GENERAL PRINCIPLES: Articles 1-6 of the Labor Code effect.
effect. That would be to ignore the well-settled principle that police
A. Social justice
- giving more to those who have less in life.
B. Social legislations and Labor legislation
- created to provide and uphold social justice.
- primarily developed to address sickness, injury or death of
employees.
- a way to relieve the employer of liabilities.
- consists of 2 parts: labor standards and labor relations.
C. Legal Basis
Art. II, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The State affirms labor
as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare.
Art. XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and
to expansion and growth.
Art. 1700 of the Civil Code. The relations between capital and labor
are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts  must yield to the common good. Therefore, such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Basic policy on labor
Art. 3. of the Labor Code Declaration of basic policy. The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. vs. Ople, G.R. No. L-49678 June
29, 1979
Facts:
Victoriano Velasquez was entitled to retirement benefits. However, he
was entitled to P675.00 for two years, computed at one-half month for
every year of service, from November 1, 1974 when the present Labor
Code became effective, instead of May, 1953 when he started working
for petitioner Company. Accordingly, private respondent Velasquez
filed a complaint with the Department of Labor against it for non-
payment.
Issue: Whether Velasquez should be given retirement benefits only
from the time that the present Labor Code came into force.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's insistence that the retirement benefits should date only
from the time that the present Labor Code came into force could be
based on the assumption that it should not be given a retroactive
power legislation intended to promote public welfare applies to existing
contracts. Nor is it accurate to assert that the right to retirement
benefits started from the enactment of the present Labor Code. That
would be to ignore the social justice and protection to labor provisions
of the 1935 Constitution.
From the standpoint of equity, it suffices to note the great disparity
between the offer by petitioner of P675.00 and the sum computed in
the amount of P7,762.50 as determined by the labor arbiter, the
National Labor Relations Commission, and respondent Minister of
Labor. The niggardly sum offered, considering the present high cost of
riving, might not even be enough for one month's subsistence. Here,
there is no question as to his rendering on that at the very least was
considered satisfactory from May, 1953. If it were otherwise, then he
would not have lasted that long. For petitioner, then, to be adamant in
its untenable stand is to show scant respect for the social justice
principle and the mandate of protection to labor.
PASEI v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner (PASEI), engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, for overseas placement, challenged the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), in the character of “GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT
OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,” It said
that:
1. The D.O. is discriminatory against males or females; 
2. That it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;
3. That it is violative of the right to travel. 
Further, it contended that It was an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, in a sense that the police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI
invokes Article XIII Section 3, of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Further, they
argued that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of
prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Charter’s non-impairment clause, that it would cause “great and
irreparable injury” that PASEI members would face should the Order
be further enforced.
Issue: Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause and Discriminatory against Sexes.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that equality before the law under the Constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; they are germane to the purposes of the law; they are not
confined to existing conditions; and they apply equally to all members
of the same class. 
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s
efforts. The State through the labor secretary exercise the police power
which is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the law of overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
 Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes, G.R. No.
163607, July 14, 2008
Facts:
Due to personal problems, Prudencio’s performance as sales manager
of Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. waned and his
absences became more frequent. The Employee Adjudication
Committee unanimously agreed to relieve Prudencio for three (3)
months to settle his problems, after which Prudencio may either return
to work but with another position, or retire and receive his separation
pay. Instead of availing either option in the report, Prudencio requested
that he be transferred from Tacloban City to Cebu City, to which
Bandag agreed. However, Prudencio’s attendance and punctuality
were still poor. The company eventually dismissed Prudencio for gross
and habitual neglect of duty under Art. 282 of the Labor Code.
Prudencio claims that assuming that he was legally separated from his
employment, he is still entitled to separation pay.
Issue: Whether an employee validly dismissed due to his own fault is
entitled to separation pay.
Ruling: No. When an employee is lawfully dismissed, separation pay
may only be awarded if the cause of dismissal was not due to the
employee’s fault, but due to: (1) the installation of labor saving devices,
(2) redundancy, (3) retrenchment, (4) cessation of employer’s
business, or (5) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health
and to the health of his co-employees (Art. 283 & 284, Labor Code). It
may also be awarded in case of strained relations. When the case falls
under Art. 282, like gross and habitual neglect of duty, separation
pay should not be paid to the employee.
Although there are cases when social justice may warrant the award of
separation pay or financial assistance, the labor adjudicatory officials
and the CA must be most judicious and circumspect lest the
constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor be at the expense
of the employers. In addition, while the company did make an offer of
separation pay upon adopting the original recommendation of the
Committee, the same offer was superseded when Bandag agreed to
Prudencio’s proposal to transfer to Cebu City.
Marcopper Mining Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 103525 March
29, 1996
Facts:
On August 23, 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in
the business of mineral prospecting, exploration and extraction, and
private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor federation duly organized
and registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank-and-file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into
a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from May 1, 1984
until April 30, 1987. Prior to the expiration of the Agreement, on 25 July
1986, petitioner and private respondent executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of the CBA, specifically on
matters of wage increase and facilities allowance, were modified.
In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the
initial 5% wage increase due on May 1, 1986.On June 1, 1987,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the
integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Orders Nos. 1,
2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to
May 1, 1987. Consequently, effective on May 1, 1987, the basic wage
rate of petitioner's laborers categorized as non-agricultural workers
was increased by P9.00 per day. Petitioner implemented the second
five percent (5%) wage increase due on May 1, 1987 and thereafter
added the integrated COLA. Private respondent assailed the manner in
which the second wage increase was effected.  It argued that the
COLA should first be integrated into the basic wage before the 5%
wage increase is computed.
Consequently, on December 15, 1988, the union filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV,
Quezon City. On July 24, 1989, the Labor Arbiter promulgated a
decision in favor of the union. Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's
decision and on November 18, 1991 the NLRC rendered its decision
sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling. It is petitioner's contention that the
basic wage referred to in the CBA pertains to the "unintegrated" basic
wage.  their dismissal from employment. Petitioners also averred that
Siding with the petitioner, the Solicitor General opines that for the
purpose of complying with the obligations imposed by the CBA, the
integrated COLA should not be considered due to the exclusivity of the
benefits under the said CBA and E.O. No. 178. Private respondent
counters by asserting that the purpose, nature and essence of CBA
negotiation is to obtain wage increases and benefits over and above
what the law provides and that the principle of non-diminution of
benefits should prevail.
Issue: Whether the basis for the computation of the CBA increase is
the basic wage without the COLA.
Ruling:
No. The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting
parties stands strong and true. However, the present controversy
involves not merely an interpretation of CBA provisions.  More
importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of an executive
order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. It is unnecessary to
delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they allegedly
meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were
executed because there is no question that as of May 1, 1987, as
mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage of workers, or the statutory
minimum wage, was increased with the integration of the COLA.  As of
said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the COLA.  This is what
the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the
parties must conform.Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in
the light of the fact that compliance with the law is mandatory and
beyond contractual stipulation by and between the parties;
consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to
include the COLA becomes immaterial. 
There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the law is
clear and unambiguous.  Unfortunately for petitioner, said law, by some
uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the
CBA increase became effective. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt
that the computation of the CBA increase on the basis of the
"integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA. What
E.O. No. 178 did was exactly to integrate the COLA under Wage
Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic pay so as to increase the
statutory daily minimum wage. Integration of monetary benefits into the
basic pay of workers is not a new method of increasing the minimum
wage. The purpose of E.O. No. 178 is to improve the lot of the workers
covered by the said statute. We are bound to ensure its fruition.
While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between
the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied
the principles of law governing ordinary contracts.  A CBA, as a labor
contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital,
is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest,
thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed
liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place
a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration
to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended
to serve.
JR Hauling Services v. Solamo, G.R. No. 214294, September 30,
2020
Facts:
Respondents, drivers/helpers of JR Hauling, were required to make
two trips per day, however, that considering that the broiler farms are
located in remote and distant areas, they could only accomplish, on the
average, one trip per day. They further alleged that from the time they
were engaged by JR Hauling, they were not paid their respective 13th
month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and
SIL. Respondents claimed that they were illegally dismissed. The
petitioners refuted respondents’ claims.
It alleged that respondents incurred shortages in their deliveries of
broilers, supported of a copy of a summary of short broilers delivery
supposedly issued. And upon further investigation, they discovered
that respondents are involved in the sale of excess broilers and crates.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, petitioners insisted that
respondents' transgressions amounted to serious misconduct, and
constituted fraud or willful breach of trust and confidence which justified
respondents were field employees and/or workers who are paid by the
results, and therefore, were not entitled to their monetary claims for
underpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day, and SIL.
Issue: Whether the respondent are illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
No. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal of
employees covers employees occupying a position of trust who are
proven to have breached the trust and confidence reposed on them. In
addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of
employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned
holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the
employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to
delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the
property and assets of the employer.
The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an
employee is penalized. In this regard, it is not the job title but the
nature of the work that the employee is duty-bound to perform which is
material in determining whether he holds a position where greater trust
