SECTION 45, RULE

39
Section 45. ENTRY OF SATISFACTION WITH OR WITHOUT ADMISSION.
–
■ Whenever a judgment is satisfied in fact, or otherwise than
upon an execution on demand of the judgment obligor, the
judgment obligee or his counsel must execute and
acknowledge, or indorse an admission of the satisfaction as
provided in the last preceding section and after notice and
upon motion the court may order either the judgment
obligee or his counsel to do so, or may order the entry of
satisfaction to be made without such admission.
What is the difference between execution
and satisfaction?
EXECUTION SATISFACTION
it is the method of enforcement of Refers to compliance with or fulfillment of
­
judgment. the mandate of judgment.
NOTE:

■ Normally, execution precedes satisfaction. But you can satisfy a

judgment without execution by simply paying voluntarily.
When a judgment has been satisfied?

■ The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it

passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and end
of the proceedings, and payment of satisfaction of the
obligation thereby established produces permanent and
irrevocable discharge. Hence, a judgment debtor who
acquiesces in and voluntarily complies with the judgment is
stopped from taking an appeal therefrom.
What happens if the judgment is satisfied?

■ it has to be recorded in accordance with section 44 and 45.

■ Section 44 and 45 provides that:
■ either the sheriff himself will record “fully satisfied”; or
■ the creditor will file an admission that the judgment is fully satisfied;
■ or the debtor on motion will ask that it be recorded that he has already paid.
QUESTION:

■ Can a plaintiff appeal from the judgment and at the same

time move for execution of the same? Can you do both
without being self-contradictory? Can you demand
satisfaction of judgment and at the same time appeal said
judgment?
G.R. No. 101428, August 5 1992
Vital – Gozon vs Court of Appeals and Dr. dela Fuente

RULING:
It depends upon the nature of the of the judgment as being indivisible or not. The decision of the Court
of Appeals of June 9. 1989 could still be modified after it was pronounced final and executory and was in
fact executed with respect to de la Fuente’s reinstatement to his position and the payment of the salaries
and allowances due him.
The general rule is what when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being
the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment of satisfaction of the obligation thereby established
produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces in and
voluntarily complies with the judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.
On the otherhand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor is estopped from appealing or
seeking modification of a judgment which has been executed at his instance, is one dependent upon the
nature of the judgment as being indivisible or not. In Verches vs Rios case, this Court held that where the
judgment is indivisible, the weight of authority is to effect that an acceptance of full satisfaction of the
judgment annihilates the right to further prosecute the appeal.
 Where the judgment is divisible, estoppel should not operate against the judgment creditor
who causes implementation of a part of the decision by writ of execution.
In this case, the amended judgment of the CA is clearly divisible, satisfaction of which may
be “split up.” One part has reference to the enforcement of the final and executory judgment of
the Civil Service Commission, that dela Fuente should be reinstated to the position of Chief of
Clinics without loss of seniority rights and that he be paid his back salaries and all monetary
benefits due him from the date of his illegal demotion. This part is no longer issuable, and has
not in truth been controverted by Gozon herslf. The other part has reference to the damages
which dela Fuente contends he suffered as a result of the unjustified refusal of Gozon and her
co-parties to comply with the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, and
which the CA has allowed him to prove. Obviously, the second part cannot possibly affect the
first.
Hence, it was therefore correct for the CA to treat its judgment as divisible, or capable of
being enforced by parts and to consider dela Fuente as not having placed in estoppel to pursue
his claim for damages by seeking and obtaining authority for a partial execution of the
judgment.
Section 46. WHEN PRINCIPAL BOUND BY JUDGMENT AGAINST SURETY. –

■ When a judgment is rendered against a party who stands as surety for

another, the latter is also bound from the time that he has notice of the
action or proceeding, and an opportunity at the surety’s request to join
in the defense.
When a judgment is rendered against a surety for another:

 The principal debtor is also bound by the judgment from the time he has notice of the
action or proceeding; and
 An opportunity at the surety’s request to join in the defense
What is a surety?

■ The surety is the guarantee of the debts of one party by

another. A surety is an organization or person that assumes
the responsibility of paying the debt in case the debtor policy
defaults or is unable to make the payments.
RES JUDICATA

■ refers to the finality of judgment, or the issues decided in a

case, once the decision has become final and executory and
cannot be litigated again by the same parties in a subsequent
action involving the same subject matter.
Rule 39, Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,

having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
A. In case of a judgment of final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
or intestate;
B. In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
What are the requisites of res adjudicata?

