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Contents
Afghanistan
 Uneasy Peace ................................................................................................................................. 8
 Earthquake Exposes Afghanistan’s Political Fault Lines ........................................................ 9
 Afghanistan’s Warlords Prepare Their Comeback ................................................................ 11
 Wars in Afghanistan and Ukraine ............................................................................................ 14

Book Reviews
 Making A Muslim ....................................................................................................................... 17
 Islamic Financial Principles ....................................................................................................... 19
 The Liar’s Truth in the Age of Misinformation ...................................................................... 21

Budget & Economic Survey

 Corrective Budget 2023 .............................................................................................................. 24
 Myth of Numbers ........................................................................................................................ 26

Climate Change
 Climate Change and Sports ....................................................................................................... 28
 How to Deal with Heatwaves ................................................................................................... 29
 Climate Crisis and Water Diplomacy ...................................................................................... 31
 Climate Change and Space Technology .................................................................................. 33

Covid-19
 Preparing for Future Pandemics ............................................................................................... 35
 Year Three of the Pandemic is Underway: Now What? ........................................................ 35
 Post-Covid-19 Situation ............................................................................................................. 37
 Economic Impacts of Covid-19 ................................................................................................. 39

CPEC and OBOR

 The SEZs are a Game-changer................................................................................................... 43
 The Meaning of China's Belt and Road Initiative ................................................................... 44
 Strengthening CPEC ................................................................................................................... 46
 Rebuilding CPEC’s Progress ..................................................................................................... 47
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Domestic Politics
 Charter of Economy .................................................................................................................... 50
 The Importance of Being Neutral ............................................................................................ 51
 A Polarised Society ..................................................................................................................... 59

Economy
 The Rise of Islamic Banking....................................................................................................... 62
 How to Prevent Inflation ........................................................................................................... 66
 Bad Macroeconomics .................................................................................................................. 68
 An ‘Overheated’ Economy ........................................................................................................ 70
 Digital Economy & Taxation Essential for Broadening Tax Base ........................................ 72
 Anatomy of Inflation .................................................................................................................. 74

Education
 The New Pandemic: Education................................................................................................. 78
 Revisiting the Benefits of Higher Education in Pakistan ...................................................... 78
 Higher Education ........................................................................................................................ 80
 Abandoning Higher Education ................................................................................................. 81

Energy Crisis
 The New Energy Order .............................................................................................................. 84
 The Winners and Losers of the New Energy World Order ................................................. 92
 How We Got Here ...................................................................................................................... 94
 Circular Debt ............................................................................................................................... 96
 A Policy Framework for LNG sector........................................................................................ 97
 Back to Dark Ages ....................................................................................................................... 99

Essays
 An Epochal Decline in American Global Power .................................................................. 102
 Roadmap to Economic Recovery ............................................................................................ 106
 Geopolitics and the Ukraine War in a World on Fire .......................................................... 114

Foreign Policy and Relations

 Foreign Policy Priorities ........................................................................................................... 119
 Why Aren’t We Buying Russian Oil? ..................................................................................... 120
 Trade with Russia ..................................................................................................................... 123
 Time for a New Beginning? ..................................................................................................... 125
 Future of Pak-India Relations.................................................................................................. 127
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 China’s Affection for Pakistan Has Limitations Too ........................................................... 128

 Pak-China Relations ................................................................................................................ 130
 A Friendly Visit to Turkey ....................................................................................................... 132
 Trade with Iran .......................................................................................................................... 133

Globalization
 Globalization Is Alive, Well, and Changing.......................................................................... 136
 Welcome to the New Age of Insecurity ................................................................................. 143
 Our New Era of Deglobalization, Depression, and War ..................................................... 145

Governance
 Rethinking Local Governments .............................................................................................. 148
 Why Local Governments?........................................................................................................ 149
 Industry 4.0 in Pakistan............................................................................................................ 151

History
 Remembering Six Days of War ............................................................................................... 155
 Distorting and Erasing Pak-India History ............................................................................ 158
 Bhutto on Foreign Policy.......................................................................................................... 160

International Issues
 Rethinking the Global Order ................................................................................................... 160
 A New International Order ..................................................................................................... 161
 Be Clear-eyed about Great Power Behaviour ....................................................................... 162
 Another Genocide ..................................................................................................................... 164
 Save the Planet, Behead the Military Budget ........................................................................ 165
 Global Efforts to Solve Refugee Crisis ................................................................................... 165
 Shift in Stance ............................................................................................................................ 166
 Game of Politics......................................................................................................................... 168
 China in the South Pacific ........................................................................................................ 169
 Analysing U.S.-China Relations with Regards to Taiwan .................................................. 171
 Western Disunity over China .................................................................................................. 172
 The G7 Infrastructure Plan ..................................................................................................... 174
 Reflecting on Hong Kong’s Handover ................................................................................... 176
 US Policy in the South China Sea .......................................................................................... 178
 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity ................................................... 186
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International Law
 Israel, Counter-Terrorism and International Law ................................................................ 189
 When International Legal Obligations Are Contradictory ................................................. 193
 Convention on the Laws of the Sea and the South China Sea Disputes ........................... 196

International Relations
 Celebrity Diplomacy ................................................................................................................ 205
 The False Promise of Democratic Peace................................................................................. 206
 Evaluation of Realism and Liberalism in the Context of Global Politics .......................... 208

Interviews
 Imran Khan ............................................................................................................................... 229
 Dr Sandeep Pandey .................................................................................................................. 233

Kashmir
 The Cauldron of Oppression ................................................................................................... 237
 Jammu & Kashmir under Siege .............................................................................................. 238
 Oppression is Kashmir Leads to Breaching of Peace ........................................................... 240
 Modi Fails to Change Kashmir’s Demography .................................................................... 243

Law
 Role of the Judiciary ................................................................................................................. 246
 Amendment to NAB law ......................................................................................................... 247
 A Constitutional Court ............................................................................................................. 249

Middle East
 Palestine’s Resistance Model ................................................................................................... 251
 America’s New Realism in the Middle East.......................................................................... 253
 How Iran Transformed Today’s Middle East ....................................................................... 255
 Annexation Strategy ................................................................................................................. 260

National
 Making Pakistan An Economic Hub ...................................................................................... 262
 The Strategic Compulsion and Economic Meltdown of Pakistan...................................... 263
 To Become a Knowledge-Economy ........................................................................................ 266
 Special Technology Zones ....................................................................................................... 267
 Untapped Mineral Assets ........................................................................................................ 269
 Attracting Foreign Investment ................................................................................................ 271
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 Digitization of Pakistan ............................................................................................................ 273

 Will to Reform PECA................................................................................................................ 275
 Super Tax.................................................................................................................................... 276
 Five Things to Watch in the Islamabad-Pakistani Taliban Talks ....................................... 278
 Commitment to Implement NAP .......................................................................................... 282
 Pakistan’s Escape from FATF Grey List ................................................................................ 283

Nuclear Issues
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence ....................................................................... 287
 AUKUS Submarines ................................................................................................................. 288
 Stigmatise Nuclear Weapons! ................................................................................................. 290

Organizations
 How NATO Will Change ........................................................................................................ 292
 War in Ukraine and New NATO Members .......................................................................... 293
 I2U2 ........................................................................................................................................... 295
 Reflections on G7 Leaders’ Summit 2022 .............................................................................. 296
 The Second-Coming of the BRICS .......................................................................................... 299

Religion
 Islam and the Nature ................................................................................................................ 302
 Introduction to Hajj .................................................................................................................. 303
 Islam – The Religion of Human Dignity and Honor ........................................................... 304

Reports
 Global Economic Prospects ..................................................................................................... 307
 The Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine .......................................................................... 309
 UN Report on the Occupied Palestinian Territory............................................................... 311

Science
 Why We Should Reject ‘Metaverse’ ....................................................................................... 314
 Why can't the ISS Operate Forever? ....................................................................................... 316
 The Fundamental Forces .......................................................................................................... 317
 Cells and Their Parts................................................................................................................. 319

Sustainable Development Goals

 Sports and Sustainable Development Goals ......................................................................... 321
 Sports and SDG 3 ...................................................................................................................... 323
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South Asia
 Is South Asia Moving Towards Contactless Wars? ............................................................. 325
 Sri Lanka’s Great Crisis and the Failed Regime Change .................................................... 326
 Sino-Indian Border Dispute ..................................................................................................... 328
 Islamophobia in India............................................................................................................... 337
 The Making of Hindu India ..................................................................................................... 339

Ukraine Crisis
 A War of Imperialism ............................................................................................................... 343
 How Ukraine Will Win ............................................................................................................ 344
 New Concepts but Old Problems ........................................................................................... 349
 Does a Protracted Conflict Favour Russia or Ukraine? ....................................................... 352
 Russia-Ukraine War: Implications for Asian Geoeconomics .............................................. 356

Water
 Ensuring Water Security .......................................................................................................... 359
 Pakistan’s Aggravating Water Crisis ..................................................................................... 360

Women
 Gender-Responsive Budgeting To Reduce Gender Disparities ......................................... 363
 Gender Parity............................................................................................................................. 365
 Economic Empowerment of Women .................................................................................... 366
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Afghanistan
UNEASY PEACE
Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry (Former foreign secretary and DG, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad)
IT has been 10 months since America`s exit from Afghanistan last August. The world now
engages with the Afghan Taliban as the country`s de facto government. But there`s no move to
recognise the Taliban as Afghanistan`s legitimate, de jure rulers.
Taliban supporters argue that if the world can recognise governments run by dictators or
kings, then why not the Taliban dispensation? Given the manner in which the Taliban ran their
government in the late 1990s, the world first wants to see if they can make progress on three critical
elements: forming an inclusive government; respecting women rights, especially girls` education;
and ensuring that Afghan soil is not used by terrorist entities.
There is also a legal issue. The UN Security Council Resolution 1267 had imposed sanctions on
several Taliban leaders. Until the Taliban leadership is delisted from the sanctions` regime, the
world might be reluctant to extend formal recognition to the Taliban government. This poses a
dilemma. If the Taliban government is ostracised, and it fails or becomes weak, terrorist forces will
regain ground in Afghanistan. On the other hand, if they are incentivised, they would be in a better
position to counter terrorist groups.
However, public opinion in the US and some other countries opposes the Taliban and their
philosophy, and is not likely to allow these governments to extend help to the Taliban.
The most disturbing corollary of this dilemma is the worsening humanitarian situation
compounded by the recent earthquake and likely economic collapse. Prices are rising. Banks do not
have money.
Joblessness is rampant. Food and medicine supplies are urgently needed. The Taliban
government does not have money to pay civil servants or soldiers. Violence against ethnic and
religious minorities has increased. To avert a humanitarian disaster and ensure stability,
allstakeholders-the Talibangovernment, regional countries, and the international community have a
role to play.
First, it falls upon the Taliban to make visible progress towards forming an inclusive
government. Some anti-Taliban Afghan groups have launched a national resistance movement. It
would be in the Taliban`s own interest to carry along other ethnic groups so that the country doesn`t
descend again into civil war. The Taliban`s approach to women`s rights is also quite disconcerting
for the international community. Addressing the UN Human Rights Council earlier this month, the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Afghanistan was witnessing the
`institutionalised systematic oppression of women`. The Taliban must review the stringent
restrictions imposed on women`s participation in public and political life.Meanwhile, several
terrorist entities are reasserting their footprint in the country.
The militant Islamic State`s Khorasan chapter has recently carried out violent terrorist attacks
in public places in Kabul and other cities. It poses a danger to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan.
The IS-K`s growing profile has also raised question marks over the Taliban`s ability to ensure that
Afghan soil is not used to launch terrorist attacks abroad.
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Under the Taliban`s watch, the Tehreek-iTaliban Pakistan is entrenched in eastern

Afghanistan and is using the Taliban`s good offices to negotiate with Pakistan. Some of the demands
they have reportedly put forth, such as annulling the merger of the tribal areas with KP, are simply
not acceptable to the people of Pakistan, who have not forgotten how mercilessly the TTP have shed
the blood of their country`s innocent citizens, including schoolchildren.
The second set of stakeholders of peace in Afghanistan include the latter`s neighboursand
near neighbours, who are coordinating closely with each other, especially with regard to
humanitarian assistance.
However, this aid is not enough. The Taliban regime needs technical and financial sup-port to
run the country, for which the region will need to play its part.
The third major stakeholder is the US (and Europe) that needs to review its present coercive
economic approach, which could plunge the country back into civil war, allowing terrorist
organisations looking for safe havens to have a field day.
Pakistan`s principal concern should remain the well-being of ordinary Afghans, who deserve
peace and stability after four decades of war. Apart from humanitarian assistance, Pakistan must
also provide economic opportunities to the Afghans, and facilitate Afghanistan to become a transit
hub between Central and South Asia.
Pakistan should also exhort the world to not abandon the Afghans. Abandoning Afghanistan
could lead to a mass exodus of Afghans towards neighbouring countries, and create a security
vacuum that in the past was filled by terrorist groups. This will adversely affect not just Pakistan
and its neighbours but the entire world as well
(Source: Dawn)

EARTHQUAKE EXPOSES AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL FAULT LINES

Fazelminallah Qazizai (Afghanistan correspondent at New Lines)
In the hours before an earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan last week, a light rain fell over
Kabul and there was thunder in the air. My 4-year-old daughter had just drifted off to sleep after I
managed to convince her that the storm was nothing to be scared of when my phone rang. It was
1:46 a.m. On the other end of the line I could hear panic in my sister’s voice. She lived nearby and
told me that a few minutes earlier she had felt the earth violently shake. While I had been too
exhausted to notice, she was clearly upset. She told me the tremors had been far worse than the ones
that often hit Kabul and thanked God that we were all OK. I thought nothing more of it until I woke
again later that morning and checked my phone.
I first heard about the scale of the devastation via WhatsApp, a mode of communication as
popular with Afghans as it seems to be with just about everyone else in the world. As the morning
unfolded, I had messages and calls from inside and outside the country, speculating on the death
toll and bemoaning the tragic fate of our nation. War, pestilence, drought and starvation have hit all
of us hard in recent years; now people in one of the poorest corners of the country had suffered our
worst earthquake in decades. Inevitably, a vocal minority of Afghans on social media were soon
using the tragedy to make ill-judged and insensitive political points.
The epicenter of the 5.9-magnitude earthquake was in southeast Afghanistan, about 25 miles
from the city of Khost. At least 1,000 people were killed in the surrounding region and some 2,000
injured, though we are unlikely ever to know the true numbers. While the international community
struggled to organize a coordinated relief effort thanks to the sanctions regime imposed upon the
Taliban government, many ordinary Afghans were quick to try to help with donations of food,
clothing, money and blood.
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As a journalist, my work often feels like an inadequate answer to acts of both human cruelty
and human kindness. But last Friday I decided I could stay in Kabul no longer and began the
journey toward the most-affected areas. As well as interviewing survivors so I could share their
plight with the world, I wanted to get a closer look at the Taliban’s reaction to the earthquake — one
of the first major crises they had faced since retaking power.
In years gone by the road southeast from Kabul passed through insurgent territory, into the
provinces of Logar and Paktia, and eventually Khost and Paktika. The Afghan police and army were
regularly ambushed along the route, which was in an area of the country dominated by what the
U.S. likes to call the Haqqani Network — a particularly formidable wing of the Taliban. The road is
safe these days and I felt a flicker of optimism as I drove, despite the terrible news I was going to
report on. That optimism was due to the resilience and compassion of the people I saw along the
way. Trucks and trailers loaded down with aid supplies were heading in the same direction as I was.
At regular intervals on the side of the road, youths were waving banners in support of the quake
victims and using megaphones to appeal for donations.
Driving through the Tera Pass, surrounded by mountains and hills, I was reminded of the
natural beauty of Landi-Kotal in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on the Pakistan side of the border. After
three hours, I reached Gardez, the capital of Paktia, and drove through the local bazaar before
heading onto another main road toward Khost. A few minutes later I pulled up to my destination: a
military base that was formerly home to the U.S.-backed Afghan Army’s 203 Thunder Corps and is
now home to the Taliban’s 203 Mansouri Corps, named in honor of the former Taliban leader
Mullah Akthar Mohammad Mansour, who was killed by a drone strike in May 2016.
As one who spent years writing about the Taliban’s insurgency and who has co-authored a
book that delves into the history of modern Islamic militancy in Afghanistan, it seems to me that the
transition from war to peace is fraught with unexpected challenges for men who have devoted their
lives to waging armed jihad. We have already seen the consequences of that in Kabul, where Taliban
officials have struggled to kick-start the economy and keep the civil service running smoothly while
still finding the time to clamp down on basic women’s rights. The death and destruction caused by
the earthquake has presented them with another kind of test. Even the most powerful governments
can fail their citizens in the aftermath of natural disasters, as the U.S. showed in 2005 in response to
Hurricane Katrina. The Taliban, however, have little room for error. Already treated as pariahs by
the west and mistrusted by many Afghans, they must prove they can build the country as effectively
as they waged war. The earthquake has underlined just how difficult that will be.
Inside the Mansouri Corps, I met Haji Mohammed Ayob Khalid to talk about some of these
issues. An old friend of both Mullah Mansour and the Taliban’s founding leader, Mullah
Mohammed Omar Mujahid, he greeted me warmly and showed me around. Khalid was born in the
mid-1960s in the Maiwand district of Kandahar, which means that most of his adult life has been
spent in war. He talked me through the physical effect this has had on him. His left hand was
wounded by a Russian mortar during the Soviet occupation and his right hand was badly injured
fighting the Afghan mujahedeen faction Jamiat-e-Islami in Herat in the 1990s. He also has a scar near
his right eye, where bullet shot by a Canadian gunner in Panjwayi, Kandahar, badly grazed him in
2006. A tall, thin man who wore a white turban and carried a Glock 17 pistol as we talked, Khalid
described his injuries matter-of-factly, not with self-pity or arrogance.
Khalid has established a madrassa at the corps and teaches three subjects in the school
himself. He was there on the night of the earthquake, jolted to his feet by the force of the first
tremors. After checking over his radio that there was no serious damage on the base, he began to try
to mobilize some sort of relief effort. His deputy flew out to one of the worst-hit areas in a helicopter
and returned with 15 seriously injured people. Then Khalid flew out to take a look himself. By
around 8:30 a.m. he knew he simply didn’t have the resources on the base to cope with the enormity
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of the tragedy. He put in a request for more helicopters from other corps and ordered the regional
division to begin transferring the less-serious casualties to local hospitals. That first day, Khalid said
there were 26 flights to and from the worst-hit areas. He acknowledged the scale of the disaster but
told me the Taliban knew how to cope because they had tried to help people during the insurgency,
“when they were bombed or attacked with heavy weapons” by US and Afghan government forces.
As a result, he said, there was no need for the international community to help with disaster relief.
He also said the West should not try to use any offer of aid as a way to pressure the Taliban on
human rights. I believe many senior Talibs feel the same way.
I have chosen to focus on Khalid in this letter not because I think his reaction to the earthquake
is more important than the suffering of the victims. Clearly, it is not. But I do think it illustrates an
important point about the Taliban government and the problems now facing Afghanistan. After 20
years of war between the Taliban and the U.S. and more than two decades of conflict and political
unrest before that, there is an understandable lack of trust on all sides. It is too soon to expect anything
less. At some stage, however, we must surely try to reconcile our differences.
Khalid told me that the Taliban responded quickly and effectively to the earthquake but said
no one outside Afghanistan would recognize those efforts. He insisted he wasn’t bothered by this
indifference. Making a Pashto joke to illustrate his point, he likened the Taliban’s relationship with
America to an unhappy marriage. Even when the Taliban were trying to help people, the U.S. would
not recognize those efforts because opinions were too deeply entrenched to change, he said.
At around 6 p.m. that same day I visited a 100-bed military hospital inside the base. Built by
the U.S., it was clean and well equipped but short of medicine and with an intermittent electricity
supply. There, I met Lemar Gul, a man in his 60s from the Barmal district of Paktika province. He
described to me how the earthquake had buried him under two floors of rubble. Terrified and
struggling to breathe, he could hear members of his family and his neighbors yelling desperately for
help. When he also tried to shout, he began to choke on dust and debris. After most of the other
villagers had been rescued and he was still trapped, he became convinced he would not survive. He
raised a finger, said the Shahada — the Islamic profession of faith — and began to cry. It was then,
he said, that he felt a light breeze wash over him and glimpsed some people walking through the
ruins. This time, they heard him when he shouted and made sure he was pulled free.
Fourteen members of Lemar Gul’s family died in the earthquake. After he was dragged from
the rubble, he did not want to leave his village without saying goodbye to the dead. Before one of
the Taliban’s helicopters arrived to take him to the hospital, he insisted on seeing their bodies.
Nothing was more important to him than showing them some last respect.
(Source: Newsline)

AFGHANISTAN’S WARLORDS PREPARE THEIR COMEBACK

Lynne O’Donnell (Australian journalist and author)
Exiled warlords, power brokers, and ethnic leaders who fled Afghanistan last year ahead of
the Taliban’s victory are threatening civil war unless the Islamists start negotiating to let them return
home and reclaim their power and authority as an alternative to the nihilistic rule of the terrorists
currently in charge.
The band that broke Afghanistan in the early 1990s and hobbled it for years after is, in other
words, getting back together. Unlike their first time around in power—right after the Soviet pullout
in 1989—this time the warlords might even seem appealing, so awful is the Taliban regime that took
over in August of last year.
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The back-to-the-future moment for the old guard came in May when 40 of the like-minded
converged in the Turkish capital, Ankara, to meet with Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and his
hangers-on. Dostum, like some of his fellow warlords, used the wealth accumulated during the 20
years of the U.S.-backed Afghan republic to build his own patronage network, the coin of the realm
in Afghanistan’s political landscape. At the time, Dostum and men like him supported the
reconstruction effort funded by the United States and allies and encouraged education for women,
including the dispatch of thousands of Afghan students abroad to study.
But the Ankara gathering had a bigger crowd. Among the group was Ahmad Wali Massoud,
uncle of Ahmad Massoud, the head of the National Resistance Front and one of the few personalities
of Afghan politics untainted by accusations of corruption or atrocities. His late father, Northern
Alliance general Ahmad Shah Massoud, is renowned for keeping the Taliban from taking full
control of the country before they were crushed in 2001.
In a statement, those in the group said they had formed a “High Council of National
Resistance” to demand that the Taliban negotiate their return to Afghanistan and include them in
government—or face the consequences. If the Taliban don’t talk, a spokesman for Dostum
threatened, “Afghanistan will experience civil war once again.”
Afghans know what that means. With an average age of 19 years, the vast majority of the
population of around 38 million knows only war. The warlords and their cohort are part of a
perpetual cycle that has blighted Afghanistan for more than 40 years. People are exhausted and
yearn for peace, but the depredations of the Taliban present a new phase of crisis. And now the
warlords are back in the mix.
Those in the new resistance front are hardly saviors. Dostum, for instance, was accused in
2016 of ordering the abduction, rape, and torture of an opponent. That was par for the course: In
2001, he allegedly rounded up captured Taliban gunmen and sealed them in shipping containers to
suffocate to death. When he was a deputy to former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—an alliance
built on his ability to deliver a million Uzbek votes—his gunmen regularly took over Kabul’s streets
in a show of force.
Among the others in Ankara: Atta Muhammad Noor, who had his own army while he ruled a
breadbasket province and, like Dostum, groomed his son as successor. Others present in Ankara
included Hazara leaders, former mujahideen, former members of the Afghan republic, and a few
other warlords. Women even took part, one advisor said, via Zoom.
Almost a year since the war ended following the withdrawal of U.S.-led military troops, the
return to the political fray of ethnic leaders with private armies adds fuel to a combustible landscape
and stokes fears that Afghanistan could again be engulfed in internecine battles for power, people,
and territory.
Afghanistan’s mosaic is now dangerously fractured. Across the north, armed groups are
fighting to dislodge the Taliban, giving the warlords and their allies confidence they’ll find popular
support for a comeback as pressure grows on Western governments to end Afghanistan’s isolation.
Amid looming starvation for millions and economic implosion worsened by U.S. financial
sanctions, the old guard has a number of factors on its side, not least the Taliban’s proven inability to
function as a national government.
But amid the rumblings of civil war, some analysts warn that history is set to repeat with another
atrocity like the 9/11 attacks as dozens of anti-West terrorist groups converge with Taliban protection.
The atomized landscape gives the new-old group of warlords breathing space to plot their
return. A Dostum advisor, speaking on condition he not be identified, said the group wants the
Taliban to widen the makeup of its government, currently composed of mostly Sunni Pashtuns and
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exclusively men. He said the council supports decentralization, a central national resistance platform
and a step toward breaking the country into autonomous, ethnically dominated regions.
That’s not an impossible request, said anthropologist Omar Sharifi, who teaches at the
American University of Afghanistan. The warlords have proved themselves able to adapt with time
and circumstances, transitioning from jihad to democracy as necessary to maintain and build their
power, influence, and wealth. The Taliban are so bad, Sharifi said, that they could make the
warlords look over time like an attractive alternative.
The Taliban’s first turn in power grew out of the 1992-1996 civil war, when warlords tried to
annihilate each other after the occupying Soviet army was defeated by U.S.-funded mujahideen in
1989; the Afghan government had collapsed three years after the Soviet withdrawal. Tens of
thousands of civilians were killed in Kabul alone, and parts of the city still bear the pockmarks of
the fighting.
The Taliban were greeted with cheers and tears when they took over, though the joy of an end
to the war didn’t last long under their theocracy. Women were sequestered; music, dancing, and
photography were banned; thieves’ hands were amputated and displayed in markets; and crimes
such as adultery were punished with public executions.
The Taliban were themselves ousted in 2001 after the U.S. invasion, setting the stage for two
decades of progress in education, economic growth, and women’s rights. But since the Taliban’s
return to power last August, they have rolled back most of the advances made during the republic.
They have brutalized women, the LGBTQ+ community, and certain minority groups, and they have
hunted down rights advocates and former members of the Afghan military and security forces.
Yet the lack of a credible governing alternative—as well as a growing humanitarian crisis—is
behind growing pressure on U.S. President Joe Biden to recognize the Taliban, the world’s biggest
drug cartel, which count dozens of sanctioned terrorists in their upper ranks. Citing the need to
relieve the humanitarian disaster—despite billions of dollars going to the United Nations to feed the
growing numbers of hungry people—and safeguard U.S. interests, some commentators have
suggested ending the Taliban’s isolation with engagement short of diplomatic recognition. So far,
though, the Taliban remain pariahs at home and abroad.
Whether the warlords can step into the breach remains to be seen. The United States and the
international coalition that fought for 20 years have no appetite for a return to conflict in
Afghanistan. Neighboring countries don’t want to finance or arm resistance groups, relieved that
conflict over the border has ended and hopeful they can settle into an albeit uneasy coexistence with
the Taliban.
For New York-based researcher Ali Mohammad Ali, who advised the former Afghan
government on security, the prospect of the warlords’ return is evidence of the failure of successive
Afghan governments and their Western supporters to build sustainable institutions.
“The international community is incompetent and incoherent and has to get its act together
because Afghanistan’s problems will not remain in Afghanistan,” he said. He underscored the lack
of durable governing institutions built during the decades of Western stewardship, including a
capable central bank and competent central government. Without the creation of such capacity, he
said, the country again risks disintegrating and becoming a hotbed of terrorism.
“Otherwise you enable the emergence of not only warlords and Taliban oppression but
groups like ISIS and al Qaeda that will fill the void by providing justice and services to the people.
This is what happened in Iraq, and it will happen in Afghanistan if the current situation is
normalized,” he said.
 14

WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND UKRAINE

William Byrd, PhD (Senior Expert on Afghanistan at USIP)
The Taliban insurgency and U.S. troop withdrawal, and Russian incursions culminating in the
February 24 invasion, constituted existential “stress tests” for Afghanistan and Ukraine, respectively.
Ukraine and its international supporters have succeeded in preventing an outright Russian victory,
imposing severe and continuing costs on Russia — ranging from high casualties to financial
sanctions. Whatever happens next, the invasion has solidified Ukraine’s national will, status and
orientation as an independent, Western-oriented sovereign country. In sharp contrast, Afghanistan’s
government and security forces collapsed within a month after U.S. troops left the country, its
president and many others fled, and the Taliban rapidly took over.
Ukraine’s success and Afghanistan’s collapse came about despite both countries facing messy
politics in recent decades (including disputed elections, irregular changes of government and
political violence), neighboring countries’ interference, widespread corruption (both countries have
been more corrupt than most of their neighbors, according to Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index) and security sector weaknesses. The many differences between the
two countries include some that favor Ukraine: far higher level of development and average per
capita income; proximity to Europe; 100 percent literacy versus 37 percent in Afghanistan; far better
human and social indicators more generally; and much less ethnic fractionalization. Other
differences, however, should have favored Afghanistan: its centuries-long history as an independent
country and the Taliban’s weakness as compared to Russia. Strikingly, the same external actors —
the United States, NATO and its member states — failed in Afghanistan but have more effectively
supported Ukraine. What key factors explain success and failure?
Two Different Conflicts
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine have been fundamentally different. Ukraine is in a
defensive conventional and hybrid war against Russia. Afghanistan was subjected to a
counterterrorism (CT) intervention in 2001 that morphed into a massive counterinsurgency (CI)
effort involving military action, security sector support, development programs and institution
building. Moreover, Afghanistan was a focal point for the global war on terror going back to 9/11
and earlier, whereas Ukraine never was. Not being a nexus in that “war” arguably was a success
factor in post-conflict transitions to stable peace.
The narrative of foreign invasion was a positive factor for Ukraine but not for Afghanistan.
The absence of U.S. and NATO combat forces was conducive to a Ukrainian narrative of Russian
aggression and building a unified and effective national response, but in Afghanistan this factor
was unfavorable for the previous government. The massive and comprehensive U.S.-led
international engagement meant the Afghan government could not credibly characterize the
conflict as its own fight, let alone against foreign forces. The Taliban narrative of fighting a jihad
against foreign invaders was more credible, even though the Taliban received essential support
from Pakistan and elsewhere.
Counterinsurgency Challenges
The CI effort in Afghanistan depended on key success factors that were not in place. Although
most insurgencies around the world fail, Afghanistan has been an exception, having seen two
victorious insurgencies against great powers in the past 40 years. Government victory in CI requires
a long time horizon and certain prerequisites. In particular, it has been virtually impossible to
decisively defeat an insurgency if it has access to reliable and durable sanctuaries outside the
country. Pakistan never wavered in providing sanctuary for the Taliban, and indeed their
headquarters was in Quetta. Moreover, the international military intervention and security sector
and stabilization initiatives as well as the Afghan government’s own efforts were plagued by short-
 15

termism, not looking out much into the future let alone planning five to 10 years ahead in line with
the time required for sustainable success at CI.
NATO was not set up for CI, but the United States should have learned from its own CI
experience. NATO, as a defensive alliance designed to deter and defend against a Soviet
conventional or nuclear attack, was much better positioned to support Ukraine’s defensive war with
Russia than to successfully pursue CI in Afghanistan. However, the United States had extensive
experience from Vietnam as well as other, smaller CI efforts. Moreover, there was ample scope for
learning from experience during the nearly two decades of the intervention in Afghanistan, as well
as for cross-learning between Afghanistan and Iraq. Some lessons from past experience were laid out
in the U.S. Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual, but efforts to apply its doctrines did not
lead to better outcomes.
Different Security Sector Reform Outcomes
Security sector reform in Ukraine worked, but Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF) failed. There is no sugarcoating the collapse of the ANDSF versus Ukrainian security
forces’ successful resistance against Russia. The latter gained valuable experience during the post-
2014 conflict in the eastern Donbas region, whereas the ANDSF did not appear to learn that much
from being trained and mentored by U.S. and other NATO forces as well as working alongside them
against the Taliban over more than a decade, and never became able to operate fully independently.
The United States and NATO effectively supported Ukraine’s security sector reform but not
the ANDSF. The same external actors (the United States, the NATO alliance and various NATO
member countries) were engaged in supporting Ukraine and Afghanistan’s security sectors, with
strikingly different results. A crucial difference was that the Afghan Army and police were built
from scratchon a new foundation and model, whereas security sector reform in Ukraine was
evolutionary, starting small when the country joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and
accelerating from 2014 onward.
Unlike in Ukraine, there was enormous built-in ANDSF dependence on unending foreign
support. The cost of the ANDSF — equivalent to more than a quarter of Afghanistan’s gross
domestic product and funded almost entirely by foreign aid — exceeded that of any other country
and could never be covered by domestic revenues. Dependency also encompassed logistics,
maintenance (by foreign contractors) and key enablers such as airpower. Though Ukraine effectively
absorbed increasing amounts of foreign military equipment in the run-up to the Russian invasion,
the share of its security costs covered by aid was small before 2022.
The sheer size and dominance of U.S. and NATO support militated against the success of the
ANDSF. Compared to targeted assistance and never more than a handful of foreign military
advisors and trainers in Ukraine, international military forces in Afghanistan peaked at well over
100,000 during the 2009-11 “surge” period, and enormous aid resources went into the ANDSF over
nearly two decades. International experience suggests that the success of security sector reform has
been negatively correlated with the magnitude of foreign involvement and the degree of reliance on
foreign models.
Complicated Politics
Both Ukraine and Afghanistan suffered from difficult politics, but this played out differently.
Ukrainian political groupings and leaders coalesced against the Russian threat, despite differences
among them including in views toward Russia. In two successive post-2014 presidential elections,
peaceful transfers of power occurred, and all political parties came together in response to the
Russian invasion on February 24. In Afghanistan, all presidential elections after 2004 were disputed,
leading to an extra-constitutional National Unity Government in 2014 and competing presidential
“inaugurations” after the 2019 election. Even when it was abundantly clear that most or all U.S.
troops would be leaving and their combat support to ANDSF was ending, Afghan politicians
continued their internecine disputes and did not come together against the Taliban threat.
 16

Wishful Thinking Versus Realism

There was wishful thinking on Afghanistan versus realism, even pessimism, regarding
Ukraine. U.S. assessments of ANDSF’s capabilities tended to be excessively rosy, whereas
assessments of Ukraine’s ability to resist a full-scale Russian military onslaught were conservative
and turned out to be overly pessimistic. Domestically, there seemed to be a remarkable degree of (at
least outward) complacency among Afghan non-Taliban political elites that the U.S. troop presence
would continue, even in the face of the increasingly clearly expressed U.S. intention to withdraw
militarily. While Ukrainian leaders and political elites expressed the hope that Russia would not
attack — which may have reflected wishful thinking — this did not inhibit an effective national
response to the invasion when it happened.
U.S. troops’ Afghan exit strategy gave rise to distortions, but this was not an issue in Ukraine.
The perceived viability, effectiveness and sustainability of the ANDSF were seen as key to the exit of
U.S. and other NATO troops from the country. This generated pressure to “show progress” in the
development and capabilities of the ANDSF, even if it was not really there, or was not tested in
combat. The absence of U.S. combat troops in Ukraine obviated the need for optimistic assessments
to justify an exit strategy.
Unlike the mixed messaging on Afghanistan from different U.S. agencies, there was more
unified, consistent messaging on Ukraine. In recent years, there were firm top-level political
declarations that the United States would be completing the drawdown of its troops in
Afghanistan, but also indications of a tug-of-war with the Pentagon, which did not particularly
hide its desire for at least a small U.S. troop presence to stay on indefinitely. While not excusing
Afghan complacency, this mixed messaging did provide some ammunition for wishful thinking
on their part. There was no such semi-public disconnect in U.S. messaging to Ukraine as well as to
Russia and more generally.
The United States and NATO had serious contingency plans and preparations for Ukraine but not
for Afghanistan. In the case of Ukraine, there was a pre-invasion U.S. and NATO buildup on the
country’s western borders and military aid was increased, and then a swift, multipronged response
when the invasion occurred, including a sharp acceleration of military aid, large amounts of civilian aid
and imposition of drastic sanctions against Russia. In Afghanistan, all eggs seem to have been put in the
ANDSF “basket,” with little in the way of a “Plan B” against the Afghan collapse that materialized.
Shifting U.S. Priorities
The United States showed growing fatigue over Afghanistan, but this is not yet the case for
Ukraine. The sheer longevity of the intervention in Afghanistan is what was surprising, not that
fatigue eventually set in. The U.S. staying power over nearly two decades, though remarkable, was a
symptom of the failure to set Afghanistan on a sustained course toward post-conflict stability, and
during its second decade reflected inertia and the search for an exit. The key shortcoming was the
lack of realistic preparations for the withdrawal of U.S. troops — forecast as early as 2011 and
increasingly on the cards under the two most recent U.S. administrations. U.S. and European fatigue
over Ukraine may set in at some point, but Ukraine’s resistance and the support provided by its
Western partners has prevented an outright Russian victory.
Afghanistan became increasingly peripheral to U.S. national security interests, while Ukraine
is more central. As time elapsed after 9/11 — especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden in
Pakistan nearly a decade later — the original CT justification for the U.S.-led intervention in
Afghanistan weakened and looked increasingly out of line with its huge size and cost. Ukraine’s
location in Europe and Russia’s 2014 incursion enhanced Ukraine’s centrality to U.S. national
security interests. Russia’s full-scale invasion has the potential to destroy the rules-based
international order in Europe, which depends on respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial
integrity. An independent, sovereign Ukraine, therefore, has become central to broader U.S. and
global security. Afghanistan, in contrast, was a high-priority focus of U.S. national security policy —
until it was not. (Source: The United States Institute of Peace)
 17

Book Reviews
S. Akbar Zaidi’s

MAKING A MUSLIM
Reviewed by: Dr Tariq Rahman
S Akbar Zaidi explores the various, often contradictory, definitions of Muslim that emerged in
colonial India in the 19th Century
Re-examining history
Whatever may be the reality of the doom and gloom scenarios about Pakistan’s academics, it
may be pointed out that not only young people but even the senior generation is at least more
productive than their predecessors. None of them are publishing for promotions and some, like Ijaz
Hussain (Indus Waters Treaty, 2018) and Naeem Qureshi (Ottomans, Turkey, Ataturk and South
Asia, 2014) are not even working in academia any more. And yet, Rasool Baksh Rais (Islam,
Ethnicity and Power Politics, 2018), Sikandar Hayat (A Leadership Odyssey, 2021), Hafeez Pasha
(Growth and Inequality in Pakistan, 2019) and Mohamamd Waseem (Political Conflict in Pakistan,
2021) have recently published books to acclaim. And what is more, some of them have even rebuilt
new scholarly identities for themselves.
S Akbar Zaidi is the best example of this phenomenon among Pakistan’s senior academics. He
was known as an economist earlier (which he remains) but in his forties, he got himself a doctorate
in history and this book is his contribution to scholarship on the modern history of South Asian
Muslims (see the preface of the book under review for the interesting story).
Zaidi’s book has four chapters besides the preface mentioned above and the introduction and
conclusion. Additionally, of course, it has the usual accompaniments of a scholarly work such as a
bibliography and an index. The introduction is where the author presents his claims which are
original and worthy of our attention. One major claim is that a sense of being humiliated, insulted
and ashamed (zillat) was the “motor which caused a revival, renewal and reform amongst Muslims,
giving rise to them emerging and coming into being in diverse manifestations and multiple forms”
(p. 7). While many historians have referred to the perception of loss of pre-eminence and political
power among the Muslims because of the colonial experience, the centrality of the psychological
processes involved in social, collective and even individual motivation and behaviour of the Indian
Muslims posited by Zaidi is original and insightful.
The more interesting thesis he presents is that there was, in fact, no Muslim collectivity (qaum,
millat, nation etc) during the 19th Century. There was, “a sense of ‘connectivity’ with one another
through some broadly shared, though highly contested, Islamic and Muslim symbols but this did
not amount to what we understand as a community, nation or identity” (p. 23). This is a bold claim
to make as most of our historians construct “a largely unified community before one existed” (p. 25)
even going back to the arrival of Muhamamd bin Qasim in Sindh missing out the Moplah Islamic
Indian culture of Malabar which preceded it entirely.
Zaidi makes this claim with a highly significant analysis of “what is a Muslim?” for which he
invokes Shahab Ahmed’s book What is Islam? What was more relevant in colonial India, as Zaidi
points out, was not what Islam is but who a Muslim is (Chapter 1: Who is a Muslim?). He points out
that, while the perception of zillat was widely shared, the question of who precisely is a Muslim was
just as widely debated. The pamphlet war in Urdu, which the author presents, convincingly argues
that the answers to this question excluded and ‘othered’ groups other than their own so that there
was, in fact, no single homogenous Muslim community. An interesting case is that of the label of
 18

Wahabi which, in India, was a pejorative term. It was also a politically loaded term used by the
colonial authorities for Muslim militant groups which opposed them.
Since the colonial state also had the authority to apply religious labels to groups, the power of
constructing communities was a matter of not only pamphlets by the articulate laity, religious edicts
(fatwa) by the ulema, polemics by the debaters but also orders, census figures and official
classifications and quotas issued by state officials. That is why Siddiq Hasan Khan, the doyen of the
Hindustani Ahl-i-Hadith writers, is so keen to distance the Hindustani contexts from Najdi
Wahabism on the grounds that the latter are Hanbali (followers of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal) while
the former are Hanafi (followers of Imam Abu Hanifa) (p. 51). And, since politics entered the
polemics, gradually the idea of the qaum graduated from that of a religiously perceived community
to a political one by the end of the 19th Century and took on its hegemonic appeal in the 20th.
In the second chapter the author expands upon the concept of zillat pointing out that its
defining feature was that it was self-inflicted (apnay hathon say i.e. literally by one’s own hands). To
imagine that they (the Muslims) had, as it were, ‘sunk’ to a new depth of degradation, intellectuals
had to imagine a glorious past so nostalgia and lamentation were invoked (p. 84). But this was not
merely a passive form of crying over spilt milk but a reason for rejuvenation and reform. Hence, the
consciousness of having being humiliated framed what one may call anti-colonial forces and efforts
to confront the majority Hindu community and assert the rights of the Muslim community (now
politically constructed as being more unified than theology would countenance).
Both political consciousness and theological imperatives, however, created an urgency of
behaviour which the author calls main majbur hua (I was compelled [to respond to the stimulus
offered to me]) in Chapter 3 which is also called Print Matters. The subject of this chapter is the nature
of the public debate which printing facilitated. Nor was this debate only religious or political; it could
also be literary or about any other matter. Its significance lies in that it constructed reading publics
which, in fact, helped to imagine Muslim civilisational communities. And, of course, as the author
argues, this helped in the imagination of a distinctive Muslim community in the 20th Century.
Another aid to this exercise of imagining a collectivity labelled Muslim was the oral debate since,
besides the medium of print, increased communication and better means of transportation also meant
that public debates (munazaras) could also be held in various locations across north India. These debates
were between Muslims, Christians, Hindus and also among various sects of Muslims. The author has
focused upon the great debates of 1876 and 1877 in which, at least in Muslim eyes, Maulana Qasim
Nanautwi, one of the founders of the famous religious seminary at Deoband, played a major role. The
debate has, as it were, two lives: one as oral performance and the other as a printed text. And both
construct communities, though different ones. While the former is taken up by the evanescent emotion of
solidarity of the moment, the latter is a record, biased in its very selectiveness, in favour of constructing
the ‘other’ which is intellectually vanquished. And since it is vanquished intellectually it not only
reaffirms the truth of Islam (ignoring the contested nature of that description as Maulana Qasim, a
Deobandi, was not regarded as a ‘true’ Muslim by everyone) but also helps imagine a Muslim
community which can vanquish others (Christians and Hindus) and, by implication, can rise above its
state of humiliation and bring about political rejuvenation.
In the last chapter, Zaidi sums up and reasserts his original claims. He rightly argues that the
concept of zillat was an agentive force which constructed the Muslim community as a political
entity. His other claims also stand vindicated. To sum up, these are: that new forms of being Muslim
emerged after the 1860s; that Muslims broke from the past and interacted with modernity as
mediated by the state to form new collective identities; that previous scholarship on the subject of
Muslim collective identity was “anachronistic or teleological as it looks forward in time towards the
Partition of 1947” (p. 210). These are original claims and it is to the credit of Akbar Zaidi that he has
come up with something both significant and original in a field as thoroughly researched as modern
 19

South Asian history. It also goes to the credit of the author that he uses the Urdu archive though,
despite his de-emphasis of the “colonial archive”, he does, in fact, make judicious use of it as a
historian should.
In the end, I come to a few lacunae which, though minor, need mentioning. First, while the
author expresses much pride, and rightly so, for using the less-used Urdu archive, it is perplexing
why he ignores the Urdu exegeses of the Quran (tafsir) altogether. Had he done so, he would have
found much material on the ulema’s understanding and construction of a Muslim. The works of Sir
Syed, Maulana Azad (Tarjuman al-Qur’an) and Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi’s (Qur’an ka Sha‘uri
Inqilab) would have given him fresh angles of examination and supported his claims. Secondly, the
munazaras between Muslim sub-sects (maslaks) should have supported the argument the author
offers about the logic of exclusion used in the oral domain by debaters. Six of these have been
recorded by Muhammad Manzur Numani in his book called Futuhat-i Nu’maniyyah and, since they
occurred between 1928 and 1936 in various locations in north India, they would have provided
useful insights into the construction of Muslim identities in the 20th Century when, as the author
convincingly argues, a political collective notion of such an identity had emerged.
In addition to these gaps as far as the archive used by the author is concerned, there is a minor
observation which, as it stands, may be misleading. He gives a note stating that the poet Ghalib
called himself a half Muslim (adha Musalman) as an example of not “subscribing to any doctrinal
faith and by following rituals and practices selectively and creatively” (p. 9). The author is factually
correct, indeed, but readers who are not acquainted with Ghalib’s assertions, sometimes with much
animation, in his letters that he is a muvahhid (monotheist) and ‘slave of the Caliph Ali’ (ka banda),
would not understand the poet’s religious position. But this is merely a quibble and I would not
even have mentioned it but for the fact that, when dealing with a work as outstanding as this book,
even a minor lapse from the author’s own high standards takes on a disproportionate significance in
the eyes of the reviewer.
In the end I should emphasise that this is a ground-breaking work in the modern historical
scholarship on South Asia. It is a product of paying close attention to the archive, of ‘doing history’,
rather than building upon and repeating what other historians have said. The claims which it has so
ably made and substantiated by research will guide future historians to examine history afresh.
Above all, the author has proved that even in a well-researched field one can come up with original
theses if one looks closely and intelligently enough.
(Source: TNS)

ISLAMIC FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES

A Comparative Strength
Dr Taseer Salahuddin
From 17th century onwards, the world saw many human civilisations going extinct due to
Europeans. Eurocentric thought process, which developed during these centuries, still persists.
Many of us truly believe in the benevolence of Europeans in bringing the world out of darkness and
into modernisation. This awe that people generally feel is a proof of that fact that history is written
by the conquerors and the real story is shockingly different. It is also the proof of their successful
propaganda of self-image building, which turned them from perpetrators to benefactors.
I had a chance of reading “King Leopold’s Ghost” by Adam Hochschild. Honestly speaking,
reading this book was the most painful literary activity of my life. Not that I have not seen movies or
read the books depicting barbaric side of human nature, but nothing prepared me for this planned
ethnic cleaning of a whole continent with such savagery. Even more aggravatingly painful was to
 20

realise that this practice of colonisation was also faced by our people at sub-continent. Rather, these
Europeans were actually searching for the riches of India, when they accidentally landed in Africa.
Human mind is such that when it comes across any atrocity, denial of deliberation is the first feeling.
Reading this book shocked me at multiple levels. Despite being aware of damages to our civilisation
in the sub-continent and value systems faced at the hands of our conquerors (The British), it was
really hard for me to digest the intentional and planned destruction of one human civilisation at the
hands of others. This destruction of other human civilisations by the Europeans was not done by
only Belgians, Spanish, Portuguese or British but almost all Europe was morally responsible in one
way or the other. Presenting a false picture to the rest of the world is one thing but convincing the
victims of being their benefactors is another. Killing, rapes or mutilations may be accounted for but
the destruction of civilisations via destroying core values, belief systems and cultural linkages
cannot. This was the most appalling realisation after reading this book. How Europeans were able to
destroy whole civilisations and yet made their animosity look like a blessing to the very subjugated.
For centuries they have maintained and even tightened the grip on human minds.
This book is a rare piece of literature which serves as a window into the truth of King
Leopold’s so-called Philanthropic efforts in Congo. In this heart moving and soul touching book,
Adam Hochschild describes how greed and hedonism of a powerful and manipulative king sitting
almost 4000 miles away resulted in one of the major human killings, rapes and mutilations in Congo.
According to estimates, eight to 10 million Congolese lost their lives in the course of two decades.
When the world was hailing him as the most philanthropic man of his times, King Leopold was
establishing a ‘one-man-owned’ colony for the very first time in human history. Most painful the is
the fact that his position power, money and deceitful cunning propaganda created such veil to truth
that while he was at his terror and greed, European newspapers were praising him as a
philanthropic god who was investing his personal wealth for public works in Africa. Surprising is
the fact that not then and even not now many were aware of the truth. Very few still mention
millions of tons of ivory and rubber extraction under cruelest slavery regime ever just for the sake of
profits. This cover up was so effective that even today many don’t know about the truth and extent
of Economic rape much so that Hochschild in opening chapter of the book expresses his
astonishment on being totally unaware of such Holocaust scale human killings in recent past even
when he was involved with human rights work and himself had visited Congo and stayed in the
city named after the king Leopold himself.
Corruption was a gift that these Europeans left in the colonies. Especially with Congo,
Europeans brought along corruption so rampant and deep rooted that an entire country was
depopulated. Human killings, trade and trafficking became a norm. Not even nobles were spared.
Thus a peaceful and well-established civilisation was completely wiped out. “Greed” and “Love for
Luxury” became new gods in town. Alfonso the King of Congo in 1561 wrote to the Portuguese King
asking for pharmacists, doctors and teachers instead of traders as he informed that the lust of
luxuries and Portuguese merchandise had corrupted his people so much so that they were ready to
sell their family members in exchange. This lust and greed was transferred to the innocent people by
the very preachers who came to spread Christianity and the word of God but their desire turned
them into slave trading merchants, rapists and killers. Alfonso was the last king of Africa who had
accepted Christianity. He kept asking for help from his fellow brethren and even Pope at Rome but
that help never came. After the death of Alfonso, Congo lost her sovereignty, Portuguese won the
battle and 1665 is marked in history as the year Congo turned into European colony in parts. Till
1800s whole kingdom was divided into European colonies.
Before the arrival of Europeans, Congo was a very sophisticated Kingdom, ruled by a king
(ManiKongo) with the help of governors of more than half a dozen provinces. They had elaborate
civil service with specialised positions like judge (mani vangu vangu). They forged copper into
 21

jewelry, iron into weapons (ironwork being profession of nobles), wove clothes from fiber,
cultivated fruits and vegetables, measured distance by marching days and time by lunar month
(having four days in a week), king collected taxes, currency was cowrie shells collected from coastal
areas (currency supply was controlled by royal authority). After the arrival of Europeans, Congolese
were considered only slaves and nothing else. They were sold, killed, raped and mutilated by the
alleged civilised Europeans to Brazil, Belgium, United Kingdom and even as far as Americas.
Europeans are the ancestors of Modern America. CIA played a very crucial role in destroying
political strengthening of Lumumba’s regime by assassinating him in 1960s. Most corrupt,
incompetent men looking for easy fame or recognition from Europe became the ruthless leaders in
colony of King Leopold. America totally supported this political uprooting of a Congo Friendly
regime for their ulterior motives.
When I compare todays political scene in Pakistan to that of Hochschild’s description of
Congo, similarities are shocking. Imran Khan may need time to reverse political, economic and
social damages done by the previous regimes. He may have taken some decisions that general
public cannot yet understand or which may need improvements. Pakistani people know one thing
for sure, even his political opponents, that he is dead honest, absolutely fearless and totally sincere
to Pakistan. His political decisions may be criticised but the self-respect he has given back to the
people of Pakistan at global front is remarkable. May Allah keep him safe. Ameen.
(Source: Daily Times)
Haroon Khalid Akhtar’s

THE LIAR’S TRUTH IN THE AGE OF MISINFORMATION

Reviewed by: Sajeer Shaikh
Mainstream media consumers are on many occasions left part-amused, part-horrified by the
manner in which debates, conversations, and even news telecasts unfold. In addition to this frontier,
with the advent of digital media as a viable and impactful communication platform, this back-and-
forth has, in many ways, slid into an even messier downward spiral of the deliberate spread of
political misinformation, and the doubling down on relentless mud-slinging.
One often wonders where one can turn to, in order to consume content that is intelligent, and
passed on in a way that is well outside the frequent boundaries of the mundane and, quite frankly,
embarrassing. Haroon Khalid Akhtar constructs The Liar’s Truth as that well-paced, gripping
medium of consumption, making it an intellect-fueled, fascinating read.
Before one manages to get their hands on the book, one goes in with a presumptive attitude.
Perhaps, one wonders, this is another book that harps on about the common man being a vehicle of
change, having been given great responsibility; a second coming-of-age, with stepping out of the
shadows of the ordinary and propulsion into the remarkable as a key theme. One may even mistakenly
assume that the narrative might be predictable, with a storyline that doubles as a sermon or lesson.
Akhtar casts these assumptions aside at the very beginning, and goes on to prove one wrong at every
turn, concocting mind-boggling mayhem that connects with the reader in a fascinating way.
Akhtar's delightfully built world follows the tale of Arsalan - or Guppy, as he is affectionately
referred to - a common man with a thoroughly fertile imagination, who has settled into a routine that
offers him little to no solace. An unexpected break in his life comes at a point where he receives a
mysterious (and initially, confusing) call that is set to change the course of his life. Inundated with rib-
tickling metaphors that make The Liar's Truth a bravely written read, it is the call that Arsalan receives
from Zeus (yes, the one on Mount Olympus) that triggers a transformative sequence of events.
 22

To summarise the plot, without giving much away, Arsalan - once a layman - is selected to be
the premier of his country, despite a complete lack of know-how, and a crippling lack of skills.
Inexperienced, naive Guppy has, as reinforcement, an equally oblivious rag-tag team, made up of a
club singer, a stunning model, a pimp, a scientist, an ambulance driver, and a matchmaker.
Amongst all this hullabaloo, a secret plan is underway, being formulated to hang Arsalan by making
a case for the fact that his love is a spy. All this eventually leads him to the gallows from where he
pens this rich, tongue-in-cheek memoir-cum-exposition laden with poignant literary gems.
Over the course of fourteen chapters, Akhtar empowers Arsalan to be an incredible storyteller -
one who keeps readers hooked with an impeccable sense of humor. The conversational unfolding of
events allows one to immerse themselves in the universe of the text, becoming a willing participant in all
that takes place. Satire, wit, and ingenious political commentary amalgamate to contribute to the
narrative, making The Liar's Truth an exceptional page-turner that one cannot put down.
One can easily place Arsalan, Zeus, and other recurring characters into our universe. In fact,
the countless similarities that exist between Arsalan’s world and ours open up a portal of parallels,
making the book all the more interesting. Indeed, the lines between fact and fiction are blurred in
The Liar’s Truth in the most spectacular way. Semblances of the ongoing political circus, and its
history that has a tendency to repeat itself, make an appearance in Arsalan’s frenzy-driven life, and
picking out those instances, as a latent realization clicks within the reader's mind, add to the overall
experience of devouring the novel as well.
There are many aspects of Akhtar’s narrative that hit home, perhaps in a manner that lies outside
one's zone of comfort, invoking a sense of unease and making one reflect on their own helpless
impotence and lack of active action. For instance, early on in the story, Arsalan talks, in passing, about
generated chaos, and the spread of successfully manufactured hatred at an alarming rate.
While this brief mention is stated rather casually, it juxtaposes, with immense resonance, with
the current state of affairs within the nation, where giants generate chaos higher up on an ivory-
tower hierarchy, watching it trickle down for their own benefit, manifesting as seemingly
unsolvable, yet crucial differences between the common man. In addition to this, Arsalan also
highlights the need for a scapegoat, who bears the brunt of all that transpires, and is, almost always,
the common man as well - a fact that seems to be, in retrospect, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The repetition of history - the constant, tired, rewriting of the same chronicles with rotating
characters - is another significant part of the novel. It is also an aspect that makes one do a double
take, switching back and forth between the text within the book, and the bombardment of content on
mainstream channels that have become akin to white noise within a local context.
Furthermore, the entire conceptualisation of an all-knowing, powerful, resourceful Greek god
who keeps tabs on Arsalan, alongside many others, wishing to alter the state of being of a
developing nation from an eagle-eyed perspective is, undoubtedly, a "heavenly" likening, and a
stroke of creative ingenuity. One cannot help but grin, utterly bemused, by the presence of this self-
proclaimed kingmaker in Arsalan's life, and the impact of this detached diety's actions for what is
passed off as the greater good. In fact, one begins to conjure up a very specific suggestion for a
vehicle that Zeus would potentially lean towards possessing, given that he chooses to utilize a very
modern, and very human mode of interaction - a phone.
One particular takeaway that one tends to ponder over once the novel ends is the idea of a
constructed narrative - a drummed-up public relations message-cum-campaign on steroids that
spirals into positioning itself as the absolute truth. As we are made aware at the very beginning by
Arsalan, the book follows his version of the truth - the way reality unfolded before his eyes.
However, the contradictory truth that exists is spread and believed as well, opening up a
conversation on fabricated realities. One feels deeply unsettled, fully taking into account the fact that
 23

everything that is peddled to us is one version of a lie - for the absolute truth may have never existed
in the first place - and it is the most convincing, most well-marketed lie that sells for a certain
amount of time, till the next lie is created. Undoubtedly, when one infers this from the text, the
avenues of questioning data and information around one crack open wide into multiple directions,
leading to a spiral of further questions that are - and may continue to remain - unanswered.
In all of this, Arsalan's innate humanness makes him a wonderful protagonist - one with
whom we forge a relationship in a strange way, and one in whom we may even, at times, catch
glimpses of our own selves. While Arsalan does not openly masquerade as a microcosm for most of
us, there are certain hints of commonalities that aid in developing the many emotions we feel for the
man narrating his own tale. On the other hand, Akhtar also births Arsalan in a way where the latter
is a quick-witted narrator, and we must pay a great deal of attention to all he states, for a lot of the
exchange between our hero and the reader is laden with meaning and humor.
The author takes a tale, that is, on the surface, one that follows the ebb and flow of a political
leader’s journey. However, Akhtar injects magic into the very spinal cord of his book, allowing
readers to be swept under a spellbinding wave that marries fact and fiction. From the bigger
punchlines to the subtle shots, Akhtar outdoes himself at the flick of every page, masterfully
balancing the message he wishes to convey with varying tonalities.
When one touches upon the tonality of the book, it becomes imperative to highlight how
skillfully Akhtar utilizes Arsalan. At many points, one finds themselves circling back to the idea of
absolute truths, given that Arsalan, himself, at many points throughout the story, speaks in a
manner that is befitting of a politician.
From sounding delusional in one instant, to employing grand political rhetoric in the next, one
finds themselves wary of Arsalan at times, further creating chaos on a microcosmic level within the
mind of the reader. After all, is Arsalan not a mere tool in a story, written by the truths that exist
within the author's reality? One finds themselves running in circles, trying to chase a singular thread
that could give way to a narrative in which one can fully place faith. Perhaps, that is the lesson for
readers, when all is said and done. In the absolute circus that is the sociopolitical sphere, one must
always be prepared for smoke and mirrors.
The Liar's Truth is Haroon Khalid Akhtar’s second novel, and in this nearly two-hundred
page body of work, one can spot instances where Akhtar remains heavily influenced by his father,
the renowned writer, Mohammad Khalid Akhtar. Indeed, many of those who have consumed
Akhtar’s father's work have been able to notably shed light on the pleasant similarities between the
wit and humor the father-son duo have shared, while maintaining the fact that individuality, and
making a piece of text one's own, were key parts of the process.
Summing up, one must hand it to Haroon Khalid Akhtar for his courageous and revelatory
plunge into the deep, dark sea that is the sociopolitical sphere of our nation. Without a shadow of a
doubt, the novel is a testament to Haroon Khalid Akhtar’s artistic and creative lenses. Touching
upon, from time to time, and borrowing from the reality in which we reside makes The Liar's Truth
a dangerously gratifying read, as one grapples with the fragility of all one knows to be true, whilst
also begrudgingly acknowledging the fact that enjoying the novel far too much might greatly
become a cause for displeasure for the all-seeing, all-knowing, omniscient eye of Zeus.
(Source: T-Magazine)
 24

Budget & Economic Survey

CORRECTIVE BUDGET 2023
Dr Khaqan Hassan Najeeb (Former adviser, Ministry of Finance)
The Setting: The idea of writing this piece is to debate the possibilities of strengthening
Pakistan’s budgeting process. This debate helps us create policy space, which appears highly
constrained.
Today, Pakistan is in the throes of an external sector solvency challenge coupled with fiscal
and quasi-fiscal imbalances. These are unprecedented times. Rising inflationary pressures due to
global commodity price hikes and an expected global slow-down exacerbate the domestic economic
threats. The risks to Pakistan’s economy remain elevated.
Restoration of market confidence is paramount. This requires an aggressive policy framework.
To push the debate further, let us structure a Corrective Budget 2023 (CB23). The contours of CB23
are framed at recognizing the severity of abnormal conditions. Each line of CB23 below expresses
strong empathy for those being crushed under pricing pressures. It simultaneously displays a
futuristic vision for a nation looking for hope.
The Strategy: Let us articulate our position. The strategy of CB23 is not one of growth. It is
simply a strategy of correcting policy omissions. CB23 aims to return the country to macroeconomic
stability, demonstrate its anti-inflationary bias, protect the vulnerable and restore the confidence of
the domestic and external markets to set the country beyond an episodic growth path.
The Objectives: CB23 frames clear objectives to meet aspirations of Pakistan’s 230 million
citizens: i) CB23 ensures that in the immediate, challenges of external solvency are met; ii) CB23
ensures that it forms the basis of an agreement with the IMF and opens Pakistan’s global funding
access; iii) CB23 ensures that the burden of price adjustments is staggered and falls squarely on the
well-off; and iv) CB23 manages a credible deficit of 5.6 per cent of GDP through: managing tax
avoidance and tax evasion and extending taxation to all sectors of the economy; and expenditure
reforms that limit benefits to the elite and focus targeted subsidies on the deserving.
Guiding Principles: CB23’s guiding principles revolve around big bang reform. On the
revenue side, focus is shifted to compliance, harmonisation of tax policies with provinces including
an integrated sales tax regime and modernisation. The tax effort helps consolidate progressive
income taxation by bringing all incomes under one head and taxed at marginal rates, rationalisation
of personal income tax slabs to shift the burden to high-income earners and taxation of capital gains
on all sectors irrespective of the holding period. The retail sector is brought into the normal tax
regime. CB23 focuses on under-taxed sectors including real-estate, wholesalers and retailers and
moves away from fixed tax regimes.
CB23 recognizes Pakistan’s true potential of around Rs7 trillion in sales tax, based on a
consumption of Rs50 trillion in the economy. Estimated collection under this head is only one-third,
at about Rs2.506 trillion in FY22.
CB23 recognizes the true potential of Rs5 trillion from Rs55 trillion of national income.
Collection is estimated at Rs2.17 trillion in FY22, which is less than half of our potential. These are
substantive compliance gaps. CB23 relies on compliance risk management and integrating data from
all sources to collect revenues by addressing tax avoidance and evasion.
Tax expenditures or the total tax revenue foregone due to specific provisions in the tax laws
amounts to a staggering Rs1482 billion in FY22. The corporate sector is the biggest beneficiary of
 25

these privileges, followed by high net-worth individuals, large traders and the feudal elite. CB23
proposes collection from these heads by reducing these privileges by at least 25 per cent.
A serious reconsideration of non-tax revenues is suggested in CB23 given the prevalent
context. No new anticipated taxation from petroleum and gas is proposed. CB23 reduces indirect
taxation and contributes to being anti- inflationary.
Expenditures have been least addressed in the last few budgets. CB23 deals with providing
targeted subsides for the vulnerable, a pension reform moving towards pay-as-you-go and only a
mildly higher development budget compared to FY22 focused on finishing of the schemes which are
near completion.
Budget Outlay in Brief: The above principles help us ensure credibility of the budgetary
numbers. CB23 estimates FBR taxes at Rs7,800 billion from estimated collection of Rs6,000 billion in
FY22. An estimated nominal GDP growth of 16.5 per cent (13 per cent inflation + 3.5 per cent
growth) adds Rs990 billion. However, keeping sales tax on oil as zero in FY23, nominal growth is
taken to add only Rs800 billion. Settlement of 12.5 per cent of the Rs4,000 billion stuck in tax
disputes is estimated to bring in another Rs500 billion. Policy measures, reducing tax expenditures
and compliance efforts are estimated to raise at least Rs500 billion.
Non-tax revenues for CB23 are estimated to fall to Rs1,250 billion, provisioning for Petroleum
Development Levy and Gas Infrastructure Development Cess, assuming all other areas as ceteris
paribus. A fair amount of new money is possible from new spectrum licensing auctions, which are
not included.
Gross revenue receipts amount to Rs9,050 billion. Provincial share is estimated at Rs4,121
billion and net revenue receipts at Rs4,929 billion. CB23 makes an effort to be realistic with a
provincial surplus at Rs400 billion and promises the 8th NFC award with a workable fiscal model,
while reducing the federal government footprint.
CB23 recognizes the need for a more than modest resource generation from privatization of
Rs600 billion. Trillions have been spent on bailout of failing state-owned enterprises. Non-bank
borrowing, net external receipts and bank borrowing are estimated at Rs3,798 billion taking the total
outlay of the budget to Rs9,724 billion. The above resource mobilization is far more direct in nature
and does not lay any extra burden on the cost-push inflationary factors – a much-needed effort.
Pakistan needs a deeper expenditure side reform. The initial thought is to recognize Rs400
billion as required to maintain a cost of living allowance. However, it is proposed to conduct
transfer pricing audits to control tax avoidance of $5 billion. As monies are available through this,
direct subsidy support may be enhanced. CB23 estimates development spending from the current
year at Rs700 billion. In light of the above, the total expenditures would be Rs9,724 billion.
Addressing Price Pressures: Pakistan cannot be behind the curve on inflation. CB23 suggests
practical measures that make a difference. Relief to urban middle-income families is necessary.
Personal income tax exemption limit is proposed to be raised to those earning Rs75,000 a month.
Reduced rates of income tax are proposed for a monthly salary of Rs200,000. Higher income earners
will have an increase in rates.
Managing inflation beyond monetary tightening is a key challenge for the government. CB23
proposes for the government to take all steps to ensure supply of cheaper fuels, ensure that there is
no undervaluation of the rupee, and limit the rate of monetary expansion to low double-digits. Low
productivity of agriculture has constrained supply. Special measures of connectivity of farmers with
universities has to be framed along with financial easing.
The futuristic tone of the budget is based on increasing efficiency and productivity of the
economy. For example, an asset recycling model to be formulated along with divestment to unlock
Rs6 trillion of assets with the government. SMEs to be supported for increasing productivity
 26

through access to finance. Promotion of digital economy and fintech, technology enabled-
development, energy transition, and climate action. Energy sector redesign to be undertaken. City
Planning Support to be given to provinces. A move to a value-added tax regime. Incentivization of
corporatization of businesses. A move to unlock land supply to reduce the cost of residential and
industrial land use. Reduction of government divisions. Move to channel more household savings to
capital markets.
Conclusion: CB23 moves to direct taxation in a big way. It gives cost of living relief now.
CB23 is framed in a way where it is less expansionary and plays its role in managing the current
account deficit. This futuristic path highlights an economic plan creating new jobs and sends the
right signal: Pakistan in the immediate has a clear handle on its economy. Some may feel that some
of the measures are aggressive in nature. One is glad that they feel so. The more aggressive the
measures, the more markets will view that the country is serious.
(Source: The News)

MYTH OF NUMBERS
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
The Economic Survey and budget of Pakistan are out. The Survey has painted a promising
picture of major economic indicators. It came up with 5.97pc GDP growth due to decent growth of
industry (7.2pc), services (6.2pc) and agriculture (4.4pc). It surprised many experts, including
international agencies.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is celebrating numbers and better management of economy as
their success. The ruling coalition is unable to understand the myth of magical numbers.
However, analysis of numbers tells us a different story and certain areas require attention and
serious debate. First, the GDP growth is mainly fuelled by consumption with 96.2pc. Household
consumption is biggest contributor with 85.2pc. Majors reasons of unprecedented contribution of
consumption are cash transfer schemes, increased number of vehicles and luxury items.
Consumption in itself is not bad if it is being met by domestic production system. Unfortunately, in
the case of Pakistan, it is opposite and Pakistan had to import to meet the demand. It resulted in
record current account deficit as country had to meet the demand by importing.
Second, agriculture growth was mainly triggered due to three factors, machinery import,
livestock and increase in the production area of major crops. The cropped area of maize was
increased by 16pc followed by sugarcane and rice with 8.2pc and 6.1pc respectively. Owning to
increased crop area, these crops showed positive growth rate. On the other hand, wheat crop area
decreased by 2.1pc which resulted in decrease in production. Besides, Pakistan will have to adjust
wheat production estimates because in many areas of Pakistan, climate change impacted the
growth of grain.
Third, industrial growth rate is highly skewed in favour of few products e.g. food, tobacco,
automobile, furniture and wearing apparel. It is interesting to note here that wearing apparel was
introduced as new category after rebasing the economy with the base weight of 6.08. Textile sector,
which had weight of 20.9, was reduced to 18.16 by excluding wearing apparel. Now, both categories
occupy same weight (24,24). Knowing that textile was performing well during COVID-19 due to
closure of economy of competitors, government changed the weight formula to show good growth.
Besides, senseless growth of automobiles has further stressed the economy. It resulted in fly of
foreign reserves as assemblers had to pay back money in US dollars. It also contributed to increase
the oil import which again hit foreign reserves.
 27

The case of tobacco is even more alarming because Pakistan committed WHO to reduce use of
tobacco. However, favourable conditions for tobacco industry are helping it to flourish.
It can be concluded that fancy numbers of Economic Survey have been built on very weak
bases. Consumption-led growth without production base is a disastrous recipe. It is worrisome
situation, but PTI is celebrating it.
Budget 2022-23 also tells the same story. It seems to be continuity of directionless policy. It is
pity to note that coalition government tried to mitigate political negativity rather than fixing the
economy. They have presented numbers which do not have economic rational and cannot hold
ground In front of IMF. For example, government revised the limit of taxable income to Rs1.2
million and announced to bring down tax to zero for import of seed and machinery and some
other input.
Unfortunately, these announcements are against the conditionality of IMF. However,
government can implement these decisions by abolishing subsidies for the elite. But, government
does not seem in a mood to compromise on elite class, rather trying to enhance benefits for them.
For example, it has given a special executive allowance to senior bureaucracy in addition to 15pc
increase in salary. Second, government is continuously expanding the cabinet. It cannot be figure
out, in such a difficult situation, how government can expand or increase the perks of bureaucracy?
But, it is happening at the cost of common people and country.
After ensuring subsidies and perks for elite class, government has started to lobby and
convince common citizens to take bitter pill of IMF. The campaign is being led by the Prime Minister
and assisted by Finance Minister. A few days back, Finance Minister was telling media IMF was not
happy and government would have to take tough decision. So, the process of U-turn has started.
It is expected that after going to IMF, government will pretend as innocent and will tell
people; we tried to give you relief but IMF is not allowing us. We will have to eliminate subsidies for
common people.
The glimpses are already visible as coalition government has started to talk about increase in
the prices of oil, essential goods and taxes on personal income. It will lead to a new wave of inflation
which will be different witnessed in the past. We know rupee is depreciating and prices are
increasing. On top of that, if government increases personal taxes, it will add salt to injury. It will be
beyond the capacity of middle class and poor to sustain the shock.
The solution government is suggesting to common citizens is to avail BISP relief packages. It is
another way to secure votes and oblige bureaucrats (by offering lavish packages). Thus, it can be
inferred that numbers do not tell true story of economy which further complicate the crisis. Hence, if
the ruling alliance wants to overcome crisis, they need to speak truth and tell the people real story.
(Source: The News)
 28

Climate Change
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SPORTS
Aamir Bilal
In this series of articles on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) & sports, we will discuss
the role sports play in achieving Goal 13, the Climate Change and Goal 11 of SDGs, i.e. how to make
countries inclusive, healthy, productive & resilient.
Before ringing the alarming bells of climate change and its devastating effects on Pakistan in
near future, let's look into speedy urbanisation of Pakistan where sports is largely ignored in the
development paradigm. It's an established fact that sports contribute to sustainable & resilient
planning of human settlements and the capacity to sustain societies.
There is now some realisation among the large builders in the private sector in Pakistan of the
importance of sports facilities. They now highlight them in their marketing campaigns. A few have
come up with facilities but there is a lot to be desired in terms of their maintenance, access to local
community and availability of trained staff.
We know that there are several ways in which sports and supervised physical activity
contribute to the development of healthy nations. A healthy urban system & ecosystem have a
significant effect on physical activity participation. Being a resident of Islamabad, I have observed
increased participation of the local community in walking and cycling over the last few years
because of improvement in walking tracks in sector area parks, Margalla tracks.
The SDG 11 is also referred to as the "Urban SDG". Just like Islamabad the other cities should
also develop green spaces and cycling opportunities, thus contributing to SDG 11.2 & 11.7 because
green settings play a role in creating healthier cities with more sports opportunities for urban youth.
Within Islamabad and other major urban cities of the country the public school facilities are
either locked in the afternoon or evening shift classes are organised for the remaining students. Most
of these schools have ample play areas which are underutilised. In case the education department
lacks the capacity to utilise the available space, these areas may be opened for local communities as
safe sports places for effective utilisation.
Provincial sports authorities and those at the federal level should make it compulsory for the
sportspersons with national appeal and recognition to participate in public awareness campaigns
regarding promotion of SDGs. For instance, any sportsperson with public recognition must promote
the idea of travelling in public transport or travelling together for offices in pooled up cars instead of
personal transport, thus reducing traffic and use of expensive fuel.
The large public and private universities in cities should promote cycling as a means of
transport for students within the university campus. Similarly, the locks on mega sports facilities
like PSB should be removed and such facilities must be utilised fully by the public when not in use
by professional athletes.
SDG 13 covers climate change and its challenges in detail. The goal also covers how sports and
physical activity reduces burden of Non Communicable Diseases (NCDs) which are linked with
climatic factors such as increase in temperature. Climate Change Mitigation (SDG 13.1) combines
educational & environmental interventions to support physical activity. In this context UN Climate
Change (UNFCC) has developed a plan called "Climate Action Sports" to empower and encourage
all sports organisations to take part in reaching global climate change goals.
 29

I am well aware of the fact that neither our sports bodies nor our policy makers have any clue
of using sports to achieve SDGs. These write-ups are an effort to draw their attention to the
importance of sports for achieving the SDGs through cost effective measures.
Pakistan has the largest number of glaciers anywhere in the world outside the polar region.
Climate change is eating away Himalayan glaciers at a dramatic rate. Since 2018 more than 300 lakes
have formed, out of which 33 are considered hazardous where 7 million people are at risk due to
glacial lake outburst flooding.
A lot of local and international mountain trackers visit Pakistan to explore its mesmerising
north.
Alpine Club of Pakistan (ACP) was founded in 1974 and is affiliated with PSB, working under
the patronage of Gilgit Baltistan Council Secretariat. ACP is also the sole representative of Pakistan
in the World Climbing & Mountain Federation. The ACP is doing a good job by promoting winter
sports and mountaineering in the country.
ACP must ensure that all national and international mountaineers, trackers and participants of
winter sports should ensure environmental cleanliness, thus contributing towards SDG 13.
Most of the sports federations and government organisations are unaware of the fact that
enough donor money is available for projects related to climate change. Pakistan is way behind in
designing such innovative projects where sports, particularly mountain climbing, are used for
achieving SDG 13.
We hope and pray that sports bodies in Pakistan use sports for attaining SDGs in effective and
innovative ways.
(Source: TNS)

HOW TO DEAL WITH HEATWAVES

Dr Shaukat Ali & Alia Saeed & M Arif Goheer
Pakistan is facing record-breaking temperatures and a prolonged heatwave since March this
year, leading to a major impact on society, environment, work hours and the economy. The city of
Jacobabad in Sindh soared to 50 degrees Celsius – a temperature called unlivable for humans.
Pakistan is no stranger to extreme heat which is becoming a new normal, but the current heatwave,
with its early beginning, long duration and severity has been worrying scientists.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a heatwave is when the maximum
temperature exceeds 45C or the deviation from normal temperature is between 4.5C and 6.5C, while
severe heatwave is when the maximum temperature exceeds 47C or the deviation from normal
temperature is greater than 6.5C.
In the pre-monsoon period, Pakistan regularly experiences excessively high temperatures,
especially in May. However, the hot weather started earlier this year in March and April. Weather
and climate researchers are now investigating how this heatwave forms. The primary driver behind
this heatwave is climate change which has already resulted in a 2C increase in temperature during
the months of March-April-May over the last 40 years in Pakistan. Not only this, the previous three
months saw a lack of clouds and rainfall, which may have warmed the surface by 5C. The second
cause is the fast-moving river of winds in the upper atmosphere, which affects surface pressure and
temperature.
In the previous two heatwave episodes, the jetstream formed a ridge/crest, resulting in high
pressure and a heat dome over Pakistan. The third reason is that La Nina has been intensifying trade
 30

winds and pushing warm water into Asia over the past two years, resulting in warm temperatures
throughout the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and finally across Pakistan and India.
These extreme weather conditions had been a constant dilemma in Pakistan over the last
decade. A study conducted at the Global Change Impact Studies Centre (GCISC) by Dr Shaukat Ali
on future heatwaves over Pakistan using Downscaled Global Climate Models projected a high
increase in heatwaves. Due to the influence of climate change, future heatwaves are projected to
increase in amplitude (severity) up to 48C, duration (length) eight times, frequency (sum of days of
all heatwaves) 10 times and number of heatwaves (events) four times.
According to the WHO, climate change has ongoing health consequences and is expected to
cause 250,000 deaths per year between 2030 and 2050, with the financial cost of climate-related
health impact ranging from $2 billion to $4 billion by 2030. Heatwaves are more than just
uncomfortable – they have serious health risks and trigger public health emergencies. They can
cause illness and death, especially in sensitive groups such as infants, pregnant women, the elderly,
and persons who already struggle with medical issues.
Heatwaves are an extreme climatic event which have become more frequent due to human-
influenced climate change and global warming. The impact of excessive temperatures on glacier
melt was seen in Gilgit-Baltistan by sweeping away a critical highway bridge in flash flooding,
which had a terrible impact on the population as many people lost their houses, fruit orchards, and
crops. Extreme temperatures also result in unpredictable monsoon rains. Heatwaves have other
multiple and cascading impacts on ecosystems, agriculture, water and energy supplies and key
sectors of the economy. Extremely hot and dry conditions have affected agriculture, especially wheat
production, sowing of cotton and rice due to less water availability and production of mangoes.
Prolonged exposure to excessive heat had other critical knock-on effects – for example,
elevated air temperatures lead to increased demand for air conditioning and, therefore, increased
electricity generation by power plants, which further intensifies air pollution problems and
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Extreme weather events, in particular, are a major source of concern in Pakistan, necessitating
not only a dedicated research effort on the part of the scientific community, but also effective
communication of that research to policymakers in order to develop timely and effective adaptation
strategies to minimize future losses. In this regard, a thorough knowledge of future extreme events
is necessary to provide policymakers with reliable facts that can influence effective decision-making
and infrastructure development.
It is imperative that we protect ourselves by taking adaptive measures. Pakistan has a well-
established heat-health early warning systems and action plans. The National Institute of Health
(NIH) has issued an advisory for necessary measures and recommendations for educational
institutions/schools on actions to mitigate the effect of extreme heat on students, reduce the
frequency of heat-related illness, and support schools to prepare for and manage risks associated
with extremely hot weather or heatwave. Likewise, the Ministry of National Health Services,
Regulations and Coordination (NHSRC) has issued a detailed heatwave advisory for the general
public, asking individuals to take immediate necessary measures to protect themselves from
extreme heat. Coordinated efforts by the Ministry of Climate Change, Ministry of National Health
Services, Ministry of National Food Security and Research, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of
Information, Ministry of Education, NDMS, PDMAs and DDMAs and municipal governments in
tackling the present heatwave are well appreciated.
To improve its resilience to future extreme heat events, Pakistan needs to take strides towards
sustainable adaptation and mitigation strategies to tackle the adverse impact of heatwaves. Well-
coordinated and effective adaptation strategies need to be put in place by developing heat-tolerant
 31

crop varieties and animal breeds. The agriculture sector requires major transformations to build
resilience, especially water-use efficiency enhancement.
Death and disabilities from such calamities can be prevented or minimized by sensitization of
healthcare departments, climate change and environment protection agencies, agriculture and other
infrastructure development authorities. Sufficient collaboration and cooperation among these
authorities are necessary to ensure consistency towards healthy society.
Cities can incorporate heat island reduction strategies such as green or cool roofs, cool
pavements, or increased vegetation and trees into long-term planning efforts to help lower urban
temperatures. Such cooling measures help reduce impacts on public health and urban systems from
extreme heat events.
Disseminating public awareness through print, electronic and social media, providing heat-
proof shelter facilities during the summer, and easing access to public drinking water would help
mitigate heatwave fatalities. Reducing outdoor exercise during heat alerts can protect individuals
from the adverse effects of extreme heat.
Pakistan was fortunate that this year's heatwaves were not accompanied by humidity, which
could have resulted in a high death toll in the country. Pre-monsoon and monsoon rains are
expected to improve conditions, but so far rainfall has been insufficient.
(Source: The News)

CLIMATE CRISIS AND WATER DIPLOMACY

Dr Muhammad Fahim Khokhar (Head of the Institute of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, School
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) Islamabad)
Dr Ejaz Hussain (Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad)
Several scientific studies have shown that the climate change crisis is real. The recently
released Global Food Policy Report 2022 has warned that “summer heat-waves are projected to
increase at a rate of 0.71 day per decade in the country [Pakistan]. In India it is estimated to triple or
quadruple by 2100…water scarcity in Pakistan is projected to worsen with climate change.
Himalayan glaciers, an important source of rivers in South Asia, have lost more mass since 2000 than
in the entire Twentieth Century… Of the world’s five basins where water scarcity-led GDP losses are
projected to be the highest, three (Indus, Sabarmati and Ganges-Brahmaputra) are in South Asia. In
the Indus Basin alone, GDP losses by 2100 are expected to exceed $5,000 billion.”
Pakistan has diverse ecological regions, ranging from mountains in the north to a coastal zone
in the south. Its glaciers are melting rapidly due to rising temperatures leading to the formation of
3,044 glacial lakes in Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Of these, 33 glacial lakes have been
assessed to be prone to glacial lake outburst flooding (GLOF). According to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), more than 7.1 million people in GB and KP are vulnerable due to
their low economic status. Also, Pakistan’s water resources are under tremendous pressure.
The rapidly growing population has made Pakistan a water scarce country. This can result in
food insecurity for the marginalised communities. According to the National Water Policy (2018),
per capita surface water availability declined from 5,260 m3 per year in 1951 to about 1,000 m3 in
2016. This is predicted to further decrease to 860 cubic metres by 2025 marking Pakistan’s shift from
a water-stressed to a water-scarce country. 1,000 cubic metres per capita per year water is required
to avoid food and health implications.
Currently, Pakistan’s freshwater resources amount to 176 million acre feet (MAF). The
freshwater is available through the Indus River system consisting of five main rivers: Indus (44
percent), Chenab (19 percent), Jhelum (16 percent), Kabul River (16 percent), and others (5 percent).
Snow melt and monsoon rains feed freshwater into the Indus River and its tributaries. The Indus
 32

River is the primary source of irrigation for 80 percent of the agricultural land, covering an area of
21.5 million hectares. Pakistan stands fourth among countries with the largest irrigated area. Its
contiguous irrigation network is the largest in the world.
Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian economy. Most of its freshwater (95 percent) is used in
irrigated agriculture. The remaining serves domestic and industrial uses. Operationally, however,
less than 40 percent of the water is actually used for irrigation. The rest is lost in conveyance and
field application. Exponential population growth and urbanisation, water intensive agriculture
practices, unsustainable groundwater extraction and irregular rainfall owing to regional climatic
changes are among the major factors in Pakistan’s water stress.
India has conventionally relied on water sources originating in the disputed Jammu and
Kashmir for irrigation in its northern states, including the Punjab.
When India stopped the flow of water into Pakistan in May 1948, the latter not only protested
but asserted ownership over the Indus Basin on the basis of “prior appropriation.”
The water crisis attracted global attention and the United States interacted with India and
Pakistan in the early 1950s. Consequently, the two countries signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)
in 1960. The IWT went beyond the Linienthalian cooperative framework and instead divided the
rivers in a manner that the water from three eastern rivers came under Indian suzerainty though
Pakistan was to use these waters for irrigation purposes for initial 10 years. The three western rivers
came under exclusive Pakistani control though India could use these waters for hydroelectric power
generation as long as the water flow remained uninterrupted. Despite opposition by nationalist
lobbies in both the countries, the arrangement was applauded globally.
The treaty has survived hostility and wars between India and Pakistan but failed to deter
India from interfering in the Indus Basin flows. In 1999, the steady period of waters management
was disturbed when India announced plans to construct Baghliar Dam on the Chenab. Pakistan
registered its concerns with the Permanent Indus Commission but its members (drawn from the two
countries) were unable to reach consensus.
In the end, Pakistan approached the World Bank which ruled in favour of the dam. India has
started building more works including the Kishanganga project, Ratle, Sawalkot Dams and Wullar
Barrage on the Western rivers, i.e., Chenab and Jhelum, in the Indian-administered Jammu and
Kashmir. Pakistan has objected as the dams can impact water flow in Chenab and Jhelum Rivers.
Pakistan approached the International Court of Arbitration against the Kishanganga project. The
court partially ruled in favour of Pakistan; however, it allowed the construction of the dam, urging
India to abide by the IWT requirement of minimum water flow in the concerned river.
India is reportedly working on more hydro projects, including Pakal Dul Dam. India’s
unilateral actions in the Indus Basin are not only worsening water relations between the two
countries but also eroding mutual trust. The other day, India-Pakistan waters bureaucracies held a
meeting in New Delhi to discuss the concerns relating to the Indus Waters Treaty.
Being a low riparian state, Pakistan is threatened by India’s plans for projects on the western
rivers. Pakistan is a predominantly agrarian economy. Almost 80 percent of its irrigation water
comes from the Indus River System. About 45 percent of the population is employed in the
agriculture sector. Pakistan’s irrigation system consists of canals and barrages fed by water in the
western tributaries. Any action by India to disturb the flow of water in the said rivers ultimately
impacts the availability of water in the barrages and canals system of the country.
It is time Indian and Pakistani authorities took IWT seriously and sat together to find
workable solutions to the issues under its framework. If the trust deficit and inflexibility between the
neighbours is not reversed, it will further exacerbate regional security challenges. (Source: TNS)
 33

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY

Zile Huma (A Public Policy graduate from the University of Oxford)
Pakistan is facing grave consequences of climate change in form of glaciers melting, floods,
droughts, unprecedented rains, heat waves, and smog. According to the 2022 report of the UN body
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Pakistan would face greater consequences of
climate change in the coming decades in rural and urban areas. It further predicts “more locusts
attack due to more conducive temperature and increased rains in deserts.”
The report also mentioned that Pakistan lost two per cent of agriculture production in the
fiscal year 2019-20.
Such predictions about the threats of climate change and environmental issues for Pakistan
will have more negative impacts on the already struggling socio-economic development of the
country. It requires smart minds with smart technological solutions to deal with this emergency.
One innovative area which needs attention for its utilization in fighting the menace of climate
change in Pakistan is space technology. The application of space technology is being emphasized all
over the world to solve many problems. The use of space technology to mitigate and adapt to
climate change can be a useful tool. According to the European Space Agency “Space technologies
have led to several inventions that benefit the environment and save energy. Satellite-based systems
are reducing vehicles’ carbon dioxide emissions, remote-sensing technology is making wind
turbines more efficient, and information from weather satellites is helping solar cells to produce
more energy.”
The use of space technology in Pakistan can be fruitful in many ways. First of all, metrological
satellites are early warning systems and can predict extreme weather conditions like unprecedented
rains, droughts, and floods. Effective, timely reporting and countering measures can reduce the
impacts of catastrophes caused by climate change. These early warning systems are being used by
the Metrological Department of Pakistan but sometimes delayed actions result in big catastrophes.
In case of floods, satellite images can help to keep a check on damages and help rescue missions to
strategise their relief operations by targeting the most effective areas. It can be used to evaluate
financial losses in form of infrastructure damages like hospitals, schools and homes. The evidence-
based reports through these images will also help to estimate the kind and number of relief packages
required like food, medicines, and shelters. The world is relying on satellites to monitor climatic
changes in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, especially glacier melting. Such advanced technology
can be utilized to supervise such changes in our northern areas which are home to the highest
mountain ranges in the world. The technique of geo sensing can be helpful to estimate the forest
cover in the country. It can also keep a check on the progress of forestation projects by providing
details about the area forested and the growth of trees. It will also help in the timely reporting of
timbre mafias in case of illegal tree cutting and make them accountable. Smog is another
phenomenon faced by the residents of Lahore city, creating health issues and disrupting everyday
routine. One of the reasons behind smog is the burning of crops which is usually banned now before
the arrival of winter. The satellites can also keep a check and provide proof against farmers who
violate the laws and burn crops. The use of space technology can also help to decrease fuel
consumption which results in less carbon emission. The abrupt use of brakes and using accelerators
repeatedly increases fuel consumption. The Global Positioning System (GPS) guides the drivers
about the economical driving style by giving information about the traffic and road disruptions.
 34

There are several suggestions to effectively utilize space technology to mitigate and adapt to
climate change impacts in Pakistan. First of all, we need to introduce these topics and subjects in our
education institutions teaching climate change/environmental sciences and space technology. The
government and private sector should create job opportunities in specialized areas like the use of
space technology in climate change. To meet demand and supply, and reduce unemployment, we
need to provide counselling to the youth of Pakistan to choose innovative areas in higher studies
especially the use of space technology in climate change issues. The Higher Education Commission
must collaborate with other countries leading in research to apply space technology in the fight
against climate change to provide a scholarship in this particular area. Such scholarship
opportunities should be shared on regular basis directly and timely with faculty of environmental/
climate change departments, and institutions teaching space technology, and also on digital media
platforms of the Higher Education Commission. We need to arrange more workshops and seminars
with international experts on this topic to keep ourselves updated with new research, inventions,
and developments in this area.
(Source: Daily Times)
 35

Covid-19
PREPARING FOR FUTURE PANDEMICS
Gordon Brown (Former British Prime Minister)
For G20 countries, to have and to hoard life-saving vaccines and deny them to the poorest
countries, is morally indefensible. To allow tens of millions of doses to go to waste is an act of
medical and social vandalism that may never be forgotten or forgiven. An urgent, ongoing, month-
by-month delivery plan and airlifting of vaccines, coordinated by the G20 countries, is now needed
to put the unused capacity to use where vaccines are most needed.
But the vaccine inequities show why more fundamental changes are needed in the
international architecture of health decision-making. Of course, few international organisations have
been given the freedom and independence to make binding decisions that national governments are
obliged to follow. The discretion available to the Appeal Court of the World Trade Organization and
to the International Criminal Court, whose decisions are final, are areas where an international
organisation can overrule nation-states and because of that, they are under assault from a coalition
of anti-internationalists.
While there is a global health treaty focused on reducing the demand and supply of tobacco,
and a 2011 agreement to ensure the WHO can commandeer supplies of flu vaccine when needed, the
binding worldwide agreement that has been called for to enable world health authorities to do more
to prevent, detect, prepare for and control a pandemic still eludes us.
The special World Health Assembly summit offers us a unique opportunity to address these
gaps by serving as a launchpad for a process that will urgently develop a legally binding
international agreement under the auspices of the WHO Constitution. They can build on important
reports – the G20 report of Larry Summers, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the
Mario Monti report to the European region of the WHO and, the recommendations of the WHO
review led by former Liberian President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and former New Zealand Prime
Minister Helen Clark.
First, our global health leaders must have more authority to develop and upgrade health
surveillance. Second, we need to build on the pioneering work of ACT-A and COVAX to ensure
equitable manufacturing and distribution of PPE, tests, treatments and vaccines so that all countries
can detect, respond, treat and protect against current and future pandemics. Third, we need a global
pandemic preparedness board.
But all this will work only if we devise a sustainable financing mechanism to address the
glaring global inequalities in health provisions across the world. Too often, in times of global crises –
even those where we face life and death decisions – we are reduced to passing round the begging
bowl or convening ‘pledging’ conferences in a way that is more reminiscent of organising a whip-
round at a charity fundraiser.
(Source: Aljazeera)

YEAR THREE OF THE PANDEMIC IS UNDERWAY: NOW WHAT?

