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(1978).

International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 59:245-254


The 'Razor's Edge' in Depression and Mourning
León Grinberg
We usually understand by depression that set of painful affects and concomitant thoughts that constitute the
individual's response to the experience of a loss or failure of achievement. It may manifest itself as part of what
we know as the psychopathology of everyday life, in instances of what I have named 'microdepression' or
'micromourning' (Grinberg, 1963) or emerge with greater intensity and develop into a long and severe illness.
It is the aim of my paper to bring into focus and discuss the salient aspects of this phenomenon, namely the
problem of painful affects—two kinds of guilt feelings found among them—the involvement of ego functions and
parts of the self in experiences of object loss; the experiences of change as triggering off depressive reactions;
the rallying of specific defences against pain or psychic suffering; along with those situations which I have
called the 'razor's edge'.
Depression is closely related to mourning and is part of the psychopathological process triggered off by the
loss of a loved object. It is my view, however, that the loss means, for the person who suffers it, having to deal
at the same time with the threatened loss of those ego functions and parts of the self linked with the lost object.
In the well-known account by Freud (1920) of the little boy and the wooden reel, with its corollary the
mirror game, I regard the child's play as the dramatic expression of the connexion between the disappearance of
the object and that of his own reflexion in the mirror: they are coexisting aspects of one and the same
phenomenon.
My hypothesis is that the temporary or permanent loss of an object evokes in a person the painful feeling that
he has also lost something which he feels is his own. The child's game, with its two scenes, the reel and the
mirror, is a vivid dramatization of what actually happens in every mourning. In other words, and in line with the
ideas advanced in several papers of mine (Grinberg, 1963), (1964), faced with the loss of an object, 'one
rushes to the mirror' to find out what has become of one's own image. Thus I proposed several years ago that in
every significant experience of object loss, we should take into account not only the mourning for the object, but
also the mourning for the lost parts of the self (Grinberg, 1963).
Depression is a many-sided phenomenon comprising those painful and complex manifestations triggered off
by the meaning or the 'meaninglessness' that each individual ascribes to the experience of loss. Every loss, be it
of an object, external or internal, or of parts of the self, may arouse the feeling that the fulfilment of the wish to
recover the loss is impossible. This depressive feeling entails the failure of love for oneself or narcissistic
love, which is linked with feelings of need, helplessness and the collapse of self-esteem, thus constituting a
'narcissistic wound'. When this is so, there is a disturbance in the development of love for the object. Hostility
and guilt arise instead, for the object as for the self; thus a vicious circle is set up in which the feeling of hatred
for and guilt about the object and the self feed each other, as it were, giving rise to no-exit situations or 'closed
systems'.
The narcissistic collapse resulting from the loss of the valued self-image, which is close to the ego ideal, is a
painful state which may, at times, be felt as an actual disaster.
In narcissistic depression, the individual feels he cannot fulfil the standards of his ego ideal, which means he
cannot ensure his self-esteem
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Presented as part of a Dialogue on 'Depression and Other Painful Affects' at the 30th International Psycho-
Analytica Congress, Jerusalem, August 1977.
Copyright © León Grinberg

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and simultaneously loses the love and respect of the object.
At times, the pathological infantile narcissistic organization is enhanced for defensive purposes, and further
reinforced by omnipotent and destructive aspects of the self which attack every libidinal link with the object and
tend to make it appear worthless. Furthermore, the breakdown of omnipotence brings about painful feelings
which are difficult to bear.
We know of the existence of a normal, useful narcissism founded on a healthy love directed towards oneself,
which eases the development of a healthy love directed towards the object and involves a psychic and somatic
protection. In this type of narcissism, the ego shows the ability to reward and to be rewarded, and to repare and
work through mourning for the objects and for the lost parts of the self. On the other hand, there is a kind of
narcissism which is like a pathological organization where envy and aggression towards the object and the self
are to the fore, which reinforces itself according to the family's attitude towards the child. When this attitude is
mainly negative, the narcissistic wound is deepened and the pathology is intensified, with a decline in the self-
esteem, the appearance of depressive and persecutory affects, humiliation, denigration and helplessness, which
the child tries to deny and to oppose through omnipotence and megalomania.
In instances such as these, sudden shifts may occur from depressive states to megalomanic manifestations,
thus giving shape to the picture I have described as the 'razor's edge', for the rapid change from one situation to
the other.