■There is res judicata if the following REQUISITES are present:

■1.) The judgment or order invoked as res adjudicata must be final;
■2.) The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the
parties;
■3.) The judgment or order must be upon the merits; and
■4.) There must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, identity of subject matter,
and identity of cause of action.
The elements are similar with litis pendentia. Actually, they are based on the same rule
– splitting of the cause of action. The only difference is, in litis pendentia, the first action is
still pending. In res adjudicata, the first action has already been decided and the decision
has already become final.
SALUD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100156 June 27, 1994

Facts:
■Spouses Isidora and Eusebio Salud sold their undivided one-half (1/2) share in
certain parcels of land to their children → late Clemente Guerrero filed two (2)
complaints, he sought to exercise his right of redemption as a co-owner of the
controverted properties → the one (Civil Case No. 3022) was granted late Guerrero
the right to redeem the properties in question (defendants were declared in
default) → the other one (Civil Case No. 3023) was tried on its merit and held that
the late Guerrero had no right to redeem the litigated property as its sale → Isidora
Salud initiated filed an Action to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud from Title, Declaratory
Relief plus Damages before the RTC → Clemente's widow, private respondent
Melania Guerrero moved to dismiss the complaint on ground, among others, of res
judicata → the trial court granted the motion to dismiss → Hence, this petition
Issue:
■ Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to Civil Case
No. 3022.
Held:

■ No, the doctrine of res judicata shall not applied in Civil Case No. 3022, not
having been tried on its merit. The rules of res judicata are of common law origin
and they initially evolved from court decisions. It is now considered a principle of
universal jurisprudence forming a part of the legal system of all civilized nations.
The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute
recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be
heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that another
will be delayed. In modern times when court dockets are filled to overflowing, this
concern is of critical importance. Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial
resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of the public at large. Where
courts are harassed by crowded dockets and complaints against slow foot justice,
frequent technical reliance on the preclusive breadth of res judicata is
understandable. The importance of judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive
suits are strong norms in a society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may,
there should not be a mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where
more important societal values deserve protection
■ The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an inflexible application
of the doctrine of res judicata will not serve our constitutional policy favoring
fairness, the heart of due process. Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No.
3022 and was not given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children,
then in the United States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were
declared in default. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but
unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied. Thus, the late Clemente
Guerrero, husband of private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by
default from the trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption
over the contested lots. The late Guerrero, therefore, prevailed primarily because
his claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where
Guerrero claimed the same right of preemption against the other children of
petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of petitioner sued by
Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The difference in
the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity not to give
res judicata effect to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner
was a non-party. The demands of due process present a weightier consideration
than the need to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than
the need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no justice
that satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK (RBP) vs. MOLINA
G.R. No. L-54287 September 28, 1988

Facts:
■The Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a case against private respondent,
Feliciano Sarmiento, Jr., for a sum of money → The civil case (Civil Case No.
116028) was dismissed upon failure of the petitioner "to prosecute its case within a
reasonable length of time → Motion for reconsideration was denied → Another
case (Civil Case No. 129829) was filed by the petitioner → Private Respondent filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground cause of action is barred by a prior judgment
(res judicata) under Civil Case No. 116028 → Trial court dismissed the case (Civil
Case No. 129829), held that dismissing Civil Case No. 116028, had become final
and had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits → Motion for reconsideration
was, once again, denied → Petitioner sought a more speedy remedy in questioning
said orders; hence, this petition for certiorari before this Court.
Issue:

■ Whether the case (Civil Case No. 129829) is barred by a prior

judgment (under Civil Case No. 116028).
Held:
■ No, Civil Case No. 129829 is not barred by prior judgement. Respondent's motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata are without cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim
that respondent trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued said
orders because he thereby traversed the constitutional precept that "no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for
any order or adjudication to be binding. It is a cardinal rule that no one must be allowed to
enrich himself at the expense of another without just cause.
 
■ The court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
private respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot render any binding
decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is
an adjudication on the merits. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must be binding,
and must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a
nullity.
■ The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the
case because the court that rendered the same did not
have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis
of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If
at all, such a dismissal may be considered as one without
prejudice.
DELFIN vs. INCIONG
G.R. No. 50661. December 10, 1990
Facts:
■A union (Atlantic Container Employees Organization and FEDLU) filed a case of unfair labor practice
(Case No. 5195-ULP) against the employer before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) → CIR
dismissed the case, held that employer was guilty of ULP but ordered the reinstatement only seven (7) of
the members of the union → Atlantic Container Employees Organization and FEDLU filed motions to
reconsider→ CIR denied the motions for being pro forma and for having been filed out of time → Atlantic
allegedly stopped operating prior to the rendition of ULP case; and was absorbed by Inland Industries,
Inc. which engaged in the identical business of the former → The petitioners (136 former employees)
filed another case based on the same ULP (Case No. 5701-ULP) → When CIR was abolished the ULP case
was transferred to the NLRC (under Case No. LR-4320) → NLRC Arbiter rendered a decision and ordered
the reinstatement of only 86 out of the 136 petitioners in Case No. LR-4320 (Charge No. 5701-ULP), who
testified and/or presented their respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action →
Respondent appealed Commissioner of NLRC, the latter set aside the decision of Arbiter on the ground of,
among others, res judicata, in that Case No. LR-4320 (Case No. 5701-ULP) was barred by the prior
judgment in Case No. 5195 → On appeal, Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of NLRC
■Motion to reconsider is was denied → This petition
Issue:

■ Whether there is the same identity of the parties in the

two ULP cases.
Held:
■ Yes, there is the same identity of parties in the Case No. 5195-ULP, as filed by
the union and Case No. 5701-ULP (Case No. LR-4320), filed by the employees.
While it is true that the complainants in the first charge was the union, in reality
it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who
stands to be benefited or defeated by a case brought in the name of the union
are the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become
final and executory, the subsequent filing of another ULP charge against
Atlantic for the same violations committed during its existence, is barred by res
judicata. The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual
members of the union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle
of res judicata. Neither will the bringing in of new respondents in the name of
the new corporation Inland, its incorporators and private respondent Roberto
Jacinto, who is also its General Manager, help petitioners’ cause.
■ It should be noted that in the decision of the first complaint, only seven (7) of
the members of the union were ordered reinstated "inasmuch as complainants
and/or their witnesses failed to present any evidence, oral or documentary, as
to who were those other union members who joined the strike." In the second
complaint, Labor Arbiter Jose T. Collado ordered the reinstatement of only
eighty-six (86) of the 136 petitioners-members of the union "considering, . . .,
that not all complainants evinced their desire to prosecute the case," and "the
award (was) extended only to those who testified and/or presented their
respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action . . ." If to allow
the second complaint to prosper for the eighty-six (86) (out of 136) petitioners-
members union after only seven (7) were ordered reinstated in the first
complaint, nothing would deter the other members of the union who were not
yet ordered to be reinstated from bringing a third complaint and there would be
no end to the litigation until all of the members of the union are ordered
reinstated.
ANGELA ESTATE, INC. vs. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO.
G.R. No. L-49261. September 26, 1986

Facts:
■Petitioner filed in the CFI of Negros Occidental a complaint against Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc. to recover additional milling shares amounting P29,644.72 and P26,546.98
for crop years 1963-64 and 1964-65 respectively, because the defendant was one of the
sugar centrals which produced more than one-third of the centrifugal sugar in the province;
that in G.R. No. 15092 entitled "Alfredo Montelibano, Et. Al. v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc. (wherein one of the plaintiffs-appellants is Gonzaga & Co., of which the successor-in-
interest is the petitioner) the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Acta No. 11 and ordered
the defendant therein to pay additional milling shares for crop year 1951-52 and subsequent
crop years; that in crop year 1963-64, the Binalbagan-Isabela and the Victorias sugar
centrals and in crop year 1964-65, the Binalbagan-Isabela and the La Carlota sugar centrals
granted their planters 64% to 65% shares as they produced more than one-third of the
centrifugal sugar produced by all the sugar centrals in the province.
Issue:

■ Whether the principle of res judicata is inapplicable.

Held:

■Yes, the res judicata in this case is inapplicable. As provided for in Rule 39, Section 49 of
the Rules of Court, the principle of res judicata, applies when there is, between two cases,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 850; Ocampo v. Jenkins, 14 Phil. 681).

■If not for minor differences, the Montelibano case and the instant case have identity of
parties and subject matter. As claimed by the petitioner, it is the successor-in-interest of
Gonzaga & Co., one of the plaintiffs-appellants in the former case, by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action in the Montelibano case. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,
defendant herein, was also the defendant in the Montelibano case. In both cases, the
demand is for additional sharing in the produced sugar and molasses although the claims are
for different crop years.
■ But the two cases differ with regard to causes of action. It is true
that both cases are aimed at achieving the same relief, that is, the
granting of additional milling shares to the planters. However, that
end was arrived at in the Montelibano case through the resolution
of the issue of the validity of paragraph 9 of Acta No. 11.
Moreover, while the payment of additional milling shares was
allowed therein, this Court reserved the right of the plaintiffs-
appellants "to sue for such additional increases as they may be
entitled to for the crop years subsequent" to crop years 1951 to
1956.
VALENCIA vs. RTC OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 82112. April 3, 1990

Facts:
■Valencias instituted Civil Case No. Q-17465 with the RTC of Quezon City, seeking the cancellation
and annulment of the award (litigated lot), by PHHC (now NHA) in favor of Jose Balot → Donelita
Carino a sister-in-law of herein private respondent Corazon Llanes, intervened in the civil case on the
ground that petitioner had sold her "squatter's rights" over the Litigated Property to her (Donelita
Carino) → Trial Court decided in favor of the Intervenor → On appeal, Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the decision, ruled that preference should have been given to the Valencias instead of to
non-resident Balot → The Supreme Court, on Balots Petition, denied for lack of merit and affirmed
the award of disputed lot to Valencias → Private respondent filed a new complaint (Civil Case No. Q-
43239) with the RTC of Quezon City for recovery of ownership and possession, alleging that the
petitioner had sold their "squatter's rights" → Valencias filed a Motion to Dismiss raising, as grounds,
the special and affirmative defenses alleged in the Answer, specifically, prior adjudication of the lot
in their favor → RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction prayed for by Llanes, prohibiting the
Valencias from exercising any and all acts of ownership over the litigated lot → Hence, Valencias
filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus against the Regional Trial
Court
Issue:

■ Whether the action in Civil Case No. Q-43239 is barred by the

prior judgment rendered in Civil Case No. Q-17465.
Held:
■(I focused on the identity of the cause of action)
■ Yes, Civil Case No. Q-43239 is barred by the prior judgment. One test of identity of causes of action
is whether or not the judgment sought in a subsequent case will be inconsistent with the prior judgment
(Tan vs. Arador G.R. No. L-38745, 6 August 1975, 66 SCRA 61). If no inconsistency will result, the prior
judgment cannot be held to be a bar. Herein, the Valencias have been pronounced by final judgment in
a prior case to be the owners of the Litigated Lot, and all occupants thereof to be illegal occupants. If
affirmative relief is granted to Corazon C. Llanes in the second case, that judgment will definitely be
inconsistent with the prior judgment in the first case, which has conclusively resolved the specific issue
of sale and the overall question of ownership. Tried by the inconsistency test, therefore, identity (at the
very least, substantial identity) of causes of action must be held to be present.

■ True, Corazon C. Llanes made it ostensibly appear that her cause of action in the second case was
for the recovery of property and the execution of a formal deed of sale. No matter how differently
formulated, however, the same basic relief was sought, that is, the declaration of ownership and the
eventual ejectment from the Litigated Lot of the adverse party. It is well settled that a party, by varying
the form of action or method of presentation, cannot escape the effect of the principle of res judicata
(Ramos vs. Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-26986, 30 September 1977, 79 SCRA 176).
■ But even if there were no identity of cause of action, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, another aspect of the res judicata
doctrine, becomes applicable. "Even if there is no identity of cause
of action, provided there is identity of parties and subject matter,
the doctrine of res judicata in its second form, namely,
conclusiveness of judgment would be applicable (Comilang vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37312, 15 July 1975, 65 SCRA 69).
The judgment is conclusive in the second case only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein.
GUEVARRA vs. BENITO
G.R. No. 110401. August 23, 1995

Facts:
■Petitioner spouses Guevara and the private respondent Far East Bank & Trust Co. entered
into a compromise agreement to settle Civil Case No. 87-4140 which petitioners had brought
in the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of property foreclosed by the bank; attached to the
agreement was a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by the parties and made a part of the,
agreement → RTC approved the compromise agreement and rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms and conditions → Petitioners paid the first three (3) out of twelve
(12) agreed monthly installments → Petitioner filed a complete in the RTC of Makati
requesting private respondent to waive the time clause of the monthly installments → The
parties failed to fix the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price → Private
respondent asked the court to dismiss petitioners' complaint on the ground that it was
barred by the judgment in the prior case (Civil Case No. 87-4140) decided by the RTC of
Manila → RTC granted motion and dismissed the case (Civil Case No. 92-2818), and denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration → Hence this petition for review on certiorari
Issue:

■ Whether the judgment based on the compromise agreement in

Civil Case No. 87-4140 constitutes res judicata in the subsequent
case between the same parties.
Held:

■ No, the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 87-4140 does not constitutes res
judicata in the subsequent case. The subject matter of the first case (Civil Case No. 87-
4140) was the resale to petitioners of the property which the bank had acquired through
foreclosure sale, whereas the subject matter of the second case (Civil Case No. 92-
2818), is the rescheduling of payment of the property after the parties originally fixed it
in their compromise agreement. Nor are the causes of action in the two cases the same,
so much so that the same evidence would not support both of them, which is the test of
the identity of causes of action. Indeed the causes of action cannot be the same for the
reason that, if true; the cause of action in the complaint in Civil Case No. 92-2818 only
arose after the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-4140.
■The principle of res judicata does not apply, since it extends only to the facts and
conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered. (Caiña v. Court
of Appeals, 239 SCRA 252 (1994)) Petitioners' claim is that private respondent
agreed to waive in their favor the time clause in the Deed of Conditional Sale
starting with the installment which became due on May 4, 1992. They are thus
alleging facts which did not occur until after the judgment by compromise had been
rendered in Civil Case No. 87-4140 on March 30, 1992. This case is governed by
the ruling in Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 151(1990) that a compromise
agreement cannot cover any cause of action that might arise after the making of
the agreement and that any cause of action which may arise from the application
or violation of the compromise agreement is not barred by what was settled in the
prior case.
SUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83251. January 23, 1991
Facts:
■Respondent Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against
petitioner Renato Suarez, his mother Paz Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 734-J → Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file another
action for custody of minor under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, contending that the issue as to
who between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the minor child could be fully
adjudicated in another action and not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus → Trial
court issued a resolution granting the motion with prejudice → Respondent Manese filed
another action for custody of minor and support on May 27, 1987 before the trial court,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 840-J against petitioner → Petitioner moved to dismiss the action on
the ground of bar by prior judgment rendered in Sp. Proc. No. 734-J dismissing the same with
prejudice → The motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court → The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied → Petitioner filed with respondent appellate court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order/preliminary injunction →Court
of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the special civil action → Hence this petition
Issue:

■ Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in

the action for the writ of habeas corpus, docketed as Sp.
No. 734-J is res judicata to the present action for custody
of minor and support docketed as Sp. No. 840-J.
Held:

