Home Exam Part 1

Conflict and Peacebuilding Analysis:

The Rwandan Civil War

Paula Baró
Conflict and Peacebuilding
Joint Master’s Program in International Humanitarian Action
 Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 3

Part 1: Conflict Analysis ..................................................................................... 3

1.1 Main Causes ................................................................................................................... 3

1.1.1 Structural causes .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.1.2 Proxy factors ................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1.3 Trigger causes .............................................................................................................................. 4

1.2 Main Actors Involved: .................................................................................................... 5

1.2.1 National actors: ............................................................................................................................ 5
1.2.2 Regional actors: ........................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.3 International actors: ..................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Dynamics ........................................................................................................................ 6

Part 2: Conflict resolution and peacebuilding .................................................... 7

Early warnings of genocide after Arusha Accords ............................................................... 8

Zartman’s Ripeness Model and the Arusha Accords ............................................................ 8

Peacebuilding and Development post-1994 ......................................................................... 9

Conclusion: ....................................................................................................... 10

2
Introduction

The following paper will examine the Rwandan Civil War conflict, understood as the period
of time from the October 1990 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attack to the signing of the
unsuccessful peace agreements “The Arusha Accords” in August 1993. In Part 1, the main
causes, actors and dynamics will be outlined while in Part 2, Zartman’s Ripeness model will
be used to explain the eventual failure of implementation of the peace agreements.

Part 1: Conflict Analysis

1.1 Main Causes

1.1.1 Structural causes

Creation of ethnic identities in colonial period

The Rwandan genocide was largely attributed to be an ethnic conflict as the parties to the
conflict seemed to ethnic-based, Hutus against Tutsis. However, these ethnic identities were
not based on any substantial historical ethnic difference but were instead originally socio-
economic categories or occupational designation: agricultural workers versus cattle herders
(Awet, 2017). In addition, these categories were fluid, if one’s economic situation improved,
they could become a Tutsi and vice versa. The German acquisition of Rwanda in 1985
introduced racial hierarchy theories and established the minority Tutsi population as the
superior race to the Hutus based on a “mythological precolonial past” (OAU, 2000)
Subsequently, the Belgian occupation (1916-1962) significantly exacerbated this racial divide
by enforcing a strict categorization of these ethnic identities with official identity
documentation (SIDA, 2004) This system of categorization would be used for decades and end
up becoming greatly efficient in carrying out the genocide. This period of colonisation created
an incredibly hierarchical society as Tutsis were offered opportunities for education and
economic and Hutus were not only deprived of these opportunities but also sometimes forced
to surrender their crops and pay special taxes (Collins, 2014) While the Tutsis held all the
political and administrative power, the hutus were marginalised (SIDA, 2004). Decades later,
the “Hutu revolution” took place where they XXX. This divisive ideology was the basis for
what would become a terrible propaganda machine used in 1990s to inflame a society and
prepare the ground for a genocide (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Economic downturn

After a few years of social stability and economic growth, during the 1980s the prices for coffee
and tea plummeted which triggered a severe economic crisis and furthered Rwanda’s
dependency on aid (SIDA, 2004). Structural adjustments programmes implemented to receive
aid triggered unemployment and high levels of inflation. In addition, there was a severe land
shortage with 50% of the population being landless in some districts (IPEP, 2000) As inequality
and poverty increased, so did the level of structural violence. The chronic unemployment
created a fertile base for hate mobilisation (Uvin, 1997)

Political and Social instability

3
Social instability derived not only from the increasing levels of violence but also from the
accumulated unsolved issues of impunity in the last decade of genocidal crimes. The political
system was based on disempowerment and exclusion of the Tutsi population and allowed for
a culture were political violence seemed common which delegitimised the state. Similarly, the
police and the military could not be trusted to bring about any social order as they often
contributed to the escalating situation by launching politically motivated attacks against
opponents of the government (HRW,1999).The combination of these circumstances led to an
increasingly frustrated population, desperate for change and susceptible to manipulation.

