FERNANDEZ v.

MARAVILLA
Are the rules on the preparation, filing, and service of applications, motions, and
other papers in civil actions applicable in special proceedings cases?
A: Section 2 Rule 73 provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in
special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to
supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure
to appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.
HILADO v. CA
Q: Do the petitioners have the personality to intervene in the case?
A: Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court.
Case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant. Intervention, as set forth under Sec. 1, Rule 19, does not extend to creditors
on a contingent claim.
ZAYCO v. HINLO
Q: Is an order appointing an administrator appealable?
A: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final
determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration,
management and settlement of the decedent’s estate. It is a final order and, hence,
appealable.
Q: Is a record on appeal in special proceedings cases required?
A: Yes. Sec 1, Rule 109 of the Rules on Special Proceedings contemplates multiple
appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to
the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should
remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.
Q: What is the period to appeal in special proceedings cases?
A: In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of
appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the
notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the
notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NISAIDA NISHINA
Q: Is a record on appeal in special proceedings cases required?
A: No. The filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed
order granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
surname in the civil registry.
Q: What is the period to appeal in special proceedings cases?
A: The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment
or final order.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT P. NARCEDA
Q: Can decisions in summary proceedings cases be appealed?
A: No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
"immediately final and executory." As such, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to
review a judgment which has become final and executory by express provision of law.
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary
proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari. When the OSG filed its
notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the
running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not
tolled. (not later than 60 days from the notice of judgment ). Upon lapse of that period,
the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRECIOSA
B. GARCIA
Q: Is venue jurisdictional in judicial settlement of estate cases?
A: No. Venue is not jurisdictional but it can be waived. Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived. In asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B.
Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence
of the decedent.
Q: What is the meaning of the word resides for purposes of judicial settlement of
estate cases?
A: Resides connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile. RESIDES means the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.
Domicile - requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile.
Residence - simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while no
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary.
Q: Is the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator equally
apply in the appointment of special administrator?
A: Yes. Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all,
the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent.
Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For
such reason, she would have as such interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin.
BENATIRO v. CUYOS
Q: Should the compromise agreement be nullified on the ground that other
compulsory heir did not participate in the supposed compromise agreement
conference?
A: Yes. While the CA correctly annulled the order of the trial court, the Supreme Court
stated that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud but on the ground
that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Generally, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection
with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such
presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.
 Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions regarding the annulment by
the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of due process. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a
valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.
Q: Would the supposed inaction of the other heirs after the publication of the
settlement amount to waiver of the right to their aliquot shares?
A: No. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of
due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any
obligation.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and,
if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
REILLO v. SAN JOSE
Q: Is the judgment on the pleadings in the case valid?
A: Yes. Although petitioners denied in their Answer that the deed was falsified, they
however admitted respondent’s allegation that the Spouses had 5 children, thus
supporting respondent’s claim that petitioners are not the sole heirs. Since they already
admitted, there is no more genuine issue between the parties generated by the
pleadings.
Q: Is the extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver of rights valid and binding
upon the other heirs who had not participated therein?
A: No. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs,
who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.
The deed of settlement made by petitioners was invalid because it excluded
respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the subject property. Under the rule,
no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.
Since the EJS is void, the logical consequence is that the property in dispute reverted
back to the estate of its original owners, the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina
San Jose. Since, it was admitted that all the parties to the instant suit are legal heirs of
