BOEING

AIRLINER January-March 1989

CONTENTS

Model 737·200/·300 Cone Bolts ....•...•....•.•......

Painting Engine Lnlet Huard Zones ........•......... 5
The Qu~n Is 20 - 741 Anniversary ........•......... 9
How Rough Is Your Runway ..•...•.•..••.••.•..•.• 13
737 Digital ..1 lgbt Control System .....••.••••••••••• 18
Stratoliner's Golden Anniversary ..••.•••••••..••...• 24
Customer Support Representatives •••••.•....•. Bat:kpage
Fuel Consenation &: OpenUons
Newslener ...........•.............. Center Pullout

BOEING COM1\lERClAL AJRPLANFS

Via President-Customer Support .........•. A.F. Carbary
Vi(:e President-Flight Operations •••••••••••• B.s. Wygle
Airliner Staff-
Supervising Editor .......•..•............. R.L OldanI
PublicatiotlS Editor ...•.•.••.•.•........•..• A.T. Uo)'d
Designer •...............•..•.......... D.~V.
ON THE COVER: The first and the latest In the 147 family are
d\\-.rfed by Mount R.amier In conJ,,mction ""ilh Ihe celet!11I110ns
of the ZOlh annl\'en.lry or the Model 747. I'ld as part of routme
niJht testmlo The Boeing Comrany displayed RAOOI (the first
Model 747 and the newest member ol this scrics, the MOOd
747400 A brief hislory of the Jumbo,tet is prdCnted on Page 9.
Photo b)': Ken De Jartal5
Copeland

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mformallon

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publishaJ.

Copyright 01989 The Boemg Compan)'

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L
 Model 737-100/-200 Engine Mounts

Lee Speight
Renton
Sel1lice Engineering

DESIGN FEATURES

T
he history of the engine mounting cone bolt can
be traced back to tbe engineering concept of
suspending engines beneal.h the wings or mount-
ing on the art fuselage of modem jet-powered airplanes.
Such external mounting permits the engine to be sus-
pended from vibration isolators. When combined with
sound-proofing in tbe cowling, inlet, and exhaust, this has
proven to be effective in dealing with the noise and
vibration created by engines. The external mounting
concept introduces some specific engineering design
criteria that determine the function and shape of the
engine mounting cone bolts.
The engine must be easily removable for periodic main-
tenance and overhaul, and provide the required level of
performance and reliability. To meet these criteria, me
three engine mounting vibration isolators were designed
with a conical socket and a mating cone-shaped bolt. This
design permits the cone bolts to be attached to the engine
mounting flanges, the engine hoisted into position, and
the bolts inserted into the conical sockets. The conical
design minimizes the possibility of improper alignment
and wear on the mounting hardware and the airplane
structure.

AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1 9 8 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I

Aft engine mount cone bolt showing
necked-doW'D thread relid area.
The engines must be securely attached to the airfnune
to impart the necessary thrust forces to the airplane. In
addition. the attachment must withstand turbulent air,
rough runways, and hard landings. The design provides
for the separation of the engines from the airplane in case
of excessive engine loads to prevent rupture of the fuel
tanks.
The engine separation feature is accomplished on all
models of Boeing jet airplanes by providing structural
fuses in the engine mounting structure. On the Model
737.100/·200, the three·point engine mounting configu·
Fonrard engine mount cone boll sho,", attached to
engine mounting nange.
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AlRLL"'ERlJAN·MAR 1989
ration consists of two forward cone bolts attached to
vibration isolators that are housed in the forward engine
mount support fining which. in tum. is attached to the
wing at the front spar. The forward cone bolts support
part of the engine weight and inertia loads as well as
transmit the thrust load to the airfnune. The aft cone bolt
suppor1S the rear end of the engine and is attached to the
aft vibration isolator whk:.h is housed in a fitting that is
pin-connC(:ted to the outboard track of the inboard flap
and permits fore and aft movement of the engine due to
thermal expansion. At the forward mOl!nt the fuse points
are located at the front spar and at the aft ends of the
thrust links. A thread relief area in the aft cone bolt
provldes the fuse.
The cause of cone bolt fatigue fa.ilures has been attributed
to the cone bolt being improperly seated or loose in the
conical socket. usually as a result of improper torquing.
If the cone bolt is loose in the mounting socket. night
loads will induce cychc bending stresses in the nC(:ked-
down thread rehef area near the fu~ section. Typical
metallurgical analyses of broken cone bolts show that
the bending stresses in the necked-down section have
resulted in slow-growth fatigue that progressed to various
magnitudes of the cross-sectional area before the remain-
ing material failed in rapid ductile separation.
SECONDARY SUPPORT
Boeing Service Bulletin 737-71-1069, released on
December 13, 1982, called for installation of a secondary
support. This support consists of a cable installed across
the aft cone bolt interface to support the engine in case
eo...
Secondary support cable and braclt.ets installed 01'1 engine
per Sern« Bulletin 737·71·1069.
of breakage of the an cone OOh. The cable is rigged for
one-half inch slack so that the aft end of the engine will
drop this distance and the broken cone bolt may be
detected by visual means. This feature is enhanced by the
installation ofa warning stripe on the fixed fairing which
is covered by the thrust reverser fairing. A mismatch of
fairings, uncovering the warning stripe occurs if the
bolt is broken and the engine is being supported by the
secondary support cable. The secondary support was an
optional instaUation and may not have been incorporated
by all operators.
In January 1986, a fatigue fracture of an aft cone oolt
resulted in the breakage of the secondary support cable.
The aft end of the nacelle was observed to be drooping
by ground personnel while the airplane was in its takeoff
roll. The flight crew was notified, the engine was shut
down, and an uneventful single-engine landing was ac-
complished. A design review and subsequent lesting of
the secondary support revealed that the supporl cable
might not preclude the possibility of an engine separation
in the case of a broken aft cone OOlt. A design change
was made to replace the support cable with a bolt that
incorporates a crushable honeycomb core block which
will absorb energy developed should the engine drop. The
new secondary support oolt provides a degree of re-
dundancy and still conforms to the design criterion of
allowing a safe separation in case of breakage of the
forward engine mounl.
However, before the revision to the secondary support
could be implemented, another incident occurred. On
December 5, 1987, a fatigue fracture of an aft cone oolt
and the subsequent loss of the secondary support resulted
in an engine separation. The engine separated during
c1imb-out at 4000 feet altitude. The airplane made an
uneventful single-engine landing. Investigation revealed
that the aft cone bolt fractured due to slow-growth fatigue
over more than one-half the cross-sectional area. The
remainder of the aft cone oolt and OOth forward cone
OOlts broke in rapid ductile separation. This incident
resulted in Airworthiness Directive AD 88-01-07, issued
on December 24, 1987. This final rule, effective on
January 25, 1988, requires inspection of the aft cone oolt
within 300 landings and thereafter at intervals not to
exceed 600 landings.
INSPECTIONS
Boeing developed an ultrasonic procedure to inspect an
installed aft cone OOlt. A calibration standard, dummy
bolt PIS 365, was designed. This dummy oolt, along with
detailed instructions, was furnished to the operators so
that they could utilize existing ultrasonic test equipment
10 inspect the cone bolts for fatigue cracks without
removing the engines. This information was provided in
Boeing AJert Service Bulletin 737-7IA1212, released on
December 22,1987. Boeing requested operators to report
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
the results of these inspections weekly until a once-
around-the-neet inspection had been completed. During
the first six months, Boeing received reports from
45 operators covering 1674 aft cone oolt inspections on
837 airplanes. These reports revealed that no cracks had
been found. As a precaution, several operators had re-
moved cone bolts that had appeared irregular during the
ultrasonic inspections; however, subsequent magnetic
particle testing revealed that none of these bolts had
cracked.
The National Transportation Safety Board called a
meeting in New York on March 4, 1988, to determine
if there was any problem with the cone bolt threads or
self-locking feature of the special cone bolt nut that would
allow the nut to loosen in service after it had been
properly installed. Thread measurements were made on
new, used, and overhauled cone oolts and samples of the
special self-locking nuts that are used on the cone bolts.
There were no significant discrepancies found on any of
the parts measured and the over all quality of the threads
was judged as very good. The Boeing maintenance
manual procedures and recommendations were also
reviewed and found to be adequate. I t was concluded that
there were no problems with the quality of the threads
and that the maintenance procedures were adequate to
ensure that the nut will not loosen after it has been
properly installed. The Boeing review of the NTSB
meeting report resulted in a recommendation to remind
the operators to observe the existing installation
procedures and to insure that the threads are inspected
for conformity to the MIL-S-8897 standard as specified
in the overhaul manual prior to reuse. Boeing Service
Letter 737-71-27, dated December 21, 1988, Engine
Mount Cone Bo/t Installation and Overhaul, reinforces
Boeing's maintenance procedures.
NEWLY DESIGNED SUPPORT
The redesign of the secondary support, as offered by
Revision I to Boeing Service Bulletin 737-71-1069, was
accepted by tbe FAA as the terminating action for the
repetitive inspections required by AD 88-02-07. A final
rule, Amendment 39-6044, to the AD became effective
on December 17, 1988, requiring incorporation of Service
Bulletin 737-71-1069 R-I within the next 4000 landings.
The service bulletin provides two installation kits, The
basic kit, PIN 65C275 I5-5, contains the parts necessary
to install the complete secondary support assembly, and
is required on airplanes that did not have the original
secondary support installed. This installation requires
support or removaJ of the engine. The supplemental kit,
PIN 65C2752 I 5-9, contains the parts necessary to
modify the original secondary support installation. This
kit replaces the cable with a bolt and energy-absorbing
crush core material while retaining the attachment bolts
and brackets. Installation of the supplemental kit does
not require supporting or removal of the engine. Included
Engine build-up hardware and cone bolt for new
se<o.da", ,"pport ,.'blllation as dep;(it§v;,e
BuUetin 737-71-1069, Revision 1. .. 107--
in both kits are instructions for applying the aft mount
indicator markings which are required on the outboard
side of the wing/nacelle fairing and the thrust reverser
deOector door fairing. These markings consist of a red
pointer on the fixed nacelle aft fairing pointing to a green
band on the thrust reverser door fairing. A misalignment
of these stripes indicates a fractured cone bolt.
Replacement of the cone boh is required before night.
Repetitive inspection of the indicator markings is
required at intervals not to exceed three calendar days
(72 hours) on in-service airplanes according to provisions
of the revised AD. Boeing Operations Bulletin 88-3,
dated August 5. 1988, recommends checking the indi-
cator Stripes during the exterior walk-around inspection
on night crew changes or first night of the day.
In addition to the redesigned secondary support, cone
bolts will be shot peened to increase their fatigue life.
Boeing Specification Drawing 10-60517 has been revised
to add shot peening to the currently preferred bolts. The
new shot peened cone bolts are identical to the superseded
cone bolts except for the addition of shot peening in the
thread relief area and new part numbers. Revision E to
Service Letter 737-71-3, incorporates the two improved
shot peened cone bolts and outlines the effectivity. The
shot peened cone bolts will replace the existing cone boils
on an attrition basis. Shot peening is nOt recommended
for used cone boIts. However, spares of existing preferred
cone boils that have not been used or overhauled may
be shot peened and the part number changed. The shot
peened cone bolts will be available from the supplier,
Barry Controls, after the first quarter of 1989. The
specification drawing defines the vibration isolators and
cone bolts. Boeing Service Letter 737-71-3E contains a
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A l R L l N E R / J A N · M A R 1989
Art engine mount with secondary support bolt and
crush-c:ore energy absorber.
matm: showing the certified configuration of cone bolt
part numbers and engine that may be used on 737-100/-
200 airplanes.
The cone bolts are replaced at each engine change with
either a new or overhauled bolt. The cone bolts are
overhauled by the supplier or operators may overhaul
their own in accordance with Barry Controls Overhaul
Manual 71-20-03. Overhaul of the cone bolt includes
refurbishment of the wear surfaces, inspection of critical
fit dimensions. thread inspection, and magniOuxing for
fatigue cracks. Approximately one half of the used cone
bolts have been rejected during overhaul due to thread
damage or wear that exceeds the overhaul limits.
SUMMARY
The 737-100/-200 engine mounting cone bolts have a
good in-service reliability record. Fatigue failures of the
cone bolt have been attributed to installation error.
Replacement of existing cone bolts with imprOVed shot
peened cone bolts will provide greater fatigue life for the
installation. A secondary support has been designed to
minimize the possibility of an engine separation in case
of a broken aft cone bolt. Revision I to Service Bulletin
737-71-1069 provides terminating action for the
repetitive inspections required by Airworthiness
Directive 88-01-07. Incorporation of this service bulletin
and operator attention to existing maintenance manual
procedures will result in a higher level of confidence in
the engine mounting cone bolts and provide a secondary
load path to protect against engine separation in case of
a fractured aft cone bolt.
 RAMP MARKINGS FOR ENGINE INLET HAZARD ZONES-
PRECAUTIONS FOR THEIR USE

