•

Airliner
Customer Services Division Publication October - December 1994

Deidng & Anti-Icing TI7 flight Controls 137 Digital Cabin Control Altt:rnate CG TIO Umits

FE \Tl RES HOH'(; ('0\1\11· R('I \1. \IRI'I. "I·. (;ROlI'

FlightOperations~"Sletter 1 Vice President & GeneraJ Manager

Deicing & Anti-Icing Awareness I Customer Servkes Division F.C. Mitchell
7n flight Control Syste.m 8
137 Digital Cabin Pressure Control S~'stem 18 Airliner Staff .
Alleroale CG TakeofT Limits 24
Corrections· Tail Strikes 27 l\1anaglngEditof ••...••....•...••...••............... S.P.MWcr
EdJtor A.T. Uoyd
Designer D.W.Copeland
front co,'cr Joe Purke . flight Test Pholography
field Service Representsth'es Back Co,'er

Cwlomer Senices D1\1SIOfl 01 the Iloting COmmndaI Aupllrot Group I:!i ~'Sihk few suppoftulg opn:llon dunng the hfe 01 each 8oc'Ulg
jrtlmer In addition 10 the SUlJOOUlg cl ~ th:iin 200 ~lJ\~ in O'e'" SO COU~. the dI\$Ufl ~ ~ partS and ~
"lJppoft. tnin:\ 1li8hl ~., :and m3~nce pcnonnc:I MId I'JIO'Ides opttUlOm :and ma~ put>bollOtlS. TIle dJ\-1Sion rontmuously
commurualC:li "'lm oper.;lkWS tbroutth l~ n'Il'rI~ <n\'1N' ..~ :and ...... Ikum and Olhet- almI'IlW\IlC'Stionl;. ~ - ~ tMm in
~ regu.btor). rcqu~ ..nd Nt Tr;mspoIt Assoc:1;J,tion <,pcaI'allons,
1l'Ic 8OEL'G A1RlJ..,n IS pubI1Shcd qual'lcrl) b)- the Cu!wmer 5cT\-1CC5 D1\'islOn. <:onunemal AJrpbne Group. cllhe BoongCompan). Scattk.
\1i'astungron. Dbk address. BOEI'(;'AlR. Addres.~ADcommurnc;abOm IOCuswmer~ica Di\·1Sion TIle BoetngComp:tny Box j-,r" Snnle.
'lIi:t.'iIung1on 9812..
 his issue of the O/Wrations N~....dene' has a DeW took. and has been relocated to get the immediale attention of our readers.

T The newslener will still focus on timely operational issues that are important to Boeing operators. In addition we will have
a new feature called our "Right Operatioos Tip". These tips are bricf answers to questions lhaI many operators have asked
Flight Operations Engineering over the years and are of gencral inlel'eSl.

T.. MInu.. TakeoIrTh.... A.allable .. FAAOpenIOn

Tbc FAA has recently released a memorandum establishing a procedure by which the five minure takeoff tIuust limiration in FAR
Pan 2S can be extended to ten minutes for engine inoperative operations.

European airlines operating under the Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs) already allow the use oftakeoff thrust forup to ten minutes
after the loss of power on one engine. DispalCb from some airports may require the additional capability in order to clear distant
obstacles after takeoff. putting FAA operators al a competitive disadvantage. With the new ruling. FAA operators will be able to
operate at obstacle limited weights comparable to their European counterparts.

Engine manufacrurers currently allow ten minute takeoffthrust operation in thciroperating instructions so hardware changes to recent
production engines should not be required in most cases. However. the required tests must be done prior to approval and ten minute
takeoff thrust may not be available for older models. Operators should checl: with the engine manufacturer regarding any warranty
issues. and certain minor aiJplane configuration changes may also be required.

Opmdors must request approval (or the ten minute tbrusI capability in writing from the aircraft manufacturer for the relevant airframe!
engine models. The applicable masterchange may be purchased from Boeing and would include adescription of the requim:l airplane
and flight manual changes. TakeoffPerfonnance software (model tables) will also be availablelo operatOR using ten minute Iakcoff
duust.

V.. ofFUab' Recorder 0..... DeIermIDe RanI I .." " " ' - -

Boeins has received many inquiries from operalOrS regarding Ihe use of flighl data recorders 10 determine the need for structural
lDSpeCbOOS after a suspected hard tanding. Boeing has intentionally DOl published specific values for either rate of descent or vertical
aa:eIeraIion tbat define a bard IaOOing. This position was established after a careful review of flighl recorder data and our flistliteSl
experience.

Boeing believes dw information from flight data rccorderscan be inconclusive fordetcrm.ining if a hard landing hasoccurred. Non-
vaticaI forces such as side 10lids from excessive crab angles are often pan of a hard landing as well. and may DOl be apparem from
a recording of vertical acceleration.

Tbe desip.location and data sampling rate ofairborne recorders a1socoatribute 10 the complexity ofdetermining a hard landing from
fIi&bt recorder data akmc:. 1bese devic:es can provide reliable acceleration data during inflighl maoeuven where accelerations are
IIeady or slowly varying. However. Beem, flight tests bave shown thai recorded aca::lcralion data can be an inaccurate indicator of
a blnllandiDg. This results from the SYSIe1D response during the short time interval during touchdown. DuriaS this interval. the
reoonkd venicaI acceleration component can become bighly erratic. Because of the relalively slow sampling rate of most ~.
it is DOl possible 10 determine iflhc recorded foR:esexperienced by the airplane are amaximum. minimum. or some intermediate value.
In dlose cases where valid data is readable. data sampling ndesIrecording time intervals are such that the peak value is usually not
diJcemibIe.
 Given the number and complexity of the facton which must be analytically combined and correlaled 10 produce an equivalent G force
faclor. Boeing bas concluded thai using nighl recorder Iype dala 10 dccennine if a bard landing has occurred is impractical. Our
position is lhat pilot judgmcnl is tbe bcsI source of infonnation for deciding if a hard landing has occurred.

Due 10 recenl EPA requiremenlS. certain diesel fuels containing more Ihan O.O.5'l- sulfur must be dyed blue. While jet: fuels are exempt
from IlUs requ~menl. il does apply 10 diesel fuel inaended for off·road uses and healing oils wilh higher sulfw'conIenlS. This leads
10 the possibility that jet fuel may be contaminated in pipelines ordistribution systems. ortbat dyed fuel may be inmvertently delivered
as jet fuel. Several ca.~ oflhis have already been reponed. Complicating the situation as ofJanuary 1994.1he Unilcd States Inaemal
Revenue ServiceCIRS) is requiring rcddye in diesel fuels thai are noIllUed for highway use. As of October 1994. the EPA will also
require red dye and blue' dye will no longer be added to diesel fuels. In the inlerim. red. blue. or a mixture of red and blue colored
fuel may appear. Also. some color.- may appear injel fuels due 10 crude oil sources or refinery processing. Nonnaljel fuels typically
range in color from water clear to Sb'aW orpale amber in color. Some hydrolreatinJ processes have recenlly been reported 10produce
green colored fuels.

The effects of various dyes on jet fuel properties and characteristics are largely unknown. Specifically. eff«ts on performance
characteristics such as thennal slability. lubricity and freezing point have r10I been detennined. Effects on characteristics important
in fuel handling and storage. such as electrical charging aendcncy. water coalesceoce. filterabilily and gum formalion are likewise
unknown. Additiooally. the dye~ may mask the re!iU11S of fuel teslS b$ed on visual observations

There is insufficient information regarding the consequences to the performance and maintenance of aircraft and engines operating
on dye-conlaminated fuel. FWlhennore. neither qualitative nor quantilative tests for the various dyes have beeD adopted 10 suppon
the establishment of any dye conceotration limias. Untillbe effeclS ofdyes injel fuels are established through testing. il is premawrc
to prescribe a permissible limit of dye concentration for use in commercial aircraft.

Preliminary IeSting at Boeing showed slighdy reduced thermal stability breakpoint tempenuures for fuels with prescribed
concentrations of blue dye. To what extent IlUs may affect engine performance has DOl been delennioed.

Boein, recommends that operators make every effort 10 prevenl fuels conlaminaled with dyes from being loaded on aircraft. Detailed
procedures for draining and clearing aircraft fuel sy5tems loaded with contaminated fuel were provided in an aU operator telex sent
to all Boeing operators and Boeing Field Service Bases. In addition. the following Service Lenen. dated 21 June 1994. provide further
infonnation on the subject of dyed fuels:

707·SL-28-Q13. 727-5L·28-Q34. 737·SL·28-044. 747-5L·28-080. 757·SL·28-021. and 767·SL-28-022.

The guidelines forhandling fuel conlamin8led with dyes described in the Service Lencrs should remain in effect uoti) acceptable levels
of dye concentration have been detennined by the appropriate analytical methods. In me interim. Boeing recommeods thai operators
do noI dispatch any airplane with fuel contaminated by dye.

Flight Operalions Tip:

Several Operators have asked Boeing why the Airplane F1ighl Manual (AFM) hasa limitation restricting the use of flaps above
20.000 feel. The reason forthe limitation is simple; Boeing does not demonstrate or test (and lherefore does not certify) airplanes
for operation with flaps eltlended above 20.000 feet.

There is no Boeing procedure which requires the use of flaps above 20,000 feet. Since flaps are intended to be used during the
takeoff and approachllanding phases of night. and since Boeing is not aware of any airports where operation would require the
use of flaps above 20.000 feel. there was no need to certify the airplane in this configur.llion,

The roUowia& videos y be

....... bY ' \ irll'll !'rngr.un :\unw ClIlalug :\t). Run I iml' -'""""","",

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Engi....:ubC
CaIIamer semces " M8IerieI Support ?:nJT8D _ BeAG
P.O." 37f17. MIS 2M'" MtJII08 P.O. Box 3707. MIS 20-88

....
Saddt. W" 981~1Z07
T... ( " " J _
?:n ........ ...,.S""'" (IRS» M931101 SeanJc. WA98124.USA
Tdephone{2(6)662-7600

1------------------------------;;-.. .
 Deicing & Anti-Icing
Awareness
Jobn Hamilton
Lead Engillffr
7frJn27mmS7
Senia Enginec:ring
CustOOH.'f Senm
O"i§ion
O
va the years a numlxr of ar-
ticles on winter operations have
appeared in lhe Boeing AIR·
LINER magazine. The October-Decem-
ber 1983 issue discussed how i~. frost
and snow contamination can seriously
reduce climb. maneuvering and perfor-
mance capabilities of an airplane. TIle
October-December 1989 edition was
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
DlU-k1 KOlker
Principal Engineer
Renton Oh'ision
AerodJnamics
Engineering
8CAG
dedicated to winter operations and in-
cluded articles on Boeing testing of the
aerodynamic effects ofdeicing/anti-icing
nuids on airplane performance. deicing!
anti-icing ground handling equipment
and procedures. related industry activity
on deicingfanti-icing. and precipitation
static. An article in the October-Decem-
ber 1992AIRLINER discussed new in-
dustry specifications that were developed
for deicing/anti-icing nuids which in-
cludes aerodynamic acceptance testing.
holdover times and application proce-
dures. In 1993. Boeing pnxIuced a video
entitled Deicing and Ami-Icing AM.·on-
ness for use by airlines as a training aid.
This artic~ summarizes the key concepts
contained in the "ideo and may be used
as a supplement to the video for training
pu'JXl'<S.
The Clean Airplane Concept
Federal Aviation Regulations prohibit
takeoff when snow. ice. or frost is adher-
ing to wings, propellers. or control sur-
faces of an airplane. This is referred to as
the Clean Airplane Concept.

