1

PROBLEM DETERMINED SYSTEMS:

TOWARDS TRANSFORMATION IN FAMILY THERAPyl

by
Harlene Anderson, Ph.D* Harold A. Goolishian, Ph.D.** and
Lee Windermand, Ph.D.***

ABSTRACT practice, is a limiting concept.

This paper challenges the tra-
ditional views of social structure
as a foundational theory underlying
current psychotherapy practice and
theory. The concept of meaning and
language systems, problem-determined
systems, is presented as an alterna-
tive.
The advantages that family theory
and family therapy brought to the
field of psychotherapy are now
becoming disadvantages. What once
helped to expand our theories and
maximize our therapeutic efforts,
now seems to limit our ideas and
restrict our practices.

Order, unity, and continuity FAMILY THERAPY: A CHALLENGE TO THE

are human inventions, just as
truly as catalogues and ency-
clopedias.
Bertrand Russell
Whitehead (1962) wrote that a
clash of doctrines is not a disas-
terl it is an opportunity. This
statement is particularly poignant
today as we examine the clash of
doctrines that exist in the world of
psychotherapy theory. In this
paper, we share some of the ideas
that we are exploring and challeng-
ing in our ongoing search to develop
a workable understanding of the
nature of human systems and with the
problems they present.
OUr search has led us to ques-
tionour familiar and comfortable
notions about family therapyz caus-
ality, pathology, diagnosis, change,
the target of treatment, and the
role of the therapist. We believe
that family therapy, in theory and
CONCEPT
A common base for schools of
psychotherapy is their heritage in
American social theory. The assump-
tions implicit in our theory and
practice are predicated on concepts
of role and structure. These con-
cepts are elabotated on by Talcott
Parson (1950). He held that each
level of social organization is in
some manner constrained by the level
immediately hierarchical to it. In
its simplest form, the individual is
constrained, through social role, by
the family, and the family in turn,
by the community, and the community
by higher social orders. I t is a
hierarchy of control and power
directed from above and harnessed by
social role. These theoretical
assumptions are so fundamental to
our notions of the operation of
social phenomena, that their influ-
ence on the formation of theories
regarding therapy is often obscured.

*Senior Faculty, Galveston Family Institute. Training Faculty, Family

Institute of Cambridge.

*·Leader of this research group. Director, Galveston Family Institute.

Clinical Professor, Baylor College of Medicine, Department of Family
Practice •

• **A8sociate Director, Galve.ton Family Institute. Private Practice, The

~uston Family Institute, Houston, Texas.

Journal of strategic and Systemic Therapies, Vol. 5, *4.