the deceased spouses, they owned the subject property in common. It is a basic rule
that any act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs or co-owners is
deemed to be a partition and as per Rule 69, there is no requirement for publication.
CRUZ v CRUZ
Q: Did the action for the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement
prescribe?
A: No. An action to annul an invalid deed of EJS does not prescribe.
Q: Shoud the EJS which is written in a language not understood by one of the co-
heirs, be annulled?
A: Yes. No EJS shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.
OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO v. CA, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E.
MENESES
Q: What is the extent of jurisdiction of probate courts?
A: The probate jurisdiction of the RTC relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment
and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. Subject to settled
exceptions, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. The parties
concerned may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the
preparation or presentation of evidence. Obviously, the approval by the probate court of
the conditional sale was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court within
the statutory period of prescription.
The CFI or RTC, acting as cadastral court, acts with limited competence. It has
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much less
to issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the former CFI, now
in the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure
therefor, is now governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a special civil action
cognizable by the RTC in the exercise of original general jurisdiction.
ROMERO v. CA (2012)
Q: What is the extent of jurisdiction of probate courts?
A: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to decide the question of ownership.
In this case, the issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership, but
the determination of which particular properties should be included in the inventory of
the estate. The determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for
purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court.
ROMERO v. CA
Q: What are the issues that can be resolved by the probate court?
A: a) to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
before final adjudication; b) to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; c) the
recognition of a natural child; d) the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of
the decedent; e) the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and f) to pass
upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.
Q: Do the RTCs, sitting as probate or intestate courts, exercise jurisdiction over
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of execution?
A: Generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
HEIRS OF YPON v. RICAFORTE
Q: Can a declaration of heirship be made in an ordinary civil action?
A: No. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Hence, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.
Q: Can the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance,
determine the lawful heirs of a decedent?
A: No. The rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
REYES v. MOSQUEDA
Q: Does the RTC, acting as a probate court, have jurisdiction to determine
whether some properties are included or excluded in the inventory of the estate
of a decedent?
A: Yes. The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the
inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may
be instituted by the parties.
DE LEON v. CA
Q: Is the Order of the trial court regarding the collation a final or an interlocutory
order?
A: It is an interlocutory order. A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The rationale being that
the probate court has limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action.
The order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the
sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots.
Based thereon, the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of
collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said
Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of
the decedent.
AGTARAP v. AGTARAP
Q: Can a probate or estate court which is a court of limited jurisdiction resolve
issues on ownership over properties?
A: Yes. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a
court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
As a general rule, the trial court either as probate or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, and does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that
such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court
is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
The general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties
are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin
Q: Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the estate of Milagros Agtarap
considering that Milagros left a last will and testament?
A: No. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted for the
probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC Pasay City. The Court
thus refrained from distributing Milagros share in Joaquin’s estate.
Vda. De Chua v. CA
Q: Is the original petition for a twin purpose: for guardianship and for intestate
estate proceedings?
A: Yes. The original petition is for the twin purpose for guardianship and intestate estate
proceedings. While Vallejo may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss
that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the
original petition unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2)
issuance of letters of administration.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which
includes the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court states that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show the following:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences
of the creditors, of the decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration:
(1) the death of the testator;
(2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is
located; and
(3) if the decedent was a nonresident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court
is sitting.

