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Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology
Volume 11, Number 3, 2012
A Method for Assessing Educability:

Some Applications in Psychopathology
André Rey, translated from French by H. Carl Haywood
SUMMARY
1. Educability as an aspect of mental diagnosis
2. Description of the manual maze; scoring; examining methods
3. Developmental analysis of learning the manual maze
4. Some applications of the method in psychopathology
EDUCABILITY AS AN ASPECT OF MENTAL DIAGNOSIS

Suppose someone shows us two dogs, one of which, following patient training, demonstrates
a well-developed conditioned reflex, whereas the other, not having received the same train-
ing, lacks the conditioned response. Suppose we are asked to estimate, on the basis of this
single clue, which of the two animals is more intelligent, more developed, more normal; in
short, which of the two exceeds the other with respect to the plasticity and quality of its neural
organization.
On hearing this question many would smile, finding it absurd. Instead of making such a
judgment, they would answer that the two dogs are not comparable and that one should not
base an opinion on the mere presence or absence of some acquired behavior. The first animal
has made an accommodation; in that animal, certain of its organismic possibilities have been
realized, whereas in the second animal, which might possess identical possibilities, but has
not been exposed to the same conditions, such an accommodation has not yet been reached.
Thus, to compare the two animals under these conditions is as useless as comparing, from a
growth point of view, a mature plant to its seed. Everyone would agree that such a compari-
son of growth would make sense for these plants only if we should examine them both at the
same time, developing under identical conditions. Only under such circumstances would any
differences between them be meaningful and usefully interpretable.
Is it not the same with the two dogs? In order to judge their adaptive capacities, would it
not be essential to subject these animals to identical treatment, permitting each organism to
realize its own potential for accommodation in given directions? Under such standard condi-
tions we can see right away that the comparison should be made with respect to the training,
This paper was originally published in French: Rey, A. (1934). D’un procédé pour évaluer l’éducabilité,
rchives de Psychologie, 24, 297–337. We used the same formatting as the original text whenever possible.
A
Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs. Teresina Rey and Médecine & Hygiène.
274 © 2012 Springer Publishing Company

http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/1945-8959.11.3.274
A Method for Assessing Educability 275
or, more precisely, on the nature and duration of the accommodative (learning) processes.
The observed differences permit us thus to say which of the two dogs has the more modifiable
and balanced organization that allows it to excel in the quality and speed of adaptation.
Without belaboring the point, let us emphasize that it is only processes that we can com-
pare in any useful manner. From a prognostic perspective, we could therefore not, without
falling into the absurd, contrast the existence of an accomplishment with its absence. To be
sure, the presence of accomplishments can constitute a significant datum. By establishing
that the individual has been able and has known how to adapt himself in the past, we may as-
sume with high probability that the same abilities will continue to be manifest in the future.
By contrast, there is no way to support the inverse proposition: the absence of achievements,
at a given moment, does not mean that in the future, and under the right circumstances, the
adaptation cannot take place.
From a theoretical point of view, the absence of achievements does not open any window on
the adaptive abilities of the subject. Although it happens in some cases that one can make a prog-
nosis on the basis of such information that might turn out to be correct, we would not know how
to evaluate the argument in order to establish this method of assessment on scientific bases.
It could happen, in fact, that an individual might find himself in such circumstances that
he would have opportunities to reach many achievements normally. If they are not attained, it
is because there is a disorder in mental organization. In such a case, the absence of achieve-
ments, observed in the examination, would have some prognostic value, provided, of course,
that one knows the individual’s history. Although such cases do exist, there are others, at least
as numerous, in which the absence of certain achievements rests solely on the individual’s
history and not on disorders of mental organization. In this case, any prognosis based on the
absence of achievements will be devoid of meaning.
We may conclude that, whatever cases one might encounter, it is always advantageous to
carry out assessments on the basis of the nature and speed of the accommodative processes.1
Psychologists and psychiatrists have made commendable efforts to design objective meth-
ods of mental assessment. The number of tests that exist now is considerable. Unfortunately,
we do not know how to make good use of all the products of this abundance.
From a superficial point of view, it is easy to criticize the efforts of others. We do so much
more than we are disposed to offer alternative methods of assessment; however, on scientific
grounds, one cannot abstain from making some comments.
Psychometricians have been so preoccupied with devising practical and rapid methods
of investigation that they have often chosen to assess products of prior learning rather than
the learning or change processes themselves. They have gathered, judged, and evaluated
the responses (that subjects have) given to a wide variety of questions and quite diverse
problems. The reference norms created with such tests have made it possible to compare
subjects with each other and to rank-order them with respect to their aptitudes or their
developmental level.
By this kind of approach, are we not comparing individuals who, in fact, are not compa-
rable? Indeed, the achievement potential of some might have been actualized to the maxi-
mum, whereas in others there might be as-yet-unrealized potential for improvement (greater
or smaller), and in still others the same achievements have not yet been realized at all, which
does not in any way suggest that they might not be reached some day. In spite of this hetero-
geneity, we continue to compare these individuals as if they belonged to the same groups,
even daring to base our prognoses on such questionable methods.
276 Haywood
If we should pose our problem of the two dogs to practitioners who deem prognoses
based on achievements to be adequate, they would probably smile. Why would they change
their approach when the subjects are human; is not the problem structurally the same?
We could answer that, given that assessment of an aptitude or a developmental level pres-
ents primarily a practical problem, it suffices to know whether, from this point of view, the
existence or absence of prior achievements plays an important role. If such is the case, is it
not then legitimate to ignore the theoretical problem in order to address the practical one?
This point of view can be defended and even, under some circumstances, adopted. Nev-
ertheless, such a concession made at the practical level can lead psychology into dangerous
territory by easily bringing about a confusion of values.
Claude Bernard observed that when we confront a given fact, it acquires scientific value
only through knowledge of its determining factors. The presence, absence, or degree of
achievement are raw facts that have scientific value only when their determination is known.
In our particular case, knowledge of how achievements have been reached comes down sub-
stantially to the processes by which these achievements have become the end product.
A certain practical psychology can be derived from this rule; it runs a strong risk of lean-
ing toward a superficial empiricism: collecting formulae, some of which work successfully.
Whereas, in the practice of mental diagnosis, we have sometimes fallen into the error
that I have called attention to here, we have also conceived of tests that are not subject to
these criticisms. There are methods that, not seeking merely to assess previously acquired
achievements, are designed to follow the processes of their acquisition. Emphasizing these
processes, they permit us to make useful comparisons of individuals. They even attain the
ability of adaptation whose qualities they reveal. They allow us therefore to base a prognosis
on knowledge of the determinants of the achievement, which alone has meaning.
In a practical sense, these tests rely on some kinds of learning. One takes note of the
manner and the speed with which individuals adapt themselves to a given task and thus com-
pares, across subjects, the characteristics of educability.
Unfortunately, this kind of assessment of educability presents some problems. The examina-
tion sometimes requires several sessions or simply a very long time. Many practitioners, pressed
to obtain a score, find this an obstacle or see it as a condition that is incompatible with the require-
ments of practice. This is an error. It is essential that science not be hurried, and it is frequently
more worthwhile to reject an experiment than to conduct a misleading one. Trying to inventory a
mind in five minutes is to resign oneself to grasp only what can be grasped in five minutes.
The other problem is more serious: The subjects may have no wish to finish the task that
one proposes that they learn. The absence of interest, of any real motive to pursue the task,
can give illusory results. Here we encounter that artificial character of experimentation in
psychology for which there is hardly any remedy.
The only way that allows one, we believe, to improve on such outcomes is not to present
the test as an experiment but as a task in which we require accomplishment.
By avoiding that companionability and that indulgence that we see so frequently recom-
mended, we place ourselves in conditions that are closer to reality, which, for the subject, will
not be characterized by indulgence. There are some cases, however, in which such an [insistent]
attitude is dangerous. We cannot formulate any rule in this regard; everything depends on the
character of the subject and especially on what it is that the examiner wishes to observe.
I will not review the tests that have already been proposed for assessing educability or,
more generally, adaptation. The tests of learning that are currently in use in the practice of
mental diagnosis are still few. Such methods rarely extend beyond the laboratories where they
are used for the advancement of theoretical research.
In the course of a developmental learning study we have developed a method and an in-
strument that enables us to assess a form of educability and to follow the phases of an adap-
tive process. It seems to us that the procedure presents some advantages that could justify its
application.
Inspired by methods used in animal psychology, our instrument is a kind of maze adapted
for prehension [ability to grasp objects]. Not wishing to add to the barbarism of the scientific
vocabulary, we have declined to give it a precise name, designating it simply “manual maze,”2
although it hardly recalls, by virtue of its form, those roundabout excursions around numer-
ous culs-de-sac in which the curiosity of psychologists has led them to enclose, successively,
all the representatives of the animal kingdom.
The task does not require that the subject have any special aptitude. It can be given to
almost all ages and all socioeconomic environments, and is to a very large extent indepen-
dent of prior achievements or learning experiences. By making slight modifications in the
presentation, one can transform the task into new and equivalent tasks and thus compare, at
different times, the rates of adaptation.
Description of the Manual Maze, Performance Recording,

