursions into Rwandan territory continued to occur in
Rwanda until 1967. Between 1959 and 1967, nearly
20,000 Tutsis were killed during the repression against
UNAR, and 200,000 others fled the country.
 Economic evolution

Economic problems
At independence, many government offices were in
Bujumbura which had been the colonial capital of
Ruanda-Urundi. Rwanda was under-equipped.
There were a few infrastructures. The country did
not have a radio, an airport, permanent roads, a
telephone system, hotels, a university or any other
institution of higher learning. Everything had to
come through Bujumbura or through Belgian
Congo.
In addition, Rwanda lacked the financial means. It

had only one donor: Belgium. As a result Rwanda
was dependent on foreign donors for most of her
needs.
Another economic problem faced by Rwanda was

the poor functioning of the monetary and customs

union between Rwanda and Burundi. Moreover, the

two countries did not have very good relations
because they had two different political regimes:
Rwanda was a republic while Burundi was a
constitutional monarchy.
The country was going through an extremely

difficult crisis including the deficits in the balance of
payments because in 1962 prices rose by 50 per cent
and by 1964, prices had risen by 300 per cent. The
Rwandan currency depreciated while agricultural
and mineral production declined. This resulted in a
big fall in exports and a big gap in foreign exchange.
To address this situation, Rwanda asked for

assistance from western countries and from
international organisations like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Rwanda’s western donors
were mainly Belgium and United States of America

(USA). Belgium and IMF had just granted Rwanda a

little more in terms of loans while the USA had
donated food and some money to buy equipment.
Besides external assistance, the government of

Rwanda took other measures to get the country out
of the economic crisis. It reduced expenses of all
ministries including funds allocated to education.
Another proposed solution was the First five year
economic development plan of 1966–1971. The plan
was based on an analysis of the economic and social
conditions, and challeges that Rwanda had to face in
order to define its economic development.
Plans were made to construct tarmac roads linking

the country to all her neighbours in the frame-work
of the five-year development plan (1966-1971). The
following roads were to be built:

Kigali–Gatuna
Kigali–Rusumo
Kigali–Butare
Ruhengeri–Cyanika
It is essential to note that before the coup d’état that

brought the First Republic in 1973 to an end,
construction had only started on the Kigali- Gatuna
road in 1971. The construction of this road was
completed in 1977. In addition, the Rusumo bridge
at the Akagera River linking Rwanda and Tanzania
and the bridge over Nyabarongo River were
constructed.
In rural development, the emphasis was placed on

the reclamation of marshlands in order to improve
agricultural production and the distribution of
improved seeds and plants in some parts of the
country. New crops like rice were introduced.
Some cattle dips were put in place to fight ticks.

 Socio-cultural evolution
Education system
The First Republic made very few achievements in
education and health. The First Republic tried to
give free education and health services.
At independence, Rwanda had a few secondary

schools such as Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida in Butare,
Ecole Technique Officielle de Kicukiro, College
Sainte André in Kigali and College du Christ Roi in
Nyanza.
By 1962 there were 23 secondary schools and this

number increased to 63 schools in 1972. The number
of pupils in primary schools increased from 261,306
in 1962 to 425,000 pupils in 1972 due to the double

shift system. The budget allocated to education also

increased from 168,264,000 Frw in 1962 to
563,194,000 Frw in 1972.
The first national university was opened on

November 3rd 1963 in Rwanda. It was started by a
Canadian priest called Levesque with 50 students
distributed in three faculties: medicine, arts and
sciences. It was launched at Ruhande in Butare
(Huye District today) with the assistance of
Switzerland and Canada. By 1971– 1972, the
enrolment had reached 470. The Institut
Pédagogique National (IPN) was started in 1966.
Despite these efforts in education, no tangible fruits
were evident as indicated by the small numbers

produced during this period.
National University of Rwanda. (Source:

Google/image)
Health
In the health sector, the First Republic also tried to

make some efforts. The focus was put on the
construction of new dispensaries whose number
increased from 67 to 142 in 1972. Steps were also
taken to address malnutrition and poor conditions
of hygiene. As a remedy, some medical centres were
constructed to provide health education in order to
sensitise people on how to prevent certain diseases.

Breastfeeding mothers were provided with child

care skills. The government also set up nutrition
centres for malnourished children. To take care of
disabled children, a centre for physically
handicapped children was built at Gatagara. A
psychiatry centre for the mentally handicapped was
built at Ndera. This centre known as Caraes Ndera
was run by the Brothers of Charity. In preventive
medicine, vaccination campaigns were initiated
between 1965 and 1970.
Reasons for the Fall of the First

Republic
 Institutionalisation of
discrimination against Tutsi
From 1959 onwards, the Tutsi population was
targeted, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths.

A population of almost two million Rwandans were

refugees for almost four decades. The First Republic,
under President Grégoire Kayibanda,
institutionalised discrimination against the Tutsi
and periodically used massacres against the Tutsi as
a means of maintaining the status quo.
In 1965, Rwanda was declared a one-party state

under MDR/ PARMEHUTU, which was the architect
of the racist ideology. The regime of Kayibanda did
not manifest a good will to repatriate the refugees.
Instead, the state killed the Tutsi whenever the
Inyenzi attacked the country.
 Transfer of ethnicism to
regionalism
In 1965, PARMEHUTU won every seat in the
National Assembly. In spite of this achievement, this

party experience had started to internal tensions

since 1963. These tensions fell into two categories:
There were inter-personal rivalries and

disagreements in the distribution of jobs as the party
organs and state structures came closer and closer.
There was increasing discontent among emerging
cadres, students and individuals with primary and
secondary education. Very fierce local political
competition was combined with rivalries at national
level. Bourgomasters and prefects competed
intensely. Whereas the former drew upon their
clientele networks and the legitimacy as elected
officials, the latter used state structures and party
influence. Divisions emerged due to the struggle for
jobs. The state decided to expose ethnic divisions so
as to unify the regime.

The purges which began in February 26th 1973 were

initially provoked by students, but also encouraged
and led by political authorities. Along with
PARMEHUTU, the authorities aimed at uniting the
regime by defining a common enemy. Northern
soldiers (particularly Lieutenant Colonel Alexis
Kanyarengwe, the Chief of Police, who was from
Ruhengeri) who, planned to cause a political crisis,
also targeted the Tutsi population (‚Mututsi mvira
aha‛). The purges, initially involved the posting of
lists of Tutsi students and staff, asking them to leave
universities and companies. This problem later run
out of control.
Consequently, Grégoire Kayibanda punished

several northern dignitaries by dismissing them
from jobs and removing them from locations
associated with power: Lieutenant Colonel Alexis
Kanyarengwe was appointed director of the

Nyundo Seminary while Major Nsekalije was

assigned to a tea cooperative in Byumba. All the
general secretaries of the government ministries
were replaced, as well as nine of the ten prefects.
The divide between the south and the north was
firmly established.
From February–March 1973, purges were organised

in schools and in public administration against the
Tutsi population. Tutsi students appeared on lists
posted in all secondary schools and at the university
of Rwanda and signed ‘Mouvement des Étudiants’
(‘Students’ Movement’) or ‘Comité de Salut Public’
(‘Committee of Public Safety’). They felt threatened
and had to flee from these institutions.
In mid-February, the movement reached the

National University of Rwanda in Butare and the
secondary school of Kabgayi managed by the

Josephite brothers. This movement, which had

started in schools, spread to public administration
and private companies. In ministries, hospitals,
banks and shops, the Committee of Public Safety
posted lists identifying the Tutsi. Private individuals
were requested to fire their Tutsi servants. From the
towns, this spread to the countryside. In the
prefectures of Gitarama and Kibuye, the houses of
the Tutsi were burned down and they were told to
leave.
Different explanations are given for the source of

this turmoil. Though orders were given through the
administration, they may have originated from
people close to Grégoire Kayibanda. They may also
have come from Alexis Kanyarengwe, the Chief of
Police, who was from Ruhengeri.
Afterwards, the names of some ministers appeared

on the lists drawn up in Kigali. In Gitarama, several

rich Hutu traders’ stores were attacked and looted,

as well as the residences of certain politicians,
including that of Rwasibo Jean Baptiste. On March
22, Grégoire Kayibanda made a pacification speech
and announced the creation of a ministerial
commission in charge of inspecting schools.
Another cause of the rivalry between the north and

the south was that PARMEHUTU members of the
south especially in Gitarama, the home area of
President Kayibanda tended to dominate
PARMEHUTU and government power at the
expense of the northern region. For example, in the
last government formed by President Grégoire
Kayibanda in 1972, there were six ministers out of
eighteen. One third came from Gitarama, the region
of Kayibanda. Kayibanda was accused of behaving
like a monarch who played around, and causing
misunderstanding in the government.

There was a failed coup attempt by Nyatanyi Pierre

the chief of cabinet under President Kayibanda and
Muramutsa Joachim, commandant of the Kanombe
unit. Because these two officers were from the north
the coup was seen as a coup of the north against the
south. The two officers were imprisoned only to be
pardoned later by President Habyarimana when he
took over power in the coup d’état of 1973.
 Towards the fall of the First

Republic
The first signs of the decline of the First Republic

appeared in October 1968, when a parliamentary
commission of inquiry report on the administration
of the country was rejected by the majority of the
members of the parliament. This was because of
interpersonal and regional differences in the ranks

of PARMEHUTU. The report had serious

accusations against President Kayibanda. The
accusations in the report included favouritism and
nepotism, intimidation, misuse of political power
and impunity which characterised the political and
public life of the regime.
As a result of this report, members of parliament

were divided into two camps. Some supported the
report while others opposed it. The supporters of
the report were suspended from the decision
making organs of the party. They were also
prevented from contesting the legislative elections of
1969.
Another factor that contributed to the reinforcement

of regional divisions was the constitutional
amendment of May 18th, 1973 by the National
Assembly. This amendment increased the duration

of presidential terms of office from five to seven

years, and allowed Grégoire Kayibanda to stand for
a third term. Although, the National Assembly
supported the amendment of the constitution, the
country was already divided according to the two
main regions: north and south. The north wanted to
take power while the south wanted to keep it.
In order to solve the problem of discontent in

political and military ranks that was linked to
regionalism, President Kayibanda resorted to
violence and ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi.
Kayibanda wanted to hide the regional divisions in
the country by turning public and international
attention to what had been considered as a lesser
evil or no evil at all.
In carrying out this plan, Tutsi children were chased

out of schools and the few Tutsi in minor

administrative positions were dismissed, and others

murdered. These crimes were planned and carried
out by top ranking officials in the government.
This impunity degenerated into regional

confrontation. The Hutu of the north started to
resent and fight the Hutu of the central part of the
country favoured by President Kayibanda. It was
under these circumstances that Habyarimana
Juvenal, the minister of defence decided to intervene
militarily. He overthrew Kayibanda in the coup
d’état of 5th July 1973. Kayibanda and many officials
in his regime were thrown into prison. They faced
court martial. They were sentenced to death or given
long prison sentences.
Achievements of the Second Republic

(1973–1990)

Political evolution
On July 5th, 1973, President Kayibanda was
overthrown in a coup d’état led by Major General
Habyarimana Juvenal. The latter was assisted by the
following senior military officers: Lieutenant
Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, Majors Aloys
Nsekarije, Benda Sabin, Ruhashya Epimaque,
Gahimano Fabien, Jean Népomuscéne
Munyandekwe, Bonaventure Ntibitura, Serubuga
Laurent, Buregeya Bonaventure and Simba Aloys.
President Juvénal Habyarimana (1937

– 1994). (Source: Google/ image)
On July 5th 1975, Major General Juvénal

Habyarimana etablished Mouvement
Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement

(MRND). The Party’s main objective was to unify,

encourage and intensify efforts of all Rwandans to
enhance economic, social and cultural development
in an atmosphere of national peace and unity. In
1977, the Commission for Administration and
Institutional Affairs of Mouvement Révolutionnaire
National pour le Développement (MRND) prepared
a new constitution. In October 1978, the constitution
was adopted by government and the MRND Central
Committee.
On the December 20th 1978, the new constitution

was adopted by the population in a referendum
with a reported 89 per cent of the votes. At the same
time Habyarimana was elected through universal
suffrage as president of Rwanda with a 99 per cent
majority.

Article 7 of the constitution declared Rwanda a

single party state under the MRND where every
citizen was a member right from birth. In reality,
this was the establishment of a one party political
system. The president of the MRND party had to be
the sole presidential candidate. The new constitution
abolished the National Assembly and replaced it
with The National Development Council (NDC).
The first National Development Council or Conseil
National pour le Développement( CND) was
elected in 1983.
At the diplomatic level, the Second Republic made

international openness and cooperation one of its
main priorities. Rwanda therefore increased the
number of its diplomatic representatives abroad.
On December 19th, 1983 Juvénal Habyarimana was

re-elected president of Rwanda with 99.98 per cent
of the votes. After five years, on December 19th,

1988 Juvénal Habyarimana was reelected again for

five years winning 99.8 per cent of the votes.
In June 1990, French President François Mitterrand

gave a speech at La Baule in France in which he
announced that French aid would be conditional
upon democratisation in Africa. Following this
speech, Rwanda experienced a slight opening up
towards a multi-party system.
French President François

Mitterrand (1916–1996). (Source: Google/image)
Thus, on July 5, 1990, during his traditional July 5

speech, the day of the Second Republic’s 17th
anniversary, Juvénal Habyarimana was in position
to announce these political changes: the separation

of the party bodies from state structures, and the

possible implementation of a multi-party system,
though he remained very vague about the details of
how this would be implemented.
On September 1st 1990, thirty-three Rwandan

intellectuals published a manifesto ‘for a multi-party
system and democracy’.
On September 25th, 1990 Juvénal Habyarimana

named the Commission Nationale de Synthèse CNS
or (National Synthesis Committee), in charge of
developing the first draft for a constitution allowing
many political parties.
Economic evolution Under the Second Republic, the

Second Five-year period of the economic, social and
cultural development plan which covered the period

from 1977 up to 1981 was implemented. This plan

had four missions: ࿤ Ensuring food security of the
population and address the population growth rate.
࿤ Promotion of human resource management. ࿤
Improvement of the social conditions of individuals
and the community. ࿤ Improvement of the Rwandan
position vis-à-vis external relations. The objective of
this second five year development plan was the
creation of many jobs in order to provide young
people in rural areas with opportunities to
participate in the social and economic life of the
country.
Towards the end of 1980–1981, the primary school

cycle changed from 6 years to 8 years. This reform
established professional schools known under the
name of Centre de l’Enseignement Rural et Artisanal
Integré (CERAI). These professional schools
admitted students who had missed secondary

school enrollment for 3 years. In such schools,

students could learn professional skills such as
woodwork, electricity, masonry and plumbing.
From 1982 to 1986, the Third Five-year period of the

economic, social and cultural development plan was
also adopted with the following aims:
To improve food security for the population in

terms of both quality and quantity.
To promote jobs at sustainable wage levels that

cover the basic needs while emphasising
training programmes in order to increase labour
productivity.
To improve the population’s health conditions,

promote access to shelter and produce goods for
mass consumption.