1.1.2 Proxy factors

Neighbouring effects

Burundi and Rwanda had very similar social structures based on a similar ethnic hierarchical
structure with one group in power, the Tutsi in Burundi and Hutu in Rwanda while the other
was perceived as the social enemy (Hintjens, 1999 )Four months after being democratically
elected, Burundi’s president was assassinated in 1993 which resulted in a terrible massacre of
Hutus (OAU, 2000) This event was later used by the Akazu (an extremist group interconnected
to the government) to escalate the conflict in Rwanda offering it as proof that sharing power
with between Hutus and Tutsis could not be a viable option (OAU, 2000).

1.1.3 Trigger causes

RPF attack 1990

The 1990 RPF attack on Uganda was a retaliation by Rwandan refugees in Uganda who had
fled the Harimbaya regime. A far-reaching diaspora emerged as a result of the political violence
directed towards Tutsis during the Hutu revolution, with a peak of 75% of the Tutsi population
being refugees in 1964 (SIDA, 2004). For decades, these refugee groups were caught in
between the Ugandan government, which was not willing to provide them full rights of
settlement and the Rwandan government which, for the most part did not grant them right of
return citing overpopulation and shortage of land as a justification (HRW,1999)The result of
such grievances was the attack of 1990 to Rwanda from the RPF in Uganda with the aim to not
only return to the country they had to flee but also change the political regime which had forced
them to do so (SIDA,2004).

Liberalization and consequences

While Habyarimana had already started to slowly liberalise the political system before RPF’s
attack, it was this event that brought the process forward and increased the momentum of this
shift (Adelman et al.,1996). Considering this and the international pressure to liberalise and
legalise a multiparty system, Habyarimana formed a coalition government in 1992 (ibid.)
However, the timing for this change did not prove to be right. With a crumbling economy, a
powder keg of ethnic conflicts and a brewing civil war. As an exiled former minister wrote,
the new multi-party system only “became a cloak for particularist interests, encouraged ethnic
mobilization and fed political fiefdoms that usurped the civil administration” (Gasana, 1995 p.
231-232)

4
1.2 Main Actors Involved:

The paper will now go on to explore the different actors that were influential before, during
and after the Rwandan civil war at the national, regional and international level of analysis.
The dynamics of these relationships are represented in the actor map below .

Figure 1 Actor Mapping of Rwanda’s civil war

1.2.1 National actors:

The main national actors were Rwandan Patriotic, whose intentions were to guarantee the right
of return to all refugees and later to take down the current regime and establish a democratic
government; and the government of Rwanda headed by Habyarimana with its infighting
political parties, the extremist Hutus who aligned with Habyarimana and the moderate Hutus
who opposed him (HRW, 1999) The government of Rwanda, in particular the MRND party
and the Akazu group (composed of the President’s wife, family and close allies) had substantial
capacities as not only they had a divided but strong party, significant military force headed by
close associates and eventually the Interahamwe militia. Furthermore, one could argue their
most relevant capacity was their ability use ethnic polarisation to their own advantage by
mobilising support of the masses with propaganda and fear mongering.

1.2.2 Regional actors:

As discussed earlier, neighbouring countries had an immense influence in the events that took
place in Rwanda. Particularly, Zaire which supported the extremist Hutu regime and Uganda
and Burundi which supported the RPF (Paris, 2004) While, In keeping with international
conventions, Uganda was never officially linked to the RPF, the country and its army served
as a rear base for the attack of 1990. Uganda’s government aided the rebel Tutsis because they
saw the RPF’s invasion as a solution to the increasing number of refugees within their borders.

