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PRINCIPLES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. `War does not belong in the realm of Arts and the `Sciences;
rather it is part of man's social existence'. Although Von Clausewitz
was correct in classifying war as a social activity both art and science
are employed in its prosecution. Science and Technology may confer an
advantage in Weapons and machines but this alone will not win wars.
Victory depends on good generalship, on how the "Commander applies
Technology on the battlefield, sound training and good morale. The
conduct of war is an art, a skill requiring a combination of judgment to
weigh up factors which can seldom be quantified precisely, insight to
assess the value of information which may be inaccurate or misleading
and flair to know when to be bold and when to be cautious.
Generalship is the art of estimating a situation, conceiving an original
but workable plan, inspiring troops with confidence and the will to
win, inspite of the enemy's reactions.

2. A Study of the history of war reveals that it's conduct is

influenced by certain broad precepts which have come to be recognized

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as principles of war. Revolution in technology, developments in
weaponry and improvements in mobility have brought changes in the
application of these principles without detracting from their general
validity, dissimilarities in scale, geography, history and commitments
which often colour the manner in which different nations make war.
For example the British principles of war reflect the particular
circumstances of the United Kingdom. Just as we may say that the
Nigerian Principles of war reflect the particular circumstance of
Nigeria and some of these were brought to play in the Nigerian Civil
war and other wars that Nigeria has participated or still participating
in.

3. The principles influence the conduct of war in its widest sense.

They are especially relevant at the strategic level where they predicate
a number of criteria against which courses of action affecting the
national interest or the planning of a campaign may be tested. Most of
them have a direct application at lower levels where they provide a
guide for the planning and conduct of operations on the battlefield.
However, they are not like the laws of natural science, where the
observance of specific conditions produces a predictable
result; nor are they like the rules of a game, a breach of which entails a
prescribed penalty. Rather they are guides to action or fundamental
tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning, but
their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the
circumstances. In the past their application with judgement and
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commonsense had led to victory while blatant disregard for them
involves risk and could lead to failure.

AIM

4. The aim of this lecture therefore is to discuss the principles of

war.

SCOPE

5. To achieve my aim, I shall discuss:

a. Principles of War.

b. Factors of which form the framework of most Estimates.

6. So now to the Principles. It has been said that war is an accident

of history complicated by lunacy at the top. Now, there may be a
certain amount of truth in that but looking back at the great military
leaders of the past, I don't think that there has been anything
accidental or lunatic about the way in which they have conducted their
campaigns.

7. On the contrary, they sought to make war a science, not to the

extent that for any particular cause there was a given effect but the

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sense that by observing certain principles they secured for themselves a
reasonable degree of assurance of success. Napoleon Bonaparte
summed it up pretty well in his book "MAXIMS" when he wrote: I
quote

All the great generals of antiquity, as well as those who have since
worthily followed in their foot-steps, accomplished their great
needs by obeying the rules and principles of the Art. They have
been successful only by adapting themselves to these rules and
have never ceased to make war real science. To this extent, they
are our great examples, and only by imitating them in this
manner can we hope to emulate them' Unquote.

8. I believe that these sentiments are just as valid today and that if
you, too, wish to become great generals of antiquity, you need to
develop a clear understanding of the science and principles of war
which are as relevant to warfare in the modern context as they were to
the classic Land, Naval and Air Battles of history.

9. Different nations have different ideas about the precise

terminology of the basic precepts upon which war should be fought.
But generally speaking they all boil down to 10 broad Principles:
namely:

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

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b. Maintenance of Morale.
c. Offensive Action.
d. Security.
e. Surprise.
f. Concentration of Force.
g. Economy of effort
h. Flexibility.
i. Co-operation, and the last but by no means the least.
j. Administration.