To develop external relations and encourage the

fairness of international trade conditions.
The Rwandan diplomatic representation in foreign

countries increased. In 1979, Rwanda had hosted the
Sixth Franco – African Conference. In 1976, Rwanda
had just been a co-founder of the Communauté
Economique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL). It
was also host to the headquarters of the Kagera
River Basin Organisation (KBO).
The Second Republic made a great effort in

agriculture. Cash crops especially tea, coffee and
pyrethrum were promoted by the increase in acrage
cultivated and the creation of factories. These
include the tea factories of Shagasha, Mata, Gisovu,

and Nyabihu, and the pyrethrum factory processing

in Ruhengeri.
The government of the Second Republic focused a

particular attention on food crops like maize, rice,
soya beans, sugarcane, etc. Some factories were also
set up to process these crops like the Maïserie de
Mukamira, Sucrerie de Kabuye, and others.
Emphasis was also put on the creation of

agricultural projects. In almost all former
prefectures, there were such projects like
Développement Global de Butare (DGB), Projet
Agricole de Gitarama(PAG), Développement Rural
de Byumba (DRB) and Crête Congo Nil.
Regarding animal husbandry, the accent was placed

on rearing one cow in a cowshed and planting reeds

and other kinds of grasses to feed the cows. To

improve the existing breeds of cows, strategies such
as the importation of bulls, artificial insemination,
research, fighting cattle diseases, etc were adopted.
Concerning infrastructural development, the

following infrastructure were put in place by the
Second Republic:
Kigali
International Airport (Source: Google Rwanda
image)

Amahoro Stadium
(Source: Google Rwanda Image)
King Faisal
Hospital (Source: Google Rwanda Image)
Asphalting of the following routes:
Kigali–Gatuna
Kigali–Butare–Akanyaru

Kigali–Ruhengeri–Gisenyi Kigali–Kibungo–
Rusumo
Butare–Gikongoro–Cyangugu
Construction of several buildings to serve as

offices, for different ministries and hospitals; for
example King Faisal Hospital,
Extension of electricity network
Construction of Kanombe Airport
Construction of Amahoro National Stadium

From 1980 to 1986, the country enjoyed
economic growth due to a combination of
positive external and internal factors. This
included good climate high prices of coffee, tea
and minerals, and a considerable flow of

external capital into the country. However, from

the end of 1986, the situation deteriorated and
the economy of Rwanda gradually declined. The
causes of the economic crisis in Rwanda during
this period included the following:
The drastic fall of the world coffee and tin prices
The over devaluation of the Rwandan franc
The poor management of public funds
The demographic explosion prevailing in

Rwanda since 1940, hence the reduced yields
from land. To address this economic crisis, the
government of Rwanda applied the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) dictated by the

Bretton Woods Institutions (International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) with a
view to stabilising the economy and benefiting
from financial support of those institutions.
IMF and
the World Bank. (www.Wikipedia.org)
Socio-cultural evolution
Health
Under the Second Republic, many attempts were
made to expand the health sector. The dispensaries

were transformed into health centres and more

medical personnel were trained.
The government also put in place a policy which

aimed at creating nutrition centres in order to
educate parents on nutrition and hygiene.
Government improved hygiene conditions by

putting emphasis on the most vulnerable groups
such as women and children. In order to find a
solution to hygiene related-problems, the
government established nutritional centres at health
centres. Thus it achieved curative care and
preventive education, including vaccination,
nutrition, maternal and child protection.
In 1979 the government established the Broad-Based

Vaccination Programme (PEV/BVP) whose objective

was to reduce infant mortality through vaccination

against certain targeted diseases which included
tuberculosis, whooping cough, tetanus, polio,
measles and diphtheria.
In 1987, the government established the Programme

National de Lutte contre le SIDA (PNLS) or National
Programme for the Fight against AIDS whose
objective was to control, prevent, reduce and
conduct research on AIDS. In the same year, the
government launched the Programme National de
Lutte contre le Paludisme (PNLP)or National
Programme for Fight against Malaria. In 1989 the
Programme for Acceleration of Primary Health Care
(PASSP) was also put in place.
This programme aimed at encouraging community

participation in self-reliance and management of
health services at their health centres.

Education
In this sector, the following were the achievements
of the Second Republic:
Many reforms were made at all levels of education

in Rwanda. Among these was the construction of
new primary and secondary schools.
During the school year of 1978–1979, primary

education was revised. The primary cycle changed
from 6 years to 8 years. Training in professional
skills was introduced in Primary 7 and Primary 8,
and Kinyarwanda became a language of instruction
from P 1 up to P 8.
At the secondary education level, the Ordinary

Level was reduced and specialisations sections

introduced in the second year of secondary

education. But this reform failed due to lack of:
teaching materials
qualified teachers in the newly introduced

subjects
appropriate evaluation methods for the reform.

So, in 1991, these reforms were revised, the
primary education cycle was brought back to 6
years.
At university level, the Institut Pédagogique

National (IPN) was fused with some departments of
the National University of Rwanda. The new
campus of Nyakinama was created in 1980–1981 as
the result of this fusion. Besides, the duration of

studies in most faculties was reduced from 5 to 4

years.
Reasons for the Fall of the Second

Republic
 The imprisonment and killing of
the politicians of the First Republic
During the two years that followed the coup, the

former ‘leaders’ of the First Republic were
assassinated or imprisoned. From 1974 – 1977,
58 people — individuals who were either close
to Grégoire Kayibanda and public figures of the
First Republic — were assassinated upon orders
from Théoneste Lizinde, chief of security at the
interior ministry. According to some sources,
the repression affected up to 700 people.

 Lack of freedom of speech and

press
The Second Republic was against multipartism.
Whoever attempted to criticise the regime was
intimidated or imprisoned. For instance, on
September 18th, 1990 the trial of the priest
André Sibomana, who was the director of the bi-
monthly publication Kinyamateka, and three of
his journalists opened in Kigali after the
publication of articles denouncing corruption in
the government. On July 3th and 6th, 1990 the
Cour de Sûreté de l’État (State Security Court)
had Vincent Rwabukwisi, the editor-in-chief of
Kanguka arrested. He was accused of having
interviewed King Kigeri V Ndahindurwa in
exile in Nairobi and of plotting with refugees.
Beside these cases, other examples of violation
of human rights are the murder of the former
chief editor of Kinyamateka newspaper, Father

Sylvio Sindambiwe and Nyiramutarambirwa

Felicula, a former member of parliament.
 Economic crisis
By the end of the 1980s, the regime was
becoming ineffective. The falling price of coffee
caused a severe crisis in the country and fueled
discontent.
From 1986, there was a fall in the prices of coffee

and tin. Coffee represented 75 per cent of the
national economy. In January 1988, one-sixth of
the Rwandan population was affected by a
famine which killed 250 people. In 1989, coffee
prices decreased by 50 per cent. There was an
increase in credits from 189 million US dollars
up to 941 million and reduction of foreign
currency reserves from 144 million US dollars
up to 30 million. The Rwandan Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of 330 US dollars fell to 200 US
dollars in 1990. In 1989, the national social

budget was reduced to 40 per cent. In 1991,
Rwanda signed an agreement with the World
Bank to implement a Structural Adjustment Plan
(SAP) which led to the devaluation of the
Rwandan franc on two occasions: its value fell
by 40 per cent in November 1990, then again by
15 per cent in June 1992. Though the SAP was
only partially implemented, the main effect of
the devaluation was inflation, which reached
19.2 per cent in 1991 and an increase in demand
because of the liberation war.
 Institutionalisation of ethnic and

regional balance or quota system
The regime of Habyrimana was not a model of

democracy as its leaders claimed. The regime
forced people into a single party system and

partisan politics based on ethnic and regional

segregation. The regime led to growth of the
Rukiga-Nduga conflict which was characterised
by the exclusion of Tutsi and Hutu of Nduga
from schools and key posts in national
leadership positions like during Kayibanda
regime.
This discrimination which was institutionalised

by the Second Republic from 1981 was known as
‚ethnic and regional balance or quota system‛.
The system saw Tutsi children excluded from
secondary and tertiary education. This policy
also tended to discriminate against the Hutu
from all other parts of the country, especially the
south. These areas were allocated fewer places
in secondary schools and in university, in the
national army, administration and diplomatic
service on the basis of ethnic and regional
belonging. The best and numerous positions in

all fields were reserved for the Hutu from the

north.
This policy applied in all government

institutions was a serious violation of,
especially, the right to education. This
culminated into the 1994 genocide against the
Tutsi. The policy excluded bright and gifted
children just because they were Tutsi.

 Enrollment in Public Secondary

schools in September 1989 by
Prefecture
Prefectur Places Places Differenc
e available given e
Butare 836 696 -140
Byumba 722 662 -60
Cyangug 461 443 -18
u
Gikongor 514 466 -48
o
Gisenyi 649 1045 +396
Gitarama 836 792 -44
Kibungo 501 425 -76
Kibuye 468 412 -56
Kigali 970 1005 +35
Ruhenger 736 746 +10
i

TOTAL 6 693 6 693 +442 - 442

Source: Kinyamateka, No. 1308, October, 1989
In the table above, only three prefectures had

their places increased. These were Gisenyi with
+ 396 places, Kigali with + 35 places and
Ruhengeri with + 10 places. Other prefectures
lost their available places like Butare which lost
140 places. That shows the unfairness in the
distribution of places in secondary schools and
university due to regionalism and ethnieism.
The places reserved for Tutsi were effectively
reduced in each prefecture.
 Centralisation of power in the

hands of a small group of people
“Akazu”

Between 1985 and 1990 most of the leadership

positions were reserved for Hutus. Power was
held by elites from the north-west of the
country, in contrast with the pro-southern
orientation of the First Republic. One-third of
the 85 most important governmental positions
were given to persons born in the prefecture of
Gisenyi. After ten years of economic growth, the
economic crisis and regional favouritism
destabilised the government. Rivalry for posts
increased, power struggles became more fierce,
and mafia-type behaviour and structures
thrived. One of the main power centres was
known as the Akazu. It was organised around
Agathe Kanziga — Juvénal Habyarimana’s
wife—and her brothers. In April 1988, the
assassination of Colonel Stanislas Mayuya, who
was considered the likely successor of the
president, was carried out by this power centre.

Division among Rwandans from the north-west

began in the 1980s. It started when two highly
regarded senior military officers, Colonel Alexis
Kanyarengwe and Major Théoneste Lizinde
were accused of plotting a coup d’état. Lizinde
was accused of killing some politicians who had
served in the First Republic from the south. This
misunderstanding divided the politicians and
people from the north. As a result, political
power was monopolised by a small part of the
north-west from Bushiru in the ex-commune of
Karago. Finally, power was concentrated in the
hands of President Habyarimana, his immediate
family, and his in-laws. This was termed Akazu
meaning ‚from one single household‛.
 Glorification of Habyarimana and

dictatorship

As years went by, President Habyarimana started

developing a personality cult. This was done
through political mobilisation and glorification of
the President by his political party using animation
and his portrait which appeared everywhere in
public and private surroundings.
In addition to this personality cult, President

Habyarimana set up a dictatorship. There was a
single party, the Revolutionary National Democratic
Movement (MRND), and power was concentrated in
the hands of a small group of President
Habyarimana’s family. No single decision could be
made whatsoever without the dictator’s consent.
 Opposing the return of refugees

In June–July 1986, the Central Committee of MRND,
the highest decision-making body in the

Habyarimana regime, examined the problem of

Rwandan refugees scattered around the world,
especially in the neighbouring countries. As a
solution, the Central Committee resolved that the
refugees were not to return into the country. The
Central Committee strongly advocated that refugees
should find a way of integrating into their countries
of asylum. According to the Central Committee,
Rwanda was overpopulated and incapable of
receiving and accommodating her own people back.
Only those who had the capacity to cater for
themselves, it was decided, should apply
individually for consideration to return to Rwanda.
It was in that context that they declared that any

refugee who wished to return should show proof of
his or her financial capacity to support
himself/herself once allowed to repatriate to
Rwanda. Habyarimana himself advocated that a

child of a refugee should not be called a refugee and

so he started negotiations with Uganda to
reintegrate Rwandan refugees. In February 1989,
President Habyarimana established a special
commission for refugees’ problems and met Uganda
government officials.
This position of President Habyarimana and his

government prompted the refugees to call for an
international conference in Washington in August
1988 in which they rejected this position and
reaffirmed their inalienable right to return to their
homeland. This was one of the causes of the
National Liberation War which sarted on October
1st, 1990

PARTY 2: Genocide Denial and

Ideology in Rwanda and Abroad
In 1994, a genocide was perpetrated against the

Tutsi. Before, during and after that genocide, its
perpetrators set up ways of denying it. Even the
international community hesitated to consider the
massive killing of the Tutsi as genocide.
Three forms of the denial of genocide against the

Tutsi have been identified: literal genocide denial,
interpretative and implicatory genocide denial.
Literal genocide denial consisted of refusal to accept
that Rwanda genocide had taken place. The
interpretative genocide denial aims at saying that in
Rwanda there had been a double genocide. The
implicatory genocide denial supports the opinion

that the Rwanda Patriotic Army also participated in

the genocide.
Genocide denial and genocide ideology are

unbearable. The government of Rwanda set up
different strategies to combat it including law
n°18/2008 of 23/07/2008 relating to the punishment
of the crime of genocide ideology. At the
international level, different conferences were
organised and the problem of genocide, its denial
and ideology were examined in order to search for
ways of fighting them.
Forms and channels of Genocide Denial

and Ideology.
Definition of the terms ‚ideology‛, ‚genocide
ideology‛ and ‚genocide denial‛

An ideology is an organised collection of ideas. The

word ideology was used in the late 18th century to
define a ‚science of ideas‛.
An ideology is a comprehensive vision, or a set of

ideas proposed by the dominant class to all
members of a society. The main purpose behind an
ideology is to introduce change in society through a
normative thought process. Ideologies tend to be
abstract thoughts applied to reality and, thus, make
this concept unique to politics. Ideologies are very
common in the world of politics and have been
used; for example, to provide guidance and to
persuade.
Definition of the concept “genocide ideology”

Genocide ideology is a collection of thoughts
characterised by conduct, speeches, documents and

other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others

to exterminate people basing on ethnic group,
origin, nationality, region, colour, physical
appearance, sex, language, religion or political
opinion, committed in normal periods or during
war.
Definition of the term “genocide denial” in

Rwanda
Genocide denial is an attempt to deny or minimise
statements of the scale and severity of an incidence
of genocide for instance the denial of the 1994
genocide against Tutsi and the holocaust.
Where there is near universal agreement that

genocide occurred, genocide denial is usually
considered as a form of illegitimate historical
revisionism. However, in circumstances where the

generally accepted facts do not clearly support the

occurrence of genocide, the use of the term may be
an argument by those who argue that genocide
occurred.
Some ways used to deny the 1994 genocide

against Tutsi
The minimisation of genocide in any behaviour
exhibited publicly and intentionally in order to
reduce the weight or consequences of the
genocide against Tutsi.
Minimising how the genocide was committed.
Altering the truth about the genocide against the

Tutsi in order to hide the truth from the people.