Robert H. Shmerling, MD (Senior Faculty Editor, Harvard Health Publishing)
Let’s not kid ourselves: the pandemic is still with us, despite how it may sometimes seem.
Increasingly, people are going back to work in person. Schools reopened this spring. And
mask mandates are history in most parts of the US. In many places, case rates are falling and deaths
 36

due to Covid-19 have become uncommon. For many, life now closely resembles pre-pandemic
normalcy. So, what do you need to know about where we are now?
Not so fast: Covid remains a big problem
The virus is still very much with us, not behind us. According to the CDC, in the US there are
nearly 100,000 new cases (likely an underestimate) and around 300 deaths each day due to Covid as
of this writing. Despite this, more and more people are paying less and less attention.
1. I haven’t gotten Covid by now. So, do I still need a vaccine?
Yes, indeed! Vaccination and boosters are the best way to avoid a severe case of Covid-19
infection.
Maybe you’ve been spared infection so far because you’ve been vigilant about physical
distancing, masking, and other preventive measures. Or perhaps you’ve inherited genes that make
your immune system particularly good at evading the Covid-19 virus. Or maybe you’ve just been
lucky.
Regardless of the reason, it’s best not to let your guard down. The SARS-CoV-2 virus that
causes Covid is highly contagious, especially the most recent variants. And while some people are at
higher risk than others, anyone can be infected and anyone can become seriously ill from this virus.
Even if you get a mild or moderate case of Covid-19, remember that some people experience
symptoms of long Covid, such as fatigue and brain fog.
2. More and more vaccinated people are getting sick with Covid. And I’ve heard that more Covid-
related deaths have occurred since vaccines rolled out than before they were available. So, how
much of a difference do vaccines and booster shots really make?
They make a huge difference.
It’s estimated that Covid-19 vaccinations have saved more than two million lives in the US. If
vaccination rates had been higher, estimates suggest more than 300,000 additional lives could have
been saved.
We know that rates of infection, hospital admission, and death dropped dramatically among
vaccinated people soon after vaccines became available. We also know that most severe cases of
Covid-19 among the vaccinated occur among people who haven’t had a booster shot. Overall, severe
cases and deaths remain much lower among people who are vaccinated and boosted than among
people who are not vaccinated.
Is it true that the share of severe Covid cases and deaths occurring among the vaccinated has
risen? Yes, but possible explanations for this trend actually show that vaccines continue to protect
people from serious illness:
 When rates of infection fall, overall rates of hospital admission and death fall for everyone,
vaccinated or not. So, the gap between rates of infection and death between vaccinated and
unvaccinated people gets smaller.
 Available vaccines aren’t as effective against new variants of the virus. True, but these
vaccines still effectively reduce the risk of severe disease.
 Immunity wanes over time. That’s true for even the best vaccines, which is why boosters are
needed. Yet only about a third of the US population has received a Covid booster. That
makes it easier for the virus to continue to spread and mutate.
 We’ve now logged more time with vaccines than without them since the pandemic began.
Because no vaccine is 100% effective, the numbers of cases and deaths will continue adding
up, eventually outnumbering pre-vaccine cases and deaths.
 37

3. First, vaccines were going to solve this. Then we needed one booster shot. Now we need two.
What's happening, and why should I even consider this?
Good questions. The protection provided by most vaccines tends to wane over time. That’s
why tetanus shots are recommended every 10 years. We’ve learned that protection against Covid-19
may wane a few months after the initial vaccine doses. A first booster is recommended for everyone
who is vaccinated, five months after completing the two-dose Moderna or Pfizer vaccine series or
four months after the single-dose J&J vaccine.
Because immunity from the first booster may wane sooner in older adults and people with
certain health conditions, another Pfizer or Moderna vaccine dose is now available to those over age
50 and others at particularly high risk.
4. Now that mask mandates are in the rearview mirror and everyone is tired of Covid restrictions,
what else helps?
It’s not yet clear that mask mandates should have been lifted as soon as they were, especially
when rates of infection were starting to rise again. We’ll only know in retrospect if that was a good
idea.
As for other measures, physical distancing, masking up, and other steps still make sense in
certain situations. For example, if you’re using public transportation or traveling by air, a well-fitted
mask can provide a measure of protection. If you’re regularly exposed to a lot of people and know
you will soon be in close contact with someone who is at high risk, mask up and get tested in
advance.
5. What's the bottom line here?
Get vaccinated! If you’re eligible for a booster, get one. It makes no sense to get the initial
vaccine and forego boosters. If you’re one of very few people who had a significant reaction to one
type of vaccine, ask about getting a different type of vaccine as a booster.
When the pandemic began, few were expecting that more than two years later it would still be
causing so much suffering and death. But we shouldn’t pretend it’s over; don’t throw out your
masks just yet and do follow public health recommendations. If you’ve decided not to get
vaccinated or boosted, think again (and again)!
Yes, we’ve all had it with the pandemic. But I think of it this way: when it looks like rain,
throwing out your umbrella and pretending it’s sunny are decisions you’ll probably regret.
(Source: Harvard Health Publishing)

POST-COVID-19 SITUATION
Pakistan’s external sector perform well
Pakistan ‘s external sector performed better by encouraging exports performance and imports
have also risen significantly because of the description of global supply chain and evolving post
Covid -19 situations.
According to Pakistan Economic Survey 2021-22 launched on Thursday, the broad-based
surge in global commodity prices, Covid-19 vaccine imports, and demand-side pressures, all
contributed to the rising imports.
During Jul-Mar FY2022, goods exports grew by 26.6 percent and amounted to US$ 23.7 billion,
whereas services exports grew by 17.1 percent and amounted to US$ 5.1billion.
 38

Resultantly, the trade deficit grew by 55.5 percent to US$ 30.1 billion which is historically
high. Remittances which always supported in easing out pressure of trade deficit of both goods and
services recorded at US$ 22.9 billion during Jul-Mar FY2022 and posted a growth of 7.1 percent.
According to the Survey this ever-highest level of workers remittances was not sufficient to
offset the trade deficit. Thus, the current account deficit was recorded at US$ 13.2 billion during
FY2022.
Further, low performance of financial accounts during the period not only resulted in
depletion of foreign reserves but also brought the exchange rate under pressure. External sector
performance as Covid-19 disrupted economic activity worldwide. Thus, in Pakistan, after a slight
contraction of real GDP in FY2020, Pakistan’s economy rebounded in FY2021 and FY2022.
Many policy measures were initiated to support export-oriented industries and facilitate these
firms to increase export earnings.
Due to pro-business measures and recent rupee depreciation, (as per PBS data) exports
marked an impressive growth of 25.0 percent during Jul-Mar FY2022 amounting to US$ 23.3 billion
as compared to US$ 18.7 billion in the same period last year, survey said.
Around two thirds of the increase came from the textile sector, especially from the high value-
added segment.
Pakistan’s textile exporters capitalized on the policy support available – including the SBP’s
concessionary refinance schemes for working capital and fixed investment, and the regionally
competitive energy tariffs – and managed to ship higher volumes to key destinations (such as the
US, UK and EU).
Higher cotton prices also helped to increase the export unit prices of both low and high value-
added textile products. Apart from textiles, rice exports also rebounded during Jul-Mar FY2022,
mainly due to the non-basmati variety.
Supply of energy to export oriented sectors including textile at regionally competitive rates i.e.
electricity at US cents 9/kWh all- inclusive and RLNG at US$ 6.5/MMBtu all- inclusive during FY
2022. However, the existing tariff of US$ 6.5 /MMBtu for Captive Power (self-power generation)
was revised to US$ 9/MMBtu w.e.f. 15.11.2021 to 31.03.2022.
Release of Rs 16 billion under Duty Drawback of taxes and levies (textiles & non textile) till
third quarter of FY2022. Continuation of duty-free import of textile machinery to encourage
investment in the textile sector and enhance capacities.
The global economy has faced multiple headwinds during Jul-Mar FY2022. The post Covid-19
growth rebound had contributed to higher consumer demand for many products and commodities,
thereby stressing supply chains and leading to a commodity price ‘super cycle’.
From late February 2022 onwards, geopolitical tensions between two major commodity
producers – Russia and Ukraine – significantly added onto the commodity price spiral, pushing up
prices of energy and food commodities even further.
Just as the higher commodity prices were pressuring external accounts of emerging markets
(EMs), higher inflation out-turns in the US and other advanced economies resulted in central banks
adopting a tightening monetary policy stance.
The revival of global economic activity in the first half of 2021 has boosted merchandise trade
over its pre-pandemic peak, as global merchandise trade volume has increased by 9.8 percent in
2021.
 39

The global trade grew by 26 percent and reached US$ 22.4 trillion, while services trade grew
by 15 percent and reached US$ 5.7 trillion. World merchandise trade volume is projected to grow by
3.0 percent in 2022 and 3.4 percent in 2023 provided the Ukraine-Russia war does not expand
further.
The total imports during Jul-Mar FY2022 clocked at US$ 58.9 billion as compared to US$ 39.5
billion in the same period last year, showing a growth of 49.1 percent.
The increase in imports is recorded in all the major groups. Multiple factors have contributed
to the steep rise in imports during Jul-Mar FY2022.
Rising global commodity prices contributed significantly to the increasing import volume.
Disaggregated data on imports indicates that the energy group is the largest source of the
increase in imports, contributing over one-third to the YoY increase in imports during the period.
Similarly, price-led pressures were also noted across non-energy commodities imported by Pakistan,
such as edible oil (palm and soybean), sugar, tea, fertilizer, and steel.
At the same time, the domestic demand for imported raw materials (such as cotton and steel)
and capital goods was also elevated in the wake of the policy induced economic rebound.
(Source: APP)

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19

… Through Trade Disruptions in Pakistan
Countries around the world have started to experience the economic impact of Covid-19. On
the domestic front, the social distancing measures, especially the lockdowns, have resulted in
restricted mobility and supply shortages. This, combined with the fall in global trade arising from
import restrictions and postponements/cancellations of export orders, has considerably slowed the
economic activity down.
Countries that are part of the global value chain (GVC) would feel the hit even if spread of
Coronavirus is contained now and has not disrupted the internal economic functioning of the
economy.
Several sectors of the economy have been affected by the ongoing lockdown in Pakistan.
This bulletin focuses on the quantification of the potential loss in economic activity for the last
quarter of FY 2019-20 resulting from trade disruptions. Although Pakistan may not rank higher on
the GVC, the country has enough integration with the global market to feel the impact of
international lockdown. The five major trade partner (with more than 50% share in trade) of
Pakistan are China, USA, UK, Japan, and Germany. Four of these partners are also the worst hit
countries by the Covid-19.
The imports and exports in the last three months (December 2019 – February 2020) for these
major trade partners is shown in Figure 1. There have been significant disruptions in the
international trade flows of these countries. China and Japan experienced more than 15% reduction
in their exports. Rest of the three partners had a reduction of around 5%. Some of them have also
experienced reductions in their imports.
 40

These trade disruptions of our major trade partner is a worrying situation for us. Figure 2
shows Pakistan’s import (exterior circle) and export (interior circle) shares with its major trading
partners. The USA and China are the major import partners and we rely heavily on them for the
import of capital and intermediate goods. These goods are then utilized in the production of final
goods for exports and domestic consumption. Similarly, being our major export partner, any
economic downturn these economies face would directly affect our exports and therefore our GDP.

Pre- and Post-Covid -19 Trade Situation of Pakistan with Major Partners
To understand what potential impact the trade disruptions could have on Pakistan’s economy,
it is important to first examine the pre and post Covid-19 trends in the import and export with major
trading partners. This is provided in Figure 3 where trade situation with UK, USA, China and
Germany is shown. The vertical lines in these panels shows the breakout of Covid-19 in China. We
may add here that at the time of this analysis data was available till February 2020, and does not
include any day of March when the situation worsened in most countries. In case of China, it could
be accessed only till January 2020. There was trade ban with China after the outbreak and this could
be the possible reason for the unavailability of data for the month February.
 41

It is interesting to see that in post-Covid outbreak in China, Pakistan’s export to other major
partner were on the rise in February. This could possibly be because of trade halt of these countries
with China as the later closed its border and stopped trade with rest of the world. The resulting
vacuum was filled by Pakistan through exports to these countries. This trajectory, however, may not
continue in the coming months because of: (i) disruptions in our imports of intermediate and capital
goods; (ii) China recovering from the outbreak; and (iii) reduced demand by the partner countries
due deterioration in their economic activity. We can also see a decline in our imports from Germany
and UK. If we have data for China for February and March, we would also see decline in imports.
All this can have detrimental effects on our economy.

GDP Loss through the Trade Disruptions

Before we calculate the potential loss of GDP for fourth quarter of FY 2019-2020, let us
examine the composition of our imports. Figure 4 shows that 32% of our imports are in the form of
final goods. Reduction in these would not affect the GDP. However, the rest of 68 percent constitutes
the raw material, intermediate goods, and capital goods. These are used to produce final goods
which are then consumed domestically or exported to other countries. A decline in these will
therefore have a negative effect on investment spending as well as on exports. Consequently, the
country will experience in a loss in GDP.
 42

We examine the impact of reduction in imports and exports on national output for three
scenarios. The estimated losses are given in Table 2. In the first scenario, when there is only 2 percent
decline in import the overall loss to GDP is negligible. In scenario II, with 10 percent decline in the
intermediate and capital goods, that will likely bring a big fall in investment, as well as a similar
reduction in exports, would result in a loss of 2.3 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of FY2020. A
20 percent decline in export and import, as assumed in scenario III, would result in a loss of 4.6
percent of GDP.
It is worth mentioning here that this is the impact entirely related to trade disruptions. We
have not considered the impact of internal lockdown, potential decline in FDI and remittances, and
disruptions in other sectors such as aviation, tourism and hospitality etc. in this analysis (these will
be covered in forthcoming bulletins).

Conclusion
We have presented very preliminary estimates of likely impact of the trade disruptions caused
by the emerging Corona economy. It is almost certain that the 4th quarter growth will be negative
and could be as high as 4 percent even in these preliminary estimates. More than likely as things
emerge there will be a larger negative impact on the economy. After all, the Corona event is a big
event where any previous estimates will no longer be valid. We will only learn as we go along.
(Source: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics)
 43

CPEC and OBOR

THE SEZS ARE A GAME-CHANGER
Hassan Baig (Noted economist)
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China – which CPEC is part of – has a lot of potential to
provide required economic stability and sustainability. The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) under
CPEC, if implemented in letter and spirit, are key to progress.
Economically Pakistan is in a greater mess than ever before. Foreign direct investment (FDI),
which is key to economic growth and development, is touching the lowest level one can imagine.
The ever-increasing gap in exports and imports is another ill to be taken care of, as is the current
account deficit. Security issues are popping up day by day. But the most crucial question is: how to
tackle these economic issues?
One of the best options may be to revive the CPEC and its related SEZs. This was the best
option pursued by the previous PML-N government. Subsequently, after the 2018 elections, there
was apparently a lacklustre attitude on the part of the PTI government – allegedly ignoring the
most important initiative that could possibly contribute a lot in economic progress and prowess.
As the new coalition government led by the PML-N has now taken over and they seem to be quite
serious concerning the economy, there is a serious and immediate need to pursue the SEZs
initiative of CPEC.
Initially, there were about 29 SEZs; this was subsequently revised to 27 out of which only nine
SEZs were prioritised as a first step, but those nine also could not properly take off. There is no
progress at all, whatsoever, except the economic zone and to some extent Rashakai. All others,
including Dhabejee and Bolan SEZs, could not take off at all apparently due to lack of interest by the
last government.
If the present government, which has a lot of credibility in the eyes of the Chinese government
and investors, goes all out for revival of 27 SEZs – initially planning to implement an agenda for
prioritizing nine in the first five years, and then 10 SEZs in the next five years, with the last eight
SEZs in the last phase of five years. There could be an estimated investment of about $350 billion by
the Chinese government and investors in the next 15 years in Pakistan that could revive our
economy in a big way. And it is badly needed to revive the economy.
The planning ministry has to chalk out a full-fledged plan and a policy document outlining
packages providing special incentives and facilitation to Special Economic Zones to attract
investment from China. What they need more than that are assurances from Pakistan to provide
foolproof security to Chinese people, workers and management and their companies working in
Pakistan. They also want assurances and timely payments of profits on their investments as well as
repatriation of their profits, which is in fact a legitimate demand.
The Chinese model of economy has taught us to go all out for infrastructure development in
the form of industrial clusters and economic zones to achieve big goals of economic development.
Pakistan has learnt recently to follow this Chinese economic growth model and has started taking
initiatives to develop Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the backdrop of CPEC. The SEZ initiative is
a step in the right direction towards the goal of a developed Pakistan.
The history of industrial clusters and special economic zones dates back to the 1950s starting
from Ireland with a growing concept of modern SEZs in the 1970s onward mainly to attract FDI with
export-led growth achieving economies of scale and job creation. One can imagine the speed of such
growth from the fact that the number of SEZs have added up to about 1400 in a span of the last five
 44

years – jumping up from 4000 to 5400 SEZs right now in the world. Although the concept of SEZs
has contributed a lot to the world economy, the Chinese experience has been amazing.
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s started implementing a new
vision of economic growth through the modern concept of SEZs by opening its market for world
investors bringing a lot of investment in the country. There are mainly seven famous SEZs namely
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, Hainan, Shanghai Pudong New Area and Tianjin Binhai New
Area; China has also developed economic and technological development zones, free trade zones,
export-processing zones and high-tech industrial development zones.
SEZs and other economic zones as mentioned above are contributing in a big way to the
Chinese economy by attracting FDI, generating employment, upgrading skills, enhancing and
diversifying exports as well as trade efficiencies. According to some of the estimates, the SEZs are
contributing around 23 per cent in GDP, almost 60 per cent in Chinese exports while attracting 45
per cent of foreign direct investment and creating about 30 million jobs, which is not less than
a miracle.
The SEZ model of economic growth is also popular in other parts and regions of the world;
most such zones are found in African and Latin American countries. These zones are in the
thousands. Countries like the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Eastern Europe have also
developed their economic zones for growth and investment. The US has developed California
Enterprise Zones, Maryland Enterprise Zones, New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zones and Michigan
Neighbourhood Enterprise Zones. There are also some specialised zones developed by the US,
which are substantially contributing to economic growth.
The same is the case in other countries of the world, especially developing countries or least
developed countries in the African continent. Last but not the least, Bangladesh is another prime
example of developing SEZs with impressive economic growth credited to such zones in
the country.
It is believed that Pakistan may realize the dream of a developed Pakistan by implementing
the SEZs initiative under CPEC by achieving roughly estimated GDP growth of about 8-9 per cent
annually for about two decades. Pakistan can get rid of all foreign loans and attached conditions,
especially loans from IMF and World Bank in 20 years time. Special incentives and facilitation to the
SEZs can bring not only FDI but also export-led growth as well as employment, jobs and prosperity
for the people of Pakistan, especially our unemployed youth. The SEZs can be a game-changer in the
real sense of the word.
(Source: Money Matters)

THE MEANING OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Ruqayya Anwer (Academic at Riphah International University, Pakistan, Ph.D. holder of media and
communication studies)
China's rise as a global power has been accompanied by remarkable investments in several
regional and transcontinental initiatives, and the most significant is the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The project has received a lot of
attention in recent years, from politicians to business leaders, China to its neighbors, Asia to Europe,
and beyond. The ideals of wide engagement, cooperative contribution and shared benefits are
central to the BRI. The development strategy intends to increase connectivity and cooperation
between China and several regional actors, including Mongolia, Russia, Eurasian nations, Central
and West Asia, Pakistan, other Indian subcontinent countries and Indochina. It is a massive
collection of investment projects that has the potential to transform the worldwide development
 45

environment on both a national and international scale. China's entire attitude toward help and its
overarching vision of global relations shifted with the BRI.
The current unipolar world order is changing, and international relations are becoming more
multipolar. The BRI is a globalizing force since it externalizes China's internal economy by lowering
trade barriers. It has a multifaceted, global or grand strategy that has the potential to transform
contemporary international relations drastically.
Because of their proximity to the world's second-largest economic power and the many
projects that are already in the works or may be built within their borders in the future, countries in
Central Asia and the South Caucasus may be able to benefit from significant economic and
infrastructure upgrades as a result of the Chinese initiative. Firstly, since these countries lack direct
access to the ocean and major marine shipping routes, which severely restricts trade, China's plans
to build railways and create roads as part of the BRI's "belt" could significantly improve their
connectivity. Many countries in the region lack adequate transportation infrastructure, and the BRI
might help ease the intra-state movement of products and people and relieve the pressure on state
governments to fund much-needed internal projects. Additionally, the BRI program could assist in
creating jobs and increase tax revenues.
Regional states might benefit from more widespread cooperation on a single initiative like the
BRI, which could alleviate tensions and enhance connections. Although regional integration is still in
its infancy, the project would open up a slew of new possibilities for tying the region together.
Notably, to reap the benefits of enhanced connection to neighboring and global markets, regional
cooperation must be strengthened and hastened while also helping to minimize the initiative's not-
insignificant negative repercussions. This approach will ensure regional cohesion, learning and
utilization of the BRI's opportunities.
The project now belongs to the entire world. It is steeped in history but strives for the future. It
is primarily focused on Asia, Europe and Africa, although it is available to all partners. It
encompasses many nations and areas, various phases of development, various historical traditions,
various cultures and faiths, and various habits and lifestyles. It is a peaceful development and
economic cooperation effort, not a geopolitical or military alliance. The initiative is rapidly growing
in importance as a platform for establishing a worldwide community of shared futures. It
encourages international trade and people-to-people interactions, improves cross-national
understanding, and removes cultural barriers to achieving peace, unity and success.
The BRI is intended to transform China's global reputation through international ties and
collaboration, emphasizing promoting China as the dominant figurehead for Asia. The plan
establishes the framework for economic and social growth, with stated goals such as boosting
economic prosperity, supporting sustainable development, developing international cooperation
and mutual understanding, and promoting global peace and stability. Similarly, its influence on
international relations and development may aid in developing nations' quick economic growth,
such as enhanced trade facilitation and fewer trade barriers to raise the average income of Chinese
residents and boost labor mobility.
Significantly, it is an inclusive and collaborative growth process, not an exclusive China club.
It makes no ideological distinctions between countries and does not engage in a zero-sum game.
Countries are welcome to participate in the effort if they so want. It adheres to the Silk Road
philosophy of peace and collaboration, openness and inclusion, mutual learning and shared profit. It
emphasizes policy coordination, infrastructural connection, unhindered commerce, financial
integration and stronger people-to-people ties. It has transformed thoughts into deeds, vision into
reality, and the endeavor into a public product well praised by the international community.
(Source: Daily Sabah)
 46

STRENGTHENING CPEC
Shahzada Irfan Ahmed (Senior journalist)
In this crucial time when our country is facing economic instability, the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) – with a massive $62 billion investment plan – can play a key role as a
‘game changer’ for the national economy, especially for the development and prosperity
of Balochistan.
The significance of this multi-billion-dollar corridor is, however, poorly understood. This is a
flagship project under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), designed to connect more than 60
countries across Asia, Europe and Africa. CPEC promises to open up new vistas of socio-economic
development and employment opportunities for the people of Balochistan.
We can say that Balochistan, and Gwadar in particular, is the linchpin of this mega project.
This project will contribute to the development of the whole province and address various economic
and social problems there. Gwadar will be transformed into an economic hub after the completion of
several projects under CPEC. It is heartening to see that more countries are taking advantage of the
investment opportunities offered by the special economic zones there. With the construction of the
western route of CPEC, property value has skyrocketed in areas where these roads have been built.
Other cities like Qalat, Quetta and Zhob will also become more vibrant with the completion of the
planned road network which will give a boost to economic activities and other development projects
under CPEC.
Numerous road and transport, energy, education and training, industrial and other socio-
economic projects are also being carried out under CPEC. Energy projects include a 320MW China
Hub Coal Power Project, and 300MW Coal-Fired Power Project at Gwadar. Likewise, connectivity
projects encompass the 19km four-lanes East Bay Expressway Gwadar which is near completion,
linking the Makran Coastal Highway N-10 to the Gwadar Port. Those under construction are Zhob-
Quetta, Kuchlak (N-50), Khuzdar–Basima Road (N-30), Hoshab–Awaran Road Section (M-8),
Nokundi–Mashkhel Road, Awaran–Khuzdar Road Section (M-8), up-gradation of DI Khan (Yarik) –
Zhob, N-50 Phase-I, Mashkhel–Panjgur Road and Quetta Mass Transit.
Upgradation and development of fishing, boat-making and maintenance services to protect
and promote livelihoods of the local population is being carried out under the Gwadar Livelihood
Project. As a matter of fact, CPEC will affect the province economically, commercially as well as
geographically. A positive impact is likely to be a step towards mitigation of poverty and reduction
of unemployment. It will be a catalyst for change in the shape of reduction of inequities among
undeveloped provinces. Soon after PM Shehbaz Sharif took charge as the 23rd prime minister, he
turned his attention towards CPEC which had been started by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.
In his maiden speech in the National Assembly after winning election, Prime Minister
Shehbaz Sharif had said that his government would speed up the construction of CPEC. He had
previously spoken highly of CPEC several times, calling it an ambitious blueprint to transform
Pakistan into a major emerging economy so that the less-developed parts of the country could enjoy
the dividends of development.
The corridor will not only help and benefit Pakistan and China but the whole region,
including Afghanistan, Iran, India, and the Central Asian Republics. Road, rail, and air linkages will
lead to a win-win model for all and is considered a real hope for a better future with growth and
development of the economy. India and Afghanistan will sooner or later join this project.
Per a market pundit: “Pakistan may have some leverage in Afghanistan, but as far as CPEC is
concerned, it cannot afford to miss this once-in-a-lifetime chance, especially when the people of the
country are getting desperate for the promised future."
 47

Unfortunately, there are those that are working on an anti- state agenda with the support of
foreign countries and have been trying to undermine the development of the province by targeting
state institutions, security forces and also Chinese nationals. In a span of just one month, the city of
Karachi witnessed three bombing incidents – a suicide attack on Chinese teachers at the University
of Karachi’s Confucius Institute in which three Chinese language teachers and their driver were
killed; and bicycle and motorbike improvised explosive device (IED) blasts in the densely populated
Saddar and Kharadar areas targeting Pakistan Coast Guards and police..
Moreover, there is no doubt that CPEC is the game-changer in the region and beyond. Both
the Pakistani and Chinese leadership need to place special attention and focus – with dedication and
commitment – to promoting CPEC and OBOR as a success story. They need to do this with strong
political will, wisdom, vision, for real economic growth and common prosperity for the whole
region through regional connectivity.
We should strengthen deep strategic cooperation with China and use CPEC to develop
infrastructure, hydro-energy resources, and industrial cooperation for real dividends and long-term
industrialization. No doubt, CPEC is not only for our economic growth but in line with the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and will bring transformation through regional
connectivity.
(Source: The News)

REBUILDING CPEC’S PROGRESS

Nasir Jamal
In the last four years, the progress on the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) initiative has mostly remained tentative and stop-start. The question is: can the
momentum seen during 2015 and 2016 be revived after years of little progress?
One of the major reasons for the slowdown in momentum on CPEC-related projects pertains
to political and economic changes in Pakistan, which have contributed a great deal to the slowdown
in CPEC-related cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing. For instance, there simply has never
been a real level of warmth between China and the previous Imran Khan government; even though
there were some phases of optimism but no actual progress.
Then, Pakistan’s fiscal problems and a deteriorating balance of payment situation meant
delays in payments to the Chinese power companies and procedural and other impediments to the
projects already agreed upon and undertaken.
China was also seen as cautious about making such major investments. Then there was
increasing sensitivity among the Chinese financing institutions to the economic and political risk
of Pakistan. Besides, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments for China have slowed down
everywhere. It was natural that its investment in CPEC, the BRI’s flagship initiative, would also
decrease.
The pandemic that led to the global shutdown didn’t help either. All these factors have
together led to the closing of many projects like ML-1 and Karachi Circular Rail (KCR), or the
slowdown of schemes such as the Gwadar international airport and Gwadar coal power plant.
“When in opposition, Imran Khan and his PTI party had reservations about the utility of
CPEC for Pakistan. They associated this initiative with PML-N. Thus, when PTI came into power, it
paused work on it for a review. At that time we saw the PTI ministers giving public statements
about corruption in CPEC projects and overpricing of schemes by Chinese companies. These factors
created an element of mistrust between the two sides,” Zafaruddin Mahmood, Pakistan’s former
 48

special envoy on CPEC between 2015 and 2017 and president of the Lahore-based thinktank,
Understanding China Forum (UCF), told this correspondent in an interview.
“Then we had the pandemic that led the Chinese government to lock down their country to
protect the lives of its citizens. The PTI government didn’t have experience and it couldn’t engage
Beijing to remove this element of mistrust. By the time Imran Khan understood the need for closely
working with China and the significance of CPEC for Pakistan’s economy, it was already too late.
The damage had been done and it’s not easy to undo that in a short span.”
But can we revive the old momentum? “Well, it will take some time before CPEC catches its
lost momentum. But the new government of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is now engaging
Chinese authorities. Our foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari recently visited China and the
prime minister himself has spoken with top Chinese officials and is personally trying to remove the
problems facing Chinese firms operating in Pakistan.
“The premier is also working on the resolution of the issue of payments to Chinese
independent power producers and finding a long-term solution for it. He has been to Gwadar twice
to show his support for CPEC and the Chinese companies working in Pakistan. Indeed, there still is
some scepticism in Pakistan based on the experience of last few years, but that must be fought
against,” Mr Mahmood argues.
When asked about Pakistan’s exclusion from the recently held Global Development Initiative
(GDI) dialogue organised around the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
conference, he said the criticism that Beijing didn’t invite Pakistan to participate in GDI dialogue is
misplaced.
“Pakistan’s participation was blocked by India as the organisation takes decisions with
consensus from each member of the group having veto power. The Chinese authorities had
informed our foreign office about that. Pakistan is an important member of the Friends of the Global
Development Initiative group and China attaches great importance to Pakistan’s important role in
promoting global development, promoting the implementation of the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Develop­ment and regional cooperation.”
Mr Mahmood points out that the recent Islamabad visit of high-ranking Chinese politician
and Politburo member Yang Jiechi represents the return of old warmth in cooperation between the
two countries.
Mr Yang is considered a personal representative of President Xi Jinping because of his
position in the Chinese hierarchy and is the first such high-ranking Chinese official after its foreign
minister to go for a foreign visit since the outbreak of the pandemic and consequent lockdown in
China.
“That he chose Pakistan to be his first stop testifies to the importance the Chinese authorities
attach to Pakistan. It reflects their support for Pakistan and is a manifestation that Islamabad
remains an important ally of Beijing like always.
“I believe that some projects under the CPEC like ML-1 and KCR will be revived in the near
future. A meeting of the Joint Cooperation Committee is expected within the next two months or
less after a long time. I can say that sincere and genuine efforts are being made and the initiative will
regain the lost momentum,” Mr Mahmood, who has recently been appointed SAPM on CPEC,
underlines.
He doesn’t agree that Pakistan has taken expensive loans from China under the CPEC
initiative. “The interest on the government-to-government debt basically averages out to less than 2
per cent, considering the large amounts of grant assistance China is giving Pakistan. For example,
China has developed Gwadar deep seaport at a cost of $198 million with its own money. Likewise, it
 49

is establishing an international airport in Gwadar at a cost of $250m besides several other

socioeconomic projects undertaken across the country.
“Pakistan, in fact, is the largest recipient of Chinese grants and assistance across the world. In
the case of commercial Chinese loans, the return is a little bit higher though.”
He believes that Pakistanis must understand that CPEC is much more important for our
country than for China. “Indeed, being a flagship project of the BRI, the progress on it will help
China send the message across the world that BRI is good for the developing countries. But Pakistan
remains the primary beneficiary of the Corridor project,” Mr Mahmood contends.
He says Gwadar in particular will benefit massively from the Chinese grants. “Most Chinese
grant projects like a seaport, airport, a state-of-the-art hospital, water desalination plant and skill
training centre being built through Chinese grants are all located in Gwadar in Balochistan.
“They are working on projects to help resolve the problems of power and drinking water for
the Gwadar residents, as well as creating employment opportunities for the local population by
distributing free fishing nets among fishermen and solar panels among the residents of Gwadar.
Then, we have a proposed coal power plant there. But we must remember that Balochistan is very
big and it is not the responsibility of the Chinese to develop that province.”
Yes, he adds, there are some problems but once economic activity opens up following the start
of the Gwadar airport operations, it will push new opportunities for the local population. Moreover,
the Chinese are also developing the Gwadar Free industrial Zone, which has been delayed due to
our failure to finalise an incentive package for the investors. Then the availability of water and
electricity there is a major issue. Still, we see Chinese investors have set up a food processing unit, a
marble refinery and a fish processing factory in Gwadar. So it is progress.”
(Source: Dawn)
 50

Domestic Politics
CHARTER OF ECONOMY
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
Pakistan is facing existential financial and economic crisis. Foreign debts are soaring and
economic activities shrinking. Inflation is on the rise while people have limited choices for
livelihoods. It is the result of deep structural flaws, including consumption-led GDP growth,
commodity-based market, lack of innovation and diversification.
The consumption-led growth has severely impacted economy hindering its transition from
primary to secondary or tertiary economy. Country is striving hard to come out of this situation and
is looking for avenues which can help people.
In this context, PM Shehbaz Sharif has come up with the idea of Charter of Economy and is
urging all the power players and stakeholders to join hands for conceiving innovative ideas and
real-time solutions. It is not for the first time such an idea has surfaced. Unfortunately, it never
materialised in the past due to differences of priorities among the power players.
Present crisis is compelling us to take practical steps to come out of this crisis. For that
purpose, we need to adopt scientific approach, not big statements. It is required to get rid of fancy
slogans and devise a charter based on ground-realities. Thus, before formulating charter, Pakistan
should ponder on few questions. First, from where the crisis originates? Second, what are the needs
of people? Third, what are the ground-realities like state of human capital and financial resources?
Fourth, which sector has potential to give immediate relief and pave way for sustainable
development? Fifth, which country can act as anchorage country? Sixth, charter for the elite or the
common people?
Second step should be to devise charter by adopting a phase-wise methodology and every
phase should be tagged with a concrete number of GDP and priority areas. A study by the Asian
Institute of Eco-civilisation came up with following phase-wise framework. Phase-1, low-hanging
fruit (two years), targeted GDP $430 billion and priority areas would be agriculture and tourism.
Phase-2, short-term (five years), GDP target $600 billion and priority areas would be SMEs and
industry. Phase-3, medium-term (15 years), GDP target $1.5 trillion and priority would be areas
would be industry and SMEs. Phase-4, long-term (25 years), GDP target $3 trillion and priority areas
would be services, industry and SMEs. It is pertinent to mention here that phase-wise priority does
not mean Pakistan ignore other sectors, it is just priority for certain phase.
Third, due to expansion of economy, Pakistan would be in need of an anchorage market,
which can accommodate surplus production and provide required foreign direct investment.
Owning to CPEC, China can act as an anchorage market for Pakistan.
Fourth, Charter of Economy should not repeat mistakes of Charter of Democracy. As most
people think, it was a charter among the power players and there was nothing for the common
people. Thus, Charter of Economy must be pro-poor, with strong mechanisms of distribution of
resources. State-owned enterprises can serve this purpose.
However, Charter of Economy cannot achieve the goals without overhauling the governance
system. First of all, Pakistan will have to go for bureaucratic overhaul. For that purpose, first
intervention should be to reform the inducement policy and merit system.
Second, the planning system of Pakistan is weak and exclusive in nature. There is strong need
to refine it. Planning should start from grassroots and not be influenced by so-called representatives
 51

of society like NGOs, think tanks etc. In this regard, we can learn from China, especially from the
process of development of five-year plans.
Third, there is need to improve the business environment, not only by ranking. For example,
registration of business is a complex process and involves seven agencies, and security clearance
further complicates it. It takes several days, in some case months, to register business. Further, tax
system must not be extractive neither for industry nor for common people. As Ibn Khaldun said, tax
rates should be rationalised, and tax net must be expanded.
Fourth, it is a well-established fact that implementation and monitoring are the weakest links
in the execution of policies and programmes. Deadlines are not observed due to lack of monitoring
and accountability mechanisms. Besides, political point-scoring creates problems. Pakistan can
overcome the hurdles by creating M&E and accountability mechanisms and by tagging promotion
with successful execution of a specific number of programmes.
Fifth, the most important intervention would be to produce high quality human capital with
strong values, ethics and commitment to society development. It should take care of needs of
economy and fourth industrial revolution.
Sixth, to create buy-in among all, there is need to constitute a joint committee comprising
heads of five leading political parties (not government or opposition), opposition leader, chief of
services, chief of judiciary with Prime Minister as head of the committee. It will help curb political
point-scoring and ensure smooth implementation of Charter of Economy.
Seventh, there should be no rehiring of retired civilian and military personnel at all. If
someone wants to serve nation, he/she should do without pay as he/she is already enjoying post-
retirement benefits.
In conclusion, Pakistan needs to learn about the importance of indigenous wisdom and role of
Islamic laws. Father of Nation always emphasised role of indigenous wisdom and Islamic principles
for building a prosper society (speech at the opening ceremony of State Bank of Pakistan). Lastly,
being an Islamic country, “œinterest (Riba) system” must be eliminated.
(Source: The News)

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING NEUTRAL

Salahuddin Ahmed (Former President of the Sindh High Court Bar Association)
In Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley’s famous Gothic novel, the brilliant scientist Frankenstein
creates a living being which, out of fear, he abandons to its fate.
Rejected by the world and his creator, the embittered creature remonstrates with Frankenstein
— “Remember, that I am thy creature: I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel.” The
scientist initially relents but, when he forsakes the creature again, it warns him of revenge —
“Beware; for I am fearless, and therefore powerful.”
To face abandonment when seeking nurture, to encounter neutrality when expecting support
— the denial of entitlement inevitably evokes powerful emotions. Every parent weaning a child
quickly learns how narrow the line between gratitude and rage is.
Our generals and judges are learning it too.
To be fair, Imran Khan made every attempt to let his creators know what would happen if he
were abandoned to the vicissitudes of the political world. He told them what he thought of
“neutrality”. He warned them, like Frankenstein’s creature, how much more dangerous he would be
if returned to the streets shorn of fear and the trappings of high office. Now he is showing them.
And, at least some of them, are running scared.
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In the popular portrayal, Frankenstein’s creature is a monster — a fearsome being consumed

with hatred for mankind and its creator. Shelley’s original novel paints a far more nuanced picture
of hubris and betrayal. But since the publication of Frankenstein, the brash experimenter and the
experiment gone wrong have become a recurrent theme in apocalyptic science fiction.
Many read Khan’s heralded entry and ignominious exit as further proof of Pindi’s
omnipotence and ability to change civilian governments at will. But when an elaborately conceived
and tortuously designed experiment spirals out of control in just three years, forcing its designers to
pull the plug and beat an undignified retreat, does it really evidence omnipotence?
The experiment has devoured, and continues to devour, much time, effort and money (both
rupee spent and rupee lost) in a nation unblessed with luxuries. In the private sector, it would be
time to summon the bean-counters: auditors and consultants would descend to tally losses and affix
blame. Heads would roll. That is far too ambitious, of course, for our public institutions. But is it too
much to ask for at least some introspection and internal review of the cost and results of the
experiment?
Taking Stock
Today, the rule of law lies in tatters. After a brief flowering in the post-Gen Musharraf era,
fundamental rights and civil liberties have been in continuous retreat for many years now.
Censorship of the media, the intimidation of journalists and political activists, and the filing of
frivolous cases against political opponents have been commonplace for a while. But in the last two
months, we have still managed to plumb new lows.
The highest constitutional functionaries sworn to preserve the Constitution brazenly defy it.
The speaker of the National Assembly refuses to even count the votes of parliamentarians. The
President of Pakistan refuses to follow the advice of the prime minister. Members of the Punjab
Assembly thrash their speaker for daring to hold elections in compliance with court orders. The
Governor of Punjab refuses to administer oaths to the chief minister-elect and his cabinet; leaving
the largest province without a government.
Polarisation has reached a level where rank and vile abuse masquerade as political critique.
Protests are held, not in public squares, but outside homes of politicians (and their ex-wives), and
even in the Masjid-i-Nabawi. Bizarre, outlandish conspiracy theories crowd out substantive
discussions about our urgent economic and social problems.
Meanwhile, the reputation of our armed forces and judiciary is in freefall. Their highest
officers are abused — not just by trolls on social media but openly by political leaders and
supporters in rallies, marketplaces and airport lounges. To counter those attacks, the Director-
General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) must hold press conferences and high courts issue
press releases, while the Chief Justice of Pakistan voices his bitter complaints from the bench. But
except for those employed (or motivated by patent self-interest) to do so, there is barely a voice in
defence.
The institutions themselves are clearly divided. Reportedly, the army chief has had to engage
in multiple meetings with serving and retired officers to try and bring them round to his point of
view. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is so riven it cannot even convene a full court or larger
bench without judges openly sniping at one another.
How did we ever end up here? Put simply — we are reaping the harvest of an utterly foolish
experiment in hybridism. The experiment entailed the sacrifice of some principles and involved
incurring costs. It is only now we are realising the price was too high.
Institutional Abandonment of Impartiality
The doctrine of political neutrality is the most powerful defence available to any professional
service. It allows judges, army officers and bureaucrats to escape public ire by pointing out they
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don’t make law or policy but only interpret or implement it. For such services to abandon the safe
haven of neutrality and harness their fortunes to political movements resting upon the whimsical
tides of public opinion (even if they do so with the noblest intentions of furthering “the national
interest”) is an act of prime folly.
Eight years ago, when Khan climbed on to a container and pleaded for the “umpire’s finger”
against an elected government, he should have been sternly rebuffed. The storming of the state
television headquarters — the opening gambit of every aspirant coup-maker or revolutionary —
could not possibly be condoned. Instead, both the military and judicial institutions chose to
mollycoddle him. They continued to do so at nearly every stage over the next eight years — making
their preferences overt. Those preferences have come to haunt them.
For years, it was systematically impressed upon the public mind that both the armed forces
and the judiciary were on the “same page” as the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) government. We
were told that this was in the supreme “national interest”. All PTI leaders would proudly and
publicly flaunt this institutional support in their rallies and talk shows (and, with many more
corroboratory details, in private).
They would openly cite it as a reason why the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) could never return to power. Not once were they snubbed for their
presumptuousness. In fact, every statement that emerged from the ISPR or was uttered from the
bench only seemed to confirm this understanding.
As a result, an entire generation has grown up with the expectation that these institutions can,
and should, pick sides. It is only wrong when they pick the other side. It is unsurprising, therefore,
that this generation is shocked at the reversion to ‘neutrality’. They see it as an immoral betrayal.
Khan — revelling in his new role as demagogue — deliberately feeds the fury of his
supporters against the military and judiciary with his taunts about the ‘neutrality of animals’ and
barely veiled references to Mir Sadiq and Mir Jafar.
Of course, political intervention is not new for our military or for our judiciary. But every
overt intervention — from the days of Ayub Khan and Muhammad Munir onwards — has
eventually been met with public disgrace for the prime actors, and has been followed by a period of
institutional retreat. Covert interventions, by their very nature, may (temporarily) avoid such public
opprobrium.
There is, however, a qualitative difference in the intervention over the past eight years. Firstly,
although it was technically a covert intervention, it was conducted in a manner as overt as possible.
Plausible deniability was thrown to the wind. Secondly, it was conducted in the age of Twitter
trends, vlogs and WhatsApp forwards. What was previously alluded to in hushed whispers, and
through cryptic signals within elite circles, is now loudly debated in your local chai shop.
For example, in a previous era, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s notification pursuant to
the so-called ‘Dawn Leaks’ inquiry may have triggered a tense meeting between the military top
brass and the civilian government. In 2017, the DG ISPR (a mere Major General) was able to tweet —
“notification is rejected” — out to his millions of followers.
And to completely remove any doubt about where the political preferences of the armed
forces lay, right after the Results Transmission System (RTS) stuttered to an inexplicable halt on
election eve in 2018 and it became apparent that the PTI had defeated the PML-N, the DG ISPR
sent a jubilatory tweet in Quranic verse: “Allah honours whom He pleases and dishonours whom
He pleases.”
Similarly, although many opposition movements and rallies in our political history are said to
have enjoyed the covert support of intelligence agencies, it was utterly unprecedented for the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) — through then Maj Gen Faiz Hameed — to directly sign on as a
 54

“guarantor” to the Faizabad peace treaty between the Nawaz Sharif government and the deceased
Khadim Rizvi of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan.
It was even more unprecedented for another ranking army officer to openly distribute money
(in full uniform, no less) to the participants of that mob. Surely, such tasks could have been
outsourced? But no, the very purpose was to send a clear and unmistakable message about where
the military stood vis a vis the PML-N government.
Judges, above all, are trained to appreciate the importance of propriety. They understand that
observance of the proper process of arriving at a result is often just as important, if not more
important, than the result itself. It lies at the heart of the well-known judicial maxim — “justice
should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.
But round about 2017, otherwise brilliant judges such as Saqib Nisar suddenly and
inexplicably cast aside considerations of jurisprudential caution, due process and propriety, and
plunged headlong into every political thicket they could find.
There is a memorable passage in Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, between the
famous jurist and philosopher Thomas More and his more impetuous son-in-law, William
Roper, who indignantly asks him whether he would give the Devil the benefit of law. W hen
More replies in the affirmative, Roper scornfully tells him he would cut down every law in
England to go after the Devil.
More’s answer is the perfect riposte to the closet vigilante that lurks in the chest of so many
Pakistanis who should know better. “Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
’round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat… And if you cut them down,
and you’re just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil the benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!”
The period shall forever be marked for its questionable jurisprudence. At the conclusion of the
hearings in Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification case, Justice Asif Saeed Khosa observed, “We will decide
this case only by the law, such that people will say, 20 years down the line, that this judgement was
made by the book.” Five years on, it is still hard to understand how the non-declaration of an
unreceived 10,000 dirham salary can be deemed an act of dishonesty justifying the removal and
disqualification of an elected prime minister.
Perhaps many in the Supreme Court find the logic in Nawaz Sharif’s case equally hard to
follow — which is why half the parliament is not sitting at home disqualified for the unconscionable
sin of not listing “a receivable” as an asset.
A little later, however, the Supreme Court also stripped Nawaz of his office as party head and
pronounced that his disqualification from contesting electoral office was for life. In the latter case,
the apex Court held that, because the Constitution is silent about how long a person who has shown
himself not to be “sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen” should remain
disqualified, it ought to be presumed such disqualification is for life.
It is noteworthy that Article 63 (h) of our Constitution provides that even a person convicted
and jailed for an offence involving moral turpitude may contest elections after five years from his
release. So, as per the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the underlying spirit and intent of the
legislature, while framing Article 62 and 63 of the Constitution, was that an actual murderer may
become a member of parliament five years after his release, but someone who omits to declare a
salary should remain disqualified for life.
However, the apex court applied a dramatically different standard in Khan’s case. Despite
recognising that Khan had admittedly concealed his London flat in his Pakistani tax returns filed
after 1981, thus making him “a violator in relation at least to his duty under the Wealth Tax Act,
 55

1963”, they did not hold it to be an act of dishonesty. Instead, they held the concealment stood cured
once Khan declared the flat and paid the requisite penalty under the tax amnesty scheme of 2000.
Notably, the apex court elided the question whether a tax amnesty scheme, introduced
through subordinate legislation and intended to protect a person against prosecution and recovery
proceedings under tax laws, could also protect him from the entirely separate consequences of
dishonesty specified under Article 62 of the Constitution.
Even more crucially (and in contrast to the elaborate investigations conducted by the Supreme
Court-nominated Joint Investigation Team in Nawaz Sharif’s case) the court refused to direct the
Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to produce Khan’s nomination form for the 1997 elections,
which would have clearly established whether he had concealed the flat in that form too.
The apex court took a different view of accounting principles too. Khan bought his London
flat through an offshore company in Jersey, Channel Islands. Even after declaring the flat, he did not
separately declare his beneficial ownership of the offshore company in any of his election
nomination forms. The court held, however, that this was of no significance because the only real
asset of the company was the flat — and that had been duly declared.
Fair enough. But what the court ignored was that, even after the sale of the London flat, the
offshore company had subsequently recovered 42,000 pounds in rental dues from a past tenant.
How is it that an unreceived salary must be listed as an asset but rental dues actually received do
not need to be?
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the court had already concluded Nawaz Sharif was
dishonest and should be excluded from Pakistani politics, whilst reaching the opposite conclusion
about Khan, and then decided to work backwards to justify those results. Ends justifying the means
cannot be the basis of any coherent judicial philosophy.
Other disquieting occurrences strengthened the perception that sides had been chosen. For
example, it is not unprecedented for the apex court to order the constitution of a Joint Investigation
Team (JIT) or even to directly nominate members of such a JIT. But it is certainly not ‘by the book’
for the court to initially pass a written order, leaving it to the discretion of a departmental head to
nominate any appropriate officer to the JIT, and then for the registrar of the court to make secret
WhatsApp calls to that departmental head, advising the nomination of a particular officer!
But the oddness of this pales against the astonishing case of Judge Arshad Malik. After
convicting Nawaz Sharif on charges of corruption, he was surreptitiously recorded on video
admitting he had been blackmailed and pressured into doing so by intelligence agencies and the
superior judiciary. Shortly afterwards, he backtracked and swore an affidavit claiming it was
actually the Sharifs who had blackmailed him into recording such a video.
Understandably, the Supreme Court considered the matter serious enough to take direct
cognizance under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution. After all, no matter which version was true, it
either pointed to gross subversion of the judicial process by a former prime minister or the same at
the hands of intelligence officers and senior judges. It was a matter more important, surely, than
even the original offence of corruption alleged against Sharif. More than sufficient, one would have
thought, to justify a full-fledged judicial inquiry or even constitution of a JIT to investigate the affair.
Instead, after a brief hearing, the apex Court declined to do either. It did not take Judge
Arshad Malik to task, nor did it opine on the impact his egregious misconduct would have on the
validity or propriety of the Sharif trial.
Instead, after taking great pains to elaborate no less than 21 tests that Arshad Malik’s video
would need to meet before the Sharifs could use it as evidence of misconduct (one of the tests being
that the maker of the video must show he had made it as part of his routine duties and not for the
 56

purposes of trapping the judge!), the court held it would not be appropriate to interfere further and
left everyone to their own fate.
But what, then, was even the purpose of the Article 184 (3) proceedings? Only to rule out the
admissibility of the video? After all, if the other factual and legal aspects involved in the shameful
episode could be left for determination by the appropriate investigative agencies, lower courts
and/or disciplinary forums — so too could the admissibility of that video evidence.
The seemingly selective application of suo motu was also concerning. The PPP government in
Sindh and the PML-N government in the centre and in Punjab met with a phalanx of suo motu
inquiries by the apex court. On the other hand, the PTI governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
the centre and Punjab (post-2018) largely escaped that level of scrutiny.
It was not that there were no scandals in the latter administrations. The widely reported
illegalities and alleged corruption in the Malam Jabba chairlift project and the Peshawar Metro
spring readily to mind. These cases were, perhaps, all the more worthy of judicial in quiry given
that NAB decided them unworthy of further probe. It is hard to reconcile this judicial reticence
with images of Saqib Nisar, then Chief Justice of Pakistan, personally leading an early -morning
raid to the hospital room of PPP Minister Sharjeel Inam Memon, and triumphantly recovering two
bottles of alcohol.
Saqib Nisar’s visit to Khan’s house after his ouster as prime minister and his speeches
attacking the judiciary have only reinforced Khan’s perceived status as a ‘favoured child of the law.’
The visit and its timing has naturally given rise to speculation whether it was at Khan’s or the
former Chief Justice’s instance, and whether it was to receive or convey a message. But it has done
nothing to burnish the judiciary’s reputation for neutrality.
Barring the singular exception of the judgement in the National Assembly Vote of No
Confidence case, PTI continues to enjoy good fortune in litigation before the apex court. When faced
with possible adverse votes in the Senate elections, President Arif Alvi sent a reference to the
Supreme Court asking for its advice whether the Senate elections needed to be by secret ballot.
One would have thought the question was quite easily answered. Article 226 of the
Constitution says, “All elections under the Constitution, other than those of the Prime Minister and
the Chief Minister, shall be by secret ballot.” After indulging the Attorney General for 16-days in his
argument that Senate elections should not be considered to be elections under the Constitution, the
court eventually concluded that, although Senate elections are held under the Constitution,
nonetheless “secrecy is not absolute [and] has not to be implemented in its ideal or absolute sense”!
Similar judicial creativity is evident in the recent opinion of the Supreme Court in President
Arif Alvi’s reference regarding the fate of defectors. Article 63-A clearly says that parliamentarians
who disobey their party head’s instructions in a vote of no confidence shall lose their seats (if their
party heads and the ECP so declare). It does not say their vote shall not be counted.
By holding so, the Supreme Court has practically deleted Article 95 of the Constitution, as no
prime minister or chief minister with a simple majority can now ever be voted out. Equally, it has
made Article 63-A of the Constitution effectively redundant. What fool would ever cast his vote
against the directions of his party head, knowing his vote will not even be counted? As the minority
opinion holds, it amounts to rewriting the Constitution.
And while this opinion (coupled with the initiation of suo motu into the wrongful transfers
and postings in prosecution agencies by the Shahbaz Sharif government) appears to have mollified
the PTI’s anger at the midnight opening of courts, it is only a temporary reprieve. The underlying
problem is that Imran Khan and his team are not content with a level playing field. They insist that
they are engaged in a holy war between good and evil, and everyone must clearly pick a side.
 57

On the other end, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition leaders complain
the apex court never bothered to initiate suo motu proceedings into the blatantly partisan
attitude of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) under the PTI government (despite such
partisanship being noted by some Supreme Court judges themselves), or the manner in which
the PTI government successfully hamstrung the prosecution in the storming of PTV case against
Khan and the senior PTI leadership.
It is hard for the powerful to resist the temptation to wield power. More so when one feels one
can shift the nation’s trajectory towards a better future. But it is that discipline that maintains the
long term credibility of our professional institutions. The abandonment of that discipline has had
terrible consequences for the reputation of our institutions and ushered in a relatively new trend in
our politics.
Since 2018, Nawaz Sharif, Maryam Nawaz and Fazlur Rehman have been publicly blaming
the army for removing Nawaz and bringing Imran to power. Coy references to ‘the establishment’
were replaced by names of specific generals and brigadiers and judges. Once the dam of reticence
broke, those names were taken everywhere. Cited not only by politicians, but even by other judges
in judgments and affidavits. The PTI’s game of name and shame is only a continuation and
intensification of that trend. This trend shall continue to gain strength unless and until institutions
can reestablish their distance from politics.
Over the last few years, we have been systematically and successfully undermining the façade
of constitutionalism and the impartiality of our judicial and military institutions. Is it any surprise,
therefore, that both institutions are viewed as overtly political actors and subjected to the vitriol
previously reserved for politicians?
By 2018, half the electorate was convinced the military and judicial establishments were
conspiring against their choice of leader. In 2022, the other half is equally convinced. The two sides
disagree on everything except the shared conviction that our judges and generals play politics. It
does not bode well for the future.
Discord and Dissensions within Institutions
The other fallout of this experiment in hybridism has been the rise of unprecedented
dissensions and discord within the military and judicial institutions.
The unity of command doctrine within the military means it has done a better job at papering
over those divisions. But close observers have pointed out the existence of pro-Imran and anti-Imran
factions even at the three-star level. This is the inevitable consequence of swinging strongly in one
direction and then abruptly reversing course. Our army does not want for significant military
challenges in the region. It cannot possibly afford to devote so much time to divisive politics.
But the judiciary is clearly the worst sufferer of the experiment. As noted above, the TLP
dharna in Faizabad badly exposed the partiality of the military institution. Simultaneously, it also
laid the seeds of division within the judicial institution.
Both the Islamabad High Court and the Supreme Court initiated proceedings in relation to the
dharna, which laid the seeds for the present divisions within the judiciary. Not coincidentally, both
judges who passed strictures against the involvement of intelligence agencies in the dharna were
visited with references. One was against Shaukat Siddiqui of the Islamabad High Court. Not one to
take anything lying down, Shaukat Siddiqui responded by publicly accusing the ISI and Gen Faiz
Hameed of manipulating judicial proceedings and trying to secure verdicts against Nawaz Sharif
with the connivance of then Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court, Anwar Kasi.
The other reference, against Qazi Faez Isa of the Supreme Court, is now disowned by ex-PM
Imran Khan and his former cabinet members, who claim to have been misled by the former law
minister, Farogh Naseem. The latter, in turn, has placed the blame squarely back on the ex-PM.
 58

But by the time the reference was politically orphaned, it had already torn the Supreme Court
in two. Judges who considered the reference against Isa to be motivated by malice and liable to be
quashed forthwith, clearly clashed with those who wished to take the matter further. The former
sent letters to the chief justice alleging they were being deliberately excluded from the bench hearing
the case. The latter accused the former, in open court, of trying to drown their voice and eventually
penned an unusually bitter dissent against the judgment allowing Isa’s review. The wounds have
yet to heal.
In his farewell speech, senior judge Maqbool Baqar felt it necessary to remind his brethren,
“[w]e must remain conscious of the mandate of the Constitution and not substitute our moral and
political beliefs for the express command of the Constitution. Unbridled judicial activism spells the
death of the rule of law.”
He complained that the “[e]xclusion of certain judges from the hearing of sensitive cases on
account of their independent and impartial views has an adverse effect on the impartiality of judges
while also tarnishing the public’s perception about the independence and integrity of the judiciary.”
He also lamented — “[c]an this country expect us to be temperate, balanced, and respectful
when we are incapable of displaying the most common of civility and courtesy to our own
colleagues?”
It has been far too high a cost to pay.
Perversions in the Media and Public Discourse
Beyond the internal workings of institutions, the experiment also extracted its toll on public
discourse and the exercise of civil liberties generally. Some time during Nawaz Sharif’s government
(some date it to Hamid Mir’s attempted assassination), the military establishment and intelligence
agencies decided to take a far more robust approach to controlling media narratives.
The successful shutdown of Geo, arguably the most popular news channel in Pakistan —
albeit in response to an act of extraordinary irresponsibility — was a lesson to all other news
channels and media personnel. At the same time, their ability to do so, without any effective judicial
interference or unsustainable public outcry, convinced our intelligence agencies that there was
practically no limit to the extent of their power.
It became a precursor to the most draconian restrictions on the freedom of speech ever
witnessed during civilian government. Television channels carrying the wrong news or hosting the
wrong guests would suddenly be taken off air by cable operators. And no one, not the judiciary and
certainly not Pemra, could do anything about it. Needless to say, channels that don’t get aired don’t
get advertisements either. So the owners of the channels became much more receptive to advice
from appropriate quarters about the right narrative to present.
Journalists unable or unwilling to understand the new rules were eventually asked by the
owners of their channels to move on. At various periods, prominent and popular journalists
including Talat Hussain, Nusrat Javed, Najam Sethi, Hamid Mir, Amber Shamsi and various others
became persona non grata at all media outlets. More stubborn ones, such as Matiullah Jan, Absar
Alam or Asad Ali Toor were abducted, shot or thrashed.
Social media did not escape attention either. New draconian provisions were inserted in laws
like the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act (Peca) to allow dissident voices to be more effectively
silenced through midnight raids by investigation agencies. But it was not only about shutting down
opposing voices. A new breed of media personnel and social media trolls were simultaneously
cultivated to loudly and aggressively propagate one point of view with scant regard for truth or
more traditional journalistic values. They were then used to facilitate and build a national narrative
in favour of the 2018 regime change and to sustain the PTI government.
 59

It is said that a frog thrown in boiling water will immediately jump out. But a frog placed in
water that is gently and gradually heated will eventually boil alive before he realises he needs to
jump. Over the past eight years, we have become habituated to the encroachments upon our
freedom of speech and our civil liberties. We have come to accept channels and anchorpersons being
unconstrained by any reference to objective truths or even the norms of common decency. Our
courts, tasked with protection of our fundamental rights, remained mostly silent.
But the basic miscalculation those pulling the strings from behind made (and one they’ve
made with others earlier) was in not realising one’s narratives and creatures can spin out of control.
When they enjoy uncontested space for years, they take a life of their own. It is no longer possible to
switch them off whenever they become inconvenient.
So once again, it is back to the drawing board. Today, Shehbaz Sharif smugly occupies, by
fervid invitation, a seat snatched from his brother only five-years back. His moustachioed Minister
of Interior demands he be extended the same cooperation from our military and judiciary in
crushing the right of speech and protest of his opponents that he claims was extended to the PTI
during their government.
By any metric — social, political, economic and legal — Pakistan has regressed. And all that
the masters of our destiny have earned from their failed experiment is public disrepute and discord
within their own ranks.
Perhaps Mary Shelley put it best:
“Man,” I cried, “how ignorant art thou in thy pride of wisdom!”
(Source: EOS)

A POLARISED SOCIETY
Tariq Khalique (Assistant Editor, Business Desk at the BOL News)
Pakistan is in a lose-lose situation, caught between politicians and the military establishment.
Soon after Imran Khan was ousted from the premiership, he has been running an aggressive
campaign, both on the ground and online, to malign his opponents and the military establishment,
which will give air to bloodshed.
Yes, democracy is the best revenge but fascism has put a brake on the democratic process in
the country. Recently, the country has seen a lurched level of political discourse, which has never
been witnessed since its inception in 1947. The environment is deeply polarised and tense. Indeed, in
the past too, the political parties were not polite but this fascist behaviour is unprecedented.
With the fascist personae, Imran Khan crushed political discord, victimised his political
opponents, kept the press in chains, played the religion card, and above all took full advantage of the
anti-US sentiment. Besides, he also dragged the military in almost every aspect of national politics.
Another feather added to the cap of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is the use of abusive
language in the national media and public gatherings. The spokespersons of the party during their
press conferences and television talk shows, instead of debating on the real economic challenges the
country is being faced with, make personal attacks on their rivals regardless of their gender.
These verbal fights often involve the use of words hardly appropriate for the members of the
parliament to exchange. Words matter and harsh words have their consequences. This has become
an awful part of the country’s politics. Both sides of the aisle, whether government or opposition, are
now speaking the same language in a manner, which is not acceptable at any cost.
 60

The political leaders are supposed to set an example by their conduct and their willingness to
engage in reasoned debate but they are involved in bitter arguments and aggressive rhetoric to
demean their opponents. Only a bunch of political leaders have resisted this behaviour.
This shows the political leadership lacks the will to resolve the issue of the common man,
which badly affects the country’s future.
Now, one can see that the political leaders in their rallies and power shows only talk about the
shortcomings and wrongdoings of their opponents instead of giving a strategy to address the
problems being faced by the people. Their accent remained slanderous, and they believed that only
they deserved to be elected.
All this has generated a form of issue-less politics, where instead of debating on the country’s
challenges and economic policies, the narratives are reduced to ridiculing opponents. The political
discourse mostly involves an exchange of provocative rhetoric.
Indeed, shallow and confrontational narratives dominate the conversations and are being
heard in television talk shows. Not only the talk shows but the parliament has also become the
breeding ground for such hooligans, denting the overall role of the parliament in resolving the
genuine problems of the people, such as high inflation.
The present day politics is just about gaining power and no political party is apparently
sincere in overcoming the hardships being faced by the people.
The perception that the political elites are only involved in power games erodes respect for the
public representatives and faith in their ability to address the problems of the people. Bickering
among the political leaders is not new in Pakistan but keeping the real issues on the backburner is of
course a cause of concern.
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf leadership continues to validate their inability to accept the
opinion of the opposition parties as legitimate, casting doubts on their patriotism. Pakistan’s
leadership lacks rational debate on policy issues, which undermines the trust of the people.
Yes, the spokespersons are pleasing their leadership but this undermines the public respect for
them. It is not just the political narrative that is defied but the democracy is also challenged.
Polarisation is shaking societies across the world, including India, Turkey, Brazil and even the
US, pushing different factions at extreme ends. It can safely be said that it is not only a problem of
the developing world but the developed world alike.
With the rise in populism, polarised politics, linguistic divide and inequality among various
groups, social values are being set aside for personal gains.
Increasing polarisation is deep-rooted in the misuse of social media, the lack of rational
debate, misinformation, special interests of politicians, and the media houses that serve as the
mouthpiece of either side.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of healthy discussion, supporters from both sides of the aisle
overplay the politics of difference as pretexts for spreading intolerance. Unfortunately, people
without having the knowledge of any issue jump to cling upon one side. They just side with the one
whom they want to follow.
Polarisation is increasing at a fast pace in Pakistan, which will prove disastrous for the
country. Political parties failed to simulate a model of democratic government that promotes
national harmony and integration. Each party after coming into power carries on its own interests
and divides the people into factions based on ethnicity, religious beliefs, provincialism, language,
etc. This gives air to polarisation and partisanship.
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Politicians, demeaning each other, has become a norm to gain public support and badly
impact the institutions such as military establishment, judiciary and the National Accountability
Bureau. This dangerous game polarises society.
The latest example is that of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, who after getting ridiculed by the
judiciary for its unconstitutional actions tries to gain public support rather than accepting it with
dignity.
It is the beauty of democracy to have different opinions but it becomes lethal when these
differences are not welcomed by either party. Various segments of the society are following the
extreme elements.
Democracies need to rise to the occasion and take effective measures if they want to get rid of
polarisation.
Divisions fostering enmity in political, social and religious spheres are weakening the very
idea of Pakistan and threatening national integration and democracy.
(Source: Bol News)
 62

Economy
THE RISE OF ISLAMIC BANKING
Is this the future of banking?
Khurram Zia Khan
On the last weekend of May 2022, Karachi’s Movenpick hotel is buzzing with excitement. An
audience of 450 individuals is ready to listen to speakers from Malaysia, the Maldives, Qatar, the
UAE, the US, the UK, France, Turkey, Bahrain and Pakistan. Another 4,500 participants would join
the sessions online.
This is the World Islamic Finance Forum 2022, a two-day conference organised by the Centre
for Excellence in Islamic Finance (CEIF), housed at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA).
One of the highlights of the events is a talk by Dr Miftah Ismail, the finance minister of Pakistan,
who joins the conference via video call.
“We are working in the right direction,” Ismail says, while speaking about the Federal Shariat
Court’s recent ruling stating that all banking in Pakistan should convert to Islamic banking.
“I think Pakistan as a country is moving towards full implementation of an Islamic finance
system and riba-free banking,” he says. The process, he admits, may take longer than the five year
timeline set by the courts.
Also joining virtually, Dr Murtaza Syed, acting governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP),
says that Islamic finance was widely recognised as one of the fastest-growing segments of global
finance.
Over 70 local and international speakers take to the podium over the weekend. The eager
audience participation and the scope of talks makes one thing clear: Islamic banking has arrived in a
big way, and is only going to continue growing.
We’ve seen the transformation before our eyes.
Ask any small shop owner about how to transfer money to them and it is quite likely they will
provide you with an account number in Meezan Bank, which pioneered Islamic Banking in Pakistan.
Bank branches around us have slowly changed their appearance. Language such as Sadiq
(truthful), Ameen (honest), Seerat (inner beauty), Mustaqeem (straight path), Raast (sincere), Imaan
(faith) and Ikhlaas (sincerity), has become more common in banks’ media messaging. Arabic
calligraphy and artistic renditions of Quranic verses have appeared on walls of waiting areas. And
even banks’ logos have incorporated calligraphic elements and geometric patterns associated with
Islamic art.
The staff members at these banks also dress differently of late. Most noticeably, women can be
seen wearing abayas. In 2020, Faysal Bank attracted criticism on social media for issuing a new dress
code mandating women to wear loose clothes and hijabs. But the criticism could not convince the
bank to alter the dress code, which was clearly part of a bigger revamp.
Two years later, the ‘human resource policy’ available on the bank’s website, states that
female staff should dress “elegantly with a full sleeved abaya” and must wear a headscarf covering
their “entire head and hair”. “Female staff are required to follow the above attire guidelines while
on duty, [and during] training and clients’ visits, as required by Islamic injunction,” the policy adds.
 63

Other banks, including Meezan Bank, have also had similar policies in place for staff. With
Meezan Bank also asking female employees to dress “elegantly” with a headscarf and abaya,
“without being ostentatious”.
Those who criticised the policy had pointed out that abayas are not necessarily part of
Pakistani culture. But this is all part of rebranding and conversion of conventional banks to Islamic
banking (more on that later).
But while initial criticism of the Islamic banking sector suggested that it is nothing more than
‘window dressing’ on conventional banking, over the years it has truly set itself apart. And
customers have followed.
Islamic banking is flourishing in Pakistan.
A growing network
According to a recent Fitch Ratings article, the size of the Pakistani Islamic finance industry is
estimated to have crossed 42 billion US dollars (5.5 trillion rupees) by the end of the first quarter of 2022.
“Islamic banks are the largest contributor to the Islamic finance industry, at 67 percent (total assets),
followed by Sukuk [Islamic bonds] at 26 percent (outstanding amount), Islamic funds at 6 percent (total
assets) and Takaful [Islamic insurance] at one percent (total contributions),” the article adds.
The assets and deposit values from Islamic banking are also sizeable. According to the latest
SBP data, these constitute nearly 20 percent of the overall banking system.
As per the SBP’s Islamic Banking Bulletin (October-December 2021), as of December 31, 2021,
there were five full-fledged Islamic banks operating in the country, with 1,693 branches. Seventeen
banks were also running standalone Islamic banking branches, while another 11 had Islamic
banking sub-branches. The total number of branches and sub-branches stood at 3,956.
Islamic financing has been around in different forms in Pakistan for some time now. But
Islamic banking, as we see it today, has made significant progress over the past two decades.
During this period, a leading Islamic bank, Meezan Bank, has succeeded in making its presence
in the top five major banks of the country in terms of profitability. Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB)
has established a separate subsidiary of Islamic banking, called MCB Islamic Bank Limited.
The impressive growth of Islamic banking is largely due to its increasing acceptability on
religious grounds. Many in Pakistan prefer to do Sharia-compliant banking over interest-based
banking.
But the reasons for the growth are not religious alone. As global financial crises have
deepened, faith in conventional banking has lowered, and this has led to a growing global interest in
Islamic banking. “Somewhat perversely, the global financial crisis presented a big opportunity to the
Islamic banking and finance industry,” writes Dr Mamiza Haq, a lecturer in finance at The
University of Queensland in Australia, in her article Is Islamic banking more risky compared to
conventional banking?
“As opposed to conventional banking, depositors to Islamic banks are entitled to be informed
about what the bank does with their money and to have a say in where their money should be
invested,” Dr Haq continues. “Another difference is Islamic banks avoid interest at all levels of
financial transactions and promote risk-sharing between the lender and borrower.”
Due to these reasons, Islamic banking has picked up around the world. Countries including the
UK, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, South Africa, China and Germany have also been exploring Islamic
banking alternatives. Of course, it has also continued to pick up in Muslim countries, including Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait and Malaysia. The progress in these countries has been much faster as
compared to in Pakistan, which lags far behind when it comes to banking of any kind.
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Pakistani users
According to the World Bank’s Global Findex database 2017, a modest 21 percent of Pakistani
adults had a bank account. This is the lowest in the region and among countries with similar
economies. This abysmally low number may have been part of the motivation to explore an
alternative banking system that could attract more individuals to the banks and provide them with
some financial inclusion.
A lot of research was put into understanding the needs and views of the average Pakistani.
Back in 2014, SBP conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey and found that 60
percent of their sample believed that the growth of Islamic banking was a demand-driven
phenomenon. Very few saw the industry’s growth as a purely supply-driven phenomenon,
indicating that most recognised that there is genuine demand for Islamic banking solutions.
Given the supply-demand gaps, there is a huge potential for further development of Islamic
banking in Pakistan. A significant portion of demand lies among those who are still financially
excluded.
Many experts believe that Islamic banking is a great way of including those who have been
excluded. “Islamic finance helps promote financial sector development and broadens financial
inclusion,” says the World Bank’s Islamic Finance brief. “By expanding the range and reach of
financial products, Islamic finance could help improve financial access and foster the inclusion of
those deprived of financial services. Islamic finance emphasises partnership-style financing, which
could be useful in improving access to finance for the poor and small businesses. It could also help
improve agricultural finance, contributing to improved food security.”
Of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, only 14 percent use banks.
The rapid growth of Islamic banking may also enhance financial inclusion by providing an
alternative to those faith-sensitive Muslims who have voluntarily excluded themselves from the
conventional financial system due to its interest-based nature.
“In this regard, Islamic finance can help meet the needs of those who don’t currently use
conventional finance because of religious reasons,” the World Bank’s brief adds. “Of the 1.6 billion
Muslims in the world, only 14 percent use banks. It can help reduce the overall gap in access to
finance, since non-Muslims aren’t prohibited from using Islamic financial services.”
In Pakistan, a majority of those who use banking services also appear to be open to switching
to Islamic banking. During the KAP survey, 74 percent of the banked responders said that they were
willing to switch to Islamic banking, while 17 percent said they were not sure. The individuals who
said they were unwilling to switch were a clear minority at nine percent.
The survey indicated that there is an overwhelming demand for Islamic banking in the
country.
The conventional banking domination can mainly be attributed to their long presence and
relatively wider network in both urban and rural areas, as compared to the network of Islamic
banks. But this is also changing.
During the survey, the responders were also asked what factors determine satisfaction from
Islamic banking services. While only just over 40 percent of responders said that they were
convinced by scholars saying that Islamic banking was Sharia-compliant, more users (over 90
percent) indicated that the environment and staff at Islamic banks made them feel comfortable.
Other major reasons were, expectedly, religious. Users said that Islamic products provide religious
satisfaction and that these products/services were interest-free.
“Since the inception of Islamic banking in the country, conventional deposits have grown at
an average of 13 percent per year,” Irfan Siddiqui, president and CEO Meezan Bank, tells Eos in an
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email interview. Islamic banking deposits, on the other hand, have grown at an annual average of 42
percent during the same period, he adds.
“Religious motivation has certainly remained a key influencer but it doesn’t just end there,”
he says. “With a greater focus on branch experience, digital and mobile capabilities, and on offering
a comprehensive range of Islamic banking products suited to the masses, we are transforming the
common misperception that Islamic banking is designed only for a niche.”
Afshan Javed, a Meezan Bank customer, would agree. A resident of Karachi, Javed used to
bank with HSBC (The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited) Pakistan until their
operations wrapped up in Pakistan and her account was automatically shifted to Meezan Bank.
At first, Javed was not sure if she preferred, or even understood Islamic banking. But over
time, with the help of the bank staff, she was able to catch up. “To me, the Islamic banking model of
profit-sharing, where the risk is shared by the bank and customer, makes sense,” she says. “I was
also lucky that my account manager was very understanding and explained the differences between
conventional and Islamic banking.”
Converting to Islamic banking
In Pakistan, various international conventional banks have been acquired by Islamic banks
including the Societe Generale Group, HSBC Bank Pakistan, HSBC Bank Oman and KASB (Khadim
Ali Shah Bukhari) Bank.
Bank of Khyber, a public sector bank, has converted over 50 percent of its operations to
Islamic banking. And Faysal Bank has nearly completed its transformation from the conventional
system to a ‘100 percent Sharia-compliant’ one.
“The conversion of Faysal Bank from interest-based banking to Sharia-compliant [banking] is
a success story not only in Pakistan but at a global level,” says Muhammad Faisal Shaikh, head of
Islamic banking at Faysal Bank.
The conversion process began in 2015. “The decision was taken by the major investors of the
bank for the transition from one mode of operation to another,” says Shaikh.
He adds that the transition was “monumental”. “Now the biggest conversion of a bank, at a
global level, is almost complete,” he says. The bank began by converting 220 branches. Today the
network has widened to 621 branches across the country. Only five branches are left and these too
will be transformed in the next few weeks.
Shaikh shares that the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), has deemed Faysal Bank a
“first of its scale” conversion in the domain of Islamic banking.
The number of customers has been increasing with the announcement of the conversion.
Reportedly, other banks also have similar plans as the Islamic finance sector goes from strength to
strength.
International think tanks predict even more growth for Islamic banking and more conversions
in the near future.
“Given the industry’s growth potential and strong financial performance, we expect more
banks to apply for Islamic banking licences and for conventional banks to convert to fully Islamic
banks,” a recent Moody’s Investors Service report says.
According to Fitch Ratings, a US-based credit ratings agency, “Islamic finance industry in
Pakistan is expected to continue its growth trajectory over the medium term, driven by strong
government push and steadily rising public demand for Islamic products.”
“If the court orders are implemented effectively, the Islamic finance industry could receive a
large boost in the medium term,” the Fitch Ratings article adds, referring to the recent court ruling
stating that all banking in the country should convert to Islamic banking.
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The article goes on to acknowledge that uncertainties loom over policy implementation as
court judgements on this subject were issued previously but with “limited effect” on the banking
sector.
The way forward
While Islamic banking has been growing in Pakistan, it faces issues and challenges as well.
One challenge is that there are Islamic scholars who do not believe in any banking system and
vehemently oppose Islamic banks. They even urge their followers to avoid this mode of banking and
financing.
Another problem is the shortage of ‘Islamic bankers’ and other professionals who understand
the system. Individuals are trained and familiarised with Islamic banking, but this too takes time. If
the Federal Shariat Court ruling is implemented, there will be a dearth of professionals in this
particular field.
Then there is the general lack of understanding of what constitutes as Islamic banking (see
box), and what differences there are between Islamic financing and conventional banking.
Ahmed Siddiqui, director of the Centre for Excellence Islamic Finance at IBA, says that
stakeholders are continuously working to raise awareness about the Islamic banking and financial
system, while also addressing the misconceptions of the scholars and the general public.
Encouragingly, he mentions that specialised schools of Islamic banking have been established
in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. These institutions have designed various courses not only for
professional bankers but for scholars as well.
Universities should introduce Islamic banking as a specialised course for students of business,
commerce and economics. Only then will we have future professionals trained to fill the growing
demand of bankers who understand Islamic banking and are able to explain it to laypersons.
Such professionals will be essential as the industry continues to grow.
“We expect growth in Islamic banking to continue to materially outpace conventional banking
[in Pakistan], reaching a market share of total assets and deposits of around 30 percent by end
2026…” predicts Constantinos Krypreos, a Moody’s Senior Vice President.
As far as Islamic banking is concerned, the future is already here.
(Source: Dawn EOS)

HOW TO PREVENT INFLATION

Richard Wolff (Professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
A deafening silence defines ‘debates’ among US leaders about stopping or slowing today’s
inflation. Alternatives to the Federal Reserve’s raising of interest rates and curtailing money supply
growth are ignored. It’s as if there were no other ways to rein in price increases except to add more
interest costs to the already excess debts of workers and small and medium businesses. Were the last
two and a half years of the deadly Covid-19 pandemic, plus the economic crash of 2020, not
sufficient enough burdens on Americans without piling on the additional burden of inflation that
has been imposed by US capitalism?
As usual, the profit-driven concerns of big business and their result – a remarkably selective
historical amnesia – fuel the silence about alternative anti-inflation policies. So too do the right-wing
ideological blinders that now constrict US politics. Yet, policy alternatives always exist, no matter
how desperately partisans promoting one policy seek to obliterate debate and discussion of others.
The narrow dogmatism of US politics these days is on full display around the issue of an anti-
inflation policy focused on raising interest rates.
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I will present three other anti-inflation policies that do not entail interest rate increases – there
are many more – that could and should be part of today’s policy discussions. All have precedents in
US history. For the first, we return briefly to World War II. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
administration grasped the risk of inflation during this period as the supply of many consumer
goods shrank relative to the demand for them. The war effort was diverting many productive
resources away from consumer goods and toward munitions and other defense products. Had the
government allowed the market to handle the prospective shortage of consumer goods, an inflation
of their prices would have resulted. Rich Americans would have bid up the prices of scarce
consumer goods, rendering them unaffordable for middle- and lower-income people. That is how
markets work. They favor the rich (who return the favor by funding economists and others to
promote markets as marvels of ‘efficiency’).
For Roosevelt’s government, the war effort required a national unity that the market
threatened to replace with bitterness, envy, and division, pitting the poor and the middle class
against the rich. The US government thus substituted rationing for the market mechanism. It printed
ration books containing ration stamps and distributed them across the US population. Rationed
goods could only be sold to those with ration stamps. No small irony (at least for those familiar with
Marxism and socialism) attaches to the following: 1) the US government distributed ration books
according to people's needs, and 2) the US government’s explicit goal was to render the distribution
of rationed goods (and especially food) ‘more fairly’ than what the market would have done.
Rationing forestalled the looming inflation. It could work equally well now to slow or stop inflation.
Another anti-inflation policy, other than raising interest rates, came in August 1971, from
Republican President Richard M Nixon. Responding to serious inflation, Nixon declared a 90-day
‘wage-price freeze’. He and his advisers knew that US wage and price controls had also been
deployed during World War II. Some had even read John Kenneth Galbraith’s 1952 book, ‘A Theory
of Price Control’, which showed how well such controls had worked during the war.
As a result of Nixon’s action, employers on one side and employees on the other were
formally denied the right to raise prices or wages, respectively. Any move to the contrary was seen
as a criminal act, rendering the perpetrator subject to police arrest. In response to these measures,
the inflation shrank, the stock market rose, and Nixon was reelected in 1972. For him, the policy
worked. Other countries have also imposed wage-price freezes to similar effects.
Each alternative policy to control inflation (raising interest rates included) has its particular
strengths and weaknesses, virtues and flaws. Honest discussions of how to respond to inflation
would involve comparing the strengths and weaknesses of all – or at least many different – policy
options. Honest national leaders would not pretend only one policy exists. That approach –
dominant in the United States today – yields both policy mistakes and leads to crucial opportunities
being lost. It does, however, serve the interests of those who advocate for that one policy.
There is a third alternative policy to controlling inflation as an inherent risk recurringly faced
by a private enterprise capitalist system. If profit is the ‘bottom line’, if the system’s mantra is
‘charge whatever the market will bear’, and if rewards and punishments follow the rise and fall of
profits that depend on prices, we can hardly be surprised when capitalists raise prices. Nor can we
be surprised that when they do it, it both provokes and excuses others following suit. Inflation
results from private capitalists’ pricing decisions. They are driven chiefly by their private profit
calculations; they need not and do not generally take into account those decisions' larger
consequences (social as well as economic) such as inflation.
The socialization of private capitalist enterprises is thus another anti-inflation policy. A
government, for example, will generally consider the inflationary consequences of any set of price
increases. On that basis, it can either limit or reject them. To the extent that the government is held
accountable politically for inflation and its effects, it has an incentive to control them. The Fed is, at
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best, held accountable only indirectly. That helps explain why the Fed has repeatedly failed to
prevent or control recessions and inflations across the last century. Of course, such socialization of
private capitalist enterprises raises the question of how genuinely democratic the government is.
Yet, the degree of genuine democracy the government upholds will influence all alternative anti-
inflation policies.
Across the United States, insurance, utility, and other public commissions limit private
capitalist enterprises’ freedom to raise their prices in the markets they regulate. Private capitalists in
such markets cannot raise prices without the permission of those commissions to do so. A
government could establish all sorts of commissions in all sorts of markets with criteria for granting
or refusing such permissions. Suppose, for example, that some or all food items were socially
(democratically) deemed to be basic goods, such that no producer or seller could raise its prices
without approval by a federal food commission. Fighting inflation could be among the approval
criteria in this case (just as that is a criterion now for the Fed's monetary policies).
In most capitalist economies, the tiny class of employers (perhaps 1 percent of the total
population) has enormous powers. That class 1) shapes wage and salary levels of their hired
workers, 2) determines the quantities of all purchased inputs and all outputs, and 3) sets outputs'
prices. That tiny class includes many employers who justify their price increases by blaming them
on input prices raised by other employers throughout the supply chain. More shrewdly, the
employer class's wiser members refocus blame instead on workers and wages, blaming them for the
price increases even when, as now, wage inflation is far lower than price inflation.
Of course, commissions to govern prices can be and have been ‘captured’ by the industries
they were established to control. Private capitalists have thus been able to weaken, render toothless,
or even eliminate controls over them. While that is indeed true of the many state-level utility and
insurance commissions, for example, it is no less true of the Fed vis-a-vis the nation’s major banks.
Rationing systems and wage-price freezes can likewise be captured. Historically, the price gouging
by and corruption of private capitalist industries have led to public demands that their businesses be
transferred to government responsibilities. Capitalism's undiminished profit drive then incentivized
the affected industries to ‘capture’ the government bodies charged with controlling them.
The solution to that inherent contradiction of capitalism is surely not an endless series of
oscillations between private and public control. That is what has failed in the capitalist system.
Rather, the alternative solution that beckons is system change, putting all the workers in democratic
control of the enterprises (instead of a tiny separate class of employers). A system based on a
democratized workplace community interdependent with a democratized residential community
offers a much better way to prevent and not merely ‘manage’ inflations and recessions.
(Source: Commondreams.org)

