Executive Summary
SPLM- IO Policy
Recommendations
To: Riek Machar -Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement-in opposition
(SPLM-IO)
From: SPLM-IO Policy Advisors
Direct Contributor: Genevieve
Fischer
Date: 18 March 2019
The following report outlines the
SPLM-IO point of view on the lasting conflict
in South Sudan and the policies suggested to
achieve lasting peace. These policy
recommendations focus on three main areas:
political, social and economic stability. The
recommendations include strategies such as
the reallocation of funds and developing a
tolerance to international aid and cooperation.
In addition to policy recommendations, we
include the feasibility of these projects and
effective methods of implementing these
proposals. Through these policy
recommendations, we hope to provide a
framework for creating peace and stability in
our country. Furthermore, we have paid
special attention to the needs of our Nuer
people. We believe that using these policies
will improve the lives of Nuer tribe members
as well as individuals within other groups. In
the following pages, we have detailed the
necessary steps for ensuring social justice,
developing political reforms, and increasing
economic development within our state.
Report Outline
I. History
II. Current State of Affairs
III. Objectives
IV. Policy Recommendations
V. Conclusion
History

The violence and strife in South Sudan are a persistent and longstanding issue throughout

the country. In 1956 Sudan gained independence from British-Egyptian rule ("South Sudan

profile - Timeline", 2018). However, the first civil war between the Muslim North and Christian

South began in 1962 and lasted until 1972. Thereafter, the government conceded a degree of

autonomy to southern Sudan and an encompassing peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa

("South Sudan Overview", 2018).

Peace between the northern and southern regions of Sudan lasted until 1983 when

President Jaafar Numeiri retracted South Sudan's autonomy (Campbell 2019). This resulted in a

second civil war that caused the deaths of over 2.5 million people and an additional 4 million

individuals to gain refugee status ("South Sudan profile - Timeline", 2018). In 2002, multilateral

negotiations in Kenya lead to the drafting of the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA), which was formally signed in 2005 ("South Sudan Overview", 2018). This accord

included a permanent ceasefire, autonomy for the 10 southern provinces, a South Sudanese

referendum on independence 6 years from the signing date, and the official establishment of the

government of South Sudan (GOSS).

The GOSS was developed in order to create a power-sharing government between the

national government of Sudan and representation from the south (Campbell 2019). The most

prominent of these groups was the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Noel, & De

Waal, 2016). Our inaugural leader, John Garang was recognized as the president of South Sudan

but his untimely death lead to the emergence of Salva Kiir. (Noel, & De Waal, 2016). You, Mr.

Riek Machar, became the vice president of the GOSS ("South Sudan profile - Timeline", 2018).
Despite ethnic differences you and president Kiir worked collectively to make South Sudan an

independent nation (Noel, & De Waal, 2016).

In January of 2011 South Sudanese residents voted in favor of independence from

Sudan. However, one month later, violence erupted in the Jonglei region (Campbell 2019).

Ethnic groups, who mostly engaged in cattle raiding before 2005, became increasingly violent

after the uneven disarmament campaign launched under the CPA ("South Sudan Overview",

2018). In January of 2012 South Sudan declared a disaster in Jonglei when 100,000 people fled

the violent ethnic clashes (Noel, & De Waal, 2016). Within the SPLM led government the

difficulty of the independence movement was present from the beginning but continued to

intensify because of the ethnic divisions between President Kiir, a Dinka, and you, Mr. Machar, a

Nuer (Noel, & De Waal, 2016). Our two groups have historically competed over natural

resources, but it seldom resulted in violent clashes. In 2013 President Kiir accused you of

plotting to overthrow his regime. Consequently, you and your cabinet were fired ("South Sudan

profile - Timeline", 2018). This resulted in an ethnic civil war. Under the command of Salva

Kiir, Dinka forces pushed our troops out of the capital before attacking our civilians. At the same

time, you directed military groups to invade several regional towns in an effort to counter the

attacks and protect our people ("South Sudan profile - Timeline", 2018). For the Nuer tribe,

pastoralism has been the mainstay of life for generations. When violence erupted, our people lost

much of their livelihood and daily survival became a difficult task. The constant cycle of

violence and revenge resulted in thousands of civilian deaths.

Ugandan troops promptly intervened on behalf of Salva Kiir’s government, while Sudan

stepped in on our behalf. Due to threats of sanctions on South Sudan by the international

community negotiations between the warring parties have begun under the leadership of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The intention of these negotiations was

to prepare for long term reconciliation, political reform, and long term peace and stability

(Vertin, 2018). Undermining these negotiations was President Kiir’s government who refused to

accept responsibility for their past misdeeds or correct them in the future. However, in August of

2015, you and President Kiir signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South

Sudan (ARCSS) (Vertin, 2018).