Administration of the Examination
The apparatus consists of a series of small wood or metallic plates (it can be constructed of
either of these materials), each in the form of a square measuring 14 cm per side. Each plate
has nine disks arranged as shown in Figure 1. Eight of the nine disks can be lifted out from
the plate easily, being held simply by a small post in a hole that has been drilled into the
plate. The ninth disk is solidly attached without appearing to be any different from the others.
Figure 1 also shows two of the removable disks and a fixed disk.
Four of these plates, stacked one atop another, usually constitute the total apparatus. The
subject’s task is to grasp each plate by the fixed disk. Given that there are no external cues for
identifying the fixed disk, the subject has to start by trying some of the movable disks until
the fixed one is found. (The disks that have been removed are put back in their places and not
Figure 1. The layout of the manual maze, showing at the bottom of the figure two
removable disks and one fixed disk.
278 Haywood
collected separately.) The plates are so arranged that each successive plate has the fixed disk
in a different position. It is this sequence of placements that the subject must remember in
the course of learning.
Several kinds of scores can be recorded during the test, including:
1. The number and sequence of errors on each repetition, each touch of a movable disk
constituting an error;
2. The time required for each trial [excursion through the four plates];
3. The number of trials to reach the criterion of learning;
4. The total time required to reach the criterion of learning.
Scores 1 and 3 seem to us the most interesting, so we have recorded only those two.
In order to keep a precise record of the subjects’ activity, we transcribe their errors in a schema. On a sheet of paper
we arrange in a column four square compartments corresponding to each of the four plates. Each compartment is
divided into nine cells corresponding to the nine disks of a plate. We then constructed a notation that would permit
us to record the errors and their sequence.
As subjects try the disks on the first plate we record the sequence of their attempts in the small squares in the first
compartment. We continue thus with the second compartment when the subjects start work on the second plate,
and proceed in this manner through the series of four plates and recording compartments. For each trial of the test
we open a new column of four compartments laid out beside the preceding one. At the end of the test we have thus
a document that permits us to follow with great precision the course of subjects’ learning. Reading this record easily
informs us regarding the work methods the subjects have used.
Figure 2 shows the series of four plates that we have used, with the positions of the four
fixed disks shown in black. On the right side, we show two scoring columns.
Figure 2. Position of the fixed disk on each of the four plates of the apparatus, and a
sample scoring sheet.
The following instructions are given to subjects.

With young children we begin by presenting a plate that is not part of the test series, dem-
onstrating that some disks are removable whereas there is one that is firmly attached to the
plate, that cannot be removed, thus permitting one to lift the whole plate [by this one fixed disk].
We then show the subjects the series of four stacked plates and ask them to lift each one, in
order, by the fixed disk. We show the children the difficulty of the first trial and encourage them
to work without being too concerned about errors, asking instead that they try to remember the
position of the fixed disks so they can find them quickly on successive trials. We ask them to use
only one hand in the task and not to move too quickly (in order for us to record their actions).
The initial trials engage the children such that it is frequently necessary to regulate their
enthusiasm and especially to restrain use of the other hand. We must take care also that the
disks are not simply tapped and that subjects do not study the plates carefully in the vain hope
of discovering [some clue to] the fixed disk.
Between 5 and 6 years of age, children’s self-esteem enters the picture rather strongly,
supporting the activity until the learning is accomplished. Prior to this age, the monotony of
the repetitious trials and the difficulty of the task quickly tire the children. If the examiner’s
entreaties and encouragement fail to motivate the subjects, it is a good idea to suspend the
activity. The four-plate series is too difficult for four-year-old children, so with them one can
use an abbreviated series of three or even two plates.
In examining adolescents or adults, we use a more expeditious technique by simply de-
scribing the properties of the task and indicating the objective.
In examining adult patients, the examiner should be careful to respect their self-esteem by
offering support, assuring them that the task is indeed an arduous one and that the learning
difficulties it presents are the same for everybody.
Subjects are considered to have reached the learning criterion for this series of four plates
when they have achieved three successive errorless trials.
DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF LEARNING IN THE MANUAL MAZE

Preliminary Comments
How does the learning of the manual maze come about? What is the nature of the process
that brings about the adaptation to this particular task? Observation of the behavior of adults
cannot answer these questions. The learning process is much too rapid for us to be able to
follow its development. By the end of one or two trials, subjects may already have established
the position of each of the fixed disks. Such rapidity gives the illusion of a very simple process.
Developmental study is the only analytic procedure that we have available to us for its detailed
analysis. Is it not by examining how individuals become capable, little by little, of this swift
adaptation that we have the chance to discover which of the elements of mental synthesis
come into play at the end of the process? Aside from this theoretical interest, developmental
study provides us with yet more important diagnostic data.
From the developmental perspective, success on the learning task interests us less than
the working procedures that subjects employ. We attempt here a classification of these work-
ing procedures, not ignoring the difficulty of the undertaking. Every subject, in fact, presents
peculiarities that we have to overlook in order to constitute our groups.
Can we, without further comment, just pass over them? It is necessary, lest we extend
ourselves into monographs from which we are unable to extract anything. We must observe,
280 Haywood
however, that each moment of the process that we are studying contributes to those that fol-
low to an extent that is difficult to appreciate: A hesitation appears here, a particular error
rather than another is committed there, some fortuitous success will influence in diverse
ways the progression of subsequent action.
We currently use two criteria: first, the age of the subjects, which, within certain limits,
allows us to fix on a state of mental organization; second, the overall progression of learning,
the speed of acquisition, which allows us to judge the prospective value of the working proce-
dures that have been used.
Developmental Classification of Actions; Isolated Attempts