A/bert F. Emanuel
Aircraft Safety Engineer
Renton Product Safety

here have been twenty-one reported ingestions One personnel ingestion has occurred since the last

T of personnel into the JT8D engines on 737 air·

planes. one resulting in a falslity, and several
causing serious injuries. There has been no report of an
ingestion into a CFM-56 powered 737, but there is a
much greater potential for injury because lhere are no
stationary inlet guide vanes which, in tbe JT8D, have
provided some protection from contact with lite rotating
fan.
AIRLINER article on the subject in tbe July-September
1987 issue, emphasizing the need for ground perwnnel
to be conslanlly alert to the potential hazard presented
by a running engine. The first rule of engine safety is for
no onc to be near an operating engine unless absolutely
necessary. Additional means for reducing the probability
of an ingestion are the inlet screen, and the Boe.ing.
approved safety harness (part number F80239·7).

AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
BOEING SAFETY PROGRAM
Boeing has an active program designed to inronn
operators of the hazard of working in the vicinity of an
operating engine. This program includes the distribu-
tion of posters, a video tape presentation. Maintenance
Manual warnings, nacelle warning decals, and articles
contained in the October·December 1983, October-
December 1984, and July-September 1985 editions of the
AIRLINER magazine.
Inlet hllZ.lLTd zone definitions are published in all 737
series Maintenance Manuals (71-‫סס‬-OO). The hazard zone
dimensions shown in Figure 1 apply to all 737 aircraft.
Beside the published hazard zones, the following con·
siderations apply:
• For reported surface winds greater than 25 knots,
increase the hazard zone boundary.
All CFM·56 powered 137s have nacelle markings clearly
indjcating tbe bazard zone boundary aft of the inlel lip
for above-idle power (see Figure 2). Decals for marking
the JT8D powered 737s can be obtained by ordering the
kits described Service BulJetin 737·11.IOIOR.I, dated
June 21, 1984.
INLET HAZARD ZONE RAMP MARKINGS
Some operators are painting the inlet hazard zone
boundary on the ramp surface al parking locations (see
Figure 3) to provide a clear definition of that boundary
10 ground personnel. While this practice can be an aid
10 safelY, an incorrect hazard zone will be displayed if
Ihe airplane is nOI parked in correct relationship to the
painted boundaries. (See Boeing Service leller 737·SL·
71-28, dated January II, 1989.)

• If ramp surfaces are slippery, additional precautions

are required.

• Following engine shutdown. allow lime for spool-

down before approaching the inlet.

Figure 2. Nacelle warning placards.

•••• • 11 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Figure 3. Inlet h.azard zone ramp markings.

Figure I.
e9
Inlet hazard zones as depicted in the
737 Maintenance Manual.

6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A l R L I N E R l J A N · M A R 1989
The hazard zone boundary dimensions include an allow-
ance ror the error inherent in estimating the dislance to
the inlet. When the boundaries are painted on the ramp,
there is no longer a requirement ror estimating the dis-
tance, and the error allowance can be used to speciry the
accuracy with which the airplane must be parked to avoid
violating the actual hazard zone. Figure 4 shows the
required accuracy ror relating the inlet lip to the painted
boundary ror any 137 aircraft. Figure 5 shows the per-
tinent dimensions relating the inlet lip, landing gear,
and passenger door ror the various 737 series airplanes,
emphasizing the requirement to clearly differentiate the ,
parking guidance ror each 737 series. It is essential that
the ramp markings are nOI inadvertently applied to air-
planes ror which they are not intended. Figure 4. The airplane must be accurately spoUed
on the ramp markings to be effective.

......
BlIIIIII.
iii.III.
111.111.
111111. . .
III.""
Figure 5. Pertinent dimensions required for proper spotting or the 737 on a parking ramp are sbown in this illustration.

AlRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - 7

B
The red nacelle sLripe (when instalJed) indicates the aft
boundary ofthe hazard wne (see Figure 2). Ifthe airplane
is not precisely positioned relative to the painted ramp
boundary, the aft ramp boundary and the nacelle stripe
will not coincide. possibly causing confusion. While the
aft boundary includes an estimating error allowance. the
distance to the inlet is small. so it must be emphasized
that confusion about the boundary location. or exceeding
the aft parking position tolerance by even a small amount.
could significantly increase Lhe exposure to ingestion
unless the nacelle stripe is used as the prime reference.
It is strongly recommended that the nacelle stripe be
installed on all 737 airplanes. especially those which will
be parked where there are painted boundaries. Training
ramp personnel to cross-check the nacelle stripe with the
painted boundary as they approach the airplane will not
only allow a quick confirmation of the airplane position- This airplane has been accurately parked relative to the
ing. but will also condition an awareness of the hazard hazard zone markings painted on the ramp.
zone for when there is no painted boundary, or when it
is obscured by snow.
with the inlet of a running engine; however. the hazard
SUMMARY zones must clearly and unambiguously indicate the air-
planes to which they apply. and the airplanes must be
Inlet hazard zones painted on the ramp can serve as a accurately positioned to ensure that the painted bound-
reminder to ground personnel of the hazard associated aries will provide the required safety margin.

DDN!T
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SUCK
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This poster. concisely defining safe and unsafe practices

around running engines, was sent to all Boeing jetliner
operators. These posters are still available.

4 Correct and incorrect exiting of an open 737-200/-200

engine cowl.

8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
 The Queen is 20
A. T. Lloyd
Editor. AIRLINER Magazine
uring the early 19605, the air transportation
D industry was in a heyday and the manufacturers
were working to develop newer and larger air-
planes to meet the needs of the airlines. During those
limes the supersonic transport, or SST, was on the
drawing boards of several aircraft manufacturers, along
with designs for large cargo jets. Boeing was caught
in a dilemma - they could build an SST for passenger
travel and a large jet for carrying cargo; however, should
the SST efforts fail, they would have 10 convert the jet
into a passenger airplane.
to August 1965, Boeing organized a design team under
Joe Sutter. His charter was to develop an airplane that
could meet either the cargo or passenger needs of the
airlines which were predicted for the 19705. Go-ahead
for the program was authorized by the Boeing board of
directors in March 1966. One month later, Pan American
announced that it would purchase 25 ofthese Model 747s,
which became known as the jumbo jets.
This article chronicles the 20 years since the first flight
of Boeing's big bird.
AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1 9 8 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
THE INCREDmLES
In order to build the new jumbo jets, Boeing required a
new manufacturing faciHly. In June 1966, the company
acquired a 780-acre plot of land adjacent to Paine Field,
Everett, Washington. The land was cleared, a rail line
was buill, and the free world's largest manufacturing
facililY, measuring 42 acres, under a single roof was
erected.
A massive overaU program plan was developed to inte-
grate plant construction, subcontracting, design, and
manufacturing of the 747. The efforts were equated with
those of the legendary Paul Bunyan. A can do spirit was
developed and major milestones were recognized with
appropriate celebrations and fanfare. The workers on the
747 program were known as The lncredib/es.
Production operations at the Everett site commenced
in January 1967. The first nose section arrived from
Wichila, Kansas, late in the year. On 30 September 1968,
just 30 months after program authorization, the first 747
was rolled out oflhe recently completed faclory. Twenty-
silt airlines had ordered the huge airplane.

Crowds were dwarfed at the roll out of the first 747.
Stewardesses, representing the original customers, wcre
present for the roU out.
The 747's maiden flight occurred on 9 February 1969,
with Jack Waddell, pilol; Brien Wygle, copilot; and Jess
Wallick, flight engineer; at the controls.
DESIGN & TESTING
More than 75,000 engineering drawings were developed
for the Number One 747. The airplane contained 2000
pieces of tubing, 135 miles of wire, and 4.5 million parts
(including fasteners).
1 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A l R L I N E R / J A N - M A R 1989
Innovations with the ~odel 747, in addition to its
enormous size, included a wide-body with twin asiles, an
upper deck and raised cockpit (which affords greater
cargo space), passenger accommodations in the forward
portion of the body, large high-bypass ratio engines, and
an inertial navigation system,
More than 12,000 hours of wind tunnel testing were
required. Then a fleet of five 747s participated in a
14m-hour, Io.month flight test program, culminating in
certification on 30 December 1969. In addition, two
production airl'rames were tortured in fatigue and stalic
tests.
Pan American inaugurated scheduled service between
New York and London with the airplane on 21 January
1970.
In March 1971, the coveted Collier Air Trophy was
awarded to Boeing for its efforts in developing the
Model 747.
RECORD-SEITING FUGHTS
Several aviation records have been achieved by the 747
during its 20 years of operation. These include:
• World heavy-weight lifting record 12 November
1970. 747-2ooB 820,700 Ib (372,269 kg) gross weight
takeoff.
• World distance record 24 March 1976. 747SP flew
10,290 miles, non-stop from Paine Field to Cape
Town, South Africa.
• Around-the-world record 3 May 1976. 747SP made
a three-stop, 22,864-mile flight in 39 hours, 26 min-
utes flight time with 46 hours, 26 minutes elapsed
time.
• World heavy-weight lifting record I November 1976.
747-2ooB 840,500 Ib (382,250 kg) gross takeoffweight
to 2000 meters (6462 feet) in 6 minutes, 33 seconds.
• Around-the-world record 28-30 October 1977. 747SP
flew over both poles, covering 26,706 miles in 54
hours, 7 minutes, 12 seconds, with four stops.
• Around-the-world record 29-30 January 1988. 747SP
flew 23,125 miles, with three stops, in 36 hours,
34 minutes, 15 seconds elapsed time.
• World heavy-weight lifting record 30 June 1988.
747-400 892,450 Ib (404,815 kg) to 2000 meters
(6562 feet) in four minutes, 49 seconds.
It is interesting to note that the Model 747SP achieved
Mach .92 during its maiden flight on 4 July 1975.
ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
Powerplant technology has always been a major factor
in the evolution of airplanes. Since the beginning of the
747 program a number of improvements have been made
in the engines being offered for the airplane. Engines from
General Electric, PraU & Whitney, and Rolls-Royce are
all available for the 747 and each manufacturer has met
the challenge of developing powerplanls with ever
increasing thrust ratings. Engine certification evolution
is shown in Table 1.
AIRPLANE GROWTH
Improvements in aerooynamics and structures coupled
with higher powered engines have resulted in ever
increasing gross weight capabilities of the 747. Table 2
illustrates the weight growth of the airplane. and
compares these weights with that of the 707-nOB.
The flI'St 747 passenger~rgo convertible airplane,
destined for service with World Airways, was certified
on 30 October 1972.
A side cargo door was certified for the 747 on I S February
1974. This modification was accomplished on a Sabena
passenger airplane and the Cambi was born. These air-
planes are capable of carrying a combined passenger/
cargo load.
The Pan American 747 fleet has undergone modification
to pennit these airplanes to be part ofthe U.S. Air Force's
Civil Air Reserve Fleet (CRAF'). The first conversion was
completed on I June 1985, at Boeing's Wichita facility.
In February 1986, the airplane successfully demonstrated
its capabilities when it participated in OPERATION
TEAM SPIRIT, an annual deployment to Korea.
UNIQUE APPLICATIONS

Over the years the Model 747 has been modified to meet
new customer requirements and to take advantage of
the latest state-of-the-art changes in technology. The
elttended upper deck produced the Model 747-300. The
latest digital avionics have resulted in the Model 747-400.
CARGO CAPABILITIES
While initially conceived as a cargo carrier, the 747 was
first offered as a passenger airplane. Later, cargo carrying
features were added. The cargo--capable airplanes may be
equipped with either a visor-type nose door, a side cargo
door aft of the left wing, or both.
Over the years, the 747's capabilities have been expanded
to include the following applications:
• Space Shuttle carrier. A former American Airlines
747-100 was modified for use by NASA in 1978 to
carry the Space Shuttle. Initially, the 747 carried the
shuttle for test nights. Today, the 747 is employed in
ferrying the shuttle from its landing site in the
California desert to its launch base in Florida.
• E-4 Airborne Command Post. Four 747s, designated
E-4Bs, serve as airborne command posts for
America's National Command Authority.

The first 747 freighter, certified on 8 March 1972, was • Aerial Tanker. Three 7475 were delivered to the
delivered to Lufthansa. Imperial Iranian Air Force for use 85 aerial tankers.

_._-......-
-"
RIIl11oA'G

- -
""""'"'"
s.atrDllL£l)

-
-
'1_

- -
....
MAX TAXJ WEIGHT

...- ..... ...