Depressive personalities show a marked intolerance to frustrations, separations, loss and experiences of
change in general.
The capacity to continue feeling oneself throughout successive changes is an important factor in the working
through of mourning and lays the foundation for the emotional experience of identity. It implies the preservation
of one's steadiness under varied circumstances and throughout the continued transformations of everyday life
(Grinberg & Grinberg, 1974).
But the development of each individual is an unbroken series of changes, large and small; it is by the working
through and assimilation of these changes that the individual establishes his sense of identity. Lack of mental
growth and changes is equivalent to psychic stagnation and emotional sterility: in other words, it means psychic
death.
Throughout development, different situations of change arise which can be interpreted as threats to one's
integrity and self-identity, forcing the individual to suffer deep, painful affects for the experience of loss of parts
of the self with depressive reactions. Living necessarily requires therefore to go through a succession of
mournings. Growing through maturation means the loss of certain attitudes, ways of behaviour, and object
relations which, although they are replaced by others which are more developed, release mourning processes
which are not always sufficiently worked through. Paradoxically, it usually happens that the same defence
mechanisms which the ego uses against anxieties and psychic conflicts are transformed into factors against the
structure and integrity of the self, thus bringing about its weakening. This especially happens with the
mechanisms of splitting and projective identification. In its fight against anxieties, the self splits off or becomes
fragmented and the parts are separated and projected away, usually on to external objects. Very often the ego
fears that these aspects or parts which have taken off will never return and feels that they are lost forever. These
fantasies can bring about an intense depressive reaction with very painful feelings for the condition in which the
self now remains.
The developmental process, when it happens normally, allows the ego to have time to work through its
experiences of loss and to re-establish itself from the temporary and tolerated moments of confusion of identity
which, most times, go unnoticed. In pathological cases and because of the failure in the working through of these
mournings, serious identity disturbances are produced.
There are important changes in life which can trigger off deep depressive reactions because they are felt
partly as experiences of loss. All of us know the depressive reactions following certain achievements which are
truly successful. Generally, that depression is interpreted as corresponding to the guilt feeling for the achieved
success in relation to the object. I believe that in certain circumstances, depression can also be the

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result of experiences of loss of the part of the self which contained the eagerness or expectation of achievement.
In other words, when one intimately desires something and that desire is fulfilled, clearly one feels pleasure; but
it can coexist with a depressive feeling, because of the disappearance of desire or the expectation of this
achievement. There are people who tend continuously to put off feeling pleasure so as not to expose themselves
afterwards to the suffering of depression for the loss, once this aim has been achieved.
I would like to reiterate the fact that depressive feelings for the self are much more frequent than is generally
admitted. What is more, I believe that it can be assumed as existing, even though as slight degrees of depression,
among the psychopathological phenomena of everyday life. I think that if we were to take into account the
appearance of these 'microdepressions' and 'micromournings' for the self, it would help us to understand better
the reason for the existence of many states of mind which, although not considered as open depression, are seen
as bad temper, apathy, tiredness, boredom, irritability, etc. A certain goal which has not been achieved, a dream
which one cannot remember, an unfulfilled ambition, a failure to find something, a journey, a move, whichever
type of change or frustration which includes an aspect of the self, are some of the many situations which may
release daily these 'depressive microreactions' and also fleeting threats to the sense of identity. Whether or not
these are favourably resolved as slight attacks of depression or whether they become more severe, depends on,
among other things, how the corresponding mournings were dealt with in the early stages of life (Klein, 1940).
A brief clinical vignette will give us an illustration.
A patient who was usually careless and slovenly in her dress—during a period of her analysis where
she had achieved a certain progress—came for her session looking visibly changed, fashionably
dressed and well turned out. Her feelings were, however, in contrast to her appearance: she said she
felt very depressed and anxious at the same time. She had been told that she looked very elegant and
her hair was nice and that she looked like a 'different person'. But it did not please her to be seen 'so
different'. She felt that because of this change she no longer belonged to her family which was known
for its 'non-conformity' and 'disorder'. In this way she felt her identity as a part of the family identity,
reacting with anxiety and strong depressive feelings due to the change. She felt deeply guilty (as much
persecutory as depressive) towards her family and herself for being better or for having change. In her
depressive reaction, she underwent a superego demand not to change, maintaining herself always the
same and opposing all progress.