The Clean Airplane Concept is neces-

Reduces lift
sary bcc-dUse airp13ne performance is
based on clean structure. An airp13ne Increases drag
is designed using Ihe predictable ef-
fects of airflow over clean wings. Ice,
snow, or frost adhering 10 Ihe wings
dislUrbs this airflow (see Figure I), and
results in reduced lift, increased dmg.
increased st.JII speed, and may cause
an abnomlal pitch characterislic.

Ice. snow. or frost only as thick and rough

as medium sandpaper can significanlly
Increases stall speed
reduce aerodynamic perfomlance.
Abnormal pitch-up moment
It is nOI just wing contamination that is
dangerous. For example, ice on the fuse-
lage can break loose and damage a rear
mounted engine. Or ice build-up on the Figure I. Airflow m'er the wings Is disturbed bJ the adherence or ice, rrost or snow, and
rear side ofengine fan blades during freez- can arret't lin, drag, stall speed and pilch moment.
ing fog conditions. can cause serious dam-
age as the engine advances for takeoff.
There are many other examples. but the
imponant thing to remember is there is
POST DEICING CHECKLIST
no acceptable level of critical surface con-
tamination. Radome
Cockpit windows
Pitot lubes
Contamination may come in the form of Stall warning vane
ice, snow, slush and/or frost. Nosewheel, nosewheel well and doors (step on wheels II needed)
01""
Antennas
Visibly obvious conditions that cause Ihis Static ports
contamination are falling snow or sleet. FOlWan::l cargo door and cabin door
AirdUCI
Wet snow is particularly dangerous be- Main wheels, wheelweUs and doors (step on wheels II needed)
cause it Slicks to the airplane surface and Lower wing surfaces (nol more than 1/8' of frost permitted under
the fuellanks area)
does not blow off easily. Contamination Leading edge of wing
can also form in conditions thaI do not Engine Intakes and exhaust
look very dangerous. such as freezing rain. Engine nacelles and pylons
Wing tip lights
freezing fog. or high humidity. These Fuel vents
conditions can cause frost or ice lhat is A1ll1aps and slats erea and all movable parts
difficult to see. but is as dangerous as wet Cavities between ailerons and lIaps
Underfalrings
snow. even in tempemtures above freez- Check the whole fUselage underneath the aircraft and antl-oollision lights
mg. Aft cargo door. bulk hold door and cabin doors
Outflow valves

AI cruise altitude the airplane's surface is

very cold. Even after landing there may
be enough cold fuel inside the wing 10
continue to keep the surface cool. If Figure 2. This is an example or a ground crew deicing chet'kiisl.
warmer humid air l;ontaclS the I;old sur-

2 Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
face. frost can form on the wing. and if
it rains on a cold-soaked wing clear ice
can form.
Clear ice cnn also foml below a layer of
snow or slush. Some airplanes have a
ground thennal anti-ice system that pro.
tects the leading edge but does not stop
contamination from forming on the up-
per and lower wing surface. So it is very
important to do careful ch«ks for con-
tamination.
Contamination Checks
For the contamination check to be suc-
cessful. the ground crew must be orga-
nized. know who is in charge. and ha\'e
approved procedures in place (.see Fig-
ure 2).
The ground check of the airplane should
cover the following critical areas:
Wing surfaces including leading
edges
Horizontal stabilizer upper and lower
surfaces. including leading edges
Vertical stabilizer and rudder
• Fuselage
• Pitot and temperature probes and
angle of attack sensors
• Sl3.tic ports
• General intakes and outlets
Control surface cavities
Engines and all probes
Landing gear and wheel wells
Eyes and hands are the best tools to use
for the contamination check. Be careful
not to touch the surface with bare hands.
since the skin may stick to a freezing sur-
face.
During times of darkness. the check
should be done in a well-lit area. Obser-
vations should be made close to the sur-
face. With a gloved hand. feel as much
of the surl"ace as possible even ifit is vis-
ible. Take exlra care when conditions
cause difficult-to-detcct contamination
such as clear ice.
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
If the only contamination on the fuselage
isa thin layerofhoar frost through which
markings can be seen. or a layer of frost
that is less thnn one-eighth of an inch
thick on the underside of the wing. take-
off may be approved by your regulatory
agency. These are the only exceptions.
If there is any doubt about the critical
surfaces - be safe and deice.
Deicing and Anti-icing
When contamination is found on the air-
plane deicing. anti-icing. or both are re-
quired.
Deicing removes contamination from
the airplane surface. Heated Type I
fluids are nonnaJly used for deicing
to help remove contamination.
• Anti-icing prevents the accumulation
of ice. snow or frost for cenain peri-
ods of time. Type II fluids are nor-
mally used for anti-icing because they
are thickened. They are most effec-
tive when applied cold to a clean sur-
f"",.
Figures 3 and 4 iIIuslrate how the fluids
work. When applied to a clean surface
the fluids form a thin layer. This layer
of fluid has a lower freezing point than
(he frozen precipitation. which melts on
contact with the fluid. As the fluid layer
becomes diluted by the melting precipi-
tation. it becomes less effective and ac-
cumulation may begin.
The time between the start of application
of the: fluid and fluid failure is called the:
holdover time. 1be goal is to take off
before the holdover time expires.
The International Standards Organization
(ISO). Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE). and Association of European Air-
lines (AEA) publish holdover times for
each fluid. They art: based on tempera-
ture. fluid mixture. and generaJ weather
conditions_ These times are only guide-
lines and other variables that redu«
nuid effectinnes5 must be taken into
account.
Examples of these variables are (see Fig-
ure 5):
• High winds or jet blast may cause the
fluid to start flowing off.
• Wet snow has a higher moisture con-
tent than dry snow • so it dilutes the
fluid faster.
The heavier the precipitlltion. the
shoner the holdover time.
• Airplane sk.in temperature signifi-
cantly lower than outside air tempera-
ture can decrease holdO\'er time.
• Direct sunlight may reduce fluid ef-
fectiveness if precipitation occurs
later.
Fluid Application
Deicing and ami-icing are either done
separately in two steps. or together in one
step. 1be procedure used depends on
weather. fluids and equipment available.
and the requi~ holdover time. Heavy
contamination or a long holdover time
usually requires a two step procedure.
After deciding which fluid type to use.
the fluid r.uio must be selected. For ex-
ample. a 75n.5 ratio means that the mix-
ture contains 75% fluid and 2.5% water.
Sometimes hot water alone is eoough to
deice. or remove contamination from the
airplane. The Boeing Maintenance
Manual contains fluid ratio guidelines.
For the fluids to be effective they must
be handled properly by everyone in-
volved in the deicing/anti-icing process.
This includes the transportation and stor-
age of the fluid. Ensure the fluid
manufacturer"s guidelines Ilave been fol-
lowed for the entire process.
Always deice/anti-ice the airplane as
3
 close to the departure time as possible.
This is especially important when bad
weather conditions require shorter hold-
over times.

Before spraying fluid. configure the air-

plane for this procedure:

• Make sure the flaps are free from

snow or ice obstructions before mov-
ing them. When the flaps are clean.
retract them to keep snow. ice, or
slush from being washed off the wing
surface into the flap mechanisms.

• Tum the air conditioning packs OFF

to keep fluid fumes from getting into
the passenger cabin.

• Engines should be shut down or

idHng. When they are operating. clos-
ing the bleed valves prevents fluid in
Figure 3. When applied to a clean surface, the deicing nuid forms a thin film onr the the engine inlet from entering the
surface. bleed system. DO NOT SPRAY DI-
REcrLY INTO THE ENGINE IN-
LETS. Several operators have re-
ported instances of smoke in the cabin
and someti mcs 3Cti'laton of the smoke
detection system which were attrib-
uted to ingestion of deicing fluids into
the engine or APU inlets.
Anti-icing
• IftheAPU isopcrating close its bleed
valve.

Each airplane has a specific configura-

tion for deicing/anti-icing. For example
the stabilizer setting varies with airplane
model. Check the operations manual or
the Boeing Maintenance Manual for
model specific procedures. (See Table I.)

If there is a heavy accumulation of con-

tamination, remove as much as possible
with a rope or a squeegee before apply-
Holdover time ing the fluid. This reduces the amount
of fluid required to get the surface clean.

No matter what type of fluid or mixture

Figure 4. The time between the start ofnuid application and nuid failure is known as the is used it should be applied with the same
holdover time. technique.

4 Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
 Treat the fuselage from the nose and
work af!. Spray at the top centerline
and work outboard.

• Spray the wings from the leading

edge to trailing edge. and work out-
board to inboard. This prevents load-
ing snow on the outboard section.

• Treat the vertical stabilizer if neces-

Bt ... sary.

br
.. - • Spray the horizontal stabilizer the
same way as the wing. Adjust the

-- "
'.1Il 2$ ..-
1ft"
spraying direction to accommodate a
strong wind if necessary.

.....
"
\OC _
"""'* '.
.......'r ~ ",,(<'(;I
c'.,.,.,! ,\",,1_
"-
z:,.