Asserting that there were two genocides in

Rwanda: one committed against the Tutsi and
the other against Hutu or saying there had been
acts of mutual killing, etc.
Forms of Genocide Denial and its

manifestation in Rwandan Ssociety and
Abroad
In 1994, the Hutu extremists in Rwanda’s

government then in power, planned, organised for
and guided through public institutions genocide
against the Tutsi and Hutu opposed to the genocide
plan. Simultaneously, they also organised how after
committing it they could deny it as it happens in all
the cases of genocide. This is the last stage (8th) in
the process of genocide. To deny here means to deny
something that was collectively organised and

involved targeted, deliberate killings of specific

groups of unarmed civilians identified on the basis
of origin, and usually targeting those with suspect
political loyalties and their relatives.
The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi was committed

according to ‘home-made’ Rwandan plans already
underway by as early as 1992 as it has been
suggested by the historical and legal record, of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and of
numerous studies. Since 1994, the genocide denial
has taken three main forms: Literal genocide denial,
interpretative and implicatory genocide denial. In
the case of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, all these
three forms of genocide denial are more or less
linked to one another.
Literal genocide denial involves negating the facts of

genocide, silencing talk of genocidal plans and

killings. Literal denial becomes harder to sustain

once evidence emerges that genocide plans were
made and executed right across Rwanda. Following
this, interpretative genocide denial reframes or
relabels, the events of the genocide, viewing them as
part and parcel of civil war, rather than genocide.
Subsequently, implicatory genocide denial becomes
prevalent, and involves explicit counter-accusations
that genocide was planned by those previously
viewed as saving the victims. The Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) government is thus accused of planning
genocide, not only in Rwanda but also in eastern
Congo, now Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
A double genocide thesis is part of both the
interpretative and implicatory forms of genocide
denial. All the three forms of denial tend to reinforce
two parallel and mutually incompatible accounts of
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, of the past, and
tend to further polarise political and public opinion,

reinforcing divisions over the past, present and

future direction of the country.
Banal denial
This kind of denial is manifested through the films
in which French soldiers seen rescuing, Belgian or
French missionaries refuse to do so towards the
thousands of Tutsi that were being killed. These
powerful film sequences convey one key quality of
everyday denial in the sense that rescuing the
expatriates while abandoning the Tutsi to their
killers constitutes one of the very flagrant aspects of
the genocide denial.
Some researchers like Freud have demonstrated that

some forms of silence or fantasy serve to protect an
individual’s ego from deep-rooted fears and
memories, including from memories of trauma.

Denial in this every day, individual sense signals the

failure to accept reality, but also has a certain logic
since it makes escape during a psychologically
impossible situation possible. Some interpersonal
forms of denial thus appear normal psychological
responses to abnormal situations.
The soldier’s turning up the music is an example of

banal denial; his being under orders to save only
non-Rwandans, and white expatriates in particular,
is something else; it is collective denial.
In a wider sense, the term ‘denial’ refers to

something societywide, something organised. In
collective forms of denial, like genocide denial,
individual, more banal responses through denial
may also be instrumentalised.

Another scholar, Cohen, focuses rather on how to

analyse social and collectively organised forms of
denial, of which genocide denial is a prime example.
He suggests that when entire societies, including
governments, and social groups, move to ignore
past atrocities, to minimise the significance of
human suffering, then this constitutes collective
denial, and can even involve official denial by the
state. Collective genocide denial has serious long-
term consequences for criminal justice which cannot
be equated with more banal forms of individual
denial, analysed by Freud as coping mechanisms.
Whilst genocide denial has both individual and
collective manifestations even before the genocide
became reality, denial of its true purpose can be
shown to be part and parcel of the logic of extremist
Hutu power political ideology, at least from 1990,
and perhaps even from the time of the first attacks
on the Tutsi in 1959,with Belgian assistance.

Through a set of historical spirals of conflicting

claims about which group is the original, real or
ultimate victim, these three broad forms of genocide
denial can however be roughly equated with three
broad phases of recent Rwandan history.
Literal denial
Although literal denial was predominant in the early
post-genocide years in Rwanda, it has not yet
disappeared. Literal denial involves either the full
intention to deceive or forms of self-deception that
result in disbelief, silence or claiming not to know.
Knowledge may be directly denied, sometimes even

in the face of clear evidence to the contrary. Silence,
indifference and treating evidence as if it does not
merit serious consideration, are all strategies of
literal genocide denial.

Literal genocide denial was mainly confined to the

private sphere during the early post-genocide years.
It still appears in some research, in internet blogs,
and among the lawyers of those accused of genocide
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
The head office of

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in
Arusha. (www.Wikipedia.org).
Interpretative denial

Arguably, this becomes the dominant form of

genocide denial in post-genocide Rwanda.
Interpretative genocide denial involves re-
categorising evidence that is established, and goes
beyond negating, ignoring or silencing talk of
genocide. Higher moral goals are often invoked in
cases of interpretative denial, such as: revolutionary
struggle, ethnic purity, western civilisation’, or in the
case of Rwanda, legitimate self-defence and a
striving for ethnic-based selfdetermination.
Interpretative genocide denial involves use of

euphemisms, and the relativising of atrocities by
one’s own side as an understandable response to the
threat of the ‘other side.’ Like literal genocide denial,
interpretative genocide denial can form part of
international scholarly discourse, or be part of public
popular opinion. In the media, the most common
expression of interpretative denial was to present

the genocide of Tutsi as simply part of a wider ‘civil

war’ of all against all, rather than a targeted
genocide.
Implicatory denial
This third form of genocide denial consists of

retaliatory counteraccusations, and explicit
justification for one’s position, through anticipatory
counter–accusation against the other party.
Implicatory genocide denial has been aimed at

restoring a sense of self-worth among those accused
of genocide crimes. By claiming, for example, that
the Rwanda Patriotic Front really started the
genocide themselves, by shooting down the plane
carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6
April 1994, implicatory genocide denial tries to

prove that if genocide was committed, it was not by

those accused but by the ‘other side’ in a civil war.
The aim is also to exonerate all atrocities and lay the

blame on others. In implicatory denial, the other
side is always guilty of lies, propaganda, ideology,
disinformation or prejudice, and thus of triggering
the genocide.
Those accusing the RPF in this way seek to

exonerate themselves from any responsibility for
genocide themselves. Implicatory denial has arisen
mainly since 2003, and mainly through legal
institutions in France and Spain, and on internet
sites of the political opposition to the Rwanda
Patriotic Front. In more details, each of these three
basic forms of genocide denial can be presented.

Literal denial 1994–1998

At first, silence was the most common form of literal
genocide denial. Silence remains salient well after
the initial post-genocide years, sometimes in a
surprising crude fashion. At a conference organised
at the Peace Palace in The Hague, on Peace and
Stability in the Great Lakes Region, silence of this
kind was evident.
Up to the late 1994s, during scholarly conferences, in

various academic journals, in the media, and
elsewhere, the events of April to July 1994 were still
called a civil war, ethnic massacres or other terms
that avoided use of the of the word ‚genocide‛.
Those who termed it genocide were still in a
minority at that time, and were even claimed to be
propagating a genocide myth.

Transitional government members mostly stuck to

the literal denial narrative of the April–July 1994
period. They even claimed to have done nothing
wrong, and that most of those killed were Hutu,
killed by the ‘ethnic’ enemy, the Rwanda Patriotic
Army.
This literal genocide denial was in line with the

ideology that Hutu power ideologies represented
the heroic little men against a cunning enemy, the
Tutsi, who it was claimed were determined to
slaughter every last Hutu man, woman and child.
Killings were presented as mostly spontaneous, to
centuries of feudal oppression by Tutsi overlords.
Literal denial was evident during the early years of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
the accounts used by defence lawyers. Genocide was
thus transformed into something else—killings
based on mutual and long-standing ethnic hatred, or

ancient rivalries of clans and castes. The fact that

genocide had been planned well in advance was
denied, and so it could be claimed that the killings
were just killings, and not a deliberate genocide of a
minority, the Tutsi. In 1997 one organisation, called
Africa Direct, organised a conference in London
entitled ‘The Great Genocide Debate’. The
programme and presenters suggested that since
there were massacres on ‘all sides’ in Rwanda in
1994, this was a civil war and not genocide. Aidan
Campbell, in the now defunct Trotskyist magazine,
Living Marxism, claimed this too. At the same time
Luc de Temmerman, the Belgian defence lawyer of
some leading genocide suspects at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, simply claimed:
‚<there was no genocide. It was a situation of mass
killings in a state of war, everyone was killing their
enemies‛.

This civil war thesis was common in the media too,

especially in the early post-genocide years. The
situation changed when the former minister Jean
Kambanda set a historical precedent being the first
accused person to acknowledge and affirm his guilt
for the crime of genocide before an international
criminal tribunal. He therefore became the first
political leader to take responsibility for the
deliberate planning of genocide, and for its
implementation.
Although he much later appealed, this was a turning

point and marked an end to widespread individual
literal denial among perpetrators, who would now
find it much harder to sustain silence in the face of
such a senior administrators’ admissions of
responsibility. As head of the provisional
government, his guilty plea departed from the
prevalence of literal genocide denial among the

others appearing at the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda at that time.
Through the International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda, a broadly-shared legal and academic
consensus emerged that genocide had indeed taken
place in Rwanda, and was targeted against the Tutsi
population and those who supported them. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
proceedings, from each region of the country,
witness and expert testimony soon filtered into
academic research, and literal genocide denial
started to be challenged and gradually gave way to
more subtle, interpretative forms of genocide denial
after 1998 or so. Since then, it was obvious to most
impartial observers, to most legal experts and to
emerging historians of the genocide period to
conclude that what happened in Rwanda in 1994
was the intent to destroy the Tutsi as a people.

The historical evidence of genocide was thus

overwhelming, and the one-sided killings of April
6–July 1994 within Rwanda started to be widely
referred to as genocide.
In response, a gradual shift took place from literal to

more interpretative forms of genocide denial. These
started with the familiar argument that this was not
one-sided genocide but two- sided civil war, an
argument later developed into the so-called double
genocide thesis.
Interpretative denial 1998–2003

Civil war in Rwanda as elsewhere provides a
convenient cover for one-sided genocide to be
planned and implemented. In the case of Rwanda,
the evidence is that the machinery of genocide was

geared around targeted killings well before 6 April

1994, when killings started, triggered by the
shooting down of the president’s plane.
Interpretative denial involves distancing, and

sometimes even victim-blaming, as in this statement
to an African Rights researcher: ‚It wasn’t genocide,
but rather a civil war. The people defended
themselves. It was bad luck if you were Tutsi
because it meant certain death, and therefore you
were eliminated‛.
Several key elements of interpretative denial appear

in this single statement. First, the speaker regards
genocide as simply part of war and claims those
who died were not targeted but were simply
unlucky.

The general effect of his words is to suggest that

perpetrators were not responsible for the outcome of
the killings of the unfortunate victims. Interpretative
genocide denial can thus appear to render victims
responsible for their own deaths.
The statement shows how literal denial says it was

not genocide. For instance, Rene Lemarchand has
claimed that the genocide against the Tutsi was a
retributive genocide, a punishment for past
atrocities committed by the Tutsi elsewhere.
However, in that case, he is viewing motivations for
genocide as somehow genuine causes.
The double genocide thesis goes further than the

civil war argument, and moves from interpretative
towards more implicatory forms of genocide denial.
The double genocide thesis is not supported by
empirical evidence about patterns of killings inside

Rwanda between April and July 1994. Verwimp’s

study, for example, confirms that killings in Rwanda
during this period fitted with the definition of
genocide as an organised, systematic attempt to
eliminate a specific and targeted population.
Interpreting data in order to ‘prove’ the double

genocide thesis is part of interpretative genocide
denial, therefore. And such accusations of double
genocide started even before the genocide began. In
fact, there is no doubt that genocide denial has been
a political weapon of perpetrators even before the
genocide against the Tutsi took place in 1994. Legal
instruments alone are not enough to tackle genocide
denial, and yet such instruments also can be
instrumentalised in a highly polarised political
climate when open criticism and implicatory denial
may, from some angles, look surprisingly similar.

Some scholars suggest that marked social conflicts

between classes and castes were not invented by
European colonisers, and were already firmly
embedded into Rwanda’s pre-colonial social fabric.
Implicatory denial: 2003 onwards
Implicatory denial explicitly accuses the other of

being behind the genocide all along and thus seeks
to lay the blame on others instead of those already
accused of genocide. Implicatory denial turns
around the existing legal and political accusations of
victims, prosecutors and researchers, and suggests
that those who claimed to end the genocide and to
support victims of genocide are in reality
perpetrators of genocide themselves.

