Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 2017 Bookmatter PrinciplesOfPublicFinance 2

    Uploaded by

    DEREJE
    3 views5 pages
    This document appears to be an index for a book on public finance. It lists topics A-Z and the corresponding page numbers. Some key topics included are: ability-to-pay principle, accrual income, aggregate demand, altruism, balanced-budget multiplier, consumption tax, debt neutrality, defined-benefit pension system, economic growth, fiscal policy, government budget constraint, income tax, public debt, welfare economics. The index provides a high-level overview of the concepts and terms discussed in the book in a concise alphabetical listing.

    Original Description:

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    This document appears to be an index for a book on public finance. It lists topics A-Z and the corresponding page numbers. Some key topics included are: ability-to-pay principle, accrual income, aggregate demand, altruism, balanced-budget multiplier, consumption tax, debt neutrality, defined-benefit pension system, economic growth, fiscal policy, government budget constraint, income tax, public debt, welfare economics. The index provides a high-level overview of the concepts and terms discussed in the book in a concise alphabetical listing.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    3 views5 pages

    2017 Bookmatter PrinciplesOfPublicFinance 2

    Uploaded by

    DEREJE
    This document appears to be an index for a book on public finance. It lists topics A-Z and the corresponding page numbers. Some key topics included are: ability-to-pay principle, accrual income, aggregate demand, altruism, balanced-budget multiplier, consumption tax, debt neutrality, defined-benefit pension system, economic growth, fiscal policy, government budget constraint, income tax, public debt, welfare economics. The index provides a high-level overview of the concepts and terms discussed in the book in a concise alphabetical listing.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 5

    Index

    A C
    Ability-specific lump sum tax, 279 Central government, 8–10, 14, 21, 45, 186,
    Ability-to-pay principle, 380 187, 190, 225, 303, 318, 358–360,
    Accrual income, 231 363–365, 367, 377–388, 392, 394, 395,
    Ad valorem tax, 221 397
    Aggregate demand, 3, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 32, Centralized system, 364–365, 367
    41–45, 47, 48, 50, 62–66, 85, 101, 130, Change of government, 342, 345–348
    141, 142, 159, 374 Clarke tax, 314–316, 326
    Aging Japan, 135, 179, 185–201 Classical view, 216–217
    AK model, 114–115 Club goods, 296, 367, 368
    Altruism, 87, 88, 92, 98, 99, 122 Cobb-Douglas utility function, 207–208,
    Altruistic bequest motive, 88, 99, 119, 122, 214–216, 227, 242, 292, 307
    127, 178 Commitment, 25, 50, 155, 156, 167, 284
    Asymmetric information, 2, 170, 284 Commons, 296
    Compensation policy, 144–145
    Comprehensive income, 231–232
    B Compulsory public pension, 172
    Balanced-budget multiplier, 33–34, 37 Constrained maximization, 5–6
    Balanced-budget policy, 34, 140–141 Consumer price, 7, 189, 221–223, 234, 240,
    Barro’s neutrality, 82–86, 88, 89, 100, 178 241, 251, 252, 254, 255, 257
    Benefit-to-pay principle, 312, 331, 378, 379 Consumption function, 29, 31, 34, 57, 62, 67,
    Bentham judgment, 268, 269 74, 89, 128, 224–226
    Bequest motive, 83, 99, 119, 122, Consumption tax, 24, 32, 194, 197, 198,
    127, 178 221–224, 227, 231, 232, 234, 236, 239,
    Bequests, 82–85, 87, 88, 98–100, 240, 242–250, 254, 256, 258, 259, 264,
    118–127, 141, 175, 178, 192, 244, 265, 356–357, 380, 381, 386
    249, 271 Convergence theorem, 338, 339
    Biased Keynesian policy, 141 Corlett-Hague rule, 236
    Big government, 331–333 Corporate tax, 216–220, 381
    Bohn condition, 151, 152, 167 Cost-benefit analysis, 133–134
    Budgetary formula, 10–12 Cost of capital, 60, 217–219, 374
    Budgetary process, 1, 12–13 Counter-cyclical fiscal policy, 141, 145, 146
    Built-in stabilizer, 21, 32, 37, 45, Credibility, 46, 283
    47–49 Crowding-in, 38–39, 65, 283
    Burden of debt, 4, 82, 92, 97–98, 183 Crowding out, 36–37, 40, 64, 65, 139, 283,
    Burden of tax, 18, 87, 90, 144, 208, 222–224, 318, 349, 351, 354
    227, 232, 337, 360 Current government, 63–67, 347, 348

    # Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2017 399


    T. Ihori, Principles of Public Finance, Springer Texts in Business and Economics,
    DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2389-7
    400 Index

    D F
    Debt neutrality, 16, 75, 78, 79, 82, 84–90, 92, Failure of government, 5, 329–331
    97–100, 141, 159, 175, 176, 178, 244 Failure of private pension, 171
    Decentralized system, 365–367, 390, 392 First best, 119, 122–123, 125–127, 145, 156,
    Decentralized theorem, 366 159, 160, 162, 250, 253–254, 257,
    Deficit-covering debt, 139 278–279, 298, 299, 350–352, 354, 355,
    Defined-benefit (DB) system, 179–181, 189, 357, 363, 364, 374, 376, 387, 389–392,
    191, 194 396, 397
    Defined-contribution (DC) system, 179–181, First optimality theorem, 7
    189, 191, 194 Fiscal bankruptcy, 141, 147–154
    45-degree model, 29–30 Fiscal consolidation, 13, 16, 18, 22–25, 48,
    Degree of optimal redistribution, 277 89–91, 139, 141, 146, 154–167,
    Demography, 68, 131, 179, 183, 189, 191, 193 347–350, 354, 356, 357
    Depreciation, 39, 42, 44, 92, 219–220 Fiscal decentralization, 363, 366, 383, 384
    Differentiated linear tax, 281–282 Fiscal discipline, 140
    Direct crowding out, 37–38, 67 Fiscal expansion, 32, 48, 63, 65
    Discount rate, 108–110, 155, 179, 183, 215 Fiscal multiplier, 16, 30–32, 34, 35, 40, 43, 49,
    Domar condition, 151, 167 65, 66
    Double burden of transition, 181 Fiscal policy, v, 4, 29, 53, 79, 101, 140, 177,
    Dual approach, 7–8, 236, 237, 252–253 337–342
    Dynamic government budget constraint, 150, Fiscal privileges, 154, 155, 166, 167, 349–358,
    153 360, 367
    Dynamic inconsistency, 46 Fiscal year, 12–14
    Dynamic optimization, 4–5 Fixed asset tax, 379, 380
    Fixed exchange system, 39–40
    Flexible exchange system, 41, 42
    E Free rider problem, 2, 310–316, 326, 349, 364,
    Economic constraint, 282–284 366
    Educational investment model, 285, 289, 292 Fully funded system, 169, 181–182
    Effective consumption, 66, 67, 69, 72 Fundamental equation of dynamic government
    Efficacy of fiscal policy, 16, 38, 43–47, 79, 86 budget constraint, 150
    Efficiency of taxation, 208–211 Fundamental equation of economic growth, 111
    Elastic good, 235, 239 Future government, 46, 63, 147, 347, 348
    Election, 24, 335, 337–341, 343–346, 348, 366
    Endogenous growth model, 113–117, 119–122,
    127 G
    Enlarging the tax base, 242 General account budget, 9, 14
    Equity, 3, 4, 18, 85, 99, 135, 139, 154, 155, Generational accounting, 97, 178
    170, 172, 220, 232, 239, 267, 269, 270, Government budget constraint, 55, 70, 71, 78,
    276, 279, 312, 383 79, 82, 84, 95, 96, 103, 116, 121, 143,
    Equivalence theorem between consumption 145, 148–150, 153, 159, 160, 209, 237,
    and labor income taxes, 244, 259 241, 251, 252, 254, 260, 274, 286, 318,
    Evaluation of government spending, 68–70, 332, 349–352, 354, 368, 380
    347 Government expenditure, 9, 14–15, 48, 69, 70,
    Excess burden, 18, 87, 90, 142–144, 154, 72–74, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165
    209–211, 224, 227, 233–236, 238, 255,
    276, 278, 337, 366, 381
    Exchange rate, 21, 39, 41, 42, 44 H
    Expectation, 12, 22, 31, 32, 37, 38, 65, 82, 89, Haig-Simons definition, 231
    93, 132, 166, 170, 179, 191, 192, 196, Hard budget game, 389–393, 396, 397
    197, 200, 224, 257, 270, 271, 283, 342, Harrod-Domar model, 101–102, 115
    343, 345, 346, 372, 397 Heterogeneous households, 239, 250
    Expenditure function, 8, 237, 253, 262, 353, Human capital, 3, 113, 114, 117–127, 215, 216,
    355 248, 283
    Expenditure tax, 232, 233, 242 Human capital effect, 215, 216, 248
    Index 401