is placed by the employer and from whom greater fidelity to duty is
concomitantly expected. Petitioners, as drivers/helpers, were entrusted
with the custody, delivery and transportation of the broilers and broiler
crates, including their proper handling and protection, in accordance
with the directives of JR Hauling and instructions of its clients.
To stress, respondents are performing the core business of JR
Hauling. Thus, even on the premise that respondents were not
occupying managerial or supervisory positions, they were,
undoubtedly, holding positions of responsibility. As to respondents'
transgressions i.e., the unauthorized sale of broilers and broiler crates,
the same are clearly work related as they would not have been able to
perpetrate the same were it not for their positions as drivers/helpers of
JR Hauling. In fine, the Court hold that there is just cause for
respondents' dismissal from the service.
Liban v. Gordon, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court
what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board
of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the
Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “no senator may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, (G.R. No. 129049),
decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in
supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Issue: Whether the office of PNRC Chairman is a government office or
an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the Constitution. 
Ruling:
No. The PNRC is not a GOCC, but a sui generis entity that has no
legal equivalent under any of our statutes. Consequently, Senator
Gordon did not forfeit his Senate seat under the constitutional
prohibition. In view of the PNRC’s sui generis character, the Court
need not even dwell on the issue of whether or not the PNRC Charter
was validly enacted. Congress is proscribed only from creating private
corporations which, as demonstrated, the PNRC is not. The sui generis
character of the PNRC does not necessarily overturn the rulings of the
Court in Camporedondo and Baluyot. The PNRC’s exceptional nature
admits of the conclusions reached in those cases that the PNRC is a
GOCC for the purpose of enforcement of labor laws and penal
statutes. The PNRC’s sui generis character compels us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis, bearing in
mind its distinct nature, purposes and special functions. Rules that
govern traditional private or public entities may thus be adjusted in
relation to the PNRC and in accordance with the circumstances of
each case.
Postigo v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., G.R. No. 155146,
January 24, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the
respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI). They retired
on various dates from 1996 to 1998. Upon retirement from service,
some of the petitioners who were compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) obtained retirement
benefits from the GSIS.
At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had
been amended by Republic Act No. 7641. Rep. Act No. 7641
granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector, in
the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. As
the respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside
from its contribution to the GSIS, petitioners claimed from the
respondent their retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641. The
respondent denied their claims on the ground that the accommodation
extended by the GSIS to the petitioners removed them from the
coverage of the law.
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 7641.
Ruling:
Yes. Extant on the records is the respondent’s admission that although
its employees are compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees
are not governed by the Civil Service Law. If the respondent is truly a
government-owned or controlled corporation, and petitioners are
employees in the public sector, then, they should have been covered
by said law. The truth, however, is that, the respondent is a non-profit
but private corporation organized under the Corporation Code, and the
petitioners are covered by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service
Law. From the foregoing, it is clear to us that the petitioners are
employees in the private sector, hence entitled to the benefits of Rep.
Act No. 7641. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory
inclusion in the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public
sector, they are still entitled to the benefits of Rep. Act No. 7641 since
they are not covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations. This
much is certain upon reading the implementing rules of Title II, Book VI
of the Labor Code as afore-cited as well as the Labor Advisory on
Retirement Pay Law.
RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all employees in
the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status
and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid. They
shall include part-time employees, employees of service and other job
contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of
another. The law does not cover employees of retail, service and
agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than (10)
employees or workers and employees of the National Government and
its political subdivisions, including Government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law
and its regulations.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80767, April 22,
1991
Facts:
A complaint for illegal transfer was filed by Private Respondents
Fortunato Esguerra, Roberto Malaborbor, Estanislao Misa, Vicente
Evangelista, and Marcelino Garcia before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment against the Petitioner Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
which was subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practices. The Labor Arbiter (LA) proceeded to hear the
complaint, and rendered an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. Nevertheless, it was revered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Hence, the present Petition whereby the
Supreme Court noted that the Petitioner alleged before the LA that it is
a civic service, non-stock, and non-profit organization, existing under
Commonwealth Act NO. 111, amended by Presidential Decree No.
460. A similar allegation was contained in the appeal before the NLRC,
as well as in the comments of the Office of the Solicitor-General and
the Officer of the Government Corporate Counsel. Thus, it claimed that
the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint of
the Private Respondents.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that an agency of the government
refers to any of the various units of the Government including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or
controlled corporation, or local government or district unit therein.
Further, the Administrative Code defined an instrumentality as any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a
charter.