PAUSE

10. Clear, Selection of One's aim is of overriding importance if the

right objectives are to be achieved. But what is equally important is
maintaining the aim once it has been set. That is not to say that you
should stick blindly to a given course of action if all the indications are
that a change of track is needed. But you should not be tempted to
change course simply because a more attractive option presents itself.
If you do that you may lose sight of the overall objective and dissipate
your energies and resources needlessly and in the end that could
prejudice a given operation or in the worst case, affect the entire
outcome of the war.

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11. But aims may legitimately be changed for good operational
reasons as in the case of the RAF Bomber squadron offensive against
Germany in World War 2. The objective of this offensive was initially
to destroy Germany's capacity to prosecute hostilities, by daylight
pinpoint bombing of military and industrial targets. But when it
became apparent from the attrition rate and the results that the RAF
possessed neither the equipment nor skill to further this objective,
precision bombing was replaced by night area (or saturation) bombing.
Later, when the allies had developed the capability to pursue a policy
of precision bombing the aim was changed back again and the air war
prosecuted with notable success.

12. And I think that this serves to illustrate that however noble the
virtues of single-mindedness and determination may be, you should not
be so inflexible in your approach that your ideas fail to keep pace with
the course of events.

13. Finally, on the aim, once it has been decided upon it must be
circulated as widely as the constraints of security will allow, so that
subordinates may direct all their efforts towards its fulfillment. There
must be no doubt as to what the commander is trying to achieve, and to
avoid such doubts keep it simple and clear.

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14. Let me turn to the question of Morale. The one constant feature
of war (or peace for that matter) is that there will rarely
be sufficient resources to get the job done. It is essential, therefore,
that you should exploit every means of drawing the best out of the
material and the men placed at your disposal.

15. So far as materials are concerned careful planning can do that,

the close control of consumption of stock and by committing to any
given task the minimum resources needed to achieve the aim.

16. With manpower the rules of the game are rather different. On
the one hand a lethargic, uninspired disorganized rabble can reduce an
otherwise well-planned operation into an unmitigated disaster, while
on the other hand a small group of well-trained, well-equipped and
well-led men can give returns out of proportion to their size.

17. But what is morale? Well, it is an elusive quality, which manifests

itself in the willingness of men to serve, often under conditions of
extreme discomfort and grave danger. For this willingness, to be
sustained, it must be fed with certain ingredients. I would suggest that
these are:

a. A clear understanding of the aim.

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b. Confidence in Weapons and proficiency in their use.

c. Realistic Training.

d. Sound Administration.

e. Good Leadership.

f. Discipline and self-respect.

18. I think that is a fair assessment; but if I had to select any one
quality for special consideration it would undoubtedly be good
leadership. That too is an elusive quality and difficult to truly
determine. All I will say here is that it doesn't mean a military
commander going over the top of trenches first with a firm resolve to
perish gloriously in the biggest bang of the war. That's all good stuff
for the Hollywood heroes, but it achieves very little and there's no
point in leading if nobody follows.

19. So what good leadership really boils down to is creating the

conditions under which men will follow. That is the core of good
morale, and is fundamental to mounting and sustaining a successful
offensive. High morale fosters offensive spirit and the will to win. It

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must inspire an army from top to bottom, from the commander to the
private soldier. Although it is primarily a mental state, it is sensitive to
material conditions and a commander should look after the well being
of his men. When Field Marshal Montgomery arrive in North Africa
to take over the command of the beleaguered 8th Army in 1941, he
brought with him 3 qualities. A flair for creating enthusiasm, an
aptitude for analyzing a situation thoroughly, and the ability to reach a
decision. He also possessed the faculty for judging character, choosing
the right men for command appointments, and for selecting the best
unit/formation for a particular task. Perhaps even more important he
was quick to identify himself with his men and was able to
communicate with the juniors.
Let us now look at:
OFFENSIVE ACTION

20. Offensive Action is the chief means open to a commander to

influence the outcome of a campaign or battle. It confers the initiative
on the attacker, giving him the freedom of action necessary to secure a
decision. A successful defence, unless followed by offensive action, will
only avert defeat temporarily. The principle of offensive action
embodies a state of mind, which breeds the determination to gain and
hold the initiative, and to create opportunities to harass and destroy
the enemy. It does not imply attacking indiscriminately and regardless
of causalities. The morale of an army, which is continually on the

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offensive, is essential to create confidence and to establish an
ascendancy over the enemy.