BAD MACROECONOMICS
Rashid Amjad (Professor of economics at the Lahore School of Economics)
Our current economic crisis is as much a result of external shocks as our lack of understanding
of macroeconomic dynamics that have caused frequent changes in Pakistan’s growth path.
Indeed, this lack of understanding has led the economy to move in stop-go economic cycles at
regular intervals; in fact, the growth cycles have become more frequent, resulting in the significant
lowering of average growth since 1988. Why has this happened?
As to the factors behind the growth slowdown, there is broad agreement — low levels of
saving and investment and lack of political will to carry out basic structural reforms to increase
revenues, break the stranglehold of monopolies, and foster competition and productivity growth,
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including the removal of trade barriers. In the absence of reforms, the challenge then is to manage
the economy within the resulting structural constraints which impose limits on sustainable growth.
To take an example: in 2008, the economy faced a severe foreign exchange crisis, with strong
concerns of default. In came the IMF to suggest a sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit to stabilise the
economy. It projected that the economy would slow down after stabilisation measures to 3.5 per
cent. In fact, it crashed to 0.5pc with unemployment rising sharply and food inflation standing at
21pc (as subsidies were slashed). This was the worst ‘hard landing’ we had ever witnessed.
The macroeconomic framework under which the budget of the new coalition government has
been prepared appears to be suffering from the same malaise. It wanted to match the PTI’s
impressive growth performance of near 6pc over the last two years but saner counsel prevailed and
it opted to target a growth rate in 2022-23 of 5pc. The government will be lucky if it achieves 3.5pc to
4pc on the current policy package. In all probability, this rate will fall even further after the
stabilisation squeeze it has agreed to with the IMF. Inflation, too, will be much higher than the
targeted 11.5 pc and may rise to near 20pc in the next six months. Interest rates will rise further.
Ambitious revenue targets will dampen growth and cause inflation to escalate.
We are heading for another hard landing. It will take all the finesse the finance minister can
muster to get the IMF to soften its stance — which, unfortunately, it rarely does. What it will agree
to are additional resources to cushion the impending stagflation in the form of well-targeted direct
income support measures through BISP. The government should use these safety nets effectively.
To what extent is the current macroeconomic predicament the result of economic policies
followed by the previous PTI government? To be fair to the PTI when it was in government, it
handled the Covid-19 pandemic extremely well and cushioned its economic impact — a fact that
was internationally recognised. Its economic policies to reignite growth helped revive it to over
5.5pc in 2020-21. Prudently, it targeted a growth rate of just over 4.5pc for 2021-22 to prevent the
economy from overheating.
What it did not foresee — as most other countries — was the post-Covid super-consumer
boom that was fast unravelling. Early signs of the economy overheating were not picked up by the
IMF and World Bank which projected a growth rate of 4pc for 2021/22 — still below the sustainable
growth projected by some studies of 4.5 pc.
In fact, the economy grew by near 6pc and the binding economic constraint to sustainable
growth — the foreign exchange constraint — had entered with full force. Here, the State Bank of
Pakistan must shou-lder much of the bla-me because it allo-w--ed the forei--gn ex--change rese-r-ves
position to fall to precarious levels. Although the central bank had started raising interest rates, its
cheap credit policy, which pumped in imports at an alarming rate, had been maintained for too
long. The sudden change in government meant a loss of international confidence, even among
Pakistan’s close friends, who refused to roll over their deposits. We now face (not for the first time) a
full-blown debt repayment crisis, with the dollar rising to unprecedented levels in past weeks,
which the new government is desperately trying to douse.
What then are the key lessons to learn so that we can move towards prudent macroeconomic
management? First, convince the IMF not to impose prior conditions that will result in a very hard
landing and to agree to a gradual and not sudden compression in aggregate demand. Second, have
better coordination of the fiscal and monetary policy while respecting State Bank autonomy. Third,
and most important, start rebuilding your foreign exchange reserves especially by attracting new
foreign investment. In future, draw a red line below which the foreign exchange reserves must not
be allowed to fall.
(Source: Dawn)
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AN ‘OVERHEATED’ ECONOMY
Hussain H Zaidi (Islamabad-based columnist)
Over the years, Pakistan’s economy has been confronted with a dilemma it has not been able
to overcome: In the event that it registers lackluster growth, it will not be able to create enough jobs
for its massive (more than 65 million) and growing labour force, thus remaining stuck in low
income-low-employment-low living standards vicious cycle.
In case the economy grows at a moderately healthy rate of five per cent or above, the growth
pace will exacerbate external imbalances mainly in the form of galloping imports, and drive up
prices exorbitantly, making economic expansion difficult to sustain. As a result, stabilization (read:
growth compression) measures will have to be instituted to cool down the ‘over-heated’ economy.
In the latest manifestation of this dilemma, the National Economic Council, the apex
government body for economic matters, has targeted a five per cent growth rate for the upcoming
financial year, because a higher growth rate would have become problematic (read: unsustainable)
in the face of the state of the economy and IMF conditionalities. When an economy is liable to
overheating at growth rate exceeding five per cent, it’s obvious that its edifice rests on flawed
fundamentals.
The, to put it euphemistically, growth-stabilization dilemma is rooted in elementary
economics. The total demand in an economy can be met either by domestic output or through
foreign goods or services (imports). When on the back of a relatively robust economic growth rate,
the domestic demand shores up, local and foreign products will compete to satisfy it.
As a rule, the lower the capacity of the local industry to cater to the heightened domestic
demand, the wider space will be available to foreign products to rack up their presence in farms,
factories, offices, and at homes. Characteristically, in the case of Pakistan, an uptick in domestic
demand drives up imports, as local supplies lag well behind the increased ability and willingness to
buy in the economy.
One obvious objection to the foregoing reasoning is that it disregards the ‘fact’ that
acceleration of economic growth is accompanied by an increase in the scale of domestic output. The
answer to this objection consists in the distinction between short-term economic growth and long-
term or potential economic growth. Short-term growth, as opposed to the potential growth, is
undergirded only by an increase in total demand without a corresponding increase in the
productive capacity of the economy. An example seems in order here.
Suppose an economy can produce 100 million shirts and 100,000 cellphones annually. This
output is the maximum attainable, given the resource base and productivity levels. Cost-saving and
profit-maximizing businesses in either industry will not necessarily produce to their capacity. The
actual number of shirts and cellphones manufactured each year will depend on their projected
demand. In a typical year, 75 million shirts and 80,000 cellphones are manufactured.
Suddenly, because of the induction of a charismatic leader in power or for some other reason,
the economy receives great amounts of remittances from the patriotic expatriates residing across the
globe. Anticipating an increase in demand, garment factories and cellphone manufacturing units
will jack up their production to 80 million pieces and 85,000 units respectively. The increase in
production and sale of the two products will be duly reflected in the expansion of the country’s total
output or the GDP.
The increase in remittance inflows keeps on increasing and with it the number of shirts and
cellphones produced, and the size of the GDP remains on an upward trajectory until in five years
the demand for shirts rises to 100 million and that for cellphones reaches 100,000 units.
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Everyone now seems better off. Consumers, by and large, have more shirts to wear and more
smartphones to use. Factories are hiring more labour and buying an increased volume of raw
materials and components and racking in higher revenues. The government has a cause for boasting
that its pro-growth policies have been consequential.
This scenario does have a fly in the ointment. During all these years, the productive capacity
of the economy has remained stuck at 100 million shirts and 100,000 cellphones, because no new
investment has been made in either industry; nor has the productivity of the workforce gone up.
This means that the short-term growth has not translated into long-term or potential growth. As the
actual shirt, as well as cellphone, output has already reached the maximum capacity, a further
increase in demand on the back of ever-increasing capital inflows can only be met by imports.
Imports are not bad per se; import of raw materials, components and capital goods may be
necessary for keeping the wheels of the economy turning. Likewise, export of certain consumer
goods, such as food and pharmaceuticals, is unavoidable. However, when exports become stagnant
or their growth lags well behind import growth, it becomes a cause for concern: foreign exchange
reserves dry up, the domestic currency takes a pounding, and external deficit balloons up. Soon the
euphoria generated by the short-run growth fizzles out and the government has no alternative to
swallowing the bitter pill of cooling down the economy and reversing the much-trumpeted pro-
growth policies. All of a sudden, the need for undertaking the painful but eventually fruitful reforms
becomes the talk of the town.
Be that as it may, growth compression policies are not sustainable either. It may be a
tautology, but undeniably a developing economy must keep growing, especially one that has a
relatively high population growth rate. Politically, no elected government would like to leave its
office with economic stagnation mocking its balance sheet. People want jobs, which can be generated
only when the economy expands. Businesses are keen to sell more, which is possible only when
consumers have rising incomes and better job prospects. The creditors, which are looking to get their
capital back along with the mark-up, would like the debtor country to jack up its earnings. So soon
after surviving the meltdown, the economy is back on the growth track – jerrybuilt, though it may
be. Somberness, again, gives way to euphoria and economic reforms are put on the backburner.
Pakistan goes through this economic cycle every four or five years, coinciding with the
election cycle. The malady is all too familiar but has proved a hard nut to crack. At 15.2 per cent,
Pakistan’s investment-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest in the world, which needs to significantly
go up. Not only that, we need the type of investment that raises the productive capacity of the
economy. This entails diversion of scarce funds from quick yielding speculative investment – in
stocks and plots – to the real sector (manufacturing, agriculture, and value-added services), with the
right tax and other incentives or disincentives, as the case may be. As in the past, such a move may
come a cropper in the face of stiff resistance from the powerful realty sector. Anyway, an increase in
productive capacity of the real sector is essential for easing supply-side constraints and putting the
country on a long-term economic growth trajectory.
The quality of output is as important as its scale. Production of sub-standard products, even if
on a massive scale, can’t provide a secure basis for long-term growth. In Pakistan, quality is widely
regarded as the most negotiable feature of goods and services. Likewise, businesses are geared more
towards keeping wages down than towards ratcheting up the productivity of labour. Because the
domestic industry is heavily protected, it can conveniently sell low-quality products at home.
However, the same enterprises are either shy of entering foreign markets or find it arduous to
compete therein. As a result, export growth is stifled and can’t match import growth, with all its
adverse implications. This calls for putting in place a proper regulatory-cum-facilitatory framework
to protect consumers and encourage the domestic industry to become competitive.
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A market economy needs entrepreneurs to pilot its ship. Entrepreneurs are a special breed
among businesses, taking abnormal risks and venturing into new areas or new ways of doing
business. As family-based well-entrenched but risk-averse business houses have held sway over the
corporate landscape and both governments and banks have been reluctant to support startups for
their risky ventures, Pakistan has remained remarkably short on entrepreneurship, which has
impaired long-term growth prospects. Through preferential credit and taxation and simplified
incorporation procedure, entrepreneurship needs to be supported.
(Source: TNS)

DIGITAL ECONOMY & TAXATION ESSENTIAL

FOR BROADENING TAX BASE
Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar (Former Chairman, Federal Excise & Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and
Senior Advisor Federal Ombudsman)
The tax structure of Pakistan is skewed towards indirect taxes but despite this undesirable
fact, the potential of tax collection in that area has not been properly tapped by the tax department
due to insignificant use of information technology and resultantly major area of economy,
manufacturer and retail sectors remain undocumented and untaxed.
The success of modern tax administrations is increasingly becoming well dependent on access
to actual data flows (both on manufacturing and sales points) and the real-time tax compliance as
well for all purposes including real tax collection.
Throughout the world, digital technology is significantly impacting and has provided
maximum facilitation to economies, taxation, businesses, society and creating new products, services
and business models. There is now no doubt that digital transformation in economy and taxation
can improve tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens on taxpayers and provide big help and
support to tax growth. However, Pakistan is lagging behind in the implementation of digitization
tax system and has failed to collect the potential of tax due.
Digitization of tax records at all levels throughout is also one of the most important economic
and tax indicators, characterizing consumer confidence as well as to evaluate the health, prospective
and expansion of the economy. Advances and initiatives in the digital economy by any country
would open new opportunities for enforcement of closer controls over manufacturing & retail
transactions and that can contribute to reduce tax risks traditionally which has been associated with
the vulnerability of tax compliance and tax collection.
For achieving the set targets of legal compliances and tax collection to maximum GDP, many
countries have introduced such legal frameworks and introduced digitization mechanism requiring
manufacturing and retail businesses to use some form of secure electronic cash register (ECR),
including online cash registers (OCRs), to generate and preserve manufacturing and sales data for
tax compliance purposes and they have succeeded. Though, digitization in taxation and (OCRs),
payment system was early introduced in Pakistan but it could not succeed due to lack of will and
implementation strategy in relevant tax laws i.e. Income tax, Sales tax, Federal excise, Customs
resultantly not providing such results which are actually required for documented economy and still
Pakistan has one of the lowest tax collection ratios compared to its GDP.
Creating a robust regulatory environment based on modern technology would be a vital step for
the implementation process and best results for documented economy and tax compliances. The
regulatory framework in most cases includes an overarching relevant tax laws with additional
regulation making powers based on technology and to control unbridled discretion by this
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mechanism. The first part would be to develop a solid tax digitization understanding and strategy of
the current environment of the country with a way forward implementation strategy with a timeline.
A top level Committee should be constituted at the federal level to make way-forward
recommendations for fully information technology/digitization based economy and for taxation
System and to properly identify and implement as well both on manufacturing and of Point of Sale
(PoS) stage with the mandate to identify the progress regularly for public on net and to address the
issues and hindering in documented economy and tax compliances. Both federal and provincial
governments should work together, share their experiences and to share their tax information by
using modern technology on case to case base for tax compliances.
It is also important to have close consultation with taxpayers to introduce technology on the
timing and planning and to prepare and handle the changes in business processes, e.g. registration,
monitoring, controlling and evaluating. It is also essential for proper tax compliance and for tax
collection to introduce a bar code through digitization process on every manufactured product in
the country with live data; this action would ensure a documented economy and would increase tax
collection in many folds as per potential of the country. It would also be important to have
awareness campaigns and to have close communication by tax authorities for a documented
economy with all interested bodies: experts, government and non-governmental bodies, sectoral
associations, cash registers vendors and the business community.
Legal framework for implementation of law for digitization of economy and taxation with a
timeline must be designed and to be strengthened as well under a well designed digitization system
through getting the professional services, who have tax, technology and law/adjudication
experiences and also having the understanding the digital economy, tax policies with knowing
implementation mechanism. This mechanism would strengthen this new system and digitize the
economy and taxation for its effective implementation. It is utmost important, that until law relating
to digitization of taxation and economy would not be implemented in letter and spirit, no initiative
of any government for broadening the tax base can succeed and yield tax results and for fair and
transparent tax environment and compliance in Pakistan.
Special measures through amendments should be made as integral parts for digital economy
and taxation in Income tax, Sales tax, Federal excise and Customs laws. It is also important for
implementation of suitable amendments for establishing Federal, Provincial and District Oversight
Committees consisting of dynamic and experienced personalities under the parent Committee for
implementation of the latest provisions of tax laws relating to digitization of the economy and tax
system for its effective implementation. These committees should be given tasks to visit for
identification of the qualified manufacturers, retailers in relevant tax laws, and in areas of
registration, monitoring, controlling, awareness and for evaluating with the objectives to address the
issues concerns to stakeholders. These oversight committees must be given targets and they should
closely work with the tax authorities, manufacturers and retailers in their respective areas.
The strategy for incentives for balloting of prizes monthly for purchasers and even for
manufacturers who fully comply with tax laws must be initiated at the earliest by the tax authorities
with full media coverage. At the same time, a coherence strategy with time limit be designed for
those manufacturers and retailers who failed to use technology and were involved in non
compliance of tax laws.
Proper implementation of digitization of economy and taxation with a good and effective
implementation strategy is a need of the time and would be right steps towards a documented
economy, taxation, controlling unbridled discretion of government & tax officials, minimizing the
loopholes in tax system and finally would increase in revenue collection and tax targets in Pakistan
through reasonably enhance good tax base to GDP. These above steps resultantly would minimize
the burden and guided policies of international lenders institutions on our citizens and country and
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would provide as well good space for the government to spend money for the welfare of citizens
and for economic social development in Pakistan.
(Source: Daily Times)

ANATOMY OF INFLATION
Dr Ishrat Husain (Former Governor of SBP
There is one single point on which there is a national consensus right from the prime minister
to the opposition leaders to the public at large – the country is suffering from the serious malaise of
inflationary pressures with their harmful effects on the lives of the citizens.
Inflation is generally welfare depressant and particularly inimical to the poor, the middle classes
with no tangible assets, the salaried class, pensioners, widows and other fixed-income earners. The
propensity to consume for all these groups is relatively high – they spend a substantial part of their
incomes on essential items such as food, rent, utilities, transport and clothing and therefore they feel
the pinch of inflation the most. It is therefore important to examine the underlying causes of inflation
in a dispassionate manner and the remedial measures to tackle this issue in the future. Unfortunately,
there is no magic wand to fix the problem in the short term and those who promise to bring down the
prices immediately are not really serious. Distorted markets and weak public-sector institutions would
not permit to do so, however sincere our intentions may be.
What are the underlying factors behind this unending phenomenon of rising prices that is
causing widespread anxiety among the majority of the population and earning unpopularity for the
government? Inflation, by definition, is excess money flowing through the economy while there is
shortage of goods and services. Thus, inflation can originate from either rise in aggregate demand or
supply shock or interplay between the two.
Let us first deal with global supply shocks that are exogenous – outside the control of national
policymakers. The Covid-19 pandemic wrapped the advanced, emerging and developing economies
within its fold and lasted for two years. The recession resulted in a slow down of economic activity
and increased unemployment. To fight recession, generous fiscal stimulus was provided by the
governments including unemployment benefits, cash grants. With savings in hand that couldn’t be
spent earlier, the post-pandemic era witnessed a surge in demand for goods and services.
Retail sales in the first half of 2021 were 22 percent higher than a year ago. However, at the
same time energy prices shot up, labour and material shortages appeared, global supply chains got
disrupted due to lengthy shipping delays caused by container lines, port congestion, and backlog in
inland freight movement. In the UK, drivers were not available to move trucks. Cars and electronic
industries were hard hit by the shortage of semiconductor chips. Lower production at farms and
processing plants spiked up food prices. Production and supply chain bottlenecks are pushing prices
to unprecedentedly high levels within a short period of time. Oil prices doubled from $40 a barrel to
$80 within a span of a few months. RLNG spot prices reached astronomically high levels. Coal
shortages in China led to loadshedding and closure of factories. Metal prices registered the same
upward trend.
The global supply shocks had repercussions for Pakistan’s economy as imports of goods and
services account for more than a quarter of GDP and the country is dependent on POL products,
machinery, food, industrial raw material, transport for both consumption as well as production.
Despite the government reducing sales tax, levy and import duties on many essential goods and not
choosing to pass through the entire burden of global spike in prices to the consumers, the impact
was still quite significant. Had the whole burden been passed through, the inflation rate would have
been much higher than what has been recorded. Adjusting the petroleum levy and GST downwards
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to the tune of Rs450 billion has severely hit government revenues but provided some partial relief to
the consumers. Despite these adjustments and negative impact on fiscal balance, (the government
has to increase its borrowing which would also contribute to inflationary pressures), the resulting
hue and cry on price hikes of POL products is understandable due to its secondary effects on
transport costs and perishable commodities prices.
In Pakistan, a complicating factor is the movement of exchange rate that has proved to be a
double whammy. For example, even if the world prices of POL had doubled but the Pak rupee-
dollar parity had remained unchanged and the government had lowered its share of taxes, the price
adjustment would have been less painful. Thus, devaluation has been a major contributory factor in
the case of Pakistan in amplifying the impulses of imported inflation arising from high global
commodity prices. Countries where the exchange rate has remained relatively stable have been
insulated from this amplification. Therefore, inflation rates in India and Bangladesh are lower than
that in Pakistan.
The issue of exchange rate adjustment would require a separate analysis but suffice to say that
the State Bank can intervene only for smoothing volatility if the market conditions become
disorderly. Should it intervene to defend a particular level of exchange rate, it would deplete foreign
exchange reserves quite fast, and the market sentiment would turn negative. We would then end up
with the worst of both worlds – erosion of foreign exchange reserves (built with great difficulty) and
a fast-depreciating currency.
On the demand side in Pakistan, the smart lockdown kept the wheels of the economy running
and GDP growth in FY21 was higher than expected. Close relations with China helped in getting 100
million people vaccinated. The fiscal stimulus package of emergency cash assistance to 16 million
households – almost one half of the population – monetary easing by provision of concessional
financing for machinery and equipment, payment to workers and other refinancing schemes put
money in the hands of a large number of consumers and investors pushing the aggregate demand
upwards. Generous price support for farmers boosted the purchasing power in the rural areas (60
percent of the population) and increased remittances from workers abroad added further to this
rising demand.
As the country's industrial and farm production capacity was inadequate in relation to this
rising demand, the excess spilled over in the form of higher imports. It is interesting to note that the
farm sector saw a peculiar phenomenon – lower volumes, higher prices and rising incomes. Wheat,
sugar and cotton had to be imported in large quantities which added further pressure on the current
account compared to the previous year. There are some transitory or one-off factors such as import
of vaccines for Covid-19 and other related supplies that have also added to the import bill in FY 21.
Current estimates of cotton arrivals also indicate that the quantum of cotton imports this year may
be lower than the previous year. Demand for wheat and sugar imports may have to be reassessed
after harvesting of the two crops.
Another source of inflationary pressures is the administered prices of electricity and gas.
Regulators use the formula of costs incurred, revenue requirements, guaranteed rates of return and
other subjective factors to determine the tariff structure. In many countries, prices are deregulated
and determined through market interactions. The job of the regulator is to protect consumers and
ensure that there are no collusive practices, market abuses, concentration of market share etc.
Banking and telecom sector regulators in Pakistan do not determine the prices of banking products
or telecom services although both sectors are dominated by the private sector.
State-owned enterprises in the energy sector are poorly governed, devoid of technical and
managerial expertise, dominated by narrow vested interests. They have weak enforcement capacity,
and their inefficiencies, leakages, waste and corruption are passed on to the consumers in the form
of higher tariffs or subsidies from the public exchequer.
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What are the possible remedial measures to subdue inflationary pressures in the economy?
None of them is a quick fix or short-termish but requires patient and consistent action immediately
to produce results in the medium and long term.
It is quite understandable that political compulsions necessitate attention to be focused on
short-term problems, but the downside is that the essential long-term policy decisions are neglected.
Urgent takes precedence over important. The main thrust for combating inflation has to be
expansion of domestic productive capacity and keeping it aligned with growth in aggregate
demand. Productivity levels in both farm and non-farm sectors are stagnating and low compared to
our neighbouring countries and have to be raised. The means to do so are well known and have
been spelled out ad-nauseum. We outline below some of the measures that would help subdue the
inflationary pressures but – and let me stress this --not right away.
First, public policymakers should pay more attention to resolving supply bottlenecks and
encourage efficient import substitution. Thar coal is much cheaper than imported coal and therefore
the existing plants should be reconfigured to use domestic coal as fuel. Gasification of coal is another
possibility that needs to be explored for substituting natural gas for producing power. Renewable
energy projects such as hydel, wind and solar ought to be given priority for completion. Investment
in transmission and distribution gaps to enable the switch from imported fuels to indigenous should
be undertaken expeditiously.
The government’s decision to introduce a competitive market model with multiple buyers and
sellers is highly welcome but the pending issue of wheeling charges has yet to be resolved. DISCOs
are already on the agenda of the Privatization Commission for management contracts and action is
required to bring the process to the end point. Exploration and development of energy reservoirs in
Balochistan should be stepped up. Retail sales of gas companies should be opened up to the private
sector through a transparent competitive process.
Weighted average cost of gas formula has become a victim of political bickering, without
realisation of how much damage it is doing in the fast depletion of our natural gas resources. The
two private terminals for RLNG ought to be made operational as early as possible. The oil refinery
policy has been debated for so long and should be operationalised. The energy ministry, although
perpetually under severe pressure, should resist the temptation of running things from Islamabad
and allow the companies under its control operational autonomy while holding them accountable
for results. They get unnecessary blame for everything that goes wrong in the sector.
With the completion of the National Social and Economic Registry, it is now possible to move
away from the present system of across-the-board subsidies on wheat, electricity, fertilizer, seeds etc
to a system of targeted subsidies. Not only is it a fiscally responsible measure that would result in
savings on public expenditures it will also help smooth consumption and enhance productivity of
deserving households. The impact of these targeted subsidies in the farm sector for promoting
production of oilseeds, pulses, and other commodities short in supply could be significant.
Third, export growth particularly in new sectors of the economy should be possible now with
a remunerative exchange rate but careful planning has to be done for each sector to identify the
specific constraints faced by the exporters. It is not realised that in a world dominated by global
value chains, tariffs on imports of components and intermediate inputs act as a tax on exports. There
has been some positive development in the last few years on IT exports. The scope for further
expansion is quite large and the government should keep its hands off this sector and adopt a ‘do no
harm’ policy only removing the impediments from their way.
The National Tariff Commission has been given the responsibility of setting tariff policy
because the FBR was too obsessed with revenue maximisation rather than promoting
industrialisation. The NTC ought to take into consideration the factors that would make Pakistani
exports competitive in the world markets. The largest market in the world – China – has not been
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fully tapped, despite our close relationship. The aim should be to attain a sustainable position where
exports of goods and services can finance up to 80 percent of imports – reducing the quantum of
trade imbalance, alleviating the stress on current account and dependence on external borrowing. A
National Single Window would, hopefully, be able to reduce the costs of international trade
transactions and increase the returns to the exporters.
The government’s direct and indirect intervention in the functioning of output and factor
markets has become too intrusive. Price setting, administrative controls, compulsory procurement,
releases and allocations have distorted markets and the results are contrary to the government's
desire to stabilise prices. Hoarding and black marketing create shortages despite the efforts of local
administration. Information flows about the quantities of goods entering and leaving the market are
known only to the market players and are not known to the administrators. On the contrary, their
interference creates disorderly conditions rather than stability. Except for reserve stock management
for wheat and administering taxes and targeted subsidies, the government should refrain from
intervening in the markets through administrative measures as they're counterproductive.
Finally – and this is the moot point which is hardly discussed in our discourse on economic
policies – current account is an accounting identity where savings equal investment. If domestic
savings fall short of the investment requirements, the gap is filled by foreign savings. Our
neighbouring countries were in the same position with low savings and low investment rates. They
have almost doubled both domestic savings and investment rates over time, which explains their
impressive growth rates and reduced dependence on foreign savings. They are in a comfortable
position to finance their trade imbalances through non-debt creating external inflows such as foreign
direct investment without resorting to extensive borrowing.
Domestic savings are a mixture of private household, corporate savings and public-sector
savings. If the fiscal deficit is eight percent of GDP and state-owned enterprises have negative
savings of two percent of GDP, the aggregate domestic savings rate would be lowered by 10 percent
and our capacity to invest would be limited to the extent of our domestic savings supplemented by
workers' remittances from overseas. Higher investment required for sustaining a high growth rate
can only take place by foreign savings in the form of borrowing unless FDI pours in. This explains
the genesis of our recurring external account difficulties. Therefore, containing fiscal deficit to a
manageable level and restructuring and privatising SOEs are the policy options that have evaded us
so far but are essential for keeping control of the current account and combating inflation.
To sum up, efficient import substitution particularly in food items, targeted subsidies, export
competitiveness, minimising government controls on markets and reducing fiscal deficit are the
remedial measures that would have beneficial impact on fiscal and current accounts, external
borrowing needs and inflation in the medium term. Attention and action are required now, not later.
(Source: The News)
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Education
THE NEW PANDEMIC: EDUCATION
Vimbai Zisengwe (Winner, 4th annual World Bank/Financial Times blog competition)
As Covid 19 ravaged the world, a new pandemic began to rise. One that had been brewing for
ages but was taken out of the pot by Covid 19, education. However, unlike Covid-19 it targeted a
specific age group and luckily this pandemic has a cure.
The first stage in my homemade remedy, like zumbani tea, is that Zimbabwe should increase
the number of domestically published textbooks so that the cost of buying these books may
decrease. If more textbooks, especially domestic ones, which are tailored to the Zimsec syllabus,
were to be published the market would flood making textbooks easier to find at a cheaper price.
Since 72% of all Zimbabweans are below the poverty line, the possibility of there being at least one
computer in each household was a farfetched dream. The lack of 21st Century technology would not
have been such a problem if the physical textbooks had been available in public schools. Having
seen fellow exam candidates begging teachers for textbooks woke me up.
The network in Zimbabwe has to improve, an upgrade from LTE to 5G really would not hurt.
If for every time my call dropped in the middle of a lesson I was given a dollar, I would be a lot less
broke than I am today. This is the experience I have as a city child meaning that children in rural
areas have little to no internet access. Meaning 72% of all Zimbabwean children have no access to
internet resources in the form of YouTube videos. Even if they had access to the computers, they
would have still failed to attend online lessons. This brings me to the second stage, build more
internet boosters in these rural areas so the network is available, even if it is slow. The Ministry of
Education could also partner up with network providers like Econet, to provide subsidized internet
bundles for students to use. These bundles would only be accessible by a unique code available only
to students to ensure that the bundles are not abused by adults.
Now with the network in place, the next part is to add good teachers. These are very hard to
find unless you are willing to pay $100 on top of the termly fees. During 2020, I saw school children
having to pay their teachers personally to learn. This should be unacceptable and banned. Lastly, on
this issue about teachers, they should be tested regularly in not only computer literacy, because I
have seen many teachers struggle with using their laptops during online, but also their subject area.
This would ensure that they teach correct and relevant information to us.
You see a simple recipe to make a cure that will stop this disease. Education does not have to
be like Covid 19 it could end today if we do what has to be done. Let’s take the easy way out before
any blood is lost.
(Source: World Bank)

REVISITING THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

Dr Muhammad Imran (Associate Professor of Urban Planning at Massey University, New Zealand)
Pakistan is in the middle of an economic (IMF negotiation, rising fuel cost and inflation),
political (political instability and polarisation) and environmental (heatwaves and water scarcity due
to climate change) crisis. However, there is no serious research and expertise produced by higher
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education institutions in Pakistan on how to address these challenges, in spite of billions of dollars
being spent in the last 20 years.
The tragedy of higher education is that new universities have been established in the last
20 years, thousands of good and bad research papers have been published, with the number
rising every year; thousands of local and international PhD students have graduated and novel
programmes have been implemented by the Higher Education Commission (HEC). However,
this knowledge and achievement have not translated into government actions and benefited
wider society.
This is because a research-policy-society contract in higher education in Pakistan is lacking.
Pakistan’s economic, political and environmental crises has been widely researched in the developed
world. However, this research has not been contextualised and transferred to Pakistan’s governance,
policy, and social environment.
Let me give the example of my own area of research in urban and environmental planning.
Decades of global climate change research produced by the International Panel for Climate Change
(IPCC) shows that Pakistan must act swiftly to protect its waterways, biodiversity and agricultural
soil, which are critical for human security in our country. However, this quality research has never
been translated into policies for food production, urban development patterns and energy
consumption. There is no doubt that new ministries (Ministry of Climate Change) and departments
(Environmental Protection Authority) have been established in the last 2 to 3 decades, new
legislation has been passed, and programmes (CNG cars, the Billion Trees project) have been
initiated. Still, these actions are too little and too late without any robust evaluation and impact. In
fact, these activities have become exercises in marketing and getting invitations and travelling to
international forums.
Environmental NGOs have focused on advocacy and activism by organising walks and
raising awareness. Their work has improved climate change coverage in the media, but they have
failed to produce political leaders like Al Gore and activists like Greta Thunberg who can make
climate change the core issue of the country. Therefore, the climate change debate is totally absent
from national political priorities, policies, funding mechanisms and national media. Even Covid-19
failed to compel us to reflect and restructure our economy and budgets away from reliance on
traditional consumption patterns.
The time has come for the HEC to reflect on its achievements and deficiencies, and then find
ways to promote a research-policy-society contract for academics in Pakistan. The hundreds of
academics of Pakistani origin working in universities in the developed world (over 100 are working
in New Zealand universities and research institutes) can help to establish this contract. As a member
of the academic community, I see three possible options for future action.
The first option is to continue research as usual as per the HEC’s criterion of publishing in
impact factor journals. This option is founded on the hope that political leaders will take some policy
action while academics stay politically neutral. The HEC and universities can also invest in new
ways to better communicate the results of academic research. However, this option naïvely assumes
that published research will be translated into policy and actions, which is already happening on a
small scale in different sectors.
As the second option, the HEC could promote social science research and advocacy, focusing
on a better understanding of why transformative change has not occurred in different sectors and
how to enable institutional, political and social change. To date, the HEC’s research funding and
scholarships have been dominated by natural science and technical disciplines. The research focus
and funding would be extended to social science and humanities with this option. There is no doubt
that social science needs more funding, but there is no evidence that exposing the powers and vested
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interests through social science research will lead to transformative actions within a reasonable
timeframe.
The third is the radical option of changing the focus of research and associated funding to the
holistic impact of research excellence. Publication impact factors, citation counts, download views,
and H-indices can only be accepted if the published output positively changes society, the economy,
and the environment. It would be unethical and irresponsible for the HEC and academics to publish
research without making any difference in the social, economic and environmental crises Pakistan is
facing now and in the near future. The HEC should consider only research that works closely with
the governments and other stakeholders to tackle the societal problems through the co-creation of
locally implementable knowledge. The third option is the only effective way to produce robust local
research that addresses the tragedy of higher education in Pakistan.
Hope is always there but revisiting the HEC’s policies on research and establishing a research-
policy-society nexus could translate hope into action.
(Source: Express Tribune)

HIGHER EDUCATION
Up the creek
Faisal Bari (Research fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, and an associate
professor of economics at Lums)
Many public-sector universities, especially the older and bigger ones, have been facing severe
budgetary pressures for the last few years. Inflation has been close to double digits during many of
these years. The government has cut funding for recurrent expenses of universities a number of
times, and in those years when the funds have not been cut, the government has barely covered the
previous years’ expenses in nominal terms.
The universities cannot increase their tuition fees by much. So, they have been feeling the
squeeze a lot. Expenditures have been increasing, even without any expansion of facilities, due to
inflationary and other cost-push factors, while revenues have not been increasing and government
assistance has been going down. It is not surprising that some of the older universities, that also
have significant pension liabilities, have been severely short of funds. Some have not been able to
make their payroll in certain months and have, at times, had to be given emergency funds. Some
universities have delayed salary payments and even pension payments to their faculty, staff and
retired employees.
But all this did not stop governments from continuing to set up new public-sector universities.
Punjab alone had announced the creation of around 10 universities last year. The federal
government has also set up a number of new higher education institutes — some very expensive
ones among them. The recurrent expenses of these universities and higher education projects, once
they start, will have claim over higher education funding as well. This will only mean more pressure
on all the universities.
A few days ago, we saw the current government proposing only around Rs30 billion for
recurrent expenses for universities for next year. Last year, the amount was approximately Rs65bn.
If universities were in trouble with Rs65bn, what are they going to do with only Rs30bn? How are
they going to survive the next year?
The amount our universities actually need is well in excess of Rs100bn. The last government
could only give Rs65bn. This had created a very serious problem for a number of universities and
had even driven some to the brink of insolvency. If the proposal for cutting funds to Rs30bn goes
ahead, this will completely decimate higher education in the public sector.
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The appeal to the government would be to increase higher education funding. The future of
young people and the future of the country depends on producing human capital that will put Pakistan
on a decent growth trajectory and keep it there. Higher education plays a crucial role in this goal.
If funding cannot be increased, at the very least the universities should be given as many
funds (in real and not nominal terms) as they had last year. If we assume an inflation level of around
10 per cent, it would mean funding of about Rs72bn for the coming year. Even with this funding
level it might still be necessary to a) stop most development projects, and b) reverse or at least halt
the development of new universities/ projects that were announced last year. We clearly cannot
afford new universities at this stage. And if we keep reallocating from the same fund, we will keep
compromising on the quality of education that we can give to our students.
If the government, God forbid, does decide to cut funding to Rs30bn, then we should have a
serious debate in the higher education sector about closing down a significant number of
programmes in many universities and maybe even a number of universities themselves. There is no
conceivable way in which public-sector universities can continue to offer all the programmes that
they currently are if their funding is cut by half.
Asking universities to raise their own funding is not going to be of much help. How much can
they raise the tuition fee by, even if they wanted to, in one year? Raising non-tuition revenues in the
higher education sector in Pakistan is not easy. It is hard enough for private not-for-profit
universities, it is near impossible for most of the bureaucratic, rule-governed public-sector
universities to do. So, the only viable option will be selective closures.
Does the current government really want that? Is this the ruling coalition’s plan for higher
education? They do not want to raise fuel prices for fear of the public reaction and for, supposedly,
not wanting to hurt the poor, but would they be fine with killing the higher education sector in the
country? It seems to be a really strange choice the government seems to be making.
Ideally, the government should be raising funding for the higher education sector
substantially as the previous government had reduced it by too much and, at the same time, had
started many new university/ higher education projects. But, these are tough financial times as well.
Clearly, the government has not made it a priority to give education, school or university level, more
funds in these times. If more funding is not available, the government should keep the funding
levels at last year’s level but stop the work on new projects and move resources towards universities
that are in financial distress.
If the government decides to cut funding by half, they should seriously consider closing down
many programmes and universities. It will happen by default. It is better to do it by design. But the
government should then also accept the fact that education has a fairly low priority for them. The
consequences in terms of the impact on the current cohort of youth and on future growth prospects
for Pakistan should also be acknowledged and accepted.
(Source: Dawn)

ABANDONING HIGHER EDUCATION

Dr Ayesha Razzaque
On May 25, members of our much vaunted ‘youth bulge’ that counts itself as supporters of the
party of justice were proudly abusing police and setting alight public property in Islamabad. At
around the same time, another news quietly broke in the background: Pakistan and the IMF failed to
reach a staff-level agreement for the resumption of the stalled External Funding Facility, for the most
predictable reason in the world.
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Like those trees set on fire in Islamabad, Pakistan is currently burning around Rs120 billion
every month on a fuel subsidy put in place in the waning weeks of the PTI government. The IMF is
demanding the government withdraw that subsidy which, according to some spitball estimates,
could catapult the price of petrol to around Rs200 per liter and even further north if taxes and levies
are re-introduced. Later, on Thursday we learned that the government has accorded high priority to
the resumption of the IMF programme and has decided to reduce the fuel subsidy on petrol by Rs30
effective Friday.
What does any of this have to do with higher education? The HEC’s recurrent budget for the
current fiscal year (2021-22) was Rs65 billion. That amount was not enough to cover the expenses of
running around 150 public universities in the country for the entire year. Some universities were
unable to pay their existing teaching staff their salaries for months. It also happens to be roughly
equivalent to the amount we have been spending on fuel subsidies every fortnight since March.
Looking at it another way, by the end of this fiscal year we will have spent four times the HEC’s
annual recurrent budget on a fuel subsidy that has simultaneously scuttled the IMF’s External
Funding Facility.
That is bad enough as it is but, unfortunately, it gets worse. For the next fiscal year, the
HEC requested a recurrent budget of Rs104 billion. However, a few days ago an official letter
(dated May 23, 2022) from the Finance Division regarding the 2022-23 budget emerged. It directs
the HEC to prepare a new budget for next year that fits into Rs30 billion, – less than a third of
what was requested and less than half of this year’s Rs65.25 billion. Here I would like to
acknowledge that Federal Minister for Planning and Development Dr Ahsan Iqbal has voiced
his opposition to this news.
For all of our talk of development, industrialization and the youth dividend, this then is the
value we put on education: we are willing to burn a year’s higher-ed expenses in fuel subsidies
every two weeks and, going forward, not only are we unwilling to adjust for inflation whatever little
we spend on public higher-ed, but we will cut it by more than half. Message received!
If wishes were horses, a healthy portion of this fuel subsidy would have gone to cover the
shortcoming in the HEC’s budget. The only way the youth bulge will ever pay out its dividend is if
we develop both school and higher-education sectors. We cannot, will not, earn ourselves out of our
economic woes by exporting unskilled labor to the Middle East and elsewhere.
After the PDM /PML-N government came to power it announced a stop to poorly conceived
political projects like the PM House university which had stalled in the Senate. That was welcome
news but was immediately followed by an announcement that the project would be replaced with a
brand-new university named for Dr A Q Khan that is to be built from scratch. It is like exchanging a
white elephant for a slightly smaller white elephant. How the PM House university was a political
stunt, but the Dr A Q Khan university is not while next year’s HEC budget looks set to be cut by half
is hard to justify. Whether it is school or higher education, talking education to governments has
become a lot like shouting, nay screaming, at a wall.
Out of the 225 universities in Pakistan, 31 (around 14 per cent) are located in Islamabad-
Rawalpindi-Taxila metropolitan area that is currently home to around four million residents which
accounts for less than two per cent of the country’s population. In these circumstances, what
problem will adding a 32nd university to the same area solve?
Consider the impact of such a project on the HEC’s development budget. In the current
inflationary environment the typical price tag of a new university has gone up from Rs4-5 billion to
around Rs8-10 billion. To put that in perspective, for the coming fiscal year the HEC requested Rs45
billion for its development budget but was only granted Rs35 billion. That means that the cost of
establishing a new university can take out a bite equal to one-third of next year’s higher-ed
development budget.
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The financial support universities receive from the HEC will inevitably shrink, and whatever
influence the HEC as a regulator has over them will further diminish. I have argued for universities
to become more financially independent of public funds. However, this cannot be accomplished by
drastically cutting funds from one year to the next without giving universities the time and
opportunity to develop business plans for alternative streams of income.
The HEC has also taken on a number of very different roles – currently it is regulator,
policymaker, financier and implementer, all rolled into one, and is arguably not able to do justice to
all of them. This suggests its own role needs revisiting.
Instead of leaving decisions about whether and how to establish schools/ universities to
professionals, all and sundry who ever went to school or college feel they are sufficiently qualified to
comment about every aspect of education. That is why these decisions are often in the hands of
politicians and anyone influential enough to reach them.
Of the 225 universities in the country, about 150 are publicly funded. Last year, it came to light
that a public university raided its faculty pension funds to cover expenses and is about to default on
its pension obligations. Next year promises to be worse. Since news broke of next year’s HEC
budget, vice-chancellors of 120 public universities have voiced their shock and concern that they will
not be able to cover their salary and pension obligations, let alone other expenses.
This is yet another reason why the government should quit the habit of announcing new
universities. Establishing new universities is easy but it leaves the HEC and the government saddled
with another institution to fund. With public funds scarcer than ever, new public universities should
only be established if they have a viable business plan for long-term self-sustainability.
(Source: The News)
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Energy Crisis
THE NEW ENERGY ORDER
Jason Bordoff & Meghan L. O’Sullivan
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world appears to be at an inflection point.
Business leaders have declared the acceleration of deglobalization and sounded the alarm about a
new period of stagflation. Academics have decried the return of conquest and hailed the renewal of
transatlantic ties. And countries are rethinking almost every aspect of their foreign policies,
including trade, defense spending, and military alliances.
These dramatic shifts have overshadowed another profound transformation in the global
energy system. For the last two decades, the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions has gradually
reshaped the global energy order. Now, as a result of the war in Ukraine, energy security has
returned to the fore, joining climate change as a top concern for policymakers. Together, these dual
priorities are poised to reshape national energy planning, energy trade flows, and the broader global
economy. Countries will increasingly look inward, prioritizing domestic energy production and
regional cooperation even as they seek to transition to net-zero carbon emissions. If countries retreat
into strategic energy blocs, a multidecade trend toward more energy interconnectedness risks giving
way to an age of energy fragmentation.
But in addition to economic nationalism and deglobalization, the coming energy order will be
defined by something that few analysts have fully appreciated: government intervention in the
energy sector on a scale not seen in recent memory. After four decades during which they generally
sought to curb their activity in energy markets, Western governments are now recognizing the need
to play a more expansive role in everything from building (and retiring) fossil fuel infrastructure to
influencing where private companies buy and sell energy to limiting emissions through carbon
pricing, subsidies, mandates, and standards.
This shift is bound to invite comparisons to the 1970s, when excessive government
intervention in energy markets exacerbated repeated energy crises. The dawning era of government
intervention won’t be a bad thing, however, if managed correctly. Appropriately limited and
tailored to address specific market failures, it can forestall the worst effects of climate change,
mitigate many energy security risks, and help manage the biggest geopolitical challenges of the
coming energy transition. The current energy crisis has refocused the world’s attention on
geopolitical energy risks, forcing a reckoning between tomorrow’s climate ambitions and today’s
energy needs and offering a preview of the tumultuous era ahead. How governments respond to
these challenges, brought into sharp relief by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, will shape the new
energy order for decades to come.
WORSE THAN THE DISEASE
The story of the 1970s energy crises is in part a story of government overreach. Even before six
Gulf members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut production and
instituted an oil embargo against the United States and other countries that supported Israel during
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Washington had actively sought to manage U.S. oil markets. In 1959, for
instance, President Dwight Eisenhower set quotas on oil imports in order to protect American
producers. These quotas had their intended effect, allowing U.S. producers to flourish and boost
supply throughout the 1960s. But they did not protect consumers from rising costs. As Americans
took to the suburbs, buying ever larger homes and cars, oil consumption outpaced supply, and
prices eventually began to rise.
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To keep prices in check, President Richard Nixon tried a number of policies. In 1971, at the
same time that his administration ended the gold standard, he imposed a series of wage and price
controls, including on oil and gas. But these measures only increased demand for oil while
pushing down domestic supply. By the winter of 1972–73, fuel shortages had forced some school
districts to close on various days, and the media was warning of a looming energy crisis. In the
spring of 1973, Nixon relented and revoked Eisenhower’s oil import quotas, at the same time
urging Americans to conserve gasoline. Yet by June, several months before the Arab oil embargo,
nearly half the gas stations in the country reported problems operating normally, and drivers were
struggling to find fuel.
Instead of dialing back the government’s role in energy markets, Nixon dialed it up, and the
cure proved worse than the disease. In November 1973, Nixon created a federal program through
which government officials determined how to allocate propane, heating oil, jet fuel, diesel, and
other fuels. The effort, according to William Simon, who headed the Federal Energy Office at the
time, was “a disaster.” It was against this backdrop of government intervention that the Arab oil
embargo led to panic buying and lines at gas stations across the country.
The end of the 1970s saw yet another oil crisis, fueled by many of the same forces. In late 1978,
a popular uprising in Iran brought oil production there to a standstill, causing shortages in the
United States and other countries and sending prices skyward. As they had during the previous
crisis, federal price controls and efforts at allocation only made things worse. Americans waited in
gas lines once again, were restricted to fueling up on certain days, and listened as President Jimmy
Carter delivered his famous “crisis of confidence” speech.
Among the lessons learned from these failures was that too much government
micromanagement of the energy economy can backfire. Carter began deregulating energy prices, a
process that President Ronald Reagan then accelerated. Gradually, over the next few decades, the
U.S. government pared back its role in the energy economy: it phased out import quotas, ended oil
and gas price controls, and scrapped the allocation system.
To be sure, the government also enlarged its role in other energy-related areas, instituting fuel
economy standards and lower speed limits, subsidizing synthetic fuels and home weatherization
initiatives, creating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and expanding leasing for exploration and
production in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska. Its increasing use of sanctions against energy-
producing nations has been another exception to the general rule. Nevertheless, many of the most
significant changes to the energy sector since the crises of the 1970s—such as deregulating natural
gas sales and creating competitive power producers and wholesale power markets—have been
guided by a bipartisan consensus that energy security and low costs are best ensured by simply
allowing the market to operate on its own.
GATHERING STORM
The energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could become the worst in half a
century. Many analysts have already drawn comparisons with the 1970s oil crises, but there are
important differences. To begin with, the global economy is less energy intense. Economic growth
has outpaced growth in energy use, so the world now uses much less energy per unit of GDP.
Moreover, many more companies distribute oil globally today than did in the early 1970s, when just
a handful of firms controlled most of the world’s oil trade. As a result, energy supply chains are now
more durable.
That said, the current energy crisis goes well beyond oil and could thus affect a wider slice of
the economy. Energy sources of all kinds stand to be disrupted by the turmoil. Russia is not only the
world’s largest exporter of oil and refined petroleum products but also the dominant supplier of
natural gas to Europe and a major exporter of coal and the low-enriched uranium used to power
nuclear plants, not to mention many other commodities. With coal, gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and
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other commodity prices all near record highs, further disruption of Russian energy supplies,
whether initiated by Russia or Europe, would accelerate inflation, invite recession, demand energy
rationing, and force business shutdowns.
The global energy system was under stress even before Russian President Vladimir Putin
decided to invade Ukraine. Europe and other parts of the world faced power generation challenges
as more and more of their electricity came from intermittent sources such as solar and wind. At the
same time, years of poor returns and increased climate pressures had reduced investment in oil and
gas, resulting in limited supplies. COVID-19-related supply chain problems compounded the
scarcity and added to pricing pressures. In 2021 and early 2022, soaring natural gas prices pushed
some European utilities into bankruptcy and forced governments to subsidize energy bills. Things
could have been even worse, but warmer-than-expected weather in Europe and Asia eased some of
the demand for energy.
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, energy markets have been even more volatile. Credit
markets have tightened, leaving little liquidity to support the buying and selling of oil, and both
supply and demand have experienced large shocks. Many buyers have steered clear of Russian oil,
concerned about Western banking and financial sanctions as well as the potential stigma of doing
business with Russia. Already, the International Energy Agency estimates that Russia is producing
around one million fewer barrels per day, a number that could climb if the European Union follows
through with its plan to ban all Russian crude oil, gasoline, and diesel by the end of the year.
Speculation that more sanctions could be on the horizon, coupled with OPEC’s reluctance to backfill
lost Russian oil supply, has pushed prices higher still.
As of late May, oil was trading at well over $100 per barrel. U.S. gasoline prices reached a
record high that month (not adjusted for inflation), and rocketing diesel prices raised the costs of
shipping and food. U.S. natural gas prices climbed to their highest level since 2008, nearly
doubling since the start of the year. Consumers in Europe and elsewhere face an even sharper
emergency as a result of record natural gas prices. Such prices would be higher still were it not for
two powerful factors that are at least temporarily moving the market in the opposite direction.
COVID-19-induced lockdowns in China have seriously dented global energy demand, and the
United States and its international partners have released unprecedented amounts of oil from their
strategic reserves. For the time being, the volume flowing from strategic stockpiles roughly offsets
the loss of supply from Russia.
But the worst is likely yet to come. When Chinese lockdowns ease, oil demand will surge,
pushing up prices. The same will be true for natural gas prices, which in turn affect electricity and
heating prices. Although Russian gas has largely continued to flow to Europe, Moscow has cut
sales to Finland, Poland, and Bulgaria; curbed exports through Ukraine and to a Gazprom
subsidiary seized by Germany; and threatened to sever supplies to all European countries that do
not pay in rubles. A complete cutoff of Russian gas supplies to Europe is still unlikely, but hardly
unthinkable, and would probably lead to shortages, energy rationing, and the shuttering of energy-
intensive industries.
Any additional sanctions would have second- and third-order effects on the global energy
system. Already, the turmoil in markets for liquefied natural gas, which has increasingly flowed
toward Europe because of higher prices there, has left Asia looking for alternative energy sources.
Coal, an abundant and comparatively cheap substitute for natural gas, has won out. China and other
countries have boosted coal production amid rising fears of global energy shortages, taking some of
the pressure off global gas markets. Without Asia’s increased production of coal, Europe would be
less able to cope with the loss of Russian gas. But greater reliance on coal has pushed its price to
record highs as well, leaving lower-income countries such as India and Pakistan struggling to meet
their energy needs in the midst of deadly heat waves. High prices for natural gas, used to produce
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fertilizer, are also driving up food prices that were already rising because of disruptions in Russian
and Ukrainian agricultural exports.
SAFE AND SECURE
These cascading emergencies demand a reevaluation of the lessons from the 1970s about the
right balance between government involvement and market autonomy. Reliance on market forces
has yielded enormous benefits over the last 40 years, making energy more affordable and accessible,
increasing economic efficiency, and boosting energy security by enabling competitive pricing to shift
supplies into markets where they are most needed. Today’s crises, however, highlight certain
market failures that can only be addressed with greater government intervention.
Three market failures in particular reveal the need for a bigger role for government in the
effort to achieve the dual goals of enhanced energy security and a timely transition to net-zero
carbon emissions. First, the private sector lacks sufficient incentives to build the infrastructure and
other assets that most countries need to ensure their energy security. Second, market forces alone
cannot encourage the building of the infrastructure required for a more orderly energy transition—
infrastructure that by definition may be obsolete before private companies have achieved a full
return on investment. And third, private firms and individuals lack strong enough incentives to curb
emissions whose costs society bears.
The first of these failures has been painfully illustrated by Europe’s vulnerability to the
disruption of Russian energy exports. To achieve energy security, countries need a range of options
for purchasing energy, a diversity of energy supplies, and adequate reserves in case of emergency—
all of which require greater government intervention. Free markets often do a good job of ensuring
that consumers have a range of options for sourcing energy. When supplies are disrupted in one
location, whether by a natural disaster or political upheaval, free trade in highly integrated and well-
functioning commodity markets allows buyers to find alternatives and thereby avoid shortages.
(This practice was more difficult in the early 1970s, when oil was sold in long-term contracts rather
than traded globally as a commodity.) But as the current European energy crisis makes clear,
switching to alternative energy sources for political, economic, or diplomatic reasons is only possible
when the infrastructure—ports and terminals with excess capacity, for example—is in place to allow
for the switch. The private sector lacks incentives to invest in such infrastructure because disruptions
are unpredictable and private companies will not bear the full cost to society of the resulting
dislocations. Governments therefore need to step in.
Lithuania is a case in point. Nearly a decade ago, the country built a floating liquefied natural
gas terminal, aptly named “Independence.” The terminal allowed the Baltic state to reduce its
dependence on Russian natural gas and negotiate better prices from Gazprom. But the commercial
operation of the terminal alone would not have justified its costs, especially since it has often
operated well below capacity. The terminal could be financed only thanks to loan guarantees and
other forms of aid from the Lithuanian government, in addition to loans from the European
Investment Bank. This decision to invest in energy security infrastructure is paying dividends today,
enabling Lithuania to become the first European country to completely cease importing Russian gas
after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Germany is also looking to liquefied natural gas to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
Russia has long been Germany’s cheapest source of natural gas, leading Germany to gradually
increase its imports from there and by 2021 to source more than half the gas it used from Russia.
Now, to bring non-Russian gas into the country, Berlin has earmarked three billion euros to support
the development of four floating liquefied natural gas import terminals. Businesses and consumers
will have to pay more for their energy going forward, but the government will have created the
infrastructure to enable a more diverse natural gas supplier base.
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These moves by Lithuania and Germany build on recent efforts by the European Commission
to ensure more competition in gas markets and provide direct funding for pipeline improvements
and liquefied natural gas infrastructure—investments that private firms alone had little incentive to
make. As a result, Europe’s natural gas market is more resilient today than it was when Russia cut
gas flows in 2009.
Government-owned stockpiles such as the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve are another tool
for energy security that cannot be delivered solely by the market. (In Europe, many governments do
not hold reserves but instead require companies to maintain above-normal levels of inventory.)
Although such stockpiles can help ease shortages in a crisis, they also require infrastructure that
private companies are unlikely to build on their own. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has
released enormous amounts of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for instance, but the
government’s ability to release even more to calm global prices is limited by a shortage of available
ports and terminals. In the past, such infrastructure constraints were uncommon. Yet the shale boom
that made the United States a net energy exporter has dramatically increased demand for port space,
which is now mostly claimed by the private sector. For government stocks to increase total global
supply rather than simply displace private-sector barrels, additional ports and terminals are needed
that may see limited use outside of energy crunches. Given that there is little commercial rationale
for infrastructure that is only occasionally used, governments must play a role in developing it, as a
major report by the Department of Energy recommended in 2015.
Governments may also need to intervene in energy markets beyond those for oil and gas. The
critical minerals needed for a successful energy transition, such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, are
likely to be in short supply as electric vehicles become more prevalent and as solar, wind, batteries,
and other forms of low- and zero-carbon infrastructure proliferate. One answer would be to mine
more of them. To date, U.S. companies have largely avoided producing and processing critical
minerals because of the environmental costs associated with doing so and the easy availability of
foreign sources. But having determined that several of these minerals are critical for national
security, the Biden administration is now offering incentives to boost their domestic production.
Additional government involvement may be needed, too. Private developers are understandably
nervous about making large investments that could take a decade or more to pay off while major
efforts are underway to find alternatives to these minerals or to commercialize their recycling. The
U.S. government might consider guaranteeing such markets, as it did for COVID-19 vaccines, to
ensure the production of critical minerals on a larger scale.
Government intervention to enhance energy security need not be limited to subsidies, tax
breaks, and other incentives. Diplomacy, too, can help secure adequate energy supplies in a crisis.
When Europe faced natural gas shortfalls last winter, for example, the United States sent envoys to
Japan and South Korea, among other places, to persuade them to forgo some natural gas cargoes
that could then flow to Europe instead. The United States also encouraged Qatar to allow its gas to
be sold to European buyers, third-party transactions that were often prohibited by destination
clauses in long-term contracts.
TIMED OUT
The second market failure that necessitates government intervention in energy markets stems
from the relatively short time frame that the world has to achieve its climate goals. New oil and gas
assets that are needed to ensure energy security during the transition may need to be retired before
the companies can pay their investors back. After all, what company would risk capital to keep the
lights and heat on in the near and medium term while policymakers make increasingly ambitious
pledges to render the necessary infrastructure obsolete? To the extent that any companies are willing
to make those investments, they should not have to bet against the world’s ability to reach its
climate goals. Moreover, such investments should not create obstacles to climate action by
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strengthening economic forces that oppose faster progress because they have vested financial
interests in today’s energy system.
Creative policymaking can help meet today’s energy needs without undermining tomorrow’s
energy transition. Governments might, for instance, designate certain types of oil and gas
installations as “transition assets” and take a more active role in helping private companies build
them. Assets such as regasification terminals and pipelines that are needed today but are at risk of
being stranded if the goal of net-zero emissions is achieved by 2050 might also be required to be
“transition ready”—that is, built equipped for carbon capture technology or for low-carbon fuels
such as hydrogen and ammonia—and governments might bear some of the additional costs in the
early years.
Alternatively, governments could develop innovative tools to plan for obsolescence. For
instance, they might favor the permitting of hydrocarbon infrastructure investments with shorter
payback periods, condition that permitting on having a right to pay to wind down the asset after a
specified time, or shorten the payback period by lowering the cost of capital for private firms in
exchange for the right to retire the asset after the investment yields a certain return.
Governments will need to take great care in adopting such policies. They should be limited to
hydrocarbon projects deemed necessary for near-term energy security needs. And they should favor
projects with more versatile uses, such as those that can deliver clean energy or might redirect
energy to other destinations. Moreover, policymakers must carefully assess what components of the
oil and gas industry are really suitable for transition-ready projects, so that untested claims that
some oil and gas projects can be “hydrogen ready,” for example, do not become a loophole for
companies to exploit. Finally, governments should require project developers to meet the strictest
emissions standards—for methane leaks, for example—so that infrastructure can have the smallest
carbon footprint possible.
OWN THE PROBLEM
The third market failure that necessitates greater government intervention in the energy
market is by now the most familiar: private firms and individuals do not bear the full costs to society
of the carbon and other pollutants they emit. Governments must therefore require producers and
consumers to “internalize” these costs, through carbon pricing or other mechanisms. Stronger
government climate policy, including carbon taxes, subsidies, mandates, and standards, is necessary
to achieve rapid reductions in carbon emissions. As the most recent report from the UN
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change made clear, time is running short to avoid the most
severe consequences of climate change. If emissions are not slashed immediately, it will not be
possible to limit the rise in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the threshold above which the
worst environmental, health, economic, and other effects will occur. And as the impacts of climate
change become more frequent and severe, the urgency of government action will grow.
Market forces alone cannot deliver a sufficiently low-carbon economy. Without greater
government intervention, real and anticipated shortages of natural gas will translate into greater
coal use, for instance, as the current crisis has already demonstrated. This may have been an
acceptable response to energy insecurity in the 1970s, when G-7 countries committed to ramping up
coal production and trade in the face of oil shortages. But as the most carbon-intensive fuel, coal is
no longer an appropriate alternative, even if it is a workable substitute for Russian gas.
The problem of dirty fuels replacing cleaner ones in times of upheaval also highlights an even
greater challenge: that of delivering low-carbon energy to developing countries whose need for
energy is growing rapidly. Developed countries will need to help make private investment in low-
carbon energy for developing countries less risky. To achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, more than
70 percent of the clean energy investment in developing and emerging markets must originate from
the private sector, according to the International Energy Agency. Governments must do more to
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help mobilize that capital. For example, institutions such as the World Bank and the U.S.
Development Finance Corporation could lend to local banks at affordable rates, finance projects in
local currency, and expand the availability of loan guarantees. These institutions could also lend to
project developers directly. Capital from development finance institutions can go a long way toward
spurring private investment.
The good news is that in the long term, many of the government actions needed to reduce
emissions—in particular by reducing demand for oil and gas—will also boost energy security. That
is in part because energy security comes not just from producing more oil but from using less of it.
Fifteen years ago, the United States imported two-thirds of the oil it consumed; in 2021, it exported
more oil than it imported. Yet Americans remain just as vulnerable to gasoline price hikes when
global oil supplies are disrupted. Households in Europe would similarly be more secure if they
consumed less natural gas, either by using substitutes or being more energy efficient. Here, too,
there is a role for government: public information campaigns and incentives for efficiency-related
investments can help drive the technological and behavioral changes needed to conserve energy
during crises.
EUROPE’S 9/11
A more expansive role for government is likely to be a defining feature of the new global
energy order that will emerge from the Russia-Ukraine crisis. And just as greater government
intrusion into energy markets had profound economic, political, and geopolitical ramifications in the
1970s, such activity will be transformational today—although not in a negative way, if done right.
Structured and managed properly, greater government engagement in the energy and climate realm
can help smooth the volatility of markets, mitigate the risks that will inevitably arise from the energy
transition, and shorten the path to net-zero emissions.
To the extent that they enhance energy security, for instance, well-crafted government policies
can reduce the risk of populist backlash, such as France’s “Yellow Vest” protests, against climate
initiatives. By the same token, more options for sourcing energy will diminish the geopolitical
leverage that may accrue to traditional oil and gas producers in the short term, before the energy
transition is complete. As we warned in these pages earlier this year, if Western governments leave
these decisions to the market, low-cost suppliers such as Russia and the Arab Gulf countries will end
up producing a greater share of the world’s oil and gas during the multidecade period in which
consumption falls but remains substantial. This dynamic could be particularly problematic if
pressures to curb fossil fuel investment lead to a decline in production by Western energy firms even
as demand rises or plateaus. But if Western governments can facilitate investment in transition
assets, over time they can reduce both carbon emissions and dependence on traditional producers
that may exploit the transition for their own economic and geopolitical benefit.
Government efforts to secure financing for clean energy projects in emerging markets can also
reduce another set of risks: those stemming from the growing rift between developed and
developing countries. In the absence of such measures, the resentment of poor and middle-income
countries toward rich ones that refuse to finance fossil fuel projects in the developing world—even
as they scramble to secure more oil and gas to offset their own losses from the current crisis—will
continue to build, compromising cooperation not just on climate change but on other critical issues
such as pandemic preparedness, conflict resolution, and counterterrorism. That the burden of a
warming climate falls disproportionately on the very countries that have the least responsibility for
global emissions only exacerbates their rancor.
Most important, government intervention to accelerate the reduction of carbon emissions can
prevent some of the climate change outcomes that have the worst geopolitical and security
implications. As the U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded last year, climate change will
amplify strategic competition over the Arctic, stoke conflict over water resources and migration, and
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potentially spark new kinds of geopolitical disputes as countries unilaterally test and deploy large-
scale geoengineering initiatives. The emissions reductions needed to prevent these outcomes cannot
be achieved without government action.
Certainly, greater government intervention in energy markets is not always desirable. As the
U.S. experience in the 1970s showed, governments that go too far toward national planning or
unconstrained industrial policy will squander the many benefits of the free market. To be successful,
policymakers must narrowly tailor their policies toward specific market failures. As Alexander
Hamilton wrote, “In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to be left free in the
main; not fettered by too much regulation; but practical politicians know that it may be beneficially
stimulated by prudent aids and encouragements on the part of the government.”
Some European countries have already gone too far in their response to the present crisis.
Spain and Portugal have approved caps on natural gas prices that are just a fraction of the market
price. Some Democrats in the U.S. Congress have proposed a measure that would prohibit price
increases during national energy emergencies declared by the president. As recent history suggests,
such price controls will be counterproductive.
In taking a more active role in energy markets, governments must resist the temptation to
direct their energy sectors in the ways that those with nationally owned companies do. The U.S.
government, for example, allocates permits to companies that wish to export natural gas, but it does
not direct where that gas goes—market forces do. A more active role for government that favors
some countries over others risks politicizing the energy trade and reducing the ability of global
markets to allocate resources efficiently.
Governments must also be careful about relying too heavily on energy diplomacy, especially
that which seeks to influence what should be market-based decisions about buying and selling
energy. Recent American efforts to free up supplies of liquefied natural gas for Europe by
discouraging Asian purchases were justified in a crisis, but caution should be exercised going
forward. Injecting politics into otherwise commercial matters risks undermining the faith of U.S.
trading partners in the sanctity of long-term contracts, which could ultimately hurt U.S. companies,
undermine investment, or risk retaliatory efforts to politicize trade in other goods and services.
Also risky are aggressive government efforts to achieve energy security by disconnecting from
the global energy economy. Some members of the U.S. Congress, noting that the United States now
exports more energy than it imports, advocate curbing U.S. exports of oil and gas in order to meet
American energy needs first. Such actions would likely backfire, undermining energy security as
well as free trade. Diversifying supply by stimulating domestic production of key commodities can
bring benefits, but so too does integration into a well-supplied and flexible energy market. Energy
self-sufficiency may seem like a route to security, but it would be highly inefficient and impose
unnecessary costs. It would also leave the United States without the necessary global energy
linkages to meet demand in the event of a future crisis or dip in U.S. shale production.
Finally, governments must avoid inflaming domestic partisan divisions, which in the United
States are already deep with regard to the question of the role of government. In the years to come, a
growing number of legislative proposals aimed at boosting energy security, smoothing the transition
to net-zero emissions, and coping with climate change promise more political flash points and
partisan wrangling. American leaders must therefore make a concerted effort to build a bipartisan
and broad-based coalition in support of these measures, one that includes everyone from
environmentalists to the oil and gas industry. Another coalition of strange bedfellows existed two
decades ago, before the shale boom, when the United States imported huge quantities of oil from
sometimes unstable regions that posed a national security threat. A broad spectrum of interests, each
motivated by different arguments, pulled together then to push the United States to consume less
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oil. Today, a similar coalition could be built around the need for an integrated strategy that ensures
both climate security and energy security.
Europe has called the Russian war in Ukraine its 9/11. The terrorist attacks of that day
brought about a new security order that dominated the international landscape for 20 years and is
still a dominant feature of world affairs. One legacy of the Ukraine war will be a new energy order,
originating in Europe but radiating to the farthest reaches of the global economy. It will be defined
by the dual imperatives of energy security and climate action. Pursuing them at the same time,
without allowing one to compromise the other, will require harnessing the power of markets. But it
will also require a much more expansive role for government to leverage, shape, and steer those
markets, correcting the failures thrown into sharp relief by today’s crisis. Without government
intervention, tailored and restrained but nonetheless increased, the world will suffer a breakdown in
energy security or the worst effects of climate change—or both.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)

THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE NEW ENERGY WORLD ORDER

Tsvetana Paraskova (A writer for Oilprice.com with over a decade of experience)
The new global order after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is set to create new winners and
losers in energy as trade flows are changing. Russia is still receiving close to $1 billion in oil and gas
revenues every day as Europe continues to buy Russian gas and is panicking over the possibility of
Russia cutting off gas supply entirely.
In the short term, Russia may have a winning hand, having hooked major European
economies to its natural gas.
Winners and Losers
But in the medium to long term, Moscow is likely to lose its global energy superpower status,
as Europe’s decision to cut off its Russian energy dependence is irreversible, Gideon Rachman, chief
foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, writes.
Asia could take many Russian oil barrels unwanted and banned in the West, but a gas pivot to
China would come in years, not months, due to a lack of sufficient infrastructure for Russia to
redirect gas flows from its biggest market, Europe, to China.
At the same time, high oil and natural gas prices are helping the U.S. shale patch, which could
be a big winner of the new global energy order, in the medium to long term, as the West will seek
non-Russian oil and gas for years to come, regardless of the developments in the war in Ukraine.
Yet, the U.S. oil and gas industry faces short-term constraints in boosting production. These
hurdles include supply chain issues, cost surges, and a U.S. Administration with an unwavering
desire to promote clean energy and equally unwavering statements blaming the oil industry for
tight fuel markets and for contributing to record-high gasoline prices.
If U.S. producers have a regulatory environment supportive of investments in new supply, the
United States has the chance to win the geopolitical game of energy in the long term. American
products and crude will be sought in major consuming regions, including in Europe and in U.S.
allies in north Asia, which will want to never depend on Russian energy again. Due to the proximity
to the U.S., Latin America is also a natural outlet for U.S. energy exports, especially as Europe –
starved of all types of energy now – is not exporting as much fuel to the Americas as it was before
the Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the energy crisis of the autumn of 2021.
The forever-changed energy trade flows and Europe’s decision to cut off dependence on
Russian oil and gas—with the oil embargo by end-2022 and a Russian gas independence deadline
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tentatively targeted for 2027— is undermining Russia’s energy powerhouse position in the medium
and long term.
“Before the war, Russia was looking at 30 more years of guaranteed oil and gas revenues.
Now they are looking at three,” a senior German official told FT’s Rachman.
Russia’s Gas Pivot To Asia To Take Years
Russia earned $98 billion (93 billion euros) in revenue from fossil fuel exports in the first 100
days of the war in Ukraine, with the EU paying 61% of this for imports, according to data compiled
by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).
As the EU aims to reduce Russia’s oil revenues by imposing an embargo on seaborne oil
imports from Russia, Moscow is redirecting more volumes to Asia. But Russia will face a more
difficult task of replacing European gas exports and revenues with those in Asia. The pipeline and
LNG volumes Russia is sending to China are just a fraction of Russian pipeline exports to Europe,
even as Russia has slashed gas supply to Europe in the past weeks.
Russia is already sending natural gas via pipeline to China through the Power of Siberia
pipeline, which became operational at the end of 2019. There are plans for another major gas
pipeline to deliver gas from Russia to China, but this will take years to complete and commission.
“Russia could eventually build a sizable business geared toward Asian markets, but the shift
will be neither immediate nor easy, and it will depend critically on foreign partners, including
China,” says Nikos Tsafos, the James R. Schlesinger Chair in Energy and Geopolitics at the Energy
Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
U.S. Energy Could Help Allies In Long Term
The U.S., the world’s largest crude oil producer ahead of Saudi Arabia and Russia, could
help offset at least some of the supply losses from Russia, both in oil and gas. American LNG
exports to Europe are surging, and fuel exports are also strong despite multi-year-low fuel
inventories in the U.S.
But the U.S. shale industry faces short-term constraints in boosting production as costs
continue to escalate and supply chain delays are worsening. Moreover, American producers are
focused on paying down debts and rewarding shareholders. They are also wary of the continued
attacks from the Biden Administration, which don’t encourage companies’ investment plans.
Recently, more than a dozen energy associations led by the American Petroleum Institute
(API) urged President Biden to visit U.S. oil and gas production centers before heading to Saudi
Arabia to plead for more oil from the world’s largest crude oil exporter.
“On behalf of millions of Americans working in the U.S. oil and natural gas industry, we wish
you every success on your upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia. But before you visit Riyadh, we invite
you to visit Reynoldsville, Pa. It’s the heart of the Marcellus Shale in the state where you were born,
one of the most prolific natural gas-producing regions in the world,” the energy associations said in
a letter to President Biden.
“U.S. energy reserves – produced to among the highest environmental standards in the world
– are the answer in the global quest for reliable energy supplies. American energy bolsters U.S.
competitiveness and national security and brings economic opportunity to every corner of
America,” the organizations noted.
(Source: Oilprice.com)
 94

HOW WE GOT HERE

Mansoor Ahmad (Economic Analysts)
Pakistan inherited a tiny but transparent power sector from the British. It was operated mostly
by the private sector. Power theft was unheard of.
At the time of independence in 1947, total power generation in what is now Pakistan stood at
61 MW. It now exceeds 33,000 MW. Access to electricity was clearly a privilege, not a right. On the
other hand, the tariffs were affordable. Power generation at that time was dominated by the private
sector. Karachi received power from privately owned Karachi Electric Supply Company. There was
a power plant at Chaman and another at Peshawar. The Campbellpur Electric Supply Company was
part of Rawalpindi Electric Supply Company. The Multan Power Supply Company was operational.
Together these companies produced 61 MW of electricity.
The situation changed drastically after the commissioning of Mangla Dam and then Terbela
Dam, both built by the state using World Bank loans. Power generation suddenly jumped from a
little over 150 MW in 1965 to over 3,000 MW in 1973. The government then became the dominant
supplier of power in the country. The power sector was developed and financed from the national
budget and the tariff was determined on the basis of the cost of production. The cost of financing the
construction was not recovered from the consumers. This proved an unsustainable model.
Another largely overlooked fact was the consumption pattern. Power distribution companies
continued to install transformers etc based on sanctioned load in that area. The sanctioned load of
almost 80 percent of the households was much less than the actual consumption. It is common
knowledge that few households had air conditioners five decades ago. A large number of middle-
class families now use air conditioners in summer. Washing machines, particularly automatic
washing machines, were also rare in the 1970s. Today, they are a common feature in urban houses.
The microwave oven is another addition to power consuming gadgets. With increase in electronic
gadgets the actual load has grown. Only a fraction of the consumers informed the electricity
distribution companies about the load increase. As a result the sanctioned load remained unaltered.
It was left to the distribution companies to upgrade the transformers after complaints of frequent
shutdowns due to overloading. The distributors still lack accurate data on the power load needed in
the areas they serve. This results in erratic supply and frequent damage to power supply equipment.
The impact of power load changes can be judged from the fact that in 2010 it was calculated
that the charging of mobile phones alone consumed 62 MW. Former PEPCO chairman Basharat
Ahmad Cheema estimates that after the staggering increase in mobile phone use, the current use on
their charging is nearly 200 MW. The regular increase in power demand was not matched by
increases in power generation capacity.
The state eventually added some furnace oil-based plants to overcome shortages but that was
not enough. Meanwhile, the government finances came under severe stress, and it was unable to
add further generation capacity from its resources. Then came the independent power producers. To
attract investment in power production the state guaranteed that their entire output would be
purchased at a fixed rate of return. The tariffs agreed with sovereign guarantees were front loaded
to cover the financial cost of the projects plus the profit. The guaranteed rate of profit on investment
was over 18 percent (more than the interest paid by commercial banks on fixed deposits). The tariff
was fixed in US dollar terms. This meant that with every devaluation of the rupee the tariff in rupee
terms would rise.
Until 2000, the power sector was managed by the Water and Power Development Authority. It
had 147,000 employees out of which 9,250 were highly qualified professionals. In 2000, the power
division was separated and reorganised into several power distribution companies looked after by
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Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO). The professional staff was not transferred to the
distribution companies. The professionals had been dealing with the problems faced by the
consumers and suggesting remedial measures for upgrading the system. The distribution companies
lacking the professional resource were unable to resolve the issues and regular upgrades were also
missed. In the meantime, the power tariff was rising on a regular basis.
The consumers were not prepared to bear the high increases in tariff. This gave rise to power
theft which increased with every increase in power tariff. The theft requires connivance of the staff
of the power distribution companies. Every increase in power tariff also increases the income of the
corrupt officials. Those consuming stolen power consume it lavishly since all they pay are nominal
bills and some bribes. In some areas of the country power theft enjoys political patronage. The theft
is accounted for as distribution losses which are among the highest documented in the world. In
addition, the distribution companies have been unable to recover power bills worth Rs 1.6 trillion.
Defaults by the private sector are worth over Rs 1 trillion. Public sector departments too owe Rs 600
million to the power companies. Why the private sector default was permitted to build while supply
continued uninterrupted is a mystery.
Today, power theft is a nationwide issue. The losses in KP, Balochistan and Sindh have
increased further after the recent increases in power tariff. In 1990s, the largest theft fraction in the
country was recorded at Kasur. While KP and Sindh have higher percentage losses, Lahore Electric
Supply Company still has greater absolute numbers than Sindh, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and
Gilgit Baltistan. It is because of the power theft and non-recovery of 10-15 percent bills that the state
is unable to recover the cost of power. It regularly defaults on payments to the independent power
producers despite the sovereign guarantees given to them.
It must pay whenever they call the sovereign guarantees. The government seeks shelter
against these payments by directing public sector companies like the Pakistan State Oil, the SSGDC
and the SNGPL to supply fuel to these companies without waiting for payment. Their dues are
released by the IPPs when the government releases some payment to them. These public sector
companies have thus accumulated acute financial problems. The so-called circular debt in the power
sector has crossed Rs 2.6 trillion.
The idea that hydel power is cheap is false. The tariffs for electricity produced by Mangla and
Tarbela dams did not factor in the cost of construction of those dams. Hydel power is good in that it
does not pollute the air, but it costs almost the same as LNG- or coal-powered generators. The tariff
for electricity produced by Basha-Diamer Dam was calculated in 2009 to be Rs 8.56 per unit based on
its construction cost. In 2021, after the estimated construction cost escalated it came to Rs 14.50.
All efforts over the past decade to revamp the power distribution companies have failed. The
boards of these companies are appointed by the state. Sometimes the appointments do not follow
transparent merit. Privatisation is a potential solution but does not guarantee the availability of
power to all consumers. A possible interim solution is to keep these companies in the public sector
and handover their management to the private sector in the interest of transparency and eradication
of theft and corruption.
(Source: TNS)
 96

CIRCULAR DEBT
The way forward
Munawar Hasan
Due to some in-built inefficiencies, the power sector in Pakistan is doomed to a financial
collapse. The main outcome of a ruined energy generation, transmission and distribution system has
been an inter-corporate circular debt, threatening its viability.
The perpetual failure to contain the circular debt has been a manifestation of the fact that
reasons behind a distorted system have not been addressed effectively. Hence, the power sector
circular debt has reached Rs 2.5 trillion. If the trend continues, it may balloon to Rs 2.53 billion by
June, showing a 10 percent growth over the last fiscal year.
No doubt, the rising cost of primary energy has contributed to the accumulation of circular
debt during 2021-22. However, a variable fuel cost would not cast a lasting impact on the size of the
circular debt, rather it is the intrinsic inefficiency of the power sector that is a constant factor
challenging its sustainability.
In simple terms, the ‘circular’ debt can be described as the difference between the cost of
power generation and transmission and the subsequent revenue collection at the distribution level.
The power distribution companies have miserably failed to collect what is due from the consmers.
The so-called technical and commercial/ financial losses form the very basis of mounting
circular debt. Technical losses, according to an assessment, however, stand at 15-20 percent of the
total losses incurred at the distribution level.
Circular debt should not be a quagmire for policy makers in today’s technologically advanced
world. The power managers at the federal level can ensure gradual but enduring cut in the circular
debt by adopting short and medium-term multi-faceted innovative approaches in a bid to control
power losses, apart from taking long-term steps for reducing the cost of generation for making
energy affordable.
Most of the losses are recorded on the financial side and mainly comprise electricity theft
abetted by power distribution companies coupled with a lack of recoveries due to corrupt and
incompetent management. Let’s focus on this persistent bottleneck in the power sector.
Had the power distribution companies been able to achieve their revenue collection targets,
says an expert, there would have been no buildup of the circular debt.
Let’s take an example of how a typical power distribution company works for the collection of
revenues in this part of the world. If an otherwise dutiful consumer fails to pay his or her monthly
power bill, the utility quickly disconnects electricity supply, forcing the customer to pay the
outstanding amount. However, habitual power thieves, with the help of the staff of distribution
companies, are immune to such actions. They continue to steal electricity at will without paying its
cost, resulting in loss-making power utilities.
Electricity theft has been made possible through flawed loss-calculations at the feeder level of
a power distribution company. By doing so, for instance, a power utility like the Lahore Electric
Supply Company (LESCO) freely cross-funds stolen units of a power thief to an honest consumer
living in another area by issuing an inflated bill.
Such cross-funding of the power revenue is also being done across various consumer
categories, meaning that a whole cluster of domestic consumers in various feeders ends up paying
for units consumed by commercial or industrial consumers in connivance with corrupt officials.
 97

How to control this menace is not a million-dollar question. There are technologies already
being used worldwide, and in this region, for controlling commercial losses at the power
distribution level. Installation of smart meters at the division, subdivision and feeder levels has been
considered as one of the most effective ways to check the losses by drawing comparison between
bulk electricity supply and consumption by end consumers.
Prepaid power meters are another means of ensuring timely payment by electricity customers.
These are part of cost-effective innovative measures for turning a power utility into a vibrant and
profit-making distribution company. Initially, these smart power meters should be installed for
consumers in the public and commercial sectors.
There are several reasons for power theft, formally known as Aggregate Technical and
Commercial (AT&C) losses, which include metering related problems. As per a study, prepaid
system of metering minimises inefficiencies in collection, while sophisticated features in the prepaid
smart metering allow real-time identification of loss pockets, while also giving consumers the
freedom to plan their electricity use according to their needs and resources.
This can help substantially reduce the AT&C losses and address the problems of consumers
regarding wrong billing, getting easily reconnected after disconnection due to non-payment of bills
and alleged unauthorised use of electricity in case of mere on-paper disconnection. For the power
sector, prepaid meter is a perfect recipe to ensure hundred percent revenue collection even before
the electricity is consumed.
This intervention is not based on an emerging technology. As per an announcement made by
the Indian government in February 2022, some 3.73 million smart prepaid meters have already been
installed across various states. Bangladesh is also making strides towards introducing cutting edge
smart technologies in the power sector.
In India, smart meters are being installed under various federal schemes as well as by the state
utilities themselves. The Indian government is providing funding to states for the implementation of
smart metering in order to incentivise it. Under some arrangements, the Centre is making the initial
capital expenditure and power distribution companies (DISCOs) are paying back on a monthly
rental basis.
The importance of inducting new technologies to curb losses remains under-appreciated in
Pakistan.
(Source: TNS)