theorist, presented detailed solu-
tions to a basic question: "How can
we explain the human actions we call
social systems." Parsons worked
from a sociological perspective,
much as Freud attempted to explain
social organization from a psycho-
logical perspective. Parson's
social theories have so influenced
our commonly shared beliefs about
social role, socialization and the
functioning of social systems, that
we in the mental health field rarely
question their logical consistency,
their influence, nor their implica-
tions for theory and practice. Par-
sons holds that all individual acts
are defined and mediated by a system
of culturally structured and shared
symbols. Within this description is
the implicit assumption that the
social system has an ontological
status. There is also a telic (tel-
eological) thrust that subordinates
all human action (Parsons, 1949,
1953). Social role, in this theory,
is the regulatory mechanism for
enforcing social order, it condi-
tions and constrains individual
action to the action requirements of
the social system (Murphy, 1982,
Haberrnas, 1970).
Goolishian (1985) likened the
Parsonian social system to an onion.
This onion theory describes society
as a system of levels with layers
within concentric layers. The fam-
ily encircles the individual, the
community encircles the family, and
so on. Each layer of the social
onion is subordinate to the level
above. Each layer is controlled for
the good or effectiveness of the
superordinate social system. Each
layer subsumes and controls to serve
it's own requirements - the homeo-
static maintenance of social order.
Social hierarchy and order are main-
tained by the social role of indi-
viduals. This concept of homeosta-
tic control, the Parsonian concept
of social role and structure, is the
very fundamental basis of our cur-
rent theories and practice.
This homeostatic control then
leads to a basic assumption that
there is an objective and observa-
tionally independent reality (a
2
higher and superordinate social sys-
tem) which permits logic and sense
to be made of an externally valida-
ted psychopathology. Ann further,
that a system or individual should
operate in a certain modal (normal)
way. Problems represent objective
deficiencies in the target of treat-
ment. The system is sick or patho-
logical. The therapist is empowered
to make judgments regarding devi-
ance, normality and pathology on the
basis of objective knowledge. In
action this means that the mental
health expert, through some d~agnos­
tic process, determines the presence
of pathology in a system and speci-
fies the corrective action to be
taken on it.
Regardless of which layer of
the onion we work with, psychothera-
pists are still applying the concept
of layered hierarchical social sys-
tems. This imparts the notion that
the system immediately over the sys-
tem of interest is responsible in
some fashion for the defective
social structure needing correction.
Thus the family damages the individ-
ual, the community, the family, and
so on. The concepts of family sys-
tems and systems therapy are obser-
vational punctuations that require
hierarchical and homeostatically
functioning social structures.
Structures that are. superordinate
and controlling to the, layers below.
Parsonian concepts possessed
great explanatory power in the early
(first order) cybernetic era. His
was, after all, one of the earliest
attempts to explain social behavior
from a cybernetic point of view. He
had formalized, in systems terms,
the prevailing views of the preced-
ing century regarding human behavior
and human systems. Current social
theory is, however, chang ing • The
German social theorist Niklas Luh-
mann (1978, 1982) , for example
offers an opposite view of social
systems. He views social action
(social behavior) as the force that
constructs, in language, the rela-
tional networks that comprise a
system. The apparent regularities