After spending more than two years outside of the country, you returned to Juba in April

2016 and resumed your position as the vice president under the reconciled power-sharing

government. Despite these efforts, violence and conflict throughout the country remain (Vertin,

2018).

Current State of Affairs

Between 2017 and 2018, a series of cease-fire agreements were negotiated but were

subsequently violated by the consenting parties. In November of 2017 a U.N. report said ethnic

cleansing, burning villages, starvation, and gang rape had become “so prevalent that it’s become

‘normal’” in the war torn country (Al Jazeera, 2018). Just three months later a report found that

more than 40 South Sudanese officials may have committed crimes against humanity, including

rape and murder of civilians and recruitment of child soldiers. In 2017, the United Nations found

that a group of Dinka soldiers attacked a refugee camp, killing an estimated 300 Nuer civilians.

Ultimately the ongoing violence has continued along ethnic lines. Although Mahboub Maalim,

the executive secretary of the East African bloc IGAD has deemed the most recent peace deal,

signed in September of 2018, “the best-negotiated proposal signed so far” refugees are still

fearful to return home (Maasho, 2018).

 It is the shared responsibility of our forces and those of Salva Kiir to prove to the South

Sudanese people that peace can be permanent and durable. Recent findings reveal that over

400,000 people have died in the six years since the conflict began and one quarter of the

population, 4 million people, have been displaced. In total, it is estimated that more than 8

million South Sudanese civilians are currently in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.

Objectives

The primary objective of the SPLM-IO should be to end war and suffering, reduce the

human cost of violence, and establish open routes of communication between members of the

Nuer and Dinka tribes. We hope that the subsequent policy recommendations will allow us to

achieve this ultimate objective without jeopardizing the health and wellbeing of our people.

We aim to provide advice on how to grant members of the Nuer tribe political and

governmental representation in a democratic society. Moreover, we provide a substantial

framework for supporting and reintegrating refugees from the Nuer tribe into South Sudanese

society. In addition to helping refugees, our proposals outline specific methods of institution

building utilizing education, houses of worship, and community centers to foster peace and

cooperation throughout South Sudan. Similarly, we have highlighted the strategic procedures of

prosecuting war criminals and reintegrating soldiers into society. Fundamentally, we believe that

improving infrastructure and existing institutions is important for the growth and development of

South Sudan. This objective should be coupled with responsible and strategic uses of oil reserves

to build the country and ameliorate the livelihood of citizens.

Policy Recommendations
Our policy recommendations will come in three subsections with a focus on political, social and economic stability.
The subsections will begin with concise recommendations, that will be italicized, followed by supporting
information and research.
Political:
1) Establish a National Council that represents all ethnic groups and facilitates ongoing
dialogue among community members.

In order to achieve lasting peace in South Sudan, collaboration and inclusivity are paramount

(Mutasa, & Virk, 2017). The establishment of a national council is an effective way of achieving

these objectives. The national council will serve as a mechanism to bring citizens and politicians

from different ethnic groups together to peacefully resolve disagreements. Additionally, the

council will allow members to collaborate on joint ventures to improve the community.

Members of the council should be elected democratically every two years. These

delegates much represent the different ethnic groups within South Sudan. Furthermore, this

council should also be given an annual budget based on national GDP. With an annual GDP of

nearly three billion US dollars, allocating .01% would provide thirty million dollars of annual

funding to this important institution. This money can be used towards development goals and

peace projects. Furthermore, there should be checks and balances through the legal system to

ensure that the council does not have unlimited power (Mutasa, & Virk, 2017). This will

guarantee that council members are working towards peace on behalf of the country and not

focusing on personal matters.

In order for this council to best function it must first address the underlying causes of the

conflict. All political parties and ethnic groups must work collectively to find ways to forgive

each other and prioritize the welfare of civilians (Noel, & De Waal, 2016). Maintaining a

national council that includes members of all ethnic groups is not only a feasible arrangement,

but also a necessary component of lasting peace. Without the opinions and perspectives of

civilians, peace will be fragmented, incomplete, and largely unsuccessful.

 South Sudan should look to the success of the National Peace Council in Ghana, which

aims to

“facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among all relevant

stakeholders in peace building...by promoting cooperative problem solving to

conflicts and by institutionalizing the processes of response to conflicts to

produce outcomes that lead to conflict transformation, social, political and

religious reconciliation and transformative dialogues.”