21. This offensive philosophy for the conduct of war is basically

simple and to the point. What it does is to sieze the initiative, upset the
enemy's equilibrium, and force him to fight under conditions, which
are not of his choosing.

22. But in preparing for the offensive, security of the home base
should not be ignored. So in security there is no point in
applying all your resources (men and material) to the offensive if you
are unable to operate from a secure base. On the other hand, there is
little point in tightening your security if by doing
so you tie up the resources needed to mount the offensive. So where
does the balance lie? Well, the balance is very much a matter for the
commander on the spot who has to base his judgment on 2 principal
factors:

a. The state of readiness of his attack force, and the time it will
take to bring weapons systems up on state.

b. The threat from both the ground and the air, which may
range from individual acts of sabotage to the possibility of attack
by opposing air forces.

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23. Now, I cannot over emphasize the importance of balance in the

conduct of war because clearly if you are able to upset the enemy's
equilibrium, then he will become confused, and uncoordinated in his
response to the threat that you pose. A very effective method of
upsetting this balance is the element of surprise, which can produce
results out of all proportion to the weight of effort applied.

24. Therefore the concept of balanced grouping of a commander's

manoeuvre force implies, according to Field Marshal Lord Slim and I
quote "That the Commander groups and positions his attack force in
such a way that he concentrates with his plans irrespective of what the
enemy may do" unquote.

SURPRISE

25. Surprise is potent psychological weapon. It causes confusion and

paralyses the enemy's chain of command. It also destroys the cohesion
and morale of his units. The shock may not last long but, while the
enemy's equilibrium is upset, the initiative may be seized to destroy his
forces at the cost of relatively few casualties.

26. But for surprise to achieve these results, it relies on 4 essential

ingredients:

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a. Secrecy.
b. Speed.
c. Originality.
d. Audacity.

27. In other words surprise can be achieved by doing something

without giving the enemy warning (secrecy), or doing something at a
pace of the enemy did not think possible (speed), also by doing
something never or seldom done before (originality) and by doing
something particularly daring (audacity). In other words as Frederick
the Great said, many centuries ago:

"Everything which the enemy least expects will succeed the best".

28. In the good old days before technology took the fun out of war, it
was relatively simple to achieve surprise but reconnaissance - satellites,
and modern air defence systems, have to some extent put an end to all
that. Certainly in the strategic sense surprise is now all but impossible
to achieve. However, tactical surprise by manoeuvre and deception
and by the sensible use of time and space is still a valuable weapon in
the hands of the intelligent military leader, and can do a great deal to
redress the imbalance of superior forces.

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29. A good example of good use of the element of time and space is to
be found in the Arab/Israeli 6-day war of 1967. The Israeli knew that
the Egyptians and others were preparing to invade with numerically
superior forces, and all the indications were that, the threat could be
countered only by inflicting maximum damage on the Egyptian war
potential, in the shortest space of time. This pointed to the need to gain
air supremacy quickly, prior to air - supported ground operations.
This ensures the condition in which the enemy is unable to interfere
effectively with own land, sea and air forces.

30. Consequently, the Israeli Air Force carried out a pre-emptive,

and surprise attack, catching the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. In
just less than 3 hours (within 170 minutes) 17 of Egypt's 19 airfields
had been neutralized and 300 of her aircraft destroyed. The Israeli's
were then able to prosecute the land battle with complete air
supremacy, whereas the Egyptians on their part had no aircraft to
provide cover for their ground force.

31. This takes me to concentration of force and economy of effort.

These 2 principles at first sight appear to be mutually exclusive, but
are in fact complementary. They are complementary in the sense that
by concentrating resources only in sufficient quantity to achieve the
aim, you are able to make the most effective use of the men, material
and weapons at your disposal.