'>At,,,,,,"
A
-..-,,---
'-,> . , , . _

F
,...
I
tl
-<"l
,. II
C Apply the fluid symmetrically to both
sides of the airplane. For a large air-
plane like a 747 it may help to use a
deicer truck on each side.
Figure 5. This table contains examples or the variables that may reduce deicing fluid
errecth'eness or holdo\"er time. The following are examples of areas that
must be avoided when spraying fluid (see
\lalllh'IIoII1('l' \lallll.ll Figure 6):
Model Subject Title
Directly on windows
Control surface cavities and balance
707 12-4-1 Cold Weather l\'laintenanct
bays
727 12-50-0 Cold Weather Maintenance
• Probes and angle of attack sensors
737-100/-200 12-50-0 Cold Weather Maintenance
• Static ports. air inlelS. landing gear.
737-3001-400/-500 12-50-00 Cold Weather Maintenance
and wheel wells
747-1001·200/·300 12·33·01 Cold Weather J\binlcmlDce
Engines and all probes
747-400 12·33·01 Cold Weather Maintenance
757 12·33·01 Cold Weather Maintenance
All of these areas are also critical surfaces
767 12-33-01 Cold Weather Maintenance
so they must be clean. Use a broom or a
777 12-33-01 Cold Weather Maintenance
hot air blower to mel! the ice and snow
from these areas. especially around the
(1!ll'n1ll1lns'I:lIIIMI
landing gear.
!\Iodel Section Title
When deicing/anti-icing is completed the
ground crew should do a final check 10
707 04.25 Cold Weather Operations
make sure the airplane is clean. When
727 04.25 Cold Weather Operations
they are cenain the airplane is safe for
737-100/-200 02.04 Cold Weather Operations
dispatch. the flight crew must be notified.
737-3001-400/-500 02.G4 Cold Weather Operations
747·100/·200/-300 04.30 Cold Weather Operations
747·400 02.05 Cold Weather Operations
757 02.17 Operating with
Deicing/Anti-icing fluids Table I. Cold weather operations reference
material is contained in these parts of the
767 02.17 Operating with
Boeing Maintenance and Operations
Deicing/Anti.icing Fluids Manuals.
777 NP.30 Adverse Weather Operations

Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994 5
The pilot-in-command needs to know the
type fluid used. the fluid miltture, and the
start time of the final fluid application.

The most efficient way to communicate

this is by using the Deicing/Anti-icing
Code as shown Figure 7. When using
the code in written records it is a good
idea to include the date.

Pilot Considerations
•
The Deicing/Anti-icing Code has all of
the measurable infonnation the pilot-in-
command needs. But judgment and elt-
•
perience must be used to evaluate the situ-
ation from anti-icing to takeoff. As al-
ready discussed the holdover lime is not
an exact figure - it is a guideline. All of
the factors that influence the effective-
ness of the fluid (see Figure 5) need to
be continuously evaluated.

When taxiing keep a safe distance behind Figure 6. Do not spray anti-king or deicing nuids into these areas
other airplanes to avoid jet blasts and
blowing snow.

Perform a continuous pre-takeoff

check. Be aware of weather condi-
tions. and detennine how the fluid is
work.ing by looking at the airline's
approved representative areas. These
areas may include the radome. wind-
shield wipers. and any parts of the fu-
selageor wings that can be seen from
the cockpit. Remember that these
areas are only representative. If they
are clean. do not assume that the criti-
cal surfaces are clean. However. if
contamination is building up on the
representative areas it is probably
building up on the critical surfaces.

Ifcontamination is building up. or the

holdover time eltpires do a pre-take-
off contamination check. This in-
cludes checking the critical surfaces
as specified in your approved pro-
gram (see Figure 8) or with the help
of the ground crew. Be especially Figure 7. The ground deleing crew will infonn the night crew or the deicing operation in
careful at night when contamination the fonn of a deicing/anti-icing code. The night deck crew should write down this code
is more difficult to detect. and rder to It prior to making the takeoff decisions.

6 Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994

Some clues that the fluid is failing are
treated surfaces becoming less reflective
and dulled. or appearing white. This
means the fluid is becoming diluted and
is less effective.
If contamination is present never assume
it will blow off the wings during the take-
off roll. Do not let schedule pressures
influence your decision - go back for an-
other fluid application.
Good coordination between air traffic
control and the flight crew may reduce
the frequency of these situations. Try 10
release airplanes as soon as possible af-
ter completion of the deicing/anti-icing
process. Then, minimize the time air·
plane sits in line for takeoff.
Airliner/Oct·Dec 1994
Safety can also be increased during take·
off by following recommended proce·
dures for winter operations. For ex·
ample:
Even if deicing/anti-icing is not re-
quired. apply recommended perfor-
mance adjustments for existing con-
ditions. such as slush on the runway.
If the airplane has been deiced/anti-
iced, apply any appropriate perfor-
mance adjustments as necessary. Re-
fer to the operations manual.
Use the normal rotation rate of two
to three degrees per second to ensure
that the liftoff poim does not occur
funher down the runway than sched-
Figure 8. Extreme care and
complete coordination be-
tween the ground and
night crt!ws are ~uired to
ensure that the deicing!
anti-icing operation is suc-
cessful.
uled. A slow rotation rate will result
in liftoff farther down the runway
than planned.
Summar}'
Winter operations require a thorough
knowledge of the current and departure-
time weather. airport configuration and
taxi distances. and airplane performance.
Cooperation and communication are
critical. Although it is ultimately the de-
cision of the pilot-in-command to take-
off or ask for another application of de-
icing/anti-icing. a safe operation is a team
effort. Every member of the team must
work together to make it clean and keep
it clean.
7
T
he Model 777 is Boeing's firsl
commercial airplane .....hich em-
ploys complete elcclronic con-
trol of the Primary Right Control Sys-
tem. However. the syStem design is such
that the airplane looks and feels similar
to other Boeing jet lrnnspons. and al the
same time. employs the lale51Iechno!ogy
to ease the pilot's workload and the long
(enn maintenance of the system.
Before the first night of the Model 777
on 12June 1994. the Primary Aight Con-
lrol System had undergone many hours
MODEL 777 PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
of testing over an eight-month period.
Individual componentS were tested. and
continue to be tested, in sW,u/-lIIQne labo-
ratories. The system as a whole was
tested in the Flight Controls Test Rig
(FCI'R), where all electrical and me·
chanical components were installed in a
simulated airplane environment and op-
erated in concert. The Primary Flight
Control System was also tested in con-
junction with other airplane systems in
the new Systems Integration Laboratory
(SIL). As a result of these tests. there
was a high level of confidence before the
Greg Bartley
Senior SpedailsI Englorer
777 f'rlmary FUghI ConInJII
...... <:emmndaI
"'_C....
system was installed in the first airplane.
The initial flight testing of the airplane
has shown few unexpected characteris-
tics.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Conventional primary night controls sys-
tems employ hydraulic actuators and con-
trol valves controlled by cables which are
driven by the pilot controls. These cables
run the length of the airframe from the
cockpit area to the surfaces to be con-
trolled. This type of system. while pro-
(see glossary rage t 7)

Spol-
(7 .........
Slao
Figure J. The primary night control s)'slem on the Model 777 is comprised or the out-
board ailerons, spoilers, nllperons elevators and rudder.
viding desirable airplane handling char-
acteristics, does have some very distinct
drawbacks. Thecable-controlJed system
comes with a weight penalty due to the
long cable runs, pulleys. brackets. and
supports needed. The system requires
periodic maintenance. such as lubricmion
and adjustments due to cable slrClch. In
addition. systems such as the Yaw
Damper which provide enhanced control
of surfaces require dedicated actuators,
wiring, and controllers. This adds to the
overall system weight and increases the
number of components in the system.
See Figure 1 for a depiction of the Pri-
mary Right Control System.
In the Model 777. the cable control of
lhc primary flight control surfaces has
been removed. Rather. lhe actuators are
controlled electronically. At the heart of
the Model 777 Primary Flight Control
System are elcctronic computers. These
computers conven elccLrical signals sent
from transducers auached to the pilot
controls into commands which are sent
to the actuators. Because of these
changes to the system, the following de-
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
sign features have been made possible:
• Full-time surface control employs
advanced control laws. The aerody-
namic surfaces are sized to afford lhe
required airplane response during
critical flight conditions. The reac-
tion time of the control laws is much
faster that of an alen pilol. There-
fore the size of the flight control sur-
faces could be made smaller than
those needed for a conventionally
controlled airplane. This results in
a reduction in the overall weight of
the system.
Retention oflhe desirable flight char-
acteristics of a conventional syslem
and lhe removal of the undesirable
ones. This is discussed later in the
section on Control Law and System
Functionality.
• Integration of functions such as the
Yaw Damper into lhe basic surface
control. This allows the separate
components nonnally used for these
functions to be removed.
Improved system reliability and
maintainability.
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
The design philosophy of the Model 777
Primary Right Control System maintains
system operation that is consistent with
a pilofs past training and experience.
What is meant by this is thai however
different the actual system architecture
is from previous Boeing airplanes. me
presentation to lhe pilot is that of a con-
ventional mechanical system. The Model
777 retains lhe conventional control col-
umn. wheel. and rudder pedals whose
operation is identical to the controls em-
ployed on other Boeing transpon air-
planes. The night deck controls of the
Model 777 are very similar to those of
the Model 747-400 (see Figure 2).
Because !.he system is cOlllrolled elec-
tronically. there is an opponunity to in-
clude system control augmentation and
envelope protection features that would
have been difficult to provide in a con-
ventional mechanical system. The Model
777 Primary Flight Control System has
made full use of the capabilities of this
architecture by including such features
as,
Bank Angle Protection
Tum Compensation
• Stall and Overspeed Protection
• Pitch Control and Stability Augmen-
tation
• Thrust Asymmetry Compensation
More will be said of these specific fea-
tures Imer. What should be noted how-
ever, is that none of these features limit
the actions of the pilot. The Model 777
design utilizes envelope protection rather
than em'elope li"'iti/lg as a deterrent.
Protection deters pilot inputs while lin/-
iting prevents pilot inputs. For example.
the Bank Angle Protection feature will
significantly increase the wheel force a
pilol encounters when attempting to roll
the airplane past a predefined bank angle.
9
 •

/
- -/

rlgu~ 2. The night dedI. controls on the l\'lode.l777 are similar to those found on other 80elngJetUners and Include the control wheel
Bnd rudder pedals for pilot Inputs 10 the Primary Flight Control System.