tha t are observed in social systems
are not considered by Luhmann to be
 3
examples of Parsonian homeostasis
and social hierarchy; nor are they
examples of systems that exist inde-
pendent of the actor. On the con-
trary, Luhmann in stressing the con-
struction of the social systems
through action, sees such observed
regularities as emerging and evolv-
ing from collaborative and collec-
tive action. Essentially social
systems are systems that exist only
in meaningful linguistic exchange.
In Parsonian theory (and in tradi-
tional therapy) the emphasis is on
hierarchy, power and control. For
Luhmann, the focus is on collabora-
tive action and discourse. These
significant changes in social theory
are supported by developments in
other arenas of science and know-
ledge.
BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF PSYCHO-
THERAPY
Family therapy had evolved out
of a continuing search for a useful
paradigm to understand human systems
and to work with human problems.
The search marked a trail leading
beyond the traditional boundaries of
psychotherapy and social theory into
other scientific communities and to
scientific concepts such as general
systems theory, cybernetic systems
theory, quantum theory, and
biological theories. Ideas drawn
from Bateson (1972, 1979), Maturana
(1978) , Varela (1975) , Prigogine
(Prigog1ne and Stengers, 1984), and
the constructivists (Watzlawick,
1984) continue to influence us in
our search. 2
Cybernetics of Cybernetics.
Bateson, Jackson, and their
colleagues (Bateson, 1976; Jackson,
1965) pioneered the translation of
the concepts of general systems
theory and cybernetics systems
theory to the arena of psychopathol-
ogy. A major contribution was
their cybernetic understanding of
how an individual's behaviors and
symptoms were related to the family
system and its organization. Their
description ot the "double-bind" and
"family homeostatis" described the
family as a closed information
system feeding information. back on
itself in the form of a symptom.
This feedback operated as a kind of
servomechanism, with a governor (the
symptom) that prevented change. The
symptom was understood to serve a
primary family function by maintain-
ing stability, continuity, and rela-
tionship definition. This powerful
thought gave the family therapy
field the capacity to describe a
dysfunctional family in terms of
system parameters rather than in
terms of individual psychic struc-
ture. To this time, the field had
been trapped in the models of indi-
vidual psychology and sickness.
This change in thinking was the
"systems" breakthrough that energiz-
ed the psychotherapy field ana
focused on what rapidly became fam-
ily therapy.
Although Bateson pioneered
these ideas, he also challenged
them, and encouraged others in the
field to question them. Bateson
came to believe that there was a
basic epistemological flaw in the
cybernetic concept of negative feed-
back and the related concepts of
homeostasis, continuous. change,
symptom functionality, and structur-
al defect as they contribute to the
basic understanding of family dys-
fu.'lction or family pathology. For
Bateson and others, Maruyama (1963),
Speer (1970), Hoffman (1971, Buckley
( 1967) , Bertalanf fy ( 1968) , Dell
(1982), Dell and 'Goolishian (1981),
Wilkins (1968), and Keeney (1983),
homeostasis and stability were not
adequate for describing living and
changing systems.
Thus, some therapists began to
move from using simple cybernetics
or first order cybernetics (observ-
er-independent) concepts to a view
that included a second order cyber-
netics or a cybernetics of cyber-
netics (observer-dependent) con-
cepts .3 This second order cyber-
netics focused on "non-pathologiz-
ing" explanations of so-called dys-
function. Auerswald (1968) proposed
such a non-lineal, non-pathologizing
paradigm when he wrote of an "eco-
logical epistemology." Watzlawick,
Weakland, and Fisch (1974) offered

