Altoriental. Forsch.

, Akademie Verlag, 36 (2009) 2, 365-371

JORD! VIDAL

The Siege of Razama

An example ofaggressive defence in Old-Babylonian times *

Abstract

This paper analyses the aggressive defence practised by the inhabitants of Razama during the siege
of the city by an army led by Atamrum in 1765 BCE, as it is described in several Mari texts. Special
attention is payed to the reconstruction of the defensive action described in ARM 14 104+, a text which
reflects the expertise of the Razameans in this kind of military action as well as the inability of the
besiegers to counteract it.

Keywords: Aggressive Defence, Razama, ARM 14104+

1. The Siege of Razama

During the 10th regnal year of Zimri-Lim (1765 BCE) an army led by Atamrum, king of
Allahad and later of Andarig, and made up of soldiers from Esnunna and Elam, besieged
the city of Razama, capital of Yussan 1 (D. Charpin - N. Ziegler (2003), 216f.; W. Heimpel
(2003), 65ff.).
The siege of Razama is mentioned in several Mari texts.2 The most detailed account is
recorded in ARM 14 104+, a letter from Yaqim-Addu, governor of Qattunan, to Zimri Lim
of Mari. This letter reflects the information provided by three men from Bab-Nahlim3,
conveying the efforts by besiegers and defenders in the conquest/defence of the city. The
description of the defensive tactics executed by the soldiers of Razama is of particular
interest. This description provides one of the best examples preserved in cuneiform texts
of aggressive defence. Unlike static defence, where all efforts are concentrated on pro-
tecting the wall, aggressive defence also makes sorties with the aim of disrupting enemy

* This paper has been written thanks to a postdoctoral scholarship granted by the Department
d' Edueaóó i Universitats de la Generalitat de Catalunya in the Sehool of Oriental and Afriean Studies
(University of London). 1 am really grateful to Dr. Ester Blay and Dr. Wilfred Watson for their support
in writing this paper. Any mistakes, of course, are my own.
1 Gn the geographical setting ofYussan see D. Charpin (1990), 118.
2 ARM 6 65; ARM 14 103; ARM 27 132, 133.

3 A city located inside the district ofMari (D. Charpin (1991), 159 n. 47).
366 Jordi Vidal, The Siege of Razama

positions, taking over their equipment or destroying it, and if possible forcing the enemy to
flee, thus putting an end to the siege.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse some unclear aspects of the siege of Razama
linked to the practice of this kind of defence.

2. The sorties ofthe besieged troops

Several passages in ARM 14 104+refer to the sorties of the Razamean troops:

When troops arrived at Razama, when they arrived, the troops of the city carne out and killed
700 Elamites and 600 Esnunakeans (ARM 14104+: 8-10).
(Sarriya) made his decision, fortified his city and started coming out regularly and killing the
Esnunakean troops. (Atamrum) heaped up a ramp toward the city. The front of the ramp
reached the base of the wall of the lower city. Citizens made a tunnel in the city. They made
two holes in the wall, right and left toward the front ofthe ramp. Atnight they entered [that]
tunnel, and in the early moming, the troops of the city [carne] out and killed half of the troops
(of Atamrum). They made them drop the bronze lances and their shields and brought them
inside the city (ARM 14104+: 22-33).

Other texts refer to the aggressive defence practised in Razama, and could perhaps be
different accounts of the very actions recorded in ARM 14 104+. ARM 6 65, a letter from
Bahdi-Lim, govemor ofMari, mentions a sortie ofthe troops from Razama causing 500 casu-
alties in Atamrum's army:

The city oí Razama is besieged, and Sarraya remains inside his city. He fought, went out and
felled 500 troops from the [enem]y army (ARM 6 65: 8-12).

ARM 27133, a letter from Zimri-Addu, govemor of Qattunan, mentions a sortie by the
soldiers of Razama, causing 300 casualties and taking over the siege ramp built by the
besiegers:

Razamean troops came out from inside the city and killed 300 Esnunakeans, and they stood
on top of the ramp that they (the Esnunakeans) had heaped up (ARM 27133: 6-9).