■ No, dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas
corpus does is not a res judicata to the action for custody of minor
and support. The most significant requirement in the principle of
res judicata is that the former judgment must be a valid one.
Supreme Court agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the former order issued by the trial court in Sp. Proc. No.
734-J, dismissing the habeas corpus case is null and void for
having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based (Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution). Further, the
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the case show that the
order of the trial court was issued whimsically and capriciously and
with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to nullity of the order.
■ In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was
without prejudice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor on the ground
that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a
second action to be filed under Rule 99 of the Revised Rules of Court. Clearly, the
purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a writ of habeas corpus was
not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of her child
but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for custody of minor. It
is worthy to note that the ground upon which respondent Manese filed her motion
for dismissal is erroneous since the question as to who shall have the custody of the
child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court without the necessity of filing a separate action
under Rule 99 of the said rules for that purpose. Nevertheless, it is error for the trial
court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action
without stating the reasons or basis thereof This should not prevent the filing of the
second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial
court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the
habeas corpus case. Hence, the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits which
would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.
RES JUDICATA

- refers to the finality of judgment, or the issues decided in a case, once the decision has
become final and executory and cannot be litigated again by the same parties in a
subsequent action involving the same subject matter.
G.R No. L-41940, November 21, 1984
ILUMINADA CARANDANG, EDEN CARANDANG, SWANIE CARANDANG and MARILO CARANDANG, petitioners, v. POMPOSA G. VENTURANZA and
GREGORIO VENTURANZA, respondents.
MARCELINO T. CATRIS, for petitioners.
GREGORIO L. VENTURANZA for respondents.

FACTS:
■ Petitioners are the surviving heirs of the late Protacio Carandang who, during his lifetime, owned and
possessed together with his spouse Iluminada, a parcel of land, duly registered in his name and of the
Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro. Because the property was saddled with claims of relatives of
Protacio as allegedly co-heirs to certain hereditary shares on the land, a case was filed against the spouses
Carandang. The latter sought the professional help of respondent Gregorio Venturanza. Pursuant to the
advice and assistance of the judge, the spouses Carandang subscribed to a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondent spouses Pomposa G. Venturanza allegedly with the specific understanding that after the
relatives’ claims shall have been fully settled, title to the subject land would be given back to Protacio
Carandang. In the meantime, the transfer certificate of title in the name of respondent spouse Pomposa
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro.
■ As what expected, a civil case for the declaration of nullity of Deed of Sale executed by the deceased in
favor of respondent Pomposa Venturanza was filed by the relatives of Protacio before the Court of First
Instance of Calapan, Mindoro. A decision was rendered by the court in favor of the defendants.
■On appeal, The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. The claims of the
relatives of the deceased Protacio were denied.
■ Upon investigation by the petitioners, they discovered that the transfer
certificate of title in the name of the respondent Pomposa had been
subsequently cancelled and replaced by two (2) transfer certificates of title
also in the name of Pomposa after the land was subdivided. Hence, a
complaint was filed by the heirs of Protacio against the respondent spouses
Venturanza before the RTC of Mindoro.
■ A motion to dismiss was interposed by the spouses Venturanza on the
ground of res judicata or by by prior judgment of the same RTC. The
respondent court sustained the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition was
file to review the court’s resolution.
ISSUE:

■ Whether or not res judicata is applicable.

RULING:

■There is NO res judicata.

■The doctrine of res judicata is found on the principle that it is to the interest of the public that
there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and
fairly adjudicated.
■ The elements of res judicata are as follows:
1) the former judgment must be final;
2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties;
3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
4) there must be, between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action.
■The existence of the first three (3) requisites in the case at bar in not disputed. However, the
issue of whether or not there is identity of parties and cause of action between the two (2) cases in
question as to bar the later action brings this case before the Court.
 ■In the identity of parties, a situation obtains whereby the parties Protacio Carandang and the
spouses Venturanza, formerly co-defendants in a case brought against them, now finds themselves
protagonists in opposite camps. Because of such adverse relationship, the question arises whether or
not the judgment in the first case in which both parties were defendants is conclusive in a
subsequent litigation between the two.
■ The Court laid down the rule in the case of Valdez vs Mendoza:
■a judgment in favor of two or more defendants is conclusive on plaintiff as against them.’ The
estoppel however is raised only between those who were adverse parties in the former suit, and the
judgment therein ordinarily settles nothing as to the relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs or
co-defendants inter sese, unless their hostile or conducting claim were actually brought in
issue.’ . . .’by cross-petition or separate and adverse answers’.

■  No such thing appears in the records so as to bring the present case under the above
qualification to the rule. The petitioners’ present claims have never been set forth in Civil Case
No. R-2149, nor were they litigated therein. Only insofar as the decision of the respondent court
in the earlier case declares the Deed of Sale between deceased Protacio Carandang and the
spouses Venturanza valid and subsisting between them will the rule of res judicata apply.
 ■But even if the judgment rendered upon the validity of the deed of sale between the
parties in Civil Case No. 2149 is conclusive between the same parties in the subsequent
action, Civil Case No. 2480 involving the same deed of sale, the petitioners’ case is not
anchored on this issue. This brings us to the question of identity of causes of action.
■However, the present cause of action is not a basis for a finding of res judicata.