such a position as a result of their
clinical research into the nature of
change and brief therapy. This work
introduced positive feedback, acci-
dent and change, and non-pathology
as concepts basic to understanding
human problems and the process of
therapy. These views (liverted
thinking away from issues of power
and control to issues of circularity
and self-reference. Perhaps even
more important, their thinking shif-
ted the focus of therapeutic work
from the individual and the family
to other systems.
Constructivist positions.
The philosophical constructiv-
ists' shift in thinking regarding
the nature of reality shakes our
beliefs in a notion of the world as
composed of stable structures, with
stable properties, existing indepen-
dent of an observer. The world is
no longer the world of the observed.
It is now the world of observing
systems (von Foerster, 1981), one in
which the act of observation changes
that which is observed. We now
exist in a reality where there is no
distinction or separation between
the observed and the observer. It
is a world characterized by a kal-
eidoscopic flow of events, patterns
of relationships, of which we are
all a part. Scarr (1985) calls this
"a cloud of correlated events." A objective reality about a family and
cloud which we participate in bring-
ing forth through perception ann. to
which we give meaning. Thus the
therapist and the client become the
therapeutic system, and the thera-
pist's descriptions become only one
of many possible descriptions, none
more correct than the others. With-
in this view, therapy is no longer
an effort where the therapist uni-
laterally "acts upon" the client.
It is an endeavor where there is an
interdependent co-evolution of ther-
apeutic realities.
Watzlawick's The Invented Real-
ity (1984), Gergen's Toward a Trans-
formation in Social Knowledge
(1982), Wilder and Weakland's Para-
digmatic Conversations (1981), and
von Foerster's Observing Systems
(1981) are all examples of this
4
growing position regardinJ t.he
influence of the observing system in
the creation of what is called know-
ledge, understanding, and reality.
The basic constructivist position is
that we do not niscover reality or
scientific fact. Thus, in the fami-
ly therapy field we do not discover
the structure or reality of fami-
lies. Rather, we invent the fami-
lies we work with, just as we invent
ourselves. We are, as they are,
creatures of mind. Mind is the
Batesonian (1972, 1979) ~ind, and
inr:ludes the totality of conscious
and unconscious mental processes and
activities interacting in a recur-
sive cybernetic loop. T"le pattern
of redundancies we experien~e and
describe are merely observational
punctuations in an enormollsly com-
plex feedback process. As Varela
(1975) indicates, we as observers
distinguish ourselves by distin-
guishing (isolating) what we are
not.
The constructivist view holds
that all knowledge, including scien-
tific fact, is a construction of
mind in the social domain. The
implication for the family therapy
field is that there are no set facts
ahout family, family theory, or fam-
ily therapy that are independent of
our observations or our mode of
engagement. There is no single
its problem waiting to be discover-
ed. There are multiverses, each
valid in its own right. None of
these exist independent of the
ohserver, the therapist.
Quantum Theory and Dissipative
Structures.
The quantum world is often
described as a world that Lewis Car-
roll might have created. Wonder-
land's weirdness can never be separ-
ated from Alice's observational par-
ticipation in creating it. The
world view that emerges from quantum
theory is a systems view that trans-
cends the metaphor of the world as a
machine predictable, determined, and
objective. In quantum mechanics,
the world is an interconnected web
of relationships in dynamic motion.
 5
To know, i.e. to observe, is to
alter things in irreversible ways.
We do not see; we create - as in
invent. The act of observation
creates history. In this fashion,
quantum theory holds that the future
is not determined, but that the past
is.
Ilya Prigogine, a Nobel Laure-
ate for his work on dissipative
structures, describes a systems par-
adigm that views systems as open,
evolving, and subject to continuous,
nonlinear change. The central no-
tion of Pr igogone' s concept, "order
out of chaos" (prigogine and Sten-
gers, 1984) is that systems must be
open to the input of energy and to
the dissipation of entropy. At any
point in time, in these open non-
equilibrium systems, there are mul-
tiple instabilities. All instabili-
ties are capable of amplification,
and therefore capable of driving the
system beyond its stability boundar-
ies. It is this process that ran-
domly drives systems to new organi-
zation and complexity. Which path
of change is chosen, of the many
paths available to the system at the
time, is a function of chance. In
this model, evolutionary leaps are
guided by chance and randomness.
Ordinary Newtonian concepts of caus-
ation and determinism are discarded.
One can interact with a system, but
one cannot control it's reorganiza-
tion, nor can one control it's
change or the timing of change. In
the world of dissipative structures,
chance is driving the complex exper-
iences that we call life. For Pri-
gogine, reality is multidimensional,
and thus our descriptions of nature
must be a web of levels of differing
descriptions that evolve in complex-
ity.
Structure Determinism and Autopoesis.
Many concepts basic to family
theory and family therapy are being
challenged by the thinking of the
Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana
and Francesco Varela (1980). They
have lOng struggled with two major
aJ;'eas ot study: 1) What is the
organization of the living? and 2)
What takes place in the phenomena of
perception? Central in Maturana' s
thinking is the concept of structure
determinism. Living systems behave
as a function of how they are built,
how they are arrayed, and how they
are put together. Living systems
are autonomous, inform<ltionally
closed, and recursively organized.
Synchronistic with this notion is
Maturana's rejection of the concept
of instructive interaction; that is,
we cannot change - in an instructive
way - any other system. It is the
structure of a system that deter-
mines its behavior; it is not the
impact of outside forces. A system
determines its response to a pertur-
bation. A perturbation does not
cause the response.
Maturana also offers us the
concept of linguistic domain; a
domain of semantic interactions.
Participants, observers in a lin-
guistic domain, interact through
descriptions, and descriptions of
their descriptions. For Maturana,
linguistically interacting systems
are systems of meaning. The concept
of linguistic domain also provides
us with a very powerful explanatory
tool. If we assume that we are
dealing with meaning systems in much
the same way that Wittgenstein
(1953) would use the term, then the
work of therapy has to do wi th the
exploration of these meaning systems
through conversation. It is what
Bateson (1972) calls an "ecology of
the mind" or an ",ecology of ideas"
that determines who does what with
whom. The interactional system that
is relevant to any problem under
study is determined in language, not
in social structure. These meaning
systems, this ecology of ideas,
determine the very behaviors and
problems for which therapy/consulta-
tion is requested. This is so,
whether we work with individuals
with problems with self or with mul-
tiple individuals interactively com-
municating about a problem.
Much of the foregoing, stands
in strong contrast to the pivotal
assumptions of traditional science
and practice in the field of mental
heal th. The work of Bateson cau-
tions us against notions of tel eo-