This kind of behavior is observed normally at around four years of age, and also in persons
with moderate intellectual disabilities. On the first plate, the child will grasp a disk at random,
most often one of the movable disks, and offer it to us to get us to notice the attempt. In the
child’s mind, the test is over. In order to generate a new attempt, we often have to repeat the
instructions, offer encouragement, and direct the subject’s attention to the plate. Everything
happens as if each attempt exhausts the tendency to act.
At this level, the subject seems not to have mastered the complexity of the test situation;
no previous analysis would have identified on the plate the series of attempts. If the child has
understood that he must grasp a specific disk, he cannot yet see that the plate offers nine pos-
sible choices simultaneously.
Such a lack of understanding confers its special characteristics on this initial strategy.
As a hypothesis we can redirect the visual perception of the problem situation to simultaneous possibilities of action;
the number and form of such actions would depend on the organizational state of the subject, and that state itself would
be reducible, in large part, to the range of accommodations the subject has achieved in the past. In this array of simul-
taneously possible actions there can be one that, by chance encounter, will play a preponderant role: the layout of the
problem situation itself [disks on plates] would tend toward a precise structure calling for a particular kind of action.
Suppose that the individual, motivated by a need, the sight of a reward, or the obligation imposed by an instruction,
has to act upon the problem situation. If the problem situation lends itself and if the developmental level of the
individual is sufficient, we will see the simultaneous mobilization of several possible acts. Given that, in a practical
sense, he can only engage in successive acts, the subject will be attracted to the one of the available possibilities that
has, at that moment and for complex reasons, the greatest perceptual attraction. This essential rejection of the other
possible courses of action does not make them disappear; they retain some part of their tendency toward action, and
thus diminish any prospect that the behavioral tactics peculiar to them might lead to attainment of the goal.
Suppose now that the chosen tactic leads to failure. Thanks to the tension that comes from the (other) possible
actions, the subject’s activity, rather than stopping short or being repeated, will change direction. Thus we will have a
continuous process that will be followed until the available perceptual data are exhausted. This mechanism is actually
quite complex, for we must not forget that failure can impel one to go back to the remaining possibilities, to modify
them, and thus to bring about a re-establishment of equilibrium in an unforeseen direction.
Now let us examine what will happen when the developmental status of the individual, or the nature of the situation,
leads to a perception that comes down to only a single possibility of action. Any tendency to act will be acted upon;
if failure occurs, the activity will stop abruptly or will be repeated again and again without change until inhibition
sets in. In this latter case, each repetition of the act will constitute a separate attempt, bringing about a return of the
tendency to act. It can also happen that failure that changes the subject’s orientation to the task would propel a new
possibility of action; as a result of trial-and-error actions, the subject will orient his actions along a new path.
These hypotheses appear to us to have the advantage of explaining the varied tactics that
we have observed in subjects who are confronted with our instrument. We acknowledge that
the perception of this arrangement comes down to that of the particular disks that it is pos-
sible to put into play.
From then on, at the lowest level of mental development, the perception, not even having
gotten beyond the first plate, not having analyzed the complex structure of the problem in
terms of possibilities of action, mobilizes only a single act of grasping, executed by chance.
Any tendency to act would mirror that prior act and would thus exhaust the attempt.
At this level, while such an attitude persists, any learning is practically impossible. In fact,
the child does not engage in any systematic attempts to discover a clue. Disks are grasped at
random, impulsively, and surprise is shown in the face of failure, revealing an expectation of
immediate success. Attempts follow one after another, underscored with exclamations: “This
time it will be this one, . . . it’s not that one!” Children who do engage themselves in searching,
in the psychological sense of the term, do not feel this need to talk; attempts follow one on an-
other, and one senses that they have a plan that is governing the succession of attempts rather
than each attempt being an isolated experience. The tendency that one sees in the youngest
subjects to stop after each trial and the necessity to urge them to continue are the best indica-
tors of this discontinuity. When urging them to continue is no longer necessary, such indica-
tors are found in pauses between attempts [to locate the fixed disk], in comments that interrupt
the action, in the indifference that characterizes the selection of disks, and in the tendency to
go back to disks that they have already tried, without noticing that they have done so.
When we move on to the second plate, after the first fixed disk has been fortuitously dis-
covered, the strategy generally is not modified. In this way we finish the series, going on to
some repetitions if we have the patience, without observing any changes. We wind up with
the impression that the subject is incapable of understanding the task and that he is not
inclined toward learning.
In summary, there is a primitive stage characterized by lack of differentiation of perception
and a unidirectional mobilization of the tendency to act, faith in immediate success, and an at-
titude that is incompatible with learning. It is important to note right away that the problem is
not one of memory or, in a more general way, of retention capacity; rather, it resides in the man-
ner of assimilation and, in the final analysis, in the level of mental organization of the subject.
It is noteworthy that we have seen some subjects who fell into this first group according to
their initial approach to the task but who adopted a different method after some repetitions.
The tactic of the isolated and impulsive attempt gave way to a superior strategy, that of triage
[sorting or classifying].
Triage Strategy
This strategy is seen as early as four years. The subjects systematically lift out all the disks on
the plate. They grasp the first disk, then, getting closer and closer to the plate, go to the next
and the next, examining each piece in order. This is repeated on all the plates; no change is
seen in the course of 10 or 15 trials (we usually suspend the examination if, after 15 trials, the
strategy is not modified).
The triage strategy can be remarkably systematic. On each plate, the subject lifts the disks
in a constant order. One has the impression of a specific pathway that is followed on each new
trial, as if it were new, and pursued right up to discovery of the fixed disk.
If an observer, alerted by the monotony of this strategy, urges the subject to try to grasp the
fixed disk on the first attempt, only an insignificant change is observed. The child attempts to
do this in his next move, but then reverts to the systematic exploration of the adjacent disks.
This modification can be durable, but often a child will simply revert to his initial p rocedure.
282 Haywood
We call this behavior the “triage strategy,” focusing on its principal character. Everything
proceeds, in effect, as if the subject has agreed to pay the penalty of amassing errors as the
price of finding the fixed disk.
This child is probably not capable of assimilating the notion of the movable disks as er-
rors. In relative terms, this attitude is reminiscent of the behavior of the infusoire3 that takes
in and then rejects particles floating in its environment. The organism can acquire a certain
ability in this exercise, but always, by the very nature of the searching-out process that it
uses, obtaining nourishment is accompanied by the ingestion and expulsion of undigestable
substances. The method of young children is sometimes like that: never mind the failures;
making a large number of attempts [touching many disks], is that not the surest guarantee
of eventually locating the fixed disk; besides, what good does it do to improve one’s method
when it is the only one that fits this undifferentiated nature of the environment?
Sometimes some subjects, after having stuck with this triage strategy for a long time,
suddenly change their orientation: One of the plates is approached differently, and the sys-
tematic searching takes off from this new starting place. Often, this innovation completely
supplants the primitive approach. In some cases we observe a curious interference of this
second a pproach with the first.
What brings about this change in orientation? A chance distraction or an impulsive move-
ment is sometimes responsible, but most often it seems to be the result of an accommodation:
in the course of the initial period of triage, the subject takes note of the location of one of the
fixed disks. Suddenly abandoning the triage method, he risks trying directly the disk in the posi-
tion where the fixed one had been observed previously. The attempt, being produced according
to a memory entirely independent of the succession of trials, leads to a failure which in turn
brings about an immediate return to systematic triage. These changes in orientation of the tri-
age approach constitute the most primitive form of accommodation that we have observed.
At about four years of age, the majority of children do not go beyond this level. Of course,
it is always possible to imagine that a large number of trials could, sooner or later, lead to a
superior level of adaptation. With young children it is, unfortunately, not possible to push
the experience so far, lest we run into boredom and resistance. Practically, we have observed
a long phase (10–15 trials) during which we see only the changes in the children’s approach
to the task that we have described. What would happen if the children were to continue to
exercise? We do not know; therefore, we conclude that the triage strategy makes learning
practically impossible.
From the age of 4 ½ years, rarely before that age, increasingly frequent changes in ori-
entation during triage reveal the existence of the accommodation process. The strategy then
becomes complex and variable; direct attempts, followed in case of failure by immediate re-
turn to systematic triage, increase and are sometimes attached to specific plates, e.g., the first
plate. Having become more differentiated, the activity begins to mark both successes and
errors in the psychological sense of these terms. The children, who are now working with
hypotheses, i.e., with a differentiated approach, are on track to appreciate the consequences
of their actions. By seeking success, i.e., by making themselves assimilate the task layout into
their understanding of the task, by avoiding errors, i.e., the resistance of the environment,
they frequently change their orientation to the task. The systematic triage strategy fades and
progressively gives way to unforeseen innovations.
Figure 3 enables us to follow the different phases that we have described. This subject, a
small boy of 4 years 7 months, began with a systematic triage that lasted through trials 2, 3,
A Method for Assessing Educability
Figure 3. Successive phases of learning in the error record of a boy of 4 years 7 months.
283
284 Haywood
and 4. On the fifth trial, third plate, he changed his approach and was successful. The strate-
gic change tended to generalize, but was still interrupted by frequent reversions to the initial
triage (trials 6 and 7). On the eighth trial a third type of orientation emerged. From that point
onward the child’s strategy became complex and difficult to follow. We observed an almost
unshakable fixation of the triage strategy on the fourth plate.
Examination of actual cases demonstrates how dangerous it is to speak of stages in relation to learning. When we
consider the phenomena of learning from a static perspective, the concept of stage seduces us by its ease and the
apparent clarity that it lends to the ranking of different subjects. When we look at the same phenomena from a dy-
namic point of view, when we begin to consider the different phases of a process, we see that successive approaches
are based on the preceding ones according to a rhythm that depends on the developmental level of the subject.
Individuals are then differentiated much more by their predilection for this or that kind of strategy than by their
actual inability to reach higher forms of learning. Thus, in the case that we just examined (Figure 3), we cannot say
that the subject is at the stage of systematic triage. Do we not notice in him any attempts to generalize his progress?
Does he not go beyond that? Does not his tactic of starting work on each plate in a different way, which we observed
from the eighth trial onward, signal an effort to master the complexity of the situation, heralding already a higher
level of search strategy? We cannot, however, take only this last degree into consideration: does the child not fall
back frequently into the triage strategy, does not his preference for it prevent his deriving complete benefit from his
efforts? What characterizes the subject, definitively, is the total process, his history of successive attempts at solving
the problem.
Unilateral Perseveration Strategy