    I Labor supply, 18, 56, 58–60, 62, 94, 101,


    Immiserizing growth, 320, 325–326 114–116, 159, 184, 205–210, 214, 215,
    Impact lag, 44 227, 229–230, 232–233, 237, 242–244,
    Implementation lag, 43, 44 247, 250, 256, 259, 267, 271–276, 278,
    Implicit separability, 257 284, 289, 292, 388
    Impure public goods, 295–297, 312, 326, 329, Lagrange function, 5, 238, 253
    331, 363 Legal commitments, 156
    Incidence, 87, 97, 121, 220–224, 227, 245–247, Legal taxpayer, 221, 222
    258, 259, 263, 265 Leisure, 58, 59, 205, 207, 208, 232, 236, 242,
    Income effect, 59, 67, 68, 93, 166, 206–208, 250, 258, 272, 286
    213–216, 224, 227, 245, 264, 265, 289, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 24, 358, 360
    304, 308, 323, 326, 331, 333, 374 Life cycle saving hypothesis, 211–213
    Income inequality, 2, 117, 234, 239, 267–268, Lindahl equilibrium, 308–311
    272, 273, 277, 281, 283, 310, 324, 331 Lindahl reaction function, 308, 309
    Inelastic good, 235 Linear income tax, 102, 258, 272–274, 278,
    Inequality and economic growth, 117–118 279, 281, 284–292, 380
    Inhabitant tax, 379–380 LM curve, 34–36, 42, 63
    Interest group, 24, 50, 135, 154–156, 166, 167, Local allocation tax, 9, 359, 360, 381,
    187, 240, 330, 336–338, 349, 350, 384–386
    358–360, 367 Local finance, 9, 363, 381
    Interest tax, 214, 229–234 Local government, 5, 9, 45, 132, 186, 225, 249,
    Intergenerational conflicts, 182, 185–191, 196, 296, 358, 363, 366
    200 Local interest group, 47, 358–360
    Intergenerational transfer, 92, 95–99, 118, 123, Local public debt, 9, 383–384
    124, 126, 169, 173, 177, 178, 184 Local public goods, 296, 350, 351, 365–374,
    Intergovernmental finance, 5, 9, 14, 303, 359, 376, 378, 379, 387, 389–392, 395
    363–367, 383–385, 387, 397 Long-run growth rate, 101–102, 112, 113,
    Intertemporal substitution effect, 59, 87 115–117
    Inverse elasticity proposition, 235–236, 239 Lump sum tax, 46, 92, 95–98, 208–210,
    IS curve, 34–36, 40–42, 63 233, 245, 247, 250–254, 256–265,
    IS/LM model, 34–37, 39 279, 281, 299, 318, 368,
    Isolation effect, 42 374, 378