The general message is that things are not always

what they seem, a message conveyed by theories
that the Rwanda Patriotic Front was involved in a
conspiracy at the start of the genocide. At an
individual level, a perpetrator engaged in this kind
of implicatory denial claims the survivors
associations only exist to persecute the Hutu in
general, and the prisoners in particular.
Implicatory denial thus involves accusing victims in

some cases, and the Rwanda Patriotic Front
government in other cases, of being the real
perpetrators behind the scenes.
Ways of Fighting Against Different Forms and

channels of Genocide Denial and Ideology
At African level

Before speaking of the strategies or ways of fighting

against the different forms and channels of genocide
denial and ideology, it is essential to reflect on the
real or perceived causes of genocide. In fact, the
perceived or real causes of genocide provide the
foundation for the peddling of genocide ideology by
extremists in our society. What then is genocide
ideology? Whether genocide is an actual ideology or
not is debatable but it is certainly a developing
stream of ideas rooted in fear and thirst for power
usually in the context of a history where the people
are of different origin. Genocide is an extermination
or destruction of the other who has been part of a
whole but is now being separated and targeted as an
enemy (and man’s spontaneous reaction to the
enemy, as we have learnt through history, is to
eliminate the enemy).

So the genocide ideology begins with the process of

identification and stigmatisation of the ‘other’ that
is, labelling of the ‘other’ and eventually the
separation of the ‘other’ from the rest of ‘us’. The
cumulative process of segregation of the ‘other’ is
initiated by the political leadership and
disseminated through various means including
addressing the public at political rallies, teaching
students at schools, universities and other
institutions of learning and indoctrinating the
general public including party militants through the
radio and television broadcasts and dissemination of
disinformation and propaganda through print and
electronic media. The ‘other’ is presented by ‘us’ as
dangerous, unreliable, and, like a dangerous virus,
must be destroyed.

The separation of ‘us’ from the ‘other’ or ‘them’ is

through racial or ethnic segregation which may then
result in internment, lynching, proscription or exile.
The process of separation begins when political
leaders start to brand a section of their own
population as the ‘other’, ‘these people’, ‘enemy of
the state’, ‘enemy of the people’ ‘security risk’, ‘rebel
sympathiser’, ‘accomplice’, ‘cockroaches’ ‘Inyenzi’,
or similar derogatory remarks. Cultural or racial
branding like ‘atheist’, ‘communist’, ‘Muslim’,
‘Christian’ or ‘white’, ‘black’ or ‘Arab’ have also
been known to have been used. The result of the
separation of ‘us’ from the ‘other’ by the political
leadership is the process through which genocide
ideology evolves.
These examples of the early warning signals at the

formative stages of genocide ideology are not
exhaustive. Extremists are very resourceful people

and are constantly inventing new ways and

vocabularies for identifying, stigmatising and
dehumanising the ‘other’. Once the ‘other’ is
sufficiently stigmatised and dehumanised, it
becomes easy, and even necessary for ‘us’ to
massacre ‘them’ without any sense of guilt or
remorse. Every African will recognise some or all of
these processes either in their own national histories
or elsewhere.
Yet, it is not possible to construct the ‘other’ before

establishing the identity of the ‘us’. The political
leadership ensures that the public understands that
the ‘us’ is more superior, intelligent and deserving
of a better life, with higher dignity and respect than
the useless and backward ‘others’. How can the law
then deal with such situations and discourage or
prevent the use of political demagoguery?

It is important to understand how the ‘ideology’ of

genocide becomes part of the dominant discourse of
a society where the ‘other’ is terrorised by the ‘us’
into silence. The hand of the state is never far from
any genocide or mass killings. The state plays a
major role, either as active participant or silent
supporter, accomplice or collaborator. To commit
the crime of genocide, considering the scope and
magnitude of mass murder that is required for it,
also needs a monopoly of arms, of propaganda, of
terror, of resources and of power. Only the state in
modern history possesses such resources. To that
extent, without the participation, complicity,
collaboration or corroboration of the state, it is most
unlikely that any group of individuals can commit
the crime of genocide. Crimes of genocide have, in
the past, been committed when the state refuses,
declines or fails to meet its responsibility under both
national and international law.

The first duty of the state is to protect its entire

citizenry without discrimination. Genocide or mass
killing is either a failure of the state in the sense of
an omission to protect or it is an act of the state as in
commission of genocide and other crimes against
humanity. However, as demonstrated at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in
Arusha, the participating citizenry is not entirely
blameless either. The active participation of the
Interahamwe (comprised not of drunken ill-
disciplined men but of highly politicised, well-
trained, armed youth responsive to the interim
government’s demands) in the Rwanda genocide is
well documented.
The challenge of the law must be the establishment,

through active parliamentary law or judicial law
making, of laws and decisions that address the
complex circumstances that permit ordinary people

to turn against each other in mass killing sprees, and

to identify mechanisms for acting on early warning
signals to emerging discrimination and
discriminatory practices of the state and its
functionaries as well as the people themselves. Good
governance demands that states’ have a ‘Best
Practice’ standard operating procedure to which all
member states of the African Union must comply
with the possibility of effective sanctions for
noncompliance.
After the Second World War the international

community recognised the dangers of these
practices and adopted laws to prevent the
development of a genocide ideology. However, after
Europe’s pogroms, genocides and holocausts against
each other and against the people they had
colonised, they adopted the 1948 Genocide
Convention but not much appeared to have changed

as is demonstrated by mass killings in the former

Yugoslavia.
For Africa, if the experiences of Rwanda, Darfur,

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the
Congo or Somalia are anything to go by, then Africa
has a long way to go notwithstanding that the law
has a definition for genocide.
Africans must also sit down and agree to stop killing

one other. At the street level, the discourse on the
subject by ordinary citizens is at a different level. It
is wrapped in the grasp of ‘victimhood’, packaged
by the finery of racial, ethnic, religious and
geographical trimmings. It is propelled by talk of
‘marginalisation’, ‘ethnic, racial or religious
discrimination’, of ‘lack of equal access to the
national cake’. It speaks the language of power and
counter-force, through legal as well as undemocratic

and unlawful means. It is this arena of discourse that

the state must seriously address.
What politicians say to the people, what professional

and civil society leaders interpret from the actions of
political leaders, what idioms and sound-bytes the
media exploits and what language religious and
cultural leaders utilise in sensitising people about
the dangers of targeting and segregation of the
‘other’ should be the stuff of concern to African
leaders – both political and civic. The lessons of
Rwanda relate to ensuring that all Africans do not
have to undergo pogroms in order to emerge from
the fire of sociopolitical change.
Besides, countries have to adopt the good

governance and anticorruption principles. What
socio-legal, political and cultural mechanisms
should also be adopted to further promote unity a

life that is, at the very least, in consonance with

human dignity.
Ethnicity will not disappear anytime soon in Africa

given our racist colonial history, and the selective
rewarding of a few against the interests of the
majority.
There is an on-going challenge with privatisation,

globalisation, and death of socialism and shunning
of socialist ideals, the marginalisation of egalitarian
ideas rooted in social worth and equity and the
rejection of most African customs, values and family
structures. These factors have exacerbated or halted
prompt and effective response to genocide ideology.
These differences, including focusing on individual

rather than group rights, have been taken to an

extreme length, resulting in breeding segregationist

ideals leading to power struggles, coups, election
rigging and denial of political space to the ‘other’ as
the ‘us’ continues to monopolise state power and the
means of inflicting violence on the ‘other’.
Continued control of state power using all means

necessary often results in an acute politicisation of
ethnicity and the rise of repression on the one hand
and resistance on the other. The signs are always
there for the keen observer to notice. When political
and military leaders begin to address a section of
society as cockroaches, pigs, criminals, backward
elements, and biological substance, it is important
that these utterances are taken seriously as warning
signs suggesting that part of the population is being
classified as the ‘other’.

These express classifications are a prelude to

genocide, signifying that genocide is being
gradually implanted in the minds of the
unsuspecting population. Left to continue unabated,
unchallenged and unrestrained, this behaviour will
snowball into a fully-fledged genocide ideology.
In view of the human rights jurisprudence read

together with the jurisprudence developed at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia
and Special Court for Sierra Leone, the courts should
take greater liberty in interpretation of social
policies, read into legislation the requirement for
social justice and re-interpret law in consonance
with social equity and fair distribution of natural
and other resources in order to counter the
development of genocidal ideologies.

Efficient nation building and the treatment of

citizens on an equal, fair and non discriminatory
basis, the essence of good governance, is a positive
counter mechanism to the rise of segregationist
ideas. All ethnic groups in a state should in theory
and practice feel represented in government and
other state institutions. Loyalty must be to the state
and not to particular ethnic groups or only to
governments of the day simply because the
leadership of that government is military. Leaders
must therefore treat their citizens in a manner that
they themselves would wish to be treated after they
have left office.
Abuse of judicial process by prosecuting the ‘other’,

or opposition leaders or former heads of state
without sufficient evidence or reasonable cause
undermine efforts to fight genocide ideology.

Governments have to make efforts to eradicate such

bad practice.
It is also important and necessary to domesticate

decisions and judgments of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In fact, knowledge of
conditions that lead to genocide is helpful and can
be used to fight genocide ideology. It is our
collective responsibility to ensure that at the national
level, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda is understood and used as one
of the tools for effectively fighting genocide
ideology.
African governments must recognise the state’s

internal propensity for abuse of the monopoly of
power and its use against the people. To counter this
inherent difficulty, it is suggested that constitutions
of different countries and their laws establish

adequate and selfmanaging monitoring and

checking mechanisms that act as an early warning
system to the rise of a genocidal ideology or any
other tendency that can lead to crimes against
humanity. Such a system, with the assistance and
support of the African Union for example, should
incorporate within it independent institutions
through which the citizens can intervene to raise the
alarm against segregation and targeting of a section
of the population as the ‘other’.
The African judiciary must be equipped with

additional powers to interpret and restrain actual or
potential mischief brewing in the society. African
states would benefit by creating propaganda
mechanism aimed at warning the people that state
functionaries can also become monsters.

Such self-governing mechanisms arouse citizen

consciousness to remain vigilant against the self as
well as against others who profit from death and
destruction. Domesticating international
jurisprudence taken from African situations like
Rwanda, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Sierra Leone, to name but a few, and
establishing national and regional policies, with
laws against hate speech, anti-discriminatory
behaviour, for equitable measures in resource
allocations, checking of abuse of power, controlling
ethnic, religious or other segregationist mass social
arrangements is perhaps one of the best ways of
telling ourselves ‚Never again‛.
At national level
The law related to the punishment of the crime of

genocide ideology has to be applied not only to
punish but also to discourage all the persons in

Rwanda found guilty with the crime of genocide

ideology.
Apart from punishing, a campaign of sensitisation

has to be led to educate the Rwandans about the
evils of the genocide ideology and denial and the
negative impact on the policy of the unity and
reconciliation, the pillar of the development of the
country.
Rwandan and foreign scholars have also to write to

combat genocide ideology and denial spread in
different written documents like the media of
different types, books, and internet.
The decent conservation of existent genocide

memorials of the genocide against the Tutsi and the
construction of others will constitute a permanent

evidence to challenge the revisionists of the

genocide against Tutsi.
The causes of the Liberation War (1990-

1994)
 The long exile
The first group of refugees fled Rwanda since 1959

after the unrest period marked by violence and
massacres of the members of the political party
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). The violence
against the Tutsi was committed by some leaders of
the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu
(PARMEHUTU) supported by Belgian authorities.
The resistance organised by refugees’ groups called
Inyenzi and their efforts to return home were in
vain. Consequently refugees were desperate and lost
hope to one day recover their dignity as Rwandans.
In exile, refugees had different living conditions.

Some of them acquired academic skills. But, in
general, those living in refugee camps and single
young adults struggled to get a better life. Such bad
living conditions coupled with lack of employment
and good education in hosting countries pushed
them to think of a solution to return home. Those in
Uganda were affected by political repression which
occurred after the fall of the President Idi Amin
Dada (1970-1979). A series of organisations were
created by refugees with first the purpose of helping
the victims of the mentioned violence and also with
the aim of returning to Rwanda.
Among the institutions set up as vehicles to address

the challenges of education were the Rwandese
Refugees Welfare Foundation (RRWF) in Uganda
and College Saint Albert in Kivu transferred to
Bujumbura. Later these institutions provided a large
number of leaders to political movement like

Rwandese Alliance of National Unity (RANU),

created in Nairobi in June 1979.
 The refusal of return for Rwandan refugees
From 1959, the Tutsi never run away from

democracy as PARMEHUTU propagandists used to
say, but they did so because they had to save their
lives. Generally, they run towards church missions,
schools and other places considered as safe to
protect them from danger. Others decided to leave
the country as soon as possible to look for asylum in
neighbouring countries.
Although the Government of Rwanda had since

1964 requested that refugees be settled in their
countries of asylum, it did almost nothing to help
them. On the contrary, its policy consisted of
making life for refugees very difficult in those

countries. The Rwandan embassies watched

refugees closely in their countries of asylum.
In 1973, the Second Republic put in place a joint

ministerial commission between Rwanda and
Uganda for the repatriation of Rwandan refugees
living in Uganda. The refugees had to express in
writing their desire to return home. The request had
to be addressed to the country of origin through the
High Commission for Refugees and the hosting
governments. Any refugee whose request was
rejected stayed in the country of exile or looked for
another hosting country.
Only few refugees managed to return to Rwanda

after facing many challenges created by security
agents. It was the Préfet’s prerogative to issue him
or her a provisional identity card and where to
settle. The returnee could not leave his or her

commune without a prior authorisation of the

Préfet. A monthly report on the returnees was sent
to the minister of local affairs and the Minister of
Defence and Police because they were suspected of
spying for refugees.
In addition to this suspicion and hindrances to

return to Rwanda, Tutsi who had stayed in the
country faced a range of challenges. For instance,
those who were displaced during the 1959 violence
could not recuperate their properties. Most of the
time, their properties were illegally taken by
bourgmestres and their friends and this is why they
were a source of trials. In 1966, President Kayibanda
prevented refugees to claim their properties. In 1975,
President Habyarimana put in place a decree stating
that Tutsi refugees’ assets should become public
properties. This decision was due to the refusal of

political leaders who did not want to return the land

to its owners.
Refugees aspiring to return home
Until 1990, the political class did not consider

refugees as Rwandans. The Government
complicated their return and destabilised them
where they were living in refugee camps. It was the
protocol on refugees signed in 1993 during the

Arusha negotiations between the then Rwandan

regime and the RPF that recognised refugees’ rights.
Despite the refugees’ challenges, some of them
continued to have good relationship with their
former friends who had stayed in Rwanda.
 The regionalism and ethnic based divisionism
Both the First (1962-1973) and the Second (1973-

1994) Republics maintained and institutionalised
‚ethnic‛ labels (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) in identity cards
and the quota system. As a result, ethnic, regional
and gender equilibrium had to be respected in
different sectors such as administration, enrolment
in secondary and tertiary schools and in the army.
Day after day, the dictatorship led Kayibanda’s

regime to trust few people. Thus, since the late 1960s
the power was in the hands of few people from

some communes of Gitarama. The same situation

was observed under the Second Republic where
again few people from some parts of the former
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi préfectures occupied key
positions in the country. As far as the political plan
was concerned, both Republics were characterized
by identity based ideology.
During the First and Second republics, hatred

against the Tutsi was reinforced. Every political
crisis was blamed on Tutsi who were treated as
scapegoats. This case was raised when refugees’
troops called Inyenzi attacked Rwanda in 1963 and
later before the 1973 Habyarimana’s coup d’Etat.
 The intimidation and killing of opponents
The Second republic did not accept and tolerate any

opposition. Any person who tried to oppose it was

jailed. Even if political assassinations were not

frequent they existed. For instance, the deaths of the
former Chief Editor of Kinyamateka newspaper,
Father Sylvio Sindambiwe and Felicula
Nyiramutarambirwa, former member of the
Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le
Développement (MRND) Central Committee are
believed to have been planned by the regime.
 The increase of dictatorship in Rwanda
During the Second Republic, only a single political

party (MRND) was allowed to operate as it was
stipulated by the 1978 constitution. In practice, the
powers were concentrated in the hands of a small
group of people from the President’s family and his
family in-law called Akazu. No single important
decision could be made without prior approval of
the President and his MRND.