However, if necessary. the pilot may
override this protection by elterting a
greater force on the wheel than is being
exerted by the backdrive aelUator. The
intent is to inform the pilot mat the com-
mand being given would put me airplane
outside of its normal operating envelope.
but the ability to do so is not precluded.
This concept is central to the design of
the Model 777 Primary Flighl Control
System.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND
REDUNDANCY
The Model 777 Primary Flight Control
System incorporales several layers of re-
dundancy. To fully understand the
amount of redundancy in the system and
how it is managed. it is necessary to ex.-
plore the types orcomponents in the sys-
tem and how they are used.
Flight Deck Controls
The 777 is equipped with standard flight
deck controls. Instead orthecontrol col-
umns, wheels, and pedals driving quad-
raniS and cables. they are attached to elec-
trical transducers which convert me-
chanical displacement into electrical sig-
nals. Multiple transducers installed on
each pilot controller ensure that the runc-
Lionalit'y or that control remains intact in

10 Airliner/Oct-Ott 1994
the event of a single transducer failure.
A gradient control actuator is attached to
the two control column feel units. These
units provide the tactile/eel of the con-
trol column by proportionally increasing
the amount of column force a pilot expe-
riences during a maneuver with an in-
crease in airspeed. In addition, pilot con-
troller backdrive actuators move the con-
trol column, wheel. and pedal in response
to autopilot commands when the autopi-
lot is engaged. This provides visual feed-
back to the pilot during autopilot opera-
tions.
System Electronics
There are two types of electronic com-
puters used in the Model 777 Primary
Flight Control System: the Actuator Con-
trol Electronics (ACE), which is prima-
rily an analog device, and the Primary
Flight Computer (PFC), which utilizes
digital technology. There are four ACEs
and three PFCs employed in the system.
The function of the ACE is to interface
with the pilOi control transducers and to
control the actuators with analog servo
loops. The role of Ihe PFC is the calcu-
lation of control laws which conven the
pilot controller position into surface com-
mands, which are then transmitted back
to the ACEs, The PFC also contains an·
ciliary functions, such as system moni·
toring. crew annunciations, and all the
system on-board maintenance capabili-
ties.
Flight Control electronics configuration
is shown in Figure 3.
The ACEs decode the signals received
from the transducers used in the pilot
controls and the primary actuation. The
ACEs conven the transducer position into
a digital value and then transmit that
value over the ARINC 629 busses for use
by the PFCs. The PFCs use these pilot
control positions and surfaces positions
to calculate the surface commands. The
PFCs then transmit the surface com-
mands over the same ARINC 629 busses
back to the ACEs, which convens them
into analog commands for each actuator.
There are three PFCs in the system, called
L, C. and R. Where the redundancy of
the ACEs lies in functional distribution,
the redundancy of the PFCs is in the num-
ber of calculating elements. Each of the
three PFCs, referred to as channels, are
identical in design and perfonn identical
calculations,
Internal to each PFC are three indepen-
dent sets of microprocessors. ARlNC 629
imerfaces, and power supplies, which are
referred to as lanes. All lanes perfonn
idenlical calculations. Failure of a single
lane internal to a PFe will cause only that
lane to be shut down. That channel will
continue to operate nonnally on two lanes
with no loss of system functionalilY. Any
subsequent failure of a channel which is
already operating on two lanes, however,
will cause that channel to be shut down,
as a channel is nOI allowed 10 operate on
a single lane.
The airplane is designed to be operated
indefinitely with one lane of nine failed,
The proposed Master Minimum Equip·
ment List (MMEL) allows the airplane
to be dispatched with two lanes failed out
AAlNC629
flIGHT CONTROLS
OATA8US(3}

Four identical ACEs are used in the sys-

tem, referred to as Ll. L2. C, and R.
These designations correspond roughly
to the len, center, and right hydraulic sys·
terns on the airplane, The night control
functions are distributed among the four
ACEs, such that a total failureofa single
ACE will leave the major functionality
of the night control system intact. An
ACE failure ofmis nature will have much
the same impact to the Primary Flight
Control Sysl'em as that of a hydraulic Figure 3, This block diagl"am depicts IheACEs and PFCs In relation 10 other interfacing
system failure. The Model 777 Primary systems which make up the Model 777 Primary Flight Control System,

Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994 11
of the nine (as long as they are not within
the same channel) for ten days and for a
single day with one PFC channel inop-
erative.
ARlNC 629 DATA BUS
The ACEs and PFCs communicate with
each other, as well as with other systems
on the airplane, via triplex. bi-.directional
ARINC 629 Right Controls data busses.
referred to as L. C and R. The connec-
tion from the electronics unit to the data
bus is an ARINC 629 coupler. Each cou-
pler can be removed from the data bus
and replaced individually without dis-
turbing the integrity of the data bus it-
self. (The ARINC 629 Data Bus will be
featured in a future AIRLINER article.)
Interfaces to Other Airplane Systems
The Primary Flight Control System re-
ceives data from other airplane systems
by two different methods. The Air Data
Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU).
Standby Attitude and Air Data Reference
Unit (SAARU), and the Autopilot Flight
Director Computers (AFDC) transmit on
the ARINC 629 Flight Controls data bus-
ses where the PFCs are able to read their
data directly. Other systems. such as the
Flap Slat Electronics Units (FSEU),
Pruximity Switch Electrunics Ullit
(PSEU), and Engine Data Interface Unit
(EDIU), among others. transmit their data
on ARINC 629 Systems Data Busses.
The PFCs receive data from these sys·
terns through the Airplane Infonnation
Management System (AIMS) Data Con-
version Gateway (DCG) function. The
DCG supplies data from the Systems
Data Busses onto the Flight Controls Data
SYSTEM ELECTRICAL POWER
There are three power sources dedicated
to the Primary Flight Control System.
which are referred to as the Flight Con-
trols Direct Current (FCDC) power sys-
tem. Each of the three power systems is
driven by an FCDC Power Supply As-
sembly (PSA). The FCDC system is sup-
plied by two dedicated Permanent Mag-
net Generators (PMG) on each engine.
Each PSA converts the PMG alternating
current into 28 volts DC for use by the
electronics modules in the Primary Flight
Control System. Alternative power
sources for the PSAs include the airplane
Ram Air Turbine (RAT), the 28 volt DC
airplane busses. the airplane Hot Bauery
Bus. and dedicated five ampere-hour
FCDC batteries. During night. the PSAs
draw power from the PMGs. For on-
ground engines-off operations or for in-
night failures of the PMGs. the PSAs
draw from any available source. See Fig-
tIOT B4ITERY
tRAT EIAOWP)
ure 4 for a schematic of the power distri-
bution for the Model 777 FCOC.
Control Surface Actuation
The control surfaces of the system are
controlled by hydraulically powered ac-
tuators. The elevators, ailerons, and
naperons are controlled by two actuators
on each surface. the rudder is controlled
by three. Each spoiler panel is powered
by a single actuator. The horizontal sta-
bilizer is po~itioned by two hydrnulic
motors driving the stabilizer jackscrew.
On the Model 777. the Primary Flight
Control surfaces are actuated through the
ACE sources which in tum CQmOland the
hydraulic actuators (see Figure 5).
The actuators on the elevators. ailerons.
naperons. and rudder have several opera-
tional modes. These modes. and the sur-
faces thai each are applicable to, are de-
fined below:
~

• ......
Busses. This gateway between the tWO
main sets of ARINC 629 busses main-
tains separation between the critical
Flight Controls bus and the essential Sys-
tems bus but still allows data to be passed
back and forth. The Primary Flight Con-
trol System interfaces to other airplane
systems are shown in Figure 3. Figure 4. This diagram shows the Model 777 Flight Controls Oirttl Current power dis-
tribution system.

12 Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
 --@lACE8ClUll:e

W-~
Left Elevator

Nole:
Righi Elevator

o
• II ACE

_C_ Spo~ers 4 and 11 are commanded via cables

• CHVO
l2ACE
• CHVO from the cootrol wt1eeI and via the ACES
• CACE • AHYD
from the speed brake lever. The stabliZ9r
Is commanded via the cables ttvough the
• RACE
""""'" aisle stand levers only and otherwise is
commanded through the ACES.

Figure S. On the Model 777, Actuator Control Eleclronics (ACE) units provide control inputs to the h)'draulic actuators rOt each
night control surface.

• Active· Normally, all actuators on
the elevato!:>, ailerons, naperons, and
rudder receive conunands from their
respective ACEs and pooition the sur-
fJ.ces accordingly. The aCllliltors will
remain in the active mode unLil c0m-
manded into another mode by the
ACEs.
Bypassed - In this mode. the aClua-
lOr does nOI respond to comma.nds
from the ACE. The aClUator is al-
lowed to move freely. so lhal the re-
dundant actuators on a given surface
may drive the surface without any
loss of authority. This mode is
presem on aileron, naperon, and rud-
der actuators.
Damped - In this mode, the actua-
tor does not respond 10 commands
from the ACE. The actuator is al-
lowed to move, but at a restricted rate
which provides flulter damping.
This mode allows the mher actuator
or aclUators on the surface to con-
tinue to operate the surface at a rate
sufficient for airplane control. This
mode is present on elevator and rud-
der actuators.
Blocked· In this mode, the actuator
does nm respond to commands from
the ACE, and is nm allowed to move.
When both actuators on a surface
controlled by two actuators have
failed, they both enter the Blocked
mode to provide a hydraulic lock on
the surface. This mode is present on
the elevator and aileron actuators.
An example using the elevator surface
illustrates how these modes are used. If
the inboard actuator on an elevator fails,
the ACE controlling that actuator will
place the actuator in the Damped mode.
This allows the surface to move at a lim-
ited rate under the control of the outboard
actuator. Concurrent with this action, the
ACE also arms the Blocking mode on the
outboard actuator on the same surface.
Ifasubsequent failure occurs which will
cause the outboard actuator to be placed
in the Damped mode by its ACE. both
actuators will then be in the Damped
mode and have their Blocking modes
armed. An elevator actuator in this con-
figuration enters the Blocking mode,
which hydraulically locks the surface in
place for flutter protection.
The Model 777 Primary Flight Control
Test Rig is shown in Figure 6. This fa-
cility allowed complete integrated test-
ing of all the components of the Right

Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994 13

Figure 6. All components of the Model 777 Primary Flight Control S)'stem were sub-
jected to rigorous testing in Boeing's new SJstems Integration L.abol'1ltory prior to being
nown.
Control System prior to being installed
in lhe actual airplane.
Mecbanical Control
Spoiler panels 4 and II and the alternate
stabilizer pitch trim system are controlled
mechanically, rather than electTonicaily.
Spoilers 4 and 11 are driven directly from
control wheel deflections via a control
cable. The alternate horizontal stabilizer
control is accomplished by using the pitch
trim levers on the aisle stand. Electrical
switches actuated by the trim levers al-
low the PFCs to detennine when alter-
nate trim is being commanded so that
appropriate commands can be given to
lhe pitch control laws.
Spoiler panels 4 and II are also used as
speedbrakes. The speedbrake function
for this spoiler pair has two positions:
retracted and fully extended. The
speedbrake commands for spoilers 4 and
II are electrical in nature, with an ACE
14
giving an extend or retract command via
a solenoid operated valve in each of the
actuators. Once lhat spoiler pair has been
deployed by a speedbrake command.
there is no conlrOl wheel to speedbrake
command mixing.
SYSTEM OPERATING MODES
The Primary Right Control System has
three operating modes: Nonnal, Second-
ary, and Direct. These modes are defined
below:
• Nonnal- In Nonna! mode, the PFCs
supply all commands to the ACEs.
Full functionality is provided. in-
cluding all enhanced performance,
envelope protection, and ride qual-
ity features.
Secondary - In this mode, the PFCs
supply all commands to the ACEs,
just as in the Nonnal mode. How-
ever, functionality of the system is
reduced. For example, the envelope
protection functions may not be ac-
tive in the Secondary mode. The
PFCs enter this mode automatically
from the Nonnal mode when there
are sufficient failures in lhe system
or interfacing systems such that Nor-
mal mode is not supported. An ex-
ample of a set of failures which will
automatically drop the system into
Secondary is total loss of airplane air
data from the ADIRU and SAARU.
The airplane is quite capable of be-
ing flown for a long period in Sec-
ondary mode if required.
Direct - In the Direct mode, the
ACEs do not process commands
from the PFCs. Instead. each ACE
decodes pilot commands directly
from the pilot controller transducers
and uses lhem for the closed loop
control of the actuators. This mode
will be entered automatically due to
total failures of the PFCs, failures
internal to the ACEs. loss of the
Flight Controls ARINC 629 Data
Busses. or some combination of
these. It may also be selected manu-
ally via the PFC Disconnect Switch
on the overhead panel in lhe flight
deck. The airplane handling char-
acteristics in the Direct mode closely
match those of the Secondary mode.
CONTROL LAWS AND SYSTEM
FUNCTIONALITY
The design philosophy employed on the
Model 777 Primary Right ConlrOl Sys-
tem control laws stresses aircraft opera-
tions consistent with a pilot's past train-
ing and experience. The combination of
electronic conlrOl of lhe system and this
philosophy provides the feel of a conven-
tional airplane, but wilh improved han-
dling characteristics.
Pitch Control
Pitch control is accomplished lhrough a
maneuver demand conlrOllaw. It is re·
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
 ferred to as a C·U control law. C· (pro-
nounced CoStar) is a term that is used 10
describe me blending of the airplane pitch
rate and load factor (the amount of ac-
celeration felt by an occupant of the air-
plane during a maneuver). At low air-
speeds. me pitch rate of me airplane is
me controlling faclor. AI high airspeeds,
me load factor predominates. 1be U term
refers to the change in the airspeed away
from a referenced trim speed. This in-
troduces an elemenl ofspeed slability into
the airplane pitch control. The result is
that Ihe airplane is trimmed to a particu-
lar airspeed. and any deviation from that
airspeed will cause a pilch change in or-
de.r to relurn to thai referenced airspeed.
However, airplane configuration
changes, such as a change in trailing edge
flap settings, will not cause airplane trim
changes. Thus, the major advantage of
using a maneuver demand control law is
that nuisance handling characterislics
found in a convenlional system which
increase pilot workload are minimized,
while the desirable characleristics are
maintained.
The pilch control law incorporates sev-
eral additional fealures. One is called
Landing Aare Compensation. This func-
tion provides handling characleristics
during flare and landing consistent with
that of a conventional airplane, whicb
would have otherwise been altered sig-
nificantly by the C·U control law. The
pitch control law also incorporates Stall
and Overspeed Protection. These func-
tions will not allow the referenced trim
speed to be set below a predefined mini-
mum value or above the maximum oper-
ating speed. They also significantly in-
crease the column force that the pilot
must hold in order to fly above or below
these speeds. An additional feature in-
corporated into the pitch control law is
Tum Compensation, which enables the
pilot to maintain a constant altitude with
minimal column input during a banked
tum.
The unique Model 777 implementation
of maneuver demand and speed stability
in the pitch control law means that:
An established flight path remains
unchanged unless the pilot changes
it through a column input or the air-
speed changes and the speed stabil-
ity function takes effeci.
• Trimming is required only for air-
speed changes.
Yaw Control
The yaw control law contains the stan-
dard funclions used on other Boeing jet
liners, such as the Yaw Damper and the
Rudder Ratio Changer functions. How-
ever, there are no separate actuators and
linkages in the Model 777 for mese func-
tions as were used in previous Boeing air-
planes. Rather. the commands for these
functions are calculated in the PFCs and
included as part of the normal rudder
command to the main rudder actuators.
This reduces weight, complexity, main-
tenance, and spares required to be
stocked.

While in flight. the pitch trim switches

on the Pilot's and First Officer's control
wheels do nOI direclly control me hori-
zonlal stabilizer. When Ihe trim switches
are used in flight, the pilot is actually re-
questing a new referenced trim speed.
The airplane will pilCh nose-up or nose-
down in response to Ihat change in order
to achieve that new airspeed. The stabi-
lizer will aUlomatically trim to offload me
elevalor surface when necessary. When
the airplane is on the ground, the pitch

, trim switches are used to trim me hori-

zontal stabilizer directly. While the al-
temate trim levers move the stabilizer
directly. even in flight. me act of doing
so will also change me C·U referenced
trim speed such that the net effect is the
same as would have been achieved if the
pitch trim switches had been used. As
on a conventional airplane. trimming is
required to reduce any column forces that
are being held by the pilot Figul"\! 7. This Model 757 Testbed was used to validate the control laws which weI"\! used
in the Model 777 Primary Flight Control System.

Airliner/Oct-Dec 1.994 15
The yaw control law also incorporates
several additional features. The Gust
Suppression system reduces airplane wil
",ag by sensing wind gusts on the verti-
cal fin and applying a rudder command
to oppose the movement that would have
been generated by the gust. Another fea-
ture is the Wheel-Rudder Crosstie func·
tion, which reduces sideslip by using
small amounts of rudder during banked-'
turns.
One important feature in the yaw control
is Thrust Asymmetry Compensation, or
TAC. This function automatically applies
a rudder input for any thrust asymmetry
between the two engines exceeding ap-
proximately ten percent of the rated
thrust. This is intended to cancel the yaw-
ing moment associated with an engine
failure. TAC operates at all airspeeds
above 80 knots; even on lhe ground dur-
ing the take-off phase. It will not oper-
ate when thrust reversers are deployed.
Roll Control
The roll control law in the Model 777 is
fairly conventional. The outboard aile-
rons and spoiler panels 5 and 10 are
locked out in the faired position when the
airspeed exceeds a value that is depen-
dent upon speed and altitude. It roughly
corresponds to flaps up. As with the yaw
damper [unction, this function does not
have a separate actuator, but is part of
the nomlal aileron commands. The Bank
Angle Protection feature in the roll con~
trot law has been discussed previously.
757 Test Bed
The control laws and features discussed
here were incorporated into a modified
Model 757 and flown in the summer of
1992 (see Figure 7). The Captain's con-
trols remained connected to the nonnal
Model 757 flight controls system. The
Model 777 control laws were nown
through the First Officer's controls. Af-
ter the initial checkout and validation
16
phase, pilots from several airlines and
regulatory agencies were invited to fly
the modified Model 757. The feedback
from the pilots was very positive and
enthusiastic. The initial flights of the
Model 777 indicate that the flight char-
acteristics of the Model 757 demonstra-
tor were very close to those of the Model
777.
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS
SYSTEM DISPLAYS AND ANNUN-
CIATIONS
The primary displays for the Primary
Flight Control System are the Engine
Indication and Crew Alerting System
(EICAS) display and the Multi-Function
Display (MFD). The EICAS display is
very similar to that used in the Model
747.-400. It displays the engine param-
eters, as well as the Warning, Caution.
and Advisory messages used by the flight
crew. The MFD displays the Status level
messages, which are used to determine
the health of the various systems, and
whether the airplane is able to be dis-
patched. The MFD also can display,
when requested, the Right Control Syn-
optic page which shows the position of
all the flight control surfaces.
SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
The Model 777 Primary Flight Control
System has been designed to keep line
maintenance to a minimum, and when
tasks do need to be accomplished. that
they are straight forward and easy to un-
derstand.
Central Maintenance Computer
The main interface to the Primary Flight
Control System for the line mechanic is
the Central Mainlenance Computer
(CMC) function of AIMS. The CMC
uses the Maintenance Access Tenninal
(MAD as its primary display. The role
of the CMC in the maintenance of the
Primary Aight Control System is 10 iden-
tify the failures present in the system and
to assist in their repair. The two features
utilized by lhe CMC which accomplish
these tasks are Maintenance Messages
and Ground Maintenance Tests. Main-
tenance Messages describe to the me-
chanic. in common tcnns. what failures
are present in the system and which com-
ponents are possibly at fault. 11le Ground
Maintenance Tests exercise the system.
test for dormant failures, and confirm
repair action. They are also used to un-
latch any EICAS and Maintcnance mes-
sages Ihat may have become latched due
to failures.
The PFCs are able to be loaded with new
software through the Data Loader func 4
tion on the MAT. This allows the PFCs
to be updated to a new configuration
without having to take them out of ser·
vice.
(The CMC will be described in a future
issue of the AIRLINER.)
Line Replaceable Units
All the major components of the system
are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). This
includes all electronics modules, ARINC
629 Data Bus couplers, hydraulic and
electrical actuators. and transducers. The
installation of each LRU has been de·
signed such that a mechanic has ample
space for component removal and re-
placement. as welt as space for the mll-
nipulation of any required tools.
Each LRU. when replaced. must be tested
to assure that the installation was accom 4
plished correctly. The major LRUs of the
system (transducers, actuators. and elec-
tronics modules) have LRU Replacement
Tests which are conducted by the PFCs
and are requested by the CMC via the
MAT. These tests lire IIser friendly and
use a minimum amount of time to run.
Any failures found in a test will result in
a Maintenance Message. which details
what failures are present.
Airliner/Oct·Dec 1994
Component Adjustment Summary

The primary surface actuators on the
Model 777 are replaced in the same man-
ner as on previous airplanes. The differ-
ence is how lhey are adjusted. Each el-
evator. aileron. flaperon. and rudder ac-
tuator has a Null Adjust Transducer.
which is rotated umil the actuator is p0-
sitioned correctly. For example. when a
rudder actuator is replaced. all hydraulic
systems are turned off except for the one
which supplies power to lhe replaced ac-
tuator. The Null Adjust Transducer is
then adjusted umil the rudder surface
aligns itself with a mark on the empen-
nage. showing that the actuator has cen-
tered the rudder correctly.
The transducers used by pilot control-
lers are. for the most part. individual
LRUs. However. there are some pack-
ages. such as the speedbrake lever trans-
ducers and the control column force
transducers. which have multiple trans-
ducers in a single package. When a
transducer is replaced. the Primary
Flight Controls EICAS Maintenance
Pages are used 10 adjust the transducer
to a cenain value at the system rig posi-
tion. There are CMC initiated PFC and
ACE Replacemem Tests which check
that the module has been installed cor-
rectly and that all electrical connections
have been properly maled.
The Model 777 Primary Aight Control
System utilizes new technology to pro-
vide significam benefits over a conven-
tional Primary Aight Control System.
These benefits include a reduction in
overall weight of the airplane. superior
handling characteristics, and improved
maintainability of the system. At the
same time. the control of the airplane is
accomplished using traditional cockpit
controls thereby allowing the pilot to fly
the airplane without any specialized
training. The technology utilized by the
Model 777 Primary Flight Control sys-
tem has earned its way onto the airplane.
and is not just technology for
technology's sake.