With representation from different ethnic and religious groups, the National Council of Ghana

elects leaders democratically to four year terms (Republic of Ghana, 2018). These members

work towards conflict resolution, non-violence, and open dialogue. The council has successfully

increased trust levels between community members and has improved reconciliation efforts and

institution-building processes throughout the country (Republic of Ghana, 2018). If South Sudan

emulates the model used by Ghana, then peace, trust, and reform will have successful outcomes .

2) Develop a hybrid court system that prosecutes war criminals and facilitates the
reintegration of soldiers into society.

As a sovereign and democratic state, we have the obligation to prosecute soldiers and

civilians who have committed war crimes. In order to restore justice to members of our

community and honor the memories of deceased civilians, we must support all efforts to

establish a functional and effective court system. The Hybrid Court of South Sudan, which was

formerly agreed upon during the Addis Ababa peace negotiations, must be implemented

(Mutasa, & Virk, 2017). In accordance with the 2015 signing of the Agreement of the Resolution

of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), the establishment of the Hybrid Court is dependent upon

unanimous consensus or a two-thirds majority vote within the national parliament (Owiso, 2018).

Under the guidelines of the ARCSS, we push to establish a National Constitutional Amendment
Committee (NCAC), which will create new legislation and proposes amendments to the Hybrid

Court (Owiso, 2018). The NCAC includes eight members that represent Salva Kiir’s regime, our

SPLM-IO party, political detainees, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

(IGAD).

When the court is established, the judges who adjudicate the trials will come from the

different political parties within South Sudan. Additionally, international prosecutors will be

included to ensure the neutrality and fairness of the justice system (Owiso, 2018). The hybrid

court, which will be located within South Sudan will try cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes

against humanity, sexual crimes, gender-based crimes, and other serious human rights violations.

As indicated in the guidelines of the IGAD and the ARCSS, all individuals who are convicted of

any of these severe offenses will be punished and banned from political participation. However,

any person who has been implicated for a crime but is proven innocent by the hybrid court will

be given significant compensation and will be provided with resources for societal reintegration

Owiso, 2018).

The Agreement of the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) also outlines

measures for restorative justice. The court is empowered to return property, money, and other

stolen assets to their rightful owners. As a result, our Nuer people will receive lands, funds, and

resources that were stolen from them during the conflict. This will accelerate the growth of South

Sudanese society and will help the Nuer to rebuild their lives.

Fundamentally, this court should draw on the successes of the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which occurred after the genocide (United Nations International

Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 2018). While there were certainly problems with

the ICTR, the court helped to make major inroads towards the maintenance of peace, the halting
and remediation of war crimes, and the enhancement of national reconciliation processes. Our

hybrid court, which will remain in South Sudan, can receive substantial funding through the

United Nations agencies, which will ensure its feasibility and success (United Nations

International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 2018). Furthermore, it can advance

steps for peace and stability within the country. Knowing that hundreds military officers from the

Dinka tribe are responsible for committing war crimes against the Nuer tribe, this hybrid court

will serve as a fair and just way to prosecute these perpetrators and bring justice to our people

(Mutasa, & Virk, 2017).

Social:
1) Working alongside President Kiir, we should establish a communal court system where
elected tribal leaders adjudicate the trials of accused war perpetrators.

While ending the violence is our primary focus and concern, ensuring a stable and inclusive

community is pivotal. Our recommendations for achieving justice and stability rely on a bottom

up approach. We should establish a court system that is by and for local citizens, this will be

called the Nuer Social Courts. This local court system should follow the Rwanda Gacaca courts

model that was implemented after the 1994 genocide (Rwanda genocide, 2008). This will serve

as a way for tribal leaders to prosecute perpetrators and reintegrate them back into society

(Rwanda genocide, 2008). The Gacaca courts were extremely successful and cost effective.

Through this system, communities can choose tribal leaders to oversee the trials of locally

accused perpetrators. The courts issue sentences and attempt to reintegrate individuals back into

their community (Ingelaere, 2012). The Gacaca trials advance reconciliation efforts by allowing

victims to learn the truth about their deceased loved ones (Ingelaere, 2012). The courts also

afford perpetrators the opportunity to confess their crimes, apologize for their misdeeds, and

request forgiveness from their community (Rwanda genocide, 2008). In total, the Rwandan
communities were able to hear more than 1.2 million cases throughout the country (Rwanda

genocide, 2008). We recommend following this model as a way to approach justice for our

citizens and build communal solidarity.

2) We propose the development of strong social institutions including houses of worship,

schools, and community centers through external funding and non-profit organizations.