The foundation of the RANU and birth of the

RPF Inkotanyi
Many Rwandan refugees had lost hope and were

reluctant to join any political organisation due to the
past failures of the early attempts to return to their
home country, spearheaded by Inyenzi. Later on,
refugees in Nairobi founded the RANU in 1979.
RANU objectives
RANU aimed at:
• Fighting against ethnic divisions and the

ideology of divisionism by the Habyarimana regime
• Fighting against grabbing Rwanda’s wealth by a
small group of people

• Instilling into the Rwandans a sense of

consciousness as far as their rights were
concerned<
• Finding an appropriate solution to the refugee

problem
• Fighting the Habyarimana dictatorial regime
• Uniting all Rwandans including those living

inside the country and in the Diaspora in order to
restore national unity.
The main organs of RANU were the Congress that

met after every two years, the General Assembly
that held annual meetings and regional committees
from local, regional and central levels. During
RANU’s recruitments, members had to take an oath
(kurahira). RANU operated on democratic
principles i.e. decisions were taken by the majority.
The organs of expression and mobilisation were:

Alliance which was replaced by Vanguard in 1987. It

was published at Kampala in English. Later on,
another newspaper, called Inkotanyi was also
created in 1989 in order to mobilise Kinyarwanda
speaking readers. In 1990 with the Liberation War
(1990-1994), the Vanguard disappeared and
Inkotanyi relocated to Burundi and took the name of
Huguka.
RANU insisted very much on the involvement of

individuals and rejected any attempt to integrate
groups. Apart from undertaking to mobilise the
Rwandans, RANU was involved in a discrete action
towards some embassies first, and then sending
petitions to the Organisation for African Unity
(OAU). It intended to attract the attention of the
international community to the problem of the
Rwandan refugees who, except for being mentioned
in different circumstances, were practically

forgotten. These efforts were relatively mitigated as

far as concrete aid was concerned. But on the other
hand, they were very important because these
contacts allowed better understanding of the reasons
for the beginning of the war launched on October 1,
1990.
On December 26, 1987, a congress of RANU

representatives met in Kampala (Uganda) and
decided to replace RANU with the Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF) under the influence of
Rwandans who had joined the National Resistance
Army (NRA) in Uganda. The RPF Inkotanyi was led
by a charismatic leader Major General Fred Gisa
Rwigema.
Eight points programme of RPF
1. Restoration of unity among Rwandans.

2. Defending the sovereignty of the country and

ensure the security of people and property.
3. Establishment of democratic leadership.
4. Promoting the economy based on the country’s

natural resources
5. Elimination of corruption, favouritism and

embezzlement of national resources.
6. Promoting social welfare.
7. Eliminating all causes for fleeing the country and

returning Rwandan refugees back into the country.
8. Promoting international relations based on

mutual respect, cooperation and mutually beneficial
economic exchange.
The military option

At the outset, RANU mainly targeted Rwandan

intellectuals living in the Diaspora and inside
Rwanda. RANU statute included a principle called
Option Zero aiming at liberating Rwanda by force.
But RANU could not achieve this objective because
it was composed of intellectuals without a military
wing. In the meanwhile, Rwandan refugees
benefited from Ugandan crisis of the 1980s. Three
young Rwandans namely Fred Gisa Rwigema, Paul
Kagame and Sam Byaruhanga joined Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni’s guerrilla with an idea of using a
military option to liberate Rwanda. Due to the
persecution of Kinyarwanda-speaking people living
in Uganda and their expulsion by Milton Obote’s
regime in the 1980s, other young Rwandans decided
to join the Museveni’s guerrilla war in order to
acquire experience that would help them to wage an
armed struggle to force their return to Rwanda. The
guerrilla war and Museveni’s final victory

constituted the essential turning point in the life of

the movement.
The beginning of the Liberation War
After benefiting from their participation in the NRA

guerilla warfare and the victory achieved by the
latter,the Rwandan military officers observed the
structures of the Ugandan army, which they later
used to recruit and train a number of Rwandan
soldiers. When the war started in 1990, the RPF
could count on about 3,000 well trained soldiers of
various grades. The Liberation War was launched by
RPF Inkotanyi and its armed wing, the Rwandese
Patriotic Army on October 1, 1990 led by late Major
General Fred Gisa Rwigema. This army was
composed of not only male but also female
combatants.

Female soldier
The RPF first launched an attack in Umutara at the

beginning of October, 1990; but this attack was not
successful because of the death of Late Major
General Fred Rwigema on October 2, 1990. After

being pushed from Umutara, the RPF resorted to

using guerrilla tactics in the northern region of
Rwanda.
Late Major General Fred Gisa Rwigema
The then government alleged that it was surprised

by that attack, even when the ordinary people were
aware of an imminent attack by refugees. The
discriminative ideology against the Tutsi reappeared
in speeches and the national media. The subject of
discussion was that RPF was a reincarnation of the
Inyenzi of the 1960s and that it was made up of Tutsi

feudal monarchists who did not accept the ‚1959

Hutu revolution‛.
The RPF raid also allowed the Habyarimana regime

to launch a vast operation to eliminate the political
opposition after gunshot fire in Kigali in the night of
October 4-5, 1990. The regime made people to
believe that it was an attempt by the rebels to attack
the capital whereas it was a false attack meant to
allow a presidential move to justify a massive
cleansing operation against the Tutsi and other
opponents of the regime. Between 7,000 and 10,000
people were arrested and imprisoned arbitrarily.
Large scale massacres took place throughout the
country, especially in Kibiriria, Mutara, Mukingo,
Murambi and Bugesera where Tutsi were molested,
imprisoned or killed together with those who dared
to criticize the regime. They were called ibyitso,
traitors or accomplices.

Attack on Ruhengeri (January 1991)
On the morning of January 23, 1991, the RPA

attacked the Town of Ruhengeri. The Rwandan
forces in the area were taken by surprise and were
mostly unable to defend themselves against the
invasion. One of the principal RPA targets in
Ruhengeri was Ruhengeri prison. The RPA stormed
the buildings, and the prisoners were rescued and
several of them were recruited into the RPA. Some
political prisoners such as Théoneste Lizinde,
Stanislas Biseruka and Brother Jean Damascène
Ndayambaje were also released from prison.
Extension of guerrilla war (1991-1992)
Following the attack on Ruhengeri, the RPA began

to carry out a classic hit-and run a guerrilla war
tactic. The RPA attacked the Forces Armées
Rwandaises (FAR) repeatedly and frequently and
made some territorial gains composed of a small

territory alongside the border. The conquered

territory was extended following other gains until
the setting up of Ruhengeri, Mutara and Byumba
fronts. In 1992, RPF/RPA headquarters was set up at
Mulindi in the then Byumba préfecture.
Peace process (1991-1993)
A series of meetings were held in order to find a

solution to the war between the RPF and the then
government. At the beginning, RPF was not
accepted at the table of negotiations. The first
meeting was held at Mwanza in Tanzania on
October 17, 1990, in this meeting, the Government of
Rwanda accepted a dialogue with internal and
external opposition. However, this was not
immediately respected by the Government. Other
meetings were also held at Gbadolite on October 26,
1990; Zanzibar on February 17, 1991 and Dar-es-
Salaam on February 19, 1991.

In all these negotiations, RPF was not directly

negotiating with the Government of Rwanda. For
the first time, RPF directly negotiated with the
Government of Rwanda at N’sele on March 25, 1991.
The RPF and the then Government of Rwanda
signed the N’sele Cease-fire Agreement and a
political settlement which provided for, among
other things, cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of
foreign troops, exchange of prisoners of war and
finally, serious political negotiations to end the
conflict. This agreement remained a dead settlement
because soonafter the Government of Rwanda and
RPF accused each other of violating the cease-fire.
Military pressure from RPF, pressure from the

international community and internal opposition led
to a serious peace process negotiations. In June 1992,
the Arusha peace negotiations started. Peace talks

pursued at a very high level in the region, drawing

in heads of state and foreign ministers.
The core negotiations on a future peace agreement

had participants and observers from five African
states: Burundi, Zaïre, Senegal, Uganda and
Tanzania; four Western countries: France, Belgium,
Germany and the USA with the presence of the
OAU delegates. The United Nations Organisation
(UNO) was brought in at the intervention of the
OAU and the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) attended as observers. Britain,
Canada, the Netherlands and European Union
closely monitored the process from their local
embassies. Nigeria was represented at the Arusha-
linked Joint Political Military Committee.
The Arusha process represented a multi-prolonged

strategy of conflict resolution. The preliminary

phase was designed to obtain a cease-fire. In July 12,

1992, a cease-fire was decided between RPF and the
then government. OAU force known as Neutral
Military Group of Observers (GOMN: Groupe
d’Observateurs Militaires Neutres) was put in place
to observe the cease-fire.
The Arusha International Conference Centre :Venue

for peace talks to end the war.
Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arusha-

international-conference-centre#/ media/File:AICC-
Arusha.jpg
During the negotiations process, the then regime did

its best to make the country ungovernable. In this
regard, Rwanda experienced massacres of Tutsi and
moderate Hutu. Moreover, insecurity affected some
public places due to some attacks by means of
grenades. In the same manner, a divisive
propaganda aimed at uniting the Hutu was
intensified and the Coalition pour la Défense de la
République (CDR) was created and utilised to block
the Arusha peace process. Due to this violence and
insecurity the RPF Inkotanyi launched an attack on
February 8, 1993. In fact, the RPF was nearing the
gates of the capital, Kigali, because they had reached
Tumba commune. But soon after, due to the
international pressure to resume negotiations, the
RPF returned to its positions before February 8,
1993.

RPA offensive, February 1993

Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_civil_War#
/media/file:Rwanda TerritoryAfterFebruary 1993.pn

The Arusha Peace Agreement was preceded by the

signing of the agreement on a new cease-fire, as well
as parties agreeing on the following principles:
• That there was neither democracy nor the

practice of the rule of law in Rwanda;
• That a broad-based government of national

unity, including parties of different political
persuasions was necessary to oversee the transition
to democracy;
• That the FAR was not national in character and

that it was necessary to set up a truly national army
from among members of the two existing armies;

• The Rwandan refugees had a legitimate

inalienable right to return home.
The agreement was structured around five pillars:
• The establishment of the rule of law;
• Power-sharing;
• Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and

internally displaced people;
• The integration of armed forces;
• Other miscellaneous provisions.

The delegates of the Republic of Rwanda during the

signing of Arusha Peace agreements on August 4, 1993
Source: RPF Archives.

The delegates of RPF during the signing of Arusha Peace

Accord on August 4, 1993 (Major General Paul Kagame
on the left and RPF Chairperson Alexis Kanyarengwe on
the right) Source: RPF Archives
The Arusha Peace Agreement was supposed to have

been implemented within 37 days, beginning with
the establishment of the institutions of the

presidency, the cabinet and the National Assembly.

This Agreement was not implemented, however its
principal provisions now constitute the
Fundamental Law of the Republic of Rwanda.
After the signing of Arusha Agreement in December

1993, the French military detachment that was in
Rwanda left and a UN intervention force arrived.
The UN peacekeeping force was known as United
Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Its mission
was to supervise the implementation of the Arusha
Peace Agreement of August 4, 1993.
On December 28, 1993, 600 soldiers of the third

battalion of RPF arrived at the Centre National de
Développement (CND) and had a mission to ensure
security of the RPF future ministers and members of
the Parliament in the new Broad-based Transitional
Government.

On January 5, 1994, President Habyarimana was

sworn in as President in accordance with the Arusha
Peace Agreement, but blocked the swearing in of
other members of the Broad-based Transitional
Government.
On April 6, 1994 at 20:30, the Presidential airplane,

the mystère Falcon 50 from Dar-es-Salaam was hit
by two missiles and Presidents Habyarimana of
Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were
killed. The long-planned Genocide against the Tutsi
immediately started and boycotted the
implementation of Arusha Peace Agreement and
other peaceful ways.

The involvement of foreign countries in the

Liberation War (19901994)
Uganda which was considered as an aggressor or

unwavering supporter of RPF rejected these
accusations. It especially avoided verbal and
military provocations on Kigali. It made so many
gestures of good will by responding to initiatives of
mediation. Uganda also accepted the UN mission of
military observers at its border with Rwanda. It
received a mission of the European Parliament
whose conclusions exonerated Uganda from all
accusations made against it by Rwanda. During the
entire period of the war, Museveni’s attitude
remained unclear. On the occasion of the 10th
anniversary of the Genocide, President Museveni
declared that despite controls of the international
community, Uganda intervened on the side of RPF
in order to stop the Genocide.