Reconstructing the siege of Razama in a precise manner is very difficult, since the informa-
tion provided by the letters is not always consistent. It is certain that defenders made
sorties regularly, as is stated in ARM 14 104+: 23.4 Identifying individual sorties, however, is
more difficult. In principIe, and bearing in mind the differing number of casualties among
the besiegers, the passages in ARM 665: 8-12, ARM 14104+: 8-10 and ARM 27133: 6-9
seem to allude to three different sorties undertaken by the soldiers of Razama. But, as
Heimpel points out, the number of casual ti es may not be a valid sign of there being
different episodes, since numbers might be inaccurate and, in fact, may refer to the same

4 ka-a-[ia]-ni-isu;I'-;I'í-ma.
 Altoriental. Forsch. 36 (2009) 2 367

action (w. Heimpel (2003), 67). It is therefore possible that passages like ARM 6 65: 8-12
and ARM 14104+: 8-10 refer to the same sortie.
Focusing on ARM 14 104+, it must be noted that the meaning of lines 22-33 is condi-
tioned by the difficulties posed by Hnes 27-29. For the previous lines, I have followed
Charpin's translation. According to him, Atamrum's troops built a siege ramp that allowed
them to use battering rams in order to open a breach in the wall. Due to the danger in-
volved in the construction of the ramp, the defenders of the city made a tunnel and opened
two holes in the wall. At dawn they went out, destroying the enemy's position and neu-
tralizing the danger in that particular are a (D. Charpin (1993), 203).
Heimpel puts forward an alternative scenario. He interprets the use of the verb
pariisum 5 in line 27 as an indication of the division of the city by its defenders, who built a
second wall in order to isolate the area endangered by the construction of the siege ramp
(w. Heimpel (1996), § 102).
More relevant for our study is the interpretation of lines 22-33 put forward by Durand
(J. M. Durand (1998), 159ff.). Thus, unlike Charpin, Durand considers that the subject of
the verb pariisum in line 27 is not the defenders but the besiegers. Therefore, the letter
would be describing the opening of a breach in the wall by Atamrum's troops, made pos-
sible by the earlier construction of the siege ramp. Gn the other hand, Durand reads
kappum 6 instead of huppum 7 in line 28. Thus, Durand's translation of the whole passage is
as follows:

les gens de la ville - (l'assaillant) entreprenant de faire une breche dans la ville - avaient
renforcé le mur sur les cótés gauche et droit, en face du remblai. S'étant introduits dans la
breche, alors qu'il faisait encore nuit, sur le front du remblai, les gens de la ville firent une
sortie au petit matin et ont tué la moitié de ces soldats.

According to Durand's translation, the defenders of the city did not open two holes in the
wall to go out, but strengthened the fortification system in the area endangered by the
construction of the siege ramp. Later, the defenders exited through a breach opened by the
besiegers and attacked them. Durand's interpretation is admissible both from a philo-
logical point of view and from the perspective of the development of the siege. Perhaps the
most problematic point is the elliptical subject ("l'assaillant") that Durand relates to the
verb pariisum. In any case, this translation must be taken into consideration when discussing
the defensive tactics described in ARM 14104+, as we shall attempt in the following lines.

3. Aggressive defence ofRazama

As we have seen, the regular practice of sorties by the besieged troops of Razama is
actually well attested. However, the texts do not show how these sorties by the defenders
were specifically undertaken.

5 "cut off" (CAD P p.165).

fi "arm,hand" (CADKp.185).
7 "hole, depression" (CAD tI
p. 239).
368 Jordi Vidal, The Siege ofRazama

As Philo of Byzantium pointed out many centuries later, a correct aggressive defence
requires the use of postern gates for the exit and entry of the troops:

Furthermore, many postems should interrupt the frontage to facilitate the emergence (of
sortie parties) and in order that on their return (these parties) will not expose themselves
unprotected by retiring towards their shielded side, (because) the party that went out by the
first postern will be effecting the (re- )entry by the second, and all the other (parties will be)
making their return in a similar manner. Some of the posterns should be at an angle, others
should make a closure (Philo, Poliorketika 1: 33-34. Translation by A. W. Lawrence (1979),
79ff.).

