VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH OF THE DEFINITION OF

TERRORISM UNDER ANTI-TERRORISM ACT

First Issue - Whether or not the definition of terrorism as a crime in

Section 4 of the ATA is void for being vague and overbroad.

As to the first issue, the petitioners in the case claim that the
definition of terrorism as a crime in Section 4 of the ATA is void for being
vague and overbreadth because it violates due process for failing to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to be
avoided and leaves enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions, and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Further, the petitioners argued that the perceived impression in the
language of Section 4 is allegedly aggravated by the phrase “regardless of
the stage of execution,” which they interpret as punishing any kind of
action, including expression of thought.

 The Supreme Court clarified that the Section 4 of the ATA has 2
distinct parts, the main part, which provides for the actus reus or the overt
acts that constitute the crime, mens rea or the enumeration of the purposes
of any of the actus reus, and corresponding imposable penalty for the
crime of terrorism. The second part is the proviso, which is, if rephrased
into its logical inverse, purports to allow for advocacies, protests, dissents,
stoppages of work, industrial or mass actions, and other similar exercises of
civil and political rights to be punished as acts of terrorism if they are
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a
person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety."
 The Court ruled that the Petitioners' contention that what sought to
be punished by the law was speech was inaccurate. The Court ruled
explained that based on the language of Section 4, the enumeration
pertains to the punishable acts or those pertaining to bodily movements
that tend to produce an effect in the external world, and not speech.

Further, the Court likewise ruled that terrorism, as defined in Section

4 of the ATA, is not impermissibly vague. It held that the actus reus and
the mens rea of the main part of the said Section should be used to construe
the crime of terrorism.

I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court on this issue since the
main part of Section 4 of the ATA, specifically, its actus reus and mens rea
parts, would sufficiently define what terrorism is. As stated by the Court in
this case, when the actus reus and mens rea of the main part of Section 4
are taken together, they create a demonstrably valid and legitimate
definition of terrorism that is general enough to adequately address the
ever-evolving forms of terrorism, but neither too vague nor too broad as to
violate due process or encroach upon the freedom of speech and
expression and other fundamental liberties.