Zaïre immediately sent soldiers to help the Kigali

regime. For unclear reasons, the Zaïrian army did
not stay in Kigali for long. The Zaïrian soldiers who
were arrested were among those who portrayed a
very positive image of RPF after their release. They
referred to RPA as an army that was convinced
about the cause it was defending, much disciplined
and very organised. The commander of the Zaïrian
contingent hailed the RPF continuously because
even when he was in the enemy camp, he was
treated with all honours due to his military rank. It
seems that the information made President Mobutu
to have a different view of RPF.
Belgium sent to Rwanda a contingent with a mission

of repatriating its citizens who wished to leave the
country. Their stay in Rwanda aroused vibrant
debates which led to their departure at the end of

October 1990. But on the other hand, Belgium sent

several high level missions which made sensible
suggestions which disturbed the Kigali regime.
According to Belgium, overcoming the crisis
depended on the Rwandans themselves and
mediation efforts had to be entrusted with
Rwanda’s neighbours and the OAU, supported
by the international community. In the end, it
was that approach that was pursued.
France was at the beginning of the conflict

requested by President Habyarimana to help a
French-speaking country that had been attacked
by a foreign country supported by English-speaking
countries. France sent a contingent to Rwanda
named Opération Noroit whose numerical strength
was difficult to estimate. The contingent stayed
officially in Rwanda until December 1993. It was
an additional military force intended to back up

French soldiers who were already in Rwanda in

the name of military cooperation.
The French troops deployed in Rwanda during

Opération Turquoise
Source: © Hocine Zaourar, AFP (archives). Militaires

français déployés au Rwanda, en 1994, dans le cadre de
l’opération Turquoise

The French military agents stayed in Rwanda until

the beginning of the Genocide. Moreover, the
French government sent again her troops in Rwanda
through Opération Turquoise. Then from June 23 up
to August 1994, the French government established
a humanitarian zone, known as Zone Turquoise in
western part of Rwanda. It covered ancient
prefectures of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibuye.
The mission saved few civilians in South West
Rwanda. However, French soldiers were also aware
of killings against Tutsi in Bisesero. Opération
Turquoise also allowed soldiers, officials and
militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda
through the areas under their control.
The end of the Liberation War and the

campaign to stop the Genocide
On April 6, 1994, the deaths of the Presidents of

Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash ignited

several weeks of intense and systematic massacres in

which over one million Tutsi perished. Less than
half an hour after the plane crash, roadblocks
manned by Hutu militiamen often assisted by
gendarmerie (paramilitary police) or military
personnel were set up to identify Tutsi and
supposed RPF accomplices.
On April 7, Radio Television Libre des Mille

Collines (RTLM) aired a broadcast attributing the
plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of UN
soldiers, as well as incitements to eliminate the
‘Tutsi cockroaches’. Later that day the Prime
Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian
peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally
murdered by Rwandan government soldiers at her
home and Camp Kigali respectively. Other moderate
Hutu leaders were similarly assassinated. After the
massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of

its force. In the meanwhile, on April 8, 1994, Major

General Paul Kagame, the RPF commander
launched a campaign to stop the Genocide and
restore peace and security in the country.
As the international community reduced its forces

and on April 9, the FAR rejected RPF’s idea to form
a joint operation to save civilians, RPF started
moving its troops to defend its battalion blocked in
CND. At the same time, it mobilised its troops to
stop the massacres. RPF forces attacked by three
axes: the East, West and Central axes (towards
Kigali). During the fights, Byumba was occupied by
the central axis troops. The two other axes joined the
battalion that was in CND headquarters, three days
after resuming the fights.
Due to RPF forces numeric inferiority (25,000

people) and FAR weaponry, RPF minimised losses

by using a range of strategies in order to avoid direct

confrontation with the FAR. For instance, RPA-RPF
forces infiltrated the FAR lines and disorganised
them with mortar fire. In addition, they occupied
supply routes and left a place for withdrawing. The
FAR were attacked by many sides and their morale
weakened. As a result, RPA-RPF forces managed to
save some Tutsi.
In the meanwhile, a diplomatic action allowed RPF

envoys to counterattack the Interim Government
(called Abatabazi) campaign saying that the war by
RPF was an invasion which was unjustly imposed
on Rwanda by Uganda under the sponsorship of
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Moreover, the
then Government’s diplomatic campaign alleged
that the killings were spontaneous due to anger and
blind obedience of the population caused by the
death of President Habyarimana. However, it was

Government’s attempt to hide its responsibility in

the killings.
On April 21, the UNAMIR force was reduced from

an initial number of 2,165 soldiers to 270 with no
clear mandate to use force to save the lives of
targeted people. Thus UNAMIR’s contribution to
save the Tutsi can be considered as a failure.
Between April and June 1994, an RPF delegation

concentrated its efforts at the UN headquarters in
New York and Washington. In fierce competition
with the representatives of the Interim Government,
they pleaded for recognition of the massacres as
genocide. The RPF delegation pleaded for the
creation of an International Criminal Tribunal in
charge of trying crimes against humanity and the
Genocide committed in Rwanda. Later on, they also

campaigned against ambiguous French military

intervention, known as Operation Turquoise.
This French military intervention had been

authorised by the Security Council on June 22 for
humanitarian purposes.
Map showing the advance of the RPF in 1994
Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Civil_Wa
r.

On July 4, 1994, Kigali fell into the hands of the RPA.

The members of the so-called Interim Government
(called Abatabazi), members of the FAR, the armed
groups, and many people who were involved in the
Genocide and the general population, fled mainly to
Zaïre, current Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
and Tanzania. Millions of civilians fled because they
had been told by the Government officials, soldiers
and militia that the RPF would kill them. Thousands
died of water- borne diseases. The camps were also
used by former Rwandan government soldiers to re-
arm and stage invasions into Rwanda. Thus, RPF
became the only force to have politically and
militarily opposed the Genocide against the Tutsi in
1994.

RPA troops enter Kigali after the fall of the capital
Source: www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/185523
On July 19, 1994, the RPF established the

Government of National Unity with four other
political parties namely PL (Parti Libéral), Parti
Social Démocrate (PSD), Parti Démocrate Chrétien
(PDC), and Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
(MDR). Pasteur Bizimungu became the President,
Major General Paul Kagame Vice President and
Minister of Defence and Faustin Twagiramungu,
Prime Minister. Weeks later, a 70-member
Transitional National Assembly was formed
consisting of representatives of the RPF, the four

other original parties plus three other smaller

parties, namely, the Parti Démocratique Islamique
(PDI), the Parti Socialiste Rwandais (PSR), and the
Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais (UDPR),
as well as six representatives of the Rwandese
Patriotic Army (RPA).
The effects of the Liberation War (1990-

1994)
The loss of lives and destruction of properties
The war increased insecurity in Rwanda. In fighting

areas, drunken soldiers could shoot at people;
ransack their houses and rape girls and women. In
addition, a number of people were killed and others
wounded including soldiers and civilians. The
killings led to the problem of orphans and widows.

There was also the massacre of Abagogwe social

group from 1991 to 1993 by Habyarimana regime in
retaliation against an RPA attack. These killings
were also seen by some analysts as a strategy of
strengthening the Habyarimana’s regime in difficult
conditions and uniting all Hutu against a same
enemy.
The similar killings were done in Kibirira, Bugesera,

Kibuye, Murambi and in Umutara. By this war,
some public infrastructures like offices, roads and
bridges, specifically in the northern regions of
Rwanda were destroyed. Besides, the private
properties were also destroyed like houses and
shops.
Refugees’ mobilisation and mixed reactions in

Rwanda

For those in exile, they were excited and felt that the
time had come to return home. As a result, they
joined massively the RPF and the struggle as the war
progressed. Besides, mobilization to support the war
effort was reinforced in the region and abroad and
recruitment into the RPF intensified. A lot of money,
medicine, food and clothes were mobilised on a
continuous basis in support of the war.
Inside Rwanda, there were mixed reactions. Some

people mainly sympathisers of the RPF, who had
been treated as second class citizens, felt the time
had come for their rescue and joined the struggle
through different neighbouring countries while
others were worried about the reactions of the
Habyarimana regime. The MRND was mobilising
the Hutu to fight against the enemy, the Tutsi.
The decline of the Rwandan economy

Because of the war and the pressure on

Habyarimana regime the Rwandan economy
collapsed. The price of main export commodities
such as coffee decreased at the international market.
Thus the country witnessed a hard economic
situation. Besides, foreign aid decreased and the
franc rwandais lost its value. Main sectors of
economic activities fell down. Rwandans’ financial
conditions worsened. In fact, because of the war, the
North corridor was closed and this led to the
stoppage of commercial exchange with Uganda.
Besides, the war increased the military expenditure
of the Government of Rwanda and the military
expenses kept impoverishing the country.
The displacement and exile of many people

More than one million of Rwandans fleeing the

battle fields were displaced inside the country and
were not working. These Rwandans were in great
need of shelter, food and other basic materials to use
in their daily life. At the end of the war, Government
officials, soldiers and militia fled to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), then known as Zaïre,
Tanzania and Burundi taking with them millions of
civilians. Thousands died of water-borne diseases.

Refugees going in exile to DRC in 1994 on Rusizi

bridge
Source: www.smh.com.au/world/rwanda-genocide-
anniversary-sheds-light-onhorrors-of-bigotry-
20140411- 36idt.html.
Campaign to stop the Genocide

In addition to the end of the Genocide, one of the big

achievements of the Liberation War was the end
of the dictatorial regime which committed that
Tutsi extermination. It was a start of a new era
where the Government put into place new
institutions aimed at eradicating discrimination in
view of unity and reconciliation. Rwandans who
were living outside the country benefited from the
change to come back to their country.
Problems of insecurity
Although the RPF had captured the power and a

transitional government had been put in place, the
security situation was still fluid, with former
government forces and Interahamwe militia still
carrying out Genocide in various part of the country.

A French buffer area in western Rwanda, known as

Zone Turquoise had become a safe haven for
genocidal forces. In addition, infiltrators from
refugee camps across the border continued to cross
and destabilise the country. The Rwandan
combatants and refugees located on the border of
the current DRC became a security threat which
destabilised the hosting country and the interests of
several companies. Consequently, a campaign
against Rwanda was organised by the affected
companies. It should be noted that the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe were allowed to keep their weapons
and to join the civilian refugees. Other sympathizers
of the former regime continued to support
combatants, notably Zaïre (current DRC) under
President Mobutu Sese Seko. All these proved to be
security challenges for a country that had been
affected by one of the worst human tragedies of the
20th century.

The Government of National Unity had to devise

means to address insecurity in the whole country so
that Rwandans could begin the task of rebuilding
the nation.
Political and administrative vacuum
The Government of National Unity inherited a

country without political and administrative
institutions, due to the chaos provoked by the
Interim Government. Most of civil servants were
either killed or have left the country and the political
institutions were destroyed. In addition, during the
period of emergence, the Government faced the
problems related to insufficient numbers of civil
servants, lack of equipment and motivation for civil
servants because they had neither salary nor
accommodation, a judicial system that had come to a
standstill due to lack of adequate qualified
personnel, cases of embezzlement of public funds,

districts without leadership (bourgmestres), and

inexperienced police force among others.
Suspicion and mistrust among the Rwandan

population
Since Rwanda’s social cohesion had fractured due to

the divisive politics that preceded the Genocide,
suspicion and mistrust characterised relationships
between Rwandans. Thus, the new government
inherited a deeply scarred nation where trust within
and between social groups had been replaced by
fear and betrayal.
This lack of trust between people posed a serious

challenge to the functioning of institutions because
the vision of the Government of National Unity was
not shared by all stakeholders. In spite of all this, the
Government of National Unity believed that

Rwanda was not dead but that it could be reborn

and re-built.
To reach that goal, the Government of National

Unity advocated strongly for unity and
reconciliation despite the enormous challenges.
Broken judicial system
The Government of National Unity inherited a

broken justice sector. More than 140, 000 genocide
suspects had been arrested yet there was insufficient
prison infrastructure to host them. Their detention
became a huge challenge in terms of feeding, and
provision of medical and other services. In the same
vein, there was inadequate number of trained
lawyers to handle the large number of perpetrators
of Genocide and this shortage of judges was also
true for other crimes that were being committed in

the country. For example, according to records of the

Supreme Court, out of 702 judges in 2003, only 74
possessed a bachelor’s degree in law.
Laws were also outdated, obscure and inadequate.

For example, there was no law on the planning and
execution of Genocide. Nonetheless, justice had to
be delivered. Despite meagre resources that were
available, the government had to operate reforms
and introduce new judicial institutions to deal with
all these challenges.
Lack of shelter for refugees and other

vulnerable people
The Government of National Unity strived to restore

Rwanda as a country for all Rwandans and provide
a homeland for millions of Rwandan refugees. Tens

of thousands of internally displaced people,

especially Genocide survivors whose houses had
been destroyed, were looking for housing facilities.
About three million Rwandan refugees taken as
hostage by the defeated genocidal forces in current
DRC and some in Tanzania and Burundi were
brought back home by the Transitional Government.
This humanitarian exercise was largely successful

despite the failure of the international community to
address their plight in refugees’ camps. A big
number of older refugees (from 1959 and
subsequent years) came back also in their country.
All these categories of the needy people were
looking for houses.
A bleak health sector