A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR LNG SECTOR

Shujauddin Qureshi (Award-winning environmental journalist)
Pakistan has a diverse energy portfolio with gas playing a major role. Gas consumption had
the largest share of energy supply with approximately 53 percent share in 2018-19 annual
consumption. Power with a 35 percent share, household 21 percent, industry 17 percent and
fertiliser with 16 percent are the major consumption sectors. Pakistan produces around 4 billion
cubic feet per day (Bcfd) of natural gas against a demand of over 6 Bcfd. According to an estimate, it
has about 12 years of gas left at the current consumption levels. Rapid depletion of gas reserves has
led to an increasing import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) since 2015. According to sector analysts,
excessive government subsidies to household and fertiliser sectors and gross underpricing of natural
gas for these sectors have resulted in excessive consumption and waste.
The gas sector in Pakistan involves a range of actors, institutions, policies and legislations. The
legal regime around gas has been growing in response to emerging needs.
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The first-ever piece of legislation, the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral
Development (Government Control) Act 1948, (amended in 1976) authorises relevant departments of
mines, oilfields and mineral development across Pakistan to make rules for the grant or renewal of
an exploration or prospecting licence, including for the control of production, storage and
distribution of minerals and mineral oils as well as determining the prices at which minerals and
mineral oils may be bought or sold. The Act is implemented by two sets of rules; one set is
applicable to onshore operations and a separate one to offshore operations.
The Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) Ordinance 2002 established the independent
regulator to foster competition, increase private investment and ownership in the midstream and
downstream industry; protect the public interest while respecting individual rights; and provide
effective and efficient regulations for similar matters. The OGRA has the powers of RLNG price
determination on a monthly basis in line with other petroleum products.
Approved pricing components include parameters such as losses on account of net sale
proceeds and relevant adjustments due to exchange rate, freight charges, import costs, importer’s
margin, terminal charges, cost of distribution, administrative margin and transmission losses.
Another important legislation concerning LNG is the Petroleum Products (Petroleum Levy)
Ordinance, 1961. It categorises LNG as a petroleum product and determines its price through an
amendment in 2015 in the First and Second Schedules of the Ordinance.
LNG/RLNG regime is covered under the mid and downstream petroleum industry of
Pakistan and the focal legislation on the subject is OGRA Ordinance 2002. Under the ordinance, the
regulator has the power to grant, issue, renew or revoke a licence to domestic LNG purchasers and
enforce compliance with licencing provisions. It also ensures cost-effectiveness, safety standards and
best prices. Licences range from construction of pipelines, facilities, terminals, storage and
transportation to gas utilities.
The Pakistan Offshore Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Rules 2003, framed under
Section II of the Regulation of Mines Oilfields and Mineral Development Act, 1948, and Section 14 of
the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976, also apply to gas in addition to petroleum and
other substances.
The first LNG policy was introduced in 2006 with the approval of the Economic Coordination
Committee (ECC). In pursuance of the LNG Policy 2006 and the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority
(ORGA) Ordinance 2002, the OGRA notified LNG Rules in 2007 to bring the anticipated LNG
activity under the regulatory regime. The LNG Rules 2007 provides legal, commercial and technical
parameters concerning LNG construction, processing, production, testing, licencing as well as
terminal and operational regimes.
The 2007 Rules define an LNG Terminal as a fixed or movable facility, whether located on
land or sea, used for loading, unloading, storage and re-gasification of LNG including all ancillary
and auxiliary equipment and pipelines. It defines LNG production as the process to convert natural
gas into LNG and includes natural gas treatment, natural gas liquefaction, LNG storage and LNG
filling. It authorises the OGRA to grant a licence to carry out any regulated activity to such persons
for a maximum period of 20 years.
The licencees are obliged, among other things, to locate, design, construct, operate and
maintain their facilities in strict accordance with the standards prescribed by the authority and in a
manner so as not to endanger public health or safety; to strictly follow the requirements of the
Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, as amended from time to time.
In 2011, the LNG Policy 2006 was revised in line with the latest developments in the LNG
sector (both locally and globally). Again in 2020, Directorate General Liquefied Gases, Petroleum
 99

Division of the Ministry of Energy initiated a process to revise the LNG Policy 2011 to make it in
conformity with the latest developments in the LNG sector (locally and globally).
The Pakistan Onshore Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Rules 2013 framed under the
Regulation of Mines and Oil Fields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948, set
out the terms and conditions of royalties to be paid by the federal government to provinces based on
their share of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (such as LPG, natural gas liquids, solvent oil,
gasoline and others).
The Oil and Gas Regulatory (Amendment) Bill, 2021, which aims to ensure natural gas pricing
on a regular basis was approved in September 2021. After this amendment, the OGRA shall
eliminate gaps between regular, semi-annual tariff determination and notification. It will also bring
the entire liquefied natural gas (LNG) and re-gasified liquefied natural gas (RLNG) licencing and
pricing under the regulatory framework of the OGRA. The amendment would further empower the
OGRA to determine and notify RLNG sale price under the OGRA Ordinance, 2002.
The Directorate General of Gas works under the Petroleum Wing of the energy ministry. On
the exploration and production side, its main functions include formulation of the government
policies regarding natural gas, LPG, LNG and CNG; assessment and management of demand and
supply; allocation of gas from new finds to gas utility companies; allocation of natural gas from
different supply sources to various sectors; review and execution of gas price agreements with
producers and gas sales agreements between the producers and the government-nominated buyer;
assessment of prescribed price for consumers determined by the OGRA and making
recommendations to the government for their fixation
Pakistan LNG Limited (PLL) is a public sector entity founded in 2015. It operates under the
Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division). The PLL has a mandate to buy, import, store LNG,
distribute, transport, metre and sell natural gas. The PLL procures LNG from international markets
and enters into onward arrangements for the supply of gas to the end users, managing the supply
chain of LNG.
The Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC) is a public listed large-scale company. It is Pakistan’s
leading integrated gas company. The government, directly and indirectly, owns a majority of the
shares in the company which is engaged in the business of transmission and distribution of natural
gas besides the installation of high-pressure transmission and low-pressure distribution system
The Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) was incorporated as a private limited
company in, 1963 and converted into a public limited company in January, 1964 under the
Companies Act 1913, and later, The Companies Act, 2017. The company took over the existing Sui-
Multan System from the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Dhulian-
Rawalpindi-Wah system from the Attock Oil Company Limited. The company’s commercial
operations commenced by selling an average of 47 MMCFD gas in two regions, Multan and
Rawalpindi.
Despite a comprehensive legislative framework, there remain major challenges arising from
the operational and administrative structure of LNG imports in Pakistan that need to be addressed.
(Source: TNS)

BACK TO DARK AGES

Engr. Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui (Former Chairman of the State Engineering Corporation)
Pakistan continues to face a serious electricity crisis for the last three weeks or so, as load
shedding has intensified across the country. The power deficit in the National Transmission &
Despatch Company (NTDC) network is currently recorded at over 7,000MW, and the power supply-
 100

demand gap is likely to widen in the coming days due to fast-growing demand for electricity on
account of hot weather conditions, and delays in supply of fuels.
The masses — already over-burdened with highly inflated electricity bills — must brace with
8 to 10-hour load-shedding daily in major cities, including Islamabad, Lahore, and Faisalabad, while
small towns, rural areas and feeders in major cities categorised as high-loss recovery areas face up to
14-hour-long blackouts. Karachi is also bracing prolonged power outages, up to nine hours in a day
as currently the K-Electric system has a deficit of over 600MW. On June 5, K-Electric has cautioned
of extended load shedding, likely for another five hours, if fuel supplies are not arranged.
The large-scale load-shedding in the national system has crippled civic life as well as industrial,
trade and commercial activities. The industrial sector is subjected to record 10-hour outages, while
industrial captive power plants are deprived of natural gas, with a multiplier effect on the national
economy. There have been protest demonstrations last month in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and a few
other cities, demanding cut in the prevalent massive load shedding that remains unscheduled. The
political unrest is another important dimension of the prevailing power crisis.
The existing installed power generation capacity from all resources is 34,501MW (NTDC
system), of which the net or dependable capacity is estimated to be about 30,000MW — much more
than demand during peak hours these days. While the government no more shares the statistics of
daily power generation and demand with the public on a regular basis, present generation, recorded
on June 6, is 20,621MW, which is disproportionate to installed capacity.
The suppressed demand is said to be 28,066MW. Electricity shortfall thus was 7,445MW on
that day. Major contributors to electricity generation are thermal power plants (12,120MW),
hydropower (5,348MW), and nuclear power (1,749MW). Renewable energy resources contribute
1,107MW wind-power, 178MW biogas, and 119MW solar to cumulative power generation.
Interestingly, NTDC system had evacuated record 24,566MW electricity during 2021. In spite
of addition of significant power generation capacity in the last few months — particularly that of
hydropower and nuclear energy resources — total generation, instead of improving, has steeply
declined, with existing capacity being grossly under-utilised. First unit of 180MW capacity of
720MW Karot hydropower station was connected to national grid in mid-May. Earlier, the second
unit of Karachi Nuclear power plant (KANUPP-III) of 1,100MW commenced commercial operations.
The power situation has worsened primarily due to inadequate transmission capacity, flawed
strategy, imprudent use of available resources, and transmission and distribution losses. The power
sector circular debt has now swelled to Rs2.46 trillion and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) are
facing difficulties in servicing their dues and, therefore, have cut down generation drastically,
despite huge reliable existing capacity. The government has recently released Rs50 billion to the
Chinese IPPs, which is the first instalment of their total dues of Rs340 billion.
Due to financial constraints, Pakistan State Oil (PSO) is unable to provide adequate oil
supplies to powerhouses, and same is the situation with gas supplies. Power plants are not getting
liquefied natural gas (LNG), furnace oil or imported coal as per their requirements. Practically, total
reliance is on hydropower generation capacity of 9,873MW but the water reservoirs are not yet full,
like in Tarbela, due to lesser rains this season though the flow in rivers has increased recently.
Obviously, the government has failed to address energy crisis effectively. It has paid no
serious attention to the mismanagement, inefficiencies, and a host of other institutional issues of the
power sector. Most importantly, laxity on the part of the government has resulted in increased
technical and collection losses, or electricity theft. The DISCOs have been unable to improve their
recoveries from the private sector that have swelled to some Rs500 billion. Energy conservation
measures, such as restricted timing for commercial activities in the evening, were either not
 101

implemented or did not yield positive results in the past. Now the government is reconsidering to
curtail business hours in markets in the evening in major cities.
In short, there is no respite seen to massive electricity load shedding in the foreseeable future.
Federal Energy Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan has said on May 8 that “the present government is
determined to provide an interrupted power supply to the masses”, but he says on June 5 that end
to load shedding was not possible. Obviously, the biggest challenge for the government is to control
ever-increasing power sector circular debt, which cannot be managed in short span of time given the
present financial crisis.
Sadly, adequate electricity at affordable price remains a distant dream for the country’s
consumers, in the wake of record increases in oil and gas prices, resultantly higher power tariff,
and anticipated withdrawal from July 1 of the available subsidy of Rs5 per unit to consumers
using 700 units.
(Source: Money Matter)
 102

Essays
AN EPOCHAL DECLINE IN AMERICAN GLOBAL POWER
Alfred W. Mccoy (Professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Throughout 2021, Americans were absorbed in arguments over mask mandates, school
closings, and the meaning of the January 6th attack on the Capitol. Meanwhile, geopolitical hot spots
were erupting across Eurasia, forming a veritable ring of fire around that vast land mass.
Let's circle that continent to visit just a few of those flashpoints, each one suffused with
significance for the future of U.S. global power.
On the border with Ukraine, 100,000 Russian troops were massing with tanks and rocket
launchers, ready for a possible invasion. Meanwhile, Beijing signed a $400 billion agreement with
Tehran to swap infrastructure-building for Iranian oil. Such an exchange might help make that
country the future rail hub of Central Asia, while projecting China's military power into the
Persian Gulf. Just across the Iranian border in Afghanistan, Taliban guerrillas swept into Kabul
ending a 20-year American occupation in a frantic flurry of shuttle flights for more than 100,000
defeated Afghan allies.
Farther east, high in the Himalayas, Indian Army engineers were digging tunnels and
positioning artillery to fend off future clashes with China. In the Bay of Bengal, a dozen ships from
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, led by the supercarrier USS Carl Vinson, were
conducting live gunnery drills, practice for a possible future war with China.
Meanwhile, a succession of American naval vessels continually passed through the South
China Sea, skirting Chinese island bases there and announcing that no protests from Beijing "will
deter us." Just to the north, U.S. destroyers, denounced by China, regularly sailed through the Strait
of Taiwan; while some 80 Chinese jet fighters swarmed into that disputed island's air security zone,
a development Washington condemned as "provocative military activity."
Around the coast of Japan, a flotilla of 10 Chinese and Russian warships steamed aggressively
across waters once virtually owned by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. And in frigid Arctic oceans way to the
north, thanks to the radical warming of the planet and receding sea ice, an expanding fleet of
Chinese icebreakers maneuvered with their Russian counterparts to open a "polar silk road," thereby
possibly taking possession of the roof of the world.
While you could have read about almost all of this in the American media, sometimes in great
detail, nobody here has tried to connect such transcontinental dots to uncover their deeper
significance. Our nation's leaders have visibly not done much better and there's a reason for this. As
I explain in my recent book, To Govern the Globe, both liberal and conservative political elites in the
New York–Washington corridor of power have been on top of the world for so long that they can't
remember how they got there.
During the late 1940s, following a catastrophic world war that left some 70 million dead,
Washington built a potent apparatus for global power, thanks significantly to its encirclement of
Eurasia via both military bases and global trade. The U.S. also formed a new system of global
governance, exemplified by the United Nations, that would not only assure its hegemony but also—
or so the hope was then—foster an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity.
Three generations later, however, as populism, nationalism, and anti-globalism roiled public
discourse, surprisingly few in Washington bothered to defend their world order in a meaningful
way. And fewer of them still had any real grasp of the geopolitics—that slippery mix of armaments,
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occupied lands, subordinated rulers, and logistics—that has been every imperial leader's essential
toolkit for the effective exercise of global power.
So, let's do what our country's foreign policy experts, in and out of government, haven't and
examine the latest developments in Eurasia through the prism of geopolitics and history. Do that
and you'll grasp just how they, and the deeper forces they represent, are harbingers of an epochal
decline in American global power.
Eurasia as the Epicenter of Power on Planet Earth
In the 500 years since European exploration first brought the continents into continuous
contact, the rise of every global hegemon has required one thing above all: dominance over Eurasia.
Similarly, their decline has invariably been accompanied by a loss of control over that vast
landmass. During the sixteenth century, the Iberian powers, Portugal and Spain, waged a joint
struggle to control Eurasia's maritime commerce by battling the powerful Ottoman empire, whose
leader was then the caliph of Islam. In 1509, off the coast of northeast India, skilled Portuguese
gunners destroyed a Muslim fleet with lethal broadsides, establishing that country's century-long
dominance over the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the Spanish used the silver they had extracted from
their new colonies in the Americas for a costly campaign to check Muslim expansion in the
Mediterranean Sea. Its culmination: the destruction in 1571 of an Ottoman fleet of 278 ships at the
epic Battle of Lepanto.
Next in line, Great Britain's dominion over the oceans began with an historic naval triumph
over a combined French-Spanish fleet off Spain's Cape Trafalgar in 1805 and only ended when, in
1942, a British garrison of 80,000 men surrendered their seemingly impregnable naval bastion at
Singapore to the Japanese—a defeat Winston Churchill called "the worst disaster and largest
capitulation in British history."
Like all past imperial hegemons, U.S. global power has similarly rested on geopolitical
dominance over Eurasia, now home to 70% of the world's population and productivity. After the
Axis alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan failed to conquer that vast land mass, the Allied victory in
World War II allowed Washington, as historian John Darwin put it, to build its "colossal imperium…
on an unprecedented scale," becoming the first power in history to control the strategic axial points
"at both ends of Eurasia."
In the early 1950s, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong forged a Sino-Soviet alliance that threatened
to dominate the continent. Washington, however, countered with a deft geopolitical gambit that, for
the next 40 years, succeeded in "containing" those two powers behind an "Iron Curtain" stretching
5,000 miles across the vast Eurasian land mass.
As a critical first step, the U.S. formed the NATO alliance in 1949, establishing major military
installations in Germany and naval bases in Italy to ensure control of the western side of Eurasia.
After its defeat of Japan, as the new overlord of the world's largest ocean, the Pacific, Washington
dictated the terms of four key mutual-defense pacts in the region with Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, and Australia and so acquired a vast range of military bases along the Pacific littoral
that would secure the eastern end of Eurasia. To tie the two axial ends of that vast land mass into a
strategic perimeter, Washington ringed the continent's southern rim with successive chains of steel,
including three navy fleets, hundreds of combat aircraft, and most recently, a string of 60 drone
bases stretching from Sicily to the Pacific island of Guam.
With the communist bloc bottled up behind the Iron Curtain, Washington then sat back and
waited for its Cold War enemies to self-destruct—which they did. First, the Sino-Soviet split in the
1960s shattered their hold on the Eurasian heartland. Then, the disastrous Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in the 1980s ravaged the Red Army and precipitated the break-up of the Soviet Union.
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After those oh-so-strategic initial steps to capture the axial ends of Eurasia, however,
Washington itself essentially stumbled through much of the rest of the Cold War with blunders like
the Bay of Pigs catastrophe in Cuba and the disastrous Vietnam War in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless,
by the Cold War's end in 1991, the U.S. military had become a global behemoth with 800 overseas
bases, an air force of 1,763 jet fighters, more than a thousand ballistic missiles, and a navy of nearly
600 ships, including 15 nuclear carrier battle groups—all linked by the world's only global system of
communications satellites. For the next 20 years, Washington would enjoy what Trump-era Defense
Secretary James Mattis called "uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We
could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, operate how
we wanted."
The Three Pillars of U.S. Global Power
In the late 1990s, at the absolute apex of U.S. global hegemony, President Jimmy Carter's
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, far more astute as an armchair analyst than an
actual practitioner of geopolitics, issued a stern warning about the three pillars of power necessary
to preserve Washington's global control. First, the U.S. must avoid the loss of its strategic European
"perch on the Western periphery" of Eurasia. Next, it must block the rise of "an assertive single
entity" across the continent's massive "middle space" of Central Asia. And finally, it must prevent
"the expulsion of America from its offshore bases" along the Pacific littoral.
Drunk on the heady elixir of limitless global power following the implosion of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Washington's foreign-policy elites made increasingly dubious decisions that led to a
rapid decline in their country's dominance. In an act of supreme imperial hubris, born of the belief
that they were triumphantly at the all-American "end of history," Republican neoconservatives in
President George W. Bush's administration invaded and occupied first Afghanistan and then Iraq,
convinced that they could remake the entire Greater Middle East, the cradle of Islamic civilization, in
America's secular, free-market image (with oil as their repayment). After an expenditure of nearly $2
trillion on operations in Iraq alone and nearly 4,598 American military deaths, all Washington left
behind was the rubble of ruined cities, more than 200,000 Iraqi dead, and a government in Baghdad
beholden to Iran. The official U.S. Army history of that war concluded that "an emboldened and
expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor."
Meanwhile, China spent those same decades building industries that would make it the
workshop of the world. In a major strategic miscalculation, Washington admitted Beijing to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, bizarrely confident that a compliant China, home to
nearly 20% of humanity and historically the world's most powerful nation, would somehow join the
global economy without changing the balance of power. "Across the ideological spectrum," as two
former Obama administration officials later wrote, "we in the U.S. foreign policy community shared
the underlying belief that U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States'
liking." A bit more bluntly, former national security adviser H.R. McMaster concluded that
Washington had empowered "a nation whose leaders were determined not only to displace the
United States in Asia, but also to promote a rival economic and governance model globally."
During the 15 years after it joined the WTO, Beijing's exports to the U.S. grew nearly
fivefold to $462 billion while, by 2014, its foreign currency reserves surged from just $200 billion
to an unprecedented $4 trillion, a vast treasure it used to launch its trillion-dollar "Belt and Road
Initiative" (BRI), aimed at uniting Eurasia economically through newly built infrastruct ure. In
the process, Beijing began a systematic demolition of Brzezinski's three pillars of U.S.
geopolitical power.
The First Pillar—Europe
Beijing has scored its most surprising success so far in Europe, long a key bastion of American
global power. As part of a chain of 40 commercial ports it's been building or rebuilding around
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Eurasia and Africa, Beijing has purchased major port facilities in Europe, including outright
ownership of the Greek port of Piraeus and significant shares in those of Zeebrugge in Belgium,
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Hamburg, Germany.
After a state visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2019, Italy became the first G-7 member
to officially join the BRI agreement, subsequently signing over a portion of its ports at Genoa and
Trieste. Despite Washington's strenuous objections, in 2020, the European Union and China also
concluded a draft financial services agreement that, when finalized in 2023, will more fully integrate
their banking systems.
While China is building ports, rails, roads, and powerplants across the continent, its Russian
ally continues to dominate Europe's energy market and is now just months away from opening its
controversial Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea, guaranteed to increase
Moscow's economic influence. As the massive pipeline project moved to completion last December,
Russian President Putin intensified pressures on NATO with a roster of "extravagant" demands,
including a formal guarantee that Ukraine not be admitted to the alliance, removal of all the military
infrastructure installed in Eastern Europe since 1997, and a prohibition against future military
activity in Central Asia.
In a power play not seen since Stalin and Mao joined forces in the 1950s, the alliance between
Putin's raw military force and Xi's relentless economic pressure may indeed slowly be pulling
Europe away from America. Complicating the U.S. position, Britain's exit from the European Union
cost Washington its most forceful advocate inside Brussels' labyrinthine corridors of power.
And as Brussels and Washington grow apart, Beijing and Moscow only come closer. Through
joint energy ventures, military maneuvers, and periodic summits, Putin and Xi are reprising the
Stalin-Mao alliance, a strategic partnership at the heart of Eurasia that could, in the end, break
Washington's steel chains that have long stretched from Eastern Europe to the Pacific.
The Second Pillar—Central Asia
Under its bold BRI scheme to fuse Europe and Asia into a unitary Eurasian economic bloc,
Beijing has crisscrossed Central Asia with a steel-ribbed cat's cradle of railroads and oil pipelines,
effectively toppling Brzezinski's second pillar of geopolitical power—that the U.S. must block the
rise of "an assertive single entity" in the continent's vast "middle space." When President Xi first
announced the Belt and Road Initiative at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University in September 2013,
he spoke expansively about "connecting the Pacific and the Baltic Sea," while building "the biggest
market in the world with unparalleled potential."
In the decade since, Beijing has put in place a bold design for transcending the vast distances
that historically separated Asia and Europe. Starting in 2008, the China National Petroleum
Corporation collaborated with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to launch a Central Asia-
China gas pipeline that will eventually extend more than 4,000 miles. By 2025, in fact, there should
be an integrated inland energy network, including Russia's extensive grid of gas pipelines, reaching
6,000 miles from the Baltic to the Pacific.
The only real barrier to China's bid to capture Eurasia's vast "middle space" was the now-
ended U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. To join Central Asia's gas fields to the energy-hungry
markets of South Asia, the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline was
announced in 2018, but progress though the critical Afghan sector was slowed by the war there. In
the months before it captured Kabul, however, Taliban diplomats turned up in Turkmenistan and
China to offer assurances about the project's future. Since then, the scheme has been revived,
opening the way for Chinese investment that could complete its capture of Central Asia.
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The Third Pillar—the Pacific Littoral

The most volatile flashpoint In Beijing's grand strategy for breaking Washington's geopolitical
grip over Eurasia lies in the contested waters between China's coast and the Pacific littoral, which
the Chinese call "the first island chain." By building a half-dozen island bases of its own in the
South China Sea since 2014, swarming Taiwan and the East China Sea with repeated fighter plane
forays, and staging joint maneuvers with Russia's navy, Beijing has been conducting a relentless
campaign to begin what Brzezinski called "the expulsion of America from its offshore bases" along
that Pacific littoral.
As China's economy grows larger and its naval forces do, too, the end of Washington's
decades-long dominion over that vast ocean expanse may be just over the horizon. For one thing,
China may at some point achieve supremacy in certain critical military technologies, including
super-secure "quantum entanglement" satellite communications and hypersonic missiles. Last
October, the chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, called China's recent launch of a
hypersonic missile "very close" to "a Sputnik moment." While U.S. tests of such weapons, which
can fly faster than 4,000 m.p.h., have repeatedly failed, China successfully orbited a prototype
whose speed and stealth trajectory suddenly make U.S. aircraft carriers significantly more difficult
to defend.
But China's clear advantage in any struggle over that first Pacific island chain is simply
distance. A battle fleet of two U.S. supercarriers operating 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor could
deploy, at best, 150 jet fighters. In any conflict within 200 miles of China's coast, Beijing could use up
to 2,200 combat aircraft as well as DF-21D "carrier-killer" missiles whose 900-mile range makes them,
according to U.S. Navy sources, "a severe threat to the operations of U.S. and allied navies in the
western Pacific."
The tyranny of distance, in other words, means that the U.S. loss of that first island chain,
along with its axial anchor on Eurasia's Pacific littoral, should only be a matter of time.
In the years to come, as more such incidents erupt around Eurasia's ring of fire, readers can
insert them into their own geopolitical model—a useful, even essential, means for understanding a
fast-changing world. And as you do that, just remember that history has never ended, while the U.S.
position in it is being remade before our eyes.
(Source: Common Dreams)

ROADMAP TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Humayun Akhtar Khan (Former commerce minister)
It is time to look beyond Budget 2023. The government’s chosen goal for the budget, despite
the clamour and possible changes, is to avoid default.
It is a crucial goal. Yet, above the numbers, there should be higher ambitions – such as
avoiding future crises, improving living standards, and building the nation’s solidarity and self-
esteem. The government may eventually give a moment to such thoughts, if they have the time. So
far, they are focused on making ends meet.
So, while we wade our way through another crisis, I believe the country must also sow the
seeds for a future with a more buoyant economy and an open society.
The long road down: Rehashing how we keep getting into the mess is important because we
have not learned any lesson. The real test of a people is how they get out of a rough spot once they
are in one. Even more so, it is about what means we use to get out of the mess and to learn not to
make a habit of getting into trouble time and again.
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So far, with each crisis the country has piled debt on debt to settle past dues to our creditors.
While that is needed again now, it is hardly strategy. This minimalist goal of avoiding default
ensures that before long we are back into another crisis.
The current mantra about why we are frequently in a crunch is ‘elite capture’. Privileges for
special interests cause much harm, of course. Yet, lack of strategic thinking is the greater perpetrator.
The economy needs a strategy to revive growth and exports. Growth will solve the top
concern of our youth, jobs. Jobs come only from more production and higher growth. And if GDP
growth leads to higher exports, at one fell swoop we will achieve more than just jobs.
Growth in exports will help with decent jobs and combat the country’s enduring affliction of
external imbalance. By increasing supply of goods, growth also acts against high prices.
In this series of columns, I propose a growth strategy. This could, in about five years, put the
economy on a path of stability and development. It would also minimize our dependence on others.
Let us take a moment to see where we are today. Runaway twin deficits define our present
state. FY22 budget deficit is estimated to be nine per cent of GDP and the current account deficit
could be four per cent or more. And each day brings news about the rupee’s further fall. The
slowdown in the economy and the high inflation have been made worse by doubt and failure to act
decisively. With mixed signals from the IMF, the risks to the economy are high.
At home and abroad, the government is running out of options to borrow. Within the country,
the government’s borrowing cost is over 15 per cent. The high rate of borrowing at home is
exhausting the banking sector’s limits. As the cost of credit grows, the private sector finds it may no
longer be in the market.
Externally, major lenders would not oblige until they have the IMF’s assurance. To get IMF
support means more pain for citizens and a high political cost for the government.
All this is because of very high public indebtedness. Pakistan’s debt has grown to a level
where loans cannot be repaid. The budget for markup payments on foreign and domestic debt is
45 per cent of federal spending. Such large sums take money away from more vital needs.
Servicing of external debt alone is now four per cent of GDP. That is, four per cent of Pakistan’s
GDP goes overseas. High import and debt servicing needs have led to a constant current account
deficit and frequent crises. Each crisis slows down the economy. Businesses suffer loss and
citizens face hard times.
This freefall has been years in the making, across many governments. Though the IMF is
needed, let us try to make it the last time. Or one of the last times. Clambering back – a strategy for
growth: To deal with all this, the economy must grow rapidly. Rapid growth would yield more tax
revenue to invest in public goods that help firms produce more. Also, GDP must increase over long
periods, not just for one or two years. For that to happen, the economy’s quality of growth must
improve. Growth should increase production of manufactured goods for exports.
The picture is the opposite today. Export has fallen continually for 30 years. It was 19 per cent
of GDP in 1990. The ratio of export to GDP now stands at about 10 per cent. Fall in export is a major
cause of our external account troubles, as the economy does not earn enough to import or repay.
The same goes for investment: To produce more manufactured goods, firms need good
infrastructure, human resources and incentives. The economy’s high debt burden leaves little in the
public kitty to afford the needed public goods. Nor can the private sector easily access credit. Thus,
we have to think of new ways to create credit so that private firms can invest. The economy will not
grow without more investment.
The remaining part of this essay will focus on how to achieve growth that spurs export and
creates jobs. For that, it is vital to stretch the limits imposed by us on our thinking. For years, there
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has been an inevitability in the country’s approach – that is: the only way to grow or exit economic
troubles is to take on more debt. We have also assumed that poverty is destined. The economy is
weak and dependent because we choose it to be so.
A growth strategy needs an enduring cycle of more public and private investment, exports,
and less foreign debt.
On the public side, a short-of-cash government has to find money by both increasing revenue
and cutting expenses. That will allow it to invest more in public goods.
For private investment, the economy must keep credit flowing. I propose ways of doing so,
even as the economy stays within the monetary limit.
Cutting cost by managing debt: Looking at the government’s high interest expense, there is no
better way to cut cost than to reduce the debt burden. For a cash-starved public sector, it is not easy
to pay back debt. Nor is the economy growing at a pace to spawn returns that help repay. So, we
must seek debt relief.
Once again, the IMF will be central to this effort. Once restored, Pakistan must go beyond the
present IMF’s EFF programme. A plan to avoid future current account crises should lie at the centre
of any substantial engagement with the IMF.
In essence, Pakistan’s foreign debt is no longer viable. The IMF considers our debt sustainable
from a cash flow point of view. Under its programme, we will get enough fresh loans to meet the
current account deficit and to pay back the creditors their due.
Yet, as we take on more debt to repay past debts, the payment due to outsiders has grown
beyond the economy’s ability to pay. Debt payment is forcing the country to postpone its other
critical needs. Foreign debt servicing is more than 50 per cent of exports and about a quarter of
exports plus remittances.
It is possible to make the IMF agree to debt relief and for it to take the lead in coordinating
with other lenders. Relief would come in the shape of lower interest rate or creditors taking a haircut
on the principal amount, or their combination. To convince the IMF that we will not seek such help
again, we must go to them with a sound plan for economic growth, exports and correction of elite
privilege. Debt relief will not prevent Pakistan from borrowing more to meet payment due to
creditors. Except, we will do so under an arrangement. And there will be severe conditions attached
– though I do not expect that they would be any more harsh than what we see today.
Pakistan has credible cause to make the appeal. For one, in 20 years Pakistan has received less
cash than it has paid outsiders. That is, the amount we have borrowed in 20 years is less than the
sum paid back by us as principal and interest. Yet, the stock of debt owed to outsiders is today three
times more than what it was 20 years ago. This is the perverse logic of compounding. During this
period, we have paid $1.4 billion annually as interest alone. And this amount is growing each year.
Whether low-cost credit or any other, the share of interest in total servicing is high. It ranges
from 20 per cent for IFIs to 51 per cent for Paris Club lenders – the latter because of rescheduling by
them.
Where debt buildup and interest paid are concerned, concessional debt is a euphemism. There
is not much difference in cost to the government. The title of concessional debt merely makes the
debtor smug and adds to the myth of the benefit of foreign debt.
Often the debt is not put to the best use. Over 70 per cent of new debt is for balance of
payments support. That does not build our ability to repay. Pakistan has been less than judicious in
this regard. Yet, the lenders with their vast knowledge resource also kept lending. To that extent,
creditors too are responsible. In 20 years, Pakistan has transferred a lot of its scarce resources to
creditors in rich countries.
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There is an alternative to the IMF. The G20 members in the last meeting set up the ‘Common
Framework for Debt Treatments’. It aims to deal with insolvency and liquidity problems in 29 low-
income economies. It will do so by providing debt relief according to the debtor’s capacity to pay,
and meet crucial spending. Pakistan is included. China has joined the framework, and the OECD
assures that private donors too will give due relief.
The government may also explore if it is possible to buy back Pakistan issued euro and other
bonds, which are trading well below cost in the secondary market. The rate of interest on these
bonds is up to 8.5 per cent. There are many pros and cons. For one, we do not have the resources.
Also, prices will increase as soon as it is known that the government plans to buy or when the IMF
restores the programme. The intermediary cost is high. Yet, it is possible to set aside funds from say
remittances to buy back at a discount. By end March 2022, Pakistan had $8.8 billion in bonds and
sukuks. That equals about three months of remittances. Of course, it calls for belt tightening. But
there is a cost to managing years of neglect and lack of prudent policy.
At home, years of high budget deficit, an average of over 6 per cent in 20 years, has also built
up our rupee debt. Everyone knows that the high debt cannot be returned, but does not admit it to
protect their balance sheets.
The SBP and the government must open discussion with Pakistani banks. Restructuring is
critical. Banks may either reduce interest rates or cut the principal amount. Again, the IMF may
guide this effort. It has recently published a complete guide in this regard.
Cutting cost by reducing subsidy: There is yet another way to cut cost. The government must
make the power supply chain viable: For that, it may look at all options. Doing so would reduce the
budget deficit and make funds available for development: the power-sector reforms of the 1990s
have fallen short of their goals. The lavish comfort offered to investors was needed when first
planned, but not forever. The economy cannot support the cost of the reforms. Also, the sector is too
complex to be solved by the simple idea of private participation in infrastructure. Having earned
their returns, the original investors have mostly left. It is now clear that the consumer or the
government does not have the means to meet the cost.
In any case, because of long delays in paying the tariff subsidy, a part of profits of power
producers stays on the books for years without getting realized. This is hardly a desirable situation.
Power supply still has many problems, while the cost of power has grown. The government’s debt
liability builds up, and IPPs await payment of the subsidy. Everyone suffers – producers, buyers,
and government. Industrial production and exports have been especially hit.
Cut PSE subsidy: There is also an urgent need to take a considered decision on PSEs. Many of
them have been in the red for years. Taxpayers cannot be asked to pay for enterprise inefficiencies.
Even those organizations, such as Pakistan Railways and PIA, that have had captive markets are in
loss. Where the loss is caused by lower than cost tariffs, the government may quantify and subsidize.
These calculations must be made public. In other cases, organizations must be privatized.
DISCOs are a special case. In essence, they are a monopoly in their area of supply. Yet they
incur high losses, costing both consumers and taxpayers. And they delay payment to power
producers. The government may consider privatizing DISCOs. This must be done with specified
cost and performance indicators.
For public investment, the government needs to both cut costs and increase revenue. Tax
policy must serve export growth. Public and private finance must fund more investment and self-
reliance would cut our import bill.
Tax policy to increase revenue and exports: We already see steps to widen the direct tax
base. The government must go further and reduce exemptions. Many exemptions have outlived
their utility. Apart from denying the government much-needed revenue, they redirect investment
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from the manufacturing and export sectors. It is time to reassess tax policy so that it serves our
economic goals.
To enable private firms to compete globally, the government may help them scale up. In this
regard, the policy to tax inter-corporate dividends needs review. According to the Pakistan Business
Council, a number of tax measures hinder investment. Upfront payment of sales tax and income tax
are an issue. These conditions also need revision.
It is unfair also to levy more tax on existing taxpayers. The FBR must set separate targets for
revenue from existing and new taxpayers.
The problem of low investment: Public and private investment both have fallen. I would have
liked the government to take note of this alarming trend and do something about it. So far, there is
not even a discussion. Falling growth, exports and the fragile current account are all outcomes of
low investment.
Re-cast and increase public investment: There is a strong case to recast the federal PSDP so
that it helps raise private productivity. The Planning Commission may develop new metrics for
selection of projects to provide infrastructure and HR aid to exporters. Most new projects must fit
into the new criteria. Given its large pipeline, the shift would be gradual.
Also, for years the government has talked about Public Private Partnership to add to its
allocation. PPP is a useful platform to boost public investment. The Viability Gap Fund may be
funded from the PSDP. The idea of SEZs has been around for over ten years with no progress. Now,
the government has pledged three SEZs. I hope to see them working soon to attract export-oriented
FDI. These zones do not just help economic activity. They are good models for city governments to
follow. In addition, setting up Special Technology Zones would help greatly to spread use of tech in
public and private sectors.
Private credit: With government borrowing high, access to credit for most private firms is an
ask. The economy and jobs will not grow without private investment. Within the fiscal and
monetary framework, the SBP may keep credit flowing. It must have especial credit windows for
selected export industries
The SBP’s TERF was received well by businesses. They would be happy to see its return. SMEs
also need more capital. Credit to targeted SMEs must grow to boost exports in new or traditional
industries. Existing sectors such as electric fans must build capacity to compete in the global market.
Similarly, our usual exports such as surgical goods, metal products, sports goods must increase
world market share.
Pakistan must revive Development Finance Institutions. Fixed cost, long-term project loans
were key to industrial growth of the 1960s. DFIs have been done away with on IFI advice. That has
not served us well. The private sector needs predictable project finance. Fall in industry has
accompanied drop in private credit. Another idea discussed for long but not put into effect is setting
up an EXIM Bank: EXIM banks offer export finance at preferred rates. If need be, its initial capital
may come from the Export Development Fund.
Private fund for projects: In a cash-scarce economy, private finance can play a key role in
industrial growth. This is especially so as the country’s investment needs are far in excess of
resources, while FDI is non-existent. Setting up a Pakistan Equity Fund is an option. The fund could
be a platform for global investors to invest in Pakistan’s high growth, high return sectors. A strategic
approach is to establish the first $2 billion private equity with capital from global investors. The
Pakistan Equity Fund would be capital protected and managed by an experienced team. It would be
a closed-end, off-shore fund.
The fund could have three parts. The Pakistan Opportunity Fund to invest in private projects
in consumer goods, food products, healthcare, among other areas; the Pakistan Climate Change
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Fund that could invest in renewable energy; and the Pakistan Technology Fund to invest in areas
such as Software as a Service or Internet of Things. The fund has the potential to mobilize large sums
of capital with great impact on growth. If done right, it will jumpstart the economy.
I also propose venture capital funds for fintech. Growth of fintech is a sure way to boost
productivity in the economy. These funds offer much needed capital. Global practices show that
technology venture capital in a country grows with tax and regulatory incentives. For example, low
capital gains tax or incentives for leveraged buyouts and other tech projects would enable the funds
to grow. Also, fewer regulatory requirements for private company owners allows them space to
make decisions freely.
Taking cue from growth economies, Pakistan too must offer targeted incentives for exports.
The usual tools for doing so are credit at low rate, duty drawbacks and workers’ training. These
subsidies will not be endless. They must have a sunset clause. Only firms that meet previously
agreed technical and export performance benchmarks would benefit.
Increase in e-commerce and online payments will lower transaction cost and create efficiency.
They will also bring exporters in Pakistan and overseas buyers in direct contact. The use of cash in
the economy should be reduced.
Self-reliance: Domestic energy must have a larger share in our supply mix: The last major
energy policy was in 2012. Since 2013, our main focus has been importing LNG. While that is good
to tide over immediate needs, building a reliable supply chain is important. The Energy Information
Administration of USA which is an office under the US Department of Energy has identified
Pakistan as one of the top shale gas sources.
Shale gas exploration needs complex technology with high cost and great risk. Pakistan must
have a separate policy for shale gas that helps access technology and reduce risk. Without such a
policy, shale gas would forever be a potential that stays unrealized. Increased production would
directly help with the current account deficit. Pakistan must also examine if the 2012 policy needs to
be updated to boost the rate of exploration. No cost is too high to build energy self-reliance, as
frequent global energy crises have shown us.
We may also incentivize production of power from green energy, such as hydro, solar, wind,
or biomass. Gradually, we will end import of coal and move to its domestic production.
In the same vein, Pakistan has for long talked about mineral exploration. Pakistan could set up
the Balochistan Area Development Organization. The organization would offer incentives to
domestic and foreign investors in mineral explorations. The government may incentivize with
favourable regulation, not with guarantees. Mineral production will have a high impact on growth
and prosperity in that province.
Another subject talked about for long is to build substitutes at home for imports. Import of
edible oil, pulses, and wheat exact a high charge on our forex reserves. It is time to bring these plans
to fruition.
The same goes for import of raw materials. Pakistan must produce raw materials by offering
incentives and R&D support. This would add value to our exports. This won’t happen quickly, but
is a worthwhile medium-term goal.
This essay offers a plan to revive the economy by moving away from conventional ideas. Its
analysis of the problems and flaws in our approach is both new and deep. The list of what needs to
be done is long. But it is doable. This is a national cause and must be led from the top with all shades
of views in the public and private sectors playing their role. Also, all levels of government must act
in unison. Most of all, we need political stability and an uncompromising approach to decision-
making by the top leadership. This is the only way to give confidence to all to play their roles.
Nations have seen worse and have come out successfully.
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Recent news has kept us stirred up with the ups and downs of our deal with the IMF. We are
at a stage where taking on debt, not for a project but to make ends meet, is reason to celebrate. It is
easy to borrow, very difficult to repay. There is now a serious dent in the country’s economic model,
under which for years it took loans for consumption.
Decision-makers must know that the party is over. The music has stopped. It is time to rebuild
the economy, put the nation above the self and plan to stay out of trouble. Once the economy is on
firm footing, we must try to improve the country’s living standards.
The government is right to focus on the top issue it faces, which is how to pay the bills due
to outsiders. Naturally, it is beset with restoration of the IMF loan. The Chinese have obliged too,
and others may follow. Yet, so far borrowing more is the government’s only stated policy. More
debt does not solve the problem, it only postpones it. It ensures that before long we could be in a
worse crisis.
We must make parallel efforts to reduce debt, revive the economy and exports, and to limit
imports. In previous writings, I have talked about the first two. Today, I want to discuss how we
may build the economy’s lost capacity for growth and exports while reducing imports.
Because we do not produce enough at home, the economy faces a crisis any time its growth
rate goes over three per cent or so. At higher growth rates, imports balloon and need to be funded
by foreign debt.
Final numbers have yet to come, but it is safe to say that in FY22 Pakistan will import edible
oil worth $4 billion. Also, it will import wheat worth about $1 billion. Recall that until a few years
ago, we exported wheat. Import of machinery will cost $11 billion. And if the economy has to grow,
we need more plant and machinery. Medicine import will be over $4 billion.
There was a time when Pakistan was fixated on building. In the first 25 years, the new country
had gained food security, made two of the world’s largest water dams and had the means to give
fixed interest loans for private credit.
It is vital to recount the story of basic industry, because of its key role in all production.
Pakistan was early in setting up a steel mill. Even before, it established a machine tool factory and
soon after the HMC and HEC. It began shipbuilding in the 1950s. It built its first oil refinery in 1960.
The one flaw in the model was that the steel mill, HMC and the rest were all in the public
sector. They did not flourish because the government funded operating costs but not capital
expenses. Without investment, these units soon lost any promise that they had in the beginning.
Now, they are shells of what they had initially set out to be. The HEC is to be privatized. We hope
that it will become a dynamic unit.
In FY 2, we will import eight million tons of iron and steel for $5.3 billion. The 1.1-million-ton
capacity steel mill will produce nothing. Also, there will be few plants and machinery produced in
Pakistan. And there is not enough foreign exchange to import them in needed volumes. The HMC, HEC
and the machine tool plants have all failed their promise, while governments stood by. Since the oil crisis
of the 1970s, policymaking has become the preserve of IFIs; the government followed orders.
Apathy to manufacturing comes at a cost. Today, Pakistan produces few of the goods needed by
downstream industries. It produces five million tons of steel against 40 million by Turkey and 29 million
by Iran. India produces 120 million tons and China over a billion. Pakistan stands nowhere in basic
chemical production. India and Brazil rank ninth and tenth in the world. Of the nations that export drugs
and medicine the most, India is tenth with $17 billion in exports. India also has the fourth highest oil
refining capacity in the world. Pakistan has not done too badly in fertilizer. But that’s about it. It
produces more light industrial goods than before but cannot export them in large numbers.
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Agriculture has done especially poorly. Since 1977, Pakistan has had an organization to boost
home production of oilseeds, our biggest food import. With 45 years of effort, Pakistan still sources
just 12 per cent of oilseeds from within.
Among others, the Ayub Agriculture Research Institute has studied why we don’t produce
more. Their work is in-depth. But the important finding is that the price farmers get is uncertain and
changes often. There is no reliable channel to sell the output. So, the country buys low quality palm
oil from abroad. And what we buy is bad for health.
Locally produced oilseed does not cost that much more. In 2019, at 36 per cent recovery, the
cost of local Canola seeds was 25 per cent above C&F price of imports. This cost is before duties.
And it is at the 2019 value of the rupee, which was 35 per cent higher than now. Local sunflower cost
was 10 per cent more in 2019. After taxes and other expenses, the cost of imported oilseeds at the
factory gate was far more than the price of local seeds, even in 2019.
The study says that to entirely source from within, oilseeds need five million hectares of land.
As water and land are scarce, that acreage must come from somewhere. PARC points out that there
are varieties that would grow in arid zones or in the hills. We may have the needed land.
If it wants to reduce import, the government must act in support of oilseed farmers. It must
put in place channels for farmers to sell their produce with a mechanism to prevent wild swings in
price. It may offer credit and technical support.
Wheat is key to a country’s food security. In the 20 years between 1980 and 2000, its
production grew by 67 per cent, from 12.5 million ton to about 21 million ton. In 15 years, between
2006 and 2021 production grew by just 18 per cent from 23.3 million ton to 27.5 million ton. In FY22,
its production fell to 26.4 million ton. So, what went wrong?
The Pakistan Economic Survey tells us that the ‘area sown’ is less this year, irrigation water is
short, there was drought at the time of sowing, and there was not enough fertilizer. So, the area
under wheat fell, even though the government has increased the support price.
As per acre yield fell, with just two per cent less area, production in FY22 was down by four per
cent. While the population has grown at about two per cent a year, the area under wheat hasn’t grown.
In 2010, wheat was grown on 8,901 hectares. In 2022, it had 8,976 hectares, less than one per cent more.
Water is a severe constraint. Pakistan hasn’t added to its water supply. In 2010, water supply
was 137 MAF. In 2022, it is 131 MAF, 6 MAF less.
Cotton has been key to Pakistan’s exports. All indicators for cotton are worse than before. We
produced 11.5 million bales of cotton in 2011. It peaked at 13.6 million bales in 2012. Production is
now 8.3 million bales, well below 2011. Area under cotton has fallen from 2.7 million hectares in
2011 to 1.9 million hectares. To halt the decline, Pakistan needs to increase use of BT cotton, though
with regulation. Studies show that use of BT cotton increases yield and lowers cost of pest control. It
results in higher gross margins for the farmer. Low pesticide use cuts the effect on the environment
as well as famers’ health cost.
For years, the country has known that climate change could reduce water for crops. In various
forms, the government has had projects for efficient use of water. The project’s goal is for farmers to
shift from flood irrigation to drip or targeted use of water. Yet in 30 years, since these projects began,
the country has made no progress. We either flood and waste or we deny water to some. The result
is we cannot extend crop acreage.
We have had a similar up and down approach to another key input, fertilizer. Its production
has grown by about 60 per cent in 20 years, yet price and reliable supply is still a problem.
To grow again, these many products need a variety of government policies and new
investment. Most of all, their revival demands that governments are alert and want a resurgence of
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growth. For years, without paying any mind to producing at home, governments have had loans
and debt as the main focus of economic policy.
So, my request to policymakers is: deal with the emergency on hand, but pay some attention
to the long term. Otherwise, the long term catches up.
(Source: The News)

GEOPOLITICS AND THE UKRAINE WAR IN A WORLD ON FIRE

Alfred W. Mccoy (Professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Just as the relentless grinding of the earth's tectonic plates produces earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions, so the endless superpower struggle for dominance over Eurasia is fraught with tensions
and armed conflict. Beneath the visible outbreak of war in Ukraine and the U.S.-Chinese naval
standoff in the South China Sea, there is now an underlying shift in geopolitical power in process
across the vast Eurasian landmass—the epicenter of global power on a fast-changing, overheating
planet. Take a moment to step back with me to try to understand what's now happening on this
increasingly embattled globe of ours.
If geology explains the earth's eruptions, geopolitics is the tool we need to grasp the deeper
meaning of the devastating war in Ukraine and the events that led to this crisis. As I explain in my recent
book, To Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change, geopolitics is essentially a method
for the management of empire through the use of geography (air, land, and sea) to maximize military
and economic advantage. Unlike conventional nations, whose peoples can be readily mobilized for self-
defense, empires are, by dint of their extraterritorial reach and the perils inherent in any foreign military
deployment, a surprisingly fragile form of government. To give an empire a fighting chance of survival
against formidable odds requires a resilient geopolitical architecture.
For nearly 100 years, the geopolitical theories of an obscure Victorian geographer, Sir Halford
Mackinder, have had a profound influence on a succession of leaders who sought to build or break
empires in Eurasia—including Adolf Hitler, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,
and, most recently, Vladimir Putin. In an academic essay published in 1904, when the Trans-Siberian
Railway was completing its 5,700-mile crawl from Moscow to Vladivostok, Mackinder argued that
future rails would knit Eurasia into a unitary landmass that, along with Africa, he dubbed the tri-
continental "world island." When that day came, Russia, in alliance with another land power like
Germany—and, in our time, we might add China—could expand across Eurasia's endless central
"heartland," allowing, he predicted, "the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the
empire of the world would be in sight."
As the Versailles Peace Conference opened in 1919 at the end of World War I, Mackinder
turned that seminal essay into a memorable maxim about the relationship between East European
regions like Ukraine, the Central Asian heartland, and global power. "Who rules East Europe
commands the Heartland," he wrote. "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who
rules the World-Island commands the World."
At the core of recent conflicts at both ends of Eurasia is an entente between China and Russia
that the world hasn't seen since the Sino-Soviet alliance at the start of the Cold War. To grasp the
import of this development, let's freeze frame two key moments in world history—Communist
Chinese leader Mao Zedong's Moscow meeting with the Soviet Union's Joseph Stalin in December
1949 and Vladimir Putin's summit in Beijing with Xi Jinping just last month.
To avoid facile comparisons, the historical context for each of those meetings must be kept in
mind. When Mao came to Moscow just weeks after proclaiming the People's Republic in October
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1949, China had been ravaged by a nine-year war against Japan that killed 20 million people and a
five-year civil war that left seven million more dead.
In contrast, having defeated Hitler, seized an empire in eastern Europe, rebuilt his socialist
economy, and tested an atomic bomb, making the Soviet Union a superpower, Stalin was at the peak
of his strength. In contrast to China's army of ill-equipped infantry, the Soviet Union had a modern
military with the world's best tanks, jet fighters, and missiles. As the globe's top communist, Stalin
was "the boss" and Mao came to Moscow as essentially a supplicant.
When Mao Met Stalin
During his two-month trip to Moscow starting in December 1949, Mao sought desperately
needed economic aid to rebuild his ravaged land and military support for the liberation of the island
of Taiwan. In a seemingly euphoric telegram sent to his comrades in Beijing, Mao wrote:
"Arrived in Moscow on the 16th and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. His attitude was
really sincere. The questions involved included the possibility of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, and
the publication of my selected works."
But Stalin surprised Mao by refusing to give up the territorial concessions in northern China
that Moscow had won at the 1945 Yalta conference, saying the issue couldn't even be discussed until
their subsequent meeting. For the next 17 days, Mao literally cooled his heels waiting during a
freezing Moscow winter inside a drafty dacha where, as he later recalled, "I got so angry that I once
pounded the table."
Finally, on January 2, 1950, Mao cabled the communist leadership in Beijing:
"Our work here has achieved an important breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin
has finally agreed to… sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship."
With Russia giving up its territorial claims in exchange for assurances about demilitarizing the
long border between the two countries, their leaders signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in
February 1950. It, in turn, sparked a sudden flow of Soviet aid to China whose new constitution
hailed its "indestructible friendship" with the Soviet Union.
But Stalin had already planted the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split to come, embittering Mao, who
later said Russians "have never had faith in the Chinese people and Stalin was among the worst."
At first, the China alliance proved a major Cold War asset for Moscow. After all, it now had a
useful Asian surrogate capable of dragging the U.S. into a costly conflict in Korea without the
Soviets suffering any casualties at all. In October 1950, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into a
Korean maelstrom that would drag on for three years and cost China 208,000 dead troops as well as
40% of its budget.
Following Stalin's death in May 1953 and the Korean armistice two months later, the new
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev tried to repair relations by presiding over a massive, yet distinctly
inequitable program of economic aid to China. However, he also refused to help that country build
an atomic bomb. It would be a "huge waste," he said, since China was safe under the Soviet nuclear
umbrella. At the same time, he demanded the joint development of uranium mines Soviet scientists
had discovered in southwest China.
Over the next four years, those initial nuclear tensions grew into an open Sino-Soviet split. In
September 1959, Khrushchev visited Beijing for a disastrous seven-hour meeting with Mao. In 1962,
Mao finally ended diplomatic relations entirely, blaming Moscow for failing to launch a nuclear
strike on the U.S. during that year's Cuban missile crisis.
In October 1964, China's successful test of a 22-kiloton nuclear bomb marked its arrival as a
major player on the world stage. That bomb not only made it an independent world power but
transformed the Sino-Soviet split from a war of words into a massive military confrontation. By
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1968, the Soviet Union had 16 divisions, 1,200 jet aircraft, and 120 medium-range missiles arrayed
along the Sino-Soviet border. Meanwhile, China was planning for a Soviet attack by building a
nuclear-hardened "underground city" that spread for 30 square miles beneath Beijing.
Washington's Cold War Strategy
More than any other event since World War II, the short-lived Sino-Soviet alliance changed the
course of world history, transforming the Cold War from a regional power struggle over Eastern Europe
into a volatile global conflict. Not only was China the world's largest nation with 550 million people, or
20% of all humanity, but its new communist government was determined to reverse a half-century of
imperialist exploitation and internal chaos that had crippled its international influence.
The rise of China and the conflict in Korea forced Washington to radically revise its strategy
for fighting the Cold War. Instead of focusing on NATO and Europe to contain the Soviet Union
behind the Iron Curtain, Washington now forged mutual defense pacts from Japan to Australia to
secure the offshore Pacific littoral. For the past 70 years, that fortified island rim has been the
fulcrum of Washington's global power, allowing it to defend one continent (North America) while
dominating another (Eurasia).
To tie those two axial ends of Eurasia into a strategic perimeter, Cold War Washington ringed the
Eurasian continent's southern rim with chains of steel -– including three navy fleets, hundreds of combat
aircraft, and a string of mutual-defense pacts stretching from NATO in Europe to ANZUS in the South
Pacific. It took a decade, but once Washington accepted that the Sino-Soviet split was the real thing, it
belatedly began to cultivate an entente with Beijing that would leave the Soviet Union ever more
geopolitically isolated, contributing to its ultimate implosion and the end of the Cold War in 1991.
That left the U.S. as the world's dominant power. Nonetheless, even without a near-peer rival
on the planet, Washington refused to cash in its "peace dividend." Instead, it maintained its chains of
steel ringing Eurasia—including those three naval fleets and hundreds of military bases, while
making multiple military forays into the Middle East (some disastrous) and even recently forming a
new Quadrilateral alliance with Australia, India, and Japan in the Indian Ocean. For 15 years
following Beijing's admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, a de facto economic alliance
with China also allowed the U.S. sustained economic growth.
When Putin Met Xi
Last month, when Vladimir Putin met Xi Jinping in Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics,
it proved a stunning reversal of the Stalin-Mao moment 70 years earlier. While Russia's post-Soviet
economy remains smaller than Canada's and overly dependent on petroleum exports, China has
become the planet's industrial powerhouse with the world's largest economy (as measured in
purchasing power) and 10 times the population of Russia. Moscow's heavy-metal military still relies
on Soviet-style tanks and its nuclear arsenal. China, on the other hand, has built the world's largest
navy, its most secure global satellite system, and its most agile missile armada, capped by cutting-
edge hypersonic missiles whose 4,000 miles-per-hour speed can defeat any defense.
This time, therefore, it was the Russian leader who came to China's capital as the supplicant.
With Russian troops massing at Ukraine's borders and U.S. economic sanctions looming, Putin
desperately needed Beijing's diplomatic backing. After years of cultivating China by offering shared
petroleum and natural-gas pipelines and joint military maneuvers in the Pacific, Putin was now
cashing in his political chips.
At their February 4th meeting, Putin and Xi drew on 37 prior encounters to proclaim nothing
less than an ad-hoc alliance meant to shake the world. As the foundation for their new "global
governance system," they promised to "enhance transport infrastructure connectivity to keep
logistics on the Eurasian continent smooth and… make steady progress on major oil and gas
cooperation projects." These words gained weight with the announcement that Russia would spend
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another $118 billion on new oil and gas pipelines to China. (Four-hundred billion dollars had
already been invested in 2014 when Russia faced European sanctions over its seizure of Crimea from
Ukraine.) The result: an integrated Sino-Russian oil-and-gas infrastructure is being built from the
North Sea to the South China Sea.
In a landmark 5,300-word statement, Xi and Putin proclaimed the "world is going through
momentous changes," creating a "redistribution of power" and "a growing demand for… leadership"
(which Beijing and Moscow clearly intended to provide). After denouncing Washington's ill-
concealed "attempts at hegemony," the two sides agreed to "oppose the… interference in the internal
affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting democracy and human rights."
To build an alternative system for global economic growth in Eurasia, the leaders planned to
merge Putin's projected "Eurasian Economic Union" with Xi's already ongoing trillion-dollar Belt
and Road Initiative to promote "greater interconnectedness between the Asia Pacific and Eurasian
regions." Proclaiming their relations "superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War
era," an oblique reference to the tense Mao-Stalin relationship, the two leaders asserted that their
entente has "no limits… no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation." On strategic issues, the two parties
were adamantly opposed to the expansion of NATO, any move toward independence for Taiwan,
and "color revolutions" such as the one that had ousted Moscow's Ukrainian client in 2014.
Given the Ukraine invasion just three weeks later, Putin got what he so desperately needed. In
exchange for feeding China's voracious appetite for energy (on a planet already in a climate crisis of
the first order), Putin got a condemnation of U.S. interference in "his" sphere. In addition, he won
Beijing's diplomatic support—however hesitant China's leadership might actually be about events in
Ukraine—once the invasion started. Although China has been Ukraine's main trading partner since
2019, Beijing set aside those ties and its own advocacy of inviolable sovereignty to avoid calling
Putin's intervention an "invasion."
A Planet Mackinder Would Hardly Recognize
In fact, even before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia and China were pursuing a strategy of
ratcheting up slow, relentless pressure at both ends of Eurasia, hoping the U.S. chains of steel
ringing that vast continent would sooner or later snap. Think of it as a strategy of push-push-punch.
For the past 15 years, Putin has been responding to NATO in just that manner. First, through
surveillance and economic leverage, Moscow has tried to keep client states in its orbit, something
Putin learned from his four years as a KGB agent working with East Germany's Stasi secret police in
the late 1980s. Next, if a favored autocrat is challenged by pro-democracy demonstrators or a
regional rival, a few thousand Russian special forces are sent in to stabilize the situation. Should a
client state try to escape Moscow's orbit, however, Putin promptly moves to massive military
intervention and the expropriation of buffer enclaves, as he did first in Georgia and now in Ukraine.
Through this strategy, he may be well on his way to reclaiming significant parts of the old Soviet
sphere of influence in East Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
Due south of Moscow in the ever-volatile Caucasus Mountains, Putin crushed NATO's brief
flirtation with Georgia in 2008, thanks to a massive invasion and the expropriation of the provinces
of North Ossetia and Abkhazia. After decades of fighting between the former Soviet republics of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia recently sent in thousands of "peace-keeping" forces to resolve the
conflict in favor of the loyal, pro-Moscow regime in Azerbaijan. Further east, when democratic
protesters challenged Moscow's local ally in Kazakhstan in January, thousands of Russian troops—
under the rubric of Moscow's version of NATO—flew into the former capital, Almaty, where they
helped crush the protests, killing dozens and wounding hundreds.
In the Middle East where Washington backed the ill-fated Arab spring rebels who tried to
topple Syria's ruler, Bashar al-Assad, Moscow operates a massive air base at Latakia in that country's
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northwest from which it has bombed rebel cities like Aleppo to rubble, while serving as a strategic
counterweight to U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf.
But Moscow's main push has been in Eastern Europe. There, Putin backed Belarus's
strongman, Alexander Lukashenko, in crushing the democratic opposition after he had rigged the
2020 elections, and so making Minsk a virtual client state. Meanwhile, he's been pressing relentlessly
against Ukraine since his loyal client there was ousted in the 2014 Maidan "color revolution." First,
he seized Crimea in 2014 and then he armed separatist rebels in that country's eastern region
adjacent to Russia. Last month, after proclaiming that "modern Ukraine was entirely created by
Russia," Putin recognized the "independence" of those two separatist enclaves, much as he had done
years before in Georgia.
On February 24th, the Russian president sent nearly 200,000 troops across the Ukraine's
borders to seize much of the country and its capital, Kyiv, as well as replace its feisty president with
a pliable puppet. As international sanctions mounted and Europe considered providing Ukraine
with jet fighters, Putin ominously put his nuclear forces on high alert to make it clear he would
brook no interference with his invasion.
Meanwhile, at the eastern end of Eurasia, China has pursued a somewhat similar, if more
subtle push-push strategy, with the punch yet to come. Starting in 2014, Beijing began dredging a
half-dozen military bases from atolls in the South China Sea, slowly ramping up their role from
fishing ports to full-fledged military bases that now challenge any passing U.S. naval patrol. Then
came swarming fighter squadrons over the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, followed, last October,
by a joint Chinese-Russian fleet of 10 ships that steamed provocatively around Japan in what had
previously been considered unchallenged U.S. waters.
If Xi follows Putin's playbook, then all that push/push could indeed lead to a punch—
possibly an invasion of Taiwan to reclaim lands Beijing sees as an integral part of China, much as
Putin sees Ukraine as a former Russian imperial province that should never have been given away.
Should Beijing attack Taiwan, Washington might find itself hamstrung to do anything
militarily except express admiration for the island's heroic yet futile resistance. Should Washington
send its aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits, they would be sunk within hours by China's
formidable DF-21D "carrier-killer" missiles or its unstoppable hypersonic ones. And once Taiwan
was gone, Washington's position on the Pacific littoral could be effectively broken and a retreat to
the mid-Pacific preordained.
All of this looks possible on paper. However, in the grim reality of actual invasions and
military clashes, amid the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, and on a planet that's seen
better days, the very nature of geopolitics is likely to be up for grabs. Yes, it's possible that, if
Washington is whipsawed between the eastern and western edges of Eurasia with periodic
eruptions of armed combat from the Xi-Putin entente, its chains of steel could strain and finally
snap, effectively evicting it from that strategic land mass.
As it happens, though, given a Sino-Russian alliance so heavily based on the trade in fossil
fuels, even if Vladimir Putin doesn't himself go down thanks to his potentially disastrous invasion of
Ukraine, both Beijing and Moscow may find themselves whipsawed in the years to come by a
troubled energy transition and climate change. The ghost of Sir Halford Mackinder might then point
out to us not just that U.S. power will fade with the loss of Eurasia, but that so much other power
may fade as well on an ever hotter, ever more endangered planet he couldn't in his lifetime have
truly imagined.
(Source: Common Dreams)
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Foreign Policy and Relations

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
Dr Ejaz Hussain (Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad)
Pakistan’s ‘unity’ government seems dynamic on the foreign policy front in terms of
prioritising countries with which relations are to be enhanced and also neutralising misgivings and
mistrust in USA and China.
Both these global powers have had extraordinary global and regional significance for a whole
range of countries in the Global South including Pakistan, which is struggling with persistent
economic issues. Earlier, the US had partnered with Pakistan in the post-Cold War period. The
situation in Afghanistan provided a strategic context for bilateral engagement post 9/11. However,
the US-Pakistan relations had several irritants, too.
The US-led Western withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 added an element of
disinterest in bilateral ties due largely to divergent interests and choices. Post-withdrawal,
Washington seems less reliant on Islamabad though it has been stressing the need to have an
inclusive and democratic dispensation in Kabul. Islamabad, in principle, agrees with the growing
global concern for a peaceful, stable and democratic Afghanistan. The Chinese and Russian
authorities have also emphasised the need for political and economic stability in that war-ravaged
country, which is facing a humanitarian crisis in the absence of global assistance.
Pakistan, while sharing the global desire to keep Afghanistan stable, hosted a couple of OIC
sessions where along with the Muslim leadership, representatives of major powers such as the US
were invited in a bid to generate agreement on the political future of Afghanistan. The OIC sessions
reflected Pakistan’s ability to keep the world engaged diplomatically, while trying to underscore its
regional significance for global peace and security. However, this approach limited Pakistan’s role to
Afghanistan in the sense that since the Cold War the country has been bracketed with Afghanistan,
in particular in the American foreign policy calculus.
In other words, our diplomats and foreign policy practitioners have been unable to project
Pakistan as a sizeable market with abundant human resources to realise economic cooperation
regionally and globally. Some Pakistani leaders have allowed short-term domestic interests to
influence their foreign policy actions. Of course, domestic politics in any country is one of the factors
that influence foreign policy formulation; it is, however, usually not a dominant variable. Linking
foreign policy with domestic political agenda arguably was a disservice to the people of Pakistan.
Recently one could notice a certain realisation at the state level for the need to revisit
Pakistan’s style of diplomacy and foreign policy conduct with key countries like the USA, Saudi
Arabia, Russia and China. If we look at the diplomatic interactions under the previous and the
current governments, the country’s political and military leadership have tried to engage
simultaneously with the USA and Russia. Former prime minister Imran Khan’s Russia visit is a
case in point.
Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari too manifested this approach during his recent visit
to the US where he revealed Pakistan’s foreign policy contours in a candid manner. The Biden-led
US government has a particular take on China. In a neorealist fashion, the US is engaging China
commercially to enhance its “capabilities”. However, the former is also getting tough on the latter
when it comes to its core strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Biden’s recent statement on Taiwan is
a case in point. He said, the other day, that China is “flirting with danger” by seeking a military
solution to its Taiwan problem. China views Taiwan as its integral part. The remark has alerted
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strategic elites in Beijing and its neighbouring countries such as Japan where the QUAD summit is
being held. The QUAD is another US-led initiative to enhance its military capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific region to keep tabs on China in the future.
Given the tense geopolitical environment, the Ukraine war, economic implications of the
Covid-19 pandemic, the climate change crisis and the global food insecurity, Pakistan has to tread
very cautiously. Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto’s China visit reflected that. The two countries
resolved to further enhance bilateral economic, technological and defence cooperation. There is a
need to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to, for example, Afghanistan. This
could be one of the ways to stabilise the latter. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has also expressed his
desire to expand it with the possible inclusion of Turkey, which is already working to align its
Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in southern Caucasus. In order to
realise the CPEC’s full potential, it ought to be made multilateral and offer business and investment
opportunities and incentives to the Saudi and UAE enterprises. Given that many US-based multi-
national corporations such as Apple have been working in China for years, it should also be open to
US investments. Pakistan’s topmost foreign policy priority must be to purse economic cooperation
with these and other partners like the ASEAN in a sustained manner. However, there is a need to
first put our own house in order as such a foreign policy design may not bring the desired outcomes
without political stability at home.
(Source: TNS)

WHY AREN’T WE BUYING RUSSIAN OIL?

Asad Ullah Kamran
Much has been made of the suggestion that Pakistan could have avoided the current economic
crisis it is in if it had managed to import cheap crude oil from Russia. Former Prime Minister Imran
Khan has made it the cornerstone of his political campaign – claiming he had reached an
understanding with the Russians and was deposed by an international conspiracy as a result.
While the claims may be a tad bit on the fantastical side, particularly ever since the Russian
Ambassador to Pakistan recently confirmed that no MoU was signed on the trade of wheat and oil at
cheaper prices with Pakistan, could looking towards Moscow for cheap fuel be our ticket out of this
crisis?
Here is the crux of it – Countries like India are indeed importing cheaper fuel from Russia and
in turn undercutting the global economic crisis domestically by having cheaper oil. In fact, India is
even exporting the oil at higher rates than they get from Russia. Similarly, China is also taking full
advantage of the situation.
So why can’t Pakistan? The problem is three-fold. For starters, given our particular dire-straits
it might prove to be more economically disastrous to test the patience of the United States and other
Western powers that have put sanctions on Russia. It would also jolt the relationship we have built
with the Arab world over decades if we started buying Russia’s Ural blend of crude oil over the
Arab blend. The second part of the equation is the fact that currently we do not have the facilities to
process Russian crude oil in Pakistan. And lastly, even if these issues were set aside, Pakistan as a
market is not large enough for Russia to consider selling their oil at a discounted price.
Of course, there are always going to be hitches in any plan. Setting aside the obstacles and the
fact that Prime Minister Imran Khan was wrong in his claims that an MoU had been signed with
Russia, how viable would it be if Pakistan decided to go ahead and buy Russian oil anyways – even
if not at discounted prices.
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Why buy Russian?

Simply put, because Russian oil is cheaper generally and on top of that the Russians are
desperate to sell. Waging war isn’t cheap, and Russia will very much be looking for markets to sell
to as it tries to shore up revenues. That is why the impulse to turn towards Russia for oil is not
entirely unfounded.
As of this moment, many European countries are also importing Russian oil and gas despite
public condemnation and sanctions. Consistent posturing by EU member states to strip Russia of its
oil and gas revenues have been little more than words.
In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia. This
accounts for over 40% of the EU’s overall gas consumption, with Germany’s reliance reaching 65%.
Russian oil and gas sales to the EU directly fund the Kremlin’s military budget.
Russia has exported €63 billion worth of fossil fuels since the start of the war, with the EU
accounting for 71% of that, according to a research released by the Centre for Research on Energy
and Clean Air. In absolute terms, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are among Europe’s top
importers.
At the same time, China and India are taking full advantage of the predicament as well.
Indian refineries, both public and private, have increased their purchases of Russian crude on the
back of the sanctions and trade restrictions from the west, which have driven most purchasers to
back out of deals with Russia. This has made Putin’s Russia somewhat desperate to increase
revenues as waging a war is not cheap, this led to offers at lucrative discounted rates.
According to Bloomberg projections based on trade data, India purchased upwards of 40
million barrels of Russian oil from late February to early May, accounting for 20% higher flows for
the entire year of 2021. According to Kpler statistics, Russian oil arrivals in India increased to 740,000
barrels per day in May, increasing from 284,000 barrels in April and 34,000 barrels a year ago.
Access to low-cost crude is already helping to enhance India’s petroleum imports, which
increased by over 16% in April alone compared to the previous year. According to Indian
government data, the Eurasian (including Russia) region’s oil contribution increased to 10.6% in
April from 3.3 percent a year earlier. Cheaper oil therefore gave the BJP government fiscal space to
reduce domestic petrol and diesel prices while the prices in the rest of the world continue to inflate.
At the same time China continued to acquire considerable energy from Russia, with imports
of oil, gas, and coal increasing by 75% by almost $6 billion in April. According to Chinese customs
data, imports of Russian liquefied natural gas increased by 80% year on year to 463,000 tonnes.
Imports of crude followed a similar trend, increasing by 4% to 6.55 million tonnes for the year.
Could Pakistan do the same?
The recent increase in fuel prices have wreaked pandemonium in the economy. And we are
being told that a cheaper source of fuel is just a little north of us. Currently, Pakistan consumes
approximately 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) in which Russian oil has no share. In India, Russian oil
has a 10% share in comparison.
Hypothetically speaking, if we shifted to the same ratio of 10% Russian oil, that would
translate into 50,000 bpd. Given that we purchased this oil with no discounts would amount to
approximately $4.5 million per day and a total of $1.6 billion annually. Even if Pakistan was refused
any discounts it would still be cheaper considering the fact that the primary export blend Ural brent
is cheaper than Arab blends.
Now if we did the same calculations using a hypothetical discount of 30% on the Ural Brent
price that would mean a per barrel rate of $64. Using the same consumption levels as above would
generate a revenue of approximately $1.2 billion for Russia on an annual basis.
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Even if we manage to transition completely to Russian oil, it would only generate $16 billion
for Russia. While $16 billion may seem like a lot, it is dwarfed by the revenues coming from Europe,
India and China.
It wouldn’t be wrong to say that purchasing Russian oil would have saved the government
invaluable foreign exchange in the range of $400 million if the share of Russian oil in imports was
10%. That would have helped the government in saving foreign exchange as well as save some of
the subsidies that the government had to give in the form of price differential claims.
At the same time it is important to mention that the government paid north of Rs 150 billion
for subsidies on petrol and diesel. If we converted the savings of $400 million into the domestic
currency it would amount to Rs80.8 billion at the current exchange rate (PKR200/USD).
If we were to compare that to that of China, India or Europe even at the current levels, $1.2
billion annually for Russia is pocket change. Comparing the revenue that Russia has earned
approximately $66 billion from EU and an additional $3.6 billion from India since the start of the
war. This effectively disproves the claims that the regime change was orchestrated because Pakistan
was getting cosy with the Russians.
The effect on our foreign relations
That being said it is also clear that Pakistan would not be allowed to go scott free as has been
the case with both China and India according to some foreign policy experts. It must be understood
that Pakistan has a smaller market and in a much weaker economic position compared to China and
India, it can reasonably be concluded that Pakistan would have had to face sanctions. Not to
mention that Pakistan has desperately been trying to get back together with the IMF, importing
Russian oil would’ve closed that door altogether.
Another key underlying factor that is often ignored on TV is our strategic and economic
understanding with Saudi Arabia and other gulf states. This relationship built over decades will be
jeopardised and constrained if we start looking towards Russia. The Saudis and Russians aren’t on
best terms as was the case in the 2020 oil price war between the two.
Can we refine Russian oil ?
Apart from this another technicality that is often ignored is the fact that the Russian Ural oil
has a relatively higher content of sulphur, therefore the price of this blend is lower than the market
benchmark.
Refining high-sulphur crude oil is costly owing to its high oxidation and corrosion properties.
The costs of excessive oxidation and corrosion damage caused to a refinery not adequately equipped
to sustain high sulphur crude will outweigh the revenues from the cheaper oil.
Apart from the Parco refinery which is a mild conversion refinery, all other refineries utilise
hydroskimming. We won’t dig into the engineering and technical details of the two different types
of refineries, the point of the matter is that our refineries cannot process it.
As far as the capacity of the refineries that are able to refine Russian goes, only Parco has the
ability according to an industry expert. That makes the argument of importing from Russia even
weaker given that local refineries would have to undertake massive upgradation.
Can we pay for it ?
President Putin said in March that ‘unfriendly’ countries will have to pay for Russian gas in
roubles in retaliation to sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine or have their gas
supplies suspended. This was a reply to the sanctions that these nations had immediately agreed
upon in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
This put the West in a very precarious position as this statement would practically defeat the
purpose of the sanctions targeted at destroying the value of the rouble. However as the EU weans
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itself off of Russian energy the revenues of Russia have not been affected despite lower export
volumes.
Following the sanctions on Russia any financial transactions with the country are seen as high
risk, especially in the case of Pakistan. To get Russian oil, nations must first purchase the currency,
which may be done at the Central Bank of Russia or on the foreign exchange market.
Dealing directly with Russia’s Central Bank, which has been sanctioned, will be difficult.
Buying rubles on the open market will necessitate the use of non-sanctioned Russian banks to
complete the transaction. Despite this, if Pakistan is able to position itself to purchase oil from
Russia, we’re still in the FATF grey list and any deals with Russia can potentially jeopardise this.
Also the country has recently got back on the IMF program after making extremely painful decisions
in terms of fuel prices. By making deals with Russia the US lender and other financial organisations
might be hesitant to offer loans.
If we were to compare ourselves with China or India we would be sorely mistaken. Both
countries enjoy very strong economic and military ties and have traditionally leaned more towards
the former Soviet Union.
This has allowed both of them to circumvent the sanctions imposed by the west. China has an
alternate equivalent to the Western SWIFT called Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).
Russia also has a similar system called System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS).
Although these systems are relatively newer as compared to SWIFT, they still have a similar
potential. Both the countries are using these systems to side step the sanctions.
Similarly India has bilateral trade agreements with Russia dating back to the 1950’s that allow
the countries to make trade payments denominated in their respective currencies. At the same time
India isn’t being pressurised as much by the West as it’s viewed as a key ally in the region to
challenge China.
Bottom line
As much as we all want cheaper fuel, importing Russian oil might not be the answer.
Although it might provide the public and government with much needed relief, the costs to
refineries which are strategic assets as well as the diplomatic capital burned would be too much. Not
to mention that it would make it extremely difficult to secure loans that we need so desperately from
time to time.
The economy is already struggling and the country as a whole cannot afford to burn bridges
and get on the bad side of major global players especially at this tricky crossroads we find ourselves
in. A very surgical and diplomatic approach is needed to navigate the seas ahead.
(Source: Profit)

TRADE WITH RUSSIA

Sikander Ahmed Shah (Former legal adviser to Pakistan’s foreign ministry)
Abid Rizvi (Expert on international law)
Pakistan’s dependency on imported fuel represents a grave vulnerability to its energy
security. This reliance on largely Western-adjacent sources of fuel raise concerns regarding the
degree of influence this dependency accords foreign states over Pakistani policy, while
compounding Pakistan’s exposure to market volatility.
In this context, recent discussions have revolved around Pakistan importing fuel from Russia
in order to ensure that domestic demand is met and to manage inflation; this proposition has,
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however, raised concerns regarding the international sanctions regime applied on Russia and the
risks to Pakistan should it decide to address its fuel needs through Russian supplies.
While Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UN Security Council to
impose restrictions on economic relations in response to threats to international peace and security,
these are unlikely given that Russia, being one of the five permanent members of the Security
Council, enjoys the power to veto any binding UNSC resolution presented against it or a trading
partner. In the absence of effective UN sanctions, therefore, the anti-Russian coalition has pivoted
towards imposing more specific sanctions regimes.
The most burdensome of such sanctions have been levied by the EU on Russian oil imports by
sea. These represent a non-trivial proportion of the bloc’s trade with Russia; however, the EU
continues to import Russian petroleum through pipelines, and has been reluctant to be more
aggressive in its sanctions regime — largely because it depends on Russia for 40 per cent of its
regional gas requirements — though it has committed to ‘phasing in’ these sanctions, but in a way
that minimises their impact on EU economies.
Concurrently, the US has banned all Russian petroleum imports, while the UK intends to
phase out Russian oil imports towards the end of 2022.
Financial restrictions have also been enacted on the international exercise of Russian wealth.
Russia’s central bank assets have been frozen, preventing it from accessing its international reserves
estimated at around $630 billion.
A complete transactions ban has also been imposed on four key Russian banks, with the
country’s access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications — a global
communication system linking financial institutions — also cut off. Russia will also likely be
subjected to MFN suspension by the US, a step that will probably be adopted by the EU as well,
enabling Western economies to levy punitive import tariffs or quotas on Russian exports.
The US Treasury department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is responsible for carrying out
certain US sanctions against Russia imposed through a series of executive orders issued by the
president and through federal legislation.
The US and the EU are also debating measures to prevent other countries from trading with
Russia. The two principal measures under discussion are an attempt to develop consensus among
Asian countries to put price caps on goods imported from Russia, with the aim of reducing Russian
revenue, and the use of secondary sanctions meant to target countries and companies involved in
trading with Russia.
These secondary sanctions, however, have yet to be imposed, as, firstly, the sanctioning
countries do not wish to risk straining their ties with large, non-Western economies such as India
and China. Secondly, imposing such second-order sanctions would contribute towards a global rise
in the prices of essential commodities, which would impact the citizens of the very countries seeking
to impose sanctions themselves.
It is in this context, therefore, that domestic discussions regarding trading in essentials — such
as fuel or wheat — with Russia need to be embedded. This discussion necessarily cannot take place
in a diplomatic vacuum, and Pakistan must consider the political capital to be gained — or lost — in
dealing with Russia in this way.
From the international legal perspective, none of Pakistan’s international law obligations
preclude the country from purchasing essentials from Russia — particularly to offset the domestic
cost-of-living crisis. While Pakistan and the EU have signed bilateral agreements, such as a 2004
agreement to cooperate on partnership and development, and the 2019 Strategic Engagement Plan,
and where all of Pakistan’s policy actions under these — and other — EU programmes should
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comply with EU restrictive measures (ie the sanctions), these measures are non-punitive and are
intended as interventions to prevent conflict or to respond to incipient or current crises.
Regardless of how hawkish the EU may be feeling, purchasing essential commodities to stave
off an emerging cost-of-living crisis domestically does not fall within the scope of the measures.
The EU is one of Pakistan’s top export markets, and has granted Pakistan special trade status
— ie the Generalised Scheme of Preferences — to lower entry tariffs to Pakistani exports. This GSP-
Plus status for Pakistan, which is already being reviewed for 2024-2034 as the current grant ends in
2023, is, however, predicated entirely upon Pakistan’s status as a developing state and its
compliance with international legal obligations relating to local issues of human rights, labour
rights, environmental protections, narcotics control, and anti-corruption programmes. It is thus
unlikely that Pakistan’s purchase of Russian essentials would be germane to the continued grant of
GSP-Plus status to Pakistan.
Countries including the US, China, India, Sri Lanka and the EU bloc continue to engage in
trade with Russia despite the sanctions imposed, and Pakistan should be able to do the same — at
least in the foreseeable future.
Earlier this year, the White House itself clarified that India’s purchasing crude oil from Russia
would not violate the sanctions regime; as recently as late May the EU has continued to engage with
Russia over grain exports in an effort to reduce global food shortages.
While historically, Pakistan has geostrategically aligned itself with the West, this recent cost-
of-living crisis will require Pakistani decision-makers to consider carefully the diplomatic costs of
purchasing oil or wheat from Russia against the very real spectre of an economic meltdown.
(Source: Dawn)

TIME FOR A NEW BEGINNING?