If there were no postern gates, the defenders would be forced to open the city gates or to
open a breach in their own wall, with the obvious problems involved in this action (the
difficu1ty of keeping the works a secret; the need to repair the wall once the sortie has
finished, etc.). In the case of Razama, the regular sorties of the besieged troops show
that the tactic of aggressive defence was well known to the soldiers of the city, probably
practised before the siege of Atamrum. If this is so, it is reasonable to as sume that the forti-
fications of the city were well adapted to this kind of defence, thus including the necessary
postern gates for the sorties. This hypothesis is supported by the well attested presence of
postern gates in Middle Bronze Age fortifications (Tuttul, U garit, Akko) (A. A. Burke
(2008),71).
Unfortunately, it cannot be ascertained whether there were postern gates in the wall of
Razama, as we do not know the actuallocation of that city. Since it was probably located north
ofDjebel Sindjar, Joannes suggests that Razama might be Tell al-Hawa (F. Joannes (1990),
45). However, the small number of texts found there (J. Black (1990), 44ff.; A. George
(1990)) do not reflect the ancient name of the city.8 But even if we provisionally accept
that Tell al-Hawa could be ancient Razama, we cannot add to our knowledge of the forti-
fication system of the city: during the three campaigns undertaken in the tell, no remains of
the wall were found. A large stone wall revetting massive earthworks was discovered in
Area C. At first, it was understood to be a part of the city wall, but after comparison with a
similar feature on Mound E, the archaeologist concluded that those remains might have
been a part of the construction of a massive artificial earthen mound or platform, perhaps
forming the base of a building (w. Ball (1990), 88).
Since no archaeological information on the fortification system of Razama is available, it
is necessary to return to the texts and to analyse a passage linked to a particular sortie.
According to our interpretation of ARM 14 104+, it is clear that at least in one occasion the
defenders opened two breaches in the wall to go out and attack the enemy: "(defenders)
made two holes in the wall, right and left toward the front of the ramp" (11.27-28). How-
ever, this could not have been the usual way to make sorties. As we have seen, the de-
fenders went out regularly. If the usual way to go out was to open a breach in the wall, then

8 In the fragment of an administrative text found in Tell al-Hawa (1M 113547 = HW 236) two place
names are mentioned, Hadnum and Suruzi. However, as George points out: "there can be no sug-
gestion on the available evidence that Tell al-Hawa was called Shuruzi(m) -or, for that matter,
Hadnum - in the early second millennium" (A. George (1990),41). ather suggested identifications for
the tell are Kiskis and Tille (see W. Ball (1990), 90ff.).
Altoriental. Forsch. 36 (2009) 2 369

it must be concluded that the wall of Razama was full of breaches opened by the defenders
themselves. Obviously, this does not seem the best means to guarantee the defence of the
city. In fact, the sortÍe mentÍoned in lines 27-28 is the consequence of a particular circum-
stance, i.e. the constructÍon of a siege ramp. The need to confront such a threat must have
forced the defenders to make a sortie as close to the ramp as possible, so that due to the
absence of a postern gate close by, they were forced to open a breach in their own wall.
If we now take into consideratÍon the translatÍon put forward by Durand, then the situa-
tion must have been completely different. According to his interpretatÍon, the defenders
went out through a pre-eXÍstent breach opened by the besiegers, so this text would not
provide us with any informatÍon about the usual way in which sorties were made, and
would instead just be mentioning a very specific and dramatÍc situatÍon (a breach opened
by the enemy with a battering ram).
In fact, the sortie mentÍoned in hnes 27-28 occurred in exceptional circumstances (it was
a response to an immediate and quite localized danger), that prevent us from regarding it
as a paradigm for aggressive defence in Razama. It must be remembered that aggressive
defence requires a knowledge of strategy, since it is a tactÍcal resource that cannot be
improvised (F. Gracia (2000), 149). Accordingly, 1 believe that the most plausible scenario
in order to understand the siege of Razama, in spite of not having direct archaeological
confirmatÍon, is the existence of a fortificatÍon system which was well adapted to the needs
of aggressive defence, including the concept of a postern gate, a well known structure in
the region in Old Babylonian tÍmes.