logy, symptom functionality, power
and hierarchy. Bateson urges us to
replace these concepts with a cyber-
netic view of the mind - to consider
the mind as a series of recursive
connections. Thus we are not defin-
ed by social role and structure.
Quantum theory brings forth a world
that is observer dependent and that
changes with our observations.
Prigogine leads us to consider the
role of chance and discontinuity in
driving the self-organizing systems
that we distinguish as human. The
constructivists define for us the
social creation of knowledge.
Maturana extends this view to con-
sider living systems. He generates
a world of interacting biological
systems that are capable of langu-
age. By paying particular attention
to the manner by which we distin-
guish what is distributed, he, along
with others, supports the view that
we create and live in a world that
exists in language and social
exchange.
With this in mind the scientist
or the therapist must be defined as
one who co-creates through his or
her own theoretical lenses what
facts there are to be observed.
This is markedly different from the
traditional concept of the therapist
as a passive recording device, who
diagnoses by simply charting the
contours and patterns of the observ-
ed psychosocial systems.
Beyond this, is the strong
position that knowledge of reality,
the individual, or the family, is
fundamentally a linguistic system.
By linguistic system we mean the
languaged communicated symbols that
are used by persons in discoursive
relationships to negotiate the
vicissitudes of what is known, diag-
nosed, or treated. Statements about
a family or system are totally
dependent on how one chooses to
define and describe one's observa-
tions. Diagnosis and treatment are
fundamentally social creations they
are created in language through dia-
logue; they are the invention of
social communicative exchange.
This contrast with current
theory and practice leads some to
6
ask, "How can a therapist do any-
thing?" or "What is the therapist
paid for?" The changes in thinking
we suggest do not necessarily lead
to such nihilism (if there is no
objective reality how can he do any-
thing?) The concept of problem
determined system, a system that
exists only in language and action,
is suggested as an alternative to
current theory and practice. By
examining the theoretical underpin-
nings of the concept, we can avoid
the nihilistic fears that arise from
the prevailing empirical views of
social reality.
LANGUAGE SYSTEMS AND THERAPY:
4
PROBLEM-DETERMINED SYSTEMS
It is not necessary, or desir-
able, to define treatment in terms
of social, cultural, biological, or
poli tical punctua tions • As thera-
pists we are most concerned with
systems that are in active communi-
cation; communicating systems that
are in a constant state of evolu-
tionary change. For the purposes of
psychotherapy, these communicating
systems are not distinguished by
names of social constructs (indivi-
dual, family, husband, wife, etc.),
but may be described as an ecology
of ideas. This ecology of ideas is
the shared, cognitive, and linguis-
tic discourse through which we
derive meaning, and out of which we
create the realities of coordinated
action systems.
Through language individuals
interact with and coordinate behav-
ior with others in a variety of
ways. This can even be ways that
are thought of as problems. Lang-
uaging defines the components (mem-
bership) of systems. Languaging
around what is identified as a prob-
lem, defines the components (member-
ship) of the systems we must work
with in treatment. These problem
determined systems are action sys-
tems that are constructed out of a
network of communicating persons
around those issues that are for
them a problem. Problems, in this
view, do not derive from the
requirements of superordinate sys-
terns; they emerge from the local,
7
collaborative, collective, and com-
muniated decision that there is a
problem.
Problems in a communicated
linguistic system can exist simply
because someone says "this is a
problem," and someone accepts this
statement. Frequently however, we
deal with problems where there is
communicated disagreement. Someone
says "this is a problem," and has
the authority to enforce response
and action. Often, this response is
a non-acceptance of the defined
problem, and the resulting language
system is an active and communica-
tive disagreement about the nature,
or presence, of a problem. In work-
ing with such systems, we must
include all who participate in
languaging around the problem, and
thus, are relevant to the treatment
of the problem. A treatment system
so distinguished is a cognitive-
linguistic problem system and is
independent of external social
structure. The parameters of these
linguistic systems define the mem-
bership of the treatment group, and
thus with whom we must position our-
selves, if we are to be useful in
our consultation with those who are
actors in the drama of struggle and
change we call therapy.
We define the treatment system
as a language system, a system with
boundaries marked by a linguistical-
ly shared problem. We call these
particular language systems problem
determine'd systems (Anderson, Gool-
ishian, Pulliam and Winderman,
1986) • In this problem determined
systems view, human systems defined
by social constructs (e.g. fami-
lies), do not cause or make prob-
lems J communicatively shared prob-
lems mark and define the system.
Social-political constructions, such
as family, are constructs relevant
to a particular description of human
experience 1 they are not necessary
to the definition of a treatment
system.
A problem determined system may
be an individual, a couple, a fam-
ily, a work group, an organization,
or any combination of individuals
that is communicatively interactive,
and organized around a shared
languaged problem. If we substitute
the concept of problem determined
systems as the appropriate descrip-
tor, for the target of treatment, it
follows that we would then drop such
concepts as individual therapy,
couples therapy, family therapy, or
larger systems therapy. The defini-
tion of a problem marks the context,
and therefore the boundaries, of the
syst,em to be treated. It also foI-
lows, tha t we mus t drop the usua 1
concepts of diagnosis since we are
not able to distinguish an ext:ernal-
ly validated pathology and are limi-
ted simply to that with which we are
presented through language.
This distinction allows us to
avoid the task of repairing defec-
tive social structures, as determin-
ed by our theoretical orientations
our descriptions of health, pathol-
ogy, and deviance. The problem to
be diagnosed and treated, and the
membership of the problem system, is
determined by those in active com-
munication regarding the problem.
This cannot be determined by the
therapist on the basis of externally
imposed views of social systems.
For example, during the past decade,
systems oriented psychotherapists
have used concepts such as positive
feedback loops and discontinuous
change to describe aspects of the
therapeutic process. When we sit in
the consultation room with members
of a family, the, family does not
change. The change is in the indi-
viduals' languaged experience of
themselves and others who are rele-
vant to the issues being discussed.
The change, sometimes startlingly
rapid, is the linguistic experience
of what is problematic. As thera-
pists we do not treat the family,
the extended family, the family of
origin, the networks, the indivi-
dual, the intrapsychic structure, or
the positive feedback loops. We
believe that therapists interact via
language with an ecology of ideas.
These ecologies of ideas are trans-
formations of experience and are
communica ted through language in a
manner that creates a context that
permits the evolution of new

