9. CUMENE HYDROPEROXIDE (CHP) DRUM EXPLOSION SUMMARY On August 22 1991, a drum of Cumene Hydroperoxide (CHP) exploded on the 5th floor of a building in a chemical plant. Nofize orinjuries occurred but therc wasconsiderable damage to the overhead ventilation ducts. ‘An operator had inspected the CHP drum the previous day and had not noticed any problems. On the morning of the incident, he had passed through the area minutesbefore the incident occurred. ‘The emergency response team was called and the situation was handled without further incident, INCIDENT INVESTIGATION ‘A Multiple Cause Investigation (MCT) was held the same day of the incident. 1. A sample of the residue in the drum was analyzed and a trace of the decomposition productAcetophenone was found. This indicated that decomposition was a legitimate cause of theincidentand that catalytic action had probably occurred. 2, Visual inspection and photographs revealed no signs of rust in the drum ‘and no apparent defects in the placite dram lining, The drum supplier was contacted and indicated that bumps and dents in the drum could possibly cause creases in the lining and expose the CHP to the carbon steel drum. The drum was sent to the supplier for further inspection and nothing abnormal was found. 3. The CHP dip tube at the drum unloading station was identified as a possible source of contamination. Soap and acid had also been pumped from drums at this location but separate dip tubes and pumps were provided. The acetic acid dip tube was locked away after cach use to avoid aL contamination problems. No rack existed for the CHP dip tube which was routinely propped in a trough into which other materials could drain. The dip tube itself was stainless stec!. 4, ‘The weigh-up area for Formapon (Sodium Formaldehyde Sufoxylate) was located directly above the CHP station and the separating floor was ‘open grating. A trough under the Formapon weigh-up area, dumped into the sewer atthe same location as the CHP trough. The supplier listed strong reducing agentsas a cause for decomposition, 3. Drumsof CHP were normally keptin a cool room on the Sth level of the building and only one drum removed for use. The drum in question had been out of the cooler for approximately two days. ‘Temperature om the Sthlevelwas not high enough to initiate a reaction in this time period. 6 The material was ordered in smalt lots and used up before reorder. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS All indicators point to contamination as the probable cause of the incident. Temperature of storage was not believed to be a factor. Formapon dust from the dispensing station above was considered the most likely source of contamination. . ‘The Formapon dispensing station was relocated completely ont of the area. A permanent storage rack with a separate drain line was fabricated for the CHP dip tube. Operating procedureswerereviewed and operator training updated to Loss Prevention Bulletin 103‘warn of possible consequences of cross contamination. + The emergency response procedures will be revised to include specific instruetionsfor handling CHP spills. KEY LEARNINGS ‘The most important lesson to be learned from this incidentis that proper procedures, designs and training are all necessary parts of any program to prevent this type of occurrence. 32 Properties of Cumene hydroperoxide (CHP): CHP is @ colourtess to pale yellow liquid, slightly soluble in waier and readily soluble in alcohol, acetone, esters and hydrocarbons. The flashpoint is 79.4°C. CHP is toxic by inhalation and skin absorption. It is a strong oxidising agent and may ignite organic materials.