Zahra Khalid (Associate at Sustainable Development Policy Institute)
Now that Pakistan has appointed a trade minister in its high commission in New Delhi after a
gap of five years, the spotlight is back on reviving bilateral trade.
Can this be a new dawn for India-Pakistan trade?
A new beginning in trade relations has huge potential for both the nations as well as for the
sub-continent, which is currently reeling under high inflation, food shortages and an energy crisis. A
disentanglement of trade from politics can be the basis of cooperative ties between the two
neighbours which would make way for socio-economic upliftment of the people in the entire sub-
continent.
Neighbourhood first
The economic shutdown between the two nations has not just impacted them but the whole
South Asian region. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the South
Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) are just two of the many multilateral groupings that have been
a dead letter and dysfunctional since diplomatic fallout between the two.
India says it gives primacy to its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy to maintain peace, promote
democratic principles and address shared economic issues by allowing smooth flow of goods and
services across borders. For instance, it has opened up border haats with Bangladesh. Such
cooperation can lead to manufacturing zones shared between the two countries. In such zones
investors and workers from both countries can work without going through border controls.
Reviving trade relations between Pakistan and India will help stabilise the economies and
control inflation. The sooner the trade relations are restored, the two countries can enter into a
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dialogue to promote mutually beneficial supply chains that can help both become more competitive
in the global market. It is in the larger interest of South Asian region that these two countries resume
trade relations.
Talking trade
The World Bank (WB), in its report titled Glass Half Full: Promise of Regional Trade in South
Asia, suggested that if non-tariff barriers are removed between India and Pakistan, the trade could
go up to $37 billion. Even if this sounds overestimated or ambitious, the two can try to work out to
achieve a fraction of it given their similar vision of becoming rising manufacturing hubs.
The bilateral trade had reached its highest level in 2013-14, $2.7 billion. The figure is not
impressive or encouraging when compared with similar border regions like India-China where the
volume of was $65.49 billion in 2013. Today, in spite of the conflicts, bilateral trade between India
and China stands at $125.70 billion. India has a large trade deficit with China but makes it up with
investment flows. Pakistan too has a large trade deficit with China.
In order to achieve higher economic growth, India and Pakistan have to work towards
economic interdependence in the primary areas of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, construction, steel,
minerals and oil industries which constitute as raw materials of the respective economies. India with
its expertise in the above mentioned areas could help Pakistan’s domestic economy. In return,
Pakistan could grant India the most favoured nation or non-discriminatory market status. India
should not shy away from extending its hand like it has offered to other neighbours, like Sri Lanka
and Nepal.
Despite the diplomatic impasse, informal trade between the two nations has gone on. But this
has its limitations. The $2.4 billion informal trade despite the economic shutdown between holds the
hope for formal trade revival and points to the huge potential for formal trade between the two.
Cricket and business must go on
Pakistan has had different parties in power but all, including military-led governments, have
remained interested in opening trade with India. India should act sensibly towards Pakistan with
whom the trade balance has always been surplus. Trade should be de-linked from political issues
and India should go the extra mile to provide Pakistan cotton and fabrics it requires for its textile
industry as raw materials. Pakistan, in return, can provide dates, cement and oils that in the past
comprised 50 percent of its exports to India.
Sports visas should be issued and Pakistani cricketers allowed in the Indian Premier League.
Business chambers and think tanks should be encouraged to promote trade relations without any
prejudice. Informed dialogue about why trade should not become hostage to political situations
should be encouraged and concerns relating to market access, tariff and non-tariff barriers duly
addressed.
The lists of items allowed for trading via the surface and sea routes should be expanded.
Furthermore, in addition to the Attari-Wagha border, the Munabao-Khokrapar border in Sindh-
Rajasthan should also be explored for transit of goods. Use of emerging technologies like full body
scanners and digitalising the logistics can make the trade flow fast, smooth and transparent. The
security concerns can also be addressed better than before.
In the days of climate change concerns, trade among contiguous countries will be
environmentally friendly, as carbon emissions on account of transportation will be much lower. This
is another driver for closer trade relations between the two countries.
Trust and good governance
An immediate steps to set the stage for trade can be the reinstatement of high
commissioners by the governments of both nations. Simultaneously, opening up the road, sea and
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rail routes for trade, promotion of people-to-people connectivity, releasing innocent fishermen and
maintaining ceasefire on borders would highlight good governance and act as a confidence
building measure. Restarting of trade and connectivity are the key enablers for robust regional
cooperation in South Asia.
(Source: SDPI)

FUTURE OF PAK-INDIA RELATIONS

Najamus Saqib (Former Ambassador)
India’s action in August 2019 and stripping Jammu & Kashmir of the autonomy it had been
guaranteed, was a kind of fait accompli practically forced simultaneously upon the Kashmiri people
and Pakistan to accept. From the ‘doctrine of realism’ to revisiting the LoC ceasefire agreement to an
almost ‘about turn’ to refusing a dialogue with India until it reverses its decision to abrogate Article
370, one has seen a series of ideas emanating from Islamabad without any tangible result. Complete
silence on the subject by New Delhi was expected as finally the ‘integral part’ had unilaterally been
made so by adopting an integrally defying posture. Following the annexation of an internationally
disputed territory, India tried to show its political and military superiority through violating
Pakistan’s territory in every possible way, provoking some correspondingly befitting response from
its western neighbour. Pakistan behaved.
The latest action that showed New Delhi’s intentions on having or not having any discussion
on Kashmir or the nature of relations with Pakistan was India’s ‘accidental’ firing of a version of the
Brahmos cruise missile into Pakistan on March 9. On the other hand, the ‘dossiers’ presented by
Pakistan providing conclusive proofs of India’s nefarious designs including state-sponsored
terrorism and well-drafted arguments placed before the world by Pakistani diplomats have fallen on
deaf ears.
Over the past few decades, Pakistan has vehemently tried to achieve its objectives on a
settlement of the Kashmir dispute. May it be the UN Security Council or General Assembly or UN
Human Rights Commission, no substantive positive result came out. Even floating a number of
proposals such as the Chenab formula or the LoC formula or ‘proxies’ or for that matter the Simla
Agreement was unable to satisfy each other’s desires. India would simply not budge, to say the
least. The military route adopted in 1965 also was of no avail. The talk of an agenda of putting
‘Kashmir’ or ‘Terrorism’ first or ‘Trade without Kashmir’ kept lurking on the negotiating tables
along with levelling of serious allegations and raising voices of interference in each other’s
internal affairs.
Let us take a deep breath and accept that India has annexed Jammu & Kashmir while
permanently putting an end to any discussion on the ‘future settlement of the Kashmir dispute’. For
PM Modi, the action of August 2019 was ‘necessary to restore stability and bring economic
prosperity to the region’. In the absence of any credible voice from the world against India’s action,
the subject matter has squarely been put to rest, proving at least one thing beyond any reasonable
doubt. The deciding factors in any international dispute are not the international law or the UN
system. Eco-military might be always right and the realpolitik bishop takes over all pawns of justice
and fair play with impunity.
Ten factors indicate, compel and plead for a fresh approach by Pakistan to peacefully co-exist
with its hostile, larger eastern neighbour.
One: The ‘Waiting for Allah’ approach on addressing issues is not going to work as neither the
international community nor a few friendly countries are concerned about what happens between
Pakistan and India, particularly on the Jammu & Kashmir dispute.
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Two: India with all its ills is still the bigger eco-military power and hoping for it to
disintegrate is a long shot.
Three: Having nuclear deterrence is by no means a tool to address and resolve issues.
Four: Dossiers, calls on the world, Press Releases, demarches and two-way allegations are
likely to continue with no effect. The world has not heeded to even the unbiased reports on India’s
human rights’ violations.
Five: No arrangement or proposal has worked. Now after the August 2019 actions by India, all
future proposals on Kashmir are already made ineffective unless history, which seems to be on
India’s side, springs a surprise.
Six: Incidents like the arrest of Kulbushan Jadhav, Abhinandan’s embarrassment, Samjhota
Express and now the accidental missile firing is not likely to stop occurring. One will not be
surprised if tomorrow India starts violating the LoC again or creates further hurdles in the
implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Seven: There is no guarantee that after Modi, any new PM would have the political guts to
reverse India’s August 2019 actions or offer Jammu & Kashmir to Pakistan on a platter.
Eight: Internal divisions, political instability and striving for economic stability are likely to
keep New Delhi and Islamabad busy at least for the foreseeable future. Commencement of bilateral
trade without touching Kashmir could prove to be the right step in the right direction. But why
would India take a step that goes in Pakistan’s favour?
Nine: Major powers like the US, China, Russia or Europe are not going to forego India’s
usefulness in the economic field or its assumed police man’s role in the region.
Ten: A final decision amongst ‘selected’, ‘imported’ or ‘real’ governments coupled with severe
economic and security challenges are likely to keep Pakistan busy for a long time to come. There is
hardly any time left to cry over spilt milk.
War between India and Pakistan does not seem to be an option anymore. Not on Kashmir at
least. The lessons learned from previous wars and May 1998 have made the two arch-rivals a bit
wiser. In any case, conquering Pakistan was never an objective for India particularly in view of its
inability to handle streaks of separatist movements creating problems inside its own territory. India
wants a ‘compliant’ Pakistan to pursue its national agenda and to keep pleasing its western masters
in their China-containment pursuit.
Guessing and calculating another provocative ‘adventure’ from India seems to be a futile
exercise unless both sides reach a kind of ‘understanding’ on not crossing the ‘red-line’. A few
skeptics believe that perhaps such an ‘understanding’ is already reached through the channels that
revisited the Ceasefire Agreement. In any case, after experiencing the ‘accidental’ firing of a missile
from India, it was time for Pakistan to draw a line and keep an adequate and proportionate response
handy, just in case. There must be a limit to the doctrine of restraint. The fact remains that co-
existing peacefully and focusing on addressing own issues is by far the best option.
(Source: The Nation)

CHINA’S AFFECTION FOR PAKISTAN HAS LIMITATIONS TOO

Imtiaz Gul (The author of ‘Pakistan: Pivot of Hizbut Tahrir’s Global Caliphate’)
Once again China stepped forward to bail Pakistan out. It underscored its time-tested
friendship by providing a near interest free loan worth $2.3 billion to Pakistan for its balance-of-
payments support, well ahead of the grueling, demand-loaded deal with the IMF.
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To underscore the “all-weather partnership”, General Zhang Youxia, Deputy Chairman of

China’s Military Commission, received Pakistan’s Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in
Tianjing for exclusive bilateral consultations.
But continued political theatrics, selfish power games and an absence of sincere commitment
among Pakistan’s key stakeholder appear to have partially shaken the Chinese trust.
The latest “snub” was the exclusion from the “High-level Dialogue on Global Development”
held recently on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. Pakistan was conspicuous by its absence in a
dialogue to which leaders of a number of developing emerging economies had been invited.
Even though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the reasons behind Pakistan’s
exclusion, the extremely dubious circumstances around the vote of no-confidence against former
prime minister Imran Khan gradually tipped the balance, and the Chinese apparently discerned a
gap in walk and talk, with the apparent inclination to the US and its allies.
But driven by a culture of consideration and empathy for friends, Beijing once again reached
out to Pakistan in view of its precarious foreign exchange situation, and eventually green-signalled
the funds through a consortium of three banks.
This also demonstrated that unlike the West, which tends to use IMF as a strategic warfare
tool, China deals with friends like Pakistan with compassion and not vengeance for geopolitical
bargains. IMF programmes are primarily a tool to subjugate economies, kill investment and growth
and thus proliferate economic despair — so do the Chinese believe. And they see what has
happened in Pakistan.
Below I would like to list down some bitter messages out of China — an extrapolation of
discussions with some influential thinkers/officials in Beijing and Shanghai.
First, Pakistan remains an all-weather friend for China but that friendship has its limitations
too. China desires political stability in Pakistan that is the prerequisite for economic development.
But how can Pakistan achieve economic growth in a vindictive, divisive climate of protests and long
marches? This is a point addressed to all key stakeholders who have been using politics of agitation
against one another every now and then.
Second, unless Pakistan tries to walk the talk made under CPEC — i.e. accelerating decision-
making and honouring contracts — it cannot stand on its feet. And in that case, it cannot
industrialise, meaning thereby no escape from the begging bowl.
Third, post-pandemic global recession has changed China’s circumstances too. The feeling, it
appears, is that we have earned political stability and achieved high economic growth on the back of
four decades of hard work centred on internal political and radical structural reforms. We cannot
dish out dividends of that hard work to a country that is constantly embroiled in domestic political
wars and lacks the real focus on economic development.
Economic growth, it is pointed out, requires business-friendly environment, ease of doing
business and integrity of those on top. How can foreign investors deal with a corrupt institution
such as the Federal Board of Revenue and officials in other aligned ministries, as they all act as
predators and extractors without the long-term interest of the country in mind?
Does Pakistan boast such “strongmen/women” of integrity like Chairman Mao, Deng
Xiaoping or Xi Jinping — leaders of unblemished character?
Fourth, for putting Pakistan on a real growth path and getting rid of external straws such as
IMF loans or handouts from China and other friends, top military and civilian leaders will have to
divorce the 19th century elitist model of governance. Unless they give up the expensive top-heavy
governance regime, they can’t expect to take the country out of woods.
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China certainly cannot finance the obscene cost of the luxurious style of governance of the
Pakistani elites, is a very clear message that Beijing has drawn in the last decade or so.
Fifth, (relates to the over-commissioning of the power projects), if you didn’t have the vision
on how you will be able to utilise and pay the additional 12000 MW electricity sought under CPEC,
then why did you push our banks into financing?
The much-touted ML-1 Railway project has also apparently stalled because “your” politicians
and bureaucrats never really came prepared with practical solutions. Financial situation has now
changed.
That is true as well. I had been told that providing $7-8 billion is peanuts for Beijing. But the
international economic conditions have now prompted Beijing to step back and preserve its
resources accumulated through sheer focus and hard work. So much for ML-1 — as of now.
Sixth, fighting the evil of corruption is unavoidable but President Xi launched that crusade
nearly a decade ago after economic consolidation of over three decades.
This, too, is a strong rebuke to all those who have harped the anti-corruption agenda — Imran
Khan and the establishment. Chinese officials also realised that NAB — instead of curbing real
corruption — only stymied decision-making. It also generated the perception of being extremely
partisan.
Countries don’t work like that. First develop and then pursue graft, is the message.
Lastly, if Pakistan’s civil and military elites — the real power brokers — are on a suicide
mission for short-term tactical gains, even the best of support from China won’t help.
(Source: Express Tribune)

PAK-CHINA RELATIONS
…in changing global scenario
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
Since the adaptation of President Xi Jinping Thoughts, China is transforming. It is becoming
more assertive, pro-active and high-profile country. China is not ready anymore to listen to senseless
lectures or baseless accusations.
Today’s China is more confident and ready to compete at global stage in any field. It is a
gigantic shift. But, China is cognizant of the reality that power comes with responsibility. Thus, it is
working to refine engagement policies in all the fields.
From the review of China’s transformation process, we can deduce few key lessons. First,
China will be sticking to core principles of peaceful co-existence. It is drawing new policies by
learning from Confucius’s vision of shared prosperity, Yellow Emperor’s governance model and Sun
Zu Security vison. However, it will not tolerate bullying. Second, China wants to become a fair and
just power which treats everyone equally and does not want to acquire title of a bully. Third, China
will be striving for equitable and development-oriented world. For that purpose, development
linkages will be enhanced. Fourth, China will be looking to clear its backyard and forge new
partnerships as it is a basic requirement to become great power. The biggest problem in the backyard
is India. It is not only creating problems for China but also for other countries like Pakistan. Fifth, it is
expected that historical engagements and relationships will also observe changes.
The early signs of transformational policy are now visible. For example, China expanded
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, launched
Global Security and Global Development Initiatives. Further, China is working to strengthen BRICS
as a representative organisation of emerging and developing economies.
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Since 2017, President Xi has accelerated efforts and is advocating for expansion of BRICS.
China and Russia also reiterated the same at the 14th Summit. In the pursuance of expansion policy,
first meeting of aspirant countries was held in May 2022.
On the other hand, high-level Dialogue on Global Development was organised on the
sidelines of the Summit to make BRICS a development-oriented organisation. The Dialogue was
chaired by President Xi Jinping. In addition to BRICS members, some other countries were also
invited.
Unfortunately, Pakistan was missing on both the occasions. It ignited a debate in the country
and many people are asking why Pakistan was not invited and what does this mean to Pakistan? It
is unfortunate that the debate is going on in vacuum without understanding the changing role of
China at the global level. First of all, we must understand that Pakistan did not show much interest
to join BRICS. That’s why it was absent from the meeting of aspirant countries. Second, BRICS, at
this point of time, is working by adhering to consensus-based formula. So, it is not possible for
China to take unilateral decision.
Third, Dialogue on Global Development was held on the sidelines of BRICS as the theme of
Summit was “Foster High-quality BRICS Partnership, Usher in a New Era for Global Development”.
Absence of Pakistan from the Dialogue does not mean that Pak-China relationship has been
comprised. The relationship is intact and is strengthening with the passage of time. It is apparent
from the visit last month of Yang Jiechi, member of the politburo of Communist Party of China.
Besides, China helped Pakistan to avert default and economic crisis by providing timely a loan
of $2.3 billion and rollover of $2 billion. It came forward at a time when we were desperately looking
for help to avert default and save our population from the cruelest impacts of crisis.
China is also trying to help Pakistan on the economic front by providing more opportunities
to enhance our exports in diverse fields. It is expected Pakistan’s agriculture export value will
exceed $1 billion this year. So, the commitment of China is firm and nothing can shake it.
People must be rational in making judgment and ponder on two questions before giving any
statement. First, why our military and security relations are strong, but economic cooperation could
not yield the same results? The major reasons are; lack of understanding of Chinese economic
model, political point-scoring, complicated bureaucratic system and weak implementation policies.
Lack of understanding of Chinese model hindered efforts to unleash true economic potential.
The biggest victim of this failure is CPEC. For example, Pakistan is implementing CPEC for
the last seven years, but still unable to operationalise Special Economic Zones which were required
to foster industrialisation process. It is impacting our progress which weakens our position to be
included in the groups like BRICS.
We need to rationalise our expectations and analyse the situation by keeping rising status of
China at the centre. The analysis must avoid emotional slogans. Pakistan will have to make efforts to
improve its economy to become a choice for big groups like BRICS. We have opportunity in the form
of CPEC and we can exploit it by adopting wise policies.
First and foremost step to achieve the purpose would be to deploy people who understand
China (economy, governance, diplomacy and security) and its role in changing global dynamics.
Unfortunately, it is not happening.
Although, PMLN and PPP consider themselves champion of Pak-China relations, they are
also committing mistakes of the past. It is feared that immature analysis and strong vocal cords,
especially among the experts and the media, will hurt our interests.
(Source: The News)
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A FRIENDLY VISIT TO TURKEY

Muhammad Zahid Rifat (Retired Deputy Controller (News), Radio Pakistan)
Turkey and Pakistan are key members of the Islamic World and share views on problems and
issues confronting the Muslim Ummah. Both countries have a deep-rooted relationship and share
unanimity of views on almost all issues of regional and international importance. For the past 75
years, the two countries have enjoyed a partnership, which can easily be described as an all-weather
partnership, that has been mutually beneficial and centred around economic development,
diplomatic backing and collaboration over security and defence issues.
Apparently in a determined attempt to renew bilateral relations and encourage more
cooperation, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently paid a three-day official visit to Turkey which
turned out to be quite friendly, productive and result-oriented.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Turkey in order to have the highest-level discussions
there on enhancing and boosting cooperation and collaboration in various sectors like investment,
trade, health, education, culture. It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan and Turkey already
enjoy a strong collaborative partnership when it comes to defence. Both brotherly countries
combined their resources to create the largest warship MILGEM-class PNS Badar which was
launched in Karachi in May 2022. This was indeed a shining example of the excellent cooperation
between the two countries in the defence sector.
In order to help and assist each other economically, both countries have also signed a Strategic
Economic Framework that inspired innovation in the fields of technology, tourism, education and
health sectors. Turkish companies’ investment in Pakistan has also increased to $ I billion for the
first time since 2011.
Needless to mention, contacts between the top leadership of the two countries greatly help in
promoting bilateral relations and cooperation in various fields and sectors for the mutual benefit of
their people.
On the very first day of the visit, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, while interacting with
Turkish businessmen and investors, emphatically pointed that somehow closeness in Pakistan and
Turkey’s relationship was not fully reflected in the trade ties and expressed the desire that the
volume of trade between the two countries should go up to $5 billion annually. He quite rightly
pointed out that Turkey and Pakistan have a long historical relationship firmly anchored in
common faith, shared history and a glorious tradition, and extend mutual support to each other
on issues of core interest, s6 there was certainly and surely no doubt that both the countries have a
great potential for increased and enhanced trade and economic relations mutually beneficial for
both sides.
The Pakistani Prime Minister had a one-on-one long meeting with host President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and then the two leaders addressed a joint press conference. Among other things,
Turkish and Pakistani leaders had also exchanged views regarding Kashmir, Palestine, Cyprus and
Afghanistan.
President Erdogan said that they had discussed a vast number of regional and international
issues in detail, reaffirmed to further enhance the scope of bilateral ties, resolved that the close
friendship and cooperation between the two countries would be further strengthened and both were
also moving on cooperation in defence projects, citing joint construction of ships.
He went on to say that mutual trade between the two countries had already soared to over $1
billion and they have resolved to it it further onward to $5 billion annually, assured to encourage the
Turkish companies to increase their investment in Pakistan, tourism, education, logistic and civil
aviation were among other sectors in which they were working to enhance cooperation.
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Turkey has all along been supporting the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination and
reiterating the quite appreciable stance, President Erdogan called for resolving lingering and
burning Kashmir issue in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions amicably.
On his turn, PM Shehbaz Sharif lauded the unflinching support of Turkey over the Kashmir
issue and said that the Kashmiris had been struggling for their legitimate right of self-determination
and been subjected by Indian occupying security forces to worst brutalities and atrocities for more
than seven decades of their freedom struggle and also nd5a was making attempts to effect
demographic changes in the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
He went on to reaffirm Pakistan’s principled stand and said that Pakistan would not abandon
its quest for peace, which was only possible in South Asia if the long outstanding issue of Kashmir
was resolved under the UN Security Council resolutions and in accordance with the aspirations of
the Kashmiri people. He also reaffirmed Pakistan’s support to Turkey over Northern Cyprus saying
that Pakistan stands with Turkey in its fight against terrorism and terrorist groups as enemies of
Turkey are enemies of Pakistan. Both Turkey and Pakistan have worked for decades for their shared
goals of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and were hosting the largest number of Afghan refugees
in the world.
It is worth mentioning here that warm bonds between Turkey and Pakistan had been close to
their hearts going beyond conventional ties and diplomatic niceties, bonds of friendship were
deeply rooted in history and intertwined in the very fabric of their respective societies, such a
relationship was deep in their hearts as they were tied with each other in the unbreakable,
intertwined and interlinked bonds which also connected them at all levels, whether the
governments, the institutions, the armed forces or the people.
The visit of the PM had taken place when the two countries were celebrating the 75th
anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Pakistan. The Seventh
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council will be meeting in Islamabad in September 2022 and
hopefully will go a long way in further promoting and strengthening the existing warm, sincere and
brotherly relations between the two countries.
All in all, the visit was quite productive as a number of agreements, memorandum of
understandings and protocols were signed for further expanding cooperation and assistance in
various sectors.
(Source: Pakistan Today)

TRADE WITH IRAN

Sikander Ahmed Shah (Former legal adviser to Pakistan’s foreign ministry)
In June, Pakistan’s foreign minister, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, met his Iranian counterpart, Dr
Amir Abdollahian, to review their countries’ relationship.
The past few years have seen serious gains across multiple facets of the two neighbours’
bilateral relations, due substantially to the efforts of Pakistan’s mission to Iran. The clearest
indicator of improving relations has been the loan of Iran’s Ilyushin 76 — described as the largest
firefighting aircraft in the world — to Pakistan to combat the deadly wildfires in Balochistan’s
Koh-i-Suleman range.
However, the potential of improved Pak-Iran ties goes beyond isolated demonstrations of
goodwill to socioeconomic windfalls for the two states.
Core to the discussions between the foreign ministers were ways to improve trade and
economic ties, particularly ways in which the cross-border movement of people and goods could
be facilitated.
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Despite the two countries’ geostrategic proximity and potential for trade, for the first 75
years of Pakistan’s existence the two have shared only one border crossing. Since 2021, two more
have become operational, greatly easing the passage of trade and peoples between the neighbours,
including the hundreds of thousands of zaireen that cross the border annually. Border
management agreements between the two have also been inked. These efforts have yielded
tangible benefits in increased border security and counterterrorism efforts.
Further, to alleviate the issue of local communities potentially being affected by these
measures, the two states are instituting visa-free border markets where these populations can
freely mingle and trade.
Discussions also involved the import of additional energy from Iran to strengthen regional
energy cooperation and ameliorate Pakistan’s current energy crisis and its energy dependency on
Western-adjacent states. Bilawal proposed the resumption of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project
initiated by former president Asif Ali Zardari. The deal for the 2,775-kilometre pipeline was struck
in 1995. Iran completed its section of the pipeline in 2011; however, Pakistan’s length of the
pipeline has been hampered by sanctions on Iran. These coercive measures, intermittently
imposed by the US, EU and the UN, have severely hampered Tehran’s efforts at diplomatic and
economic outreach.
The United Nations implemented and progressively broadened economic sanctions on Iran
through UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929.
Against this backdrop, UNSC Resolution 2231, passed in 2015, represented a key
breakthrough for Tehran, outlining a schedule for the suspension and eventual cessation of UN
sanctions. This resolution was passed after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly
known as the ‘Iran nuclear deal’. Under the terms agreed to in the JCPOA, UN sanctions on Iran
expired on Oct 18, 2020.
However, America’s wavering positions on Tehran has created dilemmas for Pakistan.
In 2010, parallel to UN sanctions, the US imposed secondary sanctions on Tehran, compelling
foreign entities to withdraw their investments from Iran. In 2012, the US Iran Sanctions Act
pressured purchasers of Iranian oil to progressively reduce their purchases or risk isolation. While
the JCPOA of 2015 suspended the remaining secondary sanctions against Iran, it retained provisions
related to primary sanctions restricting Iran’s support for extremism, the ballistic missiles
programme, and arms-related transactions.
Also, despite the thawing of relations between the US and Iran leading up to the JCPOA,
sanctions prohibiting commercial activity between the two have persisted under the US Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. In 2018, the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, and
imposed further sanctions on Iran. These sanctions were augmented in 2020. While the US has also
granted exemptions to countries such as Turkey, Iraq, India and others — allowing them to trade in
the energy sector with Iran — it has not extended such favours to Pakistan.
Another concern for Pakistan is the Financial Action Task Force’s blacklisting of Iran. While
the FATF does not prohibit trade relations with blacklisted states, such engagements may bring
global scrutiny to Islamabad.
While the threat of international sanctions remains a key concern for Pakistan, it does not
preclude Pak-Iran economic cooperation. The pipeline today itself is not subject to UN sanctions,
and the US has granted exemptions to countries such as Turkey, India, and Iraq in petrochemical
trade with Tehran. In any case, Pakistan and Iran may also conduct their trade by way of barter to
ensure that US sanctions are not triggered.
Iran’s place as a regional power and its oil and gas reserves should prompt Islamabad to
improve ties with Tehran. In our neighbourhood, Beijing accounts for 25 per cent of Tehran’s
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imports and is the number one buyer of Iranian oil today. India was the second-biggest customer
of Iranian oil until 2019. Nonetheless, India remains ready to re-engage with Iran, with an
anonymous Indian official stating that “once the sanctions are lifted, we can look to resume oil
imports from Iran”.
Even if the sanctions persist, there are avenues to explore. In addition to petitioning the US for
exemptions, Pakistan can trade directly with Iran by way of barter: for instance, trading some of its
rice and meat surpluses with Iran in exchange for Iranian gas and energy. A similar solution can
apply to trade with Afghanistan, which, in the wake of the crushing US sanctions, has been left in a
state of economic turmoil. Barter would also free Pakistan from its reliance on the US dollar, easing
pressure on our foreign exchange reserves. Pakistan can also seek to import petrochemicals from
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan by way of Iran. It can directly pay royalties for this use of Iran’s
pipeline network or provide Iran with a percentage of the gas so imported as royalties. Parallels can
be drawn with existing arrangements whereby Pakistan trades with Turkey and other Central Asian
states by way of land routes through Iran.
Pakistan and Iran have shared sociocultural and geostrategic interests. While Pakistan must
continue to foster improved ties with states further afield, such as the US or the EU bloc, it must
nonetheless cultivate reliable partnerships — in similar vein as the Pak-China relationship — with
other friendly states in the region. Greater engagement with Iran — particularly on shared issues
such as energy security or counterterrorism efforts — is thus necessary to ensure a safer and more
prosperous Pakistan.
(Source: Dawn)
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Globalization
GLOBALIZATION IS ALIVE, WELL, AND CHANGING
Scott Lincicome (Director, Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies)
Free trade is under greater attack today than it has been in decades, especially in the United
States. Despite continued public support for foreign trade and globalization generally (even during
the height of the COVID-19 pandemic), a bipartisan cadre of American politicians and pundits is
increasingly skeptical of, or downright hostile to, the longstanding consensus in favor of trade
liberalization. The U.S. government, moreover, increasingly prioritizes national security, economic
“resilience,” and the people and communities allegedly left behind by our modern and globalized
world. The Biden administration’s reluctance to remove former President Donald Trump’s tariffs or
to pursue new trade agreements has, along with pandemic‐related supply chain snarls and Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, signaled to many that an era of de‐globalization is upon us.
Yet, even as its justifications and the global economy change, the current skepticism toward
free trade and globalization remains misguided. Academic literature and recent events continue to
provide strong economic, geopolitical, and moral support for free trade and the multilateral trading
system. There is also little concrete sign that the world—so far, at least—is really de‐globalizing,
though trade and supply chains, as well as the rules under which they operate, are changing.
Put simply, the death of globalization is greatly exaggerated.
The Criticisms
Today’s criticisms of trade and globalization fall into three general categories. From an
economic perspective, critics contend that decades of “unfettered free trade” are responsible for
widespread “deindustrialization” in the United States and, by extension, increased job loss,
depressed family formation, and the erosion of industrial towns, particularly in the Rust Belt. The
most common target is U.S. trade with China—in particular, the 2000 U.S. law that granted China
permanent normal trade relations and ushered the country into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001. This supposedly drove the now‐famous “China Shock” period between 1999 and
2011 during which a sizable increase in Chinese imports caused, according to various economists,
the loss of millions of American jobs and associated social ills. Others claim that the U.S. trade
deficit—not only with China—is responsible for similar harms since the 1990s, and that
globalization’s theoretical benefits supposedly fail to match its reality while destroying the lives of
millions of American workers and their communities.
Second, critics increasingly claim that international trade has undermined U.S. national
security by not only crippling the country’s industrial base but also making it dependent on foreign
nations, especially potential adversaries, for critical goods. Thus, protectionism and industrial policy
are needed to re‐shore essential industries not on economic grounds but geopolitical ones. Here
again, China looms large, as critics not only blame China’s economic rise on U.S. trade policy but
also use it to justify trade and investment restrictions on key sectors (like pharmaceuticals or
semiconductors) and a broader “decoupling” of the U.S. and Chinese economies. Recent events in
Russia and Ukraine supposedly reinforce these concerns.
Finally, there are criticisms based on morality, particularly from self‐declared pro‐worker
populists on the left and (increasingly) the right who claim that globalization sacrifices the common
man and vulnerable communities on the altar of economic efficiency and gross domestic product,
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delivering diffuse benefits to educated, urbanite globalists at the concentrated expense of real
Americans. The elites get iPhones, Netflix, and knowledge jobs, they claim, while the working class
gets a life of joblessness, government dependency, or worse.
The Reality
In each of these criticisms, there is a nugget of truth, but they remain overwhelmed by the
reasons to support free trade and oppose protectionism.
The Economic Case
It’s undoubtedly true that international trade, like all forms of market competition, disrupts
some American companies and workers that, through government protection, formerly had the U.S.
market to themselves. However, the economic case for free trade remains rock solid. American
consumers (who are also American workers, by the way) gain from new access to goods and
services at lower prices and in greater varieties. These gains come not only from foreign‐made items
but also from similar domestic ones that are now forced to compete with imports on price and
quality. Studies show that trade’s “consumer surplus” is far more significant than a few cents on the
proverbial cheap T‑shirt. Recently, for example, several economists have found that falling prices
caused by Chinese imports into the United States during the 2000s generated hundreds of thousands
of dollars in consumer benefits for each American job potentially displaced by the China Shock—the
equivalent of giving every American “$260 in extra spending per year for the rest of their lives.”
Similar gains occur outside the United States: European consumers, for example, save €60 billion per
year (about $64 billion) from lower tariffs resulting from the European Union’s entry into the WTO.
Studies also uniformly find that these benefits—again contrary to the conventional wisdom—tend to
disproportionately aid the poor and the middle class, who have tighter budgets and concentrate
their spending on tradable sectors like food, clothing, footwear, and consumer electronics.
The consumer gains from trade are a big reason why Americans today work far fewer hours
to own more and better essentials than at any prior time in history. Dartmouth economist Bruce
Sacerdote finds that lower‐income Americans’ overall consumption (adjusted for inflation)
increased by 62 percent to 164 percent between 1960 and 2015, not fully accounting for
improvements in quality. In other words, poorer Americans today can consume about twice as
many goods and services as their 1960 counterparts, and expanded international trade is
undeniably a big reason why.
Additionally, domestic companies and farmers gain financially from exporting their products:
Total exports of goods and services hit almost $2.5 trillion in 2019, and the United States was the
world’s second‐largest goods exporter and largest services exporter that same year. Firms also
benefit from imports, either by moving and selling foreign‐made items in the United States or by
using them to produce other things. Indeed, the total value added to wholesale trade, retail trade,
and transportation and warehousing was more than $3.1 trillion in 2019—output that in many cases
(e.g., Gap or FedEx) wouldn’t exist but for global trade. Foreign‐made inputs and equipment,
moreover, boost American manufacturers’ global competitiveness and constitute about half of all
goods imported into the United States. The best testaments to these benefits are the thoroughly
documented harms that Trump‐era tariffs on steel and aluminum inflicted on American
manufacturing investment, output, and jobs.
American companies also gain from foreign direct investment—dollars that overseas
companies acquired by selling stuff to U.S. consumers and then injected back into the U.S. economy.
Foreign investments in U.S.-based companies (e.g., BMW in South Carolina) generated $5 trillion in
sales and $1.1 trillion in value-added—the affiliates’ direct contribution to GDP—in 2019, and these
same firms conducted more than $71 billion in research and development (mostly in manufacturing)
that same year. Research also shows that foreign ownership benefits not only U.S.-based affiliates—
via increased capital spending, new production or management techniques, or better supplier
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networks—but also their surrounding communities and neighboring companies. Anyone still
doubting such benefits can drive down Interstate 85 from Charlotte, North Carolina, to
Montgomery, Alabama, to check out the multinational factories and bustling towns firsthand.
The “corporate” gains from trade inevitably benefit American workers. For example, a 2020
report found that trade directly or indirectly supported approximately 40.6 million jobs. New
research also finds that, while only 6 percent of U.S. firms in manufacturing and services are goods
traders, these firms account for half of the economy‐wide employment today and 60 percent of all
new net jobs created after 2008, primarily through the establishment of new businesses. Meanwhile,
foreign‐owned affiliates in the United States employed almost 8 million Americans in 2019, typically
at higher wages than similarly situated workers at U.S.-based competitors.
Trade also has allowed American companies and workers to focus on their comparative
advantages in capital‐intensive manufacturing and skilled services. The increased prominence of
these jobs in the American economy has enabled a transition from manual, inefficient, and even
dangerous low‐skill jobs to generally safer, more productive, and better‐paying ones. A job
transporting that cheap T‑shirt (e.g., working at Amazon) now pays better, and is more promising,
than the job making it.
In general, increased imports into the United States between 1994 and 2019 have coincided
with gains in domestic output, employment, and real (median) wages. That same period also saw an
increase in the share of American households making more than $100,000 (from 23.8 percent to 34.3
percent) and declines in the shares of middle‐income (44.6 percent to 40.3 percent) or low‐income
(31.8 percent to 25.5 percent) households. In other words, during the hyperglobalization era, the
American middle class shrunk because households got richer.
Free trade is also integral to the “creative destruction”—that is, the constant replacement of
old firms, jobs, and products with new ones—that raises our living standards. While much of this
activity is imperceptible, it is doubtlessly driven by consumers and capital seeking more productive
ends in the global marketplace. International competition, for example, has long pushed American
companies, such as the Big Three automakers in the 1980s, to improve their products or go out of
business. And the money Americans save by buying cheap foreign goods is often spent on, or
invested in, promising domestic companies and their higher‐skilled workers. The outcome of these
unseen transactions is not just “cheaper stuff” but better and once‐unimaginable goods, better jobs,
better companies, and better lives.
Quantifying the overall benefits of trade is exceedingly complicated and uncertain, but
economic studies uniformly show substantial gains. For example, a 2017 Peterson Institute for
International Economics study calculated the payoff to the United States from globalization between
1950 and 2016 to be $2.1 trillion ($2.4 trillion in 2021 dollars), increasing GDP per capita and per
household by around $7,000 and $18,000 ($7,900 and $20,400 in 2021 dollars), respectively. These
benefits, again, accrue disproportionately to households in the bottom income decile.
This does not mean, of course, that all is perfectly fine in the modern American economy.
However, the convenient narrative that “globalization” is the primary driver of the nation’s most
commonly cited economic challenges is misguided. For example, the decline in American
manufacturing jobs began decades before imports were little more than a rounding error in the U.S.
economy—in 1979 in nominal terms or the mid‐1940s as a share of the workforce. These declines are
also shared by other advanced economies (including ones with trade surpluses like Germany and
Japan) and many emerging markets like China—which shed almost 18 million industrial jobs in
2012–19. In reality, the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment reflects broader, global trends
(e.g., productivity gains and changing consumption patterns), not the “American carnage” decried
by Trump at his inauguration. It also reflects a shift in worker preferences away from
manufacturing; job openings in the sector have averaged more than 850,000 since mid‐2021, and
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manufacturers consistently point to a lack of workers as their biggest impediment, even after
offering generous pay raises and signing bonuses.
Other trends also defy the anti‐globalization narrative. Male wage stagnation, for example,
actually ended before the United States entered the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994 and the WTO in 1995, and those wages generally increased thereafter. Male labor
force participation, meanwhile, has consistently declined since the 1950s. And despite ample job
openings and significant pay increases, only a small fraction of non‐working, prime‐age men today
report an interest in getting a job. Troubling trends in marriage and family formation (such as the
share of children living with married or cohabiting parents) ceased in the early 1990s and either
stabilized or reversed course thereafter. (The troublesome 1980s, by the way, also featured far more
U.S. industrial policy, far less global integration, and dozens of competitor countries still foundering
under communism or socialism.) Meanwhile, the vast majority of older industrial cities in the
United States—the ones most vulnerable to foreign competition—have long since recovered and
moved on. That a few remain in dire straits thus speaks less to national trade policy and more to
those specific towns, as well as state or local policies that might inhibit adjustment and growth.
And the supply chain crisis? Another miss. For starters, multinational corporations and
consumers have been adjusting their practices—diversifying suppliers, building inventories,
investing in new capacity, altering spending patterns—since COVID first hit. Keeping trade and
investment lanes free from government interference helps facilitate this adjustment. Just as
important, there’s scant evidence that reshoring supply chains would help the country withstand
future economic shocks. Two recent studies (one from the OECD and another from German research
network CESifo) found, for example, that an economic shock abroad would hit a “decoupled” U.S.
economy just about as hard (in terms of stability or welfare) as our current, globally integrated one.
Any meager benefits, moreover, would come with major costs: Insulation from foreign shocks
makes a nation more susceptible to domestic shocks (say, a freak ice storm in Texas) and intensifies
any resulting pain because local supply chains adapt more slowly than global ones.
Studies also show that moving toward a more localized U.S. economy would reduce economic
efficiency and thus increase prices while reducing output. In reality, most supply chain problems
have little to do with trade policy and a lot to do with the pandemic and misguided U.S. policies—
stimulus checks, tariffs, zoning, environmental regulations, immigration restrictions, etc.—that
overheated demand or restricted raw materials, labor, transportation, and construction.
The baby formula crisis provides a timely, albeit terrible, example of these economic realities.
Decades of tariff and nontariff (FDA) barriers effectively walled off the U.S. formula market from
foreign competition: According to the White House, 98 percent of all formula consumed here is
made here. These and other trade restrictions, combined with government welfare contracts that
encouraged domestic industry concentration, created a brittle system that crumbled in the face of a
serious domestic shock (the Abbott recall and plant closure) and struggled to recover thereafter.
Now the Biden administration’s solution to the crisis is to fly in formula from abroad—formula that
was seized at the border only a few weeks ago.
Other products dominated by domestic production, such as pickup trucks, also suffered from
pandemic‐related supply chain problems in 2020–21, as much as their “globalized” counterparts, if
not more so. The lesson in each case is the same: protectionism doesn’t improve economic
resilience—it usually makes things worse.
Even the damage attributed to the 1999–2011 China Shock has been wildly oversold. Along
with the aforementioned consumer benefits from Chinese imports, numerous studies completed
since that period reveal fewer American jobs were lost than the 2.4 million often claimed; substantial
employment gains in services and export‐oriented industries; and net economic benefits for the U.S.
manufacturing sector and the country as a whole (about 96 percent of all U.S. workers came out
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ahead). Even if one were to treat the China Shock as economic gospel, moreover, perspective is
sorely needed: The total American jobs lost due to the 11‐year China Shock are less than half of the
approximately 5 million job separations that occur each month in a healthy U.S. economy, and the 1
million lost manufacturing jobs would constitute less than 20 percent of all such losses (and less than
5 percent of all job losses) over the same period.
Recent analyses also show that low‐skill manufacturing employment and “late stage”
industries with routine, standardized processes likely would have suffered the same fate in the last
two decades, regardless of the China Shock, due to competition from other developing countries and
non‐trade issues such as automation. In fact, data show that from 1990 to 2017, Chinese imports
replaced other imports (particularly those from Asia), not domestic production and that this trend
reversed—lower Chinese imports and greater imports from Vietnam, Mexico, and elsewhere—when
Trump’s China tariffs were implemented.
These numbers answer a question that economic nationalists and China hawks rarely ask:
What would have happened without the China Shock? They indicate that Chinese import
restrictions would not have saved most of the American manufacturing jobs destroyed between 1999
and 2011—those jobs would have simply been lost due to other things, including technology and
non‐China imports. (Indeed, that’s just what happened when President Barack Obama slapped 35
percent tariffs on Chinese tires back in 2009.) Economists have long understood that adjustment to
economic shocks—whether due to trade, technology, pandemics, or whatever—is never easy, but
there’s nothing about the China Shock, which ended a decade ago, so novel or harmful as to justify
abandoning a century of scholarship and experience on the overall benefits of free trade.
Finally, the last few years have forced us to re‐learn about the failures of the only alternative
to free trade, protectionism. Studies show, for example, that American consumers, both companies
and individuals, bore most of the burden of the Trump administration’s tariffs on home appliances,
solar panels, steel, aluminum, and Chinese‐origin goods. Downstream manufacturing firms have
been forced to pay higher prices for metals than their global counterparts, thus costing them sales
and jobs; exporters (farmers and manufacturers) have lost competitiveness due to higher input costs
and foreign retaliation; and investment has suffered due to uncertainty surrounding American and
global trade policy. The tariffs also failed to achieve their objectives. Global steel overcapacity, for
example, remains a problem; there’s been no revival of domestic solar panel production; Chinese
economic malfeasance has actually increased (likely in response to U.S. tariffs and sanctions); and
Beijing’s hardline stances on human rights, free speech, the South China Sea, and other issues have
deteriorated further.
Engagement thus remains the worst trade policy—except for all the others that have been
tried.
The Geopolitical Case
The multilateral trading system arose in the second half of the 20th century, not only from a
desire for global economic growth or to empower global consumers but mainly from a fear that the
division of the world into competing economic blocs could again fuel global military conflict. Fresh
out of two world wars that began, in part, due to trade conflicts, the founders of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) believed that countries that traded with each other (and
thus had access to an institutionalized means for resolving commercial disputes) would be less
prone to engaging in geopolitical competition or armed conflict with each other. And this system, for
all its fits and starts, has met this aim reasonably well for over seven decades: The GATT and its
successor, the WTO, have provided an avenue for the peaceful resolution of trade disputes and for
countries to commit to a series of rules and economic reforms, mainly as a prerequisite for accession
to the organization, that increase global interdependence and make bilateral disputes less likely to
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emerge. Even China signed on to the rules and undertook reforms, with subsequent backsliding
more a failure of WTO members’ enforcement efforts than of the rules themselves.
Numerous studies have also found that increased trade leads to fewer armed conflicts among
states—a core national security objective. As countries trade more with each other or become more
exposed to each other’s growth, they are less prone to engage in conflict, and they often form deeper
alliances. These security benefits are driven by several factors. First, trade makes countries more
economically interdependent, thus making future conflict more costly. Second, trade and bargaining
are more cost‐effective ways of resolving disputes and obtaining foreign resources. Third, trade
increases material prosperity and promotes mutual tolerance and understanding. And fourth, trade
can limit the power of domestic constituencies that benefit from armed conflict.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine does little to undermine these points, and in some ways, it
enhances them. Neither the academic literature nor all but the most overzealous pundits claim
that trade prevents armed conflict, but that it simply makes interstate violence less likely. The
Russia‐Ukraine clash may therefore be considered an exception to a decadeslong decline in wars
between trading partners and deaths from cross‐border conflict. Vladimir Putin’s “Fortress
Russia” strategy, moreover, worked to reduce Russian engagement abroad so that the nation
could withstand economic blowback resulting from its foreign aggression. Prior to the Ukraine
invasion, in fact, Russia was relatively isolated economically, sporting a trade/GDP ratio well
below the global average.
Yet public and private sanctions still inflicted immense economic pain on the Russian
economy, while “globalized” smartphones, VPNs, and social media thwarted Putin’s propaganda
machine. Governments could pursue financial sanctions because of Russia’s continued reliance on
the U.S. dollar—currency obtained due to international trade. These and related events might also
serve as a warning to other illiberal countries with extraterritorial ambitions, especially those like
China which are far more integrated into the global economy. According to numerous reports,
Beijing’s hesitancy to fully embrace Russia during the Ukraine conflict stems from concerns about
the repercussions for a globalized China, which has already suffered sustained capital outflows
since Putin invaded. Thus, isolating China economically might make future conflict in Taiwan or
elsewhere more likely, not less.
Finally, allowing developing countries access to the U.S. market can decrease the appeal and
perceived benefits of joining terrorist organizations and networks because it demonstrably produces
not only economic growth but also better opportunities and improved standards of living in
impoverished regions. These benefits are particularly important for developed countries at risk of
bordering states’ poverty or instability spilling into their territories through increased migration or
refugee flows. The easiest way to slow migration from poorer Latin American countries to the
United States is to make potential migrants wealthier at home via trade.
The Moral Case
As Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations, “Man is an animal that bargains.” Humans
are unique in our ability to peacefully exchange goods and services to meet our needs. For millennia,
we have built cultures, societies, and systems around the principle of voluntary trade. In doing so,
we have come to act naturally as equals—even though we may be of different ages, genders,
nationalities, races, or religions. When individuals can freely pursue their self‐interest through trade,
obtaining value by providing value, the “invisible hand” yields economic and social outcomes that
benefit society at large.
Intended or not, American trade liberalization has removed many of the political barriers that
thwart these voluntary, beneficial human interactions and the many inequities that prevailed in
the previous, more protectionist U.S. system. Trade restrictions have long propped up certain
politically powerful U.S. workers and industries (in steel, sugar, textiles, etc.) via hidden,
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regressive taxes on all other Americans, making the country poorer overall in the process. And it
is immoral for the government not only to prioritize the protected groups’ well‐being above that
of other Americans but to do so at the latter’s direct expense. Removing tariffs might create pains
for formerly‐protected workers and companies now competing for their neighbors’ once‐captive
dollars, but moral claims based on that disruption ignore that the protection itself never should
have been there in the first place.
The morality of trade doesn’t stop at the water’s edge either: The lowering of U.S. trade
barriers, along with American leadership forming agreements and participating in trade institutions
such as the WTO, has produced immeasurable benefits for the world’s poorest people. The
International Labour Organization reports that between 1993 and 2018, for example, the share of
working individuals in low‐ and middle‐income countries living in extreme poverty (less than $1.90
a day, in purchasing power parity terms) fell from 41.7 percent to 9.8 percent—a decline of about 550
million people. Other studies show that trade helps these workers not only consume more but also
move from subsistence and informal activities to formal wage or salary work. Child labor is
disappearing too: The overall number of child workers (ages 5–17) decreased by approximately 38
percent, or 94 million, between 2000 and 2016—benefits especially important for women and girls
who were once simply married off (or worse).
Globalization Isn’t Going Anywhere
Fortunately, rumors of globalization’s demise have been, yet again, greatly exaggerated. The
share of global GDP of the goods trade was down in 2020 from its 2008 peak, yet it was still
historically high—well above levels seen during the supposed hyperglobalization heyday of the
1990s and right around where it was in 2016. This widely‐cited figure, moreover, is a lousy indicator
of what’s really going on in the global economy. For starters, goods trade was destined to slow
eventually (some goods aren’t amenable to long‐distance shipping and multinational production) as
more economies moved from manufacturing into services (many of which are, like construction,
nontradeable). Furthermore, the supposedly retrenching U.S. saw inflation‐adjusted merchandise
trade (imports plus exports) reach record levels in 2021. Global trade also hit a record high last year,
as did trade in industrial inputs (a sign of companies’ use of global value chains). And both the
Panama and Suez canals saw record traffic, with the latter being expanded to handle even more
cargo in the future.
Even more importantly, goods trade is only one part of the globalization story. Most
obviously, global trade in services continued to increase before the pandemic and is now expanding
again as countries reopen. The key here is the explosion in digital trade—the cross‐border delivery
and consumption of both “information and communication technology” products (smartphones,
software, etc.) and traditional services enabled by those same technologies (legal advice, research
and development, online education, etc.). Monthly global data traffic is expected to more than triple
(from 230 exabytes to 780 exabytes) between 2020 and 2026, and international bandwidth—the best
measure of cross‐border data flows—saw 30 percent increases in both 2020 and 2021 (with much
more on tap). Quantifying digital trade is difficult because traditional statistics have a hard time
capturing the origins, volume, and value of these transactions. Nevertheless, back‐of‐napkin
estimates reveal trillions of dollars in unseen economic activity.
Other aspects of globalization, such as international migration and capital flows, also remain
at historically high levels. Countries continue to sign trade agreements, such as the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans‐Pacific Partnership (formerly the Trans‐Pacific Partnership),
the larger (but less ambitious) Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the 54‐nation
African Continental Free Trade Area. And “cultural globalization” continues apace: Foreign cuisines
are so commonplace in America that grocers struggle to stuff them all in the “ethnic” aisle; Puerto
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Rico’s Bad Bunny topped Spotify’s charts rapping in Spanish; and the most‐watched show on
Netflix last year was in Korean. If the world is “de‐globalizing,” it has a weird way of showing it.
Finally, the pandemic and Russia have surely caused multinationals to rethink their supply
chains, but this is far more re-globalization than de-globalization. American companies, for example,
have shifted some operations out of China mainly to Southeast Asia or Mexico, not back home.
Declines in Russian or Ukrainian commodities, moreover, have pushed international buyers to turn
not inward but to Canada, South Africa, Latin America, the United States, and India. Inventory and
related systems have also been overhauled (less “just‐in‐time” and more “just‐in‐case”), and the
market is booming for supply chain and logistics technologies that let multinationals better track
shipments and processes.
In short, global business is still very much global. It’s just different from what it was a few
years ago. And it’ll be different again in a few more.
Free trade certainly isn’t painless, but its disruptions do not outweigh its tremendous
economic benefits for both the country and the world. Such pains cannot obscure trade’s geopolitical
importance and fundamental morality, as well as the inefficacy of the lone alternative to free trade,
protectionism. The challenges created by seismic shifts in industrial production, the rise of China,
and even a once‐in‐a‐lifetime pandemic are some of the most difficult of our time, and the solutions
are neither clear nor easy. But a rejection of free trade wouldn’t benefit the United States or correct
its problems; it would probably make things worse.
Globalization will continue to grow with or without the U.S. government’s endorsement. It
would be far better for American policymakers to join in than to embrace economic isolation.

WELCOME TO THE NEW AGE OF INSECURITY

Dr. John C. Hulsman (President and managing partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a prominent global
political risk consulting firm)
The Austrian psychoanalyst Theodor Reik put it best when he said that history never repeated
itself, but it did often rhyme. This has become the unofficial mantra of my political risk firm. All of
our competitors in the industry tend to assess the same three areas — macroeconomics, military
strategy, and politics and geopolitics — but we add a critical fourth in that we also use the historical
lens, applied historical experience, to make sense of the world.
As one era gives way to the next, such a broader view becomes absolutely central. For the
current global data points of Ukraine, the Sino-American cold war and the rise of endemic inflation,
important as they are on their own, make sense only in the larger context — that we are
transitioning from one era (the Age of Globalization 1991-2022) to the next (the Age of Insecurity
2022-).
Every era has its truisms, intellectual rules that make sense in the present and seem eternal,
but actually work only within a specific place and time. The just concluding Age of Globalization is
no exception to this historical rule. Just days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine (which my
political risk firm called correctly to happen in February months ahead of the fact), an old banker
“frenemy” of mine from my St. Andrews University days, chokingly angry that I had had the
effrontery to say war was imminent, laid out the truisms of the fading era as well as anyone could.
First, he told me I was all wet, and that there never would be an attack, as I had always
overrated the military, cultural, political and geopolitical components of decision making, when in
essence everything in the world came down to an economics-first basis.
Second, Russia would never endanger its lucrative energy trade with Europe by invading
Ukraine, just as the Sino-American cold war competition could be managed as both sides just
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benefited too much from the one global supply chain to ever endanger it for paltry Taiwan. In
essence, he was saying political risk in the world didn’t really matter, and certainly not compared
with these towering economic incentives.
Third, he (by now shouting) went on to say that nobody really cared where things were
made, that security of supply was an afterthought compared with the imperatives of economic
rationality. Why should Germany buy oil and gas from more politically malleable Qatar and
America, when next-door Russia would do nicely and more cheaply? He said I had never
understood how globalization worked, would have egg on my face in days, and that he looked
forward to laughing, and hung up.
The invasion started the next day. As you might guess, I have yet to hear back from him.
But my frenemy did me a huge analytical favor in laying out the shibboleths of his age,
truisms that were becoming increasingly outmoded. For what he missed was that the age itself has
been changing, rendering the verities of the old age intellectually irrelevant in the new one. For 30
years (1991-2022) the Age of Globalization was predicated upon the truisms that we lived in an
economics-first world, where security of supply was an afterthought, where political risk concerns
were peripheral.
In essence, the status quo powers of the West made a gigantic geostrategic bet that with the
enrichment of the East and the developing world that globalization had wrought, those regions
could be bought off, their non-economic concerns assuaged by their newfound riches. As the
American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson put it: “Men are conservatives when they are …
most luxurious.”
But the “every man being a conservative after dinner” theory does not explain the salient
data points of our new era. Russian President Valdimir Putin made it crystal clear he had
imperatives other than economics in mind when invading Ukraine. Germany’s energy plight after
the invasion painfully refutes the false notion that security of supply is irrelevant, just as the
ongoing jockeying for global primacy between Washington and Beijing makes a lie of the notion
that political risk is peripheral to the world’s concerns.
Indeed, in making sense of the new age of insecurity we must start in the graveyard of the
ruined shibboleths of the old, dying era. We now live in a time where there is a multiplicity of
primary motives for a country’s action; economic imperatives matter, yes, but also political,
national, cultural, historical, and ideological forces guide decision-making, often being of more
importance than a crude analysis amounting to little more than Marxian economic determinism.
Security of supply is a great imperative of our new time; suddenly we care intensely where
our pharmaceuticals come from, our rare earths are mined, our computer chips are made, and the
origins of our energy supplies.
Lastly, the world has at last woken from its holiday from history, its deep intellectual
slumber that political risk was somehow peripheral from governmental and commercial decision-
making, rather than being a central component explaining how the world does (and does not)
work. The historical lens makes it clear that the old era, and the old ways of looking at the world,
no longer explain very much. The companies and countries that grasp the new truisms are going to
have an overwhelming advantage in our new time.
(Source: Arab News)
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OUR NEW ERA OF DEGLOBALIZATION, DEPRESSION, AND WAR

Gordon G. Chang (The author of The Coming Collapse of China.)
“The Russian invasion of Ukraine has put an end to the globalization we have experienced
over the last three decades,” wrote Larry Fink in his March 24 letter to BlackRock shareholders. “We
had already seen connectivity between nations, companies, and even people strained by two years
of the pandemic.”
Fink, who oversees $10 trillion of wealth as the world’s largest asset manager, is right to be
concerned that an era has ended. “Globalization—as promoted by the United States over the past 70
years—has led to the greatest reduction in poverty and the biggest decline in interstate conflict in
human history,” writes Matthew Rooney of the George W. Bush Institute.
So will the world, in Fink’s new era, be less prosperous and peaceful? Many think high levels
of trade—in other words, continued interdependence—will save the day, yet this view is debatable.
“Does trade increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict?” Samuel Huntington, the late Harvard
political scientist, asked in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, his
landmark 1996 book. “The assumption that it reduces the probability of war between nations is, at a
minimum, not proven, and much evidence exists to the contrary.”
Huntington, building on the work of others, pointed out that it is expectation that drives
events. “Economic interdependence fosters peace,” he wrote, “only ‘when states expect that high
trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future.'”
So what is happening in the post-invasion period? The World Trade Organization in April
predicted that merchandise trade would grow 3.0% this year—down from a previous forecast of
4.7%—but admitted growth could be as low as 0.5%.
Last year’s trade volume—the WTO put total merchandise trade at a staggering $22.4 trillion
after growth of 9.8%—set a record, but that figure could decline this year. Last year’s volume was
the result of a sugar high, boosted by one-time government stimulus measures. Resulting
commodity price increases further inflated trade statistics. The factors driving trade in 2021, the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development correctly stated in February, will “abate.”
Projections of increasing trade depend on forecasts of continuing prosperity. There is concern,
however, that a downturn is coming and it will be especially severe. “You’d better brace yourself,”
Jamie Dimon, the influential CEO of JPMorgan Chase, told a financial conference in New York in
early June. He said everyone should expect not “storm clouds”—his previous prediction—but a
“hurricane,” which could be “a minor one or Superstorm Sandy.”
Dimon focused on economic factors for his grim warning, but geopolitics is hitting the world’s
economy as well. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, says the Ukraine war will
“severely set back the global recovery.” The Fund still expects growth but has slashed forecasts for
this year and 2023. “The economic effects of the war are spreading far and wide,” it stated in its
outlook published in April.
The war in Ukraine is already depressing trade. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a
German think tank, reports global trade is falling due to Russia’s February invasion.
The blockage of Black Sea ports is not the only factor inhibiting trade as countries are
beginning to realize that efficient supply chains, stretching halfway around the world, are not
resilient and must be shortened. In a turbulent world, where skies and seas are no longer considered
reliably safe, trade will decline as countries “onshore” or “nearshore,” relocate production inside
their borders or locations close to home. Additionally, food shortages, exacerbated by the fighting in
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Eastern Europe, are persuading governments to ban the export of fertilizer and foodstuffs, thereby
further reducing international commerce.
So what happens when countries begin to trade less? Huntington wrote that if trade partners
“do not expect high levels of interdependence to continue, war is likely to result.”
Huntington’s stark conclusion looks overstated, but it’s clear that the threshold for the use of
force drops as nations see their fortunes delinking.
At the moment, the world focuses on what many call the most important bilateral
relationship, the one between the United States and China. For those who believe trade equals peace,
then everything should be all right. Despite everything, trade between the pair is continuing to
increase. Merchandise trade between them jumped 17.6% in 2021 from the previous year, and in the
first three months of this year volume grew 17.4% over the same period last year.
There are reasons to believe that U.S.–China trade will top out soon, however. For one thing,
Xi Jinping, the especially willful Chinese leader, has been disadvantaging foreign companies in
China in many ways. Already some companies are leaving. In a recent move, Amazon, even
though its Kindle enjoys a 65% share of the Chinese e-reader market, announced it is exiting that
business in China. The retailer is following Microsoft’s LinkedIn, Yahoo, and Airbnb, which are
also leaving that country.
Moreover, since about the end of the first decade of this century, Xi has been using China’s
status as the world’s factory floor to bully others into submission on various geopolitical issues.
He has long endorsed the aptly named “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” an aggressive and militant
approach to others.
During the century’s second decade, these and other policies did not push companies out of
China, but now they are about to do so. As Robert Kelly of Pusan National University in South
Korea has written, “If trading with China means dealing with bullying and accepting Chinese-
imposed limits on one’s foreign policy, then expect many states, including the U.S., will start
pulling back.”
There are indications that Xi is in fact worried. “Countries around the world are like
passengers aboard the same ship who share the same destiny,” he said in April, as he opened the
Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022. “For the ship to navigate the storm and sail toward
a bright future, all passengers must pull together. The thought of throwing anyone overboard is
simply not acceptable.”
Business this year began paying attention to China risk. As Oxford University’s George
Magnus, speaking to CNN, pointed out, “China’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine was
clearly the catalyst for capital to leave China.”
“Investors are ditching China on an unprecedented scale,” CNN reported in late April.
They pulled a record $17.5 billion of portfolio assets—stocks and bonds—from China in March.
The pullback continued a trend evident in February. The U.S.-based Institute of International
Finance pointed out that the outflow was confined to China and not part of a broader flight from
emerging markets.
In this environment, China needs the United States even more. Last year, its merchandise
trade surplus with the U.S. was 58.6% of its overall surplus. The United States, which runs enormous
deficits with China—$355.3 billion last year—does not need China nearly as much. “Because of its
immense scale, wealth, and dynamism, America has matchless potential to preserve many of
globalization’s efficiency gains by substituting domestic competition for foreign competition,” Alan
Tonelson, a Washington, D.C.-based trade expert, told me.
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Moreover, as Tonelson argues, “in an era of intensifying great power tensions, reshoring
needs to be judged not simply on economic terms but for its role in strengthening national defense
and security.”
At one time, Americans thought they should increase interdependence with China. “U.S.
officials should do their best to ensure that this ‘mutually assured economic destruction’ continues,”
Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group wrote in 2010, referring to trade and economic ties between
China and America. Now, the opposite thinking prevails as many realize that trade has
strengthened a hostile Chinese regime and made it even more belligerent. In short, Americans are
coming to the realization that delinking from China and perhaps deglobalization in general are in
their interest.
“We are now living in a totally new era,” Henry Kissinger said in May, perhaps taking his cue
from BlackRock’s Fink. Everyone, therefore, must be concerned the world is moving from one of the
best moments in history to the worst.
(Source: Telos Press Agency)
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Governance
RETHINKING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Salman Abid (Executive Director of the Institute for Democratic Education & Advocacy)
The local government system is directly linked to democracy, governance, accountability,
transparency and access to justice. A fair distribution of resources is essential for social justice. A key
to success is decentralisation of powers and devolution of maximum authority to the grassroots level
to ensure that basic necessities, including service delivery mechanisms, are provided to the people.
Fortunately, these things are enumerated categorically and guaranteed by the constitution and
relevant laws. It is obligatory for the state and its institutions, including local governments, to
perform their duties as envisaged in Articles 140-A and 32 of the constitution.
It is pertinent here to analyse the current situation as little to nothing practical has been
done in this regard. Serious attention has not been paid to the matter by the state mechanisms and
institutions. We have failed to make it our first and foremost priority, resulting in the absence of
constitutional protection, discontinuity in local government system and a failure to devolve
political, administrative and financial powers and authority. That is why local governments have
not been successful in Pakistan for several decades resulting in a fragile relationship between a
citizen and the state.
A democratic setup is incomplete without elected local governments. All Pakistan’s provinces
lack democratic local governance systems. The situation is reflective of a sorry state of affairs and
calls for immediate steps to restore effective and transparent local governments. It is the duty of all
political parties to sit together and come up with a roadmap for setting up effective local
governments. A fresh assessment of the archaic local government system is the need of the hour.
Together the political parties should rethink its basic structure and framework and formulate a local
government policy on modern foundations.
It is alarming to note that the provincial laws dealing with local governments are in
contradiction with the constitutional provisions (Articles 140-A and 32). In light of the 18th
Amendment to the constitution, the federal government has devolved the subject to the provinces.
However, the provincial governments have not devolved enough powers to the local level. In terms
of holding elections, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is in the lead, having completed the local government
polls in two phases. In the other provinces, the process is under way.
In Sindh, major political parties, namely the Pakistan Peoples Party, the Muttahida Qaumi
Movement and the Jamaat-i-Islami argued long over the proposed local government laws. The
opposition parties contended that three kinds of powers had not been properly devolved to the
urban local governments and had been withheld by the provincial cabinet or the chief minister.
After lengthy discussions, they are on the same page now with written agreements drawn up
recently. It is hoped that things will improve and that the people of Sindh will be able to have a
better local government system.
In the Punjab, the Local Government Act of 2015 was amended in 2021 by the Pakistan
Tehreek-i-Insaf government. In some ways the 2021 Ordinance is considered better. In the 2015 Act,
a lot of the business was in the hands of service providing companies and autonomous authorities
headed by the chief minister instead of local governments. Many of the companies and authorities
have now been abolished. The remaining entities have been made subservient to the local
governments. The 2021 Ordinance has created smaller local government units – community and
village councils – that will be directly funded from the provincial exchequer. For the first time,
mayors and deputy mayors will be directly elected. Election to seats reserved for peasants, labour,
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women, youth and minorities will also be by direct vote. General councillors will be inducted
through proportional representation. Seats have also been reserved at the district level for the
disabled and for traders.
A five-member forum named Mohallah Council in urban area and Panchayat Council in rural
area has been introduced. Two of the members will be women. Their members will be nominated by
community and village councils. Under the 2021 Ordinance, local governments will spend 30
percent of the development budget allocated by the provincial government.
The fall of the PTI-led coalition government in the Punjab has created uncertainty regarding
the future of the 2021 Ordinance. It is not immediately clear whether the law will be further
amended.
Provincial governments and their members, regardless of party affiliation, consider local
governments ‘dangerous’. They continue to pose hurdles in the smooth functioning of the local
government system. Bureaucracy is another obstacle to the smooth functioning of local
governments. It always wants to keep maximum power, authority and decision making in its
own hand.
This year we were hoping to have local government elections according to notified election
schedules. However, some of the major political parties are now demanding general elections.
Several political pundits are predicting general election during the current year, leaving no room for
local government elections in three provinces. A postponement of local government polls will be
deplorable in that it will continue to prevent public welfare through local governance structures.
The following ideas should be considered by all stakeholders to strengthen our local
government systems:
One, the constitution should be amended to protect the local governments and provide a
mechanism for fresh elections within 90 to 120 days upon dissolution of a local government. Two,
elections to national assembly, provincial assemblies and local government institutions should be
held simultaneously. Three, the federal government should ensure that local governments in each
province function as per the provisions of the constitution. Four, political parties and the civil
society should come up with a comprehensive roadmap to provide an effective strategy for localised
governance and devolution of powers.
(Source: TNS)

WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?

Sher Ali Khalti
The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has issued a notification postponing local
government elections in 17 districts of the Punjab following an order of the Lahore High Court
(Multan Bench). Earlier, the elections were scheduled to be held in May-June this year.
“Local government is the third tier of democracy. A democracy cannot flourish without
local governments,” says Arshid Mirza, the executive director of Baidarie, an NGO that works for
the socio-economic empowerment of the marginalised, the vulnerable and excluded segments of
the society.
Mirza says that local governments are nurseries for all democratic structures. He says strong,
decisive, dedicated and committed leadership emerges from elected local government systems.
Furthermore, this leadership is trained on ideological basis. An absence of elected local
governments, he says, manifests a disregard for the spirit of democracy. He adds that it is due to the
delays in establishing the third tier of governance that the processes of development and good
governance comes to an abrupt stop at the local level.
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Mirza says local representatives are more accessible to their voters than members of the
provincial and national assemblies. It is for this reason, he says, that local governments are more
responsive and the marginalised sections of the society including women and minorities look up to
them for resolution of their day-to-day problems. He says given that women constitute half of the
population, they should be part of all decision-making processes. He says an absence of functional
local governments affects them.
Mirza says in Pakistan, politicians and bureaucrats have traditionally failed to strengthen the
local government structures. He says the bureaucrats don’t understand the problems faced by the
people at the local level. “Those who are in power and have authority consider local representation a
burden. Local governments are considered a threat to the status quo,” he says. Additionally, Mirza
says, common people don’t have access to civil servants, including deputy commissioners and
assistant commissioners.
“In this way, the problems of ordinary people remain unaddressed. Thus, the citizens’
confidence in local governments starts waning off.” Local government offices, field offices, union
councils and the like are run by government officials instead of elected representatives. Mirza says
that civil servants in these offices lack the necessary training to perform their duties. “They must be
given appropriate training so that they can be of benefit to the people they are meant to serve.”
Analysts say the unusual political situation is not helping the cause of local government
elections in the Punjab. For their different reasons, neither the government nor the opposition seem
interested in strengthening the third tier of governance.
Anwar Hussain, the executive director of Local Councils Association of the Punjab (LCAP),
says that local governments are more empowered in established democracies. Unfortunately, he
says, that is not the case in Pakistan. He adds that elections to form local governments cannot be
delayed for long.
Article 140-A of the constitution states that “each province shall, by law, establish a local
government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority
to the elected representatives of the local governments”. Hussain says that according to the Article
140-A, local councils should be able to make their own decisions and be able to finance their projects
on their own. But the local government systems have been fragile in the country. Using an example
to illustrate his point, he says that in 2015 local government elections were held on the orders of the
Supreme Court but significant powers were not transferred to elected representatives.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where local governments completed their tenure in 2020, Hussain
says, a year and a half was wasted by the KP government before holding fresh elections. In
Balochistan and Sindh, the local governments completed their tenures in January 2020. And yet,
elections have not been held so far.
In the Punjab, the Punjab Local Government Ordinance will expire in June 2022. The election
was originally scheduled to be held on June 9. Now, a stay order has been issued by the High Court
against the process. It remains unclear whether the local government elections will be held at all.
Hussain suggests that the local government elections should be held simultaneously with the
general elections. He says that that the proposal was discussed in a meeting with representatives of
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
(PML-N). According to the said proposal, the Election Commission of Pakistan would have to hold
an election within 90 days following the completion of the tenure of a local government. He says
that if local government elections are not held within the time limit, it should be considered a
violation of the constitution. (Source: Profit)
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INDUSTRY 4.0 IN PAKISTAN

Dr Imran Batada (CTO & director, Centre of Information Technology at IoBM)
Industry 4.0 can be called the Fourth Industrial Revolution that introduces relevant
improvements to be integrated into smart and future factories. This will lead to the fusing of the
digital and physical world. Additionally, industry 4.0 will lead to improved productivity, efficiency,
potential effects, economic opportunities, and social opportunities.
Global economic growth will mean that even production costs will decrease, and people will
be able to access goods and services at an affordable price. People will advance in various aspects
and be able to make sound decisions in an instant.
In Industry 4.0, IT is used to make work easier. This leads to great automation of production
and has a huge potential to offer amazing improvements in manufacturing industries in Pakistan.
The world is growing, and many changes are taking place. What seemed viable ten years ago may
not be viable at the moment. Different stakeholders are looking at how new technologies will help to
jumpstart their companies and even boost productivity. However, some stakeholders are still slow
in adopting such technologies due to their different perceptions.
There are different components involved in it. However, they haven’t been developed fully;
some are still in the initial stages. Those that have been in existence for some time have proven to be
game changers in the industrial world. IT is going to take the world to another level. However, there
is a need for a revolution in the educational system, so that students can learn how to take up
various technologies. Also, companies should be able to train their workers on how to use the
various technologies to improve their productivity.
First, there is the cyber-physical system, which comprises computerized and physical
processes. It requires modification to ensure the input of relevant controls and images in the system.
Thereby, the CPS will provide easier information access, prevention, maintenance, and easy
decision-making. Second, there are cloud systems. In this, data will be stored in a virtual server.
Therefore, information access will be able to be availed on different platforms at one’s comfort.
However, this will be in a diverse form when it reaches the industrial level.
The third one is machine-to-machine communication. This will ease the process of direct
communication between wired or wireless devices. This technology allows communication from one
channel to another. There will be more revenue streams while maintaining the operational costs for
the benefit of the business. Fourth is the internet of things. This is a concept that includes the
combination of various technologies based on physical assets/things and the internet. Thereby, with
IoT, there is the interconnection of physical devices such as vehicles, normal buildings, and other
devices. On the other hand, the internet of services is a combination of internet and services.
The fifth one is smart manufacturing, which aims at how production is undertaken in the
factories. Smart factories have processes of great importance to our future production. There is also
big data and data mining. For utmost benefit, there will be a need for high processing power, good
analysis, and management of data. There is also robotics that will help enhance the work
environment. Artificial intelligence will play a role in the development of robotics teams. For
example, humans won't undertake repetitive functions, producing high-quality products, and
increasing competitiveness as compared to areas with cheaper labour. This is important because
people can focus on new inventions and use their time to do more valuable things.
The seventh one is augmented reality. This is a technology that provides a composite view of
an image; it can help promote products and services, launch great marketing campaigns, collect
unique user data, boost productivity, and complex manufacturing. AR can then be used in glasses,
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the medical field, mobiles, the entertainment industry, tourism, education, and safety. It will bring
great development to the world.
Additionally, through simulation, people will be able to view new realities in real-time.
Augmented reality can help different industries such as health, schools, factories, etc. The eighth one
is enterprise resource planning, in which the information systems are designed to bring together all
kinds of processes and data in real-time. This will help integrate all the organizational processes.
Most companies are embracing ERP for the smooth running of their activities. Also, new startups are
readily embracing the ERP system to jumpstart and succeed in their different activities.
In Pakistan, digital transformation is greatly being embraced due to the interaction of users on
various platforms. The industrial revolution will play a major role in the growth of Pakistan's GDP.
This is because different industries like the manufacturing industry will be boosted to enhance
production. Information transmission will also be easier as the relevant stakeholders can get the
intended message.
Also, digitization is making it easier to perform some functions. Teams can collaborate on a
project when in different areas. Therefore, efficiency is also increasing by a high percentage. Pakistan
will be one of the major adopters of Industry 4.0 opportunities that will help build the area and
make residents’ lives better. The organizational resources can now be used well for the full
functioning of the factory.
For Pakistan to prosper based on Industry 4.0, there will be a need for some reforms, new
startups, and inventions that will help it to be fully embraced in different sectors like manufacturing,
production, products and services, supply chain, and value chain, and much more. The growth of a
country’s GDP means the improvement of service provision in the country and regions. However,
thorough research still needs to be done to ensure that the available opportunities are taken
advantage of. Globally, Industry 4.0 is being embraced readily and Pakistan shouldn’t be left out.
(Source: The News)
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History
REMEMBERING SIX DAYS OF WAR
Dr Murad Ali (Assistant professor at University of Malakand)
Some events have such profound implications and legacy that they leave an indelible mark on
history. The Six-Day War fought June 5-10 in 1967 is one such episode.
Also known as the June War, the 1967 Arab–Israeli War or the Third Arab–Israeli War was
fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states primarily comprising Jordan, Syria, and
President Nasser’s Egypt. While there is a long background of how hostilities escalated to a full-scale
war, this Armageddon which lasted merely for six days has had unprecedented implications for the
region and beyond. If Arabs were led by charismatic Nasser, Israelis were guided to victory by
inscrutable Moshe Dayan, defence minister during the war, who was also a fluent speaker of the
Arabic language.
In the early morning of June 5, 1967, the Israeli air force attacked air bases throughout Egypt
and destroyed most of the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground. One author has
described the scene in these words: “At 7:10 on the morning of Monday June 5, 1967, Israel Air Force
planes took off for their targets deep in Egyptian territory. The June 1967 War began with the first
strike on Egyptian military airfields (Operation Moked), whose success meant that Israel had
rendered most of its main enemy’s air power useless for the rest of the war. Within half an hour,
only Israeli planes were operating in Egyptian skies”.
On June 5 – the first day of the war – Egypt lost 300 of its military aircrafts and 60 airplanes
vanished from Syria’s inventory. Israel destroyed 35 Jordanian and 16 Iraqi planes while it lost only
19 of its 400-strong fleet. In addition, the armed forces of the Arab states were decimated. Egypt lost
12,000 men and 80 percent of its air force and armor, Syrian losses were 2,500 killed, and the
Jordanian army was temporarily put out of action as a fighting unit.
Egypt and its other Arab allies not only faced huge casualties on the battlefield but also
surrendered huge chunks of territory to Israel. Although the Arabs simply outnumbered the Israelis,
they could not match them on the battlefield.
The conflict was a decisive triumph for the Israeli military and “a humiliating disaster for the
Arab forces, and a shattering blow to Nasserism”. The Zionist state's resounding victory included
the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the iconic capture of the Old City of
Jerusalem and Golan Heights. Jordan not only lost the West Bank, which had been its most
productive agricultural region, but it was also deprived of the key tourist attractions of Jerusalem
and Bethlehem.
While the Golan Heights did not carry a huge economic loss for Syria, Israel’s occupation of
this strategically prized location brought the Israeli forces within easy striking capabilities of
Damascus. In his autobiography ‘The White House Years’, Henry Kissinger states that “the new
territory seized was three times the size of Israel itself”. This illustrates the magnitude of Israel’s
success over its opponents and its increased geostrategic and security significance for the US in the
years following 1967.
During the conflict as well as in the post-1967 war era, Washington made two basic
judgments: to provide Israel with unprecedented diplomatic, military, and economic support, and to
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use the occupied territories of the Sinai, West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights as “bargaining
chips to exchange for peace, recognition, and security from the Arab neighbours”.
During the war, various Arab countries including Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Algeria, and
Egypt announced the severing of diplomatic relations with the US. While Egypt was already
enjoying cordial relations with the Soviet Union, the result of the war enhanced their cooperation. To
enable the Egyptian military to restore its ego, reputation, and war capabilities, “the Soviets
increased their military mission in Egypt to several thousand advisers, making Egypt completely
dependent on the Soviet Union for its military survival”.
Although there was backdoor communication between Cairo and Washington on how to
strike a peace deal with Israel, the two sides could not agree on the terms and conditions. Overall,
this was a period when Egypt was firmly in the Soviet camp and ties between Cairo and
Washington remained cut off until these were restored in 1974. Israel’s overwhelming victory over
its Arab opponents and the occupation of its enemies’ territories put it politically, diplomatically and
strategically in a strong situation. The triumph of Israel was “an American gain as well, since both
Egypt and Syria were close allies of the Soviet Union and their defeat was considered a major blow
to Kremlin’s prestige in the region”. The conflict was “a disaster of great proportions for Moscow,
and a commensurate gain for the United States” at the height of the Cold War.
The 1967 war brought unprecedented changes to the region and foreign policies of key states.
On the one hand, the war and its aftermath brought the US and Israel further closer. On the other
hand, after realizing its military defeat, Cairo’s foreign policy also witnessed dramatic transformations
in the years following the conflict. After realizing that only the US has the power to bring Israelis to the
negotiating table, president Sadat of Egypt endeavoured to get US attention and made some
diplomatic gestures culminating in breaking the diplomatic stalemate between the two countries.
To appease the US, in July 1972 Sadat abruptly expelled most of the 20,000 members and
advisers of the Soviet military mission working in Egypt. It was the beginning of the end of the
Soviet-Egypt bonhomie and the onset of a new era in the US-Egypt bilateral ties. After recalibrating
its foreign policy and realigning its relations with the superpowers, slowly and gradually Cairo
strengthened its ties with the US because it had declared a complete cessation of diplomatic relations
with the US following the 1967 war where the US had fully backed Israel.
Surprisingly, Egypt’s bilateral ties with the Soviets became strained within a few years after
the death of president Nasser in 1970. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel, the Soviet
Union fully supported Egypt both materially and financially by sending men, aid and
ammunition. At one stage Brezhnev even threatened to intervene on behalf of Cairo if Israel
violated the ceasefire. However, after the war, Moscow-Cairo ties swiftly deteriorated. While US-
Egypt ties were consistently improving, Cairo’s relations with Moscow became increasingly tense
during these years.
In September 1981, President Sadat severed ties with the Soviets as the Egyptian government
accused Moscow of interference in its domestic affairs and in subversive activities aimed at
undermining Sadat's leadership concerning the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Bilateral ties between
Cairo and Moscow were restored in 1984 during the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.
(Source: The News)
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DISTORTING AND ERASING PAK-INDIA HISTORY

Mushtaq Soofi
That history can be distorted and erased needs no proof as it happens before our very eyes in
the subcontinent especially in Pakistan and India.
The diverse past haunts us. The two largest communities, Hindu and Muslim, want a
sanitised version of their chequered past. Each community is driven by a desperate desire to
highlight the wrongs it suffered and cover up the wrongs it did. For such a project to succeed, one
needs to distort and erase the history as the intention is not to right the wrongs or forgive the past
wrongs. The purpose on the contrary is to hold the past as justification for glorifying oneself and
demonising one’s rivals. The process of distortion and erasure involves tangible and intangible
aspects. Excavation sites, monuments, buildings point to the former and collective unconscious,
historical memory, languages and culture to the latter. The temper of the times unambiguously
shows that both the communities brazenly tinker with the tangible and intangible past. But let’s first
pan to India.
Historians believe that the Indian society had strength; magnanimity which enabled it to
accept and include in its fabric all the disparate elements that shaped it. Post-Harappa society didn’t
believe in human equality because of its caste system born of hostile interaction between Indus
valley people and newly arrived Aryans. But it found a way to square with diversity through the
way of co-existence. It defined castes and assigned them specific professions. Each caste or
community thus created was allowed to have its exclusive existence within its specified sphere
while interacting with others which was an inescapable necessity.
Social diversity that underpinned the Indian society has been as great as the geographical
diversity found all across the subcontinent. It has socially and culturally been enriched by diverse
races, peoples, faiths, languages and cultures.
Strangely, with the advent of modern epoch, we witness the emergence of a revivalist
movement spearheaded by a section of Hindu intelligentsia which has now morphed into full-
blown ideological war against the plurality of historical influences that defined Indian society. Its
traditional strength is touted as its weakness and its inclusiveness as destructive for the Hindu
majority. Now the emphasis on purity implies efforts to purge the Indian society of extraneous
influences.
Purity and indigenousness are supposed to envisage a new Hindu dawn shorn of all foreign
elements epitomising the upper caste glory.
Talking of the findings of those ‘who study plate tectonics’, Wendy Doniger says something
quite relevant in her book The Hindus. “...Not just the land but people came to India from Africa,
much later; the winds that bring monsoon rains to India each year also brought the first humans to
peninsular India by sea from East Africa in around 50,000 BCE. And so from the very start India was
a place made up of land and people from somewhere else. So much for “immemorial.” Even the
ancient “Aryans” probably came, ultimately, from Africa. India itself is an import, or if you prefer,
Africa outsourced India”, she writes.
Currently the Hindutva (Hindu hood) espoused by upper castes is in full swing ready to
grind anything that appears non-Hindu forgetting that purity is a product that has never been found
in the subcontinent. The word ‘Hindu’ itself implies acceptance of impurity. It’s derived from the
name of the river Sindhu. Persians, Greeks and Arabs called the people living this side of the river
Sindhu Hindu. S changed into H. In ancient times ‘Hindus’ didn’t know that they were Hindus. So
much for the purity. They even borrowed gods, goddesses and several religious practices from
Harappa civilisation. Black or blue colour of the painted deities is an incontrovertible proof. Dark
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skin couldn’t be a symbol of Arya who prided themselves on their fair complexion. As to the Arya,
against all the solid evidence found Rig-Veda (composed in Punjab) and other scriptures, whole new
“Out of India theory” has been manufactured to assert that Aryans were indigenous to the
subcontinent and Indo-European languages branched out from India.
Another pseudo theory holds that most of the contemporary languages in this region are
based on or derived from Sanskrit which is considered to be emblematic of Brahminical literary
culture. Sanskrit as the very name indicates, means perfected and manufactured.
Sanskrit makes sense when juxtaposed with Prakrit, the natural speech. Which could be older,
a perfected language or natural language? Do we need another Panini from Taxila to tell us which
one has a longer history? But Hindutva spin masters still propagate that Sanskrit, a manufactured
language, is mother of almost all peoples’ languages which have their roots in Prakrits. The assertion
rests on vocabulary borrowed from Sanskrit. If borrowings are the measure of origins of a language,
then one can comfortably claim that Punjabi and Sindhi languages are offshoots of Arabic.
The major problem Hindutva intelligentsia face is the invasions of India by Muslim Arabs and
Turks which mark the start of a new era. Notwithstanding the death and destruction invasions
cause, this painful process unleashes new social forces and welds different strands of diverse
cultures which result in a historical development pregnant with new possibilities.
Hindutva forces in India currently at the crest of their political power are dealing with the
material and immaterial manifestations of a culture born of Hindu-Muslim interaction with
unprecedented ferocity. They demolished the 16th century Babri mosque in Ayodhya which was
built, Hindus believe, at the site of Ram Janambhoomi, the birth place of the Lord Rama. It’s a
historical fact that invaders built their own monuments on the sacred sites of vanquished people as a
sign of their power. Invaders after destroying cities built new cities on the ruins of the old ones.
Lahore, Multan and Delhi are a few examples. Now should we raise the cities to the ground we live
in? Such sites are in thousands. Drive against shared culture is expressed in the efforts to spin a new
nationalist narrative on historical events and personages involving Hindus and Muslims.
Muslim names of cities and town are being changed. Prithviraj Chauhan is being projected as
mightier than Muhammad Ghori. Emperor Aurangzeb is depicted as so full of hatred that he had no
Hindu general in his army. Notwithstanding his narrow-mindedness and bigotry, Aurangzeb
employed the largest number of Hindu commanders in his army and had Hindu blood in his veins.
If the Indian society succeeds in cleansing its flesh of all non-Brahminical influences, it would end
up as a bone dry land hit by drought.
After the emergence of Pakistan, our elite comprising civil and military bureaucracy,
landlords and nascent industrialists faced a real dilemma; how to reconcile the present with the past.
The question arose from the simple fact that the state was new but the society it inherited
was old having history of thousands of years. The situation was exacerbated by another peculiar
factor; the foundational principle which provided raison detre for the state’s existence was rooted
in a faith that had nothing to do with the distant past of the region. Another element that
complicated the case further was that Pakistani society shared the past with what it separated
from; India, the enemy. The ideologues of the new state bereft of a broad historical vision opted
for a shortcut; denial of history. What didn’t belong to their faith didn’t simply exist, they
pretended. They deliberately tended to forget both specificities of their own society and what they
shared with India while being part of the subcontinent. They did not even understand properly
what set their region partly apart from the rest of India.
Amaury De Riencourt has something relevant to say in his The Soul Of India: “It was a
strange fact that, long before the birth of Christ, the Indus Valley, birthplace of Indian culture, had
become an impure land. Along with the Punjab beyond the Sutlej, the holy land of the Vedas had
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been repeatedly overrun by barbarians and had become unholy, soiled ground for all orthodox
Brahmins, totally unfit for their permanent residence. Subsequent invasions did not improve
matters. From then on, Hindu India proper started east of the Sutlej and Sarasvati rivers leaving out
of Indian perimeter Afghanistan (White India), Baluchistan, Sind, and the western Punjab (roughly
the area covered by modern Pakistan)”. Even this view of history isn’t accepted by the ruling elite
though some Pakistani scholars have tried to push this point. Acceptance means; 1, owning of
Harappa/Indus Valley civilization which despite being free of orthodox Brahmanical stranglehold is
considered non-Islamic, even anti-Islam, 2, in the post-Harappa society even if importance of caste-
based social structure is brushed aside, one still has to deal with the lingering vestiges of Harappa,
Jainism and Buddhism which were practiced here. In the conditioned Pakistani imagination all the
diverse elements of the past society are lumped together and declared Hindu or non-Muslim, at
least. When the Babri mosque was demolished by Hindutva mobs in Ayodhya in 1992, Muslim
mobs in Lahore retaliated by vandalizing and destroying an ancient Jain Mandir (Jain temple)—
which is being rebuilt these days--.
The charged mobs utterly failed to differentiate between a Hindu temple and Jain temple
displaying outlandish ignorance of their cultural history. Harappa whose excavation pushed the
history of the subcontinent thousands of years back and led to the discovery of a highly
sophisticated civilization is in ruins and as yet it is not included in the list of UNO World Heritage
Sites due to official indifference. It speaks of criminal neglect of our heritage prompted by ill-
conceived ideological constructs. It’s not that Punjab was unaware of historical significance of
Harappa prior to colonial ingress.
Poet Shah Murad (died 1702) says in one of his verses: “Wake up if you are still asleep and get
your act together / Collect the seals/stamps from Harappa and get them evaluated by the
evaluators (sutta ain ta jag, amal smaalh kay / Harappay muhraan pa saraaf dikhaal kay)”. We have
invaluable historical assets but we can’t own them. That’s what the officially peddled distortion of
history leads to.
Since Muslim separatism is considered to be the foundation on which the state has been
erected, our official history starts with the seventh century Arab invasion of Sind and 11th century
Turk invasion of Punjab. After the establishment of foreign Muslim rule and conversion of sizable
number of lower castes, a fundamental change occurred in the Muslim outlook: their homeland
(Janam bhoomi) remained the same but their centre of faith (Punniya bhoomi) shifted to the Middle
East, Arabia, to be more exact. Interestingly, Islam neither prohibits tribal affiliations nor abhors the
love for homeland. But in Indian context a peculiar version of faith developed and was propagated
under the influence of Turks and Iranians. The civilized Arabs, a relatively peaceful and trading
community in Sindh and south Punjab, “were superseded by the tough ‘Romans of Islam’ the dour,
uncultured Turks of Central Asia,” writes Riencourt.
The ruling Turks generally looked down upon things Indian which kept them away from the
process of indigenization despite their own cultural poverty. Exceptions were there like Emperor
Akbar and Prince Dara Shikoh, and a number of enlightened mystics and saints. Consequently,
alienation from the soil came to be prized as some sort of religious and cultural asset. It visibly finds
expression in the increased display of Middle eastern and Central Asian nomenclatures.
Post-Partition hardline Hindus and hardline Pakistani Muslims have become more rigid in
their outlook; the former reject everything that appears to be Islamic and the latter reject what
appears to be Hindu. The fact of the matter is that due to long historical interaction, one can find
neither a pure Hindu nor a pure Muslim. Despite this Hindus and Muslims have history of
xenophobia.
Alberuni (11th century) in his marvelous Tahqiq-e-Hind mentions the xenophobia of Hindus
and their contempt for alien things, and Malechhas (Foreigners/ Barbarians). The outlook not only
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remains unchanged but has hardened especially in recent times. Muslims have their own brand of
xenophobia which may be called xenophobia in reverse; they have nothing but contempt for what is
indigenous. In order to deal with things alien and Malechhas,the hardline Hindus have gone into a
state of denial. Against all the historical evidence, they deny and distort their past history.
The strategy of hardline Muslims in Pakistan too revolves around denial and erasure of
history; they pretend as if people here lived in dark ages before the Muslim invasions. When they
are faced with the material evidence that contradicts their hollow claim, they try to destroy it.
Hundreds of historical sites and monuments of pre-Muslim eras have been vandalized and
destroyed. Names of scores of cities, towns, street and roads have been changed to erase our non-
Muslim past. The core of the problem is diversity that keeps the entire region rattled and unsettled.
Our ideological efforts here to suppress the phenomenon of diversity created by historical
conditions has led to intellectual and spiritual impoverishment, and eventually to self-loathing. We
are now a deculturated tribe alienated from the past and the present in search of an imagined future
which is rootless.
(Source: Dawn)