    J M
    Japan’s fiscal management, 19–25 Macro IS balance, 159, 163, 166
    Japan’s health care system, 185–186 Macroeconomic production function, 94, 101,
    Japan’s public pension system, 188–189 105, 106, 110, 111, 114
    Majority voting, 331, 333–335, 337
    Marginal productivity of private investment,
    K 103–106, 113
    Keynesian 45-degree diagram, 31 Marginal productivity of public investment,
    Keynesian effect, 49, 89–91 103–106, 113, 128, 129
    Keynesian model, 16, 29–34, 45, 48, 58, 62, 63, Marginal propensity to consume, 29, 30, 40,
    65, 66, 79, 90, 102, 111, 146 58, 65, 307
    Kuznets hypothesis, 118 Marginal propensity to save, 30
    Maximin criterion, 268, 275, 280, 290
    Median voter theorem, 333–334, 338,
    L 341, 360
    Labor demand, 60–61, 189 Mobile tax base, 364, 371–372
    Labor income tax, 18, 194, 198, 206–210, 227, Modified Ramsey rule, 255–258
    229–234, 236, 242–248, 250, 252, 256, Monetary policy, 21, 22, 24, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45,
    258, 264, 265, 281, 282 153, 157
    402 Index

    N Permanent level of fiscal variables, 53–57


    Nash equilibrium approach, 302–308, 311, 319 Person-specific burden ratio, 308, 309
    Nash reaction function, 304 Phase diagram, 161
    National finance, 9, 131 Phillips curve, 341
    Neoclassical macroeconomic model, 53, 58, 65 Pigouvian tax, 349–358
    Neutrality theorem of public goods, 316–326 Pivotal agent, 314
    Non-excludability, 2, 18, 295, 296, 310 Policymaker, 43–47, 320, 337, 341
    Non-Keynesian effect, 49, 89–91, 141 Political business cycle, 340–342, 346
    Nonlinear income tax, 258, 274, 278–282 Political effort, 166, 167, 349, 350, 353, 357
    Non-rivalness, 2, 295, 296 Political party, 18, 337–342
    Politician, 18, 24, 330, 337–341, 358, 366, 367,
    388, 390
    O Primary balance, 24, 147–150, 152, 158, 196,
    Objective of parties, 337–338 197, 200
    Okun law, 342 Primary deficit, 149–152
    Optimal deficits, 158, 159, 161–167 Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 132, 133
    Optimal growth model, 113–114 Private provision of public goods, 18, 166, 302,
    Optimal marginal tax rate, 270, 276, 279–282, 303, 307, 318, 320, 349
    285, 289, 290, 292 Privatization, 131, 132, 135, 182–184, 201
    Optimal provision of local public goods, Producer price, 221–223, 234, 235, 240, 252
    367–369 Progressive income tax, 3, 18, 49, 239,
    Optimal provision of public goods, 298–302, 267–274, 379, 380
    308, 310, 368 Public bads, 320–326
    Optimal public investment, 104–110 Public debt, 4, 55, 77, 110, 139–140, 247, 340,
    Optimal saving, 78, 93, 212, 213 383–384
    Optimal size of government spending, 71 Public debt and public pension, 176–178
    Optimal taxation, 2, 18, 116, 208, 211, Public debt issuance, 13, 16, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85,
    233–240, 250–258, 267, 276–279, 281, 139–140, 148, 149, 176, 177, 348
    282, 289, 332, 353, 356, 372, 375 Public goods, 2, 68, 145, 236, 274, 295–297,
    Overlapping generations, 80–81, 88, 91–100, 329, 363
    119–122, 127, 179, 192, 245, 247–248, Public investment, 1, 37, 101, 139, 159,
    250–258, 281 358–361, 377
    Overlapping tax base, 377, 392, 397 Public investment management, 49, 50,
    130–135, 360–361
    Public pension, 3, 4, 9, 14, 18, 85, 169–187,
    P 189–201, 282
    Paradoxical case, 275 Public pension reform, 179–182, 194
    Paradox of voting, 334–335 Public-Private Partnership (PPP), 132, 133
    Pareto optimality, 6–7, 300, 306, 315, 316 Public sector of Japan, 8
    Pareto optimum, 6, 7, 298, 305, 309–312, Pure public goods, 2, 295–297, 302, 311, 317,
    316, 325 326, 331, 350, 351, 354, 364, 369, 371
    Partisan business cycle, 341–346, 361
    Paternalism, 171–172
    Pay-as-you-go system, 95, 169, 170, 172–177, R
    179, 181–185, 188, 201 Ramsey rule, 18, 234–236, 239, 250, 255–258,
    2004 Pension reform, 179, 181, 191, 200 375, 376
    Perfect capital market, 42, 70, 86, 109, 178 Ramsey-Samuelson rule, 376
    Perfect capital movement, 86 Rate of time preference, 56–58, 69, 108, 109,
    Perfect equality, 3, 270–272, 292 113, 165, 213, 226, 249
    Permanent disposable income, 57, 58, 63, 65, Rawls judgment, 268, 269, 275–276
    66, 79, 82, 91, 99 Recognition lag, 43
    Permanent expansion, 63, 65, 66 Redistribution, 2–3, 82, 117–118, 141,
    Permanent income hypothesis, 57–59, 89 170–171, 267, 312, 330, 364
    Index 403