5
Furthermore, Tanzania became an important actor in terms of “capacities for peace” as they
became intricately involved in the conflict resolution diplomacy that took place in the years
1991-1992 (GDCSR, 2017). While other actors were also involved in this diplomatic process,
Tanzania stood out as one of the more impartial actors promoting negotiations between the
RPF and the Habyarimana (HRW, 1999)

1.2.3 International actors:

International organisations such as UN, OAU at the beginning of the civil war (and eventually
during the signing of the peace agreements) put pressure in the government to implement
political and social reforms, most importantly to liberalise the political system after the 1990
attack and withheld aid, which Rwanda had grown dependent upon after its economic crisis,
in order to ensure this was accomplished (HRW, 1999)

Famously, even after president Habyarimana was assassinated and slaughter ensued, the
international community at large refused to define the situation as a “genocide”, an action that
would have required no military force but would have saved thousands of lives (ibid.)
Furthermore, having previously understood the capacity for influence, a public condemnation
might have alerted Rwandans that the government wouldn’t succeed and less likely to follow
their orders (ibid.).

Habyarimana’s regime had two international powers supporting him. Owing to the fact that
they had been long-time allies and they retained some economic interests in Rwanda, France
and Belgium were the only countries to send troops to aid the Rwandan military after the RPF
attack. Without their support, Habyarimana’s regime would have been taken down days after
the attack (Kuperman, 2003).

1.3 Dynamics
After colonial rule, the Hutu revolution transformed from a Tutsi monarchy to the first Hutu
independent republic followed by a bloodless coup which led to the second. Afterwards,
Rwanda enjoyed two decades of economic prosperity and social stability under Habyarimana’s
regime (HRW, 1999). This led to Rwanda being considered “Africa’s Switzerland” (Uvin,
1998). Even though the authoritarian MRND party had focused all power on the hands of the
Hutu elite, violence against Tutsis stopped, and while they still held no political or military
power, they came to play prominent roles in the private sector which was not as controlled.
However, it became clear the real contention laid outside Rwandan borders with the
aforementioned October 1990 attack (SIDA, 2004). It is now commonly accepted that
President Habyarimana had anticipated the attack and allowed it to take its course to sell the
message that the RPF wanted to invade Rwanda by force in order to mobilise the masses and
rally support for his regime. Similarly, in October 5 1990, after heavy firing had shook Kigali
the night before, the government reported the capital had been attacked by RPF soldiers
(HRW,1999) Nowadays, this account of the attack is known to be false as the event was
manufactured, but at the time, the international community believed the version of events
which inspired Belgium, France and Zaire to send troops in order to drive back the RPF (ibid.).

These two events triggered a swift regional diplomatic intervention particularly from
neighbouring countries Tanzania and Uganda after realising an escalating conflict could result
in a huge inflow of refugees into their borders. These regional diplomacy proved to have

6
limited success as the two cease-fires negotiated were not respected and the planned MOT
failed while many Tutsi allies and non-allies of the RPF were imprisoned. Nevertheless, in
order to appease international actors, Habyyarimana made several political concessions leading
to democratisation and liberalisation such as implementing a constitutional amendment that
made multiple political parties legal (Kuperman, 2003) .

The Arusha talks, named after the Tanzanian resort they took place in, took place in the summer
1992 involving major international powers such as the United States, France and the European
Union to find a way to ameliorate the rebel offenses and subside the violence targeting civilians
(SIDA, 2004)

With increasing levels of violence and ethnic mobilisation, Habyarimana was walking a
political tightrope. Signing the accords would anger the extreme Hutus on his party who did
not consider power sharing an option but not signing the accords would only escalate the
conflict further. Thus, the accords were signed in August 1993 owing to the fact that the
international community was threatening to remove their financial aid and remove its military
support which was the sole factor why they had not been defeated by the unrelenting RPF army
which had proved much stronger than initially expected (Kuperman, 2003)

The Arusha Accords led to a very uneasy peace. The Hutu extremists grew increasingly weary
of the Tutsis’s intentions, Habyarimana seemed to do anything possible to avoid implementing
the accords which frustrated the Tutsi rebels (ibid.)Interestingly, the position of the Hutu elite
and Habyarimana could be explored through the lens of what behavioural economists call “loss
aversion” (Anderton, 2015). To them, the Arusha Accords posed an “existential threat” which
game theory models predict will make actors make extreme choices, in this case, meticulously
polarising a society, promoting propaganda that fomented anti-Tutsi hatred and hundreds of
thousands of guns, grenades and machetes in order to prevent the supposed restoration of a
Tutsi hegemony (Kuperman, 2003)