Among the varied painful affects, the feeling of guilt is one of the most intensely present in depressive
reactions. In previous papers I have described two kinds of guilt (Grinberg, 1964). An individual's response to
loss may be intense anxiety and fear of retaliation, thus giving rise to what I called 'persecutory guilt'. This kind
of guilt corresponds to the functioning of a fragile ego with a severe superego; it emerges in those depressive
states in which envy and aggressive impulses prevail. It tends towards manic reparation and corresponds, in my
opinion, to the 'schizoic-paranoid position' (Klein, 1940). 'Depressive guilt', on the other hand, emerges in a
more mature, better integrated ego; it gives way to sorrow, responsibility and genuine wishes for object
reparation. This particular type of guilt and of depressive feelings corresponds to Melanie Klein's (1940)
'depressive position'. Both kinds of guilt may also be experienced in relation with one's own self.
The depressive affects appear blended with persecutory feelings. At times, depressive patients go through
rather quick, sudden emotional changes, from sorrowful sadness to persecution and hostility, which arouses
baffling, fearful or annoying countertransference feelings in the analyst. The characteristic narrowness of the
territory between those types of affects and the high frequency of occurrence of these kaleidoscopic reactions, in
the course of my clinical practice—above all in the borderline patients (Grinberg, 1977) and in regressive
states of neurotic patients—suggested to me the 'razor's edge' metaphor as a suitable description for these
situations.
These patients show, sometimes, the prevailing of the functioning of the so-called 'psychotic personality', but
with the upholding of ego boundaries and without withdrawal from reality. The notion of 'psychotic personality',
as described by Bion (1957), does not involve a
—————————————
1 This approach to mental functioning harks back to Freud's (1927) article on 'Fetishism', in which he shows
how the ego can, at times, keep up two different attitudes: a more normal one, through which contact with
reality is preserved, and a more pathological one, that tends to withdraw from or deny reality. Freud applies
the term 'disavowal' (Verleugnung) to the child's or the fetishistic individual's rebuff of the fact that women
lack penis; such rebuff necessarily implies a splitting of the individual's ego.

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psychiatric diagnosis but, rather, a modality of mental functioning which manifests itself in the individual's
behaviour and language and in the effects it produces on the observer. This mental state coexists with another,
conceived of as the 'non-psychotic personality' or 'neurotic personality.'1 Among the most significant
components of the 'psychotic personality' is the intolerance to frustration and to mental pain. Personalities that
are particularly incapable of coping with frustration tend to avoid the psychic suffering by means of evacuative
mechanisms, especially pathological projective identification. Such an avoidance may endanger contact with
reality, in extreme cases it may even bring about transient psychotic manifestations. Greater tolerance to
frustration, on the other hand, sets into motion the mechanisms that tend to modify the frustration and to preserve
contact with reality. On some occasions there is a rather abrupt swing from one kind of mental functioning, 'the
neurotic personality', to the other one, that is the 'psychotic personality', producing the phenomenon of the
'razor's edge'.
These personalities have a remarkable sensitivity and they drag along a certain developmental backwardness
due to their conflict-ridden links with their earliest objects. These conflicts originate chiefly in a lack of
emotional contact with a non-receptive mother who has failed as a receptive figure and was incapable of
containing adequately the projections of the child's mental suffering. Besides, the very limited tolerance to
frustration and separation from the object sparks off intense depressive reactions, the feelings of hopelessness
and a sense of inner emptiness which, at times, are experienced in a catastrophic way. They have a great ability
to grasp the mental states and emotions of the people with whom they are linked. But they expect the object to be
equally sensitive towards them: any eventual proof to the contrary is felt as an indication of rejection or of not
being loved. The slightest frustration exacerbates their depressive and persecutory feelings. They are therefore
extraordinarily susceptible and very demanding for affection. At times they obstinately seek for a kind of 'skin to
skin' contact with objects, this configurating a link of a very primitive and sensory nature.