language, new meaning, and therefore
new systems.
Personal Construct Theory.
This language systems view
extends George Kelly's theory of
personal constructs (1955). In gen-
eral, Kelly believed that how a per-
son makes sense of the world is a
phenomenon that is reciprocally
influenced by self and others in his
or her social domain. For Kelly, a
personal construct was something
devised by persons for their own
lively purposes. A construct was a
reference axis that established a
personal orientation for the various
events we encounter. This view of a
construct as a reference axis, as
opposed to a representation of some-
thing - an obj ecti ve reality, sug-
gests that human behavior can be
understood in the context of com-
municated coordination.
Kelly's (1955) view is similar
to that presented here, i.e. defin-
ing a treatment system as bounded by
all those in shared communication
vis-a-vis a problem. In Kelly's
theory, to think otherwise places
the discipline of therapy into a
"moral" as opposed to a "scientific"
domain. In therapy our treatment
must focus on the experience of
those with whom we work. As Kelly
indicates, we always work clinically
with the experience of the client,
not the experience of observers.
This is a position that strongly
emphasizes relationships, communi-
cated meaning, discourse, and langu-
age as essential to the treatment
process. Gergen (1982), commented
that a therapy emanating from such a
position would be an experience in
grass roots epistemology.
Problem Determined System Membership.
A language system view allows
those' who share in the communication
that defines the problem to define
the treatment system. Similarly,
all individuals actively involved in
communicative interaction form the
membership of the problem determined
system. The core feature of such
problem systems is a signal of dis-
tress by an observer to what a sig-
8
nificant person is doing, saying, or
thinking (one may also observe one-
self and experience distress). The
communicated implication of such
distress is a demand for a change in
how someone is behaving, thinking or
feeling. The discourse of the
observer and the observed around
this issue form the ecology of ideas
that define the membership of the
communicating system to be consider-
ed for treatment. Membership in
these problem determined systems can
overlap different social structures
and are not to be defined or distin-
guished on that basis. Problem
determined systems may be formed
through communications based on
relationships of loyalty and kin-
ship, such as families. They may be
formed through communications such
as legislative mandate. They may be
formed through communications based
on accident or chance relationships.
For example, a problem-determined
system may include family members,
protective service workers, court
personnel, or anyone else who is
languaging about the nature of a
problem. We also include the thera-
pist as part of the problem deter-
mined system. Merely by accepting a
referral, the therapist begins to
participate in a discoursive pro-
cess, and therefore becomes an
active communicating member of the
problem determined system.
Summary
We suggest caution in using
concepts such as, "social role,"
"social organization," or "family,"
to distinguish problem systems which
become the target and focus of diag-
nosis and treatment. Rather, we
suggest that we change the founda-
tional theoretical basis of the
field to include the newer concepts
emerging in a variety of sciences
briefly referred to in this paper.
Theory and ideas are useful, and
ever changing agents guiding our
work; they are not iconic represen-
tations of reality. We believe that
the concept of a problem determined
system, defined on the basis of
discoursive interaction, to be a
highly useful concept in working
 9
with the complexities of modern
psychotherapeutic practice. I t is a
concept that may be helpful in mov-
ing beyond the limitations of cur-
rent theory and practice.
QUESTIONS WE HAVE BEEN ASKED
"Isn't your caution regarding reify-
ing the family and pointing again to
the individual coming full circle?"
We posit that the problems that
we work with in therapy exist only
in language. And language is an
interactional communicative pheno-
mena. Problems can only be what is
communicated by somebodY7 therefore,
only the individuals communicating
about a problem can have a problem -
no one (and no thing) else.
Families do not exist outside
of an observer's language/descrip-
tion. Families exist only in langu-
age. As therapists, we sometimes
talk of "the family thinks," "the
family feels," or "the family does."
Family members may share certain
thoughts, emotions, and actions, but
these are not characteristics of a
family 1 they are characteristics
that we as therapists attribute to
them. Families cannot talk, fami-
lies cannot feel1 families cannot
act and we cannot talk to families.
As therapists, we can talk with
individuals and with multiple indi-
viduals simultaneously (some or all
of whom may describe themselves as a
family). We can listen to the lang-
uage of the individuals who describe
themselves as a family. We can
listen to the language of the indi-
viduals who describe themselves as a
family.
We must be cautious lest we
think that there are entities called
the family. If a family exists only
in language (through description) ,
there is a differen~ family for
everyone observing the family,
including the members themselves.
The family that we see and experi-
ence is no more than just one other
reality of the many realities that
are po.aaible through the operation
of distinctions called observation.
In liqht of the foregoing, we must
begin to wonder about our descrip-
tive concept of family and familY
therapy. We must keop in mind that
all we have are our descriptions,
and all descriptions are valid with-
in the specified domains of dis-
course which give rise to them.
Descriptions have no ontological
validity outside of a contextual
domain which exists in language.
Therefore, we believe that as thera-
pists we must have a deep and pro-
found respect for multiple reali-
ties, and the multiverses of others.
For example, a mother and a daughter
may be seen by a therapist as being
in an enmeshed relationship; the
mother might think that the daughter
is simply immature; and the daughter
might think there is no problem.
Whose view is correct?
We are thus led to seriously
reconsider most of what is standard
procedure in what we call diagnosis.
Rather than making diagnoses of sys-
tems we suggest that therapeutic
systems (which includes the thera-
pist) diagnose themselves. 6 The
individuals communicating about a
problem have distinguished (they
have languaged, dialogued) the
problem. The individuals who have
distinguished the problem compose
the system who should be engaged
,with the therapist in the discourse
we call psychotherapy. This view
allows us to avoid the controversial
issues implicit in our maintaining
predetermined ideas about the objec-
tive ontological ,nature of social
systems. We therefore avoid attemp-
ting to fix the kinds of defects our
theories indicate systems possess.
we are also implying that we must
give up our notions that therapists
are agents of change, and that ther-
apy is the possibli ty of changing
other people. Because if some of
these newer ideas described above
are at least heuristically valid,
then the only thing we can change in
the therapy room is ourselves, we
cannot change other people.
"What is the role of the therapist?
- Is it to disrupt the system (fam-
ily), trigger discontinuous change,
and hope that the family reconsti-
tutes in a more effective (less dys-
functional) way?"