■ Civil case no. R-2149 brought by Trinidad Moreno and others against the parties herein
had for its purpose the annulment of the sale of the property under litigation and the
recovery of hereditary rights. On the other hand, Civil case no. R-2480 brought by the
petitioners against the spouses Ventura seeks the reconveyance of property or
recovery of ownership on the basis of a trust agreement between the parties.
■ Petitioner do not seek the annulment of the Deed of Sale which they had executed in
favor of the respondents nor do they question the respondents’ ownership of the
property by virtue of the deed. Rather, the petitioners pray for the enforcement of the
trust agreement between the parties.
 ■Therefore, the judgment in the earlier case cannot bar the
petitioners’ present cause of action which is founded on the facts
of law different from those of the previous case involving them.
■Hence, res judicata is not applicable in the case at bar.
G.R Nos. 76142-143, December 27, 1993
VDA FISH BROKER and/or VENERANDO ALONZO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUPERTO BULA and VIRGILIO SALAC,
respondents.
FACTS:
■ Petitioner VDA Fish Broker (VDA), a duly licensed fish broker, owned, operated and represented
herein by petitionr Venerando D. Alonzo, is in the business of selling fish. It engaged the services of
private respondents Ruperto Bula and Virgilio Salac, among others, as batilyos “to arrange the fish in
the baneras in or out of the designated area.”
■ A complaint for non-payment of service incentive leave pay, emergency cost of living allowance,
thirteenth month pay, legal holiday and premium pay for rest day and holiday was filed against VDA,
and Venerando and Corazon Alonzo by Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Batilyo- NFL represented by its
local president and herein respondent Ruperto Bula. Respondent Virgilio Salac also signed the
complaint.
■Labor Arbiter Porfirio E. Villanueva dismissed the case for lack of merit. He ruled that
there was no employer-employee relationship between VDA and the batilyos.
■ Claiming that they were terminated from the service by VDA, Salac and Bula filed
separate complaints against VDA and/or Venerando Alonzo for illegal dismissal and
recovery of moral and exemplary damages.
■ Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez dismissed the complaints on the ground that there
was no employer-employee relationship between the opposing parties.
■ The decision was appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, directed VDA and Alonzo to reinstate Salac and Bula to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay their back wages.
■Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

■ Is the finding of no employer-employee relationship in the first case res judicata to

the second case for illegal termination?
RULING:

■YES. The finding of no employer-employee relationship in the first case res judicate to the
second case for illegal termination.
■ The Court that the issue of employer-employee relationship is crucial in the
determination of the rights of the parties in both cases. Moreover, it is erroneous to
suggest that res judicata applies only where there are similar cases of action. In Nabus vs
CA, the Court explained that:
■ The principle of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by
former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. There is "bar by former
judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits
rendered in the first constitutes as absolute bar to the subsequent action.
 ■It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose. But where between the first case wherein judgment is invoked,
there is identity of parties, but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is
conclusive in the second case, only as those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
conclusiveness of the judgment.
■ In San Luis vs. CA, the Court ruled that:
■The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to
the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
■It is undisputed that the factual issue of the existence of employer-
employee relationship has been determined with finality in their earlier
case, hence, the same finding should have been deemed conclusive in the
later cases. If the Court were to ignore the principle of res judicata, an
absurd situation would arise where the same administrative agency would
arise where the same administrative agency would have diametrically
opposed conclusions based on apparently similar circumstances. The effect
may even be more farcical in the sense that private respondents are given
dual or conditional status.
■ This is the dilemma the principle of res judicate seeks to avoid, hence,
res judicata is applicable in the present case.
Other principles in law which may be confused with res judicate are:

1) LAW OF THE CASE; AND

2) STARE DECISIS
LAW OF THE CASE

■ it means the legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on

the general law of the law applied to the concrete of facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict
obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the
law of the case in all after steps, whether in the lower court of in the
appellate court on a subsequent appeal.
G.R No. 100981, December 28, 1994
CELESTINO M. TABACO, MARIANO TABACO, MARIANO N. VALENCIA and MARCIAL
VALENCIA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO TACTAC and RICHARD
VILLAMINA, respondents.

FACTS:
■ Dona Maria Villanueva Vda. de del Rosario was the owner of a small island in Brgy. Mala Este,
Buguey, Cagayan, bounded on the north, east, and west by the Alabang Creek, and on the south, by
the Buguey River.
■ The widow subdivided the island into several lots which she sold to different buyers among
whom were Alberto Solive, Dewey Cortez, Eusebio Villanueva, and then under separate Deed of Sale
to herein petitioners Celestino Tabaco, Mariano Tabaco, Mariano Valencia and Marcial Valencia.