BHUTTO ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mushtaq Gaadi (Professor at QAU Islamabad))
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (BBZ) has started his official career in the same position as his
grandfather, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ZAB). Given the geo-strategic challenges BBZ faces, it might help
to revisit and reconsider the original thoughts of ZAB on sovereign equality and pragmatism in
foreign policy that he so eloquently articulated in his book ‘The Myth of Independence’. The book
was written in 1969, an odd period of crisis in Pakistan’s foreign policy. It was published by Oxford
University Press and well received by Western policy circles and academia. Numerous academic
reviews of the book were published in several journals.
The prose of the book is lucid, and seamlessly interlaces the passionate poetics of world
politics and the steady logic of international relations. Interestingly, many of his future insights of
world affairs are astounding. For example, he daringly predicts that US-China relations will witness
“a turn in events in the middle seventies…. the intensity of the United States-China confrontation
can not endure beyond the seventies.” His other three projections are also worth alluding to. They
include the emergence of China as a paramount global power, the relative rise of a united Europe as
a new power block and, lastly, the gradual weakening of the erstwhile Soviet Union. (The
disintegration of the Soviet Union was perhaps unimaginable in the milieu of the late 1960s). His
views on the dangerous consequences of the waning of the cold war are also closer to present reality.
The core issue of the book, however, revolves around the question of how weaker states
should conduct their foreign policy in the age of ‘Global Powers’. Interestingly, notwithstanding his
deep fascination and commitment to the idea of sovereignty, he appears to be more of a staunch
realist in his approach towards international relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy. For example,
he asserts that “history has not, so far, blessed any part of mankind with absolute tranquility.”
Similarly, he underlines the fact that smaller and weaker states of the post-imperial era are
confronted with the stark reality of sovereign inequality. The whole concept of ‘Great Power’ has
been changed after the emergence of ‘Global Powers’, which are unprecedented in terms of their
military, economic, territorial, and technological prowess.
His recommended conduct of foreign policy with a ‘Global Power’ is neither populist nor
pessimist. The underlying message is that the independence of foreign policy lies in neither
international isolation nor head-on collision with a ‘Global Power’. Rather, he argues that any
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meaningful chance of exercising independence in relations to a ‘Global Power’ is only possible by

acquiring objective knowledge of their hard interests and keeping in mind the fluidity of
international conflicts. Indeed, he vehemently criticizes old dogmas and lazy habits, subjective
conclusions, predetermined positions, and one-dimensional diplomacy in international relations and
foreign policy.
His three directions about the dealing of weaker states with a ‘Global Power’ are very
instructive and worth pondering. First, he emphatically suggests an utmost avoidance of head-on
collision with a Global Power. Except for certain unavoidable instances, an outright confrontation
with a ‘Global Power’ is highly dangerous and hence counter-productive to the interests of weaker
states. In his own words, “It is safer and more prudent to avoid a head-on collision with a ‘Global
Power’… It is wiser to duck, detour, step aside, and enter from the back door.” He further
illuminates, “The simple fact of the matter is that, in the long run, a Global Power is not likely to be
outwitted, so it is better for a small nation to take a realistic attitude and evolve both policy and
strategy on rational rather than on subjective lines.”
Second, in the case of unavoidable conflict, he suggests adopting the method of insulating or
putting aside the point of conflict to establish working equilibrium and assume normal and friendly
ties with a “Global Power….This would enable the state in question to enjoy rational latitude in
maintaining better relations with those Global Powers whose interests coincide with its own.”
Third, as a point of caution, weaker states must not completely align themselves with the total
interests of a ‘global power’. Rather, under no circumstances should their bilateral relations assume
the character of multilateral obligations. In other words, bilateral relations of weaker states with any
global power must not become a liability in terms of their relations with other nation-states. This
principle is especially true in the context of Pakistan’s relations with America and China – the two
bigger global powers increasingly drifting towards mutual confrontation and hostilities.
The book also offers curious insights about the fact of physical geography and the role of
neighbourhoods in shaping the foreign policy of any country. It asserts that “many relations can be
changed or influenced, but not the reality of the presence of a geographical neighbor. This is a
permanent factor in the shaping of foreign policy.’”
Given this context, ZAB doesn’t see India as a permanent enemy but rather as a jingoistic
neighbor that is incapable of accommodating the legitimate interests of Pakistan. He grudgingly
says that Indians are not able to recognize “that the existence of Pakistan that keeps India in one
piece…. If the evenly balanced scales of Pakistan tilt one way or the other, India’s equilibrium
cannot remain unaffected.”
His second observation, that the US would never give preference to Pakistan over India, is
also worth noting. In his own words, “neither during the darkest period of United States-Indian
relations, nor during the brightest phase of the United States-Pakistan relations, did the United
States take a stand as an ally of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan disputes.” Hence, Pakistan needs to
keep in mind this stark reality and avoid any kind of triangulation while formulating her foreign
policy towards both India and the United States. Perhaps, similar is also true with respect to China.
It is dangerous and would invite intervention from the United States if Pakistan triangulates her
relations with India and China.
Professor Hafeez Malik, one of the scholarly reviewers of the book in the 1970s, terms ZAB as
a Prince Metternich like character of Pakistani politics who “demonstrates an acute sensibility to the
concept of the balance of power”. Perhaps it is imperative to return to ZAB’s insights of foreign
policy in the present time of crisis. Who else is best placed to do so than BBZ?
(Source: The News)
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International Issues
RETHINKING THE GLOBAL ORDER
Turki Bin Faisal Al-Saud (Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies)
Just as the world was beginning to recover from one of the biggest crises in recent decades,
another one has erupted in Europe. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic underscored our common
humanity, Russia’s war on Ukraine has reminded us of how fragile, interconnected, and
interdependent our world is. As the Chinese say, “All is one under heaven.”
Intensifying great-power confrontations and deglobalization are jeopardizing world peace
and security. New crises seem to be lurking around every corner, but appropriate solutions are
nowhere to be seen – not in the Far East, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Eastern Europe, or Latin America. The popular mood has darkened, reinvigorating
populism, nationalism, Islamophobia, and other atavistic trends that threaten the progressive
achievements humanity has made since World War II.
The Ukraine crisis itself is a symptom of deeper structural problems in the international order.
That order, led by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), has failed to live up to the principles of good
governance enshrined in the UN Charter.
New global orders tend to emerge from major wars. In the case of WWII, the victors created
structures designed to preserve international peace and security. But while our increasingly
integrated world has changed dramatically since the UN’s founding, our organizing principles still
reflect the mentality of the post-war and Cold War era. Within the current framework, a failure to
respond to global challenges is a failure of the entire international community.
Can the system be reformed? Calls since the early 1990s to restructure the UN system – the
avatar for the broader international order – have consistently fallen on deaf ears. Worse, Russia and
China are now using their seats at the helm of the international order to push for a more multipolar
system. Rather than working to reform the current framework, they are challenging its validity.
Humanity’s collective achievements over the past seven decades are a testament to why we
must work together to make the UN system more fair, inclusive, and attentive to people’s needs and
aspirations. Indeed, that was the mission of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2003.
Consisting of 16 eminent figures from different parts of the world, and chaired by former Thai
Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, the panel analyzed contemporary threats to international peace
and security; evaluated how well existing policies and institutions had done in addressing those
threats; and offered recommendations aimed at strengthening the UN and enabling it to provide
collective security for the twenty-first century.
The panel’s final report made clear that all of the UN’s principal organs needed reform,
including the Security Council, which the panel argued should be expanded. Unfortunately, the
Security Council’s veto-wielding permanent members simply ignored the panel’s recommendations,
setting the stage for today’s paralysis and dysfunction.
The Middle East is especially in need of a well-functioning, genuinely representative UN
system. No region has suffered more from the unfair bipolar and unipolar dynamics of the past. We
have been the altar on which the principles of the international order are routinely sacrificed. The
same principles that led to the creation of the State of Israel also led to the Palestinians being
deprived of their homeland and denied their basic rights to self-determination and statehood.
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As the Middle East has gone from one war to another, from one catastrophe to another, and
from one UN resolution to another, justice has continuously eluded it. Every time an Arab, Muslim,
or Middle Eastern issue comes up, the hypocrisy of the great powers that lead the international
order becomes crystal clear.
The leaders of those powers need to come to their senses. Reforming the existing order
requires new thinking by all UN member states, including the Security Council’s five permanent
members. The international order can preserve peace and security only to the extent that it is
equitable and capable of meeting the challenges that humanity faces. Short of that, geopolitical
upheavals will continue to threaten world peace and security.
(Source: Project Syndicate)

A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Dario Velo (Full Professor of Pavia University)
Historical processes are fuelled by real phenomena that develop gradually, until they bring
about changes. Often these phenomena are not perceived by most until they produce significant
changes. Then, symbolic events take on importance, which increases the awareness that “something
is changing”.
In recent weeks, we have witnessed one of these symbolic events, which has made many
aware of a far-reaching change underway.
In the United Nations, a motion condemning Russia’s activity in Ukraine was approved by a
large majority, with 140 votes, without obtaining the approval (votes against and abstentions) of 40
voters. It was not immediately understood that this minority represents over 50% of the world
population and includes countries that are developing the most in the economic, military and
strategic fields.
This vote testifies to the crisis in the representative nature of the UN; a new international
order is emerging and this requires an adaptation of the main international organisations.
History teaches us that in the past, we have already witnessed profound changes in the
international order. The Treaty of Westphalia constitutes a fundamental chapter of modern history;
the logic with which it was drawn up still retains validity today and can contribute to the balanced
development of a new international order. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War,
which had devastated Europe. The European statesmen identified, as a guarantee of order and
security, the balance of power and the limitations to its exercise. The order sanctioned by the Treaty
of Westphalia took reality as its point of reference; the application of the principles agreed upon in
Westphalia should have curbed attempts to break the balance, thanks to the formation of coalitions
capable of acting as a counterweight.
The fundamental ambition of the Treaty of Westphalia and its relevance can be identified in
the very long-term attempt to interrupt a traditional script of history, which pits emerging countries
against those in decline. The latter have always resorted to war to block the growth of emerging
countries, before the balance of power tips in favour of the latter. Many commentators (the most
illustrious certainly being Henry Kissinger) have interpreted the wars fought by the United States on
the borders of China and Russia as an attempt to contain the affirmation of these emerging powers.
A profound difference separates the era of the Treaty of Westphalia from the current era. Then
the Treaty sanctioned a European order and a world order at the same time, this stemmed from the
centrality that Europe had at the time, so that the statesmen of the time assumed that the solutions
valid for Europe would automatically extend to the overall international community.
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This is not the case today. The problem arises of understanding what content a “new Treaty of
Westphalia” valid at world level should have and what content “a new Treaty of Westphalia”
should have, valid for the European continent in a broad sense, in order to contain the Russian
territories in Asia.
The two new Treaties hypothesised here are distinguished more by timing than by general
approach. Logically, a world treaty must precede continental treaties. From the point of view of the
need to resolve the current crisis, a European treaty can precede a world treaty, anticipating its
development.
In both cases, the European Union has a responsibility to play a crucial, very difficult role.
The tragedy of the two world wars, which were actually European civil wars, requires the
European Union to renounce violence, as an instrument of international politics, in favour of the
authority of its own initiative. Switzerland is an example of this alternative.
New treaties are called upon to renew existing international institutions, which are in a crisis
as a result of an original sin. The current international institutions were born in the postwar period
at the initiative of the United States. They were shaped by the United States, which was convinced it
was acting in the interest of all humanity, thanks to the superiority of its democratic system and
vocation for peace and solidarity; this set of notions was derived from those of the Founding
Fathers, who had emigrated from Europe in search of a promised land.
All the US presidents in this postwar period, with different languages but with the same spirit,
claimed America an exceptional role in the world, to represent good. The American model should
have been applied to the whole world as the best, not because it was supported by a hegemonic
power.
The reality is more complex. History has forged different cultures, different religions, different
social models.
This is true whether the rejection of diversity is derived from a missionary spirit, or whether it
is derived from a sovereign vision.
Federalism affirms the principle of union between different people, with mutual respect.
New treaties and new international institutions are necessary to guarantee a fundamental
principle: all countries must contribute to designing and governing the international system. A
country that has not participated in designing an international institution cannot feel represented by
it; the rules will be respected if each country contributes to their definition, with shared procedures.
Western democracy is not the only valid solution, as it may not correspond to the characteristics of a
civilization.
Affirming a world order supported by consensus implies that every community must be
aware of its right to protect its values with constitutional instruments. At this stage of history’s
development, a version of the Treaty of Westphalia shaped on today’s reality is needed, with
international institutions capable of governing a shared order.
(Source: Valdai Club)

BE CLEAR-EYED ABOUT GREAT POWER BEHAVIOUR

Lt. Gen Deependra Singh Hooda (Former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Indian Army’s Northern
Command)
The Russia-Ukraine war is showing no signs of abating. The largest ground war in Europe
since World War II has forced nearly five million people to flee Ukraine, and has displaced another
seven million inside the country. Despite the Russian withdrawal from the northern areas of
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Ukraine, cities in the east and south remain under siege. The mayor of Mariupol has said that about
21,000 residents of the port city have been killed in the Russian invasion."
The Centre for Economic Policy Research estimates that it will cost between $220 billion and
$540 billion to rebuild Ukraine after the war. Accurate figures for military losses are hard to come
by, but it is evident that the Russian military has also suffered severe damage. In addition, World
Bank projections show that Russia’s economy has plunged into recession, with output projected to
contract by 11.2% in 2022.
Experts have given several reasons for the war. The eastward expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Ukraine’s NATO ambitions were viewed as a serious existential
threat by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In a televised address to the nation before the war, Putin
stated that Ukraine never had “real statehood” and that the country was an integral part of Russia’s
“own history, culture, spiritual space.” Any western encroachment into this space would, therefore,
not be tolerated. The ease with which Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and the weak
western response could have influenced Putin to believe that a quick victory was possible through
military force.
All these reasons are valid to some extent, but one underlying cause of this war is the
behaviour of great powers in the international system. The realist school of thought believes that the
international system is anarchic due to the absence of any legitimate authority to regulate disputes
between sovereign States. This induces nation-States to compete for more and more power.
American political scientist John J Mearsheimer put forth the theory of “Offensive Realism”, in
which he argues that “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international
system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense
of rivals… A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.” Great powers will do
everything to weaken other rising powers. This dynamic has been playing out between the United
States (US) and Russia in Europe.
Following the breakup of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the US emerged as the unchallenged
superpower. With a weakened Russia, between 1999 and 2009, 12 Eastern Europe and Baltic countries
joined NATO, moving towards the Russian border. But, as the first decade of the 21st century was
coming to a close, Russia was pushing back to reassert authority over its sphere of influence, with
military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine and cyber-attacks in Estonia and Ukraine.
The US’s focus has also shifted from the global war on terrorism to great power competition.
A reading of the 2015 and 2017 National Security strategies and the 2018 National Defense Strategy
reveals a primary focus on great power competition with Russia and China. President Joe Biden’s
2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance also talks about the changing “distribution of
power across the world” and “growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states.”
Russia invaded Ukraine not because it wanted to occupy territory, but to display its power
and authority over its traditional sphere of influence. The lack of major military victories in the two
months of conflict has provided an opportunity to the US to weaken Russia by getting it embroiled
in a long and bloody war. Apart from crippling economic sanctions against Russia, the US and
NATO have provided more than $3 billion in military aid to Ukraine. Whichever way the war
unfolds, it is clear that Russia will emerge as a much feebler power in the future.
What about the smaller nations? While the world talks about universal respect for
sovereignty, as Thucydides writes in “The History of the Peloponnesian War,”the reality is that “the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
Ukraine is putting up a heroic resistance but will suffer devastating destruction. United
Nations secretary-general António Guterres has warned that rising food and oil prices caused by the
Ukraine conflict “could throw up to 1.7 billion people — over one-fifth of humanity — into poverty,
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destitution, and hunger on a scale not seen in decades.” However, the plight of the underdeveloped
nations will rarely be a reason for initiating a peace dialogue between great powers.
The new power balance, which will emerge after the Ukraine war, will undoubtedly influence
the ongoing great power rivalry between the US and China. It is premature to assess how this could
play out, but the broad aims of the two sides will remain unchanged. China will continue to strive
for regional hegemony while the US will attempt to prevent China from becoming a peer
competitor. In this geopolitical environment, India must be clear-eyed about great power behaviour
and national interests.
(Source: Hindustan Times)

ANOTHER GENOCIDE
Melvin Goodman
A major problem for Biden’s national security team has been trying to match Biden’s random
and spontaneous policy statements toward Ukraine. It typically takes his administration a week or
two to catch up. Prior to the invasion, for example, Biden remarked at a press conference that the US
response to Russia’s use of force would depend on “whether it’s a minor incursion.”
In responding to a more recent question regarding possible Russian use of chemical weapons,
Biden emphasized that it “would trigger a response in kind.” A presidential spokesman quickly
stated that the United States would not be using chemical weapons in return. Even if National
Security Adviser Sullivan genuinely believes the “level of systematic deprivation of life” doesn’t
“rise to the level of genocide,” it’s only a matter of time before Biden makes the call.
The Biden team’s belief that the enormity of Russia’s criminal acts has not reached the level of
genocide puts them on a par with previous US administrations who mishandled major cases of
genocide in the 20th Century. Currently, Biden’s national security wise men presumably believe that
genocidal activity must reach the massive level of death and destruction aimed at Armenians, Jews,
and Tutsi’s by the Turks, the Germans, and the Rwanda government, respectively.
Even then, the Roosevelt administration refused to address the issue of the Holocaust; the
Clinton administration did not engage Rwanda; and it took over one hundred years to charge the
Ottomans with genocide against the Armenians. The failure of the Israelis to support Ukraine,
moreover, puts the lie to “never again”.
In actual fact, the issue of ‘enormity’ has nothing to do with an actual genocide. This week’s
‘Economist’, the most authoritative English-language newsweekly, argued that “Investigators are
like to find that Russian forces should be indicted, even if they have not killed on such a systematic
scale as to have committed genocide.” The Economist has rarely been so obtuse. The key
determinants of genocide relate to ‘intent’; there is no doubt that Putin and his sadistic military are
trying to subjugate a nation and to exterminate members of a specific or definable identity group.
Like the Nazis 80 years ago, the Russians are trying to extinguish Ukraine as an independent
nation. The horrors of Bucha that are being repeated throughout Ukraine certainly resemble the
horrors of Babi Yar, which took place in Kiev, and the wanton destruction in Spain by the Nazi’s
Condor Legion, which was memorialized in Picasso’s ‘Guernica’, the international symbol of
genocide The United States and its Allies even suppressed the truth about Hitler’s Final Solution
during the war. We were bystanders to these genocides, and once again we appear to be bystanders.
(Source: Counterpunch)
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SAVE THE PLANET, BEHEAD THE MILITARY BUDGET

Robert Koehler (Award-winning journalist and nationally syndicated writer)
Peter Isaacson, writing in Fair Observer, seems to be saying … oh my God, democracy is a
cliché, a big sham. I stand up, put my hand on my heart, pledge allegiance to the flag. This is
America, land of the empowered voter. Then I read about our president’s latest budget proposal,
which includes $813 billion for ‘national defense’ – pushing the Pentagon budget’s already record-
setting enormity further into outer space – and I feel myself collapse (yet again) into nothingness.
Why, why, why, as our ecosystem collapses, as millions of refugees flee the horrors of war and
poverty, as the pandemic continues, as World War III and the possibility of nuclear Armageddon
rears its evil head, as the planet trembles, does ever-expanding, global militarism remain our
primary national purpose?
This question stabs me anew every year, as President Whoever announces his latest proposed
military budget, as Congress increases it, as the media shrugs. Every year I hear the voice of George
W. Bush, telling the American public – telling me – not to worry: “Just go shopping.”
So what the hell is going on? Is our military insanity totally the work of the so-called military-
industrial complex? Do Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrop
Grumman, et al., rule the country via their lobbying muscle (which, ironically, is financed by the
military budget for which they lobby)?
That’s only part of it. The mystery is deeper – and, of course, classified. Consider the legacy of
President Eisenhower, who went into office in 1953 speaking against increased militarism, yet was
unable to control the nuclear arms race and expanding Cold War while in office (the CIA, for
instance, helped overthrow progressive regimes in Iran, Guatemala and the Republic of the Congo);
and eight years later, in his farewell address, regretfully sounded the warning about the influence of
the military-industrial complex. This warning, however iconic, accomplished nothing. Waging or
financing war has been the American way throughout my lifetime.
As William Hartung writes: “Perhaps the biggest source of overspending on national defense
is rooted in the US ‘cover the globe’ military strategy, which attempts to sustain the capability to go
anywhere and fight any battle. The United States maintains 750 overseas military bases and
conducts counter-terror operations in at least 85 countries.”
And then, of course, Biden’s proposed budget remains horrifically generous regarding the
country’s nuclear weapons, allotting further billions of dollars to the Department of Energy to
modernize the nuclear triad of ballistic missile submarines, bombers and land-based missiles. Now!
As the world shudders over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s placement of the Russian
nuclear arsenal on high alert. Yet this has not ignited a serious interest, at the national level, to rid
the world of nukes: to disarm. Are we not trapped in a world of insanely limited thinking?
(Source: Counterpunch.org)

GLOBAL EFFORTS TO SOLVE REFUGEE CRISIS

Nagehan Alçi
Turkey hosts more than 4 million refugees, of whom 3.7 million are Syrian. This is a very big
number. With the growing economic and social problems, the situation with the refugees has
become more difficult. It is not specific to Turkey as any country facing such big demographic
movements in a short time faced and will continue to face such problems.
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However, although the problems have been tough from the beginning, Turkey has always
welcomed the people in need. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government has opened its doors
to people trying to save their lives while most of the European countries closed borders and
restricted refugee policies.
Even two weeks ago, we saw how Greek forces forcibly pushed some 94 Syrian refugees, 30 of
whom were children, trapped in an islet in the Maritsa (Meriç) River between Turkey and Greece.
There have been many incidents, such as in Hungary and Greece, in particular in the last 11
years like that. Most of the European states have been quite intolerant of people seeking shelter. That
is the main reason why Turkey is left with such high numbers of immigrants.
That is why I find it rather unfair for Ankara to be blamed by Athens for bad behavior toward
the Syrian refugees. Turkey should keep being friendly to refugees in need and if it changes its
policy, it would be wrong but Greece has not been following a refugee-friendly policy at all and yet
criticizing Ankara about this raises question marks.
Erdoğan recently said in a video message for the Global Parliamentary Conference on
migration, “In fact, countries like us, which are neighbors to the crisis areas, bear the real burden
on the issue of migration and refugees, the developed countries who raise high voices not bear
that burden.”
Although it is difficult to absorb so many people, this should not justify the growing hatred
toward the immigrants. In Turkey, the far-right extremists in the opposition like the Victory Party
(ZP) headed by the academic Ümit Özdağ try to demonize the refugees, which is like playing with
fire.
They create imaginary horrible scenarios, depicting in the near future a Turkey populated
more by Syrians rather than Turks and having real security issues created by those immigrants.
These horror stories do not reflect the facts. The criminal records show that immigrants are not
keener to being engaged in criminal activity; on the contrary, their percentage in police records is
lower than the average.
This is why Erdoğan’s words at the recent conference were very important and meaningful.
He stated that they observed that economic difficulties fueled xenophobia and hostility toward
immigrants all over the world during the pandemic. He added: “Simultaneously, with the economic
crisis triggered by the pandemic, more and more people are forced to leave their lands and homes.
Currently, the number of migrants worldwide has reached 275 million, the displaced persons are
approaching 85 million, and the number of refugees is 30 million. With the ongoing conflicts
between Russia and Ukraine, 5 million have been added to the current number of refugees.”
These numbers are scary. Humanity should find ways to be more tolerant and care about
those people in need. Turkey has always been a good example of that. We should not be poisoned
by the hate speech of some politicians. This global crisis needs global solutions. We should be united
against xenophobia and discrimination.
(Source: Daily Sabah)

SHIFT IN STANCE
Dr Imran Khalid
After almost a year and a half in power, the Biden Administration has finally divulged the
basic contours of its strategic intent towards China.
On May 26, while addressing a session organized by the Asia Society at the campus of George
Washington University, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken gave a rather comprehensive
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exposure to the current thinking in the White House on China. ‘Same old stuff with a more
reconciliatory tone’ is how it can be summarized in one sentence.
Certainly, it was an abridged collection of the key talking points from all the previous
administrations. However, quite conspicuously, Mr Blinken spent a lot of time elaborating the
strategy for domestic technological revival – an indirect indication that the Biden Administration has
a similar approach as Donald Trump to counter the ever-increasing Chinese technological
leadership by strengthening the American domestic technological infrastructure.
Blinken’s tone, not surprisingly, missed the caustic and sarcastic elements that were always an
integral part of the Trump administration’s trademark statements pertaining to Beijing. Blinken has
made it categorically clear that the US does not want any kind of new cold war or a direct war-like
conflict with China. “We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China
– or any other country, for that matter – from growing their economy or advancing the interests of
their people.”
At the same time, he reiterated the much-touted American policy to resort to the use of
force to snub all attempts from a “revisionist” China to redefine the post-World War II liberal
international order. “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international
order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.
Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of
the world’s progress over the past 75 years,”: Blinken bluntly warning China as well as
reassuring US allies that Washington is in no mood to compromise on the existing liberal
international order. “We’ll continue to oppose Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the
South and East China Seas.”
But Blinken did not mention any tangible plan on how Washington was planning to counter
the growing Chinese influence in the global arena. It appears that the Biden Administration is still
unclear about a concrete counter-strategy to push back China’s influence, squeeze China’s
dominance and suppress China’s development space. Interestingly, Blinken mentioned a long list of
the oft-repeated complaints against China in his speech; technology pilfering, corporate malpractices
like espionage, illicit technology transfer, supply chain problems and unequal market access etc.
Contrary to President Biden‘s statement in Tokyo last month where he pledged to intervene
militarily in case Taiwan is attacked by mainland China, Blinken did not use any coercive language
while mentioning Taiwan and its role in the complicated Sino-US relations. He emphatically
reiterated the continued adherence to the ‘One China Policy’.
A cursory appraisal of Blinken’s policy speech on China indicates that the Biden
Administration has learnt some lessons from the failure of the Trump administration’s belligerent
stance on Beijing. The Trump administration tried many aggressive steps – including a trade war,
geopolitical imposition, diplomatic intimidation, technological embargo and other indirect bullying
moves – to corner the Xi regime, but all these measures proved to be inadequate to achieve
Washington’s desired strategic objectives.
Blinken also referred to familiar American rhetoric about internal “repressive” socio-political
inside China – but in a rather soft tone. In a balancing act, while discussing a long list of ragged
complaints, Blinken was quite generous in talking about the potential territories of mutual
cooperation with China including public health issues, climate-related strategy, nuclear
nonproliferation and arms control, global expansion of narcotics networks, growing food insecurity,
and global macroeconomic coordination. In a conciliatory tenor, he pledged that “as we invest,
align, and compete – we’ll work together with Beijing where our interests come together,”
Nonetheless, the much-hyped speech by Anthony Blinken has exposed two fundamental
realities about the Biden Administration’s approach towards China. One, President Biden does not
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want to repeat the mistakes made by Trump by unnecessarily bullying Beijing. There is a realization
in the White House that arm-twisting has proven to be too counter-productive in the last five years
and has ended up inversely harming American interests. The Biden Administration is indirectly
admitting that it cannot change China and its system in the near future.
And two, the Americans have yet not been able to chalk out a tangible strategy on how to pre-
empt the growing influence of Beijing in global politics at large. And this is perhaps the bigger
problem with the policymakers in Washington. Some experts are suggesting the usage of “system
pressure” as the only viable option for the Americans at the moment to contain the Xi regime from
metastasizing its cultural, economic, political and ideological seeds across the globe.
The Biden Administration is likely to buy into this idea of system pressure as a workable tactic
to mollify Beijing. ‘Invest, align and compete’ is the new mantra of the Biden Administration to
realign its strategy towards China. But a lot still depends upon the execution part, particularly the
response of the chronic US allies which can be detrimental in shaping this new phase of very
complicated Sino-US relations.
(Source: The News)

GAME OF POLITICS
Chris Orlet
I once worked with a young woman who would often come to work with a black eye. The
women at work would beg her to leave her husband, but she refused to listen to them. She said that
he was really a nice guy, it’s just that sometimes he drank too much and lost his temper – but he
loved her. She could change him. She just had to get him off the booze. And the drugs.
A lot of people seem to have a similar relationship with the Democratic Party. Sure, they say,
the Democratic Party has lied to us over and over – about stopping Climate Change, about offering
Americans a public option for health care, about fixing our broken immigration system, about
reinstating the assault weapons ban, about getting money out of politics, about passing gun control,
etc., etc., but they are really nice people! They recycle, most of them! They support bike lanes, some
of them!
Sure the Democrats have abandoned the working class and sold out to Wall Street, but it
could be a lot worse! Remember Donald Trump? Remember how he tried to build a wall across the
Mexican Border, much like the wall Barack Obama, Chuck Schumer, and Hillary Clinton voted for?
Yes, the Democrats have conspired to defeat progressive candidates and keep third-party
candidates off the ballots, but they can change!
True, Democrats never met a war they didn’t love, but they are the party of peace! Yes, they
take millions from the military-industrial complex and the pharmaceutical industry, but how else
are they going to get elected so they can stand up to the military-industrial complex and the
pharmaceutical industry? Be real!
The Democrats mean well. And what is the alternative? The Republicans are pure evil.
If they are old enough these Democrats can remember the good times. Long ago, President
Lyndon Baines Johnson – when he wasn’t sending 18 year olds off to die in Vietnam – signed the
Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, he got Medicaid and Medicare passed.
Granted, not much good has happened since then, even when Democrats have been in power,
but it might have been worse. Sure Clinton passed NAFTA and Welfare Reform and the Crime Bill,
laws that the GOP never could have gotten passed, but Obama passed the Affordable Care Act,
which I personally cannot afford, but it made a lot of insurance industry billionaires happy.
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A lot of Democrats have convinced themselves that what the party needs is for progressives to
infiltrate the party – Trojan Horse-style – and once inside they can slowly, decade after decade, fix
the Democratic Party.
The problem with this strategy is you cannot fix the Democratic Party, because it isn’t broken.
It is working exactly as it was intended to work.
One-time Green Party Presidential Candidate Ralph Nader was right when he said the only
way to get the Democratic Party’s attention is to mount a serious third-party challenge from the left.
Nader, once one of the most beloved and respected of American political figures, had his
reputation brutally destroyed for threatening the Duopoly, the status quo. The message was sent
loud and clear. Do not challenge the Democratic Party. We will destroy you.
Sounds like something an abusive partner would say, doesn’t it?
(Source: The News)

CHINA IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Imran Malik (A retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army)
The US compulsion to contain and manage the phenomenal rise of China is getting starker,
grimmer and more urgent by the day. US efforts to circumscribe its sphere of influence and
concomitant strategic reach across the globe appear to be floundering. China, on the other hand,
riding high on its rampaging BRI, has effectively moved across Eurasia into Western Europe, is well
established in the SCAR (BRI-CPEC) and is making substantial ingresses into the GMER and Africa.
Now, it seems to be out-maneuvering US efforts to encircle and confine it to the Indo-Pacific.
In a bold stratagem, of grave geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic import, it has moved
stridently into the South Pacific. It has broken free of the psychological shackles that the policies of
the US and its allies’ (US Island Chain Strategy, QUAD, AUKUS) ostensibly wanted to lay on it. It is
fast emerging as a major player, an alternate center of power in the South Pacific too.
This multipronged Chinese onslaught at the global level is causing serious concern to the US
as it scrambles to retain its increasingly challenged global hegemony. The Ukraine crisis may help it
deal with the BRI in Europe/Eurasia, albeit temporarily. It has mustered India to its ranks and their
national interests converge generally in the SCAR, broadly against China and specifically against the
BRI-CPEC moving through Pakistan. In the Indo-Pacific it has created the QUAD, (Australia, India,
Japan), through which it intends to confine China to within manageable limits.
To be really effective, the QUAD will have to inevitably acquire a significant military avatar
and a tangible political will to employ it. AUKUS, Five Eyes and NATO (?) may need to focus more
intensely on the South Pacific too. It is thus here that the US and its allies are now moving in
decisively to not only halt this Chinese juggernaut but to deny it any major foothold in this very
critical region. Some reports indicate that South Korea and Japan could become part of the QUAD
and the AUKUS, respectively.
Deep geopolitical maneuvering to dominate, control and manage the South Pacific is now the
new normal there.
The South Pacific, aka Oceania comprises at least ten thousand islands. The major sub-
regions are Australasia (Australia, New Zealand), Melanesia (Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands,
Papua New Guinea), Micronesia (Micronesia, Palau, Kiribati, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, Wake Islands), Polynesia (New Zealand, Hawaii, Samoa, Tonga,
French Polynesia) et al.
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Of most importance is not the size of these islands or their populations but the enormous
EEZs they command – a whopping 7.7 million square kilometers of vast, open, rich, ocean space!
Furthermore, their crucial geostrategic locations make them indispensable for any major power
which has pretensions to dominate the region, as was amply demonstrated in WWII.
China’s ingress into the South Pacific gives it immense advantages at the geopolitical level. It
has made serious overtures to some of the major South Pacific Island states/subregions and engaged
them in diplomatic, economic, climate change, trade, tourism, agriculture, security, investment and
other related domains.
Climate change is of immense concern for these Island States as rising sea levels threaten their
very existence. FM Wang Yi is on a whirlwind tour of the South Pacific to develop mutually
beneficial relationships with them. This Chinese move presents options to these Island States other
than those traditionally provided by US-led Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Furthermore, China
is successfully encouraging them to switch to a one-China policy, further crystallizing its evolving
sphere of influence.
At the geostrategic level, this Chinese maneuver wholesomely nullifies the US Island Chain
Strategy – a maritime containment plan first conceived during the Korean War to restrain the
erstwhile USSR and PRC; still valid and applicable. It proposed surrounding the USSR and the PRC
with a series of military/naval bases in the West Pacific on three parallel chains of islands, intending
to project power and restrict sea access (area denial, anti-access!).
Furthermore, two island chains are also being considered in the Indian Ocean to reinforce this
strategy. The Chinese view this as maritime encirclement at the strategic level and appear to have
broken through it. In one fell swoop, they have changed the dynamics and paradigms of the US
Island Chain Strategy and the region’s geostrategic environment. By penetrating deep into the South
Pacific, they have enhanced their strategic reach very considerably and raised possibilities of
acquiring military/naval bases in the region too.
That portends to expanding the potential Pacific theatre of war substantially, causing a pull on
the US-led forces in the Indo-Pacific, bringing the vital SLOCs in the region under its oversight and
positioning itself well to exploit the enormous riches of the South Pacific Ocean! Chinese bases on
the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea now allow its strategic bombers to penetrate
even deeper into the South Pacific. China’s emergence as a genuine Pacific/South Pacific Ocean
power is thus inevitable.
At the geo-economic level, China is making a very profound and unequivocal push into the
resource rich, strategically crucial region. It seeks newer markets and access to the enormous fishery,
raw material and mineral resources of the region. It is a win-win position for both China and the
Pacific Island States. Bilateral trade, climate change, investments, infrastructure development,
tourism, etc are the vehicles for this relationship to develop further. Some analysts see Beijing’s
inroads into the region as stepping stones to the Americas and Antarctica as well. Thus, an economic
stake is being developed for the Pacific Island States in China’s presence in their region.
The Chinese foray down under might have irked the traditional Pacific Ocean powers.
However, if a free and open Indo-Pacific is a sine qua non for co-existence there then the same
paradigms must be applied here too; China and the Pacific Island States must develop their ties
peacefully and without undue external interventions/influences.
The South Pacific must become a region of development, peace and stability and must never
be allowed to degenerate into yet another potential Theatre of War!
(Source: The Nation)
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ANALYSING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS WITH REGARDS TO TAIWAN

Amber Cummings (North American editor at International Relations Today)
China has long considered Taiwan under its sovereign rule as a part of its “one-China”
principle. This claim has been disputed by not only Taiwan but by other actors in the international
system. Previously, the United States has maintained a position of strategic ambiguity; however,
following three of Biden’s statements within the last few months, it appears that the U.S. has been
shifting towards a policy of strategic clarity with regards to the dispute. This clarity is made even
more clear following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the United States has made itself known as a
fierce supporter of Ukraine in this raging conflict. The Biden administration’s emerging policy of
clarity has seemed to transcend single countries and has been representative of their policy towards
all countries.
In a recent visit to Japan, United States president, Joe Biden, promised that the U.S. would
intervene and provide military assistance if China were to invade Taiwan. This statement came as a
surprise to those who were familiar with the United States’ policy of strategic ambiguity towards
China. This strategic ambiguity has the goal of maintaining both safe competition and neutrality
between the U.S. and China, given that they do not cross any boundaries set by the other. Both the
effect of strategic ambiguity and the criteria for boundaries are debatable when considering China’s
view on them.
China appears to not hold the same values of strategic ambiguity as the United States
attributes to it. As stated by Zhao Tong, who is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “In Beijing’s view, the Biden administration has a darker heart than it is willing
to admit.” Arguably, the policy of strategic ambiguity is not as effective as the United States
considers it to be, as China has no trust in the U.S., to begin with.
It has been made explicitly clear by the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, that the United
States is not seeking out a cold war with China. However, there are no promises as to whether or not
the United States would be willing to engage in a “hot” war with China. This type of war is the type
that could occur following a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. The United States would be forced and
willing to provide military aid to Taiwan, as was made especially transparent in Biden’s recent
statement in Japan. China is viewed as a long-term challenge to U.S. foreign policy.
Despite insisting that they do not want a cold war, it is difficult to not see the parallels
between China and the defunct Soviet Union. With the United States and China boasting the largest
economies and militaries in the world, the world situation today appears like the bipolar
international system that prevailed during the Cold War. Each country has a line that must not be
crossed unless the other is willing to go to war. However, it is difficult to define these lines.
Similar to the current Ukraine situation following Russia’s invasion, the lines were also quite
blurry here. Russia cites Ukraine joining NATO as their line that must not be crossed unless the
other actor is willing to go to war. However, NATO was not planning on admitting Ukraine any
time soon. So, what was it that incited Russia to go to war? Even some Russian officials are stumped
by this question. It is therefore unsurprising that this invasion was not foreseen.
Like Russia, China’s lines they draw are also unclear. Likely, even Xi Jinping does not have a
clear grasp on what would incite a full-blown takeover of Taiwan. The United States’ lines are more
tangible when it comes to the Taiwan dispute. If China makes the first move, the U.S. will respond
as required. This can be viewed through the Biden administration’s current policy towards China:
invest, align, and compete. The United States is willing to compete with China if they refuse to align
with the country’s ideas for the modern world.
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This competition has not always meant direct military involvement. In the past, the United
State’s policy of strategic ambiguity has promised to provide Taiwan with the means to defend
itself, but no direct involvement besides that. Under Biden’s administration, this policy has changed
into one of strategic clarity. It is possible to see an additional policy shift with this clarity in strategy,
as the United States no longer limits their means to assist Taiwan in the case of an invasion.
Once again, our attention is drawn back to the parallels between the United States’ relations
with China and Russia. President Biden continues to enforce a new policy of strategic clarity in both
situations. Biden has explicitly stated that he wishes for Putin to pay the price for his unforeseen
invasion of Ukraine. In stating this, Biden hopes that China will receive a similar message for what
the United States’ reaction would be if China were to attack Taiwan.
(Source: International Relations Today)

WESTERN DISUNITY OVER CHINA

Felix Lee (An editor at China.Table)
Last month’s six-day summit marathon of the Western allies — starting with an EU Summit,
followed immediately by the G7 and NATO — has come to an end. At these meetings, the Western
allies were concerned with demonstrating unity against Russia and Putin’s war of aggression
against Ukraine. The heads of state and government succeeded in doing just that. Even Turkey is
now on board and agreed to Sweden’s and Finland’s Nato membership, giving its consent to
strengthening the northern flank.
But there is anything but harmony among the Western countries when it comes to dealing
with another equally difficult actor — China. And even though the focus at all three summits was on
the war in Ukraine and the sanctions on Russia, even the United States had to contritely admit that
any tightening of the sanctions depends on China.
Take the boycott of Russian oil, for example: the US has not bought any Russian oil since the
beginning of the war; and with the exception of Hungary, EU countries want to stop imports from
the aggressor state by the end of the year at the latest. And yet the sanctions are having little effect
because China is buying more Russian oil than ever before — and at 30 per cent below the world
market price.
The US wants to close up these gaps and has therefore proposed capping the price of Russian
oil. Washington is hoping for two effects in particular. Most recently, Russia’s income has risen due
to massive increases in oil and gas prices, despite Western sanctions. A price cap would prevent this.
Moreover, in view of the high inflation rates, a price cap would limit the negative effects on third-
party markets and consumers worldwide. But the same principle applies here: such a price cap for
Russian oil would only work if China were to participate. The Western powers must therefore
approach Beijing.
The push for an import ban on Russian gold also leads back to the US. Russia is one of the
largest gold producers in the world. Such a ban would mean billions in lost revenue for the
Russians. The Europeans would also cooperate. The only problem is that the West buys only a very
small amount of gold from Russia. The major demand countries are India and China. Here too, the
same applies: if Beijing doesn’t cooperate, nothing will happen.
Pressure to align against China
These two examples from the G7 summit in Elmau make it clear how much the West’s actions
now depend on China. When it comes to dealing with China, however, the Western allies are not at
all in agreement.
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On the one side are Great Britain, Canada and, above all, the US, which has long seen China
rather than Russia as its greatest opponent. From the US government’s point of view, the People’s
Republic poses a much greater threat economically, technologically, and militarily. For this reason it
does not shy away from conflict with Beijing.
And indeed, Beijing is currently working against the West. Outwardly, the Chinese head of
state and party leader Xi Jinping has avoided declaring support for Russia. Evidently he does not
want to risk an extension of Western sanctions to China.
However, Xi took the opportunity to rail against the West during the virtual summit of the
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which he hosted shortly before the
G7 summit. Most importantly, he left out any criticism of Putin.
Nevertheless, that doesn’t stop France and Germany from softening their tone in their
dealings with Beijing. The German government in particular wants to avoid an overly
confrontational approach, as it fears for Germany’s good economic relations with China — Germany
has deeper economic relations with China than any other Western industrialised country.
In the run-up to the G7 summit, the German government had called for rapprochement with
the People’s Republic. It was deemed important to prevent the formation of blocs with the West on
the one hand and China and Russia on the other. After all, a powerful China is also needed to
combat other global issues, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change. Great Britain and
the US, on the other hand, had already called on Germany and others at the G7 summit a year
earlier in Cornwall, England, to decide which side they wanted to be on in the future. But Berlin
merely stated that it is currently working on its own national strategy for China, which should be
ready by spring.
Clashing world views
The matter did not come to blows at the G7 summit, as those involved apparently did not
want to spoil the idyllic atmosphere in the Bavarian town of Elmau. But postponed does not
mean cancelled. Instead, the issue of how to deal with China was taken up at the NATO summit
in Madrid. At the instigation of the United States, NATO had also invited Australia, New
Zealand, South Korea, and Japan to Madrid – democracies in the Asia-Pacific region that feel
threatened by China.
NATO’s joint declaration pulls no punches. In the new strategy paper adopted in Madrid by
the member states, an entire paragraph is dedicated to China. ‘The goals declared by the People’s
Republic of China and its policy of coercion pose challenges to our interests, security and values,’ it
said. And it goes on to say that China’s close ties with Russia are opposed to Western interests. In
addition, NATO accused China of attacking its members with ‘malicious hybrid and cyber
operations and its confrontational rhetoric’. Originally, the US and UK wanted to label China a ‘risk’
or even a ‘danger’. But Germany and France opposed this. The wording was toned down
accordingly.
The outrage from Beijing was not long in coming. The spokesman for the Chinese Foreign
Ministry, Zhao Lijian, spoke of ‘slander’, claiming that the NATO strategy paper disregards facts,
and confuses black and white. ‘Hyping up the so-called “China threat” will lead nowhere,’ Zhao
said. According to Chinese state media, first Russia was the threat, and now China. ‘But the real
threat to world peace is NATO itself.’ So Germany’s efforts to tone down the criticism of China in
the NATO strategy paper have achieved little. There’s still great anger in China.
Debt traps or moral clauses
One initiative on which there was greater unity among the Western allies is the investment
programme for developing countries, the so-called ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure’, which is
also directed against China. The G7’s intention here is to compete with Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’
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project launched in 2013, with which China is in the process of opening up new trade routes to
Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
‘Together with G7 partners, we aim to mobilise $600bn by 2027,’ announced US President Joe
Biden, who initiated the project. The US intends to mobilise $200bn in public and private capital for
this partnership over the next five years alone. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
announced that ‘Team Europe’ would contribute $300bn. G7 country Japan pledged $68bn.
A US official said the initiative would target low- and middle-income countries. The goal, he
said, is infrastructure investments ‘that the countries need without being dictated from the outside’.
Projects would be held to high standards ‘to ensure that these investments are economically and
commercially driven and do not result in debt traps’.
But as right as the US representative may be, in the same breath he unintentionally cites a
problem with the Western initiative: In fact, many countries that have used funds from the Chinese
project are now realising that their mountains of debt have grown massively and they are hopelessly
over-indebted to China. But what made China’s offer so attractive for many countries — and at the
same time could become a problem for Western initiatives — is that the Chinese leadership does not
set any moral conditions for its investment aid. But that’s exactly what the G7 want to do — or at
least that’s what they assure. However, this makes their investment programme less attractive for
authoritarian states.
In addition, the G7 also have an organisational problem. While China’s New Silk Road
Initiative is controlled centrally in Beijing, the G7 are not as united as German Chancellor Olaf
Scholz claimed in Elmau. This is because it has not been agreed as to whether the gigantic
infrastructure projects will be managed at all, and if so, from where. Or whether each industrialised
country will invest on its own and in an uncoordinated manner somewhere in Central Asia and
Africa — as has been the case up to now.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the G7 countries will be able to make the billions of euros
available at all — or at least many doubt that they will. In the past, the G7 had also pledged fixed
sums for development aid and the fight against global poverty, but also for the promise to help poor
countries in the transition to climate neutrality. These pledges were never fulfilled.
(Source: IPS)

THE G7 INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN

Sunit Bagree (Communications Manager in the School of Global Studies at the University of Sussex)
The G7 has announced a Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, aiming to
provide $600bn for infrastructure development in the Global South by 2027. Such a partnership is
welcome, as G7 members are involved in a head-spinning number of international infrastructure
initiatives. But will the G7’s individual and collective efforts in this sphere really be a lot different
to China’s own global infrastructure development plan, the much-criticised Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI)?
To one extent or another, G7 members are seeking to challenge China’s BRI, which was
announced in 2013, well before any of the initiatives associated with G7 members. This is not
necessarily a bad thing, as the BRI is replete with problems. Criticisms of BRI projects include that
they are: concentrated in areas of interest to political elites rather than where need is greatest,
untransparent and conducive to corruption, burdening countries with debt, damaging to the climate
and biodiversity, unwilling to hire locals for high-skilled and management positions, hostile to
labour rights, and imposed on communities without proper consultation – which in some cases has
led to land grabbing and forced evictions.
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The last of these criticisms is particularly ironic. Both security of tenure and access to
infrastructure are elements of the right to adequate housing. Indeed, infrastructure development can
enhance tenure security (and vice-versa). Yet infrastructure projects, both those with foreign links
and those without such connections, can also undermine housing rights and other human rights.
Infrastructure needs
Our surveys in Bangladesh show that 52 per cent of people in marginalised urban settlements
have no legal right to use their house or land. In the capital, Dhaka, around a third of residents in
such settlements have been evicted at least once, and infrastructure development is a common
reason for this. Incredibly, the country’s National Housing Authority and other public agencies have
a history of forcibly evicting people.
In other cases, infrastructure projects may not lead to forced evictions, but they either fail to
serve marginalised people or serve them insufficiently. In Zimbabwe’s urban areas, the
government’s Emergency Road Rehabilitation Programmes have only targeted roads connecting
formal settlements for repair and improvement following the rainy season. No roads connecting
informal settlements have been worked on. Unsurprisingly, 59 per cent of our respondents in
Zimbabwe are unsatisfied with the quality of their roads.
In Somaliland, non-governmental organisations have managed to build toilets in certain
marginalised communities. Otherwise people who live in camps on the periphery of towns and
cities, as well as those who live in makeshift shelters in more central parts of urban areas, require
permission from their landlords in order to dig latrines. Even if granted, these residents often lack
the resources to empty full latrines. To make matters worse, some landlords charge people to use
toilets. This may explain why 30 per cent of our respondents in Somaliland struggle with the
affordability of toilets.
The Global South faces an infrastructure financing gap of $1-1.5 trillion annually. So the
question is not about the need for greater investment in infrastructure but the quality of this
investment. The BRI’s lack of coherence and slowing momentum provide opportunities for the G7 to
provide an alternative to Chinese investment in infrastructure – one that is truly inclusive of the
most marginalised. But beyond the obvious need for better coordination with one another, how can
G7 members deliver?
Inclusive infrastructure development
First, they must adopt an explicitly rights-based approach. This means that core international
human rights treaties and optional protocols should be ratified, and all human rights obligations to
the Global South should be fully enshrined in national law. It also means that all G7 members need
to ensure that their infrastructure projects use recognised participatory methods so that community
involvement is meaningful, are completely transparent throughout their life cycles, are subjected to
rigorous human rights and environmental impact assessments, and establish independent
monitoring and complaint mechanisms.
Second, they must take a politically smart, adaptive approach to infrastructure development.
This will help the G7 to navigate complexity and provide support where need is greatest. For
example, while barriers to settlements becoming legally recognised should be engaged with, the
focus should be on tenure security rather than questions of (in)formality per se.
Similarly, while on-grid service provision may be better (in terms of reliability, quality, price,
etc.) in many urban areas, off-grid infrastructure may be preferable to certain communities. The key
issue is that service provision should improve wellbeing. A clear illustration of this is that, on
average, at least 37 per cent of people in our research locations cook with fuels that pose a health
threat to their households. Regardless of whether it is on- or off-grid, the supply of clean cooking
fuels is critical.
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Third, they must finance their infrastructure investments in a fair and sustainable manner.
This means G7 members should wean themselves off the idea – clearly stated in their infrastructure
principles and Ministerial statements – that private capital is necessary. Privately financed
infrastructure in the Global South has largely failed. Even celebrated public-private partnerships are
deeply flawed on closer examination.
The fact is the vast majority of infrastructure in the Global South is publicly financed. The G7
needs to start thinking in terms of global public investment. Moreover, overhauling unjust debt, tax,
and trade rules would give Global South governments greater resources to invest in inclusive
infrastructure themselves.
By adopting such an agenda, the G7 would certainly avoid China’s mistakes, and perhaps
even embarrass Beijing into reforming its BRI.
(Source: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

REFLECTING ON HONG KONG’S HANDOVER

Martin Duffy (Badge of Honour of the International Red Cross Movement)
It is 25 years since sovereignty over Hong Kong was passed from the UK to the People’s
Republic of China. To be precise this occurred at midnight on 1 July 1997. That ceremony,
architecturally ensconced in an impressive Commemoration Monument which now geopolitically
dominates the skyline of the island, terminated a British colonial history of almost 160 unbroken
years. Thus, with the handover, the island state metamorphosed into a special administrative region
of China (SAR) for 50 years, during which (technically) it should have conserved economic and
governing systems distinct from those of mainland China. In practice, central government in Beijing
has become omniscient, especially after the passing of the Hong Kong national security law in 2020.
The 1997 hand-over formally and precipitously concluded the UK’s 99-year lease for the New
Territories. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration prescribed how Hong Kong was to be
transferred, with China agreeing to maintain existing structures of government under, “one country,
two systems” for fifty years. Hong Kong was China’s first special administrative region. Next was
Macau after its transfer from Portugal in 1999. As someone who has worked intermittently on
migration assignments in Hong Kong and the region for a couple of decades, I may be forgiven for
offering a few historical time-lines which explain the complex and frustrating events which now cut
completely against the will of the majority of the island’s population.
In 1997 Hong Kong had 6.5 million people, and was by far the largest of remaining UK
colonies. The handover ceremony attended by Lord Patton, the last British Governor, and HRH
Charles, Prince of Wales is symbolically heralded to mark the effective end of the British Empire.
With the crack-down on pro-democracy activism, Beijing’s strangle-hold on Hong Kong’s executive
powers, the termination of a previously free press, and the increasing engagement of the PRC’s
tentacles in surveillance of every aspect of the Hong Konger’s life, it has become apparent that the
island is now fully part of a resurgent Chinese empire. It will not have escaped the vision of an
observant local and international population, that Hong Kong is now exclusively part of the PRC.
While the Red Army remain confined to barracks, a new style of policing across the island marks a
radical departure with the style of law enforcement which had evolved in colonial administration.
As the new Hong Kong police practice the goose-step for the Ceremonial Parade of independence on
1 July, it is hard to avoid negative comparisons with the repulsive choreography of Fascist
demonstrations during previous world conflicts, or indeed not to conclude that the, “one country,
two systems” promise now exists only in name.
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Now like all international events, there are two sides of the narrative. The significant phrase,
“return of Hong Kong to the motherland” is nowadays preferred by Hong Kong and Chinese
officials (although not by the vast majority of the island’s residents.) On the other hand, the
expression, “Handover of Hong Kong” is used by most of the English-speaking world. “Transfer of
sovereignty over Hong Kong” was (prior to five years ago) generally the vocabulary of Hong Kong
officials but that has now terminated. Beijing maintains that neither the Qing dynasty exercised
sovereignty of Hong Kong after ceding it, nor the British therefore did, and hence the transfer of
sovereignty to China from Britain is illogical. Beijing has now undertaken, “to fully recover the
Hong Kong area” and, “to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong” which is their
interpretation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Some of this language is semantically
problematical but what is not in doubt is that the British declared “(to) restore Hong Kong to the
People’s Republic of China” which rather makes protestations about human rights abuses in the
new Hong Kong to be otiose.
Now it is worth noting that formally Britain had acquired Hong Kong Island in 1842, the
Kowloon Peninsula in 1860, and the lease of the New Territories in 1898 and thus portions of Hong
Kong’s territory through three treaties concluded with Qing China after the Opium Wars. These
were respectively the 1842 Treaty of Nanking: Hong Kong Island ceded in perpetuity, the 1860
Convention of Peking: Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutter’s Island additionally ceded and the 1898
Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory: the New Territories and outlying islands
leased for 99 years until 1997.
Despite the finite nature of the New Territories lease, this portion became highly integrated
with, the rest of Hong Kong. As the end of the lease approached, and by the time of serious
negotiations over status in the 1980s, it was thought impractical to separate the ceded territories and
return only the New Territories to China. In addition, with the scarcity of land and natural resources
in Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, large-scale infrastructure investments had been made in the
New Territories, many of them planned way beyond the deadline of 30 June 1997.
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gained a UN seat as a result of the UN General
Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971, it began to act diplomatically on its previously lost sovereignty
over both Hong Kong and Macau. The same year, on 8 November, UNGA removed Hong Kong and
Macau from the official list of colonies. As Chairman Deng had outlined his plans to make the
territory a special economic zone, which would retain its capitalist system under Chinese
sovereignty, the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sought the PRC’s agreement to a
continued British presence in the territory. However, the PRC took a contrary position: not only did
the PRC wish for the New Territories, on lease until 1997, to be placed under the PRC’s jurisdiction,
it also refused to recognise what they described as the onerous, “unfair and unequal treaties” under
which Hong Kong Island and Kowloon had been ceded to Britain. Consequently, the PRC
recognised only the British administration in Hong Kong, but not British sovereignty. While not
perhaps fully appreciated at the time, the fatal outcome meant permanent loss of sovereignty over
Hong Kong’s area, whatever wording the former treaties had.
Indeed, formalising this loss, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by Premier of the
People’s Republic of China Zhao Ziyang and PM Margaret Thatcher on 19 December 1984 in Beijing.
The Declaration entered into force with the exchange of instruments of ratification on 27 May 1985
and was registered by the People’s Republic of China and UK governments at the UN on 12 June
1985. In the Joint Declaration, the People’s Republic of China Government stated that it had decided
to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and
the New Territories) with effect from 1 July 1997 and the UK declared that it would restore Hong
Kong to the PRC with effect from 1 July 1997. In the document, the People’s Republic of China
Government also declared its basic policies regarding Hong Kong.
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In accordance with the, “One country, two systems” principle agreed between the UK and the
People’s Republic of China, the socialist system of the People’s Republic of China would not be
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), and Hong Kong’s previous
capitalist system and way of life would remain unchanged for fifty years. Technically this would
have left Hong Kong unchanged until 2047. On paper only, Hong Kong Basic Law ensured, among
other things, that Hong Kong retained its legislative system, and people’s rights and freedom for
fifty years, as a special administrative region (SAR) of China. The central government in Beijing
maintains control over Hong Kong’s foreign affairs as well as the legal interpretation of the Basic
Law. The latter has led democracy advocates and some Hong Kong residents to protest that the
territory has yet to achieve universal suffrage as promised by the Basic Law, leading to riots in 2014.
In 2019, demonstrations that started as a protest against an extradition law also demanded universal
suffrage. In December 2021, Beijing released a document, “Hong Kong Democratic Progress Under
the Framework of One Country, Two Systems”, which stated that the central government will work
with, “all social groups, sectors and stakeholders towards the ultimate goal of election by universal
suffrage of the chief executive” and the LegCo while also noting that the Chinese constitution and
the Basic Law together “empower the HKSAR to exercise a high degree of autonomy and confirm
the central authorities’ right to supervise the exercise of this autonomy.” Again, empty promises
which some might say were conveniently taken at face-value by the UK.
After the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the Executive Councillors and the Legislative
Councillors of Hong Kong unanimously approached the British Government to offer Hong Kongers
right of abode. More than 10,000 Hong Kong residents rushed to get an application form for
residency. Chris Patten as the last governor of Hong Kong introduced a package of electoral reforms
in the Legislative Council. These reforms proposed to enlarge the electorate, thus making voting in
the Legislative Council more democratic. This move posed significant changes because Hong Kong
citizens would have the power to make decisions regarding their future. With a resurgent Beijing,
what the majority of the people of Hong Kong have been left with is a prime international example
of constructive ambiguity. British promises are unenforced and unenforceable while, twenty-five
years later, far from genuinely constituting “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is no longer in
any sense a credible democracy. This leaves Beijing and London with entirely mutually exclusive
perceptions of a fateful twenty-five-year anniversary.
(Source: E-International Relations)

US POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Adam Gerval & Mark Henderson
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) have shifted the narrative of security studies
of the region. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has grown more assertive, the role of the
United States to safeguard free navigation has been challenged. Across administrations, traditional
allegiances have been in flux, while under the administration of US President Joe Biden, they appear
to have become more dynamic. US air and naval superiority are currently being maintained, but the
growing PRC defense budget and rapid increases in the quality and quantity of force has begun to
change international perceptions. Finally, western assumptions about social and political
developments in China have missed the mark. Why has the PRC not begun to liberalize political
control as a result of economic development? Where is China’s civil society? How has the PRC
become a great power while continuing to violate human rights and bend international rules?
During the Obama administration, chief US strategists claimed that, as the PRC developed, so too
would its sense of international responsibility. So far, Beijing has been showing us the exact
opposite. The PRC has been playing games in international organizations, placing their experts in
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key roles and backing sympathetic candidates for leadership positions. Unambiguous human rights
violations are being broadcasted to the world in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Relations across the
Taiwan Strait have returned to a level of tensions not seen in recent memory. China’s Paramount
Leader Xi Jinping has removed political opposition and will begin an unprecedented third term at
the top of the PRC political structure.
The sum of these trends shows an increasingly aggressive and authoritarian government in
the PRC, which runs counter to the world’s aspirations for China. Recognition of this fact may have
begun long before the administration of former President Donald Trump, but US policy on China
changed most dramatically in the Trump years. Interestingly, US actions in the South China Sea
have been relatively constant. There has been no equivalent to a trade war, as we have seen with
economic disputes. In maritime policy, the US position remains largely unchanged: to maintain open
shipping lanes and ensure freedom of navigation. Instead, the changes have largely been a means to
that end. With the singular exception of reference to the 2016 China-Philippines arbitration, much of
the change in US policy has been in the reliance on traditional alliances, frequency of operations, and
public messaging on maritime disputes.
Priority Number One: Navigation
Freedom of navigation has continued to be priority No. 1 for the United States, regardless of
who is in office. It is worth mentioning that the beneficiaries of that policy are not only US citizens: a
South China Sea that is free for all has allowed economies, even those not physically in the region, to
be able to consistently rely on steady shipping costs. Volatility in international commerce
undermines the function of liberalized capital markets. Economic growth in the Indo-Pacific has
been no exception to that rule, as we can see in the ever-growing transit of goods through the South
China Sea. More than US$3 trillion in goods moved through the SCS in 2016, including more than
30% of the world’s crude oil trade (CSIS 2021).
US maintenance of unobstructed transport for commercial, civilian, and innocent-passage
military vessels is quite simple. Complications largely arise in jurisdiction over economic activity
and enforcement of national maritime rules. As a result, the United States adheres to many
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite never
having formally ratified it into US law. Nevertheless, legal distinctions made within UNCLOS are
important when trying to understand the largely neutral position of the United States in disputes
between claimants over what constitutes a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, and an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). Under the provisions of UNCLOS, rocks and low-tide elevations, for example,
do not generate exclusive economic zones, but can extend overlapping territorial sea and contiguous
zones from land or naturally formed islands. These distinctions are important for determining what
a nation can and cannot do in a particular maritime area: they also represent the fundamental pieces
that academics in security studies and international relations have come to wrestle with in creating a
larger strategic analysis of the Indo-Pacific region (Fruend 2017).
With that in mind, navigation, mining activities, and research and exploration endeavours are
affected differently through the three zone types afforded by land, islands, rocks, and low-tide
elevations. In the case of territorial waters, commercial and military vessels may conduct innocent
passage through another country’s 12-mile zone so long as they do not carry out certain activities
while in transit, such as surveillance, fishing, and military exercises. This is not true of contiguous
zones, where governments may only conduct punitive operations on vessels that have infringed on
regulations inside their territorial waters. The wider EEZ is, for navigation purposes, considered
international waters. Any claim which inappropriately widens the range of territorial waters beyond
12 miles, draws improper straight-baselines (only afforded to archipelagic states), labels a rock or
low-tide elevation as an island, or restricts navigation (in maritime and aviation) are considered
excessive maritime claims. This is where so many of the disputes are generated.
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To combat excessive maritime claims, the United States works multilaterally through strategic
consultations and diplomatic demarches, as well as through operational assertions called freedom of
navigation operations (FONOPS). Such operations and consultations ensure open shipping lanes
and access to waters where the United States has vital trade and security interests. The program of
FON operations ‘includes both planned FON assertions (i.e., operations that have the primary
purpose of challenging excessive maritime claims) and other FON-related activities (i.e., operations
that have some other primary purpose, but have a secondary effect of challenging excessive
maritime claims)’ (US Department of Defense 2017). For example, the United States may send a
naval vessel through territorial waters (within 12 miles of a naturally occurring island or continental
land formation) without giving prior notification. In doing so, the US vessel has conducted an action
which is within the legal rights conferred by UNCLOS but conflicts with the demands of a claimant
making excessive maritime claims, such as purporting to require prior notification. In another
scenario, a US military vessel may linger or conduct a training exercise in an area which is
improperly labelled as territorial waters, thus illustrating that the claim is excessive by conducting
activities that would otherwise be unacceptable within the 12-mile zone.
It is important to note that the United States does not side with claimants over matters of
sovereignty. Rather, the primary strategy has been to ensure that UNCLOS navigation norms are
followed, regardless of the origin of the excessive maritime claims. This means that the United States
conducts FONOPS in response to excessive claims of its allies and partners as well. It is also worth
stating that FONOPS are not exclusively used to delegitimize excessive maritime claims in the SCS,
and may be wielded by partners and allies with a varying subset of strategic goals in mind.
Free and unimpeded navigation in the South China Sea is of crucial importance to the United
States and others with a vested economic and security interest in the Indo-Pacific. The trillions of
dollars in trade that pass through the region annually would be significantly impeded if commercial
travel was diverted around contested waters. Additionally, limited navigation would allow an
increasingly assertive China to further threaten longstanding US security concerns with partners like
Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
The Obama Years: Pivot to Asia
Conflicting political claims in the South China Sea began after the Sino-Japanese War. They
continued after World War II, maintaining relevance following the Treaty of San Francisco, largely
concerning the intersection of Japanese, Kuomintang (KMT)[1], and PRC interests. In the late 1960s,
the discovery of underwater oil deposits and the conflict between China and Vietnam led the United
Nations to establish UNCLOS. Following years of tension, the PRC entered into agreements with the
United States (the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, or ASEAN (the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea), and Japan
(the Joint Energy Accord). Whether it was due to China’s growing regional predominance, a
shrinking US presence in the Indo-Pacific, or a combination of external factors, stability in the South
China Sea did not last. Beijing’s three policy goals became regional integration, resource control, and
enhanced security (Dutton 2011). This approach would ultimately conflict with longstanding US
policy in the region aimed at maintaining free navigation. As a result, the US position in the South
China Sea was forced into the limelight in 2010 when the SCS disputes began to heat up.
In July 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clarified the US position in the SCS, which
would ultimately merge with President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia. In front of the UN General
Assembly, Clinton unambiguously unveiled a policy dedicated to freedom of navigation and began
a long-held precedent of neutrality in maritime disputes. Shortly thereafter, President Obama gave a
landmark speech in the Australian Parliament in 2011 in which he cemented the policy objectives of
the United States in the South China Sea (CFR 2021). The tenets of that policy are as follows:
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1. Freedom of Navigation and Unimpeded Trade (Air and Sea):UNCLOS freedoms were
paramount. The PRC policy (Law of the Sea) of required notification before military transit
through EEZs was rejected and viewed as a minority opinion. The establishment of Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the South China Sea by the PRC and others is
problematic and destabilizing, despite an often inadequate ability to enforce their integrity.
Although unrealistic ADIZ claims proliferated, a growing People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Air Force (PLAAF) alone was in a position to challenge long-established aviation routes,
including for civilian and commercial transport.
2. Peaceful Dispute Resolution: US policy here may have been ambitious, but it has thus-far
been upheld, with a few notable exceptions. This is where the misrepresentation of China’s
‘peaceful rise’ came into play. The expectation that the growing global power would refrain
from coercive diplomacy and bullying was incorrect. Instead, grey zone tactics largely
carried out by civilian fishing boats, sand dredgers, oil prospectors, and the PRC Coast
Guard has agitated regional claimants and raised anxieties in the region.
3. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a Foundation:The United States
encourages regional claimants to adhere to the tenets of UNCLOS, despite not having
ratified it. The most substantial challenge to the UNCLOS system, aside from island-building
and military buildup, is the nine-dash line. The line encircles nearly all of the SCS and is
accompanied by ambiguous claims to certain rights based on historical arguments.
4. Diplomatic Partnership:Until the Trump administration took power, the playbook
encouraged regional or multilateral negotiation over maritime disputes. During the Obama
years, this approach contradicted Beijing’s preference for bilateral negotiation, largely as a
tactic to isolate and intimidate counter-claimants. US diplomatic capital was underutilized
from 2016–2020, ironically turning the established strategy on its head.
5. A Consensus on the Code of Conduct:ASEAN claimants and Beijing agreed to the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. Although the
declaration is non-binding, the thought was that such a framework would decrease the
likelihood of conflict while disputes were slowly negotiated, likely over many years (Bader
and McDevitt 2014).
This framework was largely what the United States implemented in the region from 2008 to
2016 in order to meet its strategic goals. Taylor (2016) explains that, beginning in 2009, the policy
began to evolve. First, policy was altered in accordance with the level of tension engendered by the
disputes. Second is the US policy of neutrality and not taking sides in the disputes. Third, as its
involvement in managing tensions has grown, Washington has been careful to emphasize the
process over the product: in other words, that the process for managing conflicting claims be
peaceful. To this end it has supported the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between China
and ASEAN. Fourth, US policy ‘has sought to shape China’s behaviour in the South China Sea by
highlighting the costs of coercion and the pursuit of claims that are inconsistent with customary
international law’ (Fravel 2016).
These goals were largely projected onto the PRC and other regional claimants. In 2021, the
Congressional Research Service outlined specific and general goals in the context of US-PRC
competition. By viewing it from such a perspective, academics and policymakers are able to refocus
the lens through which we view the SCS conflicts. Instead of understanding the maritime disputes
as stand-alone interests, we are able to view the South China Sea in its proper light, in the context of
competition between Washington and Beijing. Washington’s general interests in this effort include:
(1) nurturing lasting security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region with long-term partners such as
Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan; (2) rejecting the position that ‘might makes right’ in dealing with
territorial disputes (Stewart and Pearson 2019); (3) maintaining the US security architecture; (4)
ensuring continued US leadership in the region; and (5) protecting freedom of navigation.
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According to O’Rourke (2021), specific US interests include halting China’s ongoing island
construction, military buildup, and excessive maritime and ADIZ claims near Vietnam and the
Philippines; (2) encouraging Beijing to cease its coercive actions near the Senkaku Islands, Spratly
Island, and Scarborough Shoal; and (3) and convincing the PRC to rein in its non-military assets that
are conducting illegal sand dredging and invasive fishing.
It was not until 2016 that the United States signalled a potential change from its position of
absolute neutrality. Leading up to that point, the Obama administration conducted several FONOPS
in order to assert UNCLOS conventions, even if that meant little headway on resolving individual
disputes (Werner 2019). Ultimately the operations were safeguarding the primary US interest in
freedom of navigation. Below is a table tallying the FONOPS from 20 12–2020, which allows us to
contrast tangible operations among the three administrations.
As mentioned above, the position of the United States changed after the UN 2016 tribunal
ruling for Manila and against Beijing over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. The
Permanent Council of Arbitration, headquartered in The Hague, ruled in favour of the Philippines
on several designations of maritime objects and against the excessive maritime claims being made
by the PRC (PCA 2013). Specifically, the ruling found that Beijing had no basis to assert historic
rights, nullifying many of the subsequent claims predicated on the nine-dash line (Poling 2020).
At the East Asia Summit in 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry commented that the
arbitration was ‘final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines.’ However, he added,
‘we are still studying the decision and have no comment on the merits of the case’ (Hindustan Times
2016). Despite the firm US stance on sovereignty, Kerry encouraged both parties to comply with the
ruling. His comments were precedent-setting, as no previous US government official had endorsed a
particular position on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The previous US position,
originating in 2009, was that Beijing had offered no coherent legal basis to its nine-dash line claims
(US Department of State 2019).[2] The subtle difference between the two was to connect UNCLOS
norms directly to claimants while falling short of enforcing the specific ruling of the arbitration
(countries could still disagree on the judgement) by abstaining from calling PRC claims ‘illegal.’
Instead, by calling the claims ‘destabilizing’ or ‘aggressive,’ the administration was able to support
the ruling, avoid pushing Beijing into a corner, and maintain the primary goal of supporting free
commercial transit and navigation.
For the duration of the Obama presidency, policy was rational and comprehensive in its
approach. It maintained ultimate neutrality on specific disputes, even after the 2016 arbitration,
while protecting navigation and commercial activity. Although conflicts did not escalate during
those years, Obama’s approach was, however, incapable of preventing the PRC from building bases
on disputed SCS islands, flexing its military muscle, and engaging in bilateral diplomatic coercion
(McDevitt 2015).
The Trump Years: Transactionalism and Assertive Messaging
By the time Trump took office in 2017, Xi had been in power for nearly four years, and the
PRC had effectively transformed its approach, jettisoning the rhetoric of the ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘good
neighbour’ diplomacy in favour of the ‘Chinese Dream’ and promoting ‘Xi thought.’ As a result, the
Trump administration transformed US policy in recognition of increasing PRC assertiveness and
military buildup. For the American public, trade policies were front and center, but strategic options
in the South China Sea seemed consequential.
In retrospect, the Trump administration pulled from several options from 2017–2021, with a
heavy emphasis on rollback-style public messaging and tangible actions aimed at containment,
especially in the latter years. Trump’s transactional style of policy provided minimal assistance in
the way of tangible commitments to countries in the region. There were, however, voices calling for
an increase in US landpower in the South China Sea to deter the PRC and buttress allies’ military
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positions. Bouchat (2017) argued that ‘US landpower gives pause to states with aggressive
intentions, creates networks that enhance abilities synergistically, and may also break down barriers
to misunderstanding – all of which should result in a stabilizing role for US landpower through its
proper application in the South China Sea region’ (Bouchat 2017).
President Trump began to heavily employ economic sanctions and ramped up public and
diplomatic messaging. Opponents of the policy claim that sanctions under the International
Emergency Powers Act were not adequately justified during this time and were instead viewed as
rhetorical attempts to counter PRC claims. In any case, such statements certainly supported
countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Relying too heavily on rhetoric of support for non-
PRC claimants called into question the US commitment to its partners, particularly in the absence of
military action (Williams 2020). The US Department of State is no stranger to such rhetoric. In the
words of then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, ‘America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and
partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources … and [we] reject any push to
impose “might makes right” in the South China Sea or the wider region.’ Moreover, then-Assistant
Secretary of State David Stillwell stated, ‘there is room for [sanctions],’ pointing out that ‘nothing is
off the table’ (Pamuk and Brunnstrom 2020).
Coupling public statements with sanctions may have been the Trump administration’s way of
avoiding concrete ramifications while stopping short of provoking armed conflict. Ultimately, the
United States has been frequently thrust into a position where action must be taken vis-à-vis
increased PLA Navy and Air Force operations. Claimants look to the United States to take that
action, ideally before the South China Sea becomes ‘a Chinese lake’ (Brands and Cooper 2018).
Nguyen (2016) sums up the shift from a hopeful Obama administration to that of an assertive
and recalcitrant Trump policy in the South China Sea by recognizing PRC ‘buildup in the southern
reaches of the South China Sea to establish greater control of its near seas, in the process diminishing
US access to the waters and airspace of the world’s most critical waterways.’ In response, US
policymakers assured the PRC that they would suffer the ‘net effect’ of aggressive and provocative
actions (Nguyen 2016).
James (2017) asserts that the ramping up of assertive language under Trump was to some
degree due to congressional voices. ‘Signals by a president’s own party members are generally more
powerful, while signals from members of Congress from the opposite party are less so,’ he writes.
Despite less support from across the aisle, the South China Sea has been viewed as a battlefield for
supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. In the words of Scott (2017), ‘the nature of the challenge and its
broader stakes, along with the array of economic interests and global concerns that connect the US
and China, as well as the interests of various factions of the US political system, worked to establish
competing interests and priorities that muted partisanship and generated more cooperative efforts.’
In 2020, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – calling for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) – was
declassified, revealing specific components of its competitive strategy with China in the South China
Sea and elsewhere (Chang 2020). Tenets of the strategy included: (1) ‘naming and shaming’ the PRC
for its actions in the SCS (He and Ramasamy 2020); (2) the imposition of economic sanctions on PRC
officials linked to such actions; (3) carrying out FONOPS and overflights in the SCS and the Taiwan
Strait (Zhen 2019); (4) strengthening the US military presence and countering the PRC buildup in the
Indo-Pacific (O’Rourke 2021a); and (5) encouraging allies and partners to do more individually and
in coordination with one another to defend their interests in the SCS region (Ng 2019).
The report made conclusions about Beijing’s strategy as well, citing a desire to utilize
weakened US partnerships. The overall policy picture began to coalesce by late 2018 and grew in
intensity until the transfer of power in January 2021. In an effort to connect specific actions under
Trump to a mosaic of policy goals, the table below shows a timeline of major diplomatic and policy
actions, short of military operations.
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As the Trump administration faced losing re-election in 2020, longstanding US ambiguity

towards legal claims in the SCS began to shift. Statements by the Department of Defense and the
State Department were representative of that shift, especially concerning Vietnam, the Philippines,
and Indonesia. For example, US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft sent a note to the UN
Secretary General which read, ‘the United States again urges China to conform its maritime claims to
international law as reflected in the Convention; to comply with the Tribunal’s 12 July 2016 decision;
and to cease its provocative activities in the South China Sea’ (Gertz 2020).
Secretary Pompeo went as far as to break from with the previous administration’s precedent
by edging further into the Beijing-Manila dispute in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal,
stating that, ‘Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely
unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.’ Regarding the rights afforded to the land
formations, specifically, Poling (2020) shows that the shift explicitly declared, ‘it is illegal for China
to engage in fishing, oil and gas exploration, or other economic activities in those areas, or to
interfere with its neighbours’ rights to do so’ (Poling 2020).
By labelling PRC claims as illegal, the United States took a definitive position on the dispute,
rather than defaulting to UNCLOS norms or a specific code of conduct. In doing so, the Trump
administration may have been hoping to corner its successor into a specific policy towards Beijing
(Quinn 2020). Some scholars argue that once Trump ramped up anti-PRC efforts, components of his
aligned more with the Obama administration’s efforts. The policy aimed to; (1) increase the military
presence in the East and Southeast Asia regions; (2) collect international support against the PRC;
and (3) propagate the PRC’s global image as a villain (Hu 2021). Regardless of the similarities in
method, the goal has remained the same from Obama to Trump and into the Biden administration:
to maintain freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.
The Biden Administration: Strength Through Alliances
Scholars and insiders alike speculated on the Biden administration’s approach to Beijing,
especially in the early days of 2021. Campaign rhetoric leading up to the 2020 US presidential
election was critical of Beijing on both sides of the aisle, but there was still little clarity as to how that
would translate into policy. If the wider policy was unclear, a path forward in the South China Sea
was completely indiscernible, especially due to pressing concerns on the economy and public health
(due to the COVID-19 pandemic). Area specialists like Glaser and Poling of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies had been encouraging cooperation with partners like the Philippines to
tamp down coercion from Beijing while working with other Southeast Asian partners to ensure that
US absenteeism would cease under a new administration.
At the very least, there is consensus that the PRC is a growing threat to democratic principles,
as well as sustained trepidation over an ever-increasing PRC military budget, which has grown from
roughly US$120 billion in 2009 to nearly US$250 billion in 2019 (SIPRI 2021). A report by the US
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, reiterated the need to offset Beijing’s naval
build-up: ‘To defend our Nation and interests around the globe, we must be prepared to flawlessly
execute our Navy’s timeless roles of sea control and power projection,’ the report reads, adding
‘there is no time to waste; our actions in this decade will set the maritime balance of power for the
rest of the century’ (CNO 2021).
Language in the early days answered the call for a return to historic alliances. During his
confirmation hearing and in statements following his appointment, Secretary of State Anthony
Blinken alluded to Beijing as an opponent, a challenge, and a potential partner, simultaneously. The
United States, moving forward, would approach the PRC from a position of strength, derived from
US partners and allies. Regarding the Philippines, Blinken reaffirmed that Washington considers the
US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty applicable in the event of armed attacks against the Philippine
forces, public vessels, and aircraft in the Pacific, as well as in the South China Sea. According to a
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State Department press release, the United States rejects any of China’s maritime claims in the South
China Sea that exceed what is permitted by UNCLOS (US Department of State 2021a). The
appointment of Kurt Campbell, an Obama-era China hand, to the Biden administration has sent
signals to allies in the region. The United States seems to be returning to Asia with an expanding
roster of partners who are weary of PRC bullying and coercion.
The positions expressed over the dispute between Manila and Beijing have been similar to the
sentiments in other regional disputes, like those the PRC has with Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, and
Taiwan. For example, a visit to Japan and South Korea by Secretary Blinken and Department of
Defense Secretary Austin reaffirmed the US commitment to long-time allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Statements from the Department of State are representative of the shift back towards reliance on
existing security alliances, such as reiterating America’s ‘unwavering commitment to the defense of
Japan under Article V of our security treaty, which includes the Senkaku Islands’ (US Department of
State 2021b).
During Blinken’s discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, support
from Japan was unexpectedly given to joint defense of Taiwan in the case of a PRC attack. A
subsequent high-level trip to Europe further demonstrated a longing for partnerships over key
issues (like human rights and freedom of navigation) among Western nations that operate in the
Indo-Pacific (Bennan 2021). This is especially apparent with partners like the United Kingdom, the
Czech Republic, and members of the 16+1 (a term used to describe a forum for cooperation between
Beijing and Eastern European countries) that are reluctant to allow PRC leadership to take hold
globally. Developments like the new PRC Coast Guard law in January 2021 has led US partners in
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (India, Australia, and Japan) to coalesce around a welcome US
return to the South China Sea. Growing concerns in Europe over Chinese expansionism saw the
HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier deployed to the SCS, and even Germany dispatched a frigate
to traverse the SCS for the first time since 2002, to support freedom of navigation (Aljazeera 2021).
Perhaps most telling in the early days of the Biden administration was the outcome of the US-
China meetings in Anchorage, Alaska. From the outside, analysts have seen a continuation of PRC
grandstanding for domestic audiences, while the private meetings were likely less confrontational
(Politico 2021). How else can one explain the willingness of PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to
meet after the US placed powerful sanctions over Chinese actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang?
Much of the Trump-era toughness on key issues has seemingly remained, as well as the mechanisms
to deal with them. The legislative provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (2019–2020)
remain in place to counter PRC military and technological prowess. Regional fora like ASEAN and
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as the G7, may serve a largely unchanged
strategy under Biden. The Department of State has endeavoured to design a regionally focused
policy while reporting on PRC activities, including in the South China Sea (Heydarian 2021).
Moving forward, the Biden administration will have to consider the role of Congress in
maritime disputes, especially related to mutual defense agreements and a potential, but unlikely,
ratification of UNCLOS in the United States. Campbell and Wyne (2020) claim that, ‘increased risks
caused by ramped up military activity in the South China Sea is becoming cause for concern for
experts who believe that the traffic is inevitably going to lead to an accident or escalate into a crisis
scenario.’ First, US policy makers will have to ask tough questions about bilateral security treaties.
For example, what level of strategic clarity or ambiguity is appropriate to deter PRC conflict with the
Philippines and Japan? Also, what contingency planning has the Department of Defense put in place
to deal with such an eventuality? Finally, has diplomatic messaging been effective in reaching an
understanding on a path forward with America’s Japanese and Filipino counterparts?
Congress may also raise the question again (last discussed in June 2012) of whether the United
States should become a signatory to UNCLOS. In 2012, hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee revealed arguments for and against its adoption under US law. Proponents pointed to
navigational rights, increased legitimacy in citing provisions of the treaty (including those related to
foreign military activities in exclusive economic zones), and a move away from reliance on non-
binding international norms alone (Browne 2019). Opponents have argued that Beijing has, thus far,
been able to cite international law to defend activities in their EEZs. Similarly, UNCLOS has not
been able to resolve maritime disputes along the PRC’s nine-dash line, which leaves little incentive
to enshrine such justification in US law, especially from a policy perspective (Dutton 2011). Instead,
the United States could better serve regional stability and the interests of US partners by continuing
the FONOPS program and bilateral defense support (Bromund and Schaefer 2018). Given the
current status quo, a change in the US relationship with UNCLOS is unlikely.
It is important to add a caveat to our current understanding of US policy in the South China
Sea, and that is recognition of the larger foreign policy concerns of the Biden administration. For the
greater part of 2021, the number one priority was to tackle the Covid-19 challenge. Beyond that,
Biden pushed for a new energy policy aimed at decarbonisation, energy security, and energy
development. Much of those objectives will rely on cooperation with the PRC, and they may take
precedence over the long-standing irritants in the South China Sea.
US maritime policy in the South China Sea across the Obama, Trump, and Biden
administrations has certainly taken on different forms and varying degrees of intensity. The primary
objective, however, has remained constant: maintenance of free navigation.
(Source: E-International Relations)

INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK (IPEF) FOR PROSPERITY

A New Addition to Southeast Asia’s Overlapping Economic
Constellations
Lucio Blanco Pitlo (Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation)
Twelve countries, seven of them from Southeast Asia, signed up for President Joe Biden’s
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) last month. IPEF rounds America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
and allays criticisms that Washington’s game plan in its priority region is all arms and no butter. The
deal is the latest demonstration of the region’s pragmaism and openness to potentially beneficial
economic constellations. Keen to hit the ground running, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai
and counterpart ministers from other participating countries gathered for an informal meeting last
June 11 in Paris to discuss the framework’s trade pillar.
As a theater for geopolitical competition, Southeast Asia gets regularly courted by major and
middle powers bearing investment and connectivity pitches in their strategic outreach. China’s Belt
and Road, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, India’s Act East Policy, Korea’s New
Southern Policy, and even Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy fit into this. IPEF, thus, represents the
much-awaited U.S. economic game for the region. The announcement was an instant hit. Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam closed ranks with the U.S.,
Japan, India, South Korea, and New Zealand in the recently launched undertaking. Three days later,
Fiji became the first in Oceania to join the pact. Thus, the deal began on a high note, although the
road ahead is long and arduous.
While not a free trade agreement (FTA) that offers tariff cuts and market access, the lure of
attracting companies spreading their supply chains and cornering investments in infrastructure,
clean energy, and technology sectors constitute strong incentives themselves. The warm reception
towards IPEF stands in stark contrast to the reluctance and even concern raised by some Southeast
Asian countries towards U.S.-led security arrangements like Quad and AUKUS. Many regional
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countries have China as their largest trade partner and thus have misgivings about taking part in
groupings seen adversely or with great suspicion by Beijing. That IPEF was rolled out in Tokyo
during Biden’s debut Asia tour speaks volumes of the importance of Japan as a crucial U.S. ally and
partner in countering China’s burgeoning influence in the Asia-Pacific.
Meeting China’s economic and rule-making challenge
The U.S. ceded much ground to China since it withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) in 2017. Beijing convened two Belt and Road Forums in 2017 and 2019. In 2020, it became the
biggest member economy to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s
largest FTA that includes all ten ASEAN members and five of its dialogue partners. Seven ASEAN
countries and all five dialogue partners have already ratified the trade pact, which came into effect
early this year. Last year, Beijing also expressed interest in joining the rebranded Comprehensive
and Progressive TPP and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement.
Beyond trade, Beijing has also made its presence felt in the field of development assistance. In
2018, it launched its own foreign aid outfit, the China International Development Cooperation
Agency. In 2020, it proposed a Global Initiative on Data Security, a game-changing move that
perturbed established technology powers. Last September, President Xi Jinping, in an address before
the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, also proposed a Global Development
Initiative to accelerate the realization of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development. China’s
success in poverty alleviation and food security at home boosted its confidence to share its lessons
and lend support to other developing countries.
While the U.S. turned more inward and alienated allies and partners during the previous
Trump administration, China positioned itself as a champion of multilateralism and free trade.
Hence, under Biden’s watch, IPEF is expected to help the U.S. recover lost ground. It injects new
vitality into US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, enabling it to respond to China’s growing economic clout in
the region. Although IPEF may not supplant China’s economic role in the region, it can mitigate
growing reliance on Beijing for trade, investments, and infrastructure. It also asserts Washington’s
enduring role in updating rules and norms for cutting-edge technologies. The U.S.’ countervailing
presence may also offer some cushion for countries worried about Chinese punitive economic
measures should relations turn sour over mishandled sea incidents or other foreign
policy differences.
Low entry barriers and flexibility are key features of IPEF. Countries can join any of the four
policy pillars: 1) trade; 2) supply chains; 3) clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure; and 4)
tax and anti-corruption. While there is no guarantee that all those who enlisted from the get-go will
stick around to complete the process, providing four standalone areas can help potential members
assess which one they would like to prioritize while limiting exposure to other areas they may feel
unprepared for the time being. Packaging IPEF as an executive agreement instead of a treaty that
would require congressional intervention may also hasten the process but may be seen as less
binding.
Cynicism towards tedious long-drawn multilateral negotiations and worries about drawing
legislative and public flak at home may be driving the U.S. to settle for IPEF instead of a regular
FTA. But a step less may raise questions about the commitment of contracting parties and the
strength of enforcement mechanisms. This said, while details are sparse and much work remains
ahead, the message is not lost. The Indo-Pacific is now the world’s center of gravity, and the U.S.
will not relinquish its seat in writing the rules of the road for trade, commerce, and innovation in
this vital geography.
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Playing the economic game right