We think that the role of the
therapist is to talk with the indi-
viduals communicating about the
problem in order to gain understand-
ing (a consensual domain of shared
languaged experience) with them
about the nature of their problem
(which now includes the therapist).
In our experience problems are rare-
ly limited to a blood related or
marriage related family. The role
of the therapist is simply to engage
in conversation with those who are
relevant to the problem resolution
in such a way that there is a co-
evolved new reality, a new language
system, and therefore a dissipation
of the problem or shared belief that
a problem exists. Though we used to
speak of disrupting families (or
positive feedback loops), for us
now, disrupting seems coercive 1 we
would no longer define therapy in
that way.
"Is language with the family the
therapy itself?"
We believe that therapy requir-
es that we language with the family
wi thin the domain of understanding
they have created, i.e. using their
language, not ours. This means that
every course of therapy must be dif-
ferent. In our view we do not find
it useful to think of commonalities
across problems, commonalities
across diagnoses, or commonalities
across solutions. We suggest giving
up the notion of a unitary theory
from which we can understand all the
people we work wi th. Every course
of therapy must be different,
because every problem is different.
Therefore, everything we do in ther-
apy has to change from case to case.
Some readers may feel that the idea
of no commonalities is too strong,
that maybe there are commonalities
independent of our language? We
suggest (following Maturana), that
whatever we observe in terms of
redundancy is a result of our cri-
teria of distinction, our methods of
description, our language. There-
fore the redundancies we observe are
our constructions, they are not in
the things themselves.
10
"Is the notion of causality useful?
Should we surrender the notion of
1 inear causal i ty? Is the idea of
circular causality merely more of
t he same, a concept we mus t al so
discard?"
It is important to remember
that concepts such as circular caus-
ali ty or reciprocal determinism are
nothing more than serial linear
causality. Causality is only useful
as one way we make sense of our-
selves wi thin a particular context
[or in Maturana's (1978) words a
particular "domain of expt~r ience"] ,
as we language with ourselves about
our experiences. Causality does not
exist "out there;" it is simply one
of our inventions.
"What is change? What changes? How
does change take place?"
The goal of therapy is simply
to provide, through conversation, a
context wherein the actors in a
problem determined system no longer
distinguish what they are thinking
and talking about as a problem.
What is changed is the language sys-
tem shared by the actors in the
problem determined system. I t is
within this particular language sys-
tem that a problem had previously
been distinguished.
Change exists when what we
observe no longer matches our pre-
vious descriptions. That is why
therapists often observe changes
within therapeutic systems, and the
clients do not. It is not change in
social structure, or change in
observations and descriptions that
we are after. The challenge for the
therapist is to produce a context in
which change can develop. This
requires that we engage in a dis-
course in which the concerned mem-
bership of a problem determined
system can think and talk of their
shared problems differently.
Through this process, change in
therapy becomes a disintegration of
the languaged system which is.defin-
ed by the communicated problem. The
problem determined system will no
longer exist, if its cognitive
linguistic base changes.
11
CONCLUSION
For most of us, this set of
ideas, problem determined systems,
does not represent familiar terri-
tory. It is not an easy task to
relinquish many of the social and
psychological explanatory concepts
which organize our work. The prop-
osition that problems exist only in
language and communication forces us
to question the issue of a psycho-
therapeutic theory and practice pre-
dicated on concepts of social role
and social structure. In this paper
we substitute a definition of treat-
ment systems that is not bounded by
such concepts.
Freud ( 1953), was once asked
how he would describe a mentally
heal thy person. And much to the
inquirer's surprise, Freud simply
answered, "Ueben und Arbeiten"
"to love and to work." But we think
that Freud left out one very impor-
tant thing, and this is "Sprechen,"
to talk about them. It is not our
loving and working that creates
problems, but how we talk about
them, how we discoursively interact
and communicate with each other.
Watz1awick (1976), in a similar
vein, defined communication as
"creating a shared second order
real i ty. " It is through language,
through communication, through
"sprechen," that we are able to love
and to work, and to do therapy. It
is in language that we co-create,
maintain and al ter patterns of
social coordination. This does not
mean, as Parsons implies, that we
share a social reality but that we
coordinate with each other. This
coordination can be in harmony or in
problems. They are both coordina-
tion. If we take this epistemologi-
cal leap, then psychotherapy can
truly become the "talking" cure.
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 13