■ Claiming to be the riparian owners of 4 ½ hectares of accretion, more or less, to their lots which
they bought separately from Dona Maria Villanueva Vda. de del Rosario, petitioner instituted an
action for recovery of possession and damages against private respondents Antonio Tactac and
Richard Villamina in the then RTC of Cagayan.
■ Claiming to be the riparian owners of 4 ½ hectares of accretion, more or less, to their lots
which they bought separately from Dona Maria Villanueva Vda. de del Rosario, petitioner instituted
an action for recovery of possession and damages against private respondents Antonio Tactac and
Richard Villamina in the then RTC of Cagayan.
■ The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners holding that the disputed 4 ½ hectares
are accretions to the latter’s respective lots gradually deposited by the current of the Buguey River
and ordering private respondents to vacate the premises.
■ Defendants appealed to respondent CA. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled
that contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, petitioners failed to prove accretion by the required
quantum of evidence, hence, their action for recovery of possession and damages must fail.
■ Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

■ Whether the case filed by Alberto Soliven, Dewey Cortez and

Eusebio Villanueva against Antonio Tactac, and which was decided in
favor of the former lots owners constitutes the law of the case as to
warrant a similar ruling in favor of herein petitioners.
RULING:

■ NO. the case filed by Alberto Soliven, Dewey Cortez and Eusebio Villanueva against Antonio
Tactac, and which was decided in favor of the former lot owners do not constitutes the law of the
case as to warrant a similar ruling in favor of herein petitioners.

■ The court explained that under the law of the case concept, whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case
between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so as
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. Such stability and conclusiveness given to final judgments of courts of
competent jurisdiction are said to be. grounded on reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness
and economy as well as protection of the time and interest of the litigants. Thus, the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. II-551, which became final and executory for failure of the defendant
to appeal, is already conclusive and immutable as to Alberto Soliven, Dewey Cortez and Eusebio
Villanueva on one hand, and Antonio Tactac on the other, since it has already become the "law of
the case."
■However, it can be so considered only between the aforesaid parties. It cannot
be similarly invoked in the case at bench. While private respondent Antonio
Tactac was the same defendant in Civil Case No. II-551, the present case in
addition to involving another defendant, private respondent Richard Villamina
(to whom Tactac’s interest in the property was transferred) was filed by different
lot owners who claimed ownership over entirely different lots. Therefore, since
whatever has been irrevocably established constitutes the law of the case only
as to the same parties in the same case and not to different parties in an entirely
different case, petitioners’ prayer for a similar favorable ruling must fail. The fact
that the lots owned by Soliven, Dewey and Villanueva were bought from the
same person as those owned by petitioners does not warrant a similar judgment
in favor of petitioners. A judicial determination against a party does not bar him
from contesting the same issues with a stranger to the original litigation.
■ hence, law of the case does not constitute in the case at bar.
G.R No. 118910, November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN vs MANUAL MORATO

■FACTS:
■ In G.R No. 113375, May 5, 1994, the Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC was declared
contrary to law and invalidated by the Supreme Court as it violates the exception provided in
paragraph B, Section 1 of RA no. 1169, as amended by BP. Blg. 42 which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association, or joint venture with another.
■ Petition is found to be of paramount public interest and of transcendental importance to the
public. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition.
■ In this case (GR No. 118910, July 17, 1995), PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement whereby the latter leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO
from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation.
■Petitioner contested that the new lease agreement was the same as the old one and was
still violative of PCSO’s charter.
■ The Court dismissed the petition, and held that:
■ Petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make
them real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3, Sec. 2; a determination of the
petitioners’ right to bring this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision in the prior
case between the parties; the Equipment Lease Agreement is valid as a lease contract under
the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the PCSO; and under Sec. 1 (A) of its
charter (RA 1169), the PCSO has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-
line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another
party, so long as it itself holds or conducts such lottery; and petitioners insisted that the
decision in its first case has already settled (1) whether they had a standing to sue; and (2)
whether under its charter (RA No. 1169, as amended) PCSO could enter into any form of
association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Thus, the
petitioners contend that these issues can no longer be reopened.
ISSUE:

■ Whether or not the ELA is violative of PCSI’s charter like the lease
agreement in the first ruling.
RULING:

■NO. ELA is not violative of PCSO’s charter like the lease agreement in the first ruling.
■ The Court noted that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a
joint venture agreement were removed.
■ Petitioner contended that the first ruling was the law of the case. However, the Court said that the law
of the case doctrine was inapplicable because this present case is not a continuation of the first one.
■ Petitioner also said that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
■The general rule on the conclusiveness of judgment, however, is subject to the exception that a question
may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially different claims. The ELA
was substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.

■ Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself
or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1 (B) but also §1
(A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]")
"operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the
necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."
 ■ This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the
phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention
of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under
paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs,
projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party but
also "by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these
activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B)
would prohibit.
■ The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO
under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The
amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage
in certain investments, programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds
for health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such investments by
the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are
adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
■ hence, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner is denied with finality.
STARE DECISIS

■ it means that the decision of a court should stand as precedents for

future guidance. The purpose of this is to attain stability and judicial
order. That is why we are citing precedents.
G.R No. L-62577, September 21, 1987
ESTELITA, ROBERTO, LEONARD, REYNALDO, ELY, MYRNA, MICHAELANGELO, ROMEO, and LEONOR, all surnamed ROSALES,
petitioners. vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH III, Presided by the Honorable MAGADAPA I.
RASUMAN, CITY COURT OF ILIGAN CITY, Presided by the Honorable POMPEYO L. PALARCA AND GREGORIO ORELLANA,
respondents.