In the health sector, the picture was equally

bleak. This sector was weak in Rwanda. The
personnel in health services were few and poorly
trained. This was a result of chronically poor human
resource development strategies that characterised
colonial and post-colonial Rwanda. On one hand,
this situation was greatly exacerbated by the
Genocide in which a number of health personnel
had either participated in or had fled the country.
On the other hand, some health workers had been
killed. Few refugees that had returned from exile
settled in Kigali. The capital city attracted health
personnel because it had some infrastructures and
was also safer to live in.
To mitigate the health crisis, a number of NGOs and

the army came in and tried to make a difference, but
the task was overwhelming since the number of the
injured and the patients was very high. Statistics

indicate that immunisation coverage for children

had decreased as a result of war and
mismanagement.
Malnutrition levels were also very high. Child as

well as maternal mortality rates were equally high
due to poor health service delivery.
The prevalence of water-borne diseases and other

conditions related to poor sanitation was among the
highest in Africa at that time. The high infection rate
of transmittable diseases, especially HIV and AIDS
was equally high. This pandemic disease had
worsened during the Genocide because rape was
used as a war weapon.
The situation worsened due to a good number of

traumatised people and high fertility rate coupled

with ignorance. Malaria was hyper endemic in some

parts of the country, especially in the east and
southern provinces.
A selective education system
During the genocide against the Tutsi, most

education infrastructure was destroyed and the
human capital almost decimated.
The education system was poor and did not respond

to the socio-economic needs of the country. Few
educated Rwandans could not translate their
knowledge into productive activities to improve the
standard of living of the Rwandan people. For
instance in the eastern part of the country, schools
were not only few and scattered, but in some areas
they did not exist at all. Higher education was not
only quantitatively low but was also a privilege of

the few favoured by the quota system. For example,

in the period between 1963 and 1994, only about
2000 Rwandans had completed tertiary education.
Economic challenges
The Rwandan economy and political situation

before 1994 was marked by economic stagnation and
high levels of poverty, mainly attributed to lack of
vision and poor economic planning,
mismanagement, embezzlement, corruption by the
leadership of the time. It was a state controlled
economy.
As a result, post Genocide Rwanda faced a number

of economic challenges including an unstable
macroeconomic environment. For example, in 1994,
the economy shrank by 50 % and inflation rose to 64
%. Between 1985 and 1994, the GDP growth rate was

a mere 2.2% against a population growth rate of

3.2%, meaning there was an annual decline of-1% of
per capita GDP.
These challenges were mainly due to the fact that

the economy was characterised by low productivity
in all sectors, but most especially in agriculture.
Yet more than 90% of the population depended for

their livelihood on agriculture. This situation
resulted in a very weak export base coupled with a
narrow revenue collection. It implied internally
generated resources or external aid to fund social
services like education and health.
In addition, there was low private investment. As a

result, the country lacked a serious and vibrant
private sector to drive economic growth. In the

public sector too, there was a high unskilled labour

force. For example, in 1994, at least 79% of civil
servants in the country had not done tertiary
education.
To make matters worse, skilled professionals had

been particularly either targeted in the Genocide or
had fled the country. In brief, the Government of
National Unity inherited an economy completely
destroyed by the Genocide and mismanagement
over three decades.
Agricultural challenges
Agriculture was the key economic sector for

Rwanda because it employed more than 90% of the
population. However, despite this fact, its output
continued to be poor because the techniques of
production were still rudimentary with the use of

the hand-hoe as the primary tool, lack of or

inadequate use of fertiliser, poor training of farmers
in terms of technological use and poor soils
emanating from over cultivation and
overpopulation.
Rwanda’s agriculture suffered from structural and

fluctuating problems. For example, Rwanda’s soils
depended entirely on rains because 1.64 % of this
soil was under irrigation and only 1.2% was
cultivated. This showed that Rwanda’s agriculture
depended on unpredictable climatic changes. In
addition, soil erosion affected more than 20% of the
national territory. A fraction of the Rwandan
population still suffered from food insecurity and
malnutrition. Price fluctuation of exported products
was also another problem whenever the agricultural
prices fell. Although agricultural production

increased from 1994, food availability per head per

year was on the decline.
Farming and animal husbandry activities needed

agricultural space. However, the Rwandan soil
suffered from demographic pressure and physical
degradation. It was overexploited because of high
population density. Rwanda’s inheritance system of
family land transfers also led to land fragmentation.
On average, the size of owned cultivable land by a
household was 0.72 ha, although there were
differences at regional level. Hence, land fertility
reduced gradually. Soil erosion affected a big
portion of this land and anti-erosion techniques
were not yet widespread on the entire territory.
Other behaviours contributed to aggravate the soil
situation. For example, overgrazing, bush burning
practices, irresponsible deforestation, unreasonable

exploitation of marshlands by brick makers and the

extraction of sand along valleys.
Political programme of the Government of

National Unity
The new government had to fill the power vacuum

left by the defeated Interim Government. In this
regard, the constitution of June 10, 1991, the Arusha
Peace Agreement with all its protocols, the RPF
declaration of July 17, 1994 and the Agreement of
November 24, 1994 between political parties were
used by the new Government in order to put in
place its programme. The Arusha Peace Agreement
was the main source of inspiration for governmental

action. This was due to the fact that the Arusha

Peace Agreement included two important principles
in the management of the state namely the
establishment of the rule of law and the power
sharing arrangement. However, the texts were
adapted to the new situations. For instance, MRND
and its satellite political parties supporting the
‚Hutu power‛ and those involved in the Genocide
were excluded from new institutions of the
Transitional Government. Their posts had to be
given to RPF. A new army had to be created by
integrating in the APR, the ex FAR and the
recruitment of those who had not participated in the
Genocide. In addition, independent people and
soldiers were introduced in the Transitional
Parliament and a post of Vice President of the
Republic carrying another portfolio was allocated to
RPF.

On July 19, 1994, the government programme was

presented by Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu. The latter
was the Prime Minister designated by the Arusha
Peace Agreement. The programme focused on the
following points:
• Restoration of peace and security;
• Organisation of central and local administration,

i.e.préfectures,communes, sectors and cells
• Restoration and consolidation of national unity;
• Settlement of refugees and returning their

property;

• Improvement of living conditions of the people

and solving the social problems that resulted from
war and Genocide;
• Revival of the country’s economy;
• Consolidation of democracy. During the

establishment of the transitional institutions in July
1994, only RPF, MDR, PSD, PL, PDC, PSR, UDPR
and PDI were officially recognized. Later on, MDR
was excluded from accepted political parties
because of its divisive ideology. A parliamentary
report pointed out that some people wanted to use it
for their political agenda.
Safeguarding national security
After the Genocide against the Tutsi, the security in

Rwanda was extremely unstable as there were still

unhealed wounds from the war. Most of the

population was displaced, creating a volatile
situation in the country. Military strategies were
devised to find solution and eradicate the thousands
of military groups and ex-combatants who
continued to torment and kill citizens.
The problem of insecurity especially on the western

border of the country was caused by the incursions
of Ex FAR and Interahamwe militias. To put an end
to this destabilisation, the Government of Rwanda
proceeded to the repatriation of refugees from Zaïre,
current DRC and military operations aiming at
weakening the combatants.

Repatriation of refugees from Tanzania in 1996
Source: www.smh.com.au/world/rwanda-genocide-
anniversry-shelds-light-onhorrors-of-bigotry-
20140411-36idt.html.
Politico-administrative reforms and fight

against injustice
From its inception, the Government was supposed

to set up administrative structures from the top to
the bottom. Due to lack of time to produce the most
appropriate administrative framework, it

maintained the structure left by the defeated regime

namely central government, préfectures(provinces),
communes ( districts) , sectors and cells.
Communes of Rwanda prior to 2002, after the

formation of Umutara prefecture in 1996.

Source:https:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_R
wanda#/meadi/ File:Communes_of_Rwanda.svg.
Rwanda’s decentralisation policy was an important

innovation. Its objective was to empower and invite
the population to participate actively in debates on
issues that concerned it directly. It also aimed at
encouraging the electorate in the countryside to
provide information and explain issues in order to
take decisions knowingly. The decentralisation of
activities went hand in hand with the
decentralisation of financial, material and human
resources.
The first phase (2001-2005) aimed at establishing

democratic and community development structures
at the district level and was accompanied by a
number of legal, institutional and policy reforms, as
well as democratic elections for local leaders.

However, the decentralisation process faced some

challenges because some leaders have to perform
volunteer work. In addition, some of them
cumulated jobs and this could lead to their
inefficiency.

Map of Rwanda showing administrative

division between 2002 and 2006
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Rwanda
#media/File:Rwanda. geohive.gif.
To reinforce good governance in Rwanda, anti-

corruption and public accountability institutions
were created by the Government. Their operational
capacity continued to be strengthened so as to
achieve greater accountability. They include the
Office of the Ombudsman, Office of the Auditor
General for State Finances, Rwanda Public
Procurement Authority and Rwanda Revenue
Authority.
These institutions are mandated to fight injustice,

corruption and abuse by public officials and related

offences in both public and private administration

and to promote the principles of good governance
based on accountability and transparency.
Rwanda has also signed and ratified the United

Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
the African Union anti-corruption Convention
(AUCC) and the UN convention against
Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC).
In order to promote consensual democracy, since

2000, free, transparent and peaceful elections have
been organised at local levels and Rwanda has put
in place a new constitution that clearly defines the
main principles as well as performance and limit of
political institutions, multiparty system and respect
of everybody’s right.

The 2003 Constitution accepts that all most

important political positions in the country must be
shared by political parties and independent
politicians. This power sharing was observed not
only in the government but also in the Parliament
made up of two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate.
These two chambers are complementary in nature,

but independent of each other. The Executive is
overseen by parliament, according to the
constitution, while the judiciary is also independent
from the Executive and the Legislature.
Promotion of unity and reconciliation
The national unity implies the indivisibility of the

Rwandan people. All citizens should have an equal
opportunity to national economic resources and can

claim the same political rights. Rapidly, the

Government of National Unity fought and
eliminated all constraints of national unity such as
‚ethnicity‛ and regionalism. For instance, ‚ethnic‛
labels were removed from identity cards.
In the same perspective, the Commission urges

Rwandans to strive to heal one another’s physical
and psychological wounds while building future
interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance
and forgiveness. Thus, the Commission educates
and mobilises Rwandans on matters related to
national unity and reconciliation and undertakes
research in the matter of peace and unity and
reconciliation to make proposals on measures for
eradicating divisions and for reinforcing unity. In
addition, a series of strategies such as solidarity
camps where different categories of people meet to
discuss issues related to unity and reconciliation and

programmes on radios are used by the Commission.

The Government of National Unity repatriated a big
number of refugees which was a fundamental
obligation and a bridge to peace, national unity and
reconciliation.
In addition to the above efforts, the Government of

National Unity introduced several structures and
programmes that were meant to correct past errors
that led to war and Genocide. These structures
include the National Commission of Human Rights,
the Gacaca Jurisdictions, Commission Nationale de
Lutte Contre le Génocide(CNLG) and Rwanda
Demobilisation Commission.
Besides to promote unity among Rwandans new

national symbols namely the national anthem, the
national flag and the coat of arms were designed to
reflect the unity of Rwandans. However, ‚ethnic‛

based ideologies propagated by electronic media or

in families keep hindering national unity.
Remaking justice
The Genocide was carefully planned and executed

to annihilate the Tutsi. The Government made it
among its highest priorities to apprehend and bring
to justice the perpetrators of the Genocide.
Thousands of people were arrested and judged.

Some of them were released for lack of evidence and
others convicted and sentenced. It is pertinent to the
people of Rwanda to feel that no reconciliation is
possible without justice.
The big number of prisoners and cases due for trial

placed severe strain on Rwanda’s criminal justice
system which had already been crippled by the

murder of professionals during the Genocide. The

Government of National Unity decided to ease
pressure on the criminal justice system by
categorising Genocide suspects according to the
crimes they were accused of. In this regard, category
1 was composed of the planners and perpetrators of
the Genocide. A number of 2,133 people were
convicted in the conventional courts. The categories
2-4 where involvement was slightly less serious
were convicted in traditional jurisdictions or Gacaca
courts.
This new process significantly sped up trials and

sentencing, which if they had been restricted to
conventional courts would take over 200 years to
complete. The Gacaca courts also had the advantage
of involving the community in the trial and
sentencing process. The Government believed that
involving the population in the trials could also

contribute significantly to reconciliation. In fact,

testimonies from the general population helped
survivors to discover the corpses of the family
members killed during the Genocide. Moreover,
some perpetrators demanded pardon from the
survivors. In some places, perpetrators and
survivors were gathered in associations. On the
debit side, the Gacaca courts were criticised for
corrupt judges and lack of lawyers commonly used
in modern judicial system.
The Government also made it a priority to

strengthen the criminal justice system. Special
training was provided to magistrates and judges,
while courts around the country were renovated. A
national police force was created and charged with
civil security matters and criminal investigations.
Assistance to the most vulnerable people

From the social point of view, the Government of

National Unity faced with the problem of assisting
vulnerable people.
Almost all the Rwandan population that had

survived Genocide and war was described as
vulnerable. With time, their numbers kept on
reducing given the situation which improved
politically, socially and economically. The
vulnerable people included Rwandan refugees and
repatriated displaced people, Genocide survivors,
single children and orphans, widows, people with
disabilities, the poor, HIV/AIDS victims and
prisoners. Moreover, between November 1995 and
February 1996, Rwanda hosted almost 37, 000
refugees including former Burundi refugees and
Kinyarwanda-speaking ones from Zaïre. In 2003, the
number of foreign refugees in Rwanda was

estimated at 300, 000 persons. Only 35, 000 refugees

remained in Rwanda at the end of 2003.
The survivors of Genocide were part of the most

important vulnerable groups in the country. The
Government handled them as a priority. In 1998, an
Assistance Fund for Genocide Survivors, Fonds
d’Aide pour les Rescapés du Génocide (FARG) was
set up. It was allocated 5% of the national budget.
This budget enabled FARG to solve a big part of its
problems experienced by vulnerable surviving
children in the fields of primary, secondary and
higher education. The fund was also used to pay for
health care. FARG also helped vulnerable survivors
to construct residential homes in regrouped villages
(imidugudu) and/or elsewhere. It was also used to
repair their former residences. FARG financed small
projects to help survivors fight against poverty.

From 1994, the orphans and single-children received

assistance of varied nature. For some of them,
houses were constructed; others were trained and
given supplies in reception centres. In this way, they
received physical and mental health-care, education
and social integration facilities. Some of them were
able to reunite with members of their families.
The ministries which were dealing with social affairs

performed the following services: designing
intervention programmes in favour of widows,
providing material assistance, conducting a census
of raped and pregnant women, etc. On the other
hand, women victims of war and genocide set up
associations for mutual help. These actions
produced tangible results. However, a big number
of them still suffered from the after-effects of war
and genocide such as traumatism.

Health promotion
Between 1994 and 2003, a particular focus was put

on the improvement of health infrastructure given
the role that the latter plays in the improvement of
health. Some new hospitals were constructed and
old ones were constantly rehabilitated or expanded.
Several health centres were also constructed while
old ones were repaired gradually.In 1996 the
majority of health facilities started to provide both
curative and preventive treatment.
National referral hospitals such as King Faisal

Hospital, the Centre Hospitalier de Kigali and the
University Teaching Hospital of Butare were
rehabilitated, re-equipped and made operational.
There were 25 district hospitals in the country. Out
of 279 health centres and dispensaries, 257 were
reopened after rehabilitating them with new
equipment.