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any interested person, may by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for
whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's
own right to the administration (preferential right of the heir), and may pray that letters
issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition. Only
an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration.
An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and
direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
Q: Is there a need to publish the amended petition for administration of the
intestate estate?
A: No. There is no need. It was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing
through a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was
filed for the only reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the case title can properly
and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body
of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real
intent and purpose of this petition.
There being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended
petitions, the publication of the original petition in a newspaper of general circulation
sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.
Salud Teodoro Vda. Perez v. Hon Zotico Tolete
Q: How may the two wills probated outside the Philippines be Reprobated in the
Philippines?
A: In accordance with Art. 816 of the civil code, the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws;
(2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.

The will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if
he is not the petitioner, are required.
Q: May the probate of the two wills be in a single Proceeding?
A: Yes. The wills may be probated jointly in accordance with Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person, which is not the case for
the spouses. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate
their joint probate. The court will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

SERAFIN MEDINA and ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN v. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS
Q: What is the meaning of “antagonistic” interest?
A: It is the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should
be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the
equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from
acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and
claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should
be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly.
In Lim v. Dias-Millares, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate.
EMILIO SUNTAY III v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
Q: Who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator
of the decedent’s estate?
A: The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is
laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.
Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
LERIOU v. LONGA and LONGA
Q: Was the letters of Administration properly issued to Mary Jane?
A: Yes. The trial and appellate courts did not find any factual or legal ground to remove
Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix of Enrique's estate. As to whom the Letters of
Administration should be issued the Court, in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, gave
emphasis on the extent of one's interest in the decedent's estate as the paramount
consideration for appointing him/her as the administrator. Here, petitioners cannot
assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their choice of administrator
should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth
emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors
is not absolute, and that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Q: Were the petitioners properly furnished with the Petition for Letters
Administration and the relevant?
A: Yes. It should be emphasized that testate or intestate settlement of a deceased's
estate is a proceeding in rem, such that the publication under Section 3 of the same
Rule, vests the court with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein.
Personal notice is not a jurisdictional requirement, but is just a matter of personal
convenience.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case
and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners
were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto
as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
Ocampo v. Ocampo
Q: What is the principal object why special administrators are appointed?
A: A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its
smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not
regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The
principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit
of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Q: Are the grounds for the removal of a regular administrator the same for a
special administrator?
A: NO. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first
pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order
of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher
courts is unwarranted.
The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels
the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and
discharge the obligations incumbent upon him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard
the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as
part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included
among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate.
Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.
Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate
court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.
Vda. De Manalo vs. CA
Q: Is the petition for judicial settlement of estate and for the issuance of Letters
of Administration an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family,
thus, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1 (j) of the Revised
Rules of Court?
A: No. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution of Estate reveals that petitioners’ claim is not in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. Hence, a condition precedent for filling the claim that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family
prior to the filling of the petition is not required in a special proceeding.
The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners merely
seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized
as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with
the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
Heirs of Pedro Escanlar v. CA
Q: What is the rule on the need for approval by the probate court in case of sale
of properties forming part of the estate being judicially settled?
A: The need for approval by the probate court exists only where specific properties of
the estate are sold and not when only ideal and indivisible shares of an heir are
disposed of.
Q: Is there a need for the approval of the probate court in the sale between the
Cari-ans and Escanlar?
A: No. The Court declared that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the
co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
It must be recalled that during the period of indivision of a decedent’s estate, each heir,
being a co-owner, has full ownership of his part and may therefore alienate it. But the
effect of the alienation with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. From
the foregoing, it is clear that hereditary rights in an estate can be validly sold without
need of court approval.
Natalia Carpena Opulencia v. CA
Q: Is the contract to sell valid even without prior approval from the probate
court?
A: Yes. While it is true that a prior authority granting to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber the estate pending a testate or intestate proceeding, such rule does not apply
in this case as petitioner entered into the contract to sell not in her capacity as an
administrator but as an heiress as evidenced by the fact that in the contract, she
represented herself as the “lawful owner” and stated “difficulties in her living condition”
and “need for cash” as the reasons for the sale.
Since hereditary rights are vested in the heir from the moment of death, Natalia
became the owner of her share in the property of her late father. As such, there was no
need for the court approval because she has the substantive right to sell the same.
Moreover, as to her contention that the sale would result to the partial distribution
pending the final determination of the testate proceeding, the court pointed out the
condition in the contract stating that it is contingent on the complete clearance of the
court on the last will and testament of her father and the fact that the ownership of the
respondents is subject to full payment as well as the termination and outcome of the
testate proceeding. Hence, the sale will not result to the partial distribution of the estate
RIOFERO v CA
Q: Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
decedent subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings.
A: The rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of
the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions,
namely:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of
and he is made a party defendant.
(3) when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
(4) If part of the estate to be recovered is assigned by the court to the heir.

PASTOR JR. V. CA
Q: Whether the probate order resolved the questions of intrinsic validity and
ownership
A: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75,
Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory
of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
Q: Can probate courts issue writs of execution?
A: GENERAL RULE: Probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not
supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication
of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render
any judgment enforceable by execution.
EXCEPTIONS: Probate court may issue execution
a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees
and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88),
b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and
 c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate
proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142).