During psychoanalytical treatment these patients change abruptly, as I have mentioned above, from a
depressive state to another, of persecution, critical and excessively demanding, putting pressure on the analyst to
find an immediate solution to their problems. They show, in this way, the narrowness of the intermediary area
between both types of feelings, as narrow, in fact, as the 'razor's edge'. These abrupt swings on the patient's part
can surprise the analyst who, in turn, feels rapid changes in his own countertransference reactions. Thus, for
example, he can change from a feeling of sorrow and sympathy for the patient's suffering to finding himself
overwhelmed by the requirements and demands of the patient, with fantasies of defeat, failure, guilt, impotence,
irritation, or feel trapped in a cul-de-sac. In other words, the analyst suffers a reaction of 'projective
counter-identification' (Grinberg, 1962), by being a receptacle into which the patient has emptied the feelings
he cannot accept, by means of projective identification.
One of my patients used to produce this kind of material in his sessions, with sentences like the following
… the only thing I know is that I feel overcome by complete desperation. If only I could lean on
reason, with the complete and irreversible suppression of my emotions; the only thing they are good
for is to make me a martyr … [he cries mournfully]. I am a complete and utter failure. I think of a
weeping and sentimental woman. If only I would die … I am imagining it is a beautiful sunny
afternoon, a sun which would be friendly, which would swathe me in its rays, which would give me
warmth and in that way, at least, I could spend a few pleasurable moments. Afterwards … nothing …
a void, but definitely this, a void without suffering. But I would be sorry to leave my mother. I would
ask you to explain it to her, to wash my baseness. [He abruptly changes his tone, his cry is more acute
and becomes a very demanding and threatening cry]. You are guilty of my downfall, you, my mother
and all the

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rest of the bastards. Do something! Make me into a machine, now, soon, into whatever you like, so
long as we finish with this hell. But I am just weeping …; it's a blind alley.
Through this fragment, one can appreciate the changing unconscious fantasies of the patient. Besides his
transference homosexual fantasy, we can also appreciate his desperate attempts to be free of the painful affects,
evacuating them into the analyst by means of projective identification, which would convert him into a 'void', a
being without feelings or life and, as a result, into a 'machine'. In the same way, he would like to be free of the
objects ('bastards') and from the maternal object which is hurt, from that of the weeping and sentimental voice
(corresponding to another transference image) which he has transformed into a persecutory object. He also
sought, through his projections, to be forgiven and to 'wash his baseness'. In another way his death fantasy
corresponds to his unconscious transference desire to get into the analyst so that, with his function of mother and
father, he would 'wrap him in his solar rays and would give him warmth and life'. But these fantasies fail
because he felt that even when he tried to get rid of the painful affects and of the hurtful persecutory objects,
these were reintrojected into him with the same characteristics, 'sentimental and depressive' (crying voice), the
cycle came round again and placed him once again in his 'cul-de-sac'.
It goes without saying that the analyst suffered a sudden change from having experienced positive
countertransference feelings of sorrow, empathy, understanding and a desire to help, to feeling abruptly
unexpected reactions of surprise, discouragement, guilt and irritation, due to projective counter-identification.
Depressive patients have often had early experiences of separation and loss which they have been unable to
deal with and which are reactivated by every present loss bringing about increasingly more painful depressive
feelings as well as a sensation of helplessness and inner emptiness.
The experience of loss of a mother, whether a real absence or because of the failure of this mother in her
function of returning, in a smoothing way, the painful affects projected by the child, along with the intolerance to
frustration, is found at the basis of the depressive structure. The upheavals which appear in the relationship
between the weaning child and its mother, and more particularly with the breast, have an influence in the
pathology of his ulterior object relations; because he has the feeling that the breast is the source of fundamental
emotional experiences such as love, understanding and meaning. The baby, as well as looking for the
satisfaction of his nutritional needs, projects his feared and painful affects on to the breast of his mother with the
hope of feeling loved, understood and, therefore, receiving these feelings back again, 'detoxicated' and stripped
of their intolerable painful quality: if the breast fulfils this function, it supplies him with meaning (Bion, 1965).
The fear of its absence, by the fantasy of having destroyed it, does not only imply that he will cease to exist,
since without the breast he is unable to live, but also that the meaning, just as if it were material, has ceased to
exist.