■FACTS:
■ The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease over the former’s property
for the expressed period of three (3) years. The petitioners advised the private respondent that he
would have to vacate the leased premises, not only because of the lapse of the agreed term but also
because he had subleased the property in violation of their agreement. The private respondent
objected, claiming that his verbal agreement with them was for a period of ten (10) years, which was
the reason he had introduced permanent and costly improvements in the building, and moreover,
they had also consented to his sublease of the property. As no agreement between the parties
appeared in sight, the private respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to speak, by filing with
the RTC of Iligan City an action for the continued enforcement of the lease contract and for damages.
■The said Court issued a restraining order that maintained the status quo between the
parties. The petitioner filed their own complaint for unlawful detainer with the City Court
of Iligan City. The motion filed by the private respondents before the RTC of Iligan City was
dismissed on the ground inter alia of the pendency of the ejectment case, and for the
lifting of the temporary restraining order. The private respondent moved to dismiss the
ejectment suit also on the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had
filed earlier should be decided first before the petitioners’ complaint could be entertained.
■ Petitioners’ motion before the RTC was in effect denied and ordered that the
determination of the said motion is hereby deferred until trial/ The motion for
reconsideration was denied also. In the City Court, the petitioners fared no better when
the ejectment case was ordered held in abeyance until the case in the RTC is finally
resolved. The motion for reconsideration was denied again. Thus failing in both courts, the
petitioners have come to the Court, praying for a reversal of the said orders on the ground
that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:

■ Whether or not the two cases involving the same parties and the same
subject shall have precedence over the other.
RULING:

■Yes. The two (2) cases involving the same parties and the same subject shall have precedence over
the other.

■ In the case of Pardo vs Encarnacion, the Court ruled that, the facts on record show that
despite the exchange of communication, proposals and counter-proposals, between the parties
regarding a renewal of the of the lease, they were not able to arrive at an agreement within said
period for while the lessor wanted an increased rental the lessee, on the other hand, proposed
for a reduction. With this failure of an agreement, it is to be presumed that the lessee was aware
that an ejectment case against him was forthcoming. Whether or not the case filed before the
Cavite Court of First Instance, just one day before the expiration of the lease contract, was an
anticipation to block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to take against the lessee, the
fact, however, is that the lessee was not disposed to leave the premises. At any rate, while the
said case before the Court of First Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance
with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between the parties is whether or not the
lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.
■There is no merit to the contention that the lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease
contract cannot be decided in the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro vs. Mirasol, it is to be noted
that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide that there is pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the
unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action.
■ Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially
identical with previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are guideposts
that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways and byways of the law in the search
for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are the voice of
vanished judges talking to the future. Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an
emergent viewpoint or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is
best.
■ The Court have reviewed the ruling announced in the abovementioned cases and we see no
reason to deviate from it. Its logic remains valid and no change in the law or in the condition of the
times calls for its revision or reversal. It is still sound doctrine and so the Court continue to apply it,
remembering that via trita est tutissima.
■ 
NOTE:

■ The doctrine of Stare decisis admittedly does not mean that courts
should be slave forever to precedents. A doctrine long standing has
also been reversed. The Supreme Court explained in the case of People
vs Munos why once in a while it abandons the doctrine of stare decisis.
GR No. L-38969-70, February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICIANO MUNOZ, defendants-
appellants
■FACTS:
■  Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified
men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of
them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was
then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he
was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the
mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by
Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or dissuade
him. 
■ After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino,
and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while
the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding
man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao.
■in Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her
husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his
wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the
head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by
as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old
boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed.
■ The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on
Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely
defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and
body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their
companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses.

■ The trial judge found Millaro guilty as principal for murder and Munoz and the other two herein
appellants only as accomplices in Criminal cases no. 0176, while in criminal case no. 0177 and
0178, Munoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices for
murder.
ISSUE:

■ Whether or not the death penalty shall be imposed.

RULING:

■NO. Death penalty shall not be imposed.

■ The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
■ Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
■Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was
called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by
the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium,
the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying
circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in
all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus maintained
except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition.
■ The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was
then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the Court
today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which
we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the
composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing
its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new
perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are
not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown
rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all
life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not
prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or
testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
What are the differences between res judicata, stare decisis, and law of the case?

Res judicata Stare decisis Law of the case

it operates between two (2) Refers to cases with different Refers only to one case which
actions involving the same parties. may or may not be invoked in
parties and the same cause of subsequent cases.
action.

Refers to all courts Refers to the decision of the SC  

  May refer to various cases  

which are usually invoked in
subsequent cases.