In 2000, Nyanza Hospital and Kimironko Health

Centre were established. In 2001, there were 33
district hospitals and 40 health centres. The above
district hospitals were coordinated by 11 regional
health officials.
Health staff increased qualitatively and

quantitatively. The National University of Rwanda
(NUR) Faculty of Medicine produced 1,999 general
doctors. Nonetheless, the Government resorted to
foreign doctors from neighbouring countries and
even beyond to solve the problem of inadequate
medical personnel. Kigali Health Institute (KHI) also
trained several medical assistants at A1 level. The
nursing section at secondary school also level
produced nurses of A2 level, whereas those in the
social section trained and graduated social workers.

The government policy of encouraging the people to

participate in health programmes was successful.
The Rwandan Sickness Insurance Scheme,La
Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie (RAMA) was
established to ensure that government civil servants
get proper medical insurance coverage. It started
business in 2001.
Meritocracy and skills enhancement in

education
The colonial and post-colonial administrations left

Rwanda with one of the lowest skilled populations
in the sub-region. In addition to this, an ‚ethnic‛
quota system for entry into secondary schools and
the university made access to education limited for
sections of the population.

On entering office, the Government of National

Unity immediately instituted meritocracy in
education system and measures were put in place to
address the country’s manpower incapacity. Since
1994, the number of higher learning institutions kept
increasing and were six in 2000. The total number of
students receiving higher education rose from 3,000
and was close to 7,000 in 2003. The number of
university graduates between 1963 and 1994 was
2,160. Between 1995 and 2000, a period of just five
years, the Government of Rwanda produced over
2,000 university graduates.
A former military college in the heart of Kigali was

transformed into a modern Institute of Science and
Technology. The new Kigali Institute of Science and
Technology (KIST) was established in 1997 to
provide technical, skill based training to 2,500 full
and part-time students.

The institute also hosted the African virtual

University and conducted business and
entrepreneurship courses. Licenses and facilitation
were granted to other institutions and colleges to
make more training opportunities available to the
population.
Similarly, from 1994 to 2000, the number of primary

schools increased more than one and a half times.
The number of qualified teachers rose by 53%
between 1994 and 2000. More resources were made
available to build new schools and to rehabilitate old
ones. In addition, Government introduced universal
primary education, established education support
institutions such as the National Curriculum
Development Centre, the General Inspectorate of
Education and Examinations Board.

The National Examination Council was introduced

to ensure fairness, transparency and uniformity in
standards.
Enhancing economic growth and development
Due to War and the Genocide, the country’s

infrastructure was destroyed. Between July 1994 and
2000, the Government of National Unity put in place
an emergency programme of reconstruction. In this
regard, policies and programmes of economic
recovery and social welfare were put in place. For
instance, the Government designed first a
programme of national reconciliation and another
one of rehabilitation and development. The latter
was presented during Geneva donors’ conference in
January 1995. Its aims were the restoration of the
macro-economic framework of the country, capacity
building, reinforcing the participation of local
investors and integration of refugees and displaced

people. In addition, the Government had to restore

favourable conditions for economic and social
activities.
Almost 600 million US dollars was received by

Rwanda for the period 1995-1996 thanks to the
Geneva donors’ conference. The international
financial contribution served not only to rehabilitate
and repair the basic infrastructures but also to
increase agricultural activities. It also improved
Rwanda’s balance of payments. During the second
conference held in June 1996, Rwanda received 500
million US dollars for the second recovery
programme called Rehabilitation and recovery
programme (1995-1998). The third programme
presented to the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) was a structural adjustment. It
intended to stabilise the country’s macro-economic

performance to improve the balance of payments,

controlling inflation, etc.
In June 1998, IMF approved Rwanda’s application to

achieve Reinforced Structural Adjustment Facility.
In 1999, this 3 years programme was transformed
into a ‘Facility for Poverty Reduction and Growth’
(FPRG). It was supported with funds worth 413.3
million USD. Thus Rwanda embarked on its
economic and social construction.
Even if some programmes and policies were

conceived, it was from 2000 that the Government of
Rwanda started formulating long term policies.
They included Vision 2020 and the Strategic Plan for
the Reduction of poverty (EDPRS) which was
published in June 2000. These two strategic
programmes demonstrated remarkable dynamism

because they inspired subsequent policies which

were designed in all government sectors.
The Government immediately set out to create fiscal

stability and economic growth. Inflation was
brought down from 64% in 1994 to fewer than 5%
from 1998 up to 2000. In 1994, annual fiscal revenues
were zero while in 2002 they stood at nearly 70
billion of Rwandan Francs (frw). The economy grew
steadily at an average of 11%, while gross domestic
incomes grew at an average of 14.3% per annum
since 1995.
The process of privatisation of government

enterprises started in 1996. Many enterprises were
put up for privatisation and shares were sold to local
or foreign investors. The government made it a
priority to diversify Rwanda’s economic base.

The Government of National Unity was committed

to rebuilding, expanding and improving the
infrastructure of the country in order to facilitate
economic growth. Since 2003 new roads have been
built and others have been reconstructed to improve
the road system.
Other efforts related to promote health conditions in

residential houses increased the availability of water
and electricity. Up to 2001, only 2.4% of the homes
were connected to water supplied by
ELECTROGAZ as opposed to 38.1% homesteads
which got water from natural wells. The poorest
people fetched water from rivers. The average
distance between homes and water sources was 703
meters in 2001.

As for electricity, the number of ELECTROGAZ

customers increased. It rose from 2% of the
population in 1994 to 6% in 2002. In addition, there
was a significant difference in living standards
between rural and urban dwellers.
Agriculture and animal husbandry
Ever since it took over power in July 1994, the

Government of National Unity focused its attention
on boosting agricultural production. It sensitised the
population to embark on agriculture as soon as
peace and security were achieved. It distributed
seeds, basic tools, pesticides, etc. to boost
agriculture.
To curb the problem of famine and guarantee food

security, government priority identified the
cultivation of the following crops: maize, rice,
sorghum, beans and, irish potatoes.

Rwanda’s economy heavily depended on the export

of coffee and tea. The evolution of quantitative
production of coffee from 1994 to 2003 was achieved
unevenly. The new export crops on which the
Government focused its attention included flowers
which started fetching foreign exchange to the
Rwandan economy. In short, agricultural production
increased from 1994. Between 1995 and 2005, it
multiplied twofold.
In the field of animal husbandry, government action

since 1994 was bent on the following: increasing the
reproduction of animals in all regions of the country,
reopening of veterinary laboratories and research
institutions in animal technology, provision of
veterinary medicines and the sensitization of
farmers to ensure an increase in animal production.
In 1994 and 2003, the number of domestic animals
increased by almost five. Quantitatively, animal

husbandry also improved because big-sized animals

and the number of cross-breed animals increased
though generally, a lot of improvement was still
needed.
Promotion of gender equality
Women had suffered due to war and the Genocide.

One of the Government and civil society priorities
were to strengthen capacity building programmes
for women in all fields. In this regard, the Rwandan
legislation which was disadvantaging women was
amended in order to give equal opportunities to
both men and women. The Government set up the
National Commission for Women’s Rights which
played an important role in revising the law and
culture. Articles which disadvantaged women were
removed. Similarly, women organisations became
very active. Hence, an association called
PROFEMMES trained women and empowered them

to take up roles in decision making organs, justice.

In addition, laws on inheritance were reformulated.
Furthermore , the gender factor was integrated in all
national policies on Rwanda’s long term
development.
In political domain, the Government encouraged

women to get involved in decision making organs.
This started from the first electoral campaigns of
1999, 2001 and 2003. For example, during the 2001
elections organised by district and sector
committees, almost 25% of the women were elected.


All categories of the Rwandan population took part

in the process of drafting the Rwandan constitution
of 2003. This facilitated the inclusion of the gender
factor in the constitution. The 2003 Constitution of
the Republic of Rwanda stipulates that women shall
occupy at least 30% of the decision making organs in
the country. The results of the 2003 elections showed
that Rwanda was among the first world countries in
the world with the most outstanding percentage of
women in the National Assembly.
ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

ABAKO : Alliance des Bakongo
AMNUT : All Muslim National Unity of Tanganyika
ANC : African National Congress

APSA : African Peace and Security Architecture.
ASF : African Standby Force
ASP : Afro Shiraz Party
AUCC : African Union anti-Corruption Convention
CCM : Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA : in Kiswahili Chama cha Demokrasia

na Maendeleo (meaning in English Party for
Democracy)
CND : Centre National de Développement
CNLG : Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre le

Génocide (National Commission for
the Fight against Genocide)
CODESA : Convention for a Democratic South

Africa
CPD : Centrist Democratic Party
CPP : Convention People’s Party

DAP : Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
DDP : District Development Plan
DDPs : District Development Plans
DGPR : Democratic Green Party of Rwanda
DRC : Democratic Republic of Congo
EASF : Eastern Africa Standby Force
EDPRS : Economic Development and Poverty

Reduction Strategy
FAO : Food and Agriculture Organization
FAR : Forces Armées Rwandaises
FARG : Fonds d’ Assistance aux Rescapés du

Génocide
FLN : Front de Libération Nationale
FPRG : Facility for Poverty Reduction and Growth
FRELIMO : Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique
GATT : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GLMC : Great Lakes Media Centre
GOMN : Groupe d’Observateurs Militaires Neutres (

Neutral Military Group of Observers)
HGIs : Home Grown Initiatives IFP

Inkatha Freedom Party
ICTR : International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ILO : International Labour Organization
IMF : International Monetary Fund
JADF : Joint Action Development Forums
KADU: Kenyan African Democratic Union
KANU : Kenyan African National Union
KPU : Kenya People’s Union
MAJ : Maisons d’ Accès à la Justice
MDG : Millennium Development Goals
MDGs : Millennium Development Goals
MDR : Mouvement Démocratique Républicain

MHC : Media High Council
MNC : Mouvement National Congolais
MPLA : Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation de

l’Angola (People’s Movement for Angolan
Liberation)
MRND : Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour

le Développement
MTEF : Medium Term Expenditure Framework
N DR : National Dialogue Resolutions
NCHR : National Commission of Human Rights
NEC : National Electoral Commission
NFPO : National Consultative Forum of Political

Organisations
NGO : Non-Government Organisations
NLR : National Leadership Retreat NP : National

Party

NRA : National Resistance Army
NRAC : Northern Rhodesian African Congress
NSDAP : NationalSozialistische Deutsche

Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers
Party
NURC : National Unity and Reconciliation

Commission
NYSC : National Youth Service Corps
OAS : Organisation des Armées Secrètes
OAU : Organisation for African Unity
ODM : Orange Democratic Movement
PAC : Pan Africanist Congress
PARMEHUTU : Parti du Mouvement de

l’Emancipation Hutu
PDC : Parti Démocrate Chrétien
PDI : Parti Démocratique Islamique

PL : Parti Libéral
PNP : Parti National du Peuple
PNU : Party of National Unity
PPC : Party for Progress and Concord
PS Imberakuri : Social Party Imberakuri
PSA : Parti Solidaire Africain
PSC : Peace and Security Council of the African

Union
PSCP : Peace and Security Council Protocol
PSD : Parti Social Démocrate
PSP : Party for Solidarity and Progress
PSR : Parti Socialiste Rwandais ( Rwandese Socialist

Party)
RAC : Royal African Company
RANU : Rwandese Alliance of National Unity

RDRC : Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration

Commission
RMC : Rwanda Media Commission
RPA : Rwandese Patriotic Army
RPF : Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRW F : Rwandese Refugees Welfare Foundation
RTLM : Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
RURA : Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority
SACP: South African Communist Party
SALT : Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SDP : Sector Development Plans
SJC : School of Journalism and Communication
SYGP: Seven Years Government Program
TANU : Tanganyika African National Unity
TIG : Travail d’ Intérêt Général

UDPR : Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais
UGCC : United Gold Coast Convention
UNAMIR : United Nations Mission for Rwanda
UNAR : Union Nationale Rwandaise
UNCAC : United Nations Convention Against

Corruption
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization
UNHCR : United Nations High Commission for

Refugees
UNIP : United National Independence Party
UNO : United Nations Organisation
UNTOC : UN Convention against Transnational

Organised Crime
UR : University of Rwanda

UTP : United Tanganyika Party
WB : World Bank
WHO : World Health Organization
YPLA : Youth Political Leadership Academy
ZANC : Zambia African National Congress
ZNP : Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP : Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party
9YBE: Nine Years Basic Education

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POST-COLONIAL RWANDA ...................................................................................1

Part 1: First and Second Republics of Rwanda ............................................................................ 4

Achievements and failures of the First Republic, 1962–1973 ..........................................5

Reasons for the Fall of the First Republic ......................................................................................21

Achievements of the Second Republic (1973–1990) ........................... 30

Part 2: Genocide Denial and Ideology in Rwanda and Abroad ........... 60

Forms and channels of Genocide Denial and Ideology. ....................... 61

Definition of the concept “genocide ideology” .................................... 62

Forms of Genocide Denial and its manifestation in Rwandan society

Ways of Fighting Against Different Forms and channels of Genocide

LIBERATION WAR IN RWANDA ................................................. 103

The course of the Liberation War (19901994).................................... 111

Eight points programme of RPF......................................................... 115

The effects of the Liberation War (19901994) .................................... 145

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The achievements of the Government of National Unity (1994-2003)

ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS ............................................ 198

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RPF troops and this action simultaneously marked

In the after math of the 1994 genocide against the

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administrative reforms and fight against injustice,

Part 1: First and Second Republics of

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opened a new era which would be marked by many

This unit will examine various achievements of the

Achievements and failures of the First

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 Political evolution: The new institutions of the

Achievements and failures of the Second Republic

 Political evolution: New political institutions

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 Socio-cultural evolution: Health and education

By independence day on July 1st, 1962, Rwanda had

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A constitution project was proposed by

Rwanda had a government headed by a president of

Grégoire Kayibanda, President of

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The parliament had the power to supervise the

From Multipartism to Monopartism

MDR PARMEHUTU fused with the state and the

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prefectures, the préfets were leaders of

MDR PARMEHUTU used different mechanisms to

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Rwagasana Michel (19271963). (Source:

RADER and UNAR on the other disappeared due to

After recruiting some opposition leaders in its ranks

The Inyenzi incursions

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The first challenge faced by the First Republic was

At the beginning of the 1960s, the provisional

The major attacks of Inyenzi were the

࿤ The April 1962, attack from Uganda targeting the

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The July 3rd to 4th, 1962, attack from Goma by

The December 24th, 1963 attack in Bugesera.

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8,000 and 10,000. In the same period,

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