GWSSARY

ACE - Actuator Control EICAS· Engine Indication and MOV • Motor Operated Vah'c
Electronics Crew Alerting System
PCU - Power Control Units,
ADiRU - Air Data Inertial ELMS - Electrical Load Actuators
Reference Unit Management System
PFC· Primar)' Flight Computer
ADM· Air Data Module fCDC - flight Controls Direct
(Static and Total Pre!&Jre) Current (power system) PMG· Permunent Magnet
Generutor
AFDe· Autopilot night Director FCTR· Flight Control Test Rig
Computer PSA· Power Supply Assembly
FSEU - Flap Slat Electronics Unit
ALMS - Airplane Inrormation PSEU • Proximity Switch
Management System L - Left Electronics Unit

ARINC -Aeronautical Radio Inc. Lt- Lert I R- Right

(Industry Standard)
L2· lert 2 RAT- RamAirThrbine
C- Center
LRRA· Low Range Radio SAARU· Standb)' Attitude and
C.U· Pitch Control Law uti Altimeter Air Data Unit
lized in the Primary
.'light Computer LRU - Line Replaceable Unit SIL - Systems Inleg,,"on
Laboratory
CMC - Central Maintenance j\·tAT - Maintenance Access
Computer runction Terminal TAC· Thrust Asymmetry
or AIMS Compensation
l\'lEL· Minimum Equipment List
DCGF - Data CoO\'ersion Gate WEU - Warning Eleclronics Unit
way Function or AIMS MFD - Multi-Function Display

EDlU· Engine Data [ntenace

Unit

Airliner/Oct·Dec 1994 17

737 Dig!tal Cabin
Pressure Control System
K.V. Standerfer. P.E.
Lead S)'stems Engineer
7J7nS7 Environmental Control Systems
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
Alexander Bloch
S,~em Engirleer Cabin Pressure Control
Nord·Micro Elektronik·Feinmechllllik AG
18
new improved Cabin Pressure
A Control System (CPCS) has
been developed 10 replace the
existing analog pressure control system
on the 737·300l-4001·500airplanes. The
new digital system will be available as
an option with flfSt delivery beginning
in October 1994. It will be basic for the
new 737·rnJI-7001·800 airplane family.
Nord-Micro Elektronic-Feinmechanik
AG of Frankfurt. Germany is the prime
contractor responsible for design, imer-
system integration. and manufacture of
the system. Only lhe pressurization con-
trol system has been changed. the cabin
altitude warning, positive pressure relief.
and negative pressure relief systems have
nOI been altered.
Hardware Changes
The significant hardware differences be-
tween Ihe existing analog and digital sys-
tem configurations are (see Figure I):
The analog pressurization control
panel has been replaced by a digital
control panel. The mechanical
counters for selection of Ihe night
and landing altitude have been re-
placed with advanced technology
liquid crystal displays. The standby
mode functions have been replaced
by an identical second automatic
control channel.
The analog controller has been re-
placed with twO identical inter-
changeable digital controllers. The
circuitry required to drive the out-
flow valve motors has been relocated
to the outflow valve itself. Exten-
sive system Built-Ln Test (BITE) ca-
pability has been added wilh cover-
age provided for each Line Replace-
able Unit (LRU) as well as the over-
all system. A BITE control module
has been added to lhe front of each
controller to allow simple access to
•
Ihe system's BITE.
The single gate outflow valve has
been replaced by a dual gate valve.
The electronics required to control
the valve motors have been incorpo-
rated into two electronic units at-
tached to the valve actuator. The ac
and dc motors have been replaced
by two 28 Vdc motors for automatic
mode. and asinglededicated 28 Vdc
motor for manual mode.
• The dual delta P module, and out-
flow valve heater gasket have been
eliminated. For those operators fly-
ing QFE baro-coITeCtion, the Bam
Set module has been eliminated. 1be
Bam pressure source for the Auto
Comrollers is contained within the
Air Data Computers. thereby requir-
ing no input from the flight crew.
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
 • Pin selectable mui-
mum cabin ascent rates
of 600 or 750 sea level
feet per minute and de-
scent rates of 350. 500,
or 750 sea level feet per
minute have been incor-
porated. The ability !O
operate to 41,000 ft via
ship side pin select has
been incorporated for the
737-6001-7001-800_

The control panel and

outflow valve are in-
stalled in the same loca-
r---------------, tions using the same in-
Flgurr l. Major system component stallation procedures.
changes include replaumenl or the con- The controller installa-
trol panel, controllers and oulno.... '"ah-e.
tion has been changed to
Abon is a comparison orthe digital (urt) accommodate the addi-
and analog (Right) control panels.
'-- ---:_ _---:-::----' tion of a second conlrOl-
ler on the EI-I shelf. The system inter-
connect wiring has been redesigned to ac-
commodate Ihe change from analog to
These controllers are digital system architecture. Therefore.
located in the E&E the digital and analog systems are not
bay on the El-I rack, interchangeable.

From an operational standpoint. the digi-

tal system's performance in the automatic
control mode is nearly identical to that
ofme analog system's perfonnance. The
crew procedures for the automatic mode
have been slightly modified to eliminate
some preflight procedures which have
been automated.

There is, however, a significant differ-

ence in the back-up mode between the
The new system in- digital and analog systems. The standby
corporates a dual
gate ootnow ,-all-e. mode function has been eliminated and
replaced by a second identical automatic
mode. The second automatic mode is
provided by the additional controller. The
standby mode select and standby annun-
ciatoron the pressurization control panel
have been replaced by an alternate mode
selection and annunciator. This allows
for the same crew procedures to be used

Airliner/Oct-DC( 1994 19
as the analog system if the primary auto-.
maticcontrol channel should become in-
operative in night.
The manual mode is also slightly differ-
ent. The manual ac and manual dc modes
have been replaced by a single manual
mode select position on the pressuriza-
tion control panel. The slew rate of the
valve has been reduced to allow more
stable control in manual mode.
in the FJE compartment. and one outflow
valve located near the aft service door.
Five asynchronous operating micropro-
cessors are used to build two redundant
automatic conlrol channels (AUTO and
ALTN). Thecommunication between the
processors is accomplished using serial
interfaces ofARlNC 429 or R$422. An
independent manual control mode
(MAN) is provided using dc power from
the battery (see Figure 2).
allows direct conlrol of the outflow valve
via a IOggle switch for manual mode op-
eration. A valve poSition indicator is lo-
cated on the panel which provides indi-
cation of outflow valve position in all
modes of operation.
Located immediately above the pressure
control panel are four system status an-
nunciators which are controlled by the
system:

Advantages Flight Deck Controls and Indications: AUTOFAIL: an amber caution light
which indicates that a fault has 0c-
The digital cabin pressure conlrol system The pressure control panel functions as curred in the system which has dis-
offers several advantages over the exist- an interface between the crew and the abled one or both of the automatic
ing analog system. The most imponant pressurization control system (see Figure control channels.
advantage is a substantial improvement 3). II allows the crew to select the de-
in system and LRU reliability. This is sired operating mode (AUTO. ALTN. or ALTN: a green status light which in-
accomplished by tl significant reduction MAN), the imended airplane cruise alti- dicates that at least one automatic
in system and component complexity. tude (FLT ALT). and the planned land- channel is operating.
The improvement in relitlbility is funher ing field elevation (LAND ALT). It also
assured by utilizing components with
proven perfomlance. The controllers and
outflow valve are customized versions of
components which htlve been in-service I -;:~ I .... II -~..., I
-~
for several years and have demonstrated
much higher Mean TIme Between Fail- .'~""§,""'o~
01..1-...0_
_ ......
+ ,J IL
_.- +
........<XlOOIl
ure rates than their analog system equiva-
lents.
.'~:-:=j,""',.~
...., - . . . 0 _
r---------.,I
I ...
The reduction in system and LRU com- ....' - MO. I I ~.

plexity and the incorporation of BITE

..-_..- .- I
I

:~~I='
~

means that the airplane and components =-:-=r

--
~~

_.- --
will be more maintainable. The system's
extensive BITE capability will signifi- "-' ....1
--II t ...;:.....,-, ~
I,

-
cantly reduce the amount of time neces-
L ~

sary to isolate a faulty component on the

tlirplane, and once identified. the simpler
component design will result in reduced
~
, ,
I-
l- -;;:=!= il-11
I
I -
"-- -- _- -
shop test and repair times. A third ben- I
..
efit is a considerable reduction in weight.
The digital system is approximately 15
...
~

pounds lighter than the analog system.

. . . . ..--r
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The new cabin pressure control system

is comprised of a single pressurizalion
.-,--
L .......'

NEtQN'
-~,

. . . . . -......r
-~.
."
--
- --
- -~
I
I E! I
control panel located in the P5 overhead
panel in the flight deck, two interchange-
able controllers localed on (he El-l shelf Figure 1 Thissdlelllatic:sho\l"sthem~orcolllponentsofthentwdigital cabin prESSUrt' control.s}"Stem.