....
,......
,
"'
,.... ..- rn.ooo

" _.-
~
w
-.. - ••• "' ...
---
z
zw ".
,~ ~.'" 'u_
,.,.,..
,.,-:rooo:

--- .. .0-
YEAR

--
~ .~

.v."" CERTIFIED
,.,.... '.,·w ,.,." . ,.-
,.,.-<:
.
",-- .....::
"'_wK ,."'-
AlRf>t.ANE MOOELrSERlES
"'"
"""
Table I. Certification evolution ror 747 engines. Table 2. Model 747 gross weight tapabilities~

CV ~
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1
 Rockwell Space Shuttle was test-dropped and ferried on Digital ffigbt deck on the Model 747-400.
this 747. Here. a Northrop T·38 accompanies the shuttle
earrier.

• C-25A Air Force One. On 6 June 1987, a pair of

747·2005 were ordered as replacements for the aging
707-300Bs (C-137CS) employed as presidential
transports by the U.S. Air Force.

JUMBO JET FAMILY

The Model 747 production series has grown to 12, though

four are no longer being built. Table 3 shows their first
Oighl dates.

747 STATISTICS
One of (our E-4B Sentry airborne
The first airplane, RAOOI, has served over the years in
command posts operated by the USAF.
both the flight test and crew training roles.

. ,. More than 700 Model 747s have been delivered to 73

-- - -
..-
-
customers in 47 countries. In excess of 900 of these
airplanes have been sold to date.

--- -
----
00 With a daily utilization of 10.37 hours per day, 747s have
w ,~

flown over 24 million miles and have a schedule reliability

"
w
m
-• which is greater than 97%.

---_. ..... -.
~.
~

~ -,'
~ SUMMARY
w
a
a - FlRST FllGKT
~ -~
0'''' The Model 747 has proven to be an incredible airplane.
Over the past 20 years the derivative series has grown to
""-. meet the ever-changing needs of the market place. It now
carries most of the world's international air travelers and
is expected to be the primary international transport
through the tum of the century.

Table 3. First flight dates for the Model 747 family.

12
cO!) AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
Fuel Conservation AlRUNER
&.
O peratlDrls NEWSLETTER
CONTENTS
Introduction ....•.•.•.• I
Extended Range
Update •.•.•.•...... 1
Another View of the
GolNo Go Decision .. 2
Go-Around Decision .•.• 4
Introduction
This edition of the Newsletter
discusses three items of operational
interest, Extended Range Opera-
tions, rejected takeofTs and the
go-around decision. As was an-
nounced in the April - June 1988
edition of the Newsletter, the
Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), is currently in the final
stages of revising Advisory Circu-
lar 12Q.42 which sets the require-
ments for approval of extended
range operations with twin engined
airplanes. The article. Extended
Range Operations - Update dis-
cusses what are anticipated to be
the new requirements of the
Advisory Circular and our plans to
supply appropriate supporting
Operations Manual performance
data.
The second article is Another
Review of the GO/NO GO Deci-
sion. This subject has been dis-
cussed in greater depth in previous
AIRLINERS as well as various
past Aight Operations Symposia
that were held in Seattle. However,
since the original discussion of the
matter appeared in the 1984
AIRLINER article, Takeoff Gol
No Go Decision, there have been
Fuel Conservation and Operations Newsletter
No. 33
many new personnel entering the
business of nying and many
changes in airline night crew
management and training depan-
ment personnel. With the influx of
new personnel, we believe it is
appropriate to have a brief review
of matters to consider about re-
jected takeoffs PRIOR to entering
the cockpit.
The thIrd anicle is a reprint of an
anicleentitled Go-Around Decision
that appeared in the January-
March 1984AIRLINER. With the
onset of the bad weather season. we
believe it is timely to review some
of the factors affecting this im-
portant decision.
EXTENDED RANGE
OPERATIONS UPDATE
AC 120-42 Revision Due
in January 1989
In the April-June 1988 Fuel Con-
servation and Operations News-
letter we indicated that the US
Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) was reviewing the feasi-
bility of further extending the
EROPS Area ofOperation. A draft
revision of Advisory Circular
AC 12042 Extended Range Opera-
tion with Two-Engined Airplanes
has been released. This revision
includes provisions to extend the
diversion time from an adequate
airport to 180 minutes. The final
issue of the revision is expected in
January 1989.
January-March 1989
767 EROPS VALIDATION
TEST FUGHT
One of the new requiremems pre-
scribed in the revised AC 120-42
is that the manufacturer should
conduct a test flight to validate
expected airplane handling quali-
ties and performance considering
engine failure and electrical power
losses. The requirement goes on to
state that the adequacy of remain-
ing airplane systems and perform-
ance and flight crew ability to deal
with the emergency considering
remaining flight deck information
will be assessed.
A 4 hour 10 minute validation
flight using a 767-300 powered by
CF6-8OC2 86 engines was flown
on October 7, 1988. The flight
demonstrated performance con-
siderations such as engine-out
driftdown profile, level off height,
speed capability and fuel bum.
System operations such as APU
start, and airplane operation and
handling including approach and
landing with electrical power
supplied by the Hydraulic Motor
Generator were also successfully
demonstrated (see Figure I).
OPERATIONS l\tANUAL
DATA FOR EROPS
In the past, Boeing has assisted
EROPS operators on an individual
basis in developing data required
to support each operation. Because
of the increase in the number of
EROPS operators, we have com-
mitted to add a new section to the
[