The first differentiated actions that are developed during the triage strategy lead to the
threshold of a new strategy, that of unilateral perseveration. It is characterized by a per-
sistent effort to assimilate the totality of the situation in an initial accommodation. For
example, in exercising the triage strategy, subjects observe the location of one of the fixed
disks (most often this accommodation concerns the central disk of the second plate).
Then, struck by this discovery, children will try this same location, the central disk, on all
the plates successively. Thus, they structure the situation entirely according to one suc-
cessful attempt. Totally absorbed by this, unable to subjugate it, they are content to collect
the positive outcomes that occur periodically with the specific layout of one of the plates.
Actually, here we are still in the presence of a kind of triage that, this time, presents this
particular character of being a function of an accommodation. This strategy is unilateral
in the sense that subjects are satisfied to record successes without seeming to worry about
failures.
Extending a direct tactic that has already succeeded to all the other plates is an excellent
method; it is a means of setting the parameters of the accommodation and giving rise to new
ones that can fit with it; in fact, the differentiation presupposes a previous generalization, but
it also requires that the failure experience be retained, that one stop himself there, and that
it lead to a further accommodation. What seems to us precisely to characterize the unilateral
perseveration strategy is the absence of repercussions of failure. Subjects at that level do not
so much take note of errors. Instead of proceeding carefully, they persist, by a unilateral view
of the problem, in using a strategy that leads them to benefit from some successes at the price
of a considerable number of failures.
Why, at this level, do the failures not lead to the appearance of new accommodations that
could serve to set the limits of the initial accommodation? Seeking to answer this question,
we enter into the domain of hypotheses. We are not so presumptuous as to assume that we
have solved the problem, but perhaps we can manage to clarify one aspect of it.
Individuals who apply to new situations a strategy that has succeeded for them in other situations will exhibit, accord-
ing to their developmental level, two different attitudes:
1. Some will act without looking back. They will let themselves be carried along by the strategy that is already in
place, as if it leads inevitably to success. In case of failure, they will be thrown off track to the extent that their
view of their success was clear and their conviction strong. The unilateral structure that they project onto the
problem situation will unfold without allowing any framing of it in which their actions could become part of it
and take on significance. There will not be error situations accompanied by awareness of their nature. These
subjects will revert right away to extended and costly trial-and-error behavior that leads to further costly errors
and will remain separated from the initial moves.
2. Other individuals may act differently. Faced with a new situation, they apply, in a testing mode, the strategies
that had been successful in analogous situations. While doing so, they consider possible error. We call this
attitude “attitude of experimental assimilation” in order to distinguish it from the preceding attitude, that we call
“attitude of unilateral assimilation.”
In the case of the experimental attitude, if subjects encounter failure they will not be completely thrown off track,
inasmuch as their strategy has already taken into account the possibility of failure. Instead of feeling disoriented in
the face of this situation, as in the preceding case, these individuals will see the failure as an outcome of their learn-
ing activity and will seek to move along by incorporating this new datum into their understanding.
We can drop back one level of mental development to a coordination of accommodations, revealing, on the one hand,
a maturational process that propels the individual to adjust his potential for acting on the environment [problem
situation], and, on the other hand, the experience that directs the activity in defined and developmentally sequenced
directions. This level will be more elevated to the extent that these accommodations are more numerous and better
organized among themselves. By referring to this definition and by using some of the hypotheses that we have pro-
posed, we can try to explain the two attitudes that we have just examined.
Individuals who have an extended range of strongly organized accommodations will tend to mobilize simultaneously
several different strategies; their perception of the problem situation will be a product of all their previous successes
and failures under their different strategies. All of this abundance gives rise to a “doubting” attitude, a sort of untrack-
ing before the track existed, pushing toward experimental touching of the disks. The strategy that is most powerful
at that moment, the one that structures the situation in the strongest way, will prevail but, at the instant of action,
it will be held back by the totality of previously elicited strategies that are just waiting for a failure to cause them to
be assimilated into the subject’s perception of the situation. Suppose that such a failure occurs. Then the previously
mobilized strategies will be released, but they are still around and associated with failure; moreover, the association
that has been established among previously learned tactics will be modified by the resistance that arises from having
just acted on one of them. The whole business of promises from successes or failures, whatever the perception of
the situation, will be transformed. This incorporation of failures into the cognitive organization of the individual is a
new accommodation of this organization of the task situation.
Let us examine now the case of the individual who, perceiving the situation in a unilateral fashion, can only mobilize
a single strategy. In case that strategy fails, the series of phenomena discussed in the preceding paragraph will not
occur. Perception will revert to a syncretic form and the quality of the action produced will revert to unorganized
exploration of the disks.
To summarize, in the two cases, the effects of failure are different. In the first case, the failure liberates the underlying
strategies by changing them, with the error taking its place among the liberated [thus, rejected] strategies. In the second
case, by contrast, the failure being unable to lead to the freeing up [rejection] of any underlying strategy that might
preserve a structure on the situation, leaves no refuge where the error can reside. Thus, it does not lead to any accom-
modations in the constructive sense of the term, but functions only as a limitation of the action that has just failed.
We return now to the unilateral perseveration strategy that we have observed. The hypotheses
that we have just offered seem to us to be applicable at this level.
At a certain level of cognitive organization, perception of the plates with their disks would
be syncretic and would call up only the triage strategy. In the course of the examination the
subject, struck by the position of one of the fixed disks, might achieve a first accommodation
that would quickly give rise to a differentiated strategy: on each plate the disk in question would
be detached and would constitute an attraction. If the subject’s action then leads to failure
286 Haywood
[selecting the wrong disk as the fixed one], this structure will collapse and the perception of
the layout will tend to revert to a syncretic one inasmuch as there exists no other “attractive”
position and no other differentiated strategy. This absence of a reference point will prevent the
subject from associating the error with his action and the subject will simply revert to the tri-
age strategy without having derived an accommodation from the experience just completed.
In a “normal” subject, the unilateral perseveration strategy will not be maintained indefi-
nitely in a pure state. Generally, it represents only one phase of learning, a phase whose dura-
tion will vary depending on the developmental level of the child.
In fact, the subject will soon, in the course of the exercise, notice the position of other
fixed disks, thus forming a second accommodation that, in its own turn, becomes the object
of unilateral perseveration attempts. Soon the subject has at his disposal several differenti-
ated strategies, and the general attitude then tends to become experimental. Figure 4 permits
one to follow in detail one of these phases of unilateral perseveration.4
Figure 4. Error analysis illustrating a phase of unilateral perseveration.