PABLO RALLA vs. HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN

Q: After partition and distribution of estate, can heirs attack the validity thereof?
A: NO. Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the
will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is
inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases, each involving the
estate of a different person comprising dissimilar properties.
Where a partition had been approved and became a judgment of the court, and that
distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and
the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Hi-Tri Development Corporation & Luz
Bakunawa
Q: Can the unclaimed balances be escheated in favor of the Republic?
A: NO. Insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a
copy of the complaint and summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of
the defendant bank. On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the
unclaimed balances, service is made by publication of a copy of the summons in a
newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the institution is situated. Thus, a
notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published,
directing and requiring all persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed
balances to appear before the court and show cause why the dormant accounts
should not be deposited with the Treasurer.
The CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual
notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to
effect personal service on them. Nevertheless, the Court find sufficient grounds to affirm
the CA judgment on the exclusion of the funds allocated for the payment of the
Manager’s Check in the escheat proceedings.
Q: What are escheat proceedings? Explain the nature of escheat proceedings?
A: Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the
thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is
secured by the power of the court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a
general and constructive notice to all persons interested.
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without
there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto.
In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquire into the status, custody, and
ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought
about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor.
If after the proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to
claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state to forestall an open invitation
to self-service by the first comers. However, if interested parties have come forward
and lain claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit
should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state.
The Court emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing
to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state
compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial
ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
***Act No. 3936, outlines the proper procedure to be followed by banks and other
similar institutions in filing a sworn statement with the Treasurer concerning dormant
accounts:
Sec. 2. Immediately after the taking effect of this Act and within the month of January of
every odd year, all banks, building and loan associations, and trust corporations shall
forward to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement, under oath, of their respective
managing officers, of all credits and deposits held by them in favor of persons known to
be dead, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten
years or more, arranged in alphabetical order according to the names of creditors and
depositors, and showing:
(a) The names and last known place of residence or post office addresses of the
persons in whose favor such unclaimed balances stand;
(b) The amount and the date of the outstanding unclaimed balance and whether the
same is in money or in security, and if the latter, the nature of the same;
(c) The date when the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance stands died,
if known, or the date when he made his last deposit or withdrawal; and
(d) The interest due on such unclaimed balance, if any, and the amount thereof.
A copy of the above sworn statement shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the
premises of the bank, building and loan association, or trust corporation concerned for
at least sixty days from the date of filing thereof: Provided, That immediately before
filing the above sworn statement, the bank, building and loan association, and trust
corporation shall communicate with the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance
stands at his last known place of residence or post office address.
It shall be the duty of the Treasurer of the Philippines to inform the Solicitor
General from time to time the existence of unclaimed balances held by banks, building
and loan associations, and trust corporations.
This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left
unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar
institutions are under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant
accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to determine whether an
inactive account has indeed been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an
owner. If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds in the meantime, but still
asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the bank is no longer
obligated to include the account in its sworn statement. It is not the intent of the law to
force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is
only interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an
owner.
Lastly, the doctrine that the deposit represented by a manager’s check
automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable in this case, because the
instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered. Hence,
respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more
than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.
RP vs. CA & SOLANO
Q: How different are escheat proceedings from settlement of estate cases?
A: Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state,
by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person
who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is
claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."
Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may
be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action
must be brought.
Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be
escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for
escheat. Rule 91, Section 4: "A claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
within 5 years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of
and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for
the proceeds after deducting the estate; but a claim shall not be barred forever.
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud
any claimant, on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be
claimants to be punctual in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever
in a final judgment.
City of Manila v. Archbishop of Manila
Q: Should the properties of Ana Sarmiento be escheated in favor of the City of
Manila?
A: No. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated.
The requisites for the filing of a petition to escheat properties are as follows:
1) that a person died intestate;
2) that he left no heirs or persons by law entitled to the same; and
3) the deceased left properties.

The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will
provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the
subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without
persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without
leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. In view of the facts, therefore,
the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of the property of Ana
Sarmiento.