4. Military camps

Another point of interest in the siege of Razama is the great number of casualties caused
by the defenders in their sortÍes, even if we accept that the numbers of casualties recorded
by the letters might be inaccurate. As we have noted, ARM 14 104+: 8f. registers 1300
casualties, with 500 in ARM 6 65: 8ff. and 300 in ARM 27 233: 6ff., all due to sortÍes made
by the defenders.
It is certain that, as ARM 14104+ attests, sorties were well planned, and particular atten-
tion was paid to the element of surprise. However, the success of the sortÍes must also be
explained as a result of the deficient conditions of the besiegers camp, hardly prepared to
face an aggressive defence such as that undertaken in Razama.
Even though military camps (kariisum) are well attested in the Mari texts9, we know
very Httle about their partÍcular features. The most expHcit text on this question is prob-
ably ARM 190 (J.M. Durand (1987), 170f.), a letter from Samsi-Addu to Yasmah-Addu,
in which the siege of Amursakkum is described.10 A group of Turukkean 11 soldiers had

9 ARM 1 90, ARM 14104+, ARM 26116,117,123,255,320,343,363,364,378,384,390,405, 417, 418,

419,424,508,521,522,523, ARM2716, 18, 133, 140, 145, 146, 164, 170, ARM28171 ...
10 A city probably located in the region of Nisibe (K. Kessler (1980), 209; D. Charpin - N. Ziegler
(2003),115 n. 331; see also J. M. Durand (1997), 185 n. a).
11 Ethnic group from the Urmia basin in the Zagros (1. Eidem-J. LreSS(IJe(2001), 25ff.).
370 Jordi Vidal, The Siege of Razama

taken refuge in the city, which was besieged by the army of ISme-Dagan, led by ISar-Lim
and Dadanum. During the siege of the city, the defenders made a sortie to attack the Assy-
rian campo As a result of this action, Dadanum and five of his soldiers were killed. Given
the challenge posed by the aggressive defence practised by the Turukkeans, the Assyrians
decided to fortify their military camp:

The troops fortify the military camp, dig a ditch (and) surround the city and the military camp
(ARM 190: 18-21).

The action described shows that the Assyrian leaders knew the correct tactical response to
aggressive defence, that is, adopting basic security measures such as the building of
barriers or the digging of ditches. It is doubtful that Atamrum followed such a plan. If we
focus only on ARM 14 104+, it is clear that there were sorties previous to the one made
when the ramp had been built and the defenders killed half the troops of Atamrum loca ted
in that particular area. This must necessarily mean that, after the first sorties, Atamrum
did not adopt (effective) security measures to protect his troops from the attacks of the
Razameans. The absence of those measures probably reflects the unfamiliarity of the
besiegers with aggressive defence, leaving them incapable of finding tactical means to
try to counter it. The absence of an adequate tactical response must undoubtedly have
stimulated the defenders to undertake that kind of action repeatedly, realising that it was
the most effective way to try to end the siege. In fact, towards the end of the text, we find
the best evidence of the effectiveness of the aggressive defence practised by the Raza-
means and the inability of the besiegers to counteract it, when reference is made to the
main fear of the troops of Atamrum:

Those who are inside the city will come out, [and] they will kill many troops (ARM 104 14+:
50-51).

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Jordi Vidal
Institut del Proxim Orient Antic
Universitat de Barcelona
Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes 585
E - 08007 Barcelona
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