It is not sufficient to have command of the four differentiated views that correspond to
the different positions of the four fixed disks. It is still necessary that the subjects show them-
selves capable of sequencing their actions according to a determined order.
The exercise will end by carrying out this adjustment, provided the experience can be
continued long enough. Before reaching this terminal point, children of four and five years
often go through a long unproductive phase and must overcome several difficulties that merit
discussion.
For a long time everything happens as if each of the accommodations remains isolated
from the others. Faced with a particular plate, one of the differentiated actions is engaged;
it fails; the subject, instead of trying one of the other differentiated moves that he/she pos-
sesses, falls back on triage. At the next plate, another differentiated action will emerge and
again failure will lead back to triage. Thus, for a more-or-less long time, the differentiated
actions will never succeed on the same plate.
These periodic relapses to lack of differentiation of the layout prevent the subject’s con-
fronting the already discovered structures. Failing to come together, the accommodations
remain processes of independent random grasping of disks.
Sometimes, by this stage of the development of the learning of this problem, certain struc-
tures can, aided by repetition, become fixated to the plate that attracts them. In such a case it is
the position of the plate that seems to incite a kind of determined action. We do not have here a
beginning of fitting together the scheme, a first step in a series that excites and depends on the
others. What we see is an autonomous association that leads periodically to success. It is formed
most easily on the first, second, or last plate, that is, at the most easily recognized positions.
Let us note in passing the instability of these associations. It is manifest especially in subjects at 4 or 5 years of age
who, by unilateral assimilation, having fixated on an initial structure on the particular plate, suddenly discover a
second one. The fixation that appeared to be stable then sustains a disastrous counter blow. Does the subject then
apply a new unilateral assimilation of the full extent of the display to his most recent discovery and forget to subtract
the previously fixed part? Must we assume that at this age the accommodations are still so weakly integrated into the
cognitive structures of the child, are these structures so little affected by the acquisition, that any new experimental
support will destroy a still-insecure equilibrium?
We entertain simultaneously these two hypotheses. The first accounts for the phenomenon in terms of behavior,
whereas the second attempts to explain how the phenomenon comes about and could help to bring to bear some
interesting data that we owe to the study of conditioned reflexes. Physiologists showed that when one reflex comes to
be associated with another the first loses its power and may even disappear altogether. Pavlov and his collaborators
carried out elegant experiments to find out whether the same phenomena were reproducible in the case of condi-
tioned reflexes, that is, reflexes linked to initially unrelated stimuli by artificial means where repetition plays the
principal role. They observed that a reflex thus formed was partially or wholly inhibited if they had taken care to have
several minutes elapse before another, similarly isolated, reflex was established.
This situation is perhaps analogous to those that we have observed in our learning study, that being the disappear-
ance of an accommodation following a new discovery of a primary fixed accommodation. Do these momentary
extinctions constitute a general and normal phenomenon, the sign of a temporary antagonism of strategies, of recip-
rocal inhibitions, that can be expected to be reduced progressively by successive actions during the exercise?
When it is possible, with subjects with whom we have worked up to this time, to prolong
the experience with this task, we see finally the diverse structures painfully discovered in the
course of triage become fixed successively and definitively to their corresponding plate. The
child commits no more errors, thus learning is finished.
What exactly is this accomplishment worth? It seems to us to come down to the sum of
autonomous strategies that have succeeded according to an order because their specific stim-
uli succeed themselves in a constant order. The coming together of these steps relies then
288 Haywood
more on external demand than on any internal schema projecting its structure on the situa-
tion. We have here a succession of conditioning events and not yet an organized totality, aris-
ing from contact with the problem environment but having become independent from it.
It is easy, by means of some critical tests, to appreciate the value of this adaptation:
Any change in the arrangement of the materials disturbs the adaptation. For example, if instead
of presenting the plates in a stack we arrange them in a line, the subject is troubled and makes er-
rors. If we keep the stacked arrangement but place a fifth plate on top of the one that is usually the
first, the child, in spite of our having called his attention to the addition of this unknown element,
will generally be disoriented and will be likely to grasp the added plate as if it were the former first
plate in the series. The correction being made, the order of the following moves is profoundly
altered. In other cases, the added plate immediately becomes the object of its own search, but then
the difficulty appears at the moment when the subject must take on the next plate.
If, in the presence of the child, we switch the order of the first two plates, we create consid-
erable difficulty. He does not modify the sequence of attempts; rather, they retain their initial
succession and produce errors.
Finally, if we ask the same subjects to show us on a single plate the position of the succes-
sive fixed disks, they tend to become confused by the second or third one.
All of these difficulties, as we examine further, disappear as soon as an experimental at-
titude has taken over the task.
Here is an interesting observation showing the importance of this external prompting in young children.
With a boy of 4 years 9 months, after 52 trials over three sessions, several fixed disks had been identified on the cor-
responding plates. As the subject was still hesitant and had not succeeded in eliminating errors altogether, we then
demonstrated, in the hope of helping him and sustaining his attention, the order of the plates in this way: “Look here,
plate number 1! . . . Look here, plate number 2! . . . Etc.” After two trials on the complete series, he made no more
errors. When we let him continue without the verbal intervention, the errors re-appeared. From that moment, we
alternated trials with and without verbal intervention. Each time, we observed the disappearance and then the subse-
quent re-appearance of errors; however, on the eleventh of these trials, although we remained silent, the child made
no more errors: no more falling back over three successive trials; the subject was master of the situation. Neverthe-
less, the critical examination undertaken by adding the fifth plate revealed the fragility of the learning acquisition.
The role of our intervention is clear: by associating a distinctive verbal cue with each plate, we facilitated the fixation
of the different identifications of the fixed disk by richer and better differentiated external prompts.
The detailed development of this learning can be followed on the error curve shown in Figure 5. We have indicated
on the curve the different phases of the process.
The descriptions and comments in this paragraph show only the basic aspects of the
behavior that one can observe in 4- to 5-year-old children. The forms of these unilateral per-
severations, so characteristic of this age, are varied, and we must decline, at risk of being too
fastidious, to describe them all. By carrying out the tests on suitable subjects one can reveal
details that we have omitted.
Experimental Strategies
Experimental strategies are manifest more by their effect on the speed of learning than by
any external sign that would permit one to distinguish them from the other strategies that we
have already examined.
They seem to involve an analytic structuring of the arrangement of the disks. The subject
would see immediately a certain number of simultaneously possible moves; as he considers
for each of them a failure at the same time as a success—that being the experimental nature
Figure 5. Learning curve, boy, 4 years and 9 months old. From A to B, triage phase; from
B to C, unilateral perseverations phase; from C to D, formation of autonomous associations;
from D to E, success under the effect of verbal stimulation. The vertical dashed lines on the
abscissa indicate successive sessions.
of the strategy—the overall structure of the array tends to be preserved in spite of error. Every
time a wrong disk is tried, the moves not made remain in play and for each of them the prob-
ability of failure diminishes. The subject thus progresses from uncertainty to an increasingly
strong certainty, success being the result of a process of elimination. The localization of the
fixed disk is the product of elimination of the other possible locations and takes its place in
relation to these numerous reference points. When we move on to the second plate, we gener-
ally see the appearance of a strategy that, in a formal sense, reminds us of that of unilateral
perseveration: The subject grasps the disk that corresponds to the one whose fixed location
he/she has just discovered on the preceding plate. But this is not an attempt that, if it fails,
will leave the individual distraught; the possibility of failure was anticipated. All will proceed
as if the probability of success would begin by being distributed between the two alternatives:
choose the disk that has already proved successful, or any other disk. If the subject opts for
the first possibility, failure will eliminate it, the eight remaining disks will compete for suc-
cess, and the process of elimination will resume.
This process will go on, being complicated to the extent that the number of accommoda-
tions will increase. It goes without saying that the subject can go through these operations
without doing any reasoning, even without any clear awareness. The successive phases of
perception alone lead to this distribution of the activity.
The strategy just described appears early; it can be seen clearly as early as six years of age,
and from that time forward it is enriched by several manifestations that attest to an increas-
ingly extended mastery of the situation.
By eight years, for example, the children, confronting the second plate, frequently ask,
“Does it change every time?” “Is it (the fixed disk) always in the same place?” These questions
290 Haywood
reveal a weakening of the tendency to act according to the first accommodation, i.e., the
tendency to unilateral perseveration. This progress can be explained by the new way that
shapes, at that moment, the perception of the arrangement.
The children then begin to notice the succession of the elements of the series. When chil-
dren discover the position of the fixed disk on the second plate, it could be in some respect
projected on the whole series and would lead thus to a first perception of the structure as a
whole succession of events. By asking subjects to follow up on that experience, we engender
a conflict between the requirement of the instructions and this holistic structuring. The idea
of hidden difficulty might appear; holding on to the direction suggested by the initial accom-
modation seems too easy and, in order to orient themselves and avoid erroneous attempts,
the children ask a question.
In adults, this phenomenon can come about even before an initial accommodation has
been reached. As soon as the instructions have been given and the stack of plates exposed,
hypothetical structures begin to be attributed to the series. Their abundance and their simul-
taneous appearance give rise to suspicions, which lead to requests for information; however,
the majority of individuals end their quest there; they avoid generalizing to the elements that
follow their initial accommodation; the succession of their moves suggests that they have
adopted straightaway the hypothesis of an irregular distribution of the fixed disks.
Thus, at higher developmental levels, the rapidity with which learning takes place may be
attributed to the way in which the perception of the layout of the disks is shaped.
The accommodations, by providing from their initial appearance the dual structuring of
the appropriate plate and the underlying elements, reveal a common ground of extension
and confrontation. This projection onto the stack of diverse positions of the fixed disks would
render them interdependent, thus rapidly establishing a framework for the series.
The relations thus established can be of different natures. The most frequent are optical
(visual); a zig-zag pathway is projected onto the sequence of the plates; many subjects are ca-
pable of drawing it, in the form of the letter Y. Other subjects fail to see this shape; they seem
to hold on to a succession of movements. In still others, these links have especially a verbal
character (top right, middle, top left, etc.).
In summary, by the end of the learning phase the subjects have succeeded in constructing an
internal schema that they impose on the layout. The critical tests that we have used do not induce
any errors. The modifications that we impose on the series resound in the internal schema.
Summary and Conclusions: The Stages of Learning