Performance Section of the Opera-
tions Manuals for all models
certificated for EROPS operations.
The new section is designed as a
self contained reference section,
providing all the performance data
needed to plan and conduct an
EROPS diversion of up to and
beyond 180 minutes.
Generally, the four types of
EROPS performance data opera-
tors need will be provided,
including:
• Data to establish an area of
operation
• Data to calculate the critical
fuel required for diversion.
• Data to ensure enrouee ob-
stacle clearance
• Data to actually operate the
flight to the diversion landing
field.
n Fuel Conservation and Operations Newsletter
Figure 1.
Area of Operation
In order to qualify an operation for
EROPS, the operator must estab-
lish that any point along the
proposed route of Oighl is within
the specified maximum diversion
time at the normal one-engine
inoperative speed for ISA, zero
wind conditions. Operators can
choose any single engine speed up
to VmolM mo to establish their
area of operation. The new section
will provide time/distance data for
three fixed Machllndicated Air-
speed Schedules plus Long Range
Cruise for operators to choose
from to optimize their particular
operation.
Critical Fuel
EROPS operators must show that
the fuel carried is adequate to meet
the critical fuel scenario presented
in AC 120-42. This scenario re-
quires planning the fuel load to
include the larger of: a) the fuel
required to divert to the alternate
assuming the loss of pressurization
only (i.e. two engine operation at
IlXXXJ feet); or b) the fuel required
to divert to the alternate assuming
the simultaneous loss of pressuri·
zation and one engine (i.e. one
engine operation at IQCXX) feet).
Appropriate time - distance -
fuel planning data are included.
Enroute Obstacle Oearance
Operators must show that the net
flight path wiJl clear all enroute
obstacles at the appropriate one
engine inoperative diversion speed.
Net level off data for the appro-
priate diversion speeds will be
included.
Operational Data
Inflight driftdown and diversion
time-fuel-distance data for one
engine inoperative are included for
the four speed schedules. Gross
altitude capability and cruise
tabulations are likewise provided.
Other Data and Other Models
Should an operator have a unique
requirement where additional data
is required, the Boeing Flight
Operations Engineering organiza-
tion will assist.
The first issues of Section 23.60
Extended Range Operation have
been released for certain 767
configurations. The data for other
767, and 737/757 configurations
approved for EROPS will follow.
ANOTHER REVIEW OF THE
GO/NO GO DECISION
Much has been written about the
decision to reject a takeoff (RTO)
from a speed near or equal to VI.
Several major forums have in-
cluded extensive coverage and
discussion of the subject in recent
years. Generally, the articles and
discussions have been excellent
and are definitely worthwhile
reading and occasionally re·
reading. The fact remains, the
Takeoff Go/No Go Decision is one
of the most infrequent but critical
decisions a crew may ever have to
make. The balance continues to
favor the GO side: Stopping the
airplane from VI under limiting
runway conditions is one of the
most demanding maneuvers a pilot
may ever face, Success depends
upon the pilot's timely decision
and rapid completion of the stop-
ping procedure. Once the airplane
has accelerated to a speed greater
than V I, there is virtually no
chance to stop within the run-
way length remaining when oper·
ating al a performance limit weight
condition.
Fuel Conservation and Operations Newsletter
Statistics
Statistics show that approximately
6 of 100,000 takeoffs are aborted.
The data shows that the vast
majority of RTO's are initiated
from speeds well below V I. The
same historical data shows that
about 35 out of 100,000,000 takeoff
altempts become RTO accidenls
with the aircraft running off the
side or end of the runway. Most of
theSe accidents resulted from
RTO's initiated after VI, or other
complicating factors such as
slippery runways, strong cross-
winds, or equipment failures.
Just in case you face this GO/NO
GO decision on your next flight,
consider the following:
Defining the Takeoff Decision
Speed
v 1 is commonly referred to as the
takeoff decision speed. This is an
oversimplification. In reality, V 1 is
an action point; it is the speed by
which the GOINO GO decision
must have been made, and the
speed by which appropriate action
must be initiated. Looking at it
another way, VI is the point in the
takeoff after which the takeoff
must continue if stopping action
has not already been initiated. VI
is commonly associated with
engine failure recognition but in
reality, the need for GOINO GO
decision is more often than not due
to other causes.
Scheduling VI
It is relatively easy for the
performance engineer to calculate
Vt such that all of the limiting
criteria are met. Generally, V I
must be equal to or greater than
VMCG, the ground minimum
control speed. VI must be equal to
or less than VMBE and VR, the
maximum brake energy and
rotation speeds. This data can be
presented in a variety of formats
for crews to use for each takeoff.
Using VI
The circumstances surrounding a
GO/NO GO decision are not
always as clear as one would desire.
An engine failure may be well
defined with clear instrumentation
and airplane response signals.
However, the majority of RTO's
are initiated for reasons other than
engine failures, for example,
vibration due to tire or wheel
problems or takeoff warning
system indications.
But the most important fact to
remember is simple - once be-
yond VI, there should be no
consideration of stopping: it will be
virtually impossible if operating at
a performance limit weight
condition.
Calling VI
Standard practice is for the pilot
not flying to call Vee~ne as the
aircraft reaches V 1 speed. It is
extremely important that this call-
out be timely, crisp and audible.
Consider the human factors and
airplane dynamics that may com-
plicate the RTO initiated from just
at V I. It may take one second or
more for the pilot not flying 10 see
the airspeed needle reach V I speed,
callout Vee-one and for it to regis-
ter with the pilot flying. During
this time. the aircraft has accel-
erated another 3 to 5 knots and
consumed an additional 200 to 300
feet of runway. Even one second
after the aircraft has passed V I, it
is too late to make a stop decision.
New pilots now entering the
industry and multi year veterans
alike must constantly prepare
themselves to face the GO/NO GO
Decision. Both must tboroughly
understand the concept of VI and
avoid the consequences of a bad
NO GO decision.
Note: Excellent reference mate-
rial regarding the GOINO Deci-
sion can be found in the April-June
m
1984 AIRliNER, the proceedings
of the October 1987 Boeing 747
Flight Operations Symposium,
and the proceedings of the
September 1985 Boeing 737 Flight
Operations Symposium. Boeing
Customer Training and Flight
Operations Support would be
pleased to make reprints available
to airline training departments
upon request.
GO·AROUND DECISION
The go-around is one of the most
subjective but least defined deci-
sions that faces a pilot. It requires
that the pilot continuously evalu-
ate the approach as he flies it to
determine the acceptability of
continuing. A judgement must be
fanned and then tested to decide
if continuing the approach would
be unsafe. The irony of a go-
around decision is that it is
contrary to what the pilot is
nonnally expected to accomplish;
that is to continue the approach
and land.
Some go-around decisions are
rather simple and straight forward
such as arriving at decision height
with no visual references with
which to complete the landing.
Most decisions, however, are not
that simple. More complex situa·
tions such as marginal visual
references, misalignment or dis-
placement from the runway at
decision height, or airspeed or sink
variations require a subjective
interpretation as to what can or
cannot be nown 10 a safe landing.
Runway length, width, crosswind
and surface conditions all add an
additional bias to the decision
making process.
It is easy to conclude after an
accident that going around would
have been more prudent. However,
during an approach, the pilot may
not be ware of all facts that are so
evident in hindsight.
All approaches and landings
involve some displacement or
difference from the nominal
approach. The pilot is called upon
to evaluate these differences and
displacements, take corrective
action to put the airplane back
on the appropriate path and at
the same time make a real time
evaluation as to the acceptability
or non-acceptability of the
approach.
During this time, a procedural or
perceptual error may be occurring
about which the pilot may not have
complete knowledge. The pilot
may suspe<:t that something is not
righi, but because of high work-
load during this phase of flight, he
may be unable to completely
understand or recognize the prob-
lem. At the same time, he is under
subtle pressures to continue the
approach and minimize trip fuel,
schedule impact, passenger incon-
venience and ATC delays. He
must, however, make a judgement
on go-around based on the facts as
he knows them, and more often
than not, in the press ofevents, will
elect to continue.
It is this natural tendency to
continue that must be overcome
when a pilot senses that something
is wrong or that he is not com-
fortable with the approach. It is far
better to go-around under these
circumstances and resolve the
situation with a second approach
than it is to continue with the
expectation that the situation will
improve or resolve itself prior to
touchdown and rollout. If more
pilots would eJl:ecute a go-around
decision when a doubt or uncer-
tainty exists, many accidents
would be avoided during this
critical phase of flight.

BOEING FUEL CONSERVAnON

AND OPERATIONS NEWSLElTER

Flight Operations Engineering

Flight Technical Section
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
P.O. Box 3707, Seattle \VA 981.24
Telephone (206) 655·)185