NOTES regard to the use of electro-

1. Parts of this paper and the convulsive therapy) have all
introduction of the concept of applied political pressure to
problem-determined systems were change or eliminate the use of
presented in Anderson, H., Gool- diagnostic labels. The issue
ishian, H., Pulliam, G. and is, do such diagnostic labels
Winderman, L. (1986). The Gal- possess an ontological status
veston Family Institute: A per- independent of the observers
sonal and historical perspec- making the observation, or the
tive," in D. Efron (Ed.), Jour- criteria of observation?
neys: The expansion of th-e---- Obviously those to wham the
strategic and systemic thera- labels are affixed think not.
pies. New York: Bruner Mazel.
2. For further discussion of these
ideas and their application to
therapy please see: Briggs and
Peat (1984), Dell (1985), Dell
and Goolishian (1981), Hoffman
(1986), Keeney (1983), Maturana
(1978), Maturana and Varela
(1980), and Schwartzman (1984).
3. Keeney (1983) cautions against
polarizing the concepts of nega-
tive and positive feedback
(stability and change) rather
than as orders of recursion.
4. When we talk of problem deter-
mined systems we do not mean to
imply that there is consensus
around a problem definition, but
merely that there is a problem.
5. In our own work we seldom use
the terms therapy or family
therapy. Instead, we speak of
consulting with people about
their problems, meeting with
people to talk about their con-
cerns. We do not invite people
in for therapy or family ther-
apy., For our efforts, we feel
that consultation is a language
that can lead us more to a col-
laborative rather than hierarch-
ical effort.
6. Interestingly, the idea of self
diagnosis, or more appropriate-
ly, validating the experience of
the individuals with the prob-
lem, is an important phenomena
in the political sphere of men-
tal health issues. Significant-
ly large groups have taken the
mental health field to task for
applying diagnostic terms to
them. Terms which invalidate
ttwiir experience. Women, homo-
sexuals, ethnic minorities,
alcoholiCS, former psychiatric
patients (particularly with