The task that we have required of our subjects mobilizes in them an assimilative activity
whose form varies with the state of their mental development. At all developmental levels,
this activity consists of two interdependent phases: a perceptual phase and an active phase.
Subjects perceive the situation only in terms of the actions that they can mobilize; they see
only what they can do. Assimilation begins in this initial interaction between the subjects and
the object that is perceived.
Within the specific framework of our experiments, we have distinguished five typical
forms of assimilation:
1. Isolated attempt: This seems to us to involve a combining or reconciling (syncretic) vi-

sion of the task layout. On each individual play (search for a particular fixed disk), it is
in fact the whole display that the subject grasps.
2. Triage: This seems also to involve, albeit to a lesser degree, a merging or reconciling
(syncretic) perception. The child begins to be struck by the heterogeneity of the layout
but is still not able to analyze it.
3. Unilateral perseveration: This primary accommodation provides children with an ele-
ment of analysis, which they then use and abuse, applying it indiscriminately.
4. Experimental, 1st degree: The plate that is immediately visible is analyzed; several simul-
taneously possible moves may be considered.
5. Experimental, 2nd degree: The analysis achieved on a completely visible plate is extended,
a priori, to successive plates.
It is the principle of such a classification, more than its form, which relies too much on
the observer’s subjective ideas, that we want to retain.
The foregoing developmental analysis, we believe, supports an important point: success
in the initial trials of the learning phase cannot be applied to succeeding parts of the task by
using the same strategies; each successive search depends primarily on the form of the as-
similation, that is, on the cognitive efforts the subject makes to understand the task layout
(the matrix of disks) under the structures represented on successive plates.
Thus, the direction of the whole adaptation will depend largely on the initial attitude. To
emphasize this point, let us examine the influence of the task itself. It has the principal ef-
fect of guiding the individual, by successive accommodations, from lower to higher forms
of assimilation. The exercise of lower forms, by operating at an initial structuring of the task
layout, creates a new base that can provoke further kinds of activity. Here are the principal
varieties of strategies that one can imagine.
The isolated attempt strategy leads one toward the triage strategy by requiring a first analysis
of the task layout (the plates and disks). Application of the triage strategy, which permits one to
observe the position of certain ones of the fixed disks, leads then to various forms of unilateral
perseveration. Later on, to the extent that the subject is inclined to project simultaneously onto
the task several distinct unilateral strategies, we can observe experimental strategies developing.
Finally, the experimental strategies, by being applied in different variations, become increas-
ingly synthetic according to the accommodations that their own application excites in them.
Depending on their developmental level, subjects set out at the beginning of the exercise
from one or another of these strategic levels. From this point on, thanks to repeated applica-
tions in the exercise, they may advance by steps, to the extent that their organization is sensi-
tive to modification by experience.
These observations compel us to confront questions of individual differences that we have
observed in ability to reach accommodations. Holding constant the number of trials, we have
encountered:
1. Cases in which application of the isolated attempt strategy did not lead to any apparent
modification and other cases in which, on the contrary, it led to the triage strategy.
2. Cases in which the application of the triage strategy did not bring about any progress
and other cases in which, on the contrary, it brought about the appearance of varied
forms of unilateral perseveration, which in their own turn, either did or did not lead to
the experimental modalities of the activity.
Among the factors that could be responsible for such diversity, we put at the head of the
list the mental organization of the subjects. The application of a particular strategy should
292 Haywood
bring about accommodations all the more easily, and its transformation into a higher-level
strategy, when the organization from which it derives has been altered by the experience.
A recently acquired strategy works (as) an impetuous generalizing assimilation that, little
by little, modifies it by imposing limits on it. As blind as it was in its pursuit of success, it
becomes more prudent as failures pile up. This first differentiation, which does not yet affect
the form of the strategy, only makes it lose its strength and disposes it to be more easily in-
hibited by new experience. It will have a greater tendency to be applied experimentally, i.e.,
by anticipating possible failure. Under these conditions, the subject will take account more
readily of the repercussions of his actions; the strategy will break up more easily in the face of
resistance from the arrangement of the task, only to be reconstructed by integrating the data
from successive trials; in summary, accommodations will be reached more easily.
Before they confront our task, children will already have employed, in quite diverse
circumstances, forms of assimilation analogous to those that they come to mobilize when
undertaking our task. These forms thus appear, as products of the mental development
of the individual, in different degrees of differentiation that vary across individuals. This
heterogeneity that we are not able to see at the beginning of the experience is revealed, as
a function of repeated trials, by different capacities of accommodation and by variation of
strategies.
Here are some brief indications of the variations that we have observed:
From 3 to 4 years: Persistent isolated attempt strategy.

From 4 to 5 years: We have encountered some subjects who, with equal practice (25 trials)
presented:
1. a transition from the isolated attempt to the triage strategy, stopping at this level;
2. adoption of an immediate and persistent triage strategy;
3. a transition from the triage strategy to varied forms of unilateral perseveration.
From 5 to 6 years: Rapid installation of strategies of unilateral perseveration and an
attitude that tends to become increasingly experimental.
From 6 years: An experimental attitude limited to the successively visible parts of the task.
Progressive extension to the whole series.
Adolescence and adulthood: An experimental attitude encompassing immediately the
whole series.
These ages are average reference markers that include many exceptions.
We present here (Figure 6), provisionally and in graphic form, some observations that
give us an idea of the duration of the learning process at different developmental levels. Ages
are shown on the abscissa and number of trials (to criterion) on the ordinate. The curve was
established on the basis of a relatively small number of subjects (80). More extensive research
could, we believe, modify it somewhat.
APPLICATION OF THE METHOD IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Our test can be used to assess educability.
We have seen that learning can be in large part attributable to a change in strategy with re-
spect to the problem situation. Of course, learning is not only that. It comprises as well processes
of automatization and functional exercise, but these aspects seem to be secondary and subor-
dinate to the essential phenomena of change in orientation and reshaping of s tructure.
Figure 6. Trials to criterion as a function of age of the subjects.
This observation is very important. It should incite practitioners to direct their attention
to the way in which subjects work and to share with them the more-or-less rapid process of
their adaptation.
From the very beginning of the examination, one should note carefully the way the sub-
jects address the task. Do they use the isolated attempt strategy, or systematic triage? Do their
strategies persist? Are unilateral perseverations reduced by failure or, on the contrary, do they
persist in an abnormal way? Only by following these sometimes-delicate primary determina-
tions can the learning curve be usefully interpreted. The following example should help to
clarify this.
One individual, confronted with the manual maze test, persists in the systematic triage
strategy. Some of these accommodations break down, but they soon become the basis of per-
severations that are not easily reduced by repeated failures. The error curve established on the
20 or 30 first trials shows a progressive decline, indicating very slow learning.
Another individual, tested under the same conditions, shows from the outset an attitude
that is clearly experimental, proceeding by trial and error, questioning, reflecting, striving on
each plate to identify the fixed disk. The perseverations are reduced by the first failure. In a
relatively short time, the positions of the fixed disks are approximately established. Never-
theless, the subject experiences great difficulty in establishing the sequence of moves and
memory of the positions, with some occasional inconsistency. The error curve, established
under the same conditions as in the previous case, shows first of all a decline and then oscil-
lates around a plateau parallel to the abscissa.
If these two individuals are adults, their strategy is clearly abnormal, but they show their
own personal characteristics.
In the first case, the developmentally inferior quality of the strategies suggests that it is
principally the function of assimilation that is affected and that the overall mental level is
weak. We must point out that the developmental criterion does not permit the establishment
294 Haywood
of an identity between the defect and the child, but it provides us a useful reference point, not
implying necessarily any theoretical presuppositions.
In the second case, the subject who from the outset uses an experimental approach (ten-
dency to question, analytical structuring of the problem) ought, it seems, to be able to achieve
normal learning. If he fails at that, is it not then necessary to call into question the memory
processes that, weakened, no longer come to consolidate the groundwork that the assimilat-
ing activity has constructed in order to move forward? In the second case, is it not especially
the mechanism of accommodation that is involved?
It will not always be easy to determine what function is responsible for the deficiency.
Everything rests on the psychic organism and it is artificial to erect an impenetrable barrier
between the correlated processes of assimilation and accommodation. The distinction can
sometimes be useful in a practical sense, but it would not add further confusion to psychiatric
classifications.
In the following discussion we do not propose to conduct a study of the psychopathology
of learning, or even to outline it. Wishing to show what one can derive from the method of the
manual maze in psychopathology, we have sought simply to bring together some suggestive
data based loosely on our observations.
Deficiencies in Mental Organization: Persistence of Lower-Order Strategies;