To conclude this section, it is of incredible importance to understand the real issue driving the
conflict was not a national ethnic divide. Before the RPF attack of 1990, most of the rural
masses experienced a very similar poor economic situation regardless of their ethnic
identification (HRW,1994). The drivers of the conflict were the elite groups in power, the
extremist Hutus and Habyarimana versus the moderate faction of the government who was not
happy with the regime. While the elite groups frequently championed “Hutu power”
propaganda, they didn’t take any steps to de-escalate the conflict while thousands of moderate
Hutus died years later in the genocide. These elites, on both sides, rallied the necessary support
from the masses by using a divisive rhetoric in order to obtain (or retain) power in government.

Part 2: Conflict resolution and peacebuilding

The Arusha Accords were promising at the time they were signed as they established the major
issues in contention and seemed to provide a roadmap to a peaceful and stable Rwanda (HRW,
1999) . They included the establishment of the rule of law, the right of stay for refugees as well
as displaced people and the inclusion of the RPF in military and political positions. According
to the accords, the power of the government would be shared by Habyarimana, the RPF and
the previous opposition block of parties (Beloff, 2019)

7
Early warnings of genocide after Arusha Accords

Based on the ideas of Barbara Harff, there are six conditions that indicate there is a high risk
of genocide in a region: magnitude of political upheaval, history of prior genocide,
exclusionary ideology by the ruling elite, autocratic regime, ethnic minority elite, and low trade
openness (2004) . While some of these conditions had been present in Rwanda for decades, the
peace agreement had actually significantly exacerbated the exclusionary ideology of the ruling
elite as well as the general political upheaval. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear the
situation post-Arusha Accords was incredibly volatile under the surface. Different political
parties were forming youth wings which eventually evolved into militias, the strongest of
which in due course became the Interahamwe. Simultaneously, the RPF was recruiting
thousands of members fearing the agreement would not be implemented and both sides
proceeded to acquire a large arsenal.

Having taken into consideration this explosive sum of circumstances, it is unclear how the
international community, and in particular did not monitor the developments more closely.
While they established the UNAMIR mission to which they sent peacekeeping troops, it is
commonly thought they were insufficient to deal with the task at hand (Adelman et al. 1996).
Moreover, while UNAMIR officials reported back to the United Nations the gravity of the
situation days before the genocide commenced, the warnings were overlooked (HRW, 1999)
To add insult to injury, once the killings had started most international governments as well as
the United Nations refused to call the situation in Rwanda as that would have forced them to
intervene (HRW, 1999). Consequently, for their failure to carefully monitor the situation after
the accords, react efficiently to early warning signs of a genocide and eventually turn a blind
eye to the massacres that occurred in the first weeks of the genocide, the international
community should be, and to a certain extent, has been held accountable for their shameful role
in this crisis.

Zartman’s Ripeness Model and the Arusha Accords

The conflict resolution that took place in Rwanda can be explored through the lens of Zartman’s
framework of conflict ripeness. Conflict ripeness follows the logic that there are certain
conditions whereby conflict resolution processes are more likely to be successful. There are
two different models Hartman discussed: Hurting Stalemate model or Imminent Mutual
Catastrophe model (Zartman, 1985)

The Hurting Stalemate Model describes a conflict where neither party can conceive of a victory
or an end to increasing costs (Mitchell, 1995) Evidently, this does not encapsulate Rwanda’s
situation before the peace agreements. Perhaps, this was partly because the violent conflict had
not occurred for a prolonged period of time since less than 2 years had occurred from the
moment of the RPF attack and the beginning of the peace agreements. Alternatively, it could
be argued that both parties were relatively optimistic about their possibilities of victory. Based

8
on several reports, the government’s perspective was that the RPF could win militarily but not
politically while their regime could win politically but not militarily (Kuperman, 2003)
Perhaps it was external events, like the assassination of Burundi’s president, that made each
side hopeful they could rally sufficient support to attain victory. Mitchell (1996) outlines three
potential types of stalemate: of desperation, attrition or frustration. Rwanda’s situation doesn’t
clearly fit into any of the latter due to the fact that the conflict resolution process began due to
the pressure put by international actors.