20 Airliner/Oct-Dee 1994

Figure 3. 11K' new cabin pressure control panel in the P5 panel features liquid crJstaI displ3JS.
MAN: a green Slatus light which in-
dicates that the selector switch has
been set to MAN and the system is
ready to operate in manual mode.
Both automatic channels are over-
ridden by disabling their outflow
valve driver circuit.
050: an amber caution light which
indicates that the cabin pressure con-
troller has detected the airplane de-
scending before it reached the se-
lected flight altitude (FLT ALT). and
is controlling cabin pressure back to
the take-off field elevation.
Automatic Mode (AUTO)
Each automatic control channel is com-
prised of one controller. one channel of
the pressurization control panel. one ac-
tuator electronics unit located on the
outflow valve. and one de motor which
drives the outflow valve actuator. The
outflow valve actuator and gate assem-
Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
blies are common to both control chan-
nels. (see Figure 2).
During power up, as well as operation.
each controller conducts BITE tests to
assure that it is receiving all inputs nec-
essary to control cabin pressure, and that
all components in the control channel are
operating. The controllers then check
their memories to detemline which con-
trol channel should be in control. Only
one controller is in command of the out-
flow valve at any given time. The con-
trollers alternate control channels each
flight leg to assure equal wear on the
common mechanical outflow valve parts.
When one control channel is in opera-
tion, the other control channel is in b(lck-
up mode. The back-up controller mim-
ics the calculations made by the opera-
tional controller and transmits position
commands to its on-side actuator elec-
tronics unil. The back-up channel's ac-
tuator electronics unit is disconnected
from its drive motor so it cannot com-
mand the valve. Thus. the back-up con-
trol channel is ready to take over com-
mand of the outflow valve whenever re-
quired. 5witchover to the back-up con-
trol channel is automatic if a fault occurs
which disables the operational control
channel.
The controllers use air/ground logic from
the right main gear air/ground relay. en-
gine RPM (N I and N2) from the stall
management computer. and computed
airspeed from the air data computers to
detennine the appropriate flight phase:
ground. pre-pressurizalion. take-off.
climb. cruise, or descenL Nonnally at
power up the system will enter the flight
phase it was in before power was lost.
Once the operational controller has de-
tennined the correct flight phase, it de-
tennines a target cabin pressure and sends
open or closed commands to the actua-
tor electronic unit located on the outflow
valve. The actuator electronic unit pro-
cesses the command from the controller
and drives a 28 Vdc brushless motor
which in tum drives the actuator to move
the valve gate assembly. The actuator
electronic unit receives actual valve p0.-
sition from a feedback module on the
actuator and compares it with its com-
manded position to assure proper valve
operation. The conlroller senses the new
cabin pressure and compares it with the
target pressure originally sel. This cycle
continues until the proper amount of air
flows overboard from the outflow valve
to equalize the actual and target cabin
pressures.
Alternate Mode (ALTN)
The Alternate mode is incorporated to
provide positive indication and crew
awareness that one of the two automatic
control channels is no longer operative.
and that the system has successfully
reconfigured !O the second automatic
control channel. The operation and per-
fonnanceofthe system in ALTN is iden·
tical to that in AUTO.
21
l\IanualMode (MAN)
Manual mode provides the crew direct
comrol of the outflow valve. The out-
flow valve is opened or closed using a
toggle switch on the control panel. The
valve position is indicated via the valve
position indicator on lhe control panel.
Fault Annunciation and System Re-
sponse
The following is a brief description of
how the system performs when a fault is
encountered:
The first fault in the system that disables
one automatic channel will cause the
AUTOFAIL annunciator to be illumi-
naled (along with the Master Caution and
AlRCOND annuncialors). The second
controller takes over automatically with-
out any crew action and illuminates the
ALTN annuncialor. The action for the
night crew is to cancel the Master Cau-
tion Warning and select the ALTN mode
position on the control panel. This will
extinguish the AlRCOND. Master Cau-
tion. and AUTOFAIL annunciations.
System operation remains fully automatic
in the ALTN mode with no degradation
of performance or increase in crew
workload.
If the second automatic channel faults.
thc ALTN light will extinguish and thc
AUTOFAIL. AIRCOND. and Master
Caution Warning annunciators will illu-
minate. TheextinguishedALTN annun-
ciator indicates to lhe night crew that
neither of the automatic channels is ca-
pable of control. and that the crew must
manually control cabin pressure. $elect-
ing the MAN mode position on the mode
select switch will extinguish the
AUTOFAIL annunciator and illuminate
the MAN annunciator.
Selecting the mode select switch from
MAN to either ALTN or AUTO positions
will perform a reset of both automatic
control channels. If the cause for the
22
automatic channel fauh(s) is no longer
present. or the controllers ha\'e automati-
cally recovered. the system will operate
in automatic mode again.
MAINTENANCE
The new system offers a significant im-
provement in maintainability over the
existing system. The elimination of sev-
eral supponing components. such as the
dual della P module and outflow valve
heater gasket, will result in fewer oppor-
tunities for failures. The wiring interfaces
have also been greatly simplified since
almost all of the analog control signals
have been replaced with ARINC 429
communications.
II will also be much easier to identify and
fix hardware problems in the shop. All
three of the LRUs are compatible with
standard automated test equipment which
should allow for faster and more accu-
rate identification of failed partS. The
BITE fault memory will also be avail-
able for shop use. While faults from old
night legs can be screened from display
on the airplane. clearing of the fault
memory can only be done in the shop.
This assures that the recent history of the
component is always available for iden-
tification and correlation of intenniuent
faults. The accumulated operating hours
since the last shop visit is also available
for the control panel and controller. This
allows for accurate checking of Mean
lime Between Failure and Mean lime
Between Unscheduled Removal rates for
each component.
As a funherconvenieoce. an ARlNC 429
port has been located on the from ofeach
controller. This interface will allow di-
rect access to each control channel's op-
eration and controller memory while the
system is operating. This type of input
monitoring will allow very accurate
onboard troubleshooting if required.
The most imponant improvement. how-
ever. is the incorporation ofBuih-ln Test
Equipment (BITE). The addition of
BITE allows a tremendous enhancement
in the ability to troubleshoot problems in
a timely manner on the airplane.
Built-In-T~t Equipment (BITE)
Each component in the system performs
its own imemal continuous BITE check.
The results of these tests are reponed to
the controller. A system level BITE lest
is also performed by each controller to
assure that proper system control is main-
tained. The controllers integrate the re-
sults of the individual component and
system tests and determine the appropri-
ate fault messages to be set.
The status of the system is accessed via a
BITE Control Module (BCM) located on
the front of each controller (see Figure
4). The BeM ulilizes a 16 character al-
pha-numeric LED display to show sys-
tem status and fault information with
English language messages. Also incor-
porated within the BCM is a key pad
which allows the ability to manipulate the
BITE menus and fuoctions. There ~
five selections available on the main
menu: existing faults. fault history.
ground test. system status. and system test
and clear. Each of these main functions
is described below:
Existing Faults: The existing faults
menu allows access to a list of all
active or latched faults which are
currently being detected by BITE.
"The faultsaredisplayed in real time.
Fault History: The fault history
menu allows access to a list offaults
which were recorded over the past
10 flight legs. A sub-menu allows
access to each flight leg. Each fault
stored in fault history has a list of
correlating fault details which were
recorded when the fault was de-
tected. These dctails provide a snap-
shot of the system and airplane op-
erating parameters when the fault
occurred. Parameters such as cabin
Airliner/Oct-Dec: 1994
 menu allows access to two sub-
menus which provide details on the
system'scurrent inpuls,oUlpUlS. and
configuration. The System Status
sub-menu presents parameters such
as cabin pressure. outnow valve po-
sition.the operating mode. etc. The
System Config sub-menu displays
the configuration of all pin select-
able options. such as ascent rate
limit. descent rate limit, QFE or
QNH operation. etc ..

System Test & Clear: The system

test and clear selection initiates a
complete BITE test. and if success-
ful. clears the existing fault register
and inhibits the display of any faults
recorded in fault history. (The faults
are inhibited from display on the
BCM. but nre not erased. This al-
lows the history to be retained for
shop use.) System test and clear is
a return to service test which veri-
fies that the system is functioning
properly after a maintenance action

-- · -- »,
_. -- · _ .. SF,
such as component replacement.

>'
•
.
F~l 0,
• A pocket-sized BITE control manual will
be provided with each system to describe
>~ ~ ~

'" "" the operation of the BCM, all menu

items. and each fault message together
with corrective action. A brief summary
of the BCM operation instructions is pro-
vided on the front of the controller im-
mediately above the BCM.

SUMMARY
Figure 4. The status of the cabin pressure control system may be accessed b)' means or
the BITE Control Module located on each pressure conlmllcr. The digital cabin pressure control sys-
tem will provide a significant improve-
ment in system and LRU reliability over
the existing analog system while main-
pressure. ambient pressure. cabin selection of either a display test (for taining the same level of passenger com-
climb rate, and outflow valve posi- the BeM), or a complete lest of the fan. This together with the elimination
tion are recorded. on-side control channel which may of several components. a reduction in the
be used to troubleshoot a problem. time required to isolate a fault. and a re-
Ground Tests: The ground lest menu The full ground lest requires ap- duction in system weight will result in a
allows access to tests which may be pro:<imately 90 seconds 10 complete. significant decrease in the system's op-
used to determine the current health emting cost.
of Ihe system. A sub-menu allows System Status: The system status

Airiiner/Oct·Dec 1994 23
 lo.1.d loading. The takeoff perfomlunce

T
he use of a more aft center of
gravity for calculaling takeoff
perfonnancecan significantly in-
crease performance limited takeoff
weight.
Introduction
The takeoff perfonnance of an airplane
is effected by the location of the
airplane's center or gravity (CG). For this
reason. Boeing has historically presented
airplane takeoff perfonnance using the
most conservative position for the
airplane's eG. The forward CG limit for
takeoff represents the worst-case comb;·
nation of interior configuration and pay-
calculated from the Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM) provides certified levels
of performance at the forward CO limit
per the requirements of the certifying
agency (FAA. JAA, etc). Airlines who
do not lood their airplanes near the ror-
ward CG limit for takeoff have potential
takeoff weight capabilities in excess of
these requirements. These airlines can
significantly increase their takeoff per-
fonnance limits by using an AFM appen-
dix which bases takeoff perfomlance on
an ahemate forward CG limit (further aft)
that better reneets actual in-service load-
ing.
A receOi memorandum by the Federal
Aviation Adminislfiuion (FAA) expands
the availability of altemate forward CG
limits for establishing takeoff perfor-
mance. The purpose of this article is to
review the concept of altemate forward
CG limits for takeoff and discuss its ap-
plicalion and results. The following as-
pects will be discussed:
Regulatory Environment
Why CG Location Impacls Takeoff
Perfonnance
Potential Benefits to the Airlines
Implementalion Considerations
While the concepts discussed apply to