Regression to Lower-Order Strategies
Persons with intellectual disability (ID) show all degrees of persistence of lower-order
strategies. Those with moderate ID, for example, in spite of one’s care to be sure that they
understand the instructions, frequently fail to get beyond the isolated attempt stage. At a bit
higher intellectual level one can observe the use of persistent triage. In these two categories
of subjects the error curve remains relatively flat, parallel to the abscissa. It is in persons with
mild ID that one sees the first effort toward a direct solution, that being the strategies of uni-
lateral perseveration. At this level learning is possible on condition that one gives the subject a
large number of trials, and these can be spread over several sessions. Practically, it can suffice
to examine the error curve based on 20 or so trials. A net decline in errors indicates the begin-
ning of adaptation. This observation has its price, but it goes without saying that the more the
examination is prolonged the greater the validity of the practitioner’s assessment.
Knowing on the one hand, by developmental analysis, the “normal” evolution of the strat-
egies and, on the other hand, by examination of persons with ID, the methods that charac-
terize the lowest levels of mental development, we provide ourselves with reference points
that enable us to identify cases of mental regression. Thus, following the way in which per-
sons with aphasia or general paresis work and examination of their learning curve, it will be
possible to see what extent the overall mental organization has been affected. As a simple
document we present, in Figure 7, the learning curve (solid line) of a patient with general
paresis who had improved following a course of malaria therapy. His approach to the task
was clearly experimental. Some unilateral perseverations were rapidly reduced by failures. At
first glance the curve seems not to be abnormal. Nevertheless, when we compare it to that of
a normal adult (dashed line), differences are immediately apparent. The learning takes too
long, and especially the reduction (in errors) at the second and third trials is not sufficiently
pronounced. These anomalies reveal a mental slowness, a certain difficulty in fixating and
sequencing the accommodations.
Figure 7. Error curves of a typical adult (dashed line) and an adult patient with general
paresis (solid line). Successive trials are shown on the abscissa and number of errors on the
ordinate.
Learning Disabilities Due to Emotional Factors or Fluctuations in Mental Tonus5

Subjects who fall into the category of unstable children can be usefully examined by the man-
ual maze method. By watching their adaptations unfold one has many chances to capture on
the spot their revealing characteristics.
Only from about 8 or 9 years of age is the examination worth the trouble of undertaking
it. Before this age there is the risk of interpreting as abnormalities some aspects of mental
organization that are normal in young children.
From about 8 or 9 years, five or six trials ought to be sufficient for learning to occur.
A greater number of trials (15 or 20) indicates a diagnostically “suspect” individual.
It can be simply a person of low intelligence. In such a case, the curve shows little vari-
ability and falls off by successive plateaus.
This could be only, or in addition to the foregoing characterization, an unstable or hyperemo-
tional person. In such a case the curve bounces around, suggesting swift forgetting followed by
recovery. In this case it is useful in reaching a diagnosis to resort to some alternative tactics. One
might give the child several minutes of rest in order to dissipate his nervousness. One could also
have a second test given by a person who is well known to the subject (using a parallel form of
the test). One should also observe the child’s facial expressions carefully. Anxiety, the precision
of gestures, shaking, sudden stops for reflection or, on the contrary, distraction, tendency to ask
questions unrelated to the task, to play with the materials, to talk a lot, all can be indications that
irregularities in the learning curve are attributable to hyperemotionality or instability.
In this same group of subjects, the error curve provides still other indications. After having
finally reached zero, indicating that the subject has gone through the series without errors, a
subject may then relapse on the next trial and continue to make errors several more times. In
a normally developing child of 8 or 9 years this phenomenon is not generally seen or, if it does
appear, it does not persist. As a general rule, from the instant the curve reaches zero errors it
296 Haywood
almost always stays there. (One must make sure of that each time by requiring a minimum of
three successive errorless trials.) Any phase that shows a prolonged alternation of disappear-
ance and reappearance of errors is suspect; it suggests hyperemotionality or instability. In the
first case, it is the fear of not being able to repeat the successful moves that seems to engender
a confused state leading to a return of errors. In the second case, it seems that success itself dis-
orients the children, troubles them, creates a sort of emptiness, a lowering of mental tonus.
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show two of these curves that are characteristic of unstable and emo-
tional children, who in common terms would simply be called nervous. The first (Figure 8) is
that of a girl of 9 years 10 months. In the beginning the curve declines normally. At the point
designated E, the child’s teacher enters the space where the examination is taking place, and
the anxiety that comes from this intrusion brings about an immediate recurrence of errors. At
point S the teacher goes away; however, rather than finishing the learning the child goes into
the oscillating phase mentioned earlier, a phase that is abnormally prolonged (Figure 8).
The second curve (Figure 9) represents a boy of 8 years 2 months of age (solid line). The
amplitude of the oscillations and the too-frequent reappearance of errors in the terminal
phase are clearly suspect. In the same figure we show (dashed line) the learning curve of a
normal child of 6 years 2 months of age. This curve oscillates also, but there is a progressive
decline, and the errors disappear entirely as soon as the curve reaches zero.
There is yet another group of subjects who are noticeably apathetic from the outset, for
whom examination of the learning process is equally revealing. In them, the curve starts
by declining, then reaches a plateau where it remains. The work approach that the subject
adopts, normal at first, suddenly stops developing and we observe a tendency to unilateral
perseveration. By observing the child, we quickly see apathy, indifference, boredom. Then we
have to scold the child vigorously, indicate to him that he will be free to go only after having
finished the learning. If after this experimental admonition, which contrasts with the initial
good spirit, we see a swift decline in the error curve, we know that we probably are dealing
with pathological laziness, a deficiency of effort.
Figure 8. Error curve, girl of 9 years 10 months, showing reintroduction of errors after
having reached zero.
Figure 9. Error curve of a boy of 8 years 2 months of age (solid line), and a typically
developing child of 6 years 2 months (dashed line). Successive trials are shown on the
abscissa and errors on the ordinate.
Deficits Relating Especially to Memory (Anterograde Amnesia);