IV Fuel Consenation and Operations Newsletter

 , I
•
-~-
.- .
Airport Technology
Kenneth J. DeBord
T
he Boeing Airport Technology Group has long
been involved in inspecting and testing the
strength capabilities of both paved and unpaved
runways for customer airlines. This activity has often
allowed the introduction of Boeing jet service into areas
nOI previously !.hought possible. More recently, however,
the emphasis of runway evaluation has been shifting to
the analysis of rough runway conditions at both small
and large airports. The kind of roughness of typical
concern is lhal which causes enough on-board vibration
to prevent pilots from reading inSLrumentsduring takeoff,
or roughness thai is so severe thai the nose and main gear
oleos compress to the limit, or the kind of roughness that
is not SO noticeable, bUI in which the fatigue life of the
landing gear or related structure is reduced significantly.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 3
•,
Edward L. Gervais
In a recent typical scenario, the Airport Technology
Group received a request from an airline whose pilou had
been registering concern of rough runway conditions at
a particular airport. Most airlines have few of the
resources necessary to analyze the severity of runway
roughness, nor can they readily quantify the effect that
it has on the airplane. The airline might have already
talked with the airport authority or the appropriate
governmental agency about the problem, but these
agencies are not usually in a position to make ajudgement
as to what the impact of the roughness is on the airplane.
Also, they are not usually prepared to make immediate
improvements unless they can get precise detailed
information that both locates and quantifies the
roughness on a given runway.
The Airport Technology Group, can provide assistance
on runway and airport problems to customer airlines on
a timely basis, responds to requests like these as quickly
as possible. This article describes the process the group
follows in helping the airline to solve some airfield
problems, such as a rough runway condition.
ANALYSIS OF ROUGHNESS
Boeing criteria for tolerable runway bump severity
(roughness) is shown in Figure I. This criteria has been
shown to be applicable to typical commercial passenger
jet transports. Other criteria lines developed by various
agencies such as the United States Air Force (USAF),
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), are shown
in relation to Boeing criteria in Figure 2. Because of basic
14---------------=:===----------AIRLlNERIJAN-MAR 1989
differences between commercial and military airplane
operating requirements, the USAF criteria line was
developed to more stringent standards than that for
commercial applications. This line is an airplane design
criterion, not specifically a runway roughness criterion,
and it is shown here for comparison purposes. The FAA
and ICAO roughness criteria are for new construction.
The central portion of this figure shows that commercial
airplanes can tolerate some runway deterioration above
the neW construction roughness level, but they are not
intended for military bailie conditions or airplane design
criteria appropriate to military applications. Our eltper-
ience has shown that pilot reports of rough runway
conditions tend to emerge as the runway bumps approach
the line designating the acceptable threshold, which is an
indication of runway deterioration with age and usage.
Additionally, as the bumps get nearer to the unacceptable
line, roughness becomes noticeably intolerable, both to
the pilots and passengers.
The airplane factors which were used to define the Boeing
criteria are the ultimate strength and fatigue life of the
landing gear and related structure. oleo characteristics,
and airplane structural dynamics. Figure 3 shows a plot
of venical acceleration at the airplane center of gravity
(CG) as defined in terms of cumulative occurrences per
night cycle from an aircraft struclUral dynamics study
that was conducted to help determine the acceptable
limits of runway roughness. The overall effect of this plot
Figu.. 3. Typical ,unway ,oughnesscY9
occurrence frequency. ' JV
Figure 2. Runway roughness criteria comparison.
shows that as the vertical acceleration at the airplane CG
increases, the number of occurrences required to reach
the landing gear fatigue life decreases. Thus it is essential
that vertical CO accelerations be limited to a practical
level SO as to minimize cumulative effects on the landing
gear structure.
The limiting vertical acceleration for a single event
encounter with runway roughness is shown on Figure 3
to be about 0.35g. This level of g-loading corresponds
approximately to the effect of a runway bump in the
region between the acceptable and unacceptable lines
labeled excessive in Figure J. Roughness above the
excessive level is understood to be the limit for a runway
10 be declared unfit for further high-speed ground
operations of aircraft, since the fatigue effect can occur
in an immediate fashion, particularly if the tires oleo,
and landing gear have not been recently serviced. When
roughness of this magnitude occurs, air crews and pas-
sengers alike will experience acute discomfort, and flight
deck induced instrument interference can be severe.
There is additionally a potential for a short term loss of
aircraft steerage, as well as excessive nose and main gear
loading. The problem that has been encountered histori-
cally is that no one knows quite what to do once this kind
of roughness has been detected subjectively, as described
above.
A determination of how rough a runway really is and
where the roughness exists is not always readily available.
Pilot comments are usually the first indications of rough
runway conditions, but the understanding and isolation
of the roughness itself can only be understood by a surface
profile survey. Even a high-speed run over the runway
in an automobile or ground test vehicle is less than an
AIRLINER/JAN-MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 5
ideal indicator because of the differences in wheel base,
mass, speed, and suspension between the vehicle and an
airplane. Visual observation will normally not reveal a
runway roughness problem, either, because the bumps
are often too long in length to appear to the eye.
EVALUATION OF ROUGHNESS
When there is no recent survey data available (which is
usually the case), the airline makes a formal request for
Boeing's assistance. When there is recent survey data
available from the airport authority, it often is not done
to enough detail to allow for an adequate analysis.
A practical roughness evaluation requires a profile
elevation survey along the centerline of the runway over
the reported rough areas, plus survey lines along the
same area where the main gear track would normally
be - about 3 to 3.5 meters (10 to 12 feet) either side
of the centerline. This can be done with an ordinary
surveyor's level and rod or by the use of a laser in-
strument and a rod that detects laser beams, such as that
used by Boeing. A Iypical Boeing surveying setup is
shown in Figure 4. Note that the only other equipment
required in addition to the laser equipment is a vehicle
equipped with a 12-voh battery and a two-way radio for
communications with the airport tower. The communi-
cations with the tower are important to wam the survey
crew of airpla ne uaffic on the runway. The level and rod
method of surveying requires a crew of three - one each
for the rod, level, and survey notes. The laser rod and
level method requires only a crew of two, because a level
operator is nOI required. Typically, when surveying wilh
laser equipment, the team can easily be called ofTan active
runway for aircraft operations and can quickly resume
Figure 4. Runway roughness
surveys can be easily accom-
plished by a crew of two using
laser equipment. Such surveys
can be done with minimum inter-
ruption of airplane operations.
 the surveying afterwards. A survey team can survey
200 meters (660 feet) of runway per hour if not inter·
rupted by aircraft traffic.
Upon complet.ion of the survey, the data is taken back
to the office for entry into a spreadsheet program on a
personal computer. Typical plots of the data (normalized
to remove the effects of runway slope) are shown in
Figures 5 and 6, with the elevations shown on the vertical
axis in an exaggerated form for ease of evaluation.
The Boeing surveys are done on 2.5 to 3.0 meter (8 to
10 foot) stations, while other surveys, such as those
provided by the airpon authority or airline, are often
done on 10 to 20 meter (33 to 66 foot) stations. These
broader surveys do not adequately reveal the true
Figure 6.
1 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A I R L I N E R / J A N - M A R 1989
roughness of the runway, hence requmng the more
detailed survey. The profiles shown in Figures 5 and 6.
in addition to being excellent analytical tools, render a
visual indicat.ion of the best means of repair. Depressions
can be Iilled with patching materials or small area over-
lays, and high spots can be milled down to acceptable
roughness levels.
Figure 7 shows the ploUed discrete roughness as bump
height versus bump length. As can be seen, a few bumps
are above the tolerable line for this particular runway.
but none are in the unacceptable range. Consequently,
the Boeing recommendations for this particular survey
allowed for continued operations in this case, bUI with
warnings as to the deteriorating runway pavement con-
dition. If a survey reveals bumps in the unacceptable
Figure S. Typica.l plot of
a runway roughness profile.
Figure 7. Roughness plot depicting height versus length
of bump.
cO])
 Runway surface deterioration contributing to surface roughness and increased foreign object damage (FOD) potential.

Damage due to load over a poorly
completed base which induced a
depression with dense alligator
cracking and eventual pavement
breakup (central discoloration
caused by fuel spill which accelerated
pavement deterioration).
Surface ravelling caused by poor
quality mixture of asphalt and
aggregate, damage was accelerated
by aircraft braking and turning in
tbis area.
Concrete slab comer cracking
resulting from load on an
unsupported corner. Damage
area expanded due to inade-
quate maintenance.

range, it would be recommended that no further com-
mercial jet transport operations be allowed on that
portion of the runway until the runway is repaired.
It should be noted that on the Boeing criteria chart
(Figure 7, for example) temporary, short term aircraft
operations on roughness that is mid-way between the
acceptable and unacceptable lines can be tolerated. When
surface overlays are constructed on active runways
during oIT-peak hours, temporary surface ramps at the
midpoint between the two lines are suggested as satis-
factory for short term usage. Entire runways can be
overlayed during ofT-peak hours when done with tem-
porary ramps that meet this criteria.
are not usually aware of the impact of runway roughness
on the airplanes that operate there. This is where Boeing
has been able to help both the airport operalOrs and the
airline make rational decisions as to the besl COllrse of
aclion. The profile surveys themselves are very valuable
in indicating whether a particular depression or high spot .
can be repaired, either by patching or milling of the local
surface area (Figures 5 and 6). The surface profiles in
the report that Boeing prepares 10 describe the survey
analysis are made available to the airport for their use
10 facilitate surface repairs. Boeing offers Ihis service to
any customer airline thai wishes it, in the desire to help
remedy the situation at hand.

SUMMARY Finally, rather than Boeing assisting in the actual survey

When runways start to become intolerably rough. this is
oOen an indication that the runway is either starting to
deteriorate or that it is being adversely affected by natural
conditions such as freezing and thawing cycles. Airport
operators usually are aware of deteriorating conditions
by anyone of several means, such as pilot reports, visible
roughness, or unusual surface conditions. However, they
of the runway, the customer airline is oOen able to
provide the survey data via a local surveyor. When this
proceduTc is followed, the survey interval and locations
on the runway that are surveyed should be carefully
determined. However, whelher Boeing or someone else
does the actual measurements, Boeing is willing to
provide the analysis of the data.

AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 7
 737 DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

--
Ron Ch, istianson RolfHansen

he Digital Flight Control Syslem (DFCS) on the Alert, Mach Trim and Speed Trim functions. The DFCS

T 737-300 and -400 airplanes evolved from the

similarly structured but hybrid system on the
737-200 Advanced airplane. A main feature of the DFCS
is the integrated control of the AUlopilotlFlight Director
System (AFDS), Autothrottle (A/f) System, Altitude
Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) in this system sig-
nificanlly enhances the maintenance capabilities. An
overview of the major DFCS components is shown in
Figure J. A lypical cockpit layout of the 737-400 DFCS
is shown in Figure 2.

1 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
 AFDS

The primary portion of lbe Honeywell (formerly Sperry)

SP·300 DFCS is the AUlopilotlFlight Director System.
This system includes two identical Flight Control Com·
puters (Fcq, an integrated Mode Control Panel (MCP),
and twO Flight Mode Annunciators (FMA) for airplanes
not equipped with the Electronic Flight Instrument
System (EFIS). For EFtS equipped airplanes, the flight
mode annunciations are displayed on the Electronic
Attitude Director Indicator (BAD I). Each FCC can
provide all the functions shown in Figure I; however,
both FCes are required for CAT iliA autoland and
autopilot go-around operations.

The DFCS is designed to be used during takeoff, through

climbout, cruise, descent, approach, and landing/missed
Figure 1. Digital Fligbt Control System components. approach.

C!i!J

Figure 2. Typical cockpit of a 737400 equipped with the DFCS.

AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 9
 INTEGRATED FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
WITH EFIS OPTION
DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

ELECTRONIC
ATTITUDE
DIRECTOR
INDICATOR

-.
_. '1,:: ,,, - .
:?'~-:.~
e
ELECTRONIC Q ,-
HORIZONTAL
.- . -. .- .
SITUATION INDICATOR
. ".

DIGITAL AUTOTHAOTTLE FLIGHT MANAGEMENT

DUAL DIGITAL INERTIAL
COMPUTER SYSTEM
REFERENCE SYSTEM

Figure 2a. Integrated flight management system witb the EFIS option.

TAKEOFF LVL CHG

Flight director takeoff guidance is provided in pitch and
roll from liftoff to nap!>·up maneuvering speed for normal
and one-engine inoperative conditions, and during wind-
shear conditions. These provisions make it possible to
simplify uaining and operating procedures when the
Oight director is used. A flight director comparator in
each FCC reduces the probability of misleading guidance.
CL~B/CRlRSEIDESCENT
The AFDS pitch modes and transition modes that exist
on the later model 737s for the climb/cruise/descent
phases of flight are level change (LVL CHG), vertical
navigation (Y-NA Y) path, V·NAV Speed, altitude ac-
quire (ALT ACQ) and altitude hold (ALT HOLD), and
vertical speed (Y IS). The roll modes are lateral naviga-
tion (L-NA Y), VHF omnidirectional rangellocalizer
(VOR/LOC), and heading select (HOG SEL).
The LVL CHG mode commands the airplane to fly the
MCP selected speed in either knots or Mach by varying
pitch attitude while the AIT controls the throttles to the
appropriate N I value for an ascent or moves the throttles
to the aft limit for a descent.
As the MCP selected altitude is approached, the altitude
acquire (ALT ACQ) transition mode is automatically
invoked while the A/T reverts to the SPEED control
mode. The ALT ACQ mode controls the airplane to a
.05g path during level offal the selected altitude until the
altitude hold mode engages. The altitude acquire mode
willtransilion into ALT HOLD mode from any pilch
cruise mode.
The LVL CHG mode controls the airplane to a maxi·
mum speed of VmofMmo and a minimum speed of 1.3
VSTALL (Alpha Roor). However, if the command fails