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32. But concentrating forces doesn't necessarily mean physically

amassing forces (even of the optimum size) in a particular place and at
a given time. What does matter is that they should be available when
the situation demands. The criterion should always be: Disperse
before action and concentrate in action. Once a concentration has
achieved its aim, dispersion may be necessary to avoid retribution,
particularly in nuclear operations. Knowing when to concentrate and
when to disperse is a matter of timing and judgment depending on a
careful appreciation of the situation. Rapid concentration and
dispersion demand good communications and an efficient and effective
traffic control system.

33. This is where modern technology comes in. It is not long ago that
a considerable weight of conventional ordnance had
to be applied to a target, in order to have a reasonable assurance of
destruction. But today, precision - guided conventional munitions have
been developed which give high single short probabilities of kill.
Nuclear weapons, too, allow force to be applied positively, if at times
indiscriminately, and despite their high research, development and
manufacturing costs can prove to be highly cost effective.

34. For example, it could be argued that in August 1945, the war in
the Far East was considerably shortened by the persuasive power of

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the Atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. These bombs although killing some 400,000 Japanese
(mostly civilians), undoubtedly saved the lives of many Americans and
allied servicemen, and represented an economy of scale, in terms of the
munitions and equipment which might otherwise have been applied in
defeating Japan solely by conventional means.

35. And so technology acts as a catalyst in allowing the right amount

of firepower to be applied economically. But it is no easy matter to
balance the conflicting requirements of concentration and dispersal,
and this is where the principle of flexibility plays an important part. In
effect the corollary of concentration of force is thus economy of effort.
It is quite impossible to be strong everywhere, and if decisive strength
is to be massed at the critical time and place, there must be no wasteful
dispersal of resources, or expenditure of effort where they cannot
significantly affect the issue. This involves risk, but as General Wolfe
in 1957 put it, I quote "war is in its nature hazardous and an option of
difficulties” unquote. In order to gain a substantial advantage, a
Commander will accept a calculated risk in a less vital area. Those
forces, which are not assigned to the main effort, may be required
merely to hold their positions defensively, to fight a delaying action or
to act offensively in a feint, or holding attack. The application of these
principles may amount to a balanced development, combined with a
prudent allocation of resources which are strictly related to the aim.

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36. Now to apply either of the two principles of concentration of force

or economy of effort effectively, it is essential that the 3 elements of the
armed services work in harmony and that each be served by an
efficient support organization attuned to the needs of the operational
aim.

37. And this take me neatly to the final principles of co-operation and
administration. Wars cannot be fought by a particular service or arm
in isolation. On the contrary, the contemporary use of Armed Forces is
generally in support of tactical plans involving land or sea and air
elements; sometimes all the 3.

38. Perhaps at this juncture, I might be permitted to promote the

interest of Joint Warfare within this audience. Every modern day
operation of war is a Joint undertaking involving both ground and air
forces, with some operations having a naval dimension as well. During
WW2 Louis Mountbatten, the first true director of combined
operations believed fervently that ventures in which Sailors, soldiers
and airmen were required to co-operate closely, could succeed only if
those concerned, not only plan and work together but live together,
play together and forget, not their skills, but their individual loyalties
and patterns of thinking. Those who worked in combined operations
headquarters were not considered as representative of the Army, Navy

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or Air force, and any attempt to behave as such, or argue the case of an
individual arm, when priorities for a particular operation were being
discussed, was taken as evidence that the offenders were unfit for their
present work. All of this is worth remembering as you proceed in your
career.

39. Consequently, war and training for war, must be a joint effort in
which the closest co-operation, co-ordination and planning must exist
between the 3 Armed Services. This understanding between the Army,
Navy and the Air force can be fostered by a common-sense approach
not only to operational doctrine, but also to the support services
including the standardization and inter-operability of certain
equipment, such as vehicles and ground communications equipment.