IPEF signaled that the U.S. is willing and able to compete with China in a field that the latter
came to dominate due to US retreat from multilateral FTAs and the short shelf-life of its economic
initiatives towards the region. The U.S. remains the biggest investor in Southeast Asia, and
Washington can build on this anchor to deepen economic ties with the vibrant region on China’s
periphery. Several factors are bound to increase the likelihood of the region receiving more FDI,
including from the U.S. This includes the growing attraction of ASEAN’s market, uncertainties
brought about by Beijing’s zero Covid-19 policy and a crackdown on Big Tech, and the carrots and
sticks that the U.S. government may put to bear to encourage firms to diversify away from its rival.
As Chinese companies get delisted in U.S. capital markets in the context of intensifying rivalry
spilling into the economic and technology spheres, more spaces are being opened up for ASEAN
firms. For instance, Vietnamese electric vehicle maker VinFast is raring to have its initial public
offering on the New York Stock Exchange soon. If successful, VinFast can blaze the trail for other
Southeast Asian unicorns.
But for IPEF to stay in the game, it must demonstrate survivability. Insulating trade deals
from the vicissitudes of US domestic politics will signal to regional partners that successive US
administrations – regardless of who sits in the White House or the majority party in Congress – will
honor prior international commitments. The 2017 TPP withdrawal undermined confidence in the US
on trade issues. With midterm elections in November and presidential elections in 2024, regional
leaders are hoping IPEF will be spared from major disruptions. Moreover, while setting a deadline
for negotiations is good, Washington has to make allowances for possible delays should talks bog
down. A substantial IPEF beneficial to all parties cannot be substituted for a watered-down version
rushed to score domestic points as the US hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting next year or ahead of the 2024 elections.
The U.S. also has to allay regional concerns that supply chain resilience is not a facade for
upsetting highly-integrated supply chains or accelerating global technological decoupling. Such
fears prompted leaders like former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to encourage the
U.S. to invite China into the IPEF if the grouping is not set in isolating Beijing. For many countries in
the region, China is a top source of raw materials and intermediate inputs, an assembly line, an end
market, and a key investor. Hence, removing China from the equation will create risks and losses on
multiple fronts in the immediate and foreseeable term.
Finally, the U.S. should distill lessons from its past economic overtures to the region and find
synergies with relevant initiatives by partners. For instance, Japan’s long experience in infrastructure
and aid in the region, the India-led Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and International
Solar Alliance, and the infrastructure facet of the Quad have plenty of overlaps with pertinent IPEF
pillars. So too Quad’s other dimensions, notably on climate, cybersecurity, and critical and emerging
technologies. IPEF’s infrastructure pillar can also converge with Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) announced in the recent G7 summit in Germany. Such
diversification away from a long fixation with security can respond to China’s evolving Belt and
Road, which now features health, green and digital strands.
Regional countries are always on the lookout for gainful opportunities and would prefer great
powers to compete in economics rather than security flashpoints any day. While many of them have
disputes with China and appreciate U.S. support for their defense capacity building, they fear losing
agency as great power contest intensifies with their home region as a battleground. As such, they
eschew taking sides and greet win-win initiatives from all partners. IPEF is, therefore, a welcome
addition to the region’s overlapping tapestry of international economic engagements.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
.
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International Law
ISRAEL, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Challenges of Systemic Analysis
Prof. Louis René Beres
“The existence of `system’ in the world is obvious to every observer of nature, no matter
whom.”-Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (1959)
Whether conspicuous or obscure, terrorism presents itself as a systemic challenge. This means,
inter alia, that seemingly singular strategic and legal matters may actually be many-sided and
interrelated. Regarding legal matters, though not ordinarily obvious or understandable,
international law represents an indissoluble part of every individual nation state’s domestic legal
order. To wit, William Blackstone’s Commentaries, echoing 18th century Swiss jurist Emmerich de
Vattel, explains straightforwardly: “Each state is expected to aid and enforce the law of nations, as
part of the common law, by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that
universal law….”
Lest anyone inquire about the special significance of William Blackstone, one need only to
point out that his Commentaries (1760-1769) represents the original foundation of all
United States law.
Still, we are interested here in present-day Israel. Endlessly, in the acrimonious Middle East,
there have been assorted charges and counter-charges. From the beginning of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in the late 1940s, a recurrent Palestinian defense against Israeli denunciation of “terrorism”
has been a counter-charge of IDF “disproportionality.”
What does authoritative international law say about any such defense? More precisely, what
do variously codified and customary legal norms stipulate about such purported violations of the
law of war? These are not merely questions of opinion. The correct answers are discoverable only in
authoritative legal rules.
There are also various subsidiary questions. What are the pertinent risks? What are
corresponding leadership responsibilities? And what is the “contextual” relevance of our
fragmented planet’s continuously “Westphalian” system of international law?
Soon, a reciprocal question will also need to be raised. To the extent that Hamas, Islamic Jihad
and their more-or-less recognizable insurgent allies choose a policy form of “human shields,” the
Palestinian side is guilty of “perfidy.” Any such policy is illegal on its face, and qualifies ipso facto
as a conspicuously “grave breach” of relevant Geneva Conventions. Easily the most critical legal
effect of perfidy committed by Palestinian insurgent leaders – and an effect that Jerusalem ought to
make more plainly evident to observers – is that it immunizes Israeli officials from any responsibility
for inadvertent counterterrorist harms suffered by Arab civilians.
There are many pertinent specifics available for competent study. Perfidy is identified as a
“grave breach” at Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. Deception can be legally acceptable in
armed conflict, but The Hague Regulations expressly disallow any placement of military assets or
personnel in populated civilian areas. Variously related prohibitions of perfidy can be found at
Protocol I of 1977, additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. These rules are also
binding on the discrete but still-intersecting basis of customary international law, a jurisprudential
source identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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Presently embroiled in yet another violent struggle with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and/or
assorted kindred groups, Israel will need to proceed diligently with its identification of proper legal
arguments. Optimally appropriate steps would best ensure that Palestinian war crimes could never
get in the way of Israel’s indispensable self-defense postures, and that Jerusalem could readily abide
by all authoritative expectations of humanitarian international law. Ultimately, though of no
immediate concern, this obligation would become most critical in circumstances where Sunni
and/or Shiite terror attacks were to involve weapons of mass destruction.
It’s time for candor. Such circumstances are implausible, but they are still conceivable. “The
worst,” reminds Swiss playwright Friedrich Durrenmatt, “Sometimes does happen.”
Though interpenetrating or intersecting, law and strategy should always be evaluated
separately, as conceptually discrete elements of Israel’s unified military doctrine. In this connection,
Israel must take prompt measures to convince both its Palestinian insurgent foes and its state
patrons that perfidious terrorist aggressions would be revealed in law and opposed in practice.
These remedial or corrective measures could create an efficient “force multiplier” for Israel, one
wherein the “whole” desired anti-insurgent effect would be greater than the decipherable sum of
legal and military “parts.”
In law, considerations of distinction (discrimination), proportionality and military necessity
set defined limits on the use of armed force. Always, under the customary and codified expectations
of the law of war, these three interpenetrating criteria remain unequivocally binding. When Israel’s
terrorist enemies declare an IDF attack to be “disproportionate,” they wittingly ignore that the rule
of proportionality does not demand tangibly equivalent military harms.
It demands only an amount of force that ispresumptively militarily necessary.
For the most part, the key issues here are clear and straightforward. Any gratuitous infliction
of harms is illegal under the longstanding law of war, but pertinent harms need never be of any
determinably equivalent magnitude. If such equivalence were an actual authoritative expectation,
the United States, following its August 1945 atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would
represent the single most egregious offender of “proportionality” standards in human legal history.
There is more. In the main, governing jurisprudence in such complex matters is unhidden.
Inevitably, perfidy and perfidy-like behavior represent an especially serious violation of the law of
war or law of armed conflict. During Israel’s several Gaza wars, perfidy was exploited with some
measure of tactical success by Hamas, but perhaps far more importantly, with considerable
propagandistic benefit. This is the case primarily because the Israeli side has never been sufficiently
clear in condemning the Palestinian terror group’s linguistic manipulations.
On various carefully-choreographed occasions, the practice of “human shields” was justified
by the Palestinian side in terms of alleged Israeli “disproportionality.” Though clearly successful as
Hamas propaganda, these justifications were simply concocted Palestinian claims. In essence, they
were premised upon irrelevant and intentional manipulations of acceptable legal definition. When
Palestinian insurgents claimed the right to “any means necessary” against Israel, they adopted a
powerful and compelling argument, but one that still remained immutably illegal.
Contrary to oft-repeated Palestinian claims and the derivative claims of assorted insurgent
supporters, the rule of “proportionality” under humanitarian international law does not obligate
any intentional symmetry in the use of armed force. Yet, these claims continue to represent a
markedly useful tactic in mobilizing world public opinion against Israel. All things considered, this
tactic has represented a textbook example of Palestinian “lawfare” at its practical best and law-
violating worst.
International law always regulates world system behaviors. In its particular manifestation as
the law of war, international law requires every use of force (whether exercised by a uniformed
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army or by irregular/insurgent force) to meet the test of “proportionality.” Drawn in part from the
rudimentary legal precept that “the means that can be used to injure an enemy are not unlimited,”
this test of proportionality stipulates that every resort to armed force remain limited to what is
presumed necessary for meeting legitimate military objectives.
Here, the peremptory or jus cogens principle of codified and customary jurisprudence applies
to all judgments of military advantage and to all planned reprisals or retaliations. It does not mean
that each side to an ongoing conflict must at any time agree to suffering or imposing symmetrical
harms.
“Justice,” we may learn originally from Plato’s Republic, means “a contract neither to do nor
to suffer wrong.” Unless there should be substantially greater understanding that perfidious or
perfidious-type behavior by insurgents places direct legal responsibility for correlative harms on
that insurgency, and not on the victimized state or population, sub-state foes could sometime decide
to escalate hostilities. Such manifestly dangerous terrorist escalations could eventually embrace
mega-terror assaults on Israel. These assaults could sometime include an actual use of destructive
nuclear weapon technologies.
To best manage and inhibit such consequential enemy escalations, Jerusalem will have to
choose between creating a maximally seamless web of national deterrence (ranging from narrowly
conventional to broadly nuclear retaliatory attacks) and allowing certain enemy forces to proceed
directly toward WMD terrorist capacities.
For now, such Israeli judgments will have to be made without “benefit” of any relevant
historical experience. In scientific terms, there can never be any authentic assessments of probability
in the absence of pertinent past events. Among other things, the persuasiveness of Israeli deterrent
threats will require Israel’s time-relevant foe to believe that Jerusalem is willing to launch
appropriate military retaliations andis simultaneously capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage.”
Included in this basic requirement of perceived capability would be the capacity to penetrate enemy
active defenses.
There is more. This means, in turn, that Israel’s offensive military forces must stay at least
“one step ahead” of any determined enemy’s missile defense systems. If this tactical advantage were
not present, Israel’s enemy or enemies, no longer having to anticipate unacceptable reprisals, could
sometime feel sufficiently inclined to strike first itself. In such a scenario, by definition, critical Israeli
deterrence could fail altogether.
Terrorism, like perfidy, is a codified crime under authoritative international law, but the
discrete and component crimes are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. De jure, any
human shields-based deceptions launched by anti-Israel terrorists would effectively add a second
layer of illegality to an already underlying insurgent dereliction. Though frequently disregarded,
minimized or disputed, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and Hezbollah insurgencies are inherently
illegal. This is true even if one were to assume “just cause” in all or some of these terror groups.
In law, perfidious tactics are not “only” mala prohibita (“evil as prohibited”), but also malae
in se (“evil in themselves”). This characterization also applies to “lone wolf” terrorist attackers.
Many of the most recent Palestinian terrorists identified by Israel were of this “lone wolf” variety.
And there is more to learn about deception. The terrorist crime of perfidy is not about
deception as such. Under humanitarian international law, deception is never impermissible on its
face. Some forms of deception are generally permitted to states and selectively to lawful insurgents;
that is, to those with arguably “just cause.” Nonetheless, the specific practice of human shields is
always illegal. Its universal prohibition extends to all operational combatants: state, sub-state and
individual.
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During Israel’s several Lebanon wars, Hezbollah, assisted by Syria and Iran, placed its
weapons and fighters in carefully selected areas of Arab civilian population. In the past, ISIS, which
at some earlier point might have been inclined to confront Israel directly, openly employed a human
shields strategy in its battle for Mosul (Iraq). At that time, this prohibited strategy was still useful in
providing ISIS with tangible tactical advantages.
Despite former US President Donald Trump’s reassurances years back that “ISIS has been
defeated,” the Sunni terror group remained more-or-less active in various parts of the Sinai
Peninsula. Not to be forgotten by Israel or its US ally is that the ISIS enemy was never so much a
distinct group or organization of compartmentalized Islamic adversaries as it was an enemy
ideology. Such an ideology can never be eliminated by sending in more and more bombs or missiles.
America, one hopes, ought by now to have learned this same primary lesson in Afghanistan.
To wage successful war against any Jihadist ideology, Israel’s primary “battlefield” must be
analytic or intellectual. In the ancient Greek and Macedonian worlds, this form of struggle was
identified as one of “mind over mind” rather than “mind over matter.” For Israel, the earlier
identification remains valid.
Sooner or later, certain of Israel’s Arab/Islamic terrorist enemies, perhaps under cover of
perfidy, will begin a quantum magnification of operational goals. Then, more or less systematically,
these adversaries will strive to exploit the particular methods and harms that already lie latent in
WMD violence. In one seldom-mentioned nuance of this threat, the enemy party, whether state or
terror-organization, could aim its conventional rockets against Israel’s nuclear reactor at Dimona.
Though unprecedented, the basic results of any such attack are not difficult to fathom.
The dangers of extraordinary unconventional terrorism could be enlarged in the absence
of ordinary strategic logic. Moreover, these dangers could become still more consequen tial if
insurgent enemies of Israel and their allies would become more expressly oriented toward what
French philosopher Albert Camus (The Rebel; 1956) called “crimes of passion.” Here, animated
by the clarion call of jihad and operating outside of any rules of rationality – outside what
Camus calls “crimes of logic” – these terrorists could sometime opt for inflicting chemical,
biological or (potentially) nuclear destruction upon Israel. In this connection, former Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s persistent threats of “unimaginable” reprisals against
Hamas missed the point.
Foreseeably, any terrorist nuclear threat would be limited to a “dirty bomb” attack, although it
could already extend, at least in principle, to assorted conventional assaults upon Israel’s Dimona
reactor. It is even possible that the selection of WMD terror would be detached from any rationally
considered calculations of geopolitical advantage. Plainly, there exists no good historical or
intellectual reason to expect only rational behavior in world politics.
Writing about the species of fear that arises from tragedy, ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle
emphasized in Poetics that such fear “demands a person who suffers undeservedly” and must also
be felt by “one of ourselves.” This fear, or terror, has little or nothing to do with any private
concerns for impending misfortune to others, but rather from our own perceived resemblance to the
victim. Terror, therefore, is generally fear referred back to ourselves. The credible threat of chemical,
biological, or nuclear terrorism could sometime prove purposeful from the jointly comprehensive
standpoints of enemy passion and enemy logic.
Going forward, Israel should more clearly communicate to its insurgent foes that any
contemplated excursions into higher-order forms of destruction could never elicit Israeli
capitulations. To ensure that such communications have the best possible chances of success, it is
most important that Israel’s terrorist enemies foresee no meaningful advantages to staging
“perfidious” assaults. Always, for the State of Israel, law and strategy must be contemplated
together, as closely interdependent parts of a single coherent national security policy.
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There remains one last point concerning tangible links of Israeli counter-terrorism strategy
to US foreign policy. A few years ago, former President Donald J. Trump pointed with
ostentatious and self-congratulatory pride to the “Abraham Accords,” but these agreements
negotiated via America’s “good offices” did nothing to meaningfully reduce the probability or
intensity of Israel-terrorist conflict. In essence, they did little more than marginally improve
Israel’s relations with states that had never been real anti-Israel belligerents. Quite plainly, Israelis
ought not sleep any better at night knowing that a surprise attack from Bahrain, UAE, Sudan or
Morocco is now less likely.
There is a connected and concluding observation. Israel’s adversarial relationship with
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian insurgent groups can never be improved by forging
national agreements with secondary-state foes. Agreements like the Trump-brokered Abraham
Accords were designed only for the former president’s domestic political benefit, and merely
exacerbated Israel’s relations with its Palestinian foes. To finally get beyond its corrosively
belligerent relations with the Palestinian side, Israel’s diplomacy will need to be based upon more
authentically intellectual and legal foundations. In the interim, among other things, variously
binding standards of international law should be acknowledged by all sides and by the wider global
community. Before this can happen, however, all sides will likely be impacted by what happens in
the Russian war against Ukraine, a uniquely barbarous post-World War II aggression that harbors
potentially nuclear elements.
This assessment of Israeli counter-terrorism has been about complex considerations of law and
strategy. Accordingly, in legal and strategic terms, the world is always best studied as a system. If
certain conventional-nuclear firebreaks are crossed for the first time by Vladimir Putin in Ukraine,
the consequences will be felt widely and deeply in various other places, including the Middle East. It
follows that Israel’s ongoing and escalating war on terror will have to draw systematically upon a
broad variety of nuanced insights and intersecting operations.
To do otherwise could prove too costly for Israel. Effective counter-terrorism is never a proper
subject matter for “common sense” resolution. Its multiple and overlapping elements can never be
suitably untangled by pundits, opportunists or politicos.
Israeli counter-terrorism is a strategic and legal subject, one that should always be approached
as both a systemic and dialectical challenge. It follows, going forward, that the most valuable
“armaments” available to Israeli security planners will plausibly be disciplined thinkers of
uncommonly high intellect. In a national and global society long accustomed to identifying heroes
with large guns and heavy missiles, acknowledging these “softer” armaments will not come easily.
Nonetheless, such acknowledgment will prove indispensable to effective and law-based
security protections.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)

WHEN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ARE

CONTRADICTORY
America’s Dilemma in Ukraine
Louis Rene Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971)
Ongoing Russian crimes against Ukraine are egregious and overlapping. Most conspicuous of
these crimes are Vladimir Putin’s acts of aggression and of genocide. Jurisprudentially, even if Putin
lacks any confirmable “intent to destroy” specific Ukrainian populations, Russia’s law-breaking
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behavior would still rise to the level of other relevant criteria or standards. Most recognizable, in this
regard, would be Putin’s forcible deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
What are United States obligations in this “peremptory” matter? Inter alia, these obligations
can never be permissibly disregarded. Among pertinent considerations, attempts by Washington to
modify or halt Putin’s lawbreaking in Ukraine could also increase the odds of a superpower nuclear
confrontation. How then, a basic query surfaces, should the United States do what is needed against
Russia’s genocide in Ukraine without simultaneously encouraging a superpower nuclear crisis?
Significantly, this decisional dilemma is sui generis, or without precedent. In essence, there
exist no tangible guidelines to answer such a potentially existential question with precision or
reliability. In any event, leaving aside complicating particulars, American decision-makers must take
explicit note of the two relevant concerns (nuclear war and genocide) and assess the risks of each
concern. In the end, these decisions will concern comparative hazards, including variously subtle
ways in which nuclear war risks and genocide risks could impact each other.
For the United States, international law enforcement is never just a volitional matter. Because
such enforcement has been “incorporated” into the law of the United States (see Article VI of the US
Constitution and two key cases from the US Supreme Court: Paquete Habana, 1900 and Tel Oren
versus Libyan Arab Republic, 1984), it would support variously binding expectations of American
domestic law.
There is more. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948) obliges signatories not only to avoid committing genocide themselves, but also to oppose and
prevent genocidal behavior committed by other states. At Article III of this Convention, the
obligation extends to grave acts involving “conspiracy to commit genocide,” “attempt to commit
genocide,” and “complicity in genocide.” Such core expectations are known formally in law as
“peremptory” or “jus cogens” rules. This signifies rules or obligations that permit “no derogation.”
There is more. These obligations are discoverable in corollary and complementary expressions
of international law, both customary and codified. More specifically, even if a transgressor state
were not a party to the Genocide Convention, it would still be bound by customary law and (per Art
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) by “the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.”
Neither international law nor US law advises any particular penalties or sanctions for states
that choose not to prevent or punish genocide committed by others. But all states, most notably
“major powers” belonging to the UN Security Council, are bound by “peremptory obligation”
defined at Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is the always
fundamental legal requirement to act in continuous “good faith.”
The “good faith” or Pacta sunt servanda obligation is derived from an even more basic norm
of world law. Known commonly as “mutual assistance,” this civilizing norm was famously
identified within the interstices of classical jurisprudence by eighteenth-century legal scholar,
Emmerich de Vattel. Later, it was reaffirmed by William Blackstone, whose meticulously assembled
Commentaries on the Laws of England became the bedrock of United States law.
As a historic aside, Vattel, whose The Law of Nations was first published in 1758, became a
favored jurisprudential source of Thomas Jefferson. In fact, this American founding father relied
upon his brilliant Swiss antecedent for many key principles he later chose to include in the
Declaration of Independence. As a present-day matter, a prospectively revealing question should
arise: How many American citizens can imagine an American president reading classical political
philosophy or international law?
It’s a silly question, even after Donald J. Trump’s inglorious departure.
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Back to Ukraine. In the strictest sense, though the United States could never be held
accountable under law for any legal abandonment of the Ukrainian people, any willful failure to act
against Putin in this arena of ongoing Russian criminality would violate general and immutable
principles of international law. This anti-genocide regime includes the London Charter of August 8,
1945; UN Charter (1945); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(1970); Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal (1946, 1950); and the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State
Responsibility (2001).
In its landmark judgment of 26 February 2007 “Concerning Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that all Contracting Parties have a direct
obligation to “prevent genocide.” Somewhat counter-intuitively, the ICJ found it easier to
acknowledge this obligation expressis verbis (“with clarity”) than by referencing the corollary legal
requirement not to commit genocide themselves.
Much earlier, sixteenth-century Florentine philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli fused Aristotle’s
plans for a more scientific study of world politics with assorted cynical assumptions about geopolitics.
His best-known conclusion focuses on the palpably timeless dilemma of practicing goodness in an evil
world: “A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything,” Machiavelli asserts in
The Prince, “must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good.”
If taken too literally, however, this conspicuously cynical assessment could lead not only
individuals but also entire nations toward a primal “state of nature.” Among other things, this
retrograde trajectory would describe a condition of rampant anarchy and disorder, one best clarified
by another classic political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. In his Leviathan (a work similarly well-
known to Thomas Jefferson), life in this “every man for himself” condition is grievously harsh. Such
a corrosively sad individual life, we may learn from the seventeenth-century Englishman, must be
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”
What Hobbes was unable to foresee were the devastating consequences of any future
exacerbations of anarchy by nuclear weapons.
Gabriela Mistral, the Chilean poet who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1945, wrote that
crimes against humanity carry within themselves “a moral judgment over an evil in which every
feeling man and woman concurs.” Today, continuing to coexist with other states in a self-help or
vigilante system of international law, the United States should do whatever is legally possible to
publicize and impede Russia’s genocide or genocide-like crimes against Ukraine, but do so without
expanding the likelihood of superpower nuclear confrontations. In this daunting dual-level
obligation, though there would exist no “ready to use” policy guidelines, critical national policy
choices will still have to be made.
Origins will be important. The core origins of both war and genocide lie not in monstrous
individual persons (we know this from authoritative scholarly exegeses of the Holocaust and certain
other genocides), but in collectivities, in whole societies that effectively loathe the individual. In such
societies, as we may learn especially from such “existential” thinkers as Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, Ortega y’ Gassett, Hesse and Jung, the “mass” becomes more tangibly “omnivorous” and
further inclines the now voracious state toward murderous foreign policies.
As long as powerful states are driven by “mass,” they will regard themselves, per nineteenth-
century German philosopher Hegel, as the “march of God in the world.” With such a fundamentally
distorted view, these states can become, as Nietzsche explains in Zarathustra, “…the coldest of all
cold monsters.” Plainly, such intolerable transformations could include variously palpable
inclinations toward war and genocide.
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In the 21st century, for some of these states, a war in such circumstances could become
nuclear. Should this happen, antecedent legal issues of an American policy balance between nuclear
war avoidance and genocide prevention would immediately become moot. This is because nuclear
war and genocide will no longer represent discrete or separate perils.
Now, nuclear war itself will have become the de facto instrument or creator of genocide.
(Source: Jurist)

CONVENTION ON THE LAWS OF THE SEA AND

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES
Gleice Miranda and Valentina Maljak
Interstate conflicts have shaped the destiny of nations since the very beginning of their
formation. Wars between and within states have helped to forge the current international system,
creating new laws and governments, and solidifying ancient ones. However, conflicts also
jeopardize peace and security around the world, especially when they do not receive due attention
from the international community. One such conflict is currently underway in the South China Sea
(SCS). The tensions are territorial in nature, with some parties claiming the rights to islands based on
international law and conventions, and others asserting their claims as historical rights. Overtime, as
tensions increased, the parties have attempted to settle their dispute with the help of international
bodies, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the application of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, little to no success has been achieved in
decreasing the conflict in the region. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to provide a
geopolitical and legal overview of the SCS disputes, focusing on the importance of the region and
identifying the different territorial claims; (2) to explain the major attempt at conflict resolution in
the region made through UNCLOS and the PCA; and (3) to critically analyse the impact of UNCLOS
on the SCS disputes, highlighting its merits and shortcomings in the region’s main attempt at
conflict resolution.
The second section of this chapter provides a background on the SCS conflict, focusing on the
reasons and the details for it. It examines the strategic importance of the region, as well as analyses
the various territorial claims, explaining the assertions made by the primary claimant states. The
third section reflects on the dispute settlement mechanism under the auspices of UNCLOS,
providing an overview of the convention to guide the discussion. Then, it investigates the arbitration
between the Philippines and China, which was brought before the PCA. The fourth section provides
a brief analysis of the UNCLOS conflict resolution mechanism in light of the South China Sea
Arbitration.
Dispute Background
The SCS encompasses several hundred small islands, reefs, and atolls, almost all uninhabited
and uninhabitable, within a 1.4 million square mile area (Bader 2016). Two island groups – the
Spratly and Paracel Islands – have been the primary focus of the disputes for decades due to their
significance to the coastal countries surrounding them.
First, the region is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, but accurate estimates are difficult to
find. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the area contains 11 billion
barrels of untapped oil and 190-500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (EIA 2013), while the Ministry of
Geological Resources and Mining of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the
number of barrels may be as high as 130 billion (Kaplan 2015). Second, the area is a major trading
route. Namely, it is considered as one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world with an annual
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trade of US$5.3 trillion passing through the region (CFR 2017). This number represents half of the
world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage and a third of all maritime traffic globally (Kaplan 2015).
Additionally, the oil transported through the South China Sea coming from the Indian Ocean
is three times greater than the amount that transits the Suez Canal and 15 times more than what goes
through the Panama Canal. The primary driver for this has been the increase in China’s oil
consumption, as well as a large part of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan’s energy supplies coming
through the region. Hence, it is no surprise that control of the area is of extreme importance. For
instance, China has dubbed the South China Sea its Second Persian Gulf: not only does 80% of the
country’s crude oil imports pass through the region, but also a huge assortment of goods (Kaplan
2015; CFR 2017).
This aspect of the region is one of the major causes for the contentions regarding the islands,
since many of them lie in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the
Philippines. Thus, it is not surprising that these coastal states, along with China, Brunei and the
Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, are pushing forward with their own territorial claims in the
area. Each wants to secure its own national interests by asserting their rights to exclusive
exploitation of the region through the utilization of international law and other mechanisms to
assure those are protected and exercised.
Furthermore, the South China Sea has some of the world’s richest reef systems, with more
than 3,000 indigenous and migratory fish species. It also constitutes more than 12% of worldwide
fishing (Greer 2016). Thus, the region offers abundant fishing opportunities, and whoever has
control over its waters will have the potential to support and further develop its fishery sector. This
aspect of the SCS has already led to many clashes in the region between the Philippines and Chinese
fishing vessels (Kaplan 2015; EIA 2016).
Moreover, competition over fisheries in the area has been escalating, and it tends to increase
more over time once fishing in the region becomes more jeopardized. In 2008, it was already
estimated that the fishery stocks in the region were becoming depleted, with 25% being over-
exploited and 50% fully exploited without any attempts at developing sustainable fishing practices
in the region (Greer 2016).
Territorial Claims
The claims in the SCS are twofold. While some allegations are based on historical rights,
others appeal to provisions of UNCLOS. These multiple territorial claims indicate a lack of
agreement among the parties, which resulted in a regional conflict that has been happening for
decades. The analysis of these claims (Figures 1.1 and 1.2) will be made in light of UNCLOS
guidelines from 1982, since all coastal states in Southeast Asia have ratified it. Thus, an overview of
most claimant parties will be conducted, to clarify their allegations and highlight the leading issues
in the conflict, focusing on claims made by China and the Philippines, to better establish the case
studied in this chapter.
Vietnam
Hanoi claims the Spratly and Paracel Islands along with the Gulf of Thailand. However,
unlike China, Vietnam has not written its extended claims over the South China Sea in official texts
or maps. As far as the Spratly Islands are concerned, in the 1970s, Vietnam established them as an
offshore district of the Khanh Hoa Province, occupying several islands. That same decade, China
seized the archipelago in a military engagement known as the Battle of the Paracel Islands (EIA
2013; Tonnesson 2000). In a bid to solidify its claims, Vietnam employed archaeologists to provide
evidence to support the country’s long historic presence in the SCS. It was asserted that the state has
actively dominated both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century (BBC 2016).
Consequently, China, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines oppose Vietnam’s claims.
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Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted their territorial claims in the South China Sea to the
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009 (CLCS 2009). The submission was
considered legitimate, and the countries had to clarify their positions on the legal status of features
and limits of their claims in the region (EIA 2013; Nguyen 2020). Vietnam also adopted a maritime
law in 2012 in which it claimed jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, requiring that all
naval ships from foreign states register with Vietnamese authorities when passing through the
region (EIA 2013).
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur’s participation in the SCS disputes started in 1979, when the Malaysian
Department of Mapping and Survey unveiled an official map placing the Spratly Islands within the
country’s continental shelf (Roach 2014). This map overlapped the EEZ and continental shelf of
Malaysia and other states, which drew protests from neighbours including China, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines. Although Malaysia’s claim was considered weak by some legal
analysts (EIA 2013; Roach 2014), it was not inferior to China or Vietnam’s claims to the entire Spratly
archipelago.
In 2009, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of UNCLOS[1], Malaysia and Vietnam jointly
submitted to the CLCS information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured in respect of the
southern part of the South China Sea (CLCS 2009). To date, the CLCS did not make any
recommendations matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf.
Nevertheless, the actions of these two countries can be regarded as steps within international law to
solidify their claims.
A decade later, in 2019, Malaysia made a partial submission to the CLCS for the remaining
portion of states’ the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the northern part of the SCS
(Malaysia 2017). Previously, Malaysia’s position on the dispute had often been characterised as
subdued: practicing quiet diplomacy and demonstrating a willingness to strengthen bilateral ties
with China, rather than confronting Beijing publicly (Parameswaran 2016). Following their latest
submission, Kuala Lumpur’s strategy seemed to change, leaning towards compliance with UNCLOS
and departing from an alignment with China’s position. Additionally, Malaysia has also used
diplomatic, political, and economic measures to sustain its claims by improving its ties with the
United States and supporting a united front on the part of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (Parameswaran 2016; Nguyen 2020).
Brunei
After it gained independence in 1984, Brunei released maps in which it declared a 200-nautical
mile EEZ overlapping the Chinese nine-dash line and a continental shelf extending to a hypothetical
median with Vietnam. In so doing, the Brunei government claimed part of the Spratly Islands
archipelago closer to its EEZ in the north of Borneo (Rüland 2005). Perceived for years as a silent
claimant, Brunei bases its claims on UNCLOS (EIA 2013; Putra 2021).
Brunei has often adopted a cooperative, neutral stance regarding the SCS disputes, being in
favour of a collective approach to providing maritime security and resolving disagreements
(Brunei’s Ministry of Defence 2011). At times, however, the sultanate has sided with China’s
preference for bilateral agreements, due to its weaker military power and dependency on oil
reserves to sustain its economy and monarchical rule (Putra 2021).
China
The People’s Republic of China bases its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands on historical
naval expeditions dating back to the 15th century (EIA 2013). In 1947, the Kuomintang – then, the
party in control of China – drew a line around the aforementioned islands, calling it the nine-dash
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line map (Figure 1.3). In doing so, China declared its sovereignty over all islands enveloped by this
line (Nguyen 2015). After the Communist Party ascended to power in 1949 and established the PRC,
the new government continued to use this map in official correspondence and claimed rights to the
waters within it. Currently, China maintains its claim over the SCS based on this and other historical
evidence (EIA 2013).
In 2009, following the joint submission of Vietnam and Malaysia to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), China submitted the nine-dash line map to the CLCS,
seeking to solidify its claim and legitimize it beyond 200 nautical miles.[2] China’s claims resulted in
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines also declaring rights over the islands and various
zones in the SCS, directly contesting the Chinese claims (EIA 2013). However, the nine-dash line
map is not in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS. Namely, the Convention stipulates
guidelines on baselines, the width of territorial waters, the regime of islands[3], the low-tide
elevations, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, the maritime boundary delimitation,
and dispute settlement, which are all applicable to the South China Sea (United Nations 1982).
Hence, the foundation of the Chinese claims over the islands is unsubstantiated because it fails to
follow the Convention’s determinations and does not provide sufficient historical evidence.
Nevertheless, aiming to reclaim land in the South China Sea, China has engaged in island-
building, increasing the size of islands and turning islets and other features into full-fledged islands
in order to produce an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles (CFR 2017). Therefore, PRC is claiming its
rights over and around the islands that cannot naturally support habitation, as well as building new
ones to expand the area that would be under its sovereignty.
These actions go against UNCLOS, which states in Article 121, paragraph 3 that ‘rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.’ Unsurprisingly, China’s position and operations have complicated
Beijing’s relationships with its neighbours, which also have claims in the region. As a result, the
disputes have escalated tremendously, leading to situations where vessels have been sunk, and
military exercises have been performed to assert sovereignty (EIA 2013).
The Philippines
Manila’s claims are both legal and historical over the Scarborough Shoal and the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), which is comprised of 50 features of the Spratly islands (Rosen 2014). These
claims clash with China’s declarations of ownership. In 1956, the Philippine government began
explorations in the SCS, legitimizing those by claiming that the islands and the shoal were terra
nullius, or no man’s land, and furthered it by occupying several of the Spratly Islands and naming
them the Kalayaan Island Group. In addition, the Philippines declared the aforementioned islands
and shoals as a special regime of islands that, in spite of being distinct from the rest of the Philippine
archipelago, belongs to Manila (EIA 2013).
Under the provisions of UNCLOS, Philippine sovereignty appears stronger, because an EEZ
can be declared up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Both groups of islands are 400 nautical
miles closer to the Philippines than to China, are within the Philippine’s EEZ and are recognized as
such under UNCLOS. In spite of being consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, China, Malaysia,
and Vietnam have objected to the Philippines’ claims, which led to an increase of tensions in the SCS
(CFR 2017).
Attempts at Resolution: UNCLOS and South China Sea Arbitration
In the attempt to find a peaceful resolution, bilateral and multilateral agreements were
pursued by the claimant parties, and some were signed.[4] Due to the scope of this chapter, we will
forgo the investigation of such agreements, and hereby examine the UNCLOS mechanism for
dispute settlement and its role in the SCS conflict.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The first call for a ‘constitution of the seas’ was brought forth on 1 November 1967 by Arvid
Pardo, then Ambassador to the United Nations. In his speech at the General Assembly, he addressed
the issues of emerging rivalry between states, which was spreading to the oceans; the pollution of
the seas; the conflicting legal claims and their collateral effects on stability and order; and the
potential richness of the seabed (United Nations 1967; United Nations 1998).
After three UN conferences on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS was created. The UNCLOS III
came into effect on 14 November 1994 precisely 21 years after the first meeting and one year after
ratification by the sixtieth state (GRID-Arendal 2014). To date, there are 168 state-parties to the
agreement (United Nations 2020). One of the main purposes of UNCLOS III is to strengthen peace,
security, cooperation, and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of
justice and equal rights (United Nations 1982). The unique dispute resolution system under
UNCLOS is one of the most notable features of the Convention.
Dispute Resolution Mechanism under UNCLOS
Professor Natalie Klein, dean of Macquarie Law School in 2014, started her assessment of the
20 years of dispute settlement under UNCLOS stating that one should always reach for the stars,
and if one only reaches the rooftops, then at least one had gotten off the ground (Klein 2014). Such
ambition can be found in the idealized version of the dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS,
once it aimed to be compulsory and indispensable to the solution of all maritime disputes. The result
was a politically realistic system with various dispute settlement means, exceptions and limitations,
but still compulsory and indispensable to some disputes. Thus, it can be argued that ‘it is not
possible to conclude that UNCLOS dispute settlement regime has reached the stars, but we can have
a healthy debate as to what level rooftop has been reached’ (Klein 2014, 359).
The limitations and exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement were set out in Part XV,
Section 3 of UNCLOS (Churchill 2017). For instance, before resortin.g to compulsory dispute
settlement under Part XV, Section 2, the parties had to first try to resolve their dispute by the means
provided in Part XV, Section 1. Articles 279–285 of said Section 1 lay out the obligation to settle
disputes by peaceful means. It gives parties the option to settle disputes by any peaceful means[5]
they choose; sets out a procedure for when no settlement can be reached by the parties; refers to
obligations under general, regional, or bilateral agreements; sets out rules for conciliation; and
provides for the application of this section to disputes submitted pursuant to Part XI – the Area
(United Nations 1982).[6]
Additionally, under Article 283 of UNCLOS, states have an obligation to exchange views
regarding settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS by
negotiation or other peaceful means. Furthermore, the parties shall continue to exchange views even
where the dispute has not been solved through peaceful means, but it requires consultation on the
manner of implementing the settlement (United Nations 1982).
Only after such attempts at dispute settlement have proven to be unsuccessful can one resort
to Part XV, Section 2 of UNCLOS, which sets out rules for the resolution of disputes between State
Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of UNCLOS (Tribunal 2018). Pursuant to
Article 287(1) of UNCLOS, when signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS, a state may make a
declaration choosing one or more of the following means for settling such disputes:
 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany;
 the International Court of Justice in The Hague, The Netherlands;
 ad hoc arbitration (in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS); or
 a “special arbitral tribunal” constituted for certain categories of disputes (established under
Annex VIII of UNCLOS).
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The variety of choices for dispute settlement forums was a necessary precondition for state
parties to accept the compulsory jurisdiction, even more so as they were unable to agree on a single
forum (Churchill 2017). Additionally, it is set out in Article 287(3) of UNCLOS that arbitration under
Annex VII is the default means of dispute settlement in cases where a state has not declared a
preference for a dispute resolution mechanism available under Article 287(1) of UNCLOS, or when a
state has not made any reservation or optional exceptions pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS.
Pursuant to Article 287(5) of UNCLOS, if the parties have not accepted the same procedure for
the settlement of disputes, the dispute can only be submitted for arbitration under Annex VII.
However, as stated above, there are limitations and exceptions to the compulsory dispute
settlement.
In Part XV, Section 3, Article 297, limitations and exceptions to the aforementioned dispute
settlement fora leaves a possibility for states when signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention
– or at any time thereafter – to declare in writing that it does not accept one or more of the provided
procedures. Such a statement can be made with respect to one or more disputes concerning
maritime boundaries with neighbouring states or those involving historic bays or titles, disputes
concerning military activities, and certain kinds of law enforcement activities in an EEZ and/or
disputes over which Security Council is exercising its duties under the UN Charter (United Nations
1982; Churchill 2017)[7].
It is also provided in Article 297 that there is no obligation for a coastal state to accept referral
by another state to legally binding dispute settlement concerning the exercise of its rights in the
fisheries and marine scientific research (Churchill 2017). Nevertheless, some of the disputes that are
exempted from compulsory dispute settlement are subject to compulsory conciliation. Hence, the
compulsory dispute settlement system under UNCLOS is one of its biggest assets, despite the
difficult road travelled to reach it.
Permanent Court of Arbitration (Tribunal) – South China Sea Arbitration
As mentioned above, a member state of UNCLOS may choose the ITLOS, the ICJ, an ad hoc
arbitration, or a ‘special arbitral tribunal’ to settle its dispute. After failing to solve the dispute
through negotiations, the Philippines elected to bring its dispute against China on the SCS before the
Tribunal. The arbitration started on 22 January 2013 under the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions of UNCLOS. It is important to stress that UNCLOS does not address the sovereignty of
states over land territory which the Tribunal itself has also underlined in the final award brought in
the case at hand.
The arbitration deals with disputes between the parties regarding the legal basis of maritime
rights and entitlement in the SCS; the status of certain geographic features in the SCS; and the
lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the SCS. The Tribunal in its final award sorted the
Philippines’ requests into four categories to be resolved:
 dispute concerning the source of maritime rights and entitlement in the SCS;
 dispute concerning the entitlement to maritime zones that would be generated under the
UNCLOS by Scarborough Shoal and certain maritime features in the Spratly Islands claimed
by both the Philippines and China;
 series of disputes concerning the lawfulness of China’s actions in the SCS;
 to find that China has aggravated and extended the disputes between the parties during the
course of this arbitration by restricting access to a detachment of Philippines’ marines and by
engaging in the large-scale construction of artificial islands and land reclamation at seven
reefs in the Spratly Islands.
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From the beginning, China made it clear that it refused to participate in the arbitration or to
comply with the final award. China communicated this position in public statements and in many
diplomatic Notes Verbales, both to the Philippines and to the Tribunal.
Furthermore, in 2006, China made a declaration to exclude maritime boundary delimitations
from its acceptance of a compulsory dispute settlement. This is one of the objections that China
expressed in its Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea, sent to the
Tribunal on 12 July 2014, where it offered an extensive legal analysis of each of its objections and
expressed its refusal to comply with the Tribunal’s decision (PRC 2014).
In its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Tribunal found that it could not agree with
China’s arguments and concluded that it indeed had jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, even
though China insisted that its communication should not be interpreted as participation, the
Tribunal, during adjudication, took all this into account.
The Tribunal overwhelmingly ruled in favour of the Philippines in the award released on 12
July 2016. It concluded that, in the matter of China’s claims of historical rights and its nine-dash line,
China had no legal basis to claim historical rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the
nine-dash line. The Tribunal found that China and other states had historically made use of the
islands in the SCS, but it found no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control
over the waters and their resources (Tribunal 2016).
The Tribunal also concluded that the Spratly Islands could not generate its own EEZ because
they were not inhabited and it was historically impossible for them to be inhabited, and under the
provision of UNCLOS: ‘[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.’ Thus, the Tribunal declared that the
areas are within the EEZ of the Philippines, stating that ‘those areas are not overlapped by any
possible entitlement of China’ (Tribunal 2016, 10).
Post-Award Developments
After the award was released, China continued to oppose the ruling and did not recognize the
award. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stood behind the state’s interpretation that since the
Tribunal proceeded with the arbitration despite China’s refusal to participate, this voided and
nullified the award (Philips et al. 2016). As such, the Chinese government stated that China’s
territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the region remained unaffected by the ruling.
In the Philippines, meanwhile, there was a reversal of policy. Following the election of
Rodrigo Duterte as president in 2016 on an anti-American, pro-China platform, Manila declared
that it wanted to ‘set the award aside’ and renegotiate the dispute settlement directly with China
(The Guardian 2016). This capitulation to Beijing was an indication of Duterte’s ambition to boost
Sino-Filipino ties in a bid to attract Chinese investment (Camba 2018). Duterte also stressed his
intention to decrease the Philippines’ dependence on the United States, going as far as to no longer
consider America an ally, and turning toward China for economic partnership (The Guardian
2016; BBC 2017).
However, in 2019, Duterte began to show signs of standing up to Chinese forays into the
Philippine territory, especially after tensions rose due to People’s Liberation Army Navy incursions
and the gathering of Chinese fishing vessels near the Philippines’ Pag-asa Island – the
administrative centre of the Kalayaan group and located 932 kilometres southwest of Manila.
Duterte declared tensions could escalate to armed conflict to protect the island if necessary (The
Guardian 2019). In 2020, Duterte delivered a speech to the 75th UN General Assembly in which he
expressed support for the Hague’s ruling, stating that the award is ‘part of international law, beyond
compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish, or abandon’ (Duterte
2020). Additionally, Duterte asserted that any attempts by China to undermine the award would be
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rejected and fought off. To support this position, the United States stated that in the event of an
armed attack, it would come to the Philippines’ aid, notwithstanding the current shaken state of
their relationship (Strangio 2020). These developments, and the maintenance of claims by both
China and the Philippines, further complicate the chances for peaceful resolution of the dispute.
Thus, the SCS disputes continue to rage on and to draw the attention of the international
society. This unresolved territorial feud has the potential to escalate to armed conflict, which would
bring insecurity and instability to the region. Having in mind the importance of the region, it is of
high priority to settle this dispute peacefully, avoiding any kind of armed conflict.
Analysing the Dispute Settlement Mechanism under UNCLOS in South China Sea
States are generally amenable to the UNCLOS system because it enables them to retain control
over the dispute and negotiate the conditions of a resolution rather than to find themselves bound
by strict rules of law. Furthermore, the unpredictability of international litigation also favours
negotiation (Churchill 2017). As such, the choice between diplomatic means of dispute settlement
and settlement through litigation is a matter of economic, political, and public reputation strategy.
States will rarely choose to litigate when they are aware the chances of losing the dispute are
reasonably high. Moreover, dispute resolution through diplomatic means is cheaper, could be faster,
and gives states enough space to mitigate the negative publicity that could result from litigation
(Churchill 2017).
Nevertheless, there are cases where negotiations have failed to generate a settlement or to
maintain an agreed-upon settlement as such. The disputes in the SCS fall into the latter category[8].
The UNCLOS mechanism gives states, especially weaker ones, comfort and protection in cases
where one of the parties to a dispute – like China in the SCS – consistently insists on only addressing
disputes through bilateral negotiations, because it enjoys significant advantages over other
countries. It is notable that the Tribunal in the award in the South China Sea Arbitration
acknowledged the importance of negotiation in dispute settlement, stressing that the parties were
free to use other methods of dispute settlement but only if those were in accordance with
international law (Nguyen 2018).
One of the advantages of compulsory dispute settlement mechanism is the variety of dispute
settlement forums from which states can choose, all of which have positive and negative aspects. As
seen, arbitration under Part VII is a default dispute settlement mechanism in case disputing parties
chose different fora. Furthermore, arbitration is a forum more flexible than, for example, the ICJ or
ITLOS, since the appointment of arbitrators and decisions about procedures and rules of arbitration
remains under the control of the disputing parties (Singh 2016). One of the main disadvantages is
the high financial cost of such arbitration, since both parties must pay high fees to arbitrators and
court registrars, pay to rent the premises in which proceedings are held, and pay for secretarial and
interpreting services. Another challenge for arbitration than cost is its perceived lower status when
compared with other fora. For instance, it has been argued that arbitration does not possess the same
prestige as the ICJ does, which is reflected in the higher rates of compliance with ICJ decisions
compared to arbitral tribunal awards (Singh 2016).
Such issues of non-compliance can be highlighted in China’s declared non-participation,
disobedience, and disregard toward the arbitral award issued in the South China Sea Arbitration. It
is indisputable that the award failed to settle the dispute or mitigate its escalation. Nevertheless, it
would be a mistake to completely categorize it as a failure. The award has, for the first time in
international jurisprudence, provided clarification on the meaning of historic rights claims and the
regime of islands pursuant to Article 121 of UNCLOS (Nguyen 2018, 105). Moreover, by rejecting
China’s claims based on the nine-dash line, the Tribunal has also showed its stance toward excessive
claims and reduced the maritime areas subject to the dispute. By doing so, the Tribunal provided
clarification of disputed areas and lawful overlapping claims. This is important because, prior to the
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award, disputant states in the region had not defined which features they believed were islands and
what maritime zones they are entitled to claim from such islands (Nguyen 2018, 104). Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that a significant number of states will clarify their claims based on the
definitions provided in the award. Such can already be seen in Malaysia’s 2019 partial submission,
in which the state defined the extent of its northern and southern continental shelfs (Malaysia 2017).
In doing so, Kuala Lumpur showed implicit support to the 2016 Tribunal award and strengthened
the Tribunal’s stance. This could consequently lead to more states doing the same and, at last, to
some form of dispute settlement.
Lastly, enforcement of and compliance with decisions made under international law is not a
new challenge. Nevertheless, history has shown that sometimes the non-compliance rhetoric of a
state does not always reflect its actions and behaviour in the field, which indicates that lack of an
enforcement mechanism does not necessarily translate to non-compliance (Nguyen 2018).
Furthermore, even in cases where dispute settlement mechanisms have failed to generate
compliance or mitigate the escalation of a dispute, it still provided some clarification on the
interpretation and application of the relevant provisions, which could be crucial in a final dispute
settlement.
Conclusion
The South China Sea disputes have been shaping relationships among nations for various
decades. Not only are the states directly involved in the disputes impacted, but also those outside of
it, who have been trying to reduce the tensions and find agreements on the multiple overlapping
claims. The abundant natural resources in the area and its strategic geography put the disputes at
the very centre of the states’ national interests. As presented, the disputes are territorial, and the
parties used historical (mostly China) and legal arguments (Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and
Vietnam) to support their claims.
Throughout the years, there have been attempts to decrease tensions and solve the SCS
conflicts through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Due to failure in the maintenance of such
agreements, the Philippines took their dispute with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
one of the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanism. The Tribunal found that the disputed area fell
within the Philippines EEZ, which made China’s claims legally and historically unsubstantiated.
However, China’s refusal to recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and final award highlighted the
struggle of international law to resolve the dispute. Nevertheless, this chapter presented that
compulsory adherence to the dispute settlement system and the multiple fora are two of the
advantages of the UNCLOS. However, such are challenged by non-compliance and the lack of
enforcing apparatuses international law.
Additionally, when negotiations are the preferred method of settling disputes, such dispute
resolution should definitely have a priority. However, it is important to ensure that this kind of
mechanism is used properly to give voice and security to smaller states in the international arena.
Hence, it provides a balance to the power dynamics of the international system, once less-influential
states have the option of resorting to compulsory dispute settlement fora under UNCLOS to resolve
conflicts. Moreover, it was shown that even when an attempt to settle a dispute through a judicial
forum fails, it may still create a significant legacy in form of interpretation and clarification, which
could lead to conflict resolution within and without such legal settings.
(Source: E-International Relations)
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International Relations
CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY
What prompted Biden to invite the K-pop group BTS?
Martin Kwan (APAC analyst)
Recently, President Biden met with the world-renowned K-pop music group BTS. At the
White House, they talked about the importance of tackling anti-Asian racism and showing respect
for the Asian communities. This was against the backdrop of having a flux of racism incidents in
the US.
However, the invitation of the South Korean group raises questions as to the underlying
strategy and motives. Logically, President Biden could have sought the same assistance from local
Asian American stars who belong to the affected communities, or, e.g., British Asian stars who have
similar first-hand experience with the issue. In fact, many celebrities from Hollywood and other
fields have already voiced against the rise of the anti-Asian cases. The US government has also taken
a number of notable measures, such as introducing the Covid-19 Hate Crimes Act. It can therefore
seem a bit puzzling as to why President Biden had to ask for help from foreign citizens – who may
be perceived as slightly less representative for the domestic Asian American situation.
The intuitive explanation for the collaboration would be that the US wishes to utilise the
overwhelming star power of BTS and the Korean Wave (“Hallyu”). It is not an overstatement to
suggest that BTS can potentially be even more appealing and impactful than domestic celebrities to
certain specific groups of audience. The BTS holds a few World Guinness Records for their
popularity, such as being the music group that has the most followers on Instagram. Moreover, the
BTS has demonstrated their capabilities in public diplomacy. They previously appeared as South
Korean diplomatic envoys in the UN General Assembly in 2021, where they raised awareness over
the UN’s Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs). In the UN’s YouTube channel, it can be seen
that the clip with the highest number of views is the one where BTS appeared.
However, the above explanation does not fully capture the benefits that can be derived from
the collaboration. Also, by comparison, having the BTS at the UN easily makes sense because South
Korea is part of the UN and has member state responsibility to implement the SDGs.
The better explanation is that President Biden did not only have the domestic racism problems
in mind. Rather, his tactic also targeted Asia, especially Southeast Asia. According to some surveys,
BTS’s fan base comes predominantly from the Asian regions – with India, Indonesia and the
Philippines ranking top – which even outnumbers the fans from South Korea and the US. To put this
into context, President Biden is very keen on establishing closer relations with the regions, as
discerned from recent developments such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the
US-ASEAN Special Summit in May. The collaboration with BTS builds on top of these initiatives,
and is a gesture of President Biden showing friendliness, care and solidarity to Asian groups and
communities beyond the US border. This form of celebrity diplomacy sends political messages
transnationally and directly to the general public, as compared to traditional diplomacy which
exchanges at the governments’ level.
Besides, the selection of BTS further shows that President Biden is eager to get the attention of
young people. By confessing to be a “fan” of BTS, Biden draws himself closer to younger
generations. It was surveyed that 50% of BTS fans are below 18 years old, and with another 40%
belonging to the 18-29 age group. Getting the support of young people – who generally have high
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engagement with social media – can easily multiply the local and global reach and impact of any
political message.
This highly skilful move connects the US and South Korea together by co-curating this latest
addition to the diplomatic arsenal for global good. Ultimately, this strategy sheds positive light on
President Biden, showing that he is a leader who is willing to go beyond the borders and explore
non-traditional means in order to resolve problems.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)

THE FALSE PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Robert Skidelsky (A member of the British House of Lords and Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at
Warwick University)
Through persuasion, exhortation, legal processes, economic pressure, and sometimes military
force, American foreign policy asserts the United States’ view about how the world should be run.
Only two countries in recent history have had such world-transforming ambitions: Britain and the
US. In the last 150 years, these are the only two countries whose power – hard and soft, formal and
informal – has extended to all parts of the world, allowing them plausibly to aspire to the mantle of
Rome.
When the US inherited Britain’s global position after 1945, it also inherited Britain’s sense of
responsibility for the future of the international order. Embracing that role, America has been an
evangelist of democracy, and a central US foreign-policy objective since the fall of communism has
been to promote its spread – sometimes by regime change, when that is deemed necessary.
In fact, this playbook dates back to US President Woodrow Wilson’s time. As historian
Nicholas Mulder writes in The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War,
‘Wilson was the first statesman to cast the economic weapon as an instrument of democratization.
He thereby added an internal political rationale for economic sanctions – spreading democracy – to
the external political goal that…European advocates of sanctions have aimed at: inter-state peace.’
The implication is that, where the opportunity offers, military and non-military measures should be
used to topple ‘malign’ regimes.
Questioning democratic peace theory
According to democratic peace theory, democracies do not start wars; only dictatorships do. A
wholly democratic world thus would be a world without war. This was the hope that emerged in
the 1990s. With the end of communism, the expectation, famously expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s
1989 article, ‘The End of History?,’ was that the most important parts of the world would become
democratic.
US supremacy was supposed to ensure that democracy became the universal political norm.
But Russia and China, the leading communist states of the Cold War era, have not embraced it; nor
have many other centres of world affairs, especially in the Middle East. Hence, Fukuyama has
recently acknowledged that if Russia and China were driven together, ‘then you would really be
living in a world that was being dominated by these non-democratic powers…[which] really is the
end of the end of history.’
The argument that democracy is inherently ‘peaceful,’ and dictatorship or autocracy ‘warlike,’
is intuitively attractive. It does not deny that states pursue their own interests; but it assumes that
the interests of democratic states will reflect common values like human rights, and that those
interests will be pursued in a less bellicose manner (since democratic processes require negotiation
of differences). Democratic governments are accountable to their people, and the people have an
interest in peace, not war.
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By contrast, according to this view, rulers and elites in dictatorships are illegitimate and
therefore insecure, which leads them to seek popular support by whipping up animosity toward
foreigners. If democracy replaced dictatorship everywhere, world peace would follow
automatically. This belief rests on two propositions that have been extremely influential in
international relations theory, even though they are poorly grounded theoretically and empirically.
The influence of the international system on domestic politics
The first is the notion that a state’s external behaviour is determined by its domestic
constitution – a view that ignores the influence the international system can have on a country’s
domestic politics. As the American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued in his 1979 book, The
Theory of International Politics, ‘international anarchy’ conditions the behaviour of states more than
the behaviour of states creates international anarchy.
Waltz’s ‘world-systems theory’ perspective is particularly useful in an age of globalisation.
One must look to the structure of the international system to ‘predict’ how individual states will
behave, regardless of their domestic constitutions. ‘If each state, being stable, strove only for
security, and had no designs on its neighbours, all states would nevertheless remain insecure,’ he
observed, ‘for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which
other states are threatened.’
Waltz offered a bracing antidote to the facile assumption that democratic habits are easily
transferable from one location to another. Rather than trying to spread democracy, he suggested that
it would be better to try to reduce global insecurity.
Though there is undeniably some correlation between democratic institutions and peaceful
habits, the direction of causation is disputable. Was it democracy that made Europe peaceful after
1945? Or did the US nuclear umbrella, the fixing of borders by the victors, and Marshall Plan-fuelled
economic growth finally make it possible for non-communist Europe to accept democracy as its
political norm?
The political scientist Mark E. Pietrzyk contends that, ‘Only states which are relatively secure
– politically, militarily, economically – can afford to have free, pluralistic societies; in the absence of
this security, states are much more likely to adopt, maintain, or revert to centralised, coercive
authority structures.’
A too simple theory
The second proposition is that democracy is the natural form of the state, which people
everywhere will spontaneously adopt if allowed to. This dubious assumption makes regime change
seem easy, because the sanctioning powers can rely on the welcoming support of those whose
freedom has been repressed and whose rights have been trampled underfoot. By drawing superficial
comparisons with post-war Germany and Japan, the apostles of democratisation grossly
underestimate the difficulties of installing democracies in societies that lack Western constitutional
traditions. The results of their handiwork can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and many
African countries.
Democratic peace theory is, above all, lazy. It provides an easy explanation for ‘warlike’
behaviour without considering the location and history of the states involved. This shallowness
lends itself to overconfidence that a quick dose of economic sanctions or bombing is all that is
needed to cure a dictatorship of its unfortunate affliction. In short, the idea that democracy is
‘portable’ leads to a gross underestimation of the military, economic, and humanitarian costs of
trying to spread democracy to troubled parts of the world. The West has paid a terrible price for
such thinking – and it may be about to pay again. (Source: Project Syndicate)
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EVALUATION OF REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN

THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL POLITICS
Kevin Bloor
The Key Qualities of Realism
The chief qualities of realism that will be discussed individually are as follows:
 Sovereign states as the primary actor of global politics
 The balance of power
 The importance of international anarchy
 The inevitability of war
 The security dilemma
Sovereign States as the Primary Actors of Global Politics
The realist school of thought claims that states are the main actors and key agents within
global politics. Whilst non-state actors are of some relevance, they pale into insignificance when
compared to states. For instance, the actions of a state can be detrimental to the interests of non-state
actors (such as a trade embargo upon companies from another country). In a more dramatic sense, it
is only the state that can launch a military operation. A handful of states even possess the ability to
press the nuclear button and bring devastation to the planet.
The realist conception of the state is rooted in the traditions of the Westphalian system. The 1648
Treaty of Westphalia laid down the principle that every state is sovereign over its designated territory,
and that this should overlap with common cultural, linguistic, religious and historical norms – what
we call ‘The Nation’. As a theoretical concept, the nation-state can be thought of as a sovereign state in
which most of its members share a common language, history and culture. In essence, sovereignty can
be defined as the authority of a state to govern itself. The principle therefore applies equally for a small
state like Tuvalu alongside powerful ones such as members of the G7.
The Westphalian system is thus based upon the notion of non-intervention. As sovereign
states, intervention by an external power is contrary to the United Nations Charter as ‘nothing
should authorise intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’
(United Nations 1945). However, in practice, the doctrine of non-intervention is routinely violated
for a number of reasons. These can range from military aggression to humanitarian intervention.
Intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state also undermines the Westphalian notion that
each state should have equal recognition under international law. It could also be argued that the
only means by which non-intervention can ever be completely guaranteed is the possession of
nuclear weapons, acting as a deterrent to intervention.
The Balance of Power
The balance of power is both a theoretical concept and a pragmatic means to protect the existence
of the state. The concept is built upon the assumption that states can only secure their survival by
preventing other states (or alliances) from bettering their military dominance and power basis.
In a world governed by ‘Realpolitik’, military aggression is countered by an equilibrium of
power between rival coalitions. When a country is under threat, it can gain safety and security by
adopting a policy of either ‘balancing’ or ‘band-wagoning’. Let’s unpack these terms. The former
refers to states allying themselves against a threat to their territorial existence, such as the Warsaw
Pact in response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In contrast, band-wagoning
consists of aligning with a stronger power (such as the special relationship between the United
Kingdom (UK) and the US).
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Other strategies associated with the balance of power principle include ‘buck- passing’ and
‘chain-ganging’. The former refers to the refusal amongst nation- states to confront a growing threat
in the hope that another state will act as a necessary deterrent. One of the most famous historical
examples was the policy of appeasement adopted by the major powers of Western Europe in the
face of Nazi expansionism. In doing so, the European Powers effectively passed the buck to the
Soviet Union – ‘buck-passing’. ‘Chain-ganging’ however is a term used to describe the probability of
inter-state conflict due to multi-state alliances. The agreed principles of such alliances are usually
centred upon a mutual defence clause, such as Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Inevitably, the
consequence of such an arrangement is an elevated possibility of triggering war, as with the notion
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during the Cold War.
In a system built upon self-help, structural realists, such as the noted thinker Kenneth Waltz
(1979), predict that a balance of power will always emerge even in the absence of a conscious
attempt to maintain equilibrium. In an anarchic system, alliances will form against those who pose a
threat of some kind regardless of its intentions. In contrast, classical realists emphasise the deliberate
role played by state leaders and diplomats in the maintenance of a balance of power. The Balance of
Power must therefore be constructed in some manner via international law and diplomatic
agreements. It is important to note that, despite such differences, all realists view the balance of
power as a fundamental aspect of international relations, being the outcome of human behaviour
and/or the cause of state behaviour.
International Anarchy and its Implications
Anarchy is a Greek term meaning without rules or without a ruler. Within an anarchic system,
sovereign states must ultimately focus their energies upon the search for stability and order, given
that there is no sovereign entity higher than the state – i.e., the social condition between states is
ruler-less and thus depends on their cooperative capacities. This leads them towards the pursuit of
strategies such as the aforementioned balance of power within the boundaries of a particular type of
polarity and structural order.
Amongst realists, there is an acceptance that anarchy is prevalent within the global system.
Due to the absence of an overarching authority (such as a federated world government), sovereign
states can only secure their own survival via maintaining some form of equilibrium. States must
hence forge a chain of informal understandings with other units that maintain a system of
cooperation. This equilibrium of anarchical self-help reveals itself to be rooted in norms and rules
that can increase levels of trust and reciprocity between states.
Although the international system lacks a world government, there is a system of global
governance to impose a semblance of structural formality. The obvious example of this is the United
Nations (UN). Created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the UN implements international
law agreed upon between states out of their condition of mutual anarchy, and as such, maintains
peace and stability. There are also a number of judicial organisations such as the International
Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. However, effective measures from
international organisations require the support of powerful states.
According to the neorealist school of thought, foreign policy decisions and the behaviours of
states are shaped by the structure of the international system. The anarchic character of the global
commons encourages rival states to build up their military arsenal, for example, which lead to a
‘Security Dilemma’ – as discussed below. In some cases, this can lead to the development of a
nuclear capability (as in the arms race between India and Pakistan). The development of nuclear
capability can often result in a negative cycle of regional tensions. Given the tensions between
certain states, power can in essence become an end in itself as a result of the anarchic condition these
states find themselves in.
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Another consequence of an anarchic system is that powerful countries such as China and the
United States act in a manner that would potentially result in condemnation if performed by less
powerful states. There are obvious double standards in the response of the international community
that are reinforced by the lack of an overarching authority at the international level, where such
double standards are thus unaccountable. It would be unlikely that a state or organisation would
impose sanctions on the United States for sponsoring terrorism, but the threat is often used against
‘rogue’ states, such as Iran – illustrating this point. The perspective taken upon an anarchic system
may depend upon the relative power of the state itself. For larger states, anarchy may well be
viewed as an opportunity to pursue their own interest and to act in a unilateral manner. There are
few more prescient illustrations of this point than the campaign pledge from US President Donald
Trump to construct a large wall along the Mexican border, naturally, without the consent of Mexico.
By contrast, less powerful states may view the anarchic system as one that necessitates forging an
alliance with others. It is hardly surprising to note that the most enthusiastic supporters of deeper
European integration have been smaller states like Luxembourg.
The Inevitability of War
In ideological terms, the realist view of human nature derives from a conservative perspective.
The mindset (or ideology) of conservatism adopts a very different view to the liberal perspective.
According to conservatives, humans are driven by primordial instincts centred upon survival.
Inevitably, this is reflected in the realm of international relations. Having said this, it is important to
note that conservatism and realism exist with a degree of symbiosis. Not all conservatives are
realists, and to be a realist does not necessarily make someone a conservative.
The classical realist conception owes a great deal to the theory of Niccolò Machiavelli. His
pessimistic outlook on human nature and his classically republican commitment to realpolitik both
hold a natural affinity with the realist perspective. Machiavelli is also a figure very much rooted
within practical experience due to his preference for pragmatism. For instance, his most famous
work The Prince provides a guidebook to those who practice the art of statecraft. To be an effective
leader, a politician must be able to utilise every advantage to their disposal possible and keep
fortune on their side for the benefit of the political community they serve.
Machiavelli further contends that it is impossible to be a good prince whilst always being a
morally good person. To be good in the spiritual sense is to be considered weak in the eyes of others.
Ultimately, it is fear of the consequences that keeps people in check – rather than piety or meekness.
For a statesman, it is better to be feared than loved, but not feared alone. Indeed, to act in a Christian
way with every decision would be very dangerous for any statesman. As a Prince, therefore, it is
necessary to learn how not to be good (Machiavelli 2008, 53).
According to the realist conception, International Relations is characterised by a Machiavellian
world devoid of morality. In such an environment, it is better for a state (and its leader) to be feared
on the basis of hard power. Sovereign states have no choice but to face the world as it is and act
accordingly. Even when a powerful state pursues a policy of upholding liberal values, these can only
be secured via actions devoid of morality. There are few better examples of this argument than the
United States. In promoting capitalism, the US has engaged repeatedly in Machiavellian policies.
Although something of a simplification, the realist conception of International Relations can be
described as ‘the end justifies the means’. Having said this, there is a degree of division within
realism as to the inevitability of war. According to the classical strand of thought, the cause of war is
human nature, following the thought of classical thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (2017) or Hans
Morgenthau (1948). However, structural realists emphasise the importance of an anarchic system.
The Security Dilemma
According to the theorists Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth (2007), the term can be defined as
a situation in which the military preparations of one state creates an unresolvable uncertainty in the
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mind of another. The search for security for one state is very often another state’s source of
insecurity. Other states must ask themselves if those military preparations are designed to enhance
that country’s security, or if they are designed to secure an advantage.
According to the realist outlook, states are naturally suspicious of other states, given the self-
help system. The security dilemma contributes to a spiral of insecurity, especially evident in those
scenarios in which two or more states are implacable rivals. In a hypothetical case of the Middle
East, a military build-up by Israel or Iran would be viewed in a hostile light by surrounding states
and as such increase tensions and the possibility of ‘flash points’ that could spark a conflict. The
historical conflict within the region makes the security dilemma and the spiral of insecurity virtually
inevitable. In the words of Michael Howard (2000, 1) ‘war, armed conflict between organised
political groups, has been the universal norm in human history’.
Following on from this point, some form of military escalation (or exercise) may do little to
enhance the security of the state that engaged in that action. Ironically, its position may actually
become more insecure in that it may provoke neighbouring states to militarise out of fear. The
security dilemma can also be applied to an organisation. From the perspective of policymakers in
Russia, the expansion of NATO towards Russian territory appears to be an offensive strategy. Whilst
member states of the organisation might view their enhanced military capacity as strengthening
their security, it is also likely to provoke anxiety within the Russian Federation – as seen in 2014 with
the emergence of the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
The dependent factor is often the perspective taken of another country. In a system in which
mutual trust exists, military operations by one country may provoke little or no concern amongst
others. This may be due to a habit of cooperation between those states. A military build-up by the
United States will cause little concern amongst the governments of its natural allies. In contrast, even
the prospect of American military involvement may cause considerable anxiety amongst
policymakers in Beijing.
A related point to consider here is the role of propaganda. Traditionally, governments have
used propaganda in order to identify and exaggerate an external threat. This can lead to the public
having a distorted perception of the outside world. The significance of propaganda is more overt in
the case of a closed society such as North Korea. The regime in Pyongyang blames interference by
the United States for every misfortune faced by the country. Anti-Washington propaganda is also a
feature of the Tehran-based regime in Iran.
The spiral of insecurity caused by the security dilemma can at times take on a force of its own.
On 26 September 1983, the world came very close to an all- out nuclear war. It was a time of
heightened tension between the two military superpowers after the Soviet Union had shot down a
Korean airliner. Although not widely known within the West, the world was saved by the calmness
of Duty Officer Stanislav Petrov. His system reported that missiles had been launched by the United
States. Luckily, he judged the reports to be a false alarm and therefore disobeyed orders given to
him by Soviet military protocol (Aksenov 2013). His quick thinking prevented an erroneous
retaliation on the US and its NATO allies. This isolated example serves to underline the sheer
magnitude of the security dilemma. Now that the principles of realism have been discussed, we
shall turn our attention to the qualities of the liberal perspective.
The Key Qualities of Liberalism
The chief qualities of liberalism that will be discussed individually are as follows:
 The significance of morality and an optimism concerning human nature
 Harmony and balance within the international system
 Complex interdependence
 Global governance
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The importance and growth of international institutions