First, the church and other religious institutions, must continue to preach peace and tolerance.

We should look at the model of Desmond Tutu in South Africa, who used the church as a means

of promoting human rights, justice, and non-discrimination (Shuttleworth, 2019). Eventually

winning the Nobel Peace Prize, Tutu rallied the church around the principles of forgiveness and

reconciliation (Shuttleworth, 2019). When Apartheid ended, it allowed South Africa an easier

transition into an integrated state. Additionally, there should be an annual percentage of GDP set

aside to update community centers and religious institutions. We should encourage locals to be

actively engaged in their communities through various efforts (CSPPS, 2014). One potential

recommendation for community engagement is through a non-profit organization called “Kuli

Kuli”, which was founded by a peace corps volunteer named Lisa Curtis (Kuli Kuli, 2018). The

company focuses on improving nutrition and livelihoods worldwide through the growth and sale

of the superfood moringa. The founder of Kuli Kuli decided to help women in African countries

use more moringa locally and earn a sustainable wage by selling a portion of each harvest to the

US based company (Kuli Kuli, 2018). Their mission is to work with women-led farming

cooperatives all over the world to drive economic growth and sustainable agricultural

development, both of which are issue areas we are currently working to address (Kuli Kuli,

2018). We should establish a line of connection with this company and partner with them.

Moringa trees already grow naturally in South Sudan; therefore, we should take advantage of the

opportunity to generate revenue and produce a nutritious food source for women and children in
our communities. This is just one way to create a more unified and integrated country. If we

embrace this format, development will be more feasible and achievable.

Secondly, education should be prioritized and our children should have access to safe,

quality schooling. Primary and secondary education must be improved and literacy should be

made a priority. For this endeavor, UNICEF has already provided $35,700,000 from 2019

through 2021 to ensure an increased equitable access to quality education (Education in South

Sudan, 2018). This money should be used to ensure that all children throughout the country have

a comprehensive and quality education. This funding should be allocated for buying new

textbooks, training teachers, improving the sanitation and quality of classrooms, and updating

technology (Education in South Sudan, 2018). Public transportation should also be provided to

bring students from rural areas to schools. Furthermore, this money can be used to create a large

scale database that indicates where education is most lacking. This will allow for better school

facilities and encourage higher enrollment rates of children into the education system. If used

properly, this grant, in addition to domestic funding, will allow for a successful platform by

which our students can obtain an education (Education in South Sudan, 2018).

3. Focusing on the reintegration of displaced peoples through UN assistance and

cooperation with the international community.

We must address the refugee crisis that has affected millions of Nuer people across the country

(Michael & Kenneth, 2014). These strategies will include the safe reintegration of our people as

they re-enter the country. Additionally, food, healthcare, shelter, and schooling should be

provided to affected individuals (Mutasa, & Virk, 2017). With such a high displacement rate of

Nuer civilians, it is paramount for us to focus on ways to support the return of refugees (Mutasa,

& Virk, 2017). Although millions of our people are displaced internally and internationally there
are steps that can be taken to improve the situation. This includes increasing security measures to

allow the safe passage of citizens from outside of the state back into the country. Additionally,

we must compensate refugees with a fair plot of land, food grants, and immediate health

services. This large undertaking can be achieved by working with president Kiir and the

international community. According to a United Nations report from 2012, the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has facilitated over 30 separate relief operations in

South Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict (Dusenbury, 2013).

Furthermore, the UNHCR has brought the return of over 334,000 refugees from Egypt,

Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda back into South Sudan (Dusenbury, 2013). The work of the agency

can also be coupled with the World Food Program. This organization distributes food packages

to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Dusenbury, 2013). This can help to

reintegrate individuals back into South Sudanese society and provide them with necessary

resources.

One example that South Sudan should follow as a model is Angola. After the Luena

Accords were signed in 2002, thousands of refugees were able to return home from neighboring

states (Harild, Christensen, & Zetter, 2015). With the help of the UNHCR, over two thirds of

refugees have returned to Angola. While the process of reintegration has been difficult and long-

term, the government has worked with international agencies and nonprofit organizations to

provide essential services to the repatriated citizens (Harild, Christensen, & Zetter, 2015). If we

work with President Kiir and sign a similar peace agreement, the reintegration of refugees will be

feasible and realistic. However, we must work tenaciously to ensure that refugees are provided

with the services that they require so that we bring as many of our people home as possible.

Economics:
 1. Safeguard the existing and developing oil fields by increasing security presence and
effectively prosecuting trespassers.