40. I am not suggesting that we go quite so far in standardization as

the British Army, which up till the end of the last century equipped its
soldiers with a single-size army boot which could be worn on either
foot. Although easy on logistics it was decidedly hard on the feet. And
so, standardization can be a double-edged sword. However, there are
areas where common procedures and equipment can do much to
remove many of the problems of getting the right equipment, in the
right place, at the right time, to those in contact with the enemy.

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41. International defence co-operation is another area in which
Nigeria with its commitment to the AU, and with its regional interests
currently in focus could expect to wield some influence and derive
some benefit. Although defence co-operation between nations is not
without its disadvantages: for example. It places demands on national
sovereignty and poses problems in command and control. Besides, the
questions of relative contributions, types of weapons and performance
standards are not easy to resolve. NATO and our current MNJTF in
the Lake Chad Basin are bedeviled with such difficulties.

43. It is this co-operation, which will determine the quality of the

support, which can be given to the front line, and this is where the
Administrative, Logistics and Engineering specialists among you will
come in. If you fail to appreciate what the operators are trying to
achieve, and what the precise needs of the fighting arm are, you are
unlikely to provide the backing which is so essential to success in war.
Conversely, the operators among you and those in the teeth arms, must
appreciate that it is not easy to administer to the needs of dynamic and
highly mobile forces, nor is it simply a matter of kicking the tyres,
climbing into your aircraft, ship or vehicle, and taking off into the blue.
You on your part must develop an understanding of the problems and
limitations, which are imposed on the supporting services by financial
and other constraints. The art of administration lies not in over
insurance but in making the most economic use of the available assets.

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Scarce resources must be flexible enough to react quickly to changes in
the situation, to meet the unforeseen, and to provide for interruptions
in the supply system caused by conventional, chemical and nuclear
attack. All movement resources, road, rail, water, and air, must be
carefully coordinated and fully exploited in the interest of economy and
flexibility.

44. Gentlemen, remember that military operations are joint

enterprise, involving co-operation between the 3 fighting services; and
in counter insurgency operation, between the Armed Services and the
Police. Co-operation is based on team spirit, training and entails the
co-ordination, of all activities to achieve the optimum combined effort.
Four elements are essential to co-operation: They are goodwill, a
common aim, training and a clear division of responsibilities. In
accepting these elements, the closest co-operation between commanders
and staff must replace parochial service attitudes without sacrificing
legitimate service interests. In doing so, the kind of co-operation,
which makes for efficiency between arms, services and allies, is born
but of a thorough understanding of each others capabilities and
limitations obtained during training in peacetime.

45. Field Marshal Montgomery writing in his memoirs, in 1958 said

"in battle the art, of command lies in understanding that no two
situations are ever the same: each must be tackled as a wholly new

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problem to which there will be a wholly new answer". What he is
really saying here is that the application of the principles of war must
always be considered in conjunction with the factors, which form the
framework of most estimates namely:

a. Adversary forces (including likely courses open to him).

b. Relative strength and capabilities.

c. Ground or environment.

d. Time and Space.

e. Weather.

f. Logistics.

COMPARISON
Before I conclude this lecture, let us surf for principles of
war in USA, Russia, China, Clausewitz’s and Sun Tzu’s.

CONCLUSION

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45. Gentlemen, in conclusion, we have just discussed, the principles of
war which have marked the success of many great commanders in the
past. They are not a set of rules to be slavishly followed, but they do
indicate methods of action, which time and again, have led to success,
and they serve as a warning that to disregard them involves risk that
has often brought failure. But they are by no means an exhaustive or
limiting set of values. The important thing is to bear these principles in
mind in formulating your ideas, and at the same time to be flexible in
your approach.

46. You could do worse than consider the words of that great military
thinker and author, Machiavelli, who said: and I quote:

"In war, all that is useful is legitimate". Unquote

That's is flexibility for you. Thank you for your rapt attention.

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