In these patients there is a marked intolerance to the absence of the object—and to the absence of those
aspects of the self involved—as well as an intolerance to what this absence brings with it: intense psychic
suffering. The absent object then becomes a persecutory 'non-present object' which makes its presence felt
persecutorily and must therefore be promptly got rid of. For the same reason, they cannot bear separation from
their analyst; moreover, when the analyst thwarts certain transference fantasies, he instantly acquires, even when
he is present, the characteristics of an absent object through non-fulfilment of the required gratifying aspects, and
becomes a threatening, persecutory 'non-object'. In such circumstances these patients seek interpretation merely
as evidence that the analyst has neither gone nor has been destroyed. They actively seek to arouse
countertransference feelings or reactions of projective counter-identification which may provide evidence that
meaning, as well as love and/or hate still exist. Interpretation is sought as reassurance and an antidote for
psychic pain, rather than insightful understanding. (Bion, 1970).
In such cases, every time the analyst interprets they appear to hear the word 'because', with its connotation of
causation. In this way the incomprehensible things for the patient acquire

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some meaning, whether it is the right one or not.
These patients cannot bear pain. In other words, they feel it but they do not 'suffer' it. They tend to take the
sensation of pain for actual suffering of pain (Bion, 1970). They complain of how 'painful' certain experiences
have been to them but, in fact, they have avoided suffering it. One of my patients used to cry during his sessions
as if he were suffering, until I came to see that, for him, crying was a way of releasing pain without actually
suffering it. This was brought home to me later, when once he said he was relieved when he cried because
crying was a way of 'letting off steam' and thus 'eradicating' his affects. At times, in order to avoid pain, certain
individuals tend to sexualize it, as it may be seen in some perversions; thus pain is either inflicted or accepted.2
I shall add another clinical vignette to illustrate this avoidance of suffering psychic pain. This concerns a 37-
year-old divorced woman who was very successful as an architect. However, this did not compensate for her
depressive state and her role as victim in which she used to put herself in her relationships with others. This
was due, to a large extent, to her identification with a mother who was apparently self-sacrificing and who made
'suffering a virtue' (as the patient said), but who had never been loved, looked after or understood by her. Her
father had nearly always been away on business and she felt she had never been able to enjoy his company nor
indeed get close enough to him, because later on he suffered a manic-depressive psychosis. She was the eldest
daughter; her only brother was killed in an accident when she was only six years old and, according to the
patient, he was her mother's favourite. She felt responsible for his death because of the rivalry and jealousy she
felt towards him. She had sought treatment because of her depression, the breakdown of her marriage and also
for her frequent persecutory feelings.
It is my intention to present fragments of two sessions in order to show some aspects of her pathological
mourning, her persecutory and depressive feelings and also the swing in the functioning of the psychotic and
neurotic parts of her personality. She started one session with the following words:
I don't know why, but I find it difficult to speak … I've been very anxious the last few days. I worry
about anything … My friend, Pauline, paid me a visit yesterday. I thought I'll die. She is a burden. She
keeps making demands that no one can ever satisfy. She asks for advice, but when she gets it she
objects, or is always finding faults; she is a permanent dissatisfaction. Nobody can help her. On the
other hand, I went yesterday to the interview my father had with his psychiatrist, and this made me
very anxious too. At a given moment, I felt that the level of communication between the psychiatrist
and me was totally inaccessible to my father.
(Analyst:) I pointed out her hopelessness in trying to save a part within her which she considered to be
beyond reach and very demanding, and which she felt neither she herself, nor I, nor analysis, nor indeed anyone
could change. I added that she had partly lodged this sector into me and she was afraid that I might demand too
much of her.
We may suppose that this sector contains the injured or dead objects as parts of her injured self which cannot
be repaired and which jointly take on the role of an inexorable superego which is also cruel and which cannot
be satisfied. It is as if the accident which killed her brother and the psychosis of her father (which she also saw
as an accident) had brought about an 'internal accident' in her psychic organization.
In the following session the patient said:
Yesterday I felt I would like to be hospitalized like those people who go in in order to lose weight
and who go on a diet. My idea was to come to the session and then to stay on. Last night I couldn't
sleep. I had some strange thoughts: Whom would I like to be? I realized I didn't know what other
people were like, especially on the inside. There must be other ways of living which even I have
never thought of. I remembered Elena [a friend of hers who had had an accident in which her husband
died] and how she was after the terrible operation she had. She was always the life and soul … She
was able to survive the dreadful experience thanks to her strong will to live. Will it be any use to her?