    Regional redistribution, 318, 365, 381–383 T


    Regressive income tax, 273 Tax competition, 364, 371–377, 387
    Resource allocation, 1–2, 7, 46, 104, 160, 298, Tax possibility curve, 274–275, 292
    299, 383 Tax possibility frontier (TPF), 285–287,
    Revenue-maximizing tax rate, 275, 276 289–292
    Ricardian debt neutrality, 75, 79, 97, 176, Tax postponement effect, 259–263
    178, 244 Tax rate, 24, 87, 102, 142, 194, 206, 229,
    Rules vs. discretion, 45–47 270, 331, 372
    Rural area, 21, 107, 129, 130, 186, 360, Tax reform, v, 2, 13, 18, 220, 241, 263,
    367, 381, 383 278, 280
    Tax revenue, 2, 31, 55, 78, 103, 139, 142,
    144, 147–150, 153, 190, 208, 230,
    S 274, 316, 332, 368
    Samuelson rule, 18, 298–302, 305–307, 310, Tax smoothing hypothesis, 87, 142–144
    369, 374, 376 Tax timing effect, 247, 256, 259, 261–264
    Savings elasticity, 224–227 Temporary expansion, 63–64, 67
    Second best, 254–258, 353, 374, 376, 378 Theory of public choice, 329–330
    Second optimality theorem, 7 Tiebout model, 370
    Selfish bequest motive, 88 Time consistency, 339, 375–377
    Self-selection constraint, 279, 281, 282 Timing, 43, 87, 141, 245–248, 256, 259,
    Shift of burden, 80–82, 221–222 261–265, 271, 341
    Simulation analysis, 181, 191–201, 247–250,
    264, 265
    Simulation result, 193, 196–200, 250 U
    Small government, 2, 21, 75, 330–331, 333, Uniform tax rate proposition, 236, 239
    347 Unifying tax rates, 242
    Small open economy, 387 Urban area, 21, 107, 129, 358, 381, 383
    Social indifference curve, 268, 275, 276, 285, Utilitarian criterion, 268, 276
    287–292
    Social welfare function, 122, 240, 253, 268–269,
    275, 280, 281, 284, 285, 287–290 V
    Soft budget game, 387, 389, 393–397 Voting model, 18, 330–337
    Soft budget problem, 377–378, 380, 381, 397 Voting with feet, 366, 369–371
    Solow model, 110–111
    Solvency condition, 70
    Stabilization, 3–4, 21, 22, 32, 45, 47, 48, 50, W
    140–142, 144, 157, 158, 380 Wage elasticity of labor supply, 211
    Stigma, 284 Wealth effect, 71, 79, 81, 85
    Streetlight game, 313, 314 Winning probability, 346
    Substitutability between private consumption
    and public spending, 66
    Substitution effect, 18, 59, 67, 87, 93, 207, 208, Z
    210–211, 213–216, 224, 234–236, 238, Zero capital movement, 42
    248, 256, 259, 278 Zero crowding out, 36–37
    Sustainability of fiscal management, 150, 341 Zero-tax nation, 146

    You might also like