In the present case, the Court held that the Petitioner is regarded as a
government instrumentality under the Administrative Code. First, the
Petitioner’s function is set out in its statutory charter relating to
fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism, and the general
improvement of moral spirit and fiber of the youth. Second, the
Petitioner’s National Executive Board includes six (6) Secretaries of the
Executive Department, with the President of the Philippines as its Chief
Scout, which shows the government has substantial participation in its
activities. Since it is considered as a government instrumentality, it
follows that its employees are embraced and governed by the Civil
Service Law. Thus, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the complaint.
Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are SET ASIDE.

Jalandoni, Jr. v. Arsenal, G.R. No. L-37451, July 30, 1990

Facts:
On July 9, 1973, Arsenal, a worker in Jalandoni’s Hacienda, filed a
claim for overtime pay against the latter in the NLRC of Bacolod City.
Petitioner Jalandoni filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as
money claims arising from agrarian relations were then within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, now the RTC. Aguirre,
legal officer of the NLRC, denied the motion. Hence, this petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether the NLRC have jurisdiction on money claims involving

agricultural workers.

Ruling:
At the time of its filing in 1973, the complaint was cognizable by the
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), not the NLRC, because the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844), which was in effect at
that time, gave the CAR original and exclusive jurisdiction on, among
others, money claims arising from agrarian relations. The hacienda is
agricultural land, and the nature of Arsenal’s work, which includes
cutting sugarcanes, removing weeds, applying fertilizers, etc, qualifies
him as an agricultural worker or farm laborer under RA 3844.

However, the case has been overtaken by events. On November 1,

1974, PD No. 442 was issued, instituting a Labor Code. It transferred
to the BLR the power of the CAR to hear and decide cases in relation
to agricultural workers. Subsequent amendments to the Code have
since been made, and Art. 217 of the Code, as amended by RA
6715 and RA 6725, now gives the Labor Arbiter the original jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural, for claims arising from Employer-Employee relations
involving an amount exceeding 5,000, whether accompanied with a
claim for reinstatement. The case, which was improperly filed in the
NLRC in 1973, is now properly lodged therein, and cannot be given
back to the courts which have already lost jurisdiction to hear and
decide it. The petition for certiorari was dismissed and assigned to the
Labor Arbiter of the NLRC-Bacolod for proper determination.