How can she live now? I thought
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2 B. Joseph (1978) has described a particular type of psychic pain that belongs to the emergence from schizoid
states of mind, and discussed it as a borderline phenomenon on the border between mental and physical,
between 'shut in-ness' and emergence, between anxieties felt in terms of fragmentation and persecution and the
beginnings of integration and concern.

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once again of the possibility of changing myself. I don't think it's possible. Even supposing I change,
how can I make these changes part of me, bearing in mind all that is already established? Once all the
most important things in life have been done, getting married, studying for a career, what can you do
with all the things you want to get rid of and all the things you acquire?
I believe that the patient at that moment was expressing a regressive fantasy which was coming from the
psychotic part of her personality, from having got inside me and the analysis, disconnecting herself from all
exterior reality and also from all changes experienced as 'catastrophic' (like the accidents which could not be
remedied) and, in that way, trying to avoid her psychic pain.
The patient went on to say:
I would like to begin my life all over again, go back to the mother of my infancy and of my
adolescence, but to a different mother. I would like to have a different way of going about things; this
is so difficult, to imagine myself being any different. I would like to undo all the parts of me which I
don't like: my haughtiness, my boastfulness, my competitiveness and so many more things. But if I
were to do it, I would feel too impoverished, smaller, without anything, empty.
(Analyst:) I told her that, through her analysis, she was seeking a way of being born again, as if analysis and
myself were another mother who had a different relationship with her, one which allowed her to survive, freeing
her from all the dead and mad within her. However, this put her in the position of losing aspects of herself as if
she were on a diet and which would leave her empty or hollow.
The patient replied by saying:
I don't know why but I have just remembered a dream which I had forgotten about. You told me in the
dream that you were not going to treat me any more. I thought it was Pauline's situation all over
again when the doctor stopped her analysis. You told me I couldn't go on because I hadn't brought
Pauline with me. It seemed odd. Then I saw a sick child who was crying and her father was singing
to her. When I came out of the house, I saw some children playing and they seemed happy. I
imagined they were your children and I said to myself 'he is a good father, I must ask him to let me
go on with the analysis'.
She showed through her associations that she had been worried by Pauline's episode (who had suffered a
psychotic breakdown a short time ago). It seemed odd to her that, in her dream, I should tell her that she should
have brought Pauline along with her (which represented her psychotic part) since this implied the risk that I
would not put up with this psychotic part, and so I would end up by asking her to leave.
The dream could also indicate that both she and I were 'singing' to quieten the child who was linked to the
extremely sick part of herself which she does not want to bring along to the session because that would mean
anxiety and psychic pain. But, at another level of the dream, there seemed to be an indication of hope that I was
a good 'father-mother' who 'sang' interpretations and who was dealing with her sick depressive part, trying to
make it more accessible and turning her into a child who could 'play' in order to be able to establish a
communication.
Certain kinds of patient react to the experience of separation and loss of object in a specific way; their
depressive reply is of a catastrophic nature: they feel as if they were breaking up or falling into pieces. They
usually spend hours and hours in bed, wrapped up in blankets, in order to feel contained. From childhood
onwards they have had difficulties with the 'container' aspect of the psychic function of their skin. Since they
have lacked a maternal object with a good enough capability to contain their evacuations and projections, they
have not had the possibility of learning the notion of inner space. They have not managed to learn to distinguish
between being inside or outside the object. It is for this reason that one of their characteristic symptoms is that
of superficiality in their relationships and their behaviour. They also have difficulty in their learning process,
since they cannot make true identifications to assimilate knowledge and therefore fall into imitative attitudes
which tend to reproduce what the object does. Through their lack of the idea of an inner space, in both the
objects and in themselves, they fail in the use of the mechanism of projective identification which would be the
mechanism par excellence in the threed-imensional world. These patients appear to live predominantly in a
two-dimensional world using the mechanism of 'adhesive identification'

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described by Bick (1968). This type of identification can produce an extreme dependency in which separate
existence and autonomy of the object are not recognized, and they have the fantasy of being 'stuck' to the surface
of the object, like a stamp; thus they become a part of the object, imitating its appearance and behaviour. They
develop characteristics similar to the 'as if' personality (Deutsch, 1942) or to that of the 'false self' (Winnicott,
1955).
For these patients, not only separations but any other experiences of change is felt as a 'catastrophic change',
to which they react as if their 'container' skin has been perforated and they fear being 'scattered away'.