The Hurting Stalemate Model describes a conflict where neither party can conceive of a victory
or an end to increasing costs (Mitchell, 1995) Evidently, this does not encapsulate Rwanda’s
situation before the peace agreements. Perhaps, this was partly because the violent conflict had
not occurred for a prolonged period of time since less than 2 years had occurred from the
moment of the RPF attack and the beginning of the peace agreements. Alternatively, it could
be argued that both parties were relatively optimistic about their possibilities of victory. Based
on several reports, the government’s perspective was that the RPF could win militarily but not
politically while their regime could win politically but not militarily (Kuperman, 2003)
Perhaps it was external events, like the assassination of Burundi’s president, that made each
side hopeful they could rally sufficient support to attain victory. Mitchell (1996) outlines three
potential types of stalemate: of desperation, attrition or frustration. Rwanda’s situation doesn’t
clearly fit into any of the latter due to the fact that the conflict resolution process began due to
the pressure put by international actors.

The second model is imminent mutual destruction and describes a situation whereby an
escalation process can take place because both parties are envisioning an imminent major
catastrophe and don’t perceive a high probability of success. Ironically, looking back both
parties were headed towards a major catastrophe before the accord. The relevant question is
whether the leaders of both parties predicted the horrific mass killings that were going to take
place and did not consider it a major catastrophe because even after such loss of human life
they could reasonable achieve their ultimate objectives; military and political power.

Peacebuilding and Development post-1994

Dan Smith proposed a four-category framework to conceptualise and develop peacebuilding

strategies (2004). The categories were as follows: security (including matters such as
demobilisation, security sector reform), political matters (stop the use of propaganda, political
system reform, democratization), socio-economic foundations (economic re-infrastructure,
return of the refugees) and reconciliation and justice (reconciliation, accountability) (ibid.)

All of these categories were included in the Arusha Accords with measures that allowed for
power-sharing in the government, permission for refugees and displaced people to return, the
democratisation of media and free democratic elections. Despite this, not only were these
measures not properly implemented but they became the source of further conflict as Hutu
extremists put pressure on Habyarimana to avoid implementing them and moderate Hutus and
Tutsis grew tired of the stagnant situation. Thus, it is increasingly complex, even

9
retrospectively to design a peacebuilding strategy that would have succeeded and been
accepted in 1992, at the time of the Arusha Accords.

It is important, however, to emphasize that post-genocide Rwanda constructed two justice

mechanisms that proved to immensely important for society to receive justice and retribution.
Firstly, the international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up by the UN to prosecute
the genocide architects and other high-level offenders. Remarkably, this court was the first to
interpret rape as a method of genocide. Secondly, and most importantly, the unique Gacaca
courts focused on lower-level perpetrators and was created to seek justice at the local level
(Beloff, 2019) Attendance to Gacaca courts was mandatory for the communities as they beared
witness to retellings of the crimes (ibid.). These courts were fundamental in the process of
reconciliation as, even though they had downfalls, they proved to be a change from the decades
of political and civilian violence followed by impunity.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, while the conflict in Rwanda had all ethnic, historical and social components,
the most significant one was the political component. The critical events that led to terrible
violence as well as the subsequent reaction to these was always based on acquiring political
power and suppressing any threat to it. Leaders of both parties fed momentum to an ethnic
hatred that later became out of control and resulted in one of the deadliest genocides in history
(HRW, 1999).