Upon gaining independence we should have been among the most wealthy nations in the

continent due to our seemingly endless supply of natural resources. The extremely fertile soil

found all across the country combined with the abundant supply of water means that our nation’s

agricultural lands are among the richest in Africa. We are also among the largest cattle producers

in the region, with an inventory between 10-20 million animals (CIA, 2018). However, what has

the greatest potential to make us a player in the global economic stage is our vast supply of oil.

Before independence in 2011, nearly ¾ of daily total oil output in Sudan came from our region

(CIA, 2018). Although the economies of Sudan and South Sudan remain linked because of this

shared oil infrastructure, most of the oil fields can be found in our state. Therefore, we must

protect them. As the leader of the SPLM-IO, you have the authority to designate soldiers to these

fields to guard and regulate the production of our most precious natural resource. Military and

security personnel should also be trained to counter threats of terrorism that could cause severe

damage to these sites. Additionally, there must be an end to corruption regarding oil revenues.

All government officials who have used oil funds or have expressed intentions of using oil

revenue for personal gain must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Included in the

new peace deal are measures calling for the reopening of five major oil fields that have been

closed since 2013. Working with President Kiir to protect the integrity of these areas, oil

production can be expected to reach its pre-war levels of 350,000 barrels per day by mid-2019

(CIA, 2018).

2. Designate oil-generated revenue and foreign aid to infrastructure development and

poverty reduction programs.
 While Salva Kiir maintains that there is not enough money to implement the peace deal

and the development programs that come with it, revenue generated from oil production will be

more than enough to stimulate the economy and lift people out of poverty (Holland, 2019). The

first of these initiatives needs to be land reform. While oil is the main source of revenue for the

South Sudanese government, agriculture remains the leading source of income for our citizens.

Hundreds of thousands of acres of pastoral lands have been destroyed as a consequence of the

war (Holland, 2019). Most of the destruction was caused by Dinka members who intended to

ruin the livelihood of our people. The restoration of pastoral lands will help Nuer people regain

their livelihoods as farmers, cattle herders, and agriculturalists. Additionally, it will allow them

the opportunity to participate in the national economy, which 66% of the population cannot do

on their current income of less than 2 US dollars per day (CIA, 2018). You, Mr. Machar, must

advocate that the government designate oil funds to farmers. This money will be used to help

farmers grow sustainable crops and maintain livestock. This will allow for the growth of the

economy and the decrease in our impoverished and malnourished population.

Since 2005, 11 billion dollars have been given to South Sudan by the global community,

specifically the US, UK, and EU (CIA, 2018). Unfortunately, everyday citizens have not seen the

benefits of that money. While the military budget continues to grow, it comes at the expense of

improving infrastructure that would undoubtedly lead to a poverty reduction. Because the

military remains ununified, only Dinka troops are benefiting from the continual supply of foreign

funds. This has fueled resentment towards their party. With just 2% of roads in our nation

currently paved and less than 2% of the population with access to electricity, we must start

improving these indicators of development (CIA, 2018). The government spending budget needs

to be reconfigured and expenditures on public works should be increased dramatically. This

includes building safe roads, improving public transportation, and developing clean water

systems. While this is undoubtedly a large undertaking, you must advocate that a larger part of

the budget generated from oil be allocated towards these projects. Ultimately, this will function

as a way of improving the quality of life for our Nuer people. Without these massive

development programs, our people will remain in this cycle of poverty for generations to come.

China is an example of how building infrastructure results in economic stimulus. They

have already enacting a large-scale project in South Sudan, which aims to develop power

distribution capabilities for villages and rural areas throughout the country (Ranganathan &

Briceño-Garmendia, 2011). To date this project has had positive results. Additionally, South

Sudan should look to the successes of the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. These states are also rich in

oil reserves and have used the oil-generated revenue to build cities, develop infrastructure, and

decrease poverty. If we can emulate these successful models and more effectively allot our

budget to fit the demands of our people, we will see an increase in the public perception of our

regime.

Conclusion

Creating lasting, positive peace in South Sudan is a challenging task. However, we

believe that the revitalization of South Sudan can be achieved with the outlined policy proposals.

There must be a focus on justice and a framework for restitutions for affected individuals. We

believe that creating a hybrid court, building local institutions, and securing the oil reserves are

important components of a strong, unified, and safe country. The Nuer people have been

devastated by the violence that has raged throughout our country. It is our responsibility to

ensure that affected individuals are provided with the necessary resources, services, and facilities
to improve their situations. If we work cooperatively with president Kiir and the international

community, our goals of peace and prosperity for the Nuer people will be realized.
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