Sometimes they give the impression that their mental apparatus 'was falling into little pieces' and is reduced
only to their perceptual capabilities (Meltzer et al., 1975).
One patient, whose case was under my supervision, suffered a dramatic depressive reaction when her
husband telephoned her from abroad to tell her that he would be arriving a day later than planned. This
coincided with the fact that her mother had recently moved away from the district to another address further
away, which alarmed the patient because she had a symbiotic relationship with her. She then went through a
hallucinatory episode which was described by the patient in the following words:
When my husband told me not to expect him today, I felt upset, very depressed; I didn't know what to
do. My mother was no longer there. I tried to sleep but I couldn't. I had a vision; it was dreadful. I saw
my little son falling into little pieces or breaking up … but it wasn't a dream. It shocked me terribly. I
felt very agitated and wanted to cry. I wanted to rub out the image. At the beginning I couldn't;
afterwards I could. I had to think of you to calm me down. I went to bed and wrapped myself up in
blankets; finally, I managed to fall asleep.
The experience of the loss of the object sparked off the hallucinatory fantasy of disintegration, although it
was projected in the image of her son, who represented herself in her infantile part. She then took refuge in
calling her analyst to mind as a 'container' object and used the blankets as a protective 'skin' which would
reintegrate her in order to counteract the experience of the loss felt as an intolerable 'catastrophic change'.
'Catastrophic change' is the term by which Bion (1966) tries to join certain facts characterized by violence,
invariance and subversion of the system, elements which he considers inherent in all situations of change and
growth. A new situation or a new idea contains a potentially disruptive force which violates to a greater or
lesser degree, the structure of the field in which it appears. Thus a new discovery violates the structure of the
pre-existing theory; an experience of change can violate the structure of the personality. One structure is
transformed into another through stages of disorganization, pain and frustration: growth depends on these
vicissitudes. The term 'invariance' refers to that which allows recognition in the new structure of aspects of the
old one. Subversion of the system refers to those changes which appear to break up the already existing order.
But, it behoves us to bear in mind that the 'catastrophic change' experience can also be found in those
situations of change which involves progress, development or acceptance of new ideas as happen in the creative
process. Every creative act is specifically based on the working through of depressive fantasies and painful
affects which aim at the reparation and the re-creation of the lost object and parts of the self which are felt to be
damaged. In normal mourning, the predominance of depressive guilt, together with the sublimatory tendencies
for reparatory attitude, increase the creative capacity. There are people who, in their mournings, become
involved in writing or composing music or other creative activities.3 I have pointed out elsewhere (Grinberg,
1972) that the creative act can be conceived as the outcome of a process, during which the individual must go
through transitory states of 'disorganization' and disrupture of familiar structures and established links, and must
accept the temporary erasing of the ego boundaries and become immersed in fusion with idealized internal
objects through projective
—————————————
3 Hanna Segal (1952) establishes the relationship between infantile depressive position, mourning and
creativity, pointing out that by the re-creation the lost object becomes a symbol.

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identification, in order to reintegrate and reorganize himself later in a different way, from which the created
product will emerge and which is felt as if it were a new part of himself. The creative personality ought to
tolerate frustration and the anxiety of remaining temporarily in a 'void', in 'disorder' and in 'chaos'; he will
endeavour to draw near the truth and will be open to the impact of intuition and ready to follow it. In exactly the
same way as the creative process rearranges a special situation of change, it will inevitably involve a mourning
reaction with its corresponding painful affects, due to the loss of the old structures, and the loss of the aspects of
the self and of the objects with their respective links which will necessarily be replaced with new links and
new structures.
Other authors have occupied themselves with a similar phenomenon as, for example, M. Milner (1969) when
she points out that certain people endeavour to break down their false internal organization by means of a
temporary chaos or by means of a 'creative fury', which destroys a merely compliant adaptation which allows
the emergence of a more authentic organization. This idea is in line with Winnicott's (1955) assertion about the
need to replace the 'false self', which acts as a protective armour, by the 'true self'.
When different experiences appear, of whatever type, which can trigger off a threat of mental pain, several
defensive operations are mobilized in the patient and, occasionally, in the analyst also. Among these defence
manoeuvres against psychic suffering we can mention splitting, omnipotent control, omniscience, 'reversal of
perspective', somatizations and, in the case of the analyst, the 'resistential' use of psychoanalytical theories in an
attempt to avoid psychic pain.