2 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
to satisfy a minimum descent rate when operating on
YmofMmo in descent or a minimum climb rate when
operating on Alpha Floor in climb, the autopilot will
disengage and the Flight Directorcommand bats will bias
out~f-view.
Althougb not an AFDS mode. the altitude alert function
is an important part of the altitude acquire and altitude
hold modes. The standard altitude alert function warns
with a single aural alert and constant illumination of
the altitude alert lights when the airplane is between
9<X) and 300 feet during approach to the selected altitude,
a single aural alert and nashing altitude alert lights occur
if the altitude deviates between 300 and 900 feet from the
selected altitude.
VNAV,LNAV
The Right Management Computer (FMC) provides
target commands and mode requests to the AFDS and
A/f in VNAV and LNA Y operation. VNAV Path is a
path following mode which utilizes vertical speed (VIS),
altitude acquire or altitude hold mode for vertical path
control with A/f controlling to FMC Speed. VNA Y
Speed provides speed control through the elevator with
A/f controlling N I values during climb or night idle
during descent.
AIRUNER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = : : = = = : : : : . - - 2 1
The LNA V mode is a IatenJ path mode which utilizes
roll commands from the FMC. an Inertial Navigation
System (INS) or OM.EGA Navigation System. For FMC
LNAV operation, the FCC imposes a 30 degree bank
angle limit.
APPROACH MODE CAPABILITIES
The 737-200 Advanced and later models are certified
for dual channel (fail-passive) autoland to CAT ilIA
minimums (700-foot R VR and SO foot decision height)
and (for FAA certification) dual FlO or single channel
AlP to CAT II minimums (1200-foot R VR and tOO-foot
decision height).
The fail~passive design is achieved through mechanical
force voting of tbe commands from the two channels
combined with monitors which compare each channel
with surface position. An exceedance of a monitor
threshold causes the AlP to disconnect leaving the air·
plane in a neutral or, when below 400 feel, in a slightly
nose-up state of trim.
The autoland performance of the 737 derivatives as
demonstrated for certiflCation is shown in Figure 3.
During the course of the 737-400 development, success-
ful aUlOland operations have been made in 43 knots
headwind and 16 knots crosswind. In-service autoland
success rates have been 99.1% for reporting airlines using
the 737-300 and between 95.5 to 99% for the 737-200
Advanced. It is believed that these figures primarily
reflect the reliability and operational characteristics of
the DFCS.
Autoland flare starts at 50 feet of radio altitude during
the autoland mode sequence. The flare control law con-
trols radio altitude rate as a function of radio altitude.
The AIT starts retarding the throttles nominally at
27 feet of radio altitude with the rate of retard varied
so that the throttles will reach idle at touchdown. A
transition from inertial altitude rate to the radio altitude
derived altitude rate is accomplished afier the initiation
of the flare maneuver. This makes the autoland control
law relatively insensitive to runway approach terrain
varialions.
GO-AROUND
Dual FlO or dual AlP go-around capability is provided
in the 737 AFDS and in the AlT. The basic operation
in the AlP - F/O go-around mode is the control of
airspeed with the target speeds being the flap retraction
speeds. In the event of loss of performance (as measured
by rate-of-climb) such as during windshear conditions,
the speed submode is phased OUI and substituled with
pitch altilude control 10 preserve rate-of·c1imb. However,
nose-up commands are limited to keep maximum alpha
to a value below stick shaker alpha.
AI go·around, based on a weight estimate, the AIT
controlled thrust is nominally set to an NI limit value
which will give about 1000 to 2000 feet/min rate-of-climb
depending upon acceleration. However, if windshear
conditions cause the climb rate and/or speed to decrease
significantly, full go-around power is automalically
applied. Full G/A power is also set regardless of weight
with a second push of either takeoff/go-around (TO/GA)
switch.
737 AFDS DEVELOPMENT
A new FCC or MCP version with a derivative part
number may be developed in order to incorporate prod-
uct improvements, to update the control laws to account
for aerodynamic differences of a new airplane model, or
10 implement a cUSlomer request. The intermixing of new
and previous FCC versions is accomplished through
program pin selection with airplane wiring. An airplane
with specific program pin wiring will activate the new
features of the new FCC version while disabling previous
FCC versions.
Since the introduction of the 737-300, three versions of
the FCC have been developed. The 10-62038-1 FCC was
2 2 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1989
developed for the basic 737-300 configuration. The
-2 FCC, which is not compatible with the -I FCC,
incorporated windshear guidance and control improve-
ments and EFIS interfacing requirements. The -3 FCC,
which is compatible with the -2 FCC. add mainly aero-
dynamic requirements for the 737-400. There has been
but one significant change on the MCP to date, namely
the change from paddle type AlP engage switches to push
button type AlP engage switches, which is standard on
the 737-400.
The -4 FCC is being developed for the basic 737-500 and
will be compatible with the -2 and the -3 FCes. Beside
aerodynamic changes for the -500 being added in this
FCC, the MCP!FCC will have optional provisions for
speed intervention and altitude intervention, functions
which are available when operating in the FMC VNA V
mode. Speed intervention enables the flight crew to
override the FMC target speed; altitude intervention
enables the nighl crew to bypass FMC intermediate
altitude restrictions.
BITE
The Advanced 737-200 with the Speny SPI77 (digital!
analog) AFDS provided the first opportunity in the
737 family to achieve a more comprehensive BITE capa-
bility associated with digital systems. The introduction
of the 737-300 with the full digital flight control system
(DFCS), along with other digital systems in the Flight
Management System (FMS), elevated the maintenance
capability to a significantly higher level.
The SP-300 DFCS BITE utilizes the Flight Management
Computer System Control Display Unit (FMCS COU)
as a means of providing control cabin convenience to
the maintenance team. The operalor can, by pressing
buttons, reading instructions, and performing other
minor tasks within the control cabin, review in·flight fault
status or perform tests 10 verify operational status. Thus
maintenance personnel can display failures recorded by
the DFCS BITE (internal and interfacing LRUs) during
the last 10 flights or perform 19 quick (automatic) tests,
20 interactive tests, 6 flight control surface tests, rigging
checks, and digital/analog sensor checks. These functions
provide the maintenance personnel with the ability to:
• Isolate malfunctions and perform a quick test of the
OFCS and interfacing line replaceable units (LRUs)
within 3 minutes.
• Perform tests to insure proper operation of LRUs
following maintenance.
• Perform tests to insure the proper operation of the
automatic landing system.
• Perform extensive tests required for more complex
problems using the overnight maintenance functions.
• Perform rigging checks after replacement of DFCS
flight control components or to check proper adjust-
ment of rigging components.
• Display the inputs from critical analog and digital
signals.
The simplicity and versatility of the DFCS BITE are its
greatest attributes. With power applied to the airplane
and circuit breakers closed, a maximum of four actions
(pushing buttons) will get the operator to the DFCS
BITE Index page. This consists of two pages of main-
tenance functions. The first page is for line maintenance
and includes choices of CURRENT STATUS tests, IN
FLIGHT FAULTS, LRU INTERFACE, or LAND
VERI FY tests. These tests are used for tum-around
type of troubleshooting. The second page is for over-
night maintenance and includes choices of GROUND
FUNCfIONAL tests, RIGGING, or SENSOR VALUES.
These tests are used when more extensive time consuming
problems exist on the airplane.
The DFCS BITE requires a minimum ofwrilten material
in order to perform the tests. The FMCS CDU screen
displays instructions or choices of responses as a result
of testing. If initial conditions are required prior to
running a test, the instructions are displayed. When a lest
has been completed or if an observation and response is
required, the choice of answers is displayed and the
operator responds accordingly. Examples would be YES,
NO, CONTINUE, PRESS IF NO RESPONSE. When
all desired testing has been completed, instructions are
given to the operator to perform the actions required to
return the airplane to its normal configuration. As the
BITE program is exited, a power-up self test of the
Figure 4. Typical FMCS CDU display.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 3
FCC is perfonned to insure operational capability upon
returning to the application (flight) program.
LINE MAINTENANCE TFSfS
Current Status - The Current Status test provides a
rapid check of the FCC and all interfacing LRUs. This
group starts with a quick test (40 seconds, fully auto-
matic) which checks all discretes. active LRUs, passive
LRUs. position sensors, and actuators. Figures 4 and 5
are examples of typical displays which may appear on the
FMCS CDU. ]f a fault is detected, the test will stop and
the LRU which most probably has caused the failure will
be identified. A choice is then available to re-run the
failed test or continue on with the remainder of the tests.
When all of the tests have been completed, a summary
page will identify any LRUs that failed during the tests.
If all of the quick tests pass, the operator is given the
choice of continuing with tests of the autopilot, flight
director, Mach trim, speed trim or altitude alert. These
tests include interactive (operator action) and flight
control surface tests, where applicable.
In Flight Faults - The In Flight Faults test provides the
maintenance personnel with faults detected during the
last flight. By entering code 300 on the keyboard and
pressing line select key 6R, a more detailed explanation
of all faults which have occurred over the past 10 flights
can be displayed.
LRU Interface - The LRU Interface test provides a
choice of performing interface tests for FCC A, FCC B
or both. There are two pages which can be displayed on
the FMCS CDU and the operator merely presses the
button next to the LRU which requires testing. This
Figure 5. Typical FMCS CDU disP~
c:Y
provides a check for post maintenance verification. There
are 16 LR U selections plus one which provides checks
of the flap position sensors, spoiler position sensors,
control wheel steering transducers, elevator/aileron
actuators and position sensors, neutral shin sensor, and
stabilizer position sensor.
Land Verify - The Land Verify test is used to verify
complete CAT IlIA autoland system status. This test
checks the dual channel operation of items required for
approach, nare, and go-around. Pitch and roll confidence
tests, sensor LRU tests, and servo tests are performed.
OVERNIGHT MAINTENANCE TESTS
Ground Functional Test - The Ground Functional tests
are used when more extensive airplane testing is required.
These tests can be performed on FCC A, FCC B or both.
A choice is also given the operator ofselecting a complete
functional test (19 quick tests, 20 interactive tests, and
6 surface tests), deleting certain tests or selection of
certain tests. Regardless of the selection, the system will
automatically lead the operator through the quick, inter-
active, and surface (if applicable) tests.
Rigging - The rigging tests provide a means to check
surface rigging or to re-rig a system after a rigging related
component has been replaced. Tests cover the elevator,
aileron, flaps, stabilizer, control wheel steering, and
, -
~RATOLINER'SGOLDEN ANNIVERSARY.
AT Lloyd
Editor, AIRLINER Magazine
he Model 307 Stroroliner made its first flight fifty
T years ago on 31 December 1938. This airplane was
an airliner derivative of the Model 299 - the
famed 8-17 Flying Fortress. Ten of these airplanes were
built: four for Pan American World Airways, one for
Howard Hughes, and five for Transcontinental Western
Airlines (forerunner of Trans World Airlines). The
basic airplane was a Model 307; TWA operated the
Model 307B.
2 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
Mach Trim system. Tests include single or dual channel
tests, hardoyer tests, and tests at various pitot conditions
for feel systems. An example is shown in Figure 5.
Sensor Values - The sensor values tests allow for read-
ing analog inputs, digital inputs, or the Standard Option
selections for the airplane. The analog inputs include
aileron, elevator, localizer, glide slope, low range radio
altimeter, stabilizer, angle of attack vane and more. The
digital inputs include IRU acceleration and rate inputs
along with DADe computed airspeed.
SUMMARY
Throughout the 737 development, the basic DFCS design
objectives have been to improve the product whenever
possible to increase its utility, accuracy, serviceability
and maintainability while retaining commonality in all
important functions so as not to affect flight crew training.
This process has always relied on inputs from our cus-
tomer.> who are in a position to apply to the system the
widest operational envelope.
As the 737-400 is about to be put into service and the
-500 is on the drawing board, we are confident that the
DFCS will continue to contribute to tbe success of the
737 airplane.
- ----
The Strotolinen cruised at 140-220 miles per hour and
had service ceilings of 23.0Cl0-26,OOO feet (Model 307 and
307B, respectively). The design gross weight approached
42,000 pounds. They had a range of 2400 miles.
The Model 307 was the first airliner to have a fully
pressurized cabin. Passenger accommodations included
a carpeted floor, ashtrays and upholstered seats. A dado
sidewall reached the windows. Doped fabric was installed
 above the sidewaU. Some of the seats could be converted
into berths.
Introduction of the Model 307 marked a turning point
for commercial aviation in that it was the first four·
engined transport to be used in scheduled domestic
service. Until 1946, the Strotoliner was the largest
commercial aircraft in commercial operation in the
United States.
The first Model 307, built for Pan American, was retained
for testing at Boeing. The remaining three Pan American
airplanes served on their Latin American routes. They
operated between Miami and the Panama Canal Zone,
connecting with west coast planes, and between Miami
and Belenem to meet airplanes from the South American
East Coast. These Stratoliners were configured with
38 passenger seats.
Trancontinental Western used their 33-passenger Model
3078s for their coast-to-cost operation. These airplanes
operated the fastest transcontinental scheduled service in
the United States.
During World War II, the USAAF took over the TWA
neet and redesignated the airplanes as C·75s. Using TWA
L>
TWA's NXI940 left night test status to become NCI940.
Pan American's Rainbow Clipper carried registry NCI9903.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1989
crews, these airplanes new 4S,lXXJ hours with the Air
Transport Command and made 3,lXXJ trans·Atlantic
crossings. In 1944, these airplanes were returned to
Boeing for refurbishmenL New 8-17G wings, landing
gear and horizontal tail surfaces were retrofitted. Newer
1200 horsepower engines replaced the earlier 1100
horsepower engines. A 8-29 electrical system was
installed. The passenger capacity was increased from 33
to 38. A night engineer was added to the airplane which
was a first for a domestic airline crew. (The first Boeing
airplane to have a night engineer was the XB-IS.) The
pressurized cabin was eliminated and the airplanes were
redesignated as SA-3Q7B-ls. These upgraded airplanes
remained in TWA service until 1951.
Howard Hughes' airplane, later named The Flying
Penthouse, ended up with its fuselage becoming a house
boat. During the 1960s and 19705 several Model 307s
were operated by the United Nations International Con·
trol Commission and new between Saigon and Hanoi. A
Stratoliner served as the personal transport of Haiti's
chief of state Pappa Doc DuValier and now resides at the
Pima County Air Museum in Tucson, Arizona.
~r;:;::;:;;""----::--:::-:-::::;':---::j
L>
The Flying Penthouse, carrying civil NCl9904, was
formerly owned by entrepreneur Hnward Hughes and
ended its life as a houseboat,
The first Transcontinental
Western Airlines (now Trans
World Airlines) Model 3078
carried experimental registry
NXt940.
2S
.OEING
CUSTOMER SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVES
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD SERVICE UNIT Seattle. Washington

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HONG KONG T 8ry.n. T. MOtriI,18152+3) 781·29018
KUNMING C. OdIgI,d. {88+811)31188.••1. 380
XIAMEN 5 Chen (88+5821285111

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