Examination of Adult Patients; Simulation
Whenever an adult subject adopts a clearly experimental work method and, in spite of this,
finds learning difficult and acquisitions unstable, this seems to represent a deficit that relates
especially to memory, without any apparent deficiency in overall mental organization. The
individual still seems to know how to learn, has conserved a work method, but that method
is at times inaccessible.
Especially in this category of patients the manual maze method can be particularly useful.
The classical tests in the psychiatric arsenal, such as memory for words, numbers, or pictures,
generally give only gross clues. By contrast, the complete examination of a form of learning
allows one to see quickly the difficulties that beset the patient, by revealing processes that are
unattainable by other methods. Further, the global assessment of educability to which this ex-
amination lends itself enables one to respond precisely to the question of the level of difficulty.
The learning curve shown in Figure 10(A) shows the work of a post-traumatic patient with an-
terograde amnesia (amnesia of fixation). It concerns a 40-year-old man, a former factory director,
who had sustained his injuries in an automobile accident about a year prior to the examination.
Neurological examination pointed to trauma of the prefrontal cortex. From a psychological per-
spective, aside from some hallucinatory incidents, anterograde amnesia and mood disorders
rounded out the characteristic picture of prefrontal syndrome.6 What does the learning experi-
ence show us? What do we learn about the form and degree of the anterograde amnesia?
Right away, the patient adopted an experimental attitude. After the first trial, he tried to
grasp the fixed disks directly. The succession of attempts and some spontaneous comments
left no doubt about this. “Where is it? I believe it’s there . . . I don’t remember any more . . .
No, it’s not there . . . Maybe it’s there . . . I don’t recall any more . . . Even a child can do this!”
Nevertheless, in spite of this considerable difficulty in fixation, the error curve declined slowly
(solid line in Figure 10). Finally, a moment came when our post-traumatic patient, having
298 Haywood
Figure 10. Error curves of an adult with anterograde amnesia (solid line), a typical adult
without pathology (N; dashed line), and a 6-year-old child (E; dotted broken line).
identified the positions of the four fixed disks, tapped only at the level of these positions.
Thus, he had come to work on analyzing the layout, but he was unable to sequence the moves,
to build up their succession, in short to bring about this synthesis, to construct this internal
schema that represents the series.
After a 48-hour interval, he had forgotten everything and the error curve reverted to the
level of the first trial (B). Something did seem to have been conserved from the previous expe-
rience: the curve declined more rapidly that it had the first time, reaching a floor level that the
subject would be able to lower only if he were capable of putting together the exact succession
of the fixed disks. An interruption for some minutes of conversation can be seen on the curve
by a reappearance of errors (point P). Finally, we pointed out to the patient that the successive
positions can be easily retained if one associates them with the four points of a schema in the
form of a Y. The patient understood immediately and faulted himself for not having thought
of that. We drew the schema, and as long as we left the drawing within his sight he made
almost no more errors, but as soon as we took the drawing away the errors reappeared.
Can we not derive some valuables clues from such an examination?
In the same figure (8) we show a curve from a normal adult (N) and one from a 6-year-old
child (E).
Here we see quite a different case, a 50-year-old male post-traumatic merchant who showed
all the characteristics of the prefrontal syndrome. His injury occurred three years prior, and
his difficulties got worse from year to year. On the first trial, we could see that the series of
four plates would be too difficult for the patient, so we continued with only the first two plates.
Under these conditions, learning for a person without pathology would be child’s play.
The patient worked in an incoherent fashion. We were able to distinguish a tendency toward
triage and an uncertain attempt at perseveration. The severe headaches that the patient com-
plained of and his increasing irritation soon compelled us to suspend the examination. The error
curve is shown in Figure 11. We can see that the patient was lucky initially but was then totally
Figure 11. Error curve of a 50-year-old man with a 3-year-old traumatic brain injury. Trials
are on the abscissa, errors on the ordinate.
unable to benefit from his initial good fortune: the curve ascends rather than declining, which
is paradoxical. At first glance, all educability had disappeared. The patient was working only on
some automatisms and we were faced with a total collapse of mental organization (which con-
firms moreover the neurological examination and simple observation of his behavior.7
In practice, it can happen that one may encounter fakers of memory disorders. In many
such cases, it is not difficult, with the help of the manual maze, to unmask the deception. By
making himself not learn, a faker provides us with a characteristic curve that defies all the
biological data, one that is made up of a succession of oscillations that run parallel to the ab-
scissa. Only persons with intellectual disability, very young children, those with profound de-
mentia, patients with totally collapsed mental organization—all recognizable easily by other
characteristics—would produce such curves. Taking account of this information, we can see
that it is relatively easy to detect such deception.
We have obtained some deception curves from nonpathological adults whom we asked
to play the role of one who wished to fake a memory disorder. Figure 12 shows two of these
curves. The first (solid line) was taken following a learning experience, whereas the second
(dashed line) was taken without the subject’s having had a learning experience beforehand.
The oscillations observed on the two curves are easy to interpret. They even show the evidence
of the simulation, the struggle against the tendency to direct solution.
One could have cases in which the subject would undertake this deception by consciously
adopting a systematic triage strategy. The error curve would then show no oscillations and
would remain parallel to the abscissa. The strangeness of such a curve would be sufficient to
betray the subject’s motive.
Finally, one could encounter the more delicate case of an individual who would consciously
fabricate a very slow learning curve. This is not likely to be perpetrated by just anyone, but
would require a certain knowledge of the psychology of learning, the nature of the task, and
a good deal of emotional detachment.
The manual maze method can be adapted easily, thanks to the flexibility of the materials
that permit one to reduce or augment at will the difficulty level of the learning task, to create
300 Haywood
Figure 12. Two error curves produced by nonpathological subjects who were asked to fake
a memory disorder, the first (solid line) following the learning experience, and the second
(dashed line) without having had the learning experience.
parallel series. It is thus possible to construct an entire battery of tests that are capable of
yielding interesting clinical signs. It would be especially useful to carry out an examination
focused on sensory-motor adaptation such as the one that we have proposed, and one using a
verbal test of the progressive memorization of a list of words. Comparison of the two learning
curves could be, in certain cases, quite instructive.
NOTEs
1. The author uses the term “accommodative processes” (processus d’accommodation) to suggest
learning or training, achievements, or accomplishment, or even with the more familiar notion of skills. It
implies changes having taken place within the person, in the Piagetian sense of accommodation. —NT
2. Known more familiarly today as Rey’s Plateaux Test. —NT
3. A single-celled animal, e.g., zooplankton, that is suspended in water, subsisting by absorbing
plant material from the water and expelling whatever is nonnutritive —NT
4. Figure 4, trial 5 and 6, 1st row: digit 10 is missing in the original manuscript.
5. Mental tonus is a loosely defined term that refers generally to mental weakness somewhat akin
to the older concept of psychaesthenia. NT
6. G. de Morsier (undated). Le syndrome prefrontal, l’amnésie de fixation. L’Encéphale, XXIV année,
No. 1, p. 19.
7. These patients were referred to us by Dr. G. de Morsier, lecturer at the Faculty of Medicine, Uni-
versity of Geneva. We are grateful for his courtesy.
Correspondence regarding this article should be directed to H. Carl Haywood, Vanderbilt University,
144 Brighton Close, Nashville, TN 37205. E-mail: carl.haywood@vanderbilt.edu
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A Method for Assessing Educability:

EDUCABILITY AS AN ASPECT OF MENTAL DIAGNOSIS

274 © 2012 Springer Publishing Company

Description of the Manual Maze, Performance Recording,

The following instructions are given to subjects.

DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF LEARNING IN THE MANUAL MAZE

Developmental Classification of Actions; Isolated Attempts

Unilateral Perseveration Strategy

Figure 4. Error analysis illustrating a phase of unilateral perseveration.

Summary and Conclusions: The Stages of Learning

1. Isolated attempt: This seems to us to involve a combining or reconciling (syncretic) vi-

From 3 to 4 years: Persistent isolated attempt strategy.

APPLICATION OF THE METHOD IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Figure 6. Trials to criterion as a function of age of the subjects.

Deficiencies in Mental Organization: Persistence of Lower-Order Strategies;

Learning Disabilities Due to Emotional Factors or Fluctuations in Mental Tonus5

Deficits Relating Especially to Memory (Anterograde Amnesia);

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1. Isolated attempt: This seems to us to involve a combining or reconciling (syncretic) vi-