Many of the above-mentioned defensive processes are sufficiently well known, so I do not need to embark on
them on this occasion. Nevertheless, I think it will be useful to say a few words about some of them.
Omniscience is characterized by a response to the functioning and influence of a superego which opposes all
search for the truth and tries to impose itself on a basis of a fantasy ot total superiority. Patients who use this
fantasy, instead of trying to learn, insist that they 'possess knowledge', trying to avoid the painful experience of
the learning process. The meanings and emotions with which they come into contact are completely stripped of
vitality and sense, so they cannot learn, neither can there be growth or evolution in their personalities.
Obsessive omnipotent control tends towards the separation of the object and the simplification of
experiences, which is equal to a true splitting of the same; these are reduced therefore to a level at which
psychic meaning disappears and emotions are cancelled out. It is for this reason that this mechanism is so much
used as a defence against mental pain.
As for 'reversal of perspective', as described by Bion (1963), it consists in a silent and constant rebuff of the
interpretive tenets on which the interpretation is based, disguised as apparent agreement with the analyst. There
are patients who react to certain interpretations as if they were a countertransference confession;
misrepresenting in this way the objective of the analysis. What the patient is really doing is denying the dynamic
character of the interpretation and its investigatory aspect, which are fundamental preconditions by which the
analysis can be capable of furthering change and mental growth. For his part, the analyst can also revert the
perspective, taking the associations of the patient as an antidote for his own anxiety in face of the unknown and
unknowable of the material.
Another way of defensive operation which tends to counteract the suffering of psychic pain, consists in the
unconscious evacuation of the above-mentioned pain, along with the conflict which originated this in the body.
Normally, physical pain appears to be better tolerated than psychic pain. Thus the mental phenomenon is
transformed into a sensory feeling which is devoid of the feared emotional meaning, or better still, it tries to
change that psychic meaning which is intolerable into a sensory experience.4
—————————————
4 Pain, as Rosenfeld (1978) pointed out, can also mean the existence of an overwhelming depressive affect
which is trying to find its way towards consciousness.

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5
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Conclusion: Depression is an affective-cognitive 'constant conjunction'5, in which different elements that
affect one another play a part. Among these are an experience of loss, an object and self-aspects involved in the
said loss, painful and displeasure-provoking affects along with their corresponding ideational representations,
and an ego which, faced with the menace of psychic pain, sets in motion specific defences against it. The afore-
mentioned painful affects may, at times, alternate in a very swift manner, thus giving rise to the 'razor's edge'
phenomenon.
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BION, W. R. 1963 Elements of Psychoanalysis London: Heinemann. [→]
BION, W. R. 1965 Transformations London: Heinemann. [→]
BION, W. R. 1966 Catastrophic change (unpublished paper).
BION, W. R. 1970 Attention and Interpretation London: Tavistock Publ. [→]
DEUTSCH, H. 1942 Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia Psychoanal.
Q. 11:301-321 [→]
FREUD, S. 1920 Beyond the pleasure principle S.E. 18 [→]
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Int. J. Psychoanal. 43:436-440 [→]
GRINBERG, L. 1963 Culpa y Depresión Buenos Aires: Paidós.
GRINBERG, L. 1964 On two kinds of guilt — their relation with normal and pathological aspects of mourning
Int. J. Psychoanal. 45:366-371 [→]
GRINBERG, L. 1972 Psychoanalytical observations on creativity Isr. Ann. Psychiat. 10 137-148
GRINBERG, L. 1977 An approach to the understanding of borderline patients In P. Hartocollis (ed.),
Borderline Personality Disorders New York: Int. Univ. Press.
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London: Hogarth Press, 1948 [→]
MELTZER, D., BREMNER, C., HOXTER, S., WEDDELL, D. & WITTENBERG, I. 1975 Exploration in
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—————————————
5 'Constant conjunction' is a term taken from Hume and refers to the fact that certain data observed regularly
appear together. Bion uses this term in his hypothesis about the development of thought. A concept or a word
are definitions that bind the observed elements that are constantly conjoined.

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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]
Grinberg, L. (1978). The 'Razor's Edge' in Depression and Mourning. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 59:245-254

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