Through the lens of Zartman’s Ripeness model, the Arusha Accords are a clear example of a
conflict had not reach the point where both parties were ready to start the conflict resolution
process. The accords were signed due to the threats of the international community rather than
an innate desire to reach a settlement by any side. Lastly, the civil war and subsequent genocide
in Rwanda showed the international community the real price of inaction. It is estimated that
an intervention in the first weeks of the genocide could have saved hundreds of thousands of
lives. Their reaction to this crisis brought about shame in the public consciousness, even
inspiring the phrase “Never again” (Forbes, 2017)

10
Bibliography

Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (1996) “The International Response to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience”. Steering Committee of the Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Available at:
https://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/50189764.pdf

Awet, Halefom (2017). “ Genocide in Rwanda. Conflict Analysis of the Civil War”

Anderton, Charles (2015). “Genocide: Perspectives from the Social Science”, Economics
Department Working Papers. Paper 152. Available at:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8e4b/a7b782ba1e0dfe67e56d47220a61a206bb70.pdf?_ga=2.
58004527.441247871.1646324154-454221625.1646324154

Beloff, Jonathan (2019) “Peace and Compromise, Idealism and Constraint: The Case of the
Arusha Peace Accords in Rwanda and Burundi”. International Organisation of Genocide
Scholars. Volume 13 Issue 2 Rethinking Genocide, Mass Atrocities, and Political Violence in
Africa: New Directions, New Inquiries, and Global Perspectives. Available at:
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1696&context=gsp

Collins, B. (2014). Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and Its
Consequences. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-
studies/article/abs/rwanda-1994-the-myth-of-the-akazu-genocide-conspiracy-and-its-
consequences-by-barrie-collins-basingstoke-palgrave-macmillan-2014-pp-272-6500-
hbk/B44244FBFBA0B0C2C320F6397528152C#

Forbes (2017) “After The Rwandan Genocide The UN Promised 'Never Again' - Now It's
Time For Them To Take Action Against ISIS” Available at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/04/20/after-the-rwandan-genocide-the-un-
promised-never-again-now-its-time-for-them-to-take-action-against-isis/?sh=2b3d651f4142

Kuperman, Alan (2003). “Explaining the Ultimate Escalation in Rwanda:

How and Why Tutsi Rebels Provoked a Retaliatory Genocide. Johns Hopkins University -
Bologna Center. Available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ss12.pdfGasana, James K.
(1995) "La guerre, la paix et la d‚mocatie au Rwanda," in André Guichaoua, (ed.), Les crises
politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-94). Paris: Karthala/Université de Lille: 435-447.

Harff, B. (2003) “No lessons learned form the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder since 1955”, The American Political Science review. Vol. 97, No.1.
Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-
review/article/abs/no-lessons-learned-from-the-holocaust-assessing-risks-of-genocide-and-
political-mass-murder-since-1955/FBA37FA563AC35E1CB6F7B57F8140F2C

11
Hintjens, H. M. (1999 ). Explaining The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda. The Journal Of Modern
African Studies, 37(2 ), 241‐286. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/161847?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Human Rights Watch (1999) “Leave no one to tell the story” Genocide in Rwanda. Available
at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/12/rwanda-leave-none-to-tell-the-
story.pdf

IPEP. 2000. ”Rwanda. The Preventable Genocide. The Report of International Panel of
Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding
Events.” Addis Ababa: OAU/ AU. Available at:
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf

OAU. (2000). Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide International panel of eminent

personalities. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf

Paris, R. (2004). At War’s End Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge
University Press . Available at: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-
content/files_mf/1389730980d6Turner.pdf

SIDA Division For Eastern And Western Africa (2004). “A Strategic Conflict Analysis for
the Great Lakes Region” Available at: https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida3689en-a-
strategic-conflict-analysis-for-the-great-lakes-region.pdf

William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985,p. 232.

Uvin, P. (1997). Prejudice, crisis and genocide in rwanda. African Studies Review, 40 (2), 91‐
115. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/525158?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

12