Alternate CG TakeoffLimits
FOR INCREASED TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE

Martin 1\'1. Withington

Aerodynamic Performance Enl;in~r
Hoeing Commerdal Airplane Company

24 Airliner/Ocl-Dcc 1994
any type ofairplane, the eltamples shown
will be for the 767·3OOER for which
Boeing currently offers theAFM appen-
dix required.
Regulatory Environment
During the late 1960's the 727 airplane
had a series of forward CG limits which
corresponded to structural, OEW, and
MTOW changes to the airplane. Then
during the I 970·s. the FAA began resuict-
ing approval of alternate forward CG lim-
its for determining revised takeoff andl
or landing performance to only one per
manufacturer's airplane model. Some
eltamples of this are the DC-I040, the
737-300 and theA310. AFMs were pro-
vided with improved takeoff performance
if the alternate forward CG limit was fur-
ther aft of the original forward CG limit.
The effect of this was that all operators
of a manufacturer's model had the same
single alternate forward CG limit, which
may not afford any takeoff performance
benefit for a particular operator's load-
ing requirements.
Why CG Location Impacts Takeoff
Performance
A common simplification in aerodynamic
theory is that by summing up all of the
forces acting on a wing. they can be re-
duced to the forces of lift and drag and a
pitching moment. For an airplane in
flight, the pitching moment is countered
by the trimming force provided by the
horizontallail surface. An aft movement
of the airplane's CG reduces the pitch-
ing moment such that the downward tail
load required (0 uim is reduced. For level
flight, the required wing lift is the sum
of the weight of the airplane and the tail
down load to trim. Therefore, since an
aft movement of the airplane's CG re-
duces the tail down load, the required
wing lift is also reduced (see Figure I).
Wing lift
A reduction in the required wing lift will
present itself as a reduction in speed for
the same pitch attitude and weighl which
reduces the stalilimiled speed. This wing
Iif! reduction also reduces the airplane
pitch attitude for the same weight and
speed which reduces the takeoff attitude
limited speed (used to set the margin to
lail strike at rotation). These limits are
the basis for calculating the operating
takeoff speeds. A reduction in these
speeds reduces the field length required
for a given takeoff weight. The reduc-
tion in the lail down load also reduces
the airplane's trim drag which improves
climb capability.
The resulting takeoff performance im-
provement is either an increase in lhe
takeoff weight limil for a particular

The FAA has recently defined a proce-

dure for basing takeoff performance on
two alternate forward CG limits per op- [] !!!!" • ..
erlltor-specific variam of0 particular air-
pilUle type. An oi'7)lalle tytH! refers to
Tail trim
airplanes with the same Type Certificate
(i.e. 767-200. 767-300), while operator-
specific \·ariant is an airplane outfitted Fwd CG limit
to a particular customer's requirements
(e.g. engine type, seat pitch. galley loca-
tions, etc.). The manufacturer can now
provide takeoff performance tailored to Wing lift
an operator's choice of two alternate for-
ward CG limits which best cover their B !!I!fI • .
own in-service loading requirements. In-
service loading is a function of interior
configuration. route structure. and cargo Tail trim
loading procedures. Since an operator
may use an airplane in many different Operational CG
ways, twO altemale forward CG Hmits
provide better nexibility for an operator's
use of that airplane.

Figurl:': I. Till, location of tJll:': ..." euler of gra~'ity arrecl.'i Ihe laillood 10 trim.

Airliner/Ckt-Dec 1994 25
 airpon"s conditions or the same takeoff
weight al more limiting conditions
400
"0 (shorter field length, higher lemperalure.
360 etc.). The key characteristics which de-
360
340 termine the amount of benefit are the
weight of the airplane. the tail moment
ann lenglh. and the distance between the
original forward CG limit and the aller-
,;.W~';;';''''''''J nate forward CG limit.
,.
Potential Benefits to the Airlines
Cenler 01 26 '"
Gravity 22 $(:. A typical fully loaded 767-300ER with a
0/0 MAC is
18
,. ~
tri-class interior (see Figure 2) may have
" .. CG values which vary with fuel load be-

6'--------U~ ~
tween 22% and 29% of the mean aero-
dynamic chord (MAC). The forward CG
limit for current 767-300ER AFM take-
ofT perfonnance calculations is 7% MAC.
By choosing an alternate forward CG
limit of 22% MAC for takeoff perfor-
mance calculations. the increase in field
length limited takeoff weight ranges from
Figure 2. 767·300ER Tri·CIass. Notice lhechange in CG ,'alues wilh increasing fuel weight. 5.000 to 7,000 Ibs (see Figure 3). The
increase in the tire speed limited takeoff
weight is 8.000 Ibs. Brake energy and
obstacle limited takeoff perfonnance will
also show improvements.

For operators who do not foresee takeoff

16
performance limitations as a primary con-
Tlre Speed umited~~
cern, alternate forward CG limits may be

" Cu"enl Forwatd-.............

•
I
chosen to allow greater oPpor1unities for
reduced thrust operations. Both engine
Tlr8 Speed umited~ e.G. Umit "
thrust derates and the assumed tempera-
" :
FAR.
Takeoff
Field
Length " , "
, "
~
, ,
,''--22%C.G.
ture method reduce the exhaust gas tem-
perature in the hOi engine section which
increases engine reliability and reduces
(1.000 h) engine maintenance costs. The above
8 example provides about a 2% thrust re-
duction. It should be noted, however. that
6 reduced thrust operation cost benefits are
highly dependent upon an individual
airline's maintenance agreements, and
"·80~=-300:'-:-""'320L..-C34LO--,J360L_C380L_-'-'OO.,-_-.L20:--".LO----"W therefore should be evaluoted by the op-
Brake Release Gross Weight (1 ,000 lb) erator.

Implementation Considerations

To implement alternate takeoff CG lim-

its additional emphasis may be required
Figun: 3. 767·JO(}ER TH.k~fT Pt'rrurlllanl;t~. ErrL't:t ur CG lucatiuli. in maintaining weight and balance

26 Airliner/Oct-Dec 1994
recoros and providing the necessary train-
ing and operating procutures for night.
ground. and dispatch crews to assure ac·
curate loading. In addition to these cri-
teria. there are several other issues an
operator should be aware of \l, hen con-
sidering implementation.
1ne ability to take advantage of the per-
fonnance benefits of an alternate takeoff
CG limit is dependent on the airplane's
interior configuration and the operator's
loading practices. The number of pas-
senger classes. location of galleys. use of
LD-2 or LD-3 containers. and the load-
ing of bulk cargo all affect the takeoffCG
of an airplane. Attention to lhese and
Other items can increase the potential ben-
efilS of alternate forward CG limits for
takeoff.
As a generaJ rule. Iri-class interiors on
the 767-300ER load 10 CGs which are
more aft lhan either dual class. inclusive
toor. or frrighter configurations. For this
reason a tri·dass interior has a greater
opportunity for takeoff performance im-
provements using alternate forward CG
limits for takeoff.
Airplanes which are loaded 10 funher aft
CGs for takeoff also have funher aft CGs
in night which reduces fuel bum.
Having a more aft ahemBte forward CG
limit for takeoff does not restrict that air-
plane from operating Btlhe basic forward
CO limit with the appropriate takeoff
perfonnance level.
Summary
Alternate forward CO limits for takeoff
aIlowairlinestotakeoovantageofadded
revenue for the 767-JOOER due to in-
creased allowable takeoff weights. 1m-
pt'O\'ed engine reliability and savings in
engine maintenance costs are also avail-
able through an increase in the availabil-
ity of reducW engine thrust operations
at non limiting airports. All of this can
be done by adding an altem:ue CG limit
appendiX to the AFM and maintaining
attention 10 the airplane loading proce-
dures. 0 modifications are required of
either in-service or fUlure airplanes 10
lake advantage of Ihis takeoff perfor-
mance improvemcnt. The alternale for-
ward CO limit appendices for all Model
767s are available by a change requcst
through your Boeing regional contracts
manager or Boeing CUSlOmer Engineer.

- - I Correction 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
AvoidingTail Strikes

The: July·September 1994 edi- ·'• ..,. ......... _ _ 11 ......

tion of the AIRLINER con- .......""_i'l_......--
tained an ankle entitlcdAmid-
ing Tail Strikes. Several errors
inadvenemly appeared in this
anicle. '"
_ 0---
....... ""-"'*'...,(1 ~ I

_ o-_~ __

Page 10. MiddleColumn. First

Line - Should read main gear
vs nose gear.

Page 11. Figures I llnd 2 -

should have read figures 2
and L respectively.

Page 13. Figure 6· some of the

dala dropped off of the figure
which is reprinted here.

Page 16. Left Column. Line 18

- the degree sign dropped. 11
should have read 2.5 - 3".
."igure 6. Ceometry·limited tail strike
---
bod" angles rOf" selec1ed airplane modds are
depicted in Ihis chart.

Airliner/Ckt-I)ec 1994 27
Customer Services Representatives fIELD IIRVICI

Boeing Customer services Division, Field service Unit, Seanle. Washington

Region One Regloo SIx
'DALlAS 0.8. Wall, REG. OIA., (214) 55().n47
ATlANTA K. L Ooem, L Anglin, J. zabriskie 'OUBAI C Armstrong,REG. DIR.. (971+4) 314077
(404)-714-3129 ABU OHABI J. Krekelbeig, (971+2) 7067485
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834251. ext. 469
I
T. Tam, P. Wagner 886+33) 833023 or
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R.~~I\56+216019382
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. 56+2) 6018509
J.~
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SEOULI KALI
Regloo Four SEOUL MR) P. Th~,H.R~ns(82+2)6654095
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LUTON MON) O.Gencoz, (44+582) 4116490r 398603 XIAMEN E. Chaog ("'592)602<1204
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Region FIve /31+20) 649-4554
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MADRID W. Shaw,(34+1l329-1755 HANOVER H. 5cheunemam, {49+5"19727387
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PARIS (ORY)
(33>1}_-1069
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MOSCOW(AROI
S. oakes (352l!4211-3399
M. Mennenga +0951578-1505
AOME A. MCAllister (39+6 6501-0135
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SOFIA M. Blum f359+2) 7 16
TUNIS T. Bray (216+1) 781996 PRAGUE M. Hutchings 42+2) 360616
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WARSAW S. GoIanka, (48+) 39121370
"REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Headquarters.. Field S&rvice
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6oei':l9 AIRLINER Magazine
October· December 1994
R J MCARTHUR
20-89 M-7671 322