The Significance of Morality and Optimism Concerning Human Nature
First and foremost, liberalism adopts a normative approach to international relations. The
discourse of liberalism is embedded with norms and values that seek to establish a better world.
Whereas realists are primarily concerned with the world as it is, liberals focus on how the world
ought to be. From this basic starting-point, the whole tone and language of liberalism differs
dramatically from the realist perspective. Secondly, liberal theorists seek to make the world a better
place. This is based upon progress towards a more peaceful and prosperous environment grounded
on global governance, respect for human rights and the spread of liberal values. These objectives are
underpinned by an increasingly optimistic view of human nature. Whereas realists take a
Machiavellian view, the liberal outlook flows from an assumption that human beings are rational
entities who can recognise and respond to shared interests. Extending this practically, such a
perspective produces a world of cooperation as opposed to that of a Hobbesian ‘State of Nature’.
The fundamental mission of liberalism concerns ‘the bonds of perpetual peace’, in the words
of the enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1991). Theorists from the liberal viewpoint
believe that an international system grounded on free trade, democratic accountability and dispute-
resolving institutions provides the most effective means towards securing a lasting peace between
states – forging a world that is governed by rationalism as opposed to passion.
As a normative theoretical perspective, the worldview of liberalism gravitates towards that of
morality. It is both necessary and desirable to create a system in which liberal norms and values are
fostered amongst nations. Unlike rogue and dictatorial regimes such as North Korea, liberal
democracies must always take into account the wishes of their electorate. This acts as a significant
motivational factor in the need to avoid warfare and pursue diplomatic means.
Liberalism is therefore based upon three interrelated principles. Firstly, it is a body of theory
that attempts to reject the power politics highlighted within the realist perspective. Secondly, it is a
belief-system which claims that the recognition of mutual benefits shapes international cooperation.
Finally, it seeks to create a system of global governance in order to influence and adjudicate the policy
decisions of states and non-state actors. Unlike realists, the liberal perspective has greater faith in the
ability of international organisations to maintain an effective level of global governance. For instance,
international law provides a forum in which states can identify and pursue their mutual interests.
These principles, thus, push for a peace based upon rational behaviour and mutual cooperation.
The Possibility of Harmony and Balance
Liberalism contends that international institutions maintain a system of harmony and balance
amongst states. Military and political conflict can be reduced with a combination of international
institutions combined with a complex system of ‘interdependence’. According to liberals, mutual
dependence provides the key towards a degree of equilibrium within international relations.
Harmony can therefore be created through an emphasis upon liberal values.
Following on from this, there are three main theories to consider. Firstly, ‘the democratic
peace thesis’, which suggests that the spread of democratic values can establish a better world. In a
democracy, leaders have an electoral incentive to avoid military conflict. Elected leaders will always
seek to avoid war whenever humanly possible due to the financial and human costs involved.
Amongst liberal democracies, warfare is very much the last resort after all reasoning has failed. The
democratic peace theory has a lengthy tradition amongst liberal scholars dating back to the
Enlightenment and is continually a topic of discussion even today (Placek, 2012).
Equally, ‘commercial peace theory’ also has a lengthy pedigree within International Relations.
Associated with free-market economists such as Richard Cobden (1903) and David Ricardo (1817), it
is a body of thought which claims that free trade has a pacifying impact on the international system.
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Countries that trade with one another have an overwhelming economic reason to maintain those
trading links. In a contemporary twist to this argument, Thomas Friedman (2000) points out that no
two countries with a McDonalds have ever gone to war. Known as ‘the Golden Arches theory of
international relations’, Friedman observed that: ‘countries with middle- classes large enough to
sustain a McDonald’s have reached a level of prosperity and global integration that makes
warmongering risky and unpalatable to its people’ (1996).
The third element to consider is the ‘institutional peace theory’. Unlike the other two
theoretical models, the emphasis here is upon the beneficial role played by forums such as the UN,
the World Bank and the EU. International institutions seek to generate a habit of cooperation
amongst sovereign states. Following from this, institutions can also provide a means by which
bilateral disputes can be resolved in a non-violent manner. Furthermore, institutions ensure that
states interact with one another in a relatively transparent manner and thereby uphold the norms of
global governance. Given the right mix of economic and institutional factors, states will maintain a
harmonious system in order to maximise prosperity and minimise conflict. As a conclusion, it could
hardly be more at odds with the realist paradigm, at least without a deeper investigation of the
manner in which they may hold similarities; a subject that is discussed later.
Complex Interdependence
The term ‘complex interdependence’ is associated with the ground-breaking work of Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977). When ‘Power and Interdependence’ was first published during the
late-1970s, it offered a robust intellectual challenge to the realist paradigm. Their work seemed to
capture an era of détente between the two superpowers and growing calls for a new international
economic order that included developing countries. It remains a seminal text in the liberal
perspective on International Relations. Nonetheless, what does the term indicate?
Complex interdependence consists of four interrelated elements. First of all, there are
important linkages between states and non-state actors that shape global politics. Secondly, the
international agenda exhibits none of the realist differentiation between low and high politics. The
former relates to economic, cultural and social affairs whilst high politics centres on that which is
essential to the survival of the state. Thirdly, there is a recognition of multiple channels for
interaction amongst actors across national boundaries. Finally, there has been a marked decline in
the effectiveness of military force as a tool of statecraft. In a system characterised by complex
interdependence, there are multiple channels of interaction between societies. The existence of a
global civil society has brought about a decline in the reliance upon military force and power
politics. Even the most powerful military states no longer rely upon the fire and fury of their
military arsenal. The web of linkages that connect states together, that lead to their condition of
mutual cooperation and dependency – this is the condition of complex interdependence.
In a world of complex interdependence, ‘soft power’ will gradually replace the use of hard
power. According to Joseph Nye (2004, ix), soft power relates to: ‘the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion … it arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals and policies.’ States could thereby achieve their objectives via non-military means
such as diplomacy and cooperation. Due to a system of complex interdependence, military force or
coercion is no longer a common feature of international relations. Nye (2012) also adds that ‘the best
propaganda is not propaganda.’ In other words, the most effective use of propaganda is via
persuasion rather than force; to make others want what you want. This aids the creation of a
normatively interconnected, pacified, world.
It should also be noted that multiple channels of interaction are present within a system
centred upon complex interdependence. Informal ties between governmental elites and non-
governmental elites exist alongside regular and routine communication amongst transnational
organisations. These arenas of multiple channels are often summarised as inter-state, trans-
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governmental and transnational relations. These links generate a shared mindset, interest, and a
habit of cooperation. In doing so, the concept of complex interdependence contends that we have
moved beyond the boundaries imposed via the realist paradigm, of states out for themselves alone.
Global Governance
Global governance is a movement towards political cooperation amongst transnational actors
with the aim of negotiating solutions that affect more than one state or region. There are several
institutions that function within a system of global governance. This being said, global governance is
not a unified system which can be observed precisely because there is no single overarching
sovereign world government – as explained above when discussing the concept of anarchy within
the realist framework.
In terms of a definition, James Rosenau (1995) claims that the term governance denotes the
regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of an overarching political authority. Others
have suggested that global governance refers to the management of global processes in the absence
of a ‘cosmocracy’. The term is widely applied to a shared political authority that leads towards a
single government or state with global jurisdiction (Skolimowski 2003). Either way, global
governance entails concrete and co- operative problem-solving arrangements on either a formal or
informal basis. Such definitions are flexible enough to apply whether participation is bilateral,
regional or international.
By its very nature, global governance entails a number of states and international
organisations. That said, a powerful state or institution may take on a prominent role and drive the
process forward. In the case of tensions within the Middle East, the United States has long sought to
establish stability in an area of clear economic and strategic importance. Russia also plays an
interventionist role within the region and both countries are members of the Middle East Quartet
(alongside the EU and the UN).
The term global governance has gained greater prominence in the contemporary era given the
trend towards globalisation. It is a relatively broad term that encompasses the process of designating
laws, rules and regulations within the global commons. The need for global governance is almost
certain to increase as globalisation becomes embedded further within the field of International
Relations and global social relations as a whole.
The post-Cold War world of the 1990s instigated a renewed attempt to establish a systemic
form of global governance. The end of the Cold War shifted the goalposts of international relations
beyond the somewhat narrow confines of US-USSR ‘bipolarity’ – the international power structure
that forms around two major poles of power – and the balance of power between two monolithic
spheres of influence. Perhaps the most obvious illustration of this trend is the growing salience of
environmental issues. This can also be identified in the context of a more conventional political
realm. Naturally, this poses a number of interrelated challenges. Building a responsible and effective
global governance requires the establishment of democratic legitimacy amongst important
stakeholders. However, obtaining the required level of legitimacy demands a complete rethink of
the Westphalian system due to its emphasis on state sovereignty. The purpose, remit and scope of
international institutions would also have to be transformed entirely. Sovereignty is ultimately a
concept that embeds the status quo, placing ultimate decision-making power in the hands of the
state; emphasising a certain statism. Above all, the relationship between the state and global
institutions would require recalibration. For instance, sovereignty would have to be shared or
pooled, whereby ultimate decision-making power is disseminated amongst a plethora of
international bodies.
Global governance has also encroached upon the realm of high politics. For instance, almost
every sovereign state is a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). More
countries are party to the NPT than any comparable agreement. Adherence to the NPT is a
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testimony to the ability of sovereign states to protect the shared global commons. However, it is also
the case that a handful of nuclear states have either not signed (or simply withdrawn from) the
Treaty – North Korea, India, Israel and Pakistan. This is a significant problem as this condition of
exclusive dissent adds to the perception of instability within the regions these states cohabit. Whilst
multilateral agreements can, and do, play a crucial role in global governance, it is also important to
note their limitations.
The War on Terror’is another interesting case study to consider in regards to global
governance. This term was used repeatedly by the Bush administration in order to justify
intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Firstly, the nature of the threat is transnational. Secondly,
international security and cooperation is largely driven by Washington on the basis of their
hegemonic status. Partly because of this, attempts to prevent the spread of global terrorism lack the
institutional support compatible with its overall importance.
For all the high-minded rhetoric of global governance, there are three notable gaps to
highlight. The first of these is the jurisdictional gap between the growing need for global governance
and the lack of appropriate authority to take action. Secondly, the incentive gap relates to the factors
that motivate cooperation. Although globalisation does enhance the incentive to co-operate with one
another, this clearly does not occur in every situation. For example, there was very little cooperation
during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the participation gap refers to the fact
that international cooperation remains primarily the affair of governments. This inevitably means
the marginalisation of civil society groups such as pressure groups and non-profit organisations,
even when international in scope and reach, or at least their secondary placement in relation to the
significance of state actors.
Arguably the most optimistic objective for those who seek global governance is the formation
of a global constitution. According to Gustavo Marin and Pierre Calame (Marin and Calame 2005), a
global constitution would act as ‘the common reference for establishing the order of rights and
duties applicable to UN agencies and to the other multilateral institutions.’ One of the conditions for
building democratic governance is the development of platforms for citizen dialogue on the legal
formulation of global governance and the harmonisation of objectives. Furthermore, a global
constitution must clearly express a limited number of objectives in order to remain pragmatic and
applicable globally. Such a constitution could guide the common action of UN agencies and
multilateral institutions. The specific role of each of these would be subordinate to the pursuit of
such objectives. In order to achieve this, citizens must be persuaded by tangible benefits to their own
standard of living.
As with much else within the subject matter, the significance of the phrase ‘global governance’
is a contested one. Despite the continued process of globalisation, realists tend to downplay its
importance. Institutions remain relatively weak within an anarchic international system. However,
liberals contend that the term has gained increasing significance. The noted academic David Held
even claimed that global governance has changed the parameters of debate surrounding
sovereignty. Here it was argued that we have now moved beyond classical sovereignty, in the
Westphalian sense of the phrase, to a mode of sovereignty that is internationalised (Held et al. 1999;
Held and McGrew 2002).
The Impact and Growth of International Organisations
It is widely accepted that a correlation exists between the number of international
organisations and the process of globalisation. The impact of those institutions has also increased
alongside an expansion in their scope and scale. For instance, there was a rapid increase in the
number of peacekeeping operations launched by the UN shortly after the end of the Cold War.
Between 1989 and 1994, the Security Council authorised 20 new operations and an increase in the
number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000 (United Nations Peacekeeping 2021). There have also
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been a number of international organisations created since the 1990s, such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the African Union (AU) or the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), all
formed to deal with the growth of a truly global politics.
In terms of regional integration, the European Union is perhaps the clearest example of an
organisation expanding its influence on global affairs. Since the 1990s, the EU has more than
doubled its membership. Consistent with the process of deeper integration, twenty-seven sovereign
states have willingly chosen to pool their resources within an institution that contains supranational
institutions. From a continent with a devastating history of warfare and rampant nationalism, this is
a major achievement. In the contemporary era, the European Union holds considerable elements of
soft power with over 140 diplomatic embassies throughout the world. The Single European Market
is the largest of its kind, and the EU continues to adopt a greater burden in terms of global
governance as its power (both hard and soft) grows.
The effectiveness of international organisations depends upon several factors, some of which
may be interrelated. Arguably the most important dilemma is the tension between the liberal values
embedded within such institutions and the concept of national sovereignty. For such institutions to
be effective, they must transcend the barriers posed by national sovereignty. However, many of the
most powerful states are reluctant to accept the authority of international organisations when it
conflicts with their own narrowly defined national interests. For instance, the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council (P5) sometimes flout the rules of international institutions in
the absence of any effective sanction. It is also common for a superpower to simply ignore
international condemnation. Illustrating this, since 1992, the UN General Assembly has passed an
annual resolution condemning the American embargo against Cuba, yet this has amounted to little
in the way of US response. Under successive administrations, the United States has also brushed
aside criticism from Amnesty International (2020) for its treatment of ‘enemy combatants’ in
facilities such as the infamous Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp.
Another problem to consider is the level of legitimacy held by several institutions. Reliant
upon soft power, such organisations can only persuade rather than coerce. As such, the presence of
international organisations needs to be seen as legitimate by the parties involved in order to be
effective. For instance, between 1999 and 2006 peacekeeping troops were welcomed in Sierra Leone
and contributed to stabilising the country. By contrast, the ‘blue helmets’ (UN Peacekeepers) sent to
Somalia in 1992 and 1993 conspicuously failed to secure peace because rival groups did not view the
involvement of the UN as legitimate. In the oft-used phrase, there was no peace for the peacekeepers
to keep. As such, the perceived legitimacy of international institutions is key to their successful
functioning in achieving their objectives.
The efficacy of international institutions is further limited by the lack of political will to
address vested and powerful economic interests. In regards to the Washington Consensus,
international institutions have proved incapable of addressing the problems associated with
multinational companies. The role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank may
have been complicit in the growing economic strength of technology giants known by the acronym
FAANGs (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google). A similar critique is applicable when
addressing the threat posed by environmental degradation and human rights violations.
A further inherent weakness with institutions is that they are often reactive. For instance, the
UN Security Council (UNSC) first discussed the Covid-19 pandemic some three months after the
issue arose in the Wuhan province of China (Nature 2020). International institutions have also been
slow to act when faced with humanitarian disasters. In the case of Sudan, repeated human rights
violations in the region of Darfur were either downplayed or simply ignored for many years,
leading to what is now considered to be a genocide.
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On a more prosaic note, such institutions often lack the necessary funding to be an effective
actor on the international stage. It is often problematic to gain funding in the first place. For instance,
the United States is in considerable financial arrears with the United Nations. As the largest
contributor (around a fifth of the total budget), this is clearly a major problem. Donald Trump even
withdrew American funding to the WHO for its inability to deal effectively with the Chinese
government in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic.
There are also problems specific to particular organisations. For instance, the effectiveness of
the UN is undermined by the difficulties posed by representativeness. The General Assembly
operates on the democratic principle of one vote for each member state. However, this distorts
representativeness and results in a loss of credibility. Rather than exercising the capacity to
influence, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) effectively passes the buck to powerful countries.
Thus, each organisation holds equally unique and distinct problems.
The ‘alter-globalisation’ academic Joseph Stiglitz (2015) argues that the need for international
institutions has never been so great, but trust in them has never been so low. This is indeed a salient
point. Those of a reformist outlook argue that improved global governance demands more powerful
institutions, consensus-building and heightened levels of accountability. However, this first requires
a level of engagement and cooperation from national governments.
The Divisions Between Realism and Liberalism
The main distinction between realism and liberalism concerns human nature, power, security,
the likelihood of conflict, and the importance of institutions and states. We will now consider each
element in turn, beginning with their different views of human nature.
Human Nature
Liberalism is built upon the assumption that individuals are rational entities whose behaviour
is shaped by their own best interests. Like individuals, nation-states are able to identify areas of
shared benefit such as trade and mutual security. States are also able to rationalise that their interests
are best served by the avoidance of warfare. This can be achieved via cooperation with other states,
pooling sovereignty within a regional organisation or by conforming to the norms and conventions
of international relations.
The realist perspective however is based upon a very different set of assumptions. Unlike
liberals, realists generally hold a more pessimistic view of human nature. As with individuals, the
relationship between nation-states is characterised by power politics. In an anarchic system, it is
simply impossible to completely trust another state. There is always the possibility that a state (or
even a group of states) will ignore international diplomacy and cooperation. For instance, during the
1930s, military expansion by Nazi Germany took place without an effective system of prevention
from the League of Nations. All realists, whether classically or structurally inclined, would concur
with the slogan ‘to ensure peace, you must prepare for war.’ According to the realist position,
liberals are far too naïve about (a) the potential for cooperation amongst sovereign states, and (b)
how national interest undermines common interest.
Perhaps the first-ever document to outline the realist position on International Relations was
Sun Tzu’s Art of War. The ancient Chinese military strategist considered each aspect of warfare
from laying plans to the use of spies. There are several arguments put forward by Sun Tzu, but
perhaps the most useful is that ‘war is a thing of pretence’ (Tzu 2010, 10), of deception, alongside
that ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’ and that we should know
our enemies and ourselves (Tzu 2010, 20). When using force, the aggressor must also appear
inactive. When they are near, they must seek to make the enemy believe they are far away (and
vice versa). Many a battle has been won or lost without fighting, and his observations have been
adopted by other guides to statecraft.
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The realist perspective also owes a great deal to the influence of the seventeenth century
philosopher Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes (2017, 80), the relationships that govern
human nature are characterised by ‘a perpetual and restless desire for power after power that
ceaseth only in death.’ In an anarchic system, states must ensure their survival against the threat
of military action. In the eyes of a realist, this can only be achieved via the balance of power.
Forging alliances on this basis acts as a check upon potential aggression from a hostile state. In the
realist conception of international relations, states must at all times acknowledge that ‘the enemy
of my enemy is my friend’.
In contrast, there is an unmistakable streak of idealism that runs through the liberal
perspective. Liberalism is built upon an assumption that we should be optimistic about human
nature and its capacity to make the right decisions. Whilst realists view human nature as fixed and
immutable, liberals contend that human nature is perfectible. This enables social progress based
upon democracy, free trade and effective institutions. In a system of complex independence and
global governance, foreign policy decisions can actually make the world a more peaceful and
prosperous place. In order to support this argument, research into globalisation has shown that we
are living in the most peaceful era in history (Pinker 2011).
Power
In relation to power, the language of liberalism is normative whereas realists are cynical. The
former emphasises the possibility of conflict-resolution by international institutions, whilst realism
is grounded upon a more hard-headed assessment. For realists, states must ensure their survival
through self-help alone within an anarchic system of international relations. This can only be
achieved via an emphasis upon hard power such as military hardware and economic inducements.
Within foreign policy discourse, in order to distinguish between realists and liberals, the terms
‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ are sometimes used. Hawks focus upon a realist worldview whilst doves adopt
a more liberal and idealistic tone. This distinction enables us to categorise the interests and actions of
various bureaucracies within government. For instance, in the US, there is often a tension between
the hawkish approach of the Department of Defense and the diplomatic approach of the Department
of State. Symbolically, as the chief foreign policy actor of the United States, the presidential seal
contains both an olive branch and a quiver of arrows.
Another area of division between liberals and realists in the contemporary era concerns their
grasp of how power operates. To neoliberals, the process of globalisation has transformed the
manner in which power is exercised. In the early 1990s, Joseph Nye applied the concept of soft
power which consists of the ability to attract rather than coerce. Soft power entails the utilisation of
culture and political values in order to persuade. The mobilisation of soft power enables one country
to get other countries to want what it wants without the threat of coercion. The term soft power is
emblematic of the assumptions that govern the liberal perspective.
In contrast, neorealists claim that globalisation has not changed the fundamentals of global
politics. In an article entitled ‘Back to the Future’, John J. Mearsheimer (1990) challenged the
prevalent liberal argument of the time that the end of the Cold War would lead to a more peaceful
world. Instead, Mearsheimer (1995, 9) observed that cooperation would still be: ‘constrained by the
dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate’. According
to the neorealist outlook, the end of the Cold War era would result in the return of traditional
balance of power concerns. Talk of a peace dividend was therefore nothing more than a false dawn.
According to realists, physical force will always trump persuasion.
Order and Security
Alongside human nature and power, there are also a number of divisions between these two
grand narratives in relation to order and security. Realists contend that the focus must be upon
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preventing another state (or alliance) from securing sufficient military resources to impose its will
upon others. The state system is governed by Darwinian principles in which the strong exploit the
weak. The emphasis within the realist perspective is therefore upon high politics (such as warfare
and national security). For realists, order can only be secured via an equilibrium of power. It is a
self-help system with no overarching world government to impose an effective sanction.
Liberalism however asserts that order is borne out of multiple interactions of governance.
Stability within a global system of governance stems from laws and behavioural norms between
states and non-state actors. Liberalism seeks to ensure a more orderly system via the democratic
peace theory, the commercial peace theory and the institutional peace theory. Taken together, they
provide the means by which liberal values of peace, prosperity and progress can be achieved.
The distinction between these two seemingly polar opposites emerges from unproven and
untestable assumptions. When it comes to order and security, realism describes the world as it really
is (or as opponents point out, the way that realists choose to see it). By contrast, the language of
liberalism is notably more progressive. There is a shared hope amongst liberals that the world can
(and should) be improved via a system of global governance and the spread of commerce and
democratic norms. There is also a tendency amongst liberals to highlight the importance of
transnational linkages and mutual dependence.
Given the contestable character of theoretical assumptions, there are clearly problems with
both grand theories of international relations. For instance, the realist roadmap contributes towards
the security dilemma which can spiral out-of-control and lead to yet further conflict. There is also
disagreement within the perspective itself over which system of polarity is most likely to ensure an
equilibrium of power. Equally, the liberal mindset can be criticised for its excessive and misplaced
faith in the ability of democracy and capitalism to ensure peace and stability. In addition,
international institutions are themselves greatly constrained by the realist outlook adopted by
member states.
The Likelihood of Conflict
Under the realist paradigm, conflict between states is inevitable. The world only has a limited
number of resources available – and in the absence of an effective world government, states are
locked in a Darwinian struggle for survival. In order to support the realist position, the likelihood of
conflict is usually greater when a state (or region) holds valuable resources. In the case of oil, the
Middle East has been a source of geo-political tension. Realists would claim that Washington has
sought to intervene in the region via a deliberate strategy of ‘divide and rule’ amongst Arab states in
order to aid Israel. The high-profile attempt at peace under the Trump administration recognised
Israeli settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, established Jerusalem as the undivided capital,
and recognised the Jordan valley as part of the Israeli state. The bias shown towards Israel by the
Trump administration forms part of a clear and lengthy narrative of American engagement in the
Middle East.
Although the realist stance has been modernised over time, its main tenants can be traced
back to the Athenian historian Thucydides. His work considered the conflict between the oligarchs
that ruled Sparta against the more democratic Athenians. In the specific context of conflict, an
understanding of the realist paradigm is outlined further in contributions ranging from Hobbes to
Machiavelli – who were keen readers of Thucydides, and in Hobbes’ case is credited with the first
translation of Thucydides into English (Skinner 2002). Whilst the international system can at times
drift towards a more peaceful equilibrium, such phases are merely temporary. In the words of the
neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1959, 232) ‘wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them from
occurring.’ It is an observation of particular relevance towards his neorealist ‘Theory of International
Politics’ (1979) as it marked the same year that the era of détente came to an abrupt end. The Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is widely seen as marking the end of a general thaw in
the Cold War that characterised the 1970s period of ‘détente’.
Liberals, however, believe that states are rational entities who seek to avoid the financial cost
and economic disruption caused by warfare. Even in regions of the world with a lengthy history of
tension, states do co-operate on a regular basis. Once again, this could be readily applied to the
Middle East. There have been several attempts at reconciling peace between traditionally warring
neighbours. This has usually entailed a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
As one would expect, both the realist and liberal positions have been subject to criticism.
Realists have been charged with imposing ‘truths’ which turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. This
prevents the possibility of creating a more peaceful world in which swords turn into ploughshares.
There are few better illustrations of this point than the security dilemma. Equally, it must surely be
observed that the supposed stability of MAD brought the world to the brink of disaster during the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The First World War could also be seen to expose the inherent flaws
with the realist assumption that alliances lead to order and stability.
Liberals however have long been accused of overestimating the ability of states to recognise
shared interests and acting rationally upon them. They may also have placed too much faith in the
efficacy of international organisations to ensure cooperation. During the late-1980s, Joseph Grieco
(1988) identified two barriers towards cooperation. The first is simply that of cheating. In the
absence of effective sanctions, it is often possible for one (or more) states to cheat the system. The
second barrier concerns the relative gains secured by another state. According to Grieco, ‘absolute
gains’ refers to those situations in which states are able to increase their power and influence. This
makes cooperation relatively straight-forward. However, states are also concerned with relative
gains. The likelihood of states accepting international co-operative efforts is greatly undermined
when participants see others as gaining more from the arrangement. In an unpredictable world of
rivalries and a hierarchy of states, the issue of relative gains offers a thoughtful critique of the
liberal mindset.
The Impact of International Organisations and the Significance of States
Perhaps the most important point of departure to consider is their conception of how the
international system operates. According to realists, domestic politics ends at the water’s edge.
Relations between states operate according to the ‘billiard-ball analogy’. In this analogy states are
like billiard balls: they are self-contained and their reaction to an exogenous force from another self-
contained unit coming into conflict with it is calculable, reinforcing the notion of a self-help system.
International organisations designed to ensure peace and cooperation are largely irrelevant to a
realist outlook on International Relations. The most significant actors are (and will always be) states.
In contrast, liberal theorists such as Keohane and Nye view the world as a cobweb of interactions. As
a consequence of globalisation, states have been permeated – making the billiard-ball conception
redundant. Some theorists even predict the end of the nation-state due to the dynamics of
globalisation (Ohmae 1995).
It is important to note that there are strands of thought within both of these paradigms. Most
notably, there has been a perceptible shift in the focus of realist thinking. Neorealists claim that
international actors shape the behaviour of states. As such, international organisations do have some
impact upon the behaviour of states. Unlike classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, neorealists
stipulate that structure determines behaviour. According to Kenneth Waltz, the interaction of
sovereign states can therefore be explained via pressures exerted upon them by the anarchic
structure of the global system. Inevitably, this imposes a constraint upon their choices.
From a shared perspective, Graham Allison (2017) claims that national security concerns can
no longer be resolved by a strategy of unilateralism. Global pandemics, terrorism and climate crisis
require a multilateral approach from a plurality of organisations and institutions. It may also be
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necessary to forge partnerships with non-state actors. The attention of international relations has
therefore shifted towards a multitude of actors, although states retain primary importance for a
variety of reasons, such as their monopoly upon the legitimate use of political violence.
Although there are clear areas of overlap between them, the main distinction is that classical
realism claims that warfare is caused by human nature, whilst neorealism stipulates that the
dynamics of an anarchic system determines the behaviour of diplomats, leading them to seek
structural security and power for their nation state in a self-help system. Warfare is therefore the
result of an anarchic system rather than merely the primordial desire to dominate others.
Another area of dispute between realism and liberalism is the importance attached to the role
of institutions. Viewed from the realist lens, institutions are relatively insignificant when compared
to states. Moreover, institutions are largely constrained by the interests and interplay of states.
Organisations tasked with global governance ultimately rely upon states for funding and support.
Without a major state playing a key role, the actions of various institutions are unlikely to achieve
peace and cooperation. The realist perspective adopts a much more conservative outlook in regards
to human nature. Our behaviour is fixed and immutable, and institutional change based upon high-
minded rhetoric does little to change that. The ill-fated experience of the European Union in the
Balkans conflicts of the 1990s offers a stark illustration of this argument. Early talk was of a
European problem requiring a European solution, but it took the military might of the United States
and NATO to bring stability to the former Yugoslavia and end the genocidal activity that thinkers
such as Mary Kaldor (2013) have labelled as ‘New Wars’, typical of the contemporary world.
Liberals however view institutions as having a crucial role to play in terms of facilitating
cooperation and ensuring peace. Regarding the significance of states, one of the most influential
liberal thinkers is the English philosopher John Locke (1967) who claims that civil government can
remedy the anarchic state of nature. People are more likely to act rationally when a government is in
place because there are laws and consequences to abide by. Locke’s dictum (1967, 324) ‘without
laws, man has no freedom’ has been adopted by liberals in terms of creating a method of global
governance. In the contemporary era, the purpose of international institutions should be to serve as
a mediator to inter-state problems. In a world characterised by complex interdependence, actors are
mutually dependent and therefore have a rational interest in maintaining economic ties and peaceful
cooperation. The role of international organisations is to maintain this system and ensure that rules
are adhered to. In contrast, having states deal with economic and political disputes would be much
more costly and uncertain. Ultimately, it is better for states to rely upon international institutions to
resolve problems.
On a final note, liberalism tends to gain momentum amongst scholars of International
Relations after the perceived failure of the international system to avoid the outbreak of war. As an
ideology, liberalism first emerged from the Thirty Years War. The conflict was brought to an end via
the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, which in turn shaped political thinking behind the concept of state
sovereignty and the social contract. Liberalism also gained greater prominence as a result of the
horrors of the First World War, and to a lesser extent as a reaction against the prospect of nuclear
armageddon at the height of the Cold War. Realism however benefits from its traditional
predominance within International Relations theory. Most of us probably carry a realist mind-map
around to a certain extent, and that invariably makes the perspective slightly more convincing.
Anarchy and the Theory of International Society
There is much that divides liberals from realists within the contested arena of International
Relations. However, there is one thing they both accept – the international system is anarchic.
Although the term anarchy is associated with disorder and chaos, this would be misleading. In the
specific context of international relations, anarchy implies the lack of a supreme authority. In
absentia of a world government, there is no higher body in which states can go to resolve disputes.
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However, there are certain rules and conventions similar to any social structure. This is widely
described as thus being an ‘international society’ or a ‘society of states’ (Bull 2012; 1966).
In terms of a definition, Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley describe a society of states, an
‘international society’, as a ‘norm-governed relationship whose members accept that they have …
limited responsibilities towards one another and the society as a whole’ (Brown and Ainley 2009).
As with all relationships, there are certain rights and duties to observe. For instance, the right to self-
determination entails a duty to respect the national sovereignty of another state. The obligations that
fall upon states are also outlined within the United Nations’ responsibility to protect (R2P).
The society of states theory begins with the realist argument that an international system
emerges the moment two or more states have a sufficient level of interaction. The theorist Hedley
Bull (2012, 9) describes that an international system is formed ‘when two or more [states] have
sufficient contact between them, and…sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to
behave as part of a whole.’ He also observes that states share a limited degree of common interest
within this system of power politics. For instance, the fear of unrestricted violence leads towards the
development of certain rules and conventions. A society of states, in contrast to an international
system, thereby exists when a group of states establish diplomatic procedures for the conduct of
their relations – i.e., it exists in the emergence of common norms, values, interest and principles that
are reproduced and upheld by state behaviours within said society. Even within an anarchical order,
a society must have rules and restraints upon the use of coercion and the sanctity of agreements.
Simply put, in this condition, obligation and responsibilities remain. Without these elements, there
would be no such thing as even the thinnest society (of states).
The rules that govern the society of states are contained within a set of institutions that reflect
accepted behavioural patterns. Since these rules are clearly not binding in a manner comparable to
domestic politics, the emphasis upon norms holds particular relevance towards our understanding.
In the society of states, there are norms that govern the conduct of warfare and the recognition of
sovereignty. Crucially, this argument is applicable from both a realist and liberal perspective.
The ‘English school’ of IR, as the ‘society of states’ or ‘International Society’ approach as it has
come to be known, adopts a non-deterministic nature of anarchy that draws upon the normative
element of liberalism, alongside the power-centric statist focus of realism. It is a body of thought
built upon the assumption that a society of states emerges from the ideas that shape an anarchic
system. The English school is commonly divided into two main wings: pluralists and solidarists. The
former claims that the diversity of humankind is contained within a society that facilitates the
greatest possible independence for states. Pluralists such as Robert Jackson (2000) or James Mayall
(1990; 2000) contend that states must be able to express their own conception of ‘the good life’.
Solidarists however argue that the society of states should be limited towards the promotion of
human rights and a cosmopolitan outlook. According to figures such as Nicholas Wheeler (2000),
humanitarian intervention should take precedence over the Westphalian concept of non-
intervention in domestic affairs.
The Absence of Overarching Authority
According to classical realists, states are the primary actors within the international system.
Ultimately, states can only rely upon themselves for security. They have no choice but to accept the
doctrine of self-help within an anarchic system. The fundamental motive for the behaviour of states
is simply one of survival.
From this basic starting-point, the interaction of states becomes clear. States are forced to take
into account the threat posed by others within the anarchic order. Security can also be viewed in
zero-sum terms. In other words, enhancing security means a decline in security for another state. As
such, an increase in the security of one state can lead to a decrease in the security of others
(especially neighbouring states). The system is therefore competitive and, as the classical theorist
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Hans Morgenthau (1948, 13) once observed, ‘international politics is a struggle for power. Whatever
the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.’
Not surprisingly, the realist conception of power is firmly centred on military terms. This can
be viewed through the prism of either offensive realism (in which a state seeks to become a
dominating hegemonic power) or defensive realism (in which states forge alliances based upon the
balance of power for security). A sovereign state may therefore enhance its security on the basis of
seeking dominance over other rivals, or via siding with others in order to balance the threat of
another state (or group of states) (Waltz 1979). Either way, the realist paradigm is centred upon
military capabilities. It also places an emphasis upon the economic dimension of hard power. This
may entail the use (or threat) of economic sanctions.
In an article entitled ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation’, Joseph Grieco (1988, 485)
argued that ‘international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their
willingness to co-operate even when they share common interests.’ This is an insightful quote to
consider when seeking to identify the realist position on the significance of anarchy. Grieco
emphasises the assumption shared by all realists that states can never entirely trust another state.
There are several implications to consider here. According to Robert Jervis (1978), states can never be
fully aware of the intentions of others. The build-up of military resources by one state could
therefore be (mis)interpreted as an aggressive act. This particular view is more likely when it leads
to a relative gain for another state. In this scenario, an arms race on a regional or international scale
is virtually inevitable.
The security dilemma might also force states to form new alliances or strengthen existing
ones. According to Glenn H. Snyder (2007), there are two reasons that an alliance will form. Firstly, a
state dissatisfied with its current level of security will form an alliance in order to bolster its own
national security. In addition, a state will decide to secure an alliance when it has doubts about the
reliability of an existing ally. The French President Charles de Gaulle once raised this quandary in
regards to American assistance during the Cold War, with his provocative question ‘would
Washington risk Philadelphia for Paris?’.
Finally, realists claim that the security dilemma necessitates a reliance upon the balance of
power. There are two concepts to consider (e.g. ‘chain- ganging’ and ‘buck-passing’). In a multipolar
world, national security is interconnected with other members of an alliance. When an ally decides
to participate in warfare, it drags its partners into warfare. If one member marches, the others must
follow. If the partner does not participate, it will endanger the security of its allies. In regards to
buck-passing, states might choose to avoid confronting an emerging threat. It is hoped that other
states will balance each other out, or engage in a war of annihilation. In doing so, they are acting as a
‘free-rider’ on the military capacity of others. They are therefore able to gain the benefits of a
military alliance without bearing any of the costs.
Neorealism emerged during the 1970s as an attempt to rectify some of the conceptual
limitations of the classical approach. Neorealists would argue that their perspective is not based on
interpretivism; what makes them different from Classical Realists is that they are not interpretivists
but positivists – they focus on structure due to their engagement with political science methods and
the measurement of power by quantitative means. Neorealism is most closely associated with the
influential theorist Kenneth Waltz. Whilst classical realists such as Morgenthau attribute the
dynamics of power politics to human nature, neorealists emphasise that state behaviour is
influenced by the overarching structure of the anarchic system. From a shared perspective, John
Herz (1976, 10) reminds us that global politics is a struggle for power ‘even in the absence of
aggressivity or similar factors.’ As is abundantly clear, the tone of the realist perspective is one
which lacks optimism.
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Cooperation From Common Norms, Rules and Obligations

Liberalism offers a very different interpretation of the anarchic international system.
According to liberals, anarchy can be mitigated via institutions, democracy and interdependence. It
is therefore both possible and necessary that institutions are created to bolster levels of trust and
provide for a system of behavioural reciprocity amongst states. Liberals advocate a better world via
three related models discussed above (the democratic peace thesis, commercial peace theory and the
institutional peace theory). All three are based firmly upon the desirability of liberal-democratic
values, central of which are those such as free trade.
Liberalism asserts that the combination of democracy, free-market economics and global
governance will greatly reduce the likelihood of conflict. According to liberal theorists such as
Norman Angell (1909), Leonard Woolf (1916, 1922) or Thomas Friedman (2005), democratic
capitalist states are highly reluctant to fight one another due to the financial cost involved, and as
such increased trade reduces the likelihood of war. To engage in warfare would be highly disruptive
to trading links with other states. As rational enlightened actors, states fully recognise that warfare is
emphatically not in their interests.
The liberal view of the national interest differs significantly from the realist conception.
Whereas the latter is focused upon the high politics of security matters, the liberal view is somewhat
broader. For instance, the interests of the state can be identified from an economic and even cultural
angle. These multiple ties bind us all together on a variety of levels. Either way, it is an argument
that moves beyond the narrow security concerns put forward by the realist model of behaviour.
The implications of the liberal perspective are stark. Peaceful existence between states is
entirely possible even in the absence of an overarching sovereign. States have mutual interests and
in cases when a dispute arises, international institutions can offer a channel for mediation between
them. The potential conflict is therefore mitigated by the actions of various international
organisations (the apex of which is the UN).
The liberal perspective of power, broadly, is clearly very different in character to that of
realism. Whereas the latter is focused upon ‘hard power’, liberal theorists claim that states can
pursue their objectives via ‘soft power’, by, as Nye (2004, 6) claims: ‘getting others to want the
outcomes you want’. Liberalism thereby rejects the realist view that power is secured via the threat
of military action. Rather than focus upon the three S’s (survival, self-help and statism), liberals
argue that shared values generate mutual dependence. In doing so, the prospect of military conflict
is considerably weakened. As Norman Angell (1909, 137) points out: ‘we cannot ensure the stability
of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by
imposing its will on a rival.’
As with realism, the main tenets of liberalism have been adapted to reflect the complexities of
the contemporary era. Neoliberalism emerged as a response to the neorealist argument that
institutions are simply unable to mitigate the constraining effects of anarchy, yet mirroring its
scientific and positivist approach to International Relations. Even with the absence of an absolute
sovereign, cooperation between states can (and does) emerge on the basis of trust and reciprocity.
According to neoliberals, such as Robert Keohane, the effects of the anarchic system are
distorted by the realist prism. Time and time again, states are more concerned with absolute gains
rather than relative gains. This argument holds major consequences for our understanding of the
behaviour of states. The logical conclusion of the realist worldview is that anarchy necessitates a
focus upon survival and self-help. In contrast, the neoliberal perspective emphasises cooperation
between states based upon mutual interests.
The most important contribution from this perspective is that of neoliberal institutionalism.
This branch of theory prescribes a mediator role for international institutions such as the WTO and
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the UN. As a means to achieve cooperation, such institutions help to govern the international
system. These institutions endorse multilateralism as a means of promoting peace and prosperity.
The dynamics of inter-state relations are thereby governed by an alphabet soup of institutions.
Although some regions are more integrated than others, the process of integration and mutual
dependence provides a means whereby states co-operate in a non-military fashion. Due to
globalisation, we are witnessing an increase in the role and significance of intergovernmental and
even supranational institutions. As an aside, neoliberal institutionalists recognise that cooperation is
difficult to achieve when leaders perceive there to be no areas of mutual interest between them.
The distinction between neoliberalism and neorealism is particularly stark when we consider
the vexed issue of security. Neorealists (and realists broadly) assume that security is a competitive
and relative concept. Neoliberals (and liberals broadly) however adopt an entirely different
conclusion. Rather than a zero-sum game, states can enhance their own security by engaging in
cooperation with other states. Crucially, this does not mean that the security of other states is in any
way compromised, thereby allowing states to move beyond the potentially destructive spiral of
insecurity known as the security dilemma.
To What Extent Do Realism and Liberalism Explain Twenty-First Century Developments in
Global Politics?
When seeking to evaluate realism, the obvious starting point is the state system that emerged
from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The Westphalian system is built upon several interrelated
elements. Firstly, each state holds exclusive sovereignty over its territorial boundaries. The UN
Charter (United Nations, 1945) declares that ‘nothing should authorise intervention in matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’ Secondly, each state is entitled to have its
sovereignty respected by other states. International law centres upon an assumption that all states
should be treated equally regardless of their size or relative power. Intervention from another state
would therefore be illegal unless expressly authorised on humanitarian grounds. States can also act
in accordance with the notion of self-defence.
Realism is also based upon the assertion that states are the most important actors within
International Relations. Although realists concede that non-state actors hold some significance,
global politics is conducted primarily at the state level. Following on from this, states are
analogous to a billiard-ball. In theoretical terms, states are unitary actors and their internal politics
are irrelevant to their behaviour on the international stage. In the realist conception, domestic
politics ends at the water’s edge, and beyond is the realm of international politics. Theorists within
the realist tradition centre their attention firmly upon the interaction of states. In contrast, liberal
theorists adopt a cobweb model towards their understanding of the subject matter, a web-like
nexus of connectivity between actors on different levels but with the state still firmly in a position
of primacy.
In terms of the distinction between high politics and low politics, classical realism
emphasises the importance of those matters essential to the very survival of the state. In an
anarchic system, the state must ensure its survival and therefore engage in policies that fall under
the remit of high politics (such as maintaining a nuclear deterrent). In contrast, the liberal
perspective views low politics as a fundamental element of International Relations. For instance,
no realist would ever claim that the capitalist peace theory offers a convincing explanation of
international relations. The liberal emphasis on the salience of democracy and institutions is also
rejected by state-centric realism.
The function of any theoretical perspective is to enable us to better understand the world
around us. In regards to events since the turn of the century, the realist perspective offers a
persuasive and coherent account. For instance, the sovereignty of the state has been reasserted in
recent years. Powerful countries such as China and the United States have pursued their own
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national interests with considerable vigour. The reassertion of state sovereignty perhaps shows that
the impact of globalisation has been exaggerated and misunderstood by liberals.
It should also be noted that the world remains one in which conflict and warfare are central
towards our understanding. The realist emphasis upon warfare underlines on-going conflict
throughout the world, i.e., that war is, has been, and will continue to be an ever-present part of
human dynamics. In historical terms, some of these conflicts have been significant. For instance,
until 2021 the United States was engaged in the longest military conflict in its history, in
Afghanistan. The liberal assumptions that underpin the democratic peace theory have been shown
to be somewhat optimistic. Whilst inter-state warfare is less common, the incidence of civil war has
continued to be a marked feature of international relations. There have also been sporadic acts of
terrorism (most notably on 11 September 2001) and concerted attempts to create a caliphate amongst
Islamic extremists at different localities around the globe. Over the last two decades, the battle
against Islamic extremism has dominated national politics in several countries. Realism also
provides a convincing and clear framework for understanding outbreaks of ethnic cleansing against
minority groups (such as Christians in Iran) and genocide (such as against Iraqi Yazidis by ISIS). The
Chinese government has also been accused of genocide against Uyghur Muslims (Newlines Institute
2021; Amnesty International 2021). Unlike liberals, realism fully recognises the existence of conflict
and hatred within international relations.
The discourse of realism also provides a convincing account of relations between competing
states and alliances. The realpolitik concerns of states are clearly evident in regards to the relations
between the West and Russia, especially following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The security
dilemma, and the associated spiral of insecurity, also offer an explanation of relations between
rival states. The politics of the Middle East lends itself towards the language of realism, given the
justification for conflict and political manoeuvres taken in the ‘national interest’. For instance,
Israel employed a narrative of national defence in terms of tensions with Palestinians in both 2014
and 2021.
Although there have been some attempts at peace, the continued tension between Israel and
many of its Arab neighbours can be clearly understood through the realist lens. The normative and
optimistic tone of the liberal outlook doesn’t translate well to the long-standing conflict between
Israel and Arab States within the region. The realist perspective also highlights the conduct and
broader significance of proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
However, the realist perspective falls short in its account of certain aspects of global politics.
There are several aspects to this critique. Of these, perhaps the most insightful is the tendency to
reduce global politics towards a negative view of human nature. The subject matter is arguably far
more complex than the framework offered by thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli would have
us think. There are habits of cooperation, patterns of behaviour and systems of mutual dependence
within global politics that realists always downplay. Since the year 2000, the international
community has managed to make some progress towards a more peaceful and progressive world.
For instance, the International Criminal Court was established in 2002 and the UN Human Rights
Council was created in 2006. These institutions have since provided a rigid apparatus for dealing
with global justice, interdependence and cooperation in the name of common interest.
Secondly, the realist perspective seems particularly unconvincing in the context of regional
integration. The fact that countries throughout the world have transferred sovereignty to various
organisations sits uncomfortably with the emphasis upon the three Ss (statism, self-help and
survival). Even the transfer of sovereignty towards supranational institutions within the EU has
provided a template for other regions in the world (such as ASEAN). Moreover, the African
Economic Community is committed to deeper economic integration by the year 2023. In addition,
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the realist preoccupation with hard power offers a less than convincing description of the
contemporary era.
On a final note, the myopic focus upon the Westphalian system is also flawed. Indeed, the
whole concept of sovereignty could be described as a Eurocentric construct designed to serve the
powerful whilst marginalising the periphery. The Westphalian rhetoric of non-intervention and
equality amongst nations hides the exploitative character of neoimperialism. As the former diplomat
Stephen Krasner (1999) points out, talk of absolute sovereignty for many countries is little more than
‘organised hypocrisy’.
Liberalism adopts a very different approach to their understanding of International Relations.
First and foremost, the whole tone of liberalism is more normative and optimistic. This enables us to
better comprehend the growing emphasis within the international community upon protection of
the global commons and the salience of human rights. Liberalism also casts light upon soft power,
the importance of low politics and mutual dependence.
This normative narrative leads us towards a better understanding of how the world has made
progress towards peace and prosperity in recent years. Since the turn of the century, democratic
values have spread throughout many parts of the world. Liberals claim that there is a degree of
causation between the spread of liberal values and a more stable and peaceful system. The counter
argument would suggest that only a slight correlation exists between the two variables. It is
therefore difficult to properly ascertain if the expansion in the number of people living in a
democratic system has contributed towards the bonds of perpetual peace.
The capitalist peace theory also presents certain flaws when applied to real- life events. The
liberal perspective advocates free trade as a means by which to establish a more peaceful
international system. This is based upon the innate view amongst liberals that free trade creates the
circumstances by which warfare can be largely avoided. Once again, there is a great deal of evidence
to support the golden arches argument of Thomas Friedman. According to liberals, the realist
standpoint misses the significance of commerce as a contributor towards global peace.
The institutional peace theory is another central element of the liberal prescription for a better
world. Liberals argue that international institutions have a positive impact upon cooperation
between state and non-state actors. Liberalism also seeks to go beyond the narrow focus upon state
sovereignty towards establishing a system of global governance. Interactions between states are
shaped by the rules, conventions and sanctions that derive from international institutions. In the
contemporary era, it must be recognised that the actions of states are governed in a direct and
indirect manner by the system of global governance. For example, the existence of a global
governance may prevent states from engaging in warfare against neighbouring rivals.
In each of these three areas, liberalism enables us to better comprehend the world of global
politics. Most notably, liberalism helps to explain why states that trade with one another are less
likely to engage in warfare. There is a clear economic and political benefit in maintaining a
constructive relationship. To take one example, the rivalry between China and the United States
since the turn of the century has not yet stepped over into outright conflict. Part of the reason can be
found in the mutual economic benefits established between Beijing and Washington.
Liberalism also assists our understanding of international law. Liberal values concerning the
universal character of human rights are upheld via a number of institutions. There is also a legal
process that is broadly followed when the international community considers humanitarian
intervention (such as Libya in 2011). Despite the G77 (and China) rejecting the concept of
humanitarian intervention at the turn of the century, intervention on humanitarian grounds has
been implemented on several occasions.
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Another important point to consider is that global governance enables states to manage
disputes and thereby avoid a deadly and disruptive path to warfare. Having said this, global
governance still suffers from three gaps (jurisdictional, incentive and participation). For instance,
there have been several criticisms levied against bias shown by the International Criminal Court.
Equally, global governance failed to prevent the world’s hegemonic power from unauthorised
military engagement in Iraq, in 2003. The hard- headed approach of realism enables us to properly
comprehend the motivation behind the intervention (such as achieving regime change, gaining
access to oil, and out of security concerns for national interest). The realist outlook also helps us
understand how and why powerful states often ignore international law so as not to limit their
individual interests.
Whilst the realist account may be more persuasive in terms of power and developments, and
the continued importance of the state; it is somewhat less relevant towards an understanding of
global governance. According to the realist outlook, states are the most important actors within
International Relations. The growing significance of non-state actors and international institutions is
far more likely to be recognised via the liberal perspective. Moreover, the liberal perspective offers a
particularly persuasive description of globalisation.
Another crucial point of departure of the two main theoretical perspectives concerns their
understanding of human nature. Realism is fundamentally conservative in its outlook on human
nature. According to their outlook, we must adopt a pessimistic view about the capacity of
humanity for improvement. Liberals however are notably more optimistic about human nature,
with humans intrinsically holding rational capabilities that forge a will to mutual interest and
cooperation. Since the year 2000, there is evidence to support both sides of the argument. The realist
discourse enables us to comprehend the fact that global spending on defence increased from 1.14
trillion US dollars in 2001 to 1.92 trillion US dollars in 2019 (Szmigiera 2021). The pessimistic outlook
of realism also casts light upon the continued threat of terrorism, the actions of rogue states and the
threats posed by failed states. Equally, the liberal perspective emphasises the centrality of low
politics and the dynamics of mutual dependence.
It is also worth noting here that dramatic events such as 9/11 can be used to support both
perspectives. To the liberal perspective, the terrorist attack on the American mainland underlines the
significance of globalisation. The multiple atrocities were committed by citizens of Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Egypt. Moreover, the response from the international
community in Iraq brought together troops from Poland to Mongolia (Beehner 2007). Equally, the
terrorist acts of 9/11 underscore the continued relevance of the realist paradigm. As the analytic
philosopher John Gray dramatically declared at the time: ‘the era of globalisation is over’ (Gray
2001). The causes and consequences of other historic events since the turn of the century (such as the
financial crisis and the coronavirus outbreak) can also be understood from either perspective with
the interrelation.
For all their differences, both liberalism and realism provide a useful framework for seeking to
comprehend International Relations. As the political scientist Robert Cox (1981) rightly points out,
they can both be described as problem-solving theories offering a blueprint for dealing with
cooperation and security. When seeking to properly assess these two contrasting outlooks, it is
important to recognise their similarities. It is also important to acknowledge where the similarity
ends. No theoretical perspective is entirely watertight, and theoretical debate is a constant feature of
International Relations.
(Source: International Relations Theory)
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Interviews
IMRAN KHAN
Former Prime Minister of Pakistan
Former premier Imran Khan is playing the toughest innings of his political career. All the
odds appear to be stacked against him. The PML-N led government is gunning to arrest him. His
supporters are being hounded and threatened. He is the target of a vicious propaganda and
character assassination campaign. Yet, he appears unfazed. He is as determined, as focused and as
unyielding and uncompromising as he was in 1996 — when he jumped into the murky waters of
Pakistani politics for the first time.
Since his ouster from power as a result of the controversial no-confidence motion, he has been
relentlessly challenging what he calls the corrupt old order. His rallies have attracted mammoth
crowds. His daily talks, addresses and frequent television interviews have become the talk of the
town, evoking both passionate support and severe criticism. In his interview to ‘Bol News’ – the first
to any publication after his ouster — the former premier and PTI chairman talks about his future
plans and shares some insight on how the Houses of the Sharifs and Zardaris managed to
manipulate the system.
QUESTION: Let’s start with an obvious question: do you expect a quick victory against what you
call the “imported government” or is it going to be a long-drawn out struggle?
ANSWER: Political struggles do not have a time frame. The important point is that one does
not give up. I am not fighting for myself. I am waging a jihad to save Pakistan which has again been
handed over to the most corrupt. That’s the reason one sees such a strong public reaction and
mammoth crowds at PTI rallies. Pakistanis are angry. The political parties, which are part of this
foreign-sponsored conspiracy of regime change, are being decimated, but its fallout is also affecting
the institutions. They (the institutions) are calling themselves neutral, but the perception is that they
are with this corrupt government. I don’t think that this situation is sustainable. Their (the new
government’s) plan is to rig the next elections with the help of the Election Commission. They want
to rig the system to an extent that when elections are held, they win.
QUESTION: All the cards are ostensibly stacked against you. So, what is the basis of your
optimism?
ANSWER: The promising sign is that in my 26 years of political struggle, I never saw public
opinion turning so decisively in our party’s favour as it has now. This is for the first time that we are
witnessing such a massive shift of public opinion among the cross section of society. And there is a
reason for this. People have been seeing these thieves’ faces for the last 35 years… They themselves
used to call each other thieves. They stand exposed in front of the public now. As Abraham Lincoln
said, you cannot fool all the people all the time.
Secondly, as soon as it came to light that it was an American-backed regime change, that the
American embassy was part of it, people reacted. The embassy called our backbenchers and many
others ahead of the no-confidence motion. They were part of the planning. Donald Lu (the US
diplomat) met our ambassador and threatened him. An imported government has been imposed on
the 220 million people of Pakistan. This has engendered a public reaction.
Thirdly, when people saw the politicians prostituting themselves, [the horse-trading] they
reacted. There has been a huge backlash against the ‘lotas.’
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QUESTION: Do you think that your party is prepared for a protracted protest campaign given the
preemptive actions the PML-N-led government appears prepared to take? The PTI got a taste of it
on May 25…
ANSWER: The way the PTI workers stood-up to the brutalities and high-handed actions of
this government was beyond expectations. Rana Sanaullah (the interior minister) gave an
impression that he would be able to crush the PTI and its supporters through repressive measures.
But our party stood up to these. However, our organisational set-up was admittedly affected by the
way they raided the homes of our supporters. One can face brutalities himself, but no one likes the
police barraging into their homes and harassing family members, especially women. It was not just
shocking, but created anger among the people. These harsh measures prevented many from joining
the march. But in Islamabad, despite a heavy use of teargas, barricades and other measures, people
kept pouring in and braved the police atrocities. Then, on my way from Peshawar to Islamabad, I
witnessed a sea of people. No other party has this kind of street power and following.
QUESTION: How will your second long-march be different? Is that even an option now?
ANSWER: What I don’t want in the country is violence, damage to public and private
property, or anarchy. I do not want the people standing against the police. This government has
appointed criminal police officers at command positions in the Punjab. And they are resorting to
vindictive actions and violence against us. This resulted in the martyrdom of one of our workers…
There was no legal basis to stop us. If the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Ministers
and the Azad Kashmir Prime Minister come along with their people for a public protest, how can
the Punjab government stop them? We did not stop Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah when he
came for a protest along with Bilawal. We stopped no one. We did not resort to violence or register
any cases against them. In fact, they are promoting provincialism — in the way they have
transformed Punjab into a fiefdom of the Sharifs. I want the Supreme Court to give a clear direction
and after that we will plan accordingly. If the Supreme Court gives us its approval, and they still
stop us, it will be a contempt of court case.
QUESTION: Is there an alternate plan to increase pressure on the government?
ANSWER: We have planned a series of protests. We are not restricting ourselves to only one
element of protest. As I stated, first we will wait for the Supreme Court ruling. And after that we
will disclose our plans.
QUESTION: Can the country’s institutions play any role in forcing the government to call early
elections?
ANSWER: All the institutions are on trial. The Establishment is on trial. The judiciary is on
trial. The police, the bureaucracy — all are on trial. What the Punjab Police did, was inhuman. The
Sharifs have always used the Punjab Police in this fashion. The brutal crackdown has intensified
public hate against the Punjab Police. Now the judiciary has a very important role to play, especially
in protecting the fundamental rights of citizens. The Establishment has the power to act. Now the
question is, what will the Establishment do? Will it take the country towards free and fair elections,
or will it support these criminals? They are on trial too.
QUESTION: Although there is no provision in the Constitution for it, some analysts suggest the
installation of a Supreme Court-sanctioned caretaker government for a longer period than usual,
to carry out needed reforms and make necessary tough decisions before taking the country
towards elections. This will also help cool political temperatures. What do you think?
ANSWER: A caretaker setup is needed to hold elections. They have pushed the country into a
great economic mess. Only a government with a big political mandate and power can pull Pakistan
out of this crisis. For any caretaker government, making big decisions would be difficult. I see tough
times ahead. I see inflation rising every month. Load-shedding has gone to an extreme this summer.
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The entire country is suffering and the situation is deteriorating rapidly. Matters have already
slipped out of the hands of this imported government. They cannot control it. We say follow the
constitution, bring in a caretaker for three months and hold elections. There is no other solution to
this crisis.
QUESTION: Given the current economic mess, can Pakistan even afford elections?
ANSWER: What other choice does Pakistan have? Can this government do anything? They
stand exposed. In an interview with CNN, Miftah Ismail (the finance minister) exposed this
government when he said that Pakistan cannot buy Russian oil because of the US sanctions. All of
Europe is buying Russian oil. Are the sanctions only for Pakistan? In a nutshell, Miftah said that
until we get permission from the ‘Master’ who gave us the government, we will not purchase oil
from Russia. This means we can’t give our people relief.
QUESTION: Let’s talk about the past… say around six months before the No-Confidence Motion,
did you ever imagine Shehbaz Sharif as your successor?
ANSWER: I had been receiving IB (Intelligence Bureau) reports since last August–September
that Shehbaz Sharif was maneuvering hard. He was desperately knocking at every door as he was
afraid of conviction. The FIA’s (money laundering) case against him is an open and shut one and he
would have been convicted in it. Therefore, Shehbaz was desperate… He played all the cards he
could and was part of the foreign conspiracy.
QUESTION: Shehbaz Sharif, his two sons, and other family members face charges of corruption
and money-laundering. How did Shehbaz and his allies manage to turn the tables?
ANSWER: I think foreign support played a decisive role. Then, they have been the main
wheelers and dealers in the Punjab for the last 35 years. Their roots are deeply [embedded — they
extend] from within the lawyers’ community to the judiciary and bureaucracy.
QUESTION: You say that the cases against Shehbaz are open and shut ones. So why did the
corruption cases against him and other politicians not see closure? Shehbaz hasn’t been indicted
yet.
ANSWER: The judicial system is the main cause. I can’t make a phone call to the judges. The
judiciary is not in our hands. The RUDA (Ravi Urban Development Authority) is an example. There
had been efforts to build a new city near Lahore. The government, investors were ready, but
suddenly one day we found out that there was a stay order which had stalled this project –
attracting investment and foreign exchange — for 11 months.
I met the country’s eight regulatory bodies – such as the Competition Commission, OGRA,
and NEPRA — and asked about their problems. They said that their hands remained tied. These
eight regulators were slapped with 800 stay orders and as a result, 200 billion rupees were stuck.
‘Inshallah’ whenever we come to power again, the first thing we will do is to sit with the judiciary
and resolve such issues. If you cannot convict criminals, that means there is no rule of law in the
country. Now an NRO-2 is being given by changing the NAB laws. All these people will again
escape justice.
QUESTION: Many Pakistanis still remain baffled about how Nawaz Sharif was allowed to leave
Pakistan? That was unprecedented.
ANSWER: We were told that he was about to die and we would be held responsible. There
was intense pressure on us. And then he gave an Oscar-winning performance to indicate he was
about to die any day. A long report was presented before the cabinet listing his ailments and
highlighting the danger to his life. The cabinet debated for four-five hours [and he was allowed to
leave] but his ailments were only in prison. The moment he climbed the aircraft stairs, he was a
different man. The question is, who tampered with the medical reports? It was a big game.
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QUESTION: The Houses of the Sharifs and Zardaris appear too entrenched at the national level;
the same is the case in almost 60 percent of the country’s constituencies, which are dynastic. In
this framework, can Pakistan ever really achieve true democracy?
ANSWER: In the last 60 years or so, two families ruled Pakistan for nearly 30 years, and the
army ruled the rest of the time. If Bilawal becomes party chairman at the age of 24, where’s the
merit? Maryam, who roams around like a queen… what are her credentials? This is the ultimate
negation of democracy. Going forward, I think Pakistan will change. Social media has created
awareness. Just as in India, dynastic politics will end in Pakistan too.
QUESTION: However, you too banked on electable candidates…
ANSWER: You are right, but this is changing. Dynastic politics have been shaken.
QUESTION: If voted again to power, say with a two-third majority, what crucial structural
changes do you plan to make?
ANSWER: There will be many changes, but basically, we will establish the rule of law. Under
the current circumstances, accountability is not possible. We have to sit with the judiciary and work
out reforms to strengthen it. Secondly, we will introduce an empowered Local Government system.
This system has been introduced in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa, but not in other provinces. Local
Governments are a must because they take the accountability process to the grassroots level.
Thirdly, our experience has taught us that changes in the bureaucracy should be made immediately
after assuming power. We delayed them. Now we have prioritised and decided the steps that need
to be taken in the first 90 days.
QUESTION: Do you indulge in self-criticism? Where did you go wrong?
ANSWER: For human progress, self-criticism, and your own critical analysis remain a must.
The number one lesson we learnt: a clear majority is needed if you want to carry out reforms in
parliamentary democracy because there are so many roadblocks. After the 18th Amendment, power
has been devolved to the provinces; the centre has very limited powers. The 18th Amendment has
fractured the system and vested interests hold you back.
QUESTION: In hindsight, was Usman Buzdar a mistake?
ANSWER: Usman Buzdar was a compromise candidate. He hailed from one of the poorest
parts of the Punjab. I can say with conviction that no past chief minister had brought such basic
improvements in the lives of the common people, as did Buzdar. The ‘Health Card’ is number one.
Rs.400 billion were allocated under this scheme which was a blessing for the common man. 70-80
percent poor households get one million rupees health insurance, which is big.
Usman Buzdar was one candidate who had no opposition in the party. We had three-four
other candidates for the Punjab CM-ship, but they each faced bitter opposition from within the
party. So, Usman Buzdar emerged as a compromise candidate. And the way he ran the Punjab,
despite all the pressures and blackmailing, that alone makes him eligible for paradise.
QUESTION: Many advised you to lower temperatures with the opposition during your heydays
in power. Do you think you should have paid heed to the advice?
ANSWER: People who give such advice do not think corruption is bad. Here we have people
who do not see corruption as evil when done by the powerful. But as said in Alice in Wonderland, if
you don’t know where you are going, every road takes you there. So, if you don’t have an ideology,
you can do anything. But the point is that if you want to establish the rule of law, how can you
throw poor people in prison and give NROs to the powerful who robbed the exchequer of billions of
rupees. There can be no compromise on corruption. But you are right, I used to frequently get advice
to lower political temperatures by striking deals with the corrupt.
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QUESTION: Even after your ouster from power, you said that the Pakistan Army remains the
best guarantor of Pakistan’s unity. Yet, following your ouster, we saw many venting their anger
against the army on social media and even in rallies despite discouragement from the leadership.
Why so much anger?
ANSWER: You cannot guarantee Pakistan’s security without a strong army. But when you
have power — and the Establishment and the army have the power – you also have a responsibility.
And you have to accept the criticism that comes your way when people see that all the big dacoits
are in the government. You say that you are neutral, but [how are you oblivious to the fact that]
more than 60 percent of the cabinet members are thieves, and include individuals who used to abuse
the army. Such people, who repeatedly carried out anti-army propaganda, and that too by colluding
with Pakistan’s enemy India, as the Sharifs did, are now in the cabinet. Modi never criticised Nawaz
Sharif, but called General Raheel Sharif a terrorist. Asif Zardari is the mastermind of Memogate, and
that by using Hussain Haqqani. He even helped him escape abroad.
So, when the Establishment says it’s neutral, they have to accept the criticism that comes their
way. No one can control social media. Now whoever has a mobile phone has a voice on social
media. How many you can control? The slogan “imported government naa manzoor” smashed all
records on Twitter. It is organic, nobody can run it or control it. In this scenario when people see that
you have power and you are ‘neutral,’ then there will be criticism.
QUESTION: Your popularity skyrocketed after the ouster of the government. Do you feel the
weight of the expectations that come with this popularity?
ANSWER: We can only make an effort; the rest is in Allah’s hands. He is the only one Who
gives success. During my cricketing days, I used to tell my team to give 100 percent. I say the same
thing now. If one loses after his/her best effort, it hurts, but there is no harm in that. But if you lose
without a fight, without effort, then it is unforgivable. That’s why I am never worried as only Allah
grants success. I will continue to try my best — as I am already doing now.
(Source: Bol News)

DR SANDEEP PANDEY
Known social activist from India
A simple man, who refuses to own a mobile phone, Dr Sandeep Pandey is a known social
activist from India. He looks like a down-to-earth sufi whose lifestyle speaks for his empathy and
close ties with the ordinary people of his society. Way back when I invited him to speak at the South
Asia Peace Conference I organised at a university in Texas, he appeared in a simple kurta-pajama
with flip-flop sandals.
Dr Sandeep has a doctoral degree from the prestigious University of California, Berkeley, in
mechanical engineering. Since then, he has taught at several universities in India, but activism seems
to be his lifelong passion.
He has been working for peace and socio-cultural harmony in South Asia. He and his group
organised peace marches from Karachi to Delhi and Delhi to Multan in 2015. In 1999, he walked
1,000 kilometer from the Indian nuclear test site of Pokhran to Sarnath, Buddha‘s first teaching place,
to create awareness about nuclear devastation. He told me how difficult it was to deal with the
bureaucratic hurdles created to stop peace marches in India and Pakistan.
Dr Pandey has fought throughout his life to create an egalitarian society, education for
underprivileged children, human rights and corporate accountability, among other issues. For these
activities, he has been arrested and jailed several times.
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In the following interview, Dr Pandey speaks candidly on burning issues of freedom of

expression, nuclear disarmament, peace and communal harmony in South Asia.
QUESTION: How would you define freedom of expression and media freedoms in the
contemporary world?
Answer: As right-wing thinking has begun dominating in different parts of the world,
freedom of expression and media have shrunk. In the post-truth world, dominant communities/
powers, presenting themselves as victims, have been projecting their narrative, and any voice which
questions this narrative is drowned. As a result, independent thinking has been curtailed and
intellectuals are denigrated or humiliated.
QUESTION: The traditional wisdom says that free media are essential for a functional
democracy. In modern-day democracies, however, elected representatives seem to have a free
hand to curb media freedoms. Your opinion?
Answer: The majoritarian rule of the dominant section of society by creating its hegemony has
impeded functioning democracies by squeezing out free debates. Many members of the ruling
dispensations act more as vigilantes than people‘s representatives. They seem to be more worried
about protecting the government than the people who elected them. Media also becomes a target in
this exercise, and more often than not, media chooses to become subservient to the ruling
establishment for its survival.
QUESTION: Postcolonial India prides itself in being an established democracy, while Pakistan
has been experiencing a hybrid democracy with a strong security establishment. Despite this
difference, both nations are witnessing the same kind of media censorship. So, how would you
compare the political dynamics in both countries that led to the ongoing level of media
censorship?
Answer: In India, media has been relatively free for most of the time during its democratic
history. Two exceptions are the period of Emergency and the rule of the right-wing Bhartiya Janata
Party. In Pakistan, which has not had long periods of democratic rule, surprisingly media asserted
its independence and always gave a feeling that it was free. However, covert anti-democratic forces
have always attempted to censor media in both countries. Although it sometimes becomes apparent,
on most occasions, it remains hidden.
QUESTION: Since the Partition, India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads.They are also
locked in a perpetual state of nuclear weapons race. In your opinion, how can we end this
madness?
Answer: Hostility between India and Pakistan can be ended by creating a Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone in South Asia. Such zones are in existence in Latin America and the Caribbean through
the Treaty of Tlatelolco for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in South Pacific the Treaty of
Rarotonga, in Southeast Asia the Treaty of Bangkok, in Africa the Treaty of Pelindaba, and in
Central Asia. All outstanding issues, including Kashmir, should be resolved through dialogue. Most
importantly, the border between India and Pakistan should be opened for common citizens the way
it has been done to visit the Kartarpur Sahib gurudwara. Bringing down the wall will bring instant
normalcy in relations, creating a conducive atmosphere for resolving disputes.
QUESTION: India and Pakistan dominate the discussion of peace and development in South
Asia at regional and international forums, while issues of smaller countries are ignored. Do you
think it is fair?
Answer: It is unfair. Other countries should also be given equal importance. On the one hand,
we ignore the positive achievements in Bhutan and Bangladesh related to development, and on the
other hand, we underplay the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. We must pay more attention to what is
going on in smaller countries in the region. Also, by trusting other nations and taking them along,
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India should give up its ambition of becoming a regional superpower. Instead, it should play the
role of facilitator in a democratic fashion in forging regional cooperation. Moreover, it should give
up its big brother attitude and stop being a threat to the smaller countries around it. Right now, it is
held in awe by most of its neighbors.
QUESTION: Despite different levels of economic development, most countries in the region face
extreme levels of poverty, lack of healthcare facilities, hunger, unemployment, illiteracy and an
impending water crisis. How can we create egalitarian societies in the region?
Answer: We must resolve to reverse the neo-liberal economic policies, resulting in an
increasing gulf between rich and poor, unemployment, degradation of public services like
education, healthcare, and environmental devastation, etc. We must make a conscious attempt to
remove hunger, poverty, illiteracy, homelessness, improve public services like education, health
care, transportation and communication, and preserve our environment to ensure that natural
resources are not only available for us but also for future generations.
Political leaders have been busy with power games and have not cared about the masses. A
feudal mindset still dominates the political culture. Even in a democracy in India, sons and
daughters of politicians become unquestionable heirs. Corruption is an integral part of our systems
so that political leaders can fund their politics and amass personal wealth.
QUESTION: South Asians have been living in harmony for centuries. Currently the region has
witnessed all kinds of religious, ethnic and racial conflicts. How do you analyse the situation?
Answer: South Asia has been witness to the unique culture of unity in diversity. However, the
right-wing forces are out to weaken it. First, India was divided based on religion. Then in India, the
right-wing found an easy way of mobilising votes by creating a communal frenzy.
When right-wing forces capture power, they always overshadow the communal harmony
present in a society built over centuries. So this struggle between the traditional syncretic and
politically hegemonic religious cultures will continue. It remains to be seen which one survives.
Usually, any ideology driven by hate and violence doesn‘t survive for a long time as it is not the
natural state for human beings.
QUESTION: Why does peace in South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan, seem to be a
remote possibility? What hurdles do you see in establishing a durable peace in the region?
Answer: Only when India and Pakistan realise that peace and friendship are in their mutual
interest, the possibility for lasting peace can become a reality.
Most people realise the futility of the arms race. We take consolation in that when leaders talk,
they must speak our language, even though many do not do anything substantial to establish peace
and friendship. With the nuclearisation of South Asia, India and Pakistan have no choice but to talk
about peace, as any war can be catastrophic.
The Kargil War in 1999 was the first in history where two nuclear powers came face to face.
This is potentially a very dangerous situation.
Moreover, there is the danger that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. With
so many terrorist attacks in both countries, we should now feel the need for peace more than ever
before. There should also be some serious efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue.
QUESTION: How do you see the future of South Asia in terms of peace, equality and social
harmony?
Answer: Ultimately peace and social harmony will prevail because that is the only normal
state in which human society can exist. However, the disturbances created by right-wing politics
will take time to reach a steady-state. Equality is much tougher to achieve because that requires
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fighting against the unjust economic policies that favour the rich. The rich, anywhere, will not give
up their privileges easily. The rich control the politics by financing the people who grab power.
QUESTION: Thanks for your thoughtful analyses of burning issues in the region. Finally, please
identify and discuss three issues that you consider a threat to peace and progress in the region.
Answer: One, economic policies which promote inequality; two, politics that divide people in
the name of caste and religion; three, interference of global powers with hegemonic ambitions. A
society having economic inequalities will never be peaceful. Moreover, if people are affected by
malnourishment and hunger, they cannot give their best to the society as they will always
underperform. Caste, religious and ethnic divisions compound the economic inequalities as they
tend to justify or promote the latter. For example, in a hierarchical caste order, the less privileged at
the lower rung will be considered natural. When global powers get involved, they prioritise their
economic-military interests and always exploit the other nations. Moreover, their economic-military
interests will be served only when there is unrest somewhere. That is why we see how even after the
end of the Cold War, the United States felt compelled to promote the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which should have been dismantled. Instead, the situation resulted in Russia
becoming insecure and ultimately attacking Ukraine.
(Source: TNS)
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Kashmir
THE CAULDRON OF OPPRESSION
Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain (Defence Analyst)
The decision by an Indian court to impose life imprisonment on Yasin Malik, a Kashmiri
freedom fighter, is yet another instance of New Delhi’s brutal suppression of Kashmiris’ right to self-
determination and denial of their freedoms.
Yasin Malik’s incarceration for life marks the culmination of BJP’s long standing policy to
either eliminate the Kashmiri resistance through a policy of systematic torture or by targeting the
brave Kashmiri leaders like Yasin Malik by throwing them into jail forever on fabricated charges.
Afzal Guru and Burhan Wani are some of the more prominent Kashmiri leaders who have
been martyred for the just cause of Kashmir.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other human rights organization have
documented New Delhi’s savage policy which has turned life for 9 million Muslim Kashmiris into a
“living hell”.
The All Parties Hurriyat Conference has condemned the verdict, saying that Yasin Malik since
1994 pursued peaceful and democratic means of conflict resolution. Describing Yasin Malik as a
“strong votary of dialogue and negotiations between the concerned parties to the conflict i.e. people
of J & K, India and Pakistan, he has been relentlessly and selflessly seeking its resolution. Yet he was
arrested, shifted to Tihar and has now been convicted in invented cases under draconian laws for his
political beliefs on the J & K dispute and for representing the sentiments of the people.”
Islamabad has done the right thing in launching a worldwide campaign for the release of
Yasin Malik. Through this campaign Islamabad hopes to highlight not only the plight of Kashmiris
but also prick the sleeping moral conscience of the world.
One may argue that such campaigns are not going to be effective in a world dominated by
geopolitical and geo-economic concerns.
Yet Pakistan must lend its geostrategic weight to the Kashmiri peoples cry for freedom. A
great historical wrong was committed against the people of Kashmir by the forces of British
imperialism when in 1947, in clear violation of the principles of geographical contiguity and national
self-determination, the district Gurdaspur was awarded to India rather than the new state of
Pakistan.
This arbitrariness was never acknowledged nor rectified by the successive British
governments. Historian Alastair Lamb has described this British injustice as the “disputed legacy” of
Jammu Kashmir.
Yasin Malik’s incarceration is an extra-ordinary case of the violations of Kashmiris right to
freedom and denial of justice. First of all, he was arrested in 2019 on totally false charges of
committing “terrorist” acts, illegally raising funds, belonging to terrorist organization, and criminal
conspiracy and sedition.”
Secondly, after his arrest he has been imprisoned by Indian security forces without due
process of law and has been kept in isolation in the infamous Tihar jail. There are credible reports
including statements by his wife Mishal Malik that he has been tortured while in police custody. For
the past three years he has not been allowed to maintain any kind of contact with his wife and nine
year old daughter. Thirdly, Yasin Malik has not been provided any legal counsel and he has been
fighting his case alone.
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During the hearing Malik told the court that he had given up violence in 1994 and declared
that he “would follow the peace path of Mahatma Gandhi and engage in non-violent political
struggle.” The court observed that in its opinion there was no reformation in him. It said Malik may
have given up the gun in 1994, but he “never expressed any regret for the violence committed prior
to 994.”
India claims to be the largest democracy, but its treatment of the Kashmiri Muslims makes a
total mockery of this assertion.
The intensification of repression against Kashmiri Muslims has to be viewed against the
backdrop of BJP’s decision to eliminate the status of the autonomous state of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir in August 2019 and annex it as a Union territory directly rule by New Delhi. This was a
blatant attempt not only to do away with the disputed status of Kashmir, but also change its
demographic structure by eliminating article 35 A that had recognized to own the land by state
subjects only.
As observed by Sumantra Bose in his new book, Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st
Century Conflict: “The Hindu nationalist government’s Kashmir strategy relies crucially on divide-
and-rule, by exploiting the social and exploiting the social and political heterogeneity of the pre-
August 2019 Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. This strategy seeks to pit Jammu Hindus against
Kashmiri Muslims, and Ladakhi Buddhists against Ladakhi Muslims.”
However hard New Delhi may try to deprive Kashmir Muslim of their undeniable right to
freedom particularly their right to ancestral land, such policies based on force of arms are bound to
boomerang in the long run.
By silencing the voices of dissent and protest in occupied Kashmir, New Delhi’s approach has
already run into a cul-de-sac. Kashmiri Muslims may appear to be without a cohesive and organized
resistance, but their will to fight Indian oppression remains intact. Many in Pakistan have argued
that we should wait for the Modi era to come to an end before we can return to the dialogue as a
forum for seeking just settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
As perceptively noted by Sumantra Bose, “The end of the Modi era would not in itself lead to
dramatic turnaround in Kashmir, in part because the BJP would remain in play to an opposition
party and no doubt deploy its ultra-hardline Kashmir card against its opponents…A better future in
Kashmir hinges crucially …on whether India’s democratic and federalist structure can be saved
from the Hindu nationalist onslaught. If it can, then the Hindu nationalist’s attempt to erase
Kashmir as a political question may turn out to have provided a clean state for the crafting of a
negotiated settlement.”
(Source: Bol News)

JAMMU & KASHMIR UNDER SIEGE

An Unending Account of Indian Crimes
Asadullah Khan (Senior researcher at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies, Islamabad)
Since coming to power, the Hindu-nationalist BJP government in India has forcibly tried to
dismantle the self-proclaimed socially diverse and secular face of the Indian polity. Nowhere has the
state oppression against religious minorities seen greater belligerence than in the Muslim-majority
Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJK). In August 2019, when Prime Minister
Narendra Modi revoked the special status of Kashmir – guaranteed by Articles 370 and 35-A – the
constitutional protection to Kashmir’s limited autonomy and territorial sovereignty came into
jeopardy. Revocation of these two articles, through a presidential decree, has enabled people from
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the rest of India to buy property, hold public offices, and permanently reside in occupied Jammu &
Kashmir, thereby, altering the demography of the pre-dominantly Muslim region.
Subsequently, the Hindu majoritarian government in New Delhi introduced a fast-track
process to ease the criteria for Indian citizens to obtain domiciles in this disputed territory.
Moreover, major positions in Kashmir’s top bureaucracy are filled by non-Kashmiri Indians. The
fears of demographic transformation (institutionalised through a discriminatory state apparatus) are
on the rise with the government preparing to change the delimitation laws, aimed at turning IIOJK
Muslim majority into a tiny minority. Exclusionary state practices are, therefore, eroding the distinct
religious and ethnic identity of Kashmiris. Fearing strong public resistance against such draconian
measures, the state authorities have imposed a military siege to clamp down on dissent. Kashmiris
living in such a dire situation routinely endure strict curfews, communication blackouts, heavy
surveillance, gender-based violence, torture, and displacement by law enforcement agencies and
increasing deployment of troops. However, while such measures have been worsening since
revocation IIOJK’s special status, they are not new to Kashmiris who have been living under the
yolk of Indian oppression for decades.
Since August 2019, Indian state forces have carried out extrajudicial executions with brazen
impunity, targeting civilians, journalists, academics and students. According to the Kashmir
Media Service, 7,235 custodial killings cases have been reported in the past 30 years. Human
Rights Watch considers investigation into extrajudicial killings to be meaningless due to the
enforcement of the ‘Armed Forces Special Powers Act’ (AFSPA) that grants special powers to the
Indian occupying forces to use heavy-handed tactics against citizens (under the guise of
maintaining ‘public order’) with immunity from prosecution for serious abuses. Special
legislation, along with other counterterrorism and sedition laws, allow violent crackdowns on
innocent people and clampdown on peaceful protests. For instance, the ‘Public Safety Act’ allows
detention without trial for up to two years.
Consistent use of pellet guns by Indian security forces, to disperse crowds, raised serious
alarm among rights activists and humanitarian agencies. Amnesty International’s briefing in 2017
titled ‘Losing Sight in Kashmir: The Impact of Pellet-Firing Shotguns highlighted how pellet use was
responsible for damaging eyes/ facial features/ ears or blinding the sight of hundreds of young
Kashmiris. The Indian troops deployed in Kashmir have cared little for humanitarian concerns of the
people as evident from the presence of hundreds of mass graves in the valley. Human rights groups
have constantly urged the Indian government to investigate these unidentified graves. According to
the Associated Press of Pakistan, mass graves of at least 8,652 people were reportedly found in
IIOJK, believed to be victims of unlawful killings and enforced disappearances.
The militarisation of Kashmiri society has brutalised women, elderly and children as well – as
they too often become victims of enforced detentions and indiscriminate torture. Kashmiri women
are vulnerable to gender-based violence and rapidly increasing instances of rape by security forces.
Rights groups have been concerned about the use of rape as a weapon of war by the Indian security
forces with evidence of mass rapes reported by the Human Rights Watch in 2014. The brutalisation
of Kashmiri children is another bleak side of the state violence perpetrated against the most innocent
in the population. In the past three decades, according to the Kashmir Media Service, 107,860
children have been orphaned in one of the most heavily militarised regions in the world.
The United Nations, international human rights agencies, rights groups, and humanitarian
activists have reported these crimes while urging the Indian government to refrain from using
draconian and oppressive tactics against Kashmiris. However, the Indian authorities and security
forces have always approached the Kashmiri question from the lens of national security without
caring for the fundamental rights of the Kashmiri people. Militarisation of Kashmiri society – further
compounded by the far-right majoritarian approach of the current Indian government – has only
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laid the seeds for greater resistance and uprising among the Kashmiri people. It is high time that the
international community urges the Indian government to accept the counterproductive nature of
brutal policies and violent tactics against innocent Kashmiris. Otherwise, their continuous struggle
and resistance against Indian oppression would take more lives, consume greater human cost, and
spill more blood.
(Source: The Nation)

OPPRESSION IS KASHMIR LEADS TO BREACHING OF PEACE

Anwar Mansrro Khan (Former Attorney General of Pakistan)
‘To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ are amongst the first words of the
UN Charter Preamble. These motivational words were coined by the founders of the United
Nations, who lived through the devastation of the two World Wars by 1945. Thus, the objective of
the UN was to prevent disputes, and help restore peace following the outbreak of armed conflict and
to promote lasting peace.
In the past, there has been breach of peace in the world as powerful states attacked smaller
and weaker countries for material gains or for their security. One of the permanent members having
veto power, Russia has been involved in aggression against Ukraine. Saudi Arabia continues to
cause misery and destruction in the war waged against Yemen. Instead of calling for peace and
moving to secure peaceful existence of the weaker nations, the members of the UN have subscribed
to such wars. The destruction of Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan are some examples of aggression
causing breach of peace in the world.
One of the first such disputes after the second World War was the Kashmir dispute, where the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervened to save succeeding generations from the
scrouge of war, thus stopping the war between India and Pakistan and by the famous resolution of
the UNSC resolution no. 38 and 39 of 1948 that the war should be ceased immediately so that peace
can prevail for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict.
On 23rd April 1948, the UNSC passed Resolution no. 47 which ruled that the people settled in
Jammu and Kashmir shall have the right to decide their own fate through a plebiscite. The
responsibility was given to India for the plebiscite to be conducted under the supervision of the UN.
Observers were appointed on both sides of the ‘Line of Control’. It was in that resolution that India
agreed to appoint a nominee of the UN Secretary General for conducting the plebiscite, where the
nominee would be the Administrator giving him full authority. Thus, the state of Jammu and
Kashmir was not considered to be a part of India, though the said resolution did allow India to keep
minimum forces there. There have been 13 resolutions of the UNSC till 1971, reiterating the
Resolution 47 of 1948 to be acted upon. It is simply unfortunate that the UN could not force its
resolutions to be implemented from 1948 till date. Hence, the dispute continued, and India and
Pakistan have since been engaged in two wars and numerous skirmishes, the recent being the Indian
Airforce entering in Pakistan’s territory, where the plane was shot down and the pilot Abhinandan
Varthaman was captured.
Wars in the world have commenced and ended. The 20-year-old Vietnam War came to an end
and today Vietnam continues to progress. The wars in Iraq and Kuwait ended and these countries
continue on their path of progress. Although the war in Afghanistan has concluded, it continues to
be isolated from the world being a weak country. Lebanon and Palestine remain at war with Israel
without any intervention from the UN despite the many resolutions of the UNSC. Similarly, the
dispute in Kashmir has not ended.
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The voices of the Kashmiris are muffled by the oppressive attitude of India. Kashmir is a
stateless nation where in 1947 the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed an Instrument of
Accession which was accepted by Lord Mountbatten of Burma, then the Governor General of India,
whereby, it was categorically stated:
“I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement
is made between the Governor General and the ruler of this state whereby any functions in relation
to the administration in this state of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the
ruler of this state, then any such agreement shall be deem to form part of this Instrument and shall
be construed and have effect accordingly.”
“The terms of this Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act
or of the Indian Independence Act 1947 unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument
supplementary to this Instrument.”
“Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this
state authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that
should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this state deem it
necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land
belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement,
determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice Of India.”
In view of this, the defence, the currency and foreign policy of Jammu and Kashmir state was
given to the State of India. However, there was a dispute as to this accession by the people of
Kashmir who were predominantly Muslims. This led to an uprising initially crushed by the Indian
Army, followed by a war between Pakistan and India in December 1947, as a part of Kashmir within
the area was controlled by Pakistan; the matter was later taken up at the UNSC and the aforesaid
resolutions were passed.
However, serious resentment continues. It is the Indian Army, police and other forces that
continue to be posted by India in Jammu and Kashmir with a view to crush the fight for freedom.
India calls these freedom fighters terrorists. It is said that one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter.
India has continued to keep itself away from the International Criminal Court (ICC) by not
subscribing to the ICC Statute, for obvious reasons; thus, the jurisdiction of the ICC is barred against
India and its citizens. India continues to create crime against humanity like murder, extermination,
deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international laws, torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual
offences, persecution against all the identifiable groups, enforced disappearances of persons and
other inhuman acts including terror by use of brutal force including the use of pellet guns and other
fire arms killing thousands of people amounting to genocide.
Jammu and Kashmir has its own Constitution and a State within its own rights, though
presently under control of India on account of the UNSC Resolution No. 47 of 1948. Article 370 was
introduced in the Constitution of India where it was provided that the Parliament needed the
consent of the government of Jammu and Kashmir for applying a law of India except for the laws of
defence, foreign affairs, finance, and communication. The laws of citizenship, ownership of
property, and fundamental rights of the residents of Jammu and Kashmir is different from the
residents of India. Under Article 370, citizens of India cannot buy property in Jammu and Kashmir.
However, due to the blatant action by India, the provision was done away with, and the
Constitution of India was made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, making the area Union
Territories of India. India violated the Resolution no. 47 of 1948 and all subsequent resolutions of
the UNSC. The UNSC, for political reasons, kept quiet despite its mandate.
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Article 35-A of the Constitution provided that the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature has full
discretionary power to decide the ‘permanent residents’ of the state. It gave them special rights and
privileges regarding employment with the state government, acquisition of property, settling in the
state and other similar rights. The provision has now been taken away. Thus, India has annexed the
State of Jammu and Kashmir which could not have been done in terms of the UNSC Resolutions that
gave the power to the people of Jammu and Kashmir to choose through a UN controlled plebiscite.
The question is: why did the UN keep quiet, especially when the Charter of the UN in Chapter VII
clearly provides, ‘action with respect to threat to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression’.
It is apparent that Jammu and Kashmir was dealt with as a State, controlled by India, and not
being the Union of India. Hence, it had a special position on account of its being a disputed territory.
In 2019 India, on the basis of Article 370(3), caused Article 370 to be revoked and made the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, as two Union territories, controlled and governed now by
the Government of India under the Constitution in its entirety, whereby, the special status of
Kashmir as being a State itself under its own constitution was taken away by force and coercion by
India, its armed forces and para-military taking over despite riots against the unlawful annexation.
It is also unfortunate that India has closed the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir making it a
de facto prison, violating the Geneva Convention, which relates to the treatment of ‘Protected
Persons’, being the Kashmiris. It could be disputed that Kashmir was not a product of war, but it
should be noted that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory, being so declared by
the UNSC as a consequence of the aggression by India, in sending their forces to stop the indigenous
uprising there and blaming Pakistan in 1948. It is after India sent in their troops that Pakistan moved
their forces.
This conflict has caused two wars between India and Pakistan and numerous Line of Control
violations by India. The Indians openly claim aggression against Pakistan after violating the
Pakistan air space. Peace continues to be breached which is the main issue. It is mandated upon
India under the Geneva Convention to protect the said ‘Protected Persons’ which is being violated
by India.
The UNCHR cannot under the said Convention be restrained from entering the area, but India
chooses not to allow the UNCHR from entering. Phones have been restricted, media is not allowed
so that they cannot report the actual situation.
It is the duty of the members of the United Nations to assume responsibility for the
administration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The principle that ‘might is right’ cannot be
allowed in the presence of the numerous UNSC Resolutions. The UN has to free the imprisoned
Kashmiris. The International Trusteeship System enshrined in Articles 75 to 91 of the UN
Charter has not been tested, nor activated. One fails to understand why the UN chooses not to
implement the Trusteeship System in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where India has acted in
complete violation.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 has defined the term ‘Aggression’,
being the use of armed forces by a State in contravention of the Charter would be an act of
‘Aggression’. The State of Jammu and Kashmir being a disputed territory, a State having its own
Constitution that was annexed by the armed forces of India thus being in contravention of the
Charter of the United Nations. Article 5 of Resolution 3314 also provides, that “no consideration of
whatever nature whether political, economic, military or otherwise may serve as a justification for
aggression and no territorial acquisition of special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be
recognized as lawful” while Article 7 clearly states and allows “the right of self-determination,
freedom and independence.” Resolution no. 47 of 1948 clearly provides for self-determination which
India resists till date.
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The Charter of the United Nations categorically provides that the formation of United Nation
was to protect mankind from the scourge of war and create peace in the world. Such aggression,
whether it is Russia against Ukraine or annexation of Crimea or war in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya,
is in no way acceptable. It is the UN which needs to protect its own Resolutions and implement
them if peace is to be guaranteed in the world.
It is unfortunate that the UN has become a platform for political manoeuvring rather than
diplomacy. Permanent Members of the UN need to analyse the critical Kashmir issue and deal with it
strictly in accordance with the Charter of United Nations and various Resolutions passed by it, such
that each resolution is implemented in terms of Chapter VII specially Articles 39 to 51 of its Charter.
Finally, whether these members choose their countries’ prosperity over the Charter and the
very reason for the UN’s existence, poses a great responsibility upon them.
(Source: Bol News)

MODI FAILS TO CHANGE KASHMIR’S DEMOGRAPHY

Amjed Jaaved (Ex-Civil Servant)
A series of events took place in which Kashmiri pandits (brahmin) or non-Kashmiri settlers in
occupied Kashmir were attacked. Rahul Bhat, a pandit employee, in Budgam’s Chadoora was shot
dead. on May 12. A Hindu teacher was shot dead outside a school where she worked. Some
unknown person hurled a grenade at a group of Bihari workers, mostly brick-kiln labourers. In
protest, hundreds of Pandit employees left the valley.
Apparently to alter the demography of the occupied Kashmir, over 4,000 Pandits were
recruited since 2008 under the Indian PM’s special employment package. Bihari settlers were issued
domicile certificates to work and settle in the Valley. A vast tract of land was allotted to the military.
The Modi government has been reciting the mantra that all is hunky dory since abolition of
statehood. The killing of non-Kashmiri settlers brought home the truth that the situation was not
peaceful in occupied Kashmir.
Hindus in Jammu launched violent protests that the Pandit employees and Bihari employees
should be relocated to safer locations. The Indian government relocated the 177 protesting
employees to safer urban centres.
The militants have changed their strategy. They no longer take to social posts to own
responsibility for the killing of the non-Kashmiris. A secular-sounding Resistance Group appears to
be in the forefront. The Modi government however continues to propagate that it was just another
splinter group of religious outfits like Lashkar-e-Toyaba, Jaishe-Mohammad or their ilk.
The group first surfaced with a grenade attack in October 2019. Injuring at least eight civilians
on Srinagar’s busy Hari Singh High Street, it was the first grenade attack in the city after the region
lost special status. India says it was in April 2020 that the group first drew official attention. An
intense gunfight between militants and security forces in the Keran sector of the Line of Control, in
North Kashmir’s Kupwara district, left five personnel of the Army’s elite Special Forces dead. An
equal number of militants, all native Kashmirs, were also martyred.
The Resistance Front struck again that month, this time in Sopore, a town in North Kashmir’s
Baramulla district, killing three personnel and injuring two others from the Central Reserve Police
Force. More attacks followed in May 2020: a 16-hour gunfight with security forces in Kupwara
district that killed five security personnel. Another attack on Central Reserve Police Force personnel
left three personnel dead.
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Members of The Resistance Front keep a low profile, unlike the Hizbul Mujahideen militants
of recent years, who became household names and faces through their social media presence.
The Kashmiri has been ruled by Shah Mirs and Sultans (1339-1586), Mughals (1586-1751), and
Dogras (1846-1947).An immutable lesson of history is that they never reconciled with foreign rule. If
they could no longer fight an invader with arms, they pelted stones on invaders (Moghal). The
stone throwers were called dilawars, and the Moghal, were addressed as shikas mogle. This
Kashmiri-language expression is spoken when something is lost. C’est dommage in French (it’s too
bad, or it’s tough) is a rough equivalent..
The Moghal were Muslim. Yet, the Kashmiri hated them. The expression Shikas mogle affords
a peek into the Kashmiri heart and mind. They cursed foreigners, be they be Muslim. They are
honest and simple, people, rather gullible though not imbeciles . They hate cheating and consider
Akbar `the Great’ an epitome of treachery. Akbar invited Kashmir ruler Yusuf Chak (1579 – 1586) for
talks. But treacherously imprisoned and killed him in Bihar state. Be it noted that Akbar had failed
to subjugate Kashmir in his earlier two expeditions. After take-over, the Moghal lived in a walled
nagri, city, later called Sri nagar). The helpless Kashmir used to throw stones at the walled city to
express their anguish. The general feeling of hatred, Kashmiriyat, was akin to what Ibn-e-Khuldoon
calls asabiya (national cohesion). It ran across all sects (Shia-Sunni), religions, castes and creeds.
It baffles one’s imagination how Kashmiris have sustained their spirit of resistance despite
over174 years of oppression (Dogra rule 1846-1947 to India’s raj, 1947 onwards). India marched its
forces into the Valley and annexed Kashmir on 27 October 1947. The self-conceited basis for India’s
aggression was a fake instrument of accession. The world community does not recognise this so-
called accession instrument. As such, the United Nations granted the right of self-determination to
the Kashmiris. This right is enshrined in the UN’s resolutions of 1948 and 1949.
Let us have a glimpse of the Dogra’s reign of terror in Kashmir. To stifle the Kashmiri’s
fighting spirit, the Dogra punished even Kashmiri children who played with slingshots (ghulail) and
stones (Muhammad Yousaf Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, vol. 1, p. 50). Under the Dogra rule,
the Kashmiri were treated as no better than beasts of burden. Instead of donkeys and horses,
Kashmiri Muslims were used to transport goods across Gilgit, Leh and Skardu. They carried
luggage on their backs across glaciers as high as 17,000 feet. Thousands of them perished along the
way each year owing to frostbite, falls from precipices, and hunger or sickness.
The reign of terror by Indian forces (now estimated at about 900,000 regulars and security
personnel) who replaced the maharajah’s constabulary on 27 October 1947, is no less gruesome.
International human rights organisations, as well as India’s National Human Rights Commission,
have brought into limelight the Kashmiris’ mysterious disappearances, their custodial deaths, and
countless rapes of hapless Kashmiri women.
Like the Dogra, Indian rulers are mercilessly exploiting Kashmiris’ economic resources. The
bulk of locally-generated electricity is being diverted to Indian states. The tourism industry is in
shambles. Highly educated people have no jobs. With no inflow of tourists, the shopkeepers have no
business. Unlike the occupied Kashmir, all the socio-economic sectors in Azad Kashmir are
progressing by leaps and bounds.
Neither Indians nor the Dogra could gag them. The struggle for freedom has continued
unabated despite centuries of oppression.
The lesson from Kashmiris’ struggle for freedom is that repression or palliatives like elections
in occupied Kashmir are no good. India shall have to allow the Kashmiris to exercise their right of
self-determination.
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India should learn a lesson from the history of Kashmir. Dogra oppression spanned 101 years,
1846-1947 followed by Indian yoke for over 73 years, until today. The struggle for freedom goes on.
The sooner India replaces its terrorising military operation All-Out, with –get-out, the better.
Modi’s government applied the Public Safety Act and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
to stifle dissent. The Public Safety Act (PSA), 1978, of Jammu & Kashmir is an administrative
detention law that allows detention of any individual for up to two years without a trial or charge.
The Public Safety Act allows for the arrest and detention of people without a warrant, specific
charges, and often for an unspecified period of time.
Kashmiri journalist Sajad Gul was arrested under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act
[JKPSA], a day after a court granted him bail in connection with a police case that accused him of
criminal conspiracy. Gul was working with an NGO The Kashmir Walla and was arrested by police
for allegedly “spreading disinformation through fake tweets regarding the recent anti-terrorist
operation”.
In an interview, many Indian retired generals exposed the “myth of normalcy” in the
occupied Kashmir. They pointed out those talks with all stakeholders including Pakistan was the
only way to restore peace in Kashmir.
The Hindu protesters in Jammu have been demanding a crackdown on the Kashmiri
population in the Valley. Already the Indian security forces are killing countless Kashmiris, even
minors, in the guise of fake encounters. The killing of pandits may be used as an excuse to carry out
genocide of the Kashmiri population.
(Source: Pakistan Today)
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Law
ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Sulema Jahangir (Solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales)
The role of the judiciary has once again taken centre stage. For an apolitical institution that is
built upon the tenets of independence, due process and equality, it is concerning how often its most
senior members become arbiters of political events.
Unlike most other countries, personalities in the superior judiciary and ‘suo motu’ have
become household names in Pakistan. Recently, the chief justice of Pakistan felt the need to take suo
motu notice of what he felt were perceptions about interference in the criminal investigation of
government officials and who remains on the Exit Control List.
If judges are able to bring cases themselves to the apex court, then certain rules must be
established to ensure against the appearance of bias. Should the judiciary be receptive to invitations
for interventions from politicians or opinion-makers? Questions are also raised about suo motu
benches excluding particular members of the judiciary. The façade of judicial propriety has
descended to a new low, where one group of senior judges criticise another group for deliberately
excluding them from deciding constitutional petitions of a political nature.
Suo motu empowers the senior judiciary to enforce fundamental rights on a ‘question of
public importance’, but applying this power selectively can cause irreparable damage to the dignity
of the judiciary. Where cases against political leaders, commercial enterprises or government
departments are selected to ensure that they are prosecuted with zeal in the interest of preserving
the rule of law, and other cases do not raise such judicial fervour, it raises the fundamental question
of equality before the law. Are certain political leaders more equal than others? Some examples are
the targeted investigations by NAB officials, as noted by the apex court itself; the murder of activists
in North Waziristan; the recent police brutality against Afghan refugees; and even a case filed
against PTI leader Imran Khan, which was later withdrawn by the prosecution. No suo motu
followed these instances.
Public interest litigation can be a useful tool, which the judiciary can use for the empowerment
of vulnerable groups, but its exercise should be limited to the rules.
In India, following the emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi, an era of judicial activism
followed, in which the Indian supreme court took suo motu cases based on letters or press reports of
state excesses. There were reported instances of judges soliciting petitions from journalists, which
led to the formation of a public interest litigation cell, tasked with screening petitions, which are
then placed before the chief justice for assignment. This took away the power of individual judges or
benches to select and control issues being brought before the court. Despite rules to prevent selection
by individual judges, suo motu cases have been on the rise in India.
In Bangladesh, the power is used more sparingly, and mainly in existing or decided criminal
cases. Beyond South Asia, suo motu cases have been taken up by the Nigerian court, but mainly in
relation to issues in ongoing or decided cases.
The moralistic leaning of our Supreme Court also comes forth in the court’s observations in
other politically charged cases. For example, the majority opinion in the defections case compared
defections to a cancer afflicting the body politic. The minority judgement noted that not counting the
vote of defecting lawmakers is in effect rewriting the Constitution, in which Article 63-A clearly lays
out the remedial process. The majority went further to advise parliament that strict sanctions must
be put in place for defecting lawmakers.
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In India, defection laws are wider, but nowhere does the law state that the vote of a defecting
lawmaker in a no-confidence motion should not be counted. In established democracies like the
United Kingdom and United States, there is no sanction when members of the legislature defect
other than to exclude them from the party.
Article 95 of our Constitution provides for a no-confidence motion against the prime minister.
If this is successful, the Constitution stipulates that he or she shall cease to hold office. If the votes of
defecting lawmakers cannot be counted, as ruled by the majority bench, then Article 95 would
become futile. It would be career suicide for a parliamentarian to vote out even a most repugnant
leader if it meant that not only would his or her vote not be counted but that he or she would also be
subjected to punitive sanctions.
In the UK, which has inspired our own parliamentary system, there have been several
defections in the last few years over political issues such as Brexit. More recently, Prime Minister
Boris Joh-nson faced a no-confidence motion in his own party when 148 parliamentarians voted
against him.
The purpose of Article 63-A was to deter established forces from engineering another regime
change. Given that not one prime minister has managed to finish his or her term in the last 75 years,
the apprehensions that informed Article 63-A were legitimate. It was not meant to quell freedom of
choice of legislators where they are compelled to represent their constituencies. While the majority
judiciary in the defections case clearly expressed their disdain for politicians who switch parties, the
reality is that switching loyalties is rife in every party because of how regime changes are brought
about and not because parliamentarians exercise their right to vote on a no-trust motion when they
believe that a leader is unable to deliver effectively.
The apex court has supervisory and standard-setting responsibilities, and it is the routine
application of rules that provides a stable and certain justice system. Where it would be rare to find
two households who would agree on a set of morals, it is concerning that the senior judiciary must
select matters and intervene in the running of the state for the cause of ensuring that elected
members of parliament display the ‘correct’ morals. It is for the people to make that decision.
(Source: Dawn)

AMENDMENT TO NAB LAW

A holistic review
Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar (Practicing lawyer at Supreme Court and has served as Chairman, Federal
Excise & Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and Senior Advisor Federal Ombudsman)
National Account ability Bauru (NAB) being the important anti-graft agency has been on the
media radar since its establishment. The spirit, intent, objectives and performance of this institution
may be commendable but the way the NAB law was legislated, the manner and circumstances in
which it was applied, the unbridled authority of the chairman, the mechanism of burden of proof on
the accused, and the process of arrest, remand, investigation, prosecution and trial has always been
a subject of debate.
There have been judgments of the superior courts on the working and prosecution. Even in
some judgments, certain guidelines have been given for improvement in its working.
Actually, the purpose behind the enactment of NAB law was to provide effective measures for
detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt
practices, misuse or abuse of power or authority, misappropriation of property, taking of kickbacks,
commissions and for matters connected and ancillary or incidental thereto, but how much the
objectives have been achieved, it can be debated on both sides.
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The Parliament recently suggested 27 amendments to the National Accountability Ordinance,

1999 which have touched almost all important sections of the NAB law. Some of them are very
important including the definition of certain clauses of NAB sections, appointment and tenure of
chairman, jurisdiction and cognizance of NAB, role of prosecutor general, case management and
trial of offences, arrest, investigation, enquiry & remand of the accused, tender of pardon, approval
of the State Bank of Pakistan in banking matters and restriction on issuance of public statements and
many others.
The president in the first round did not give his assent to the amended Bill under the
Constitution. However, despite that the president returned the bill to amend the National
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999), the Parliament again passed the Bill on the same
pattern in a joint session under Article 75 (2) of the Constitution by majority and after its
presentation again to the president, he shall give his assent within 10 days, failing which the assent
shall be deemed to have been given.
There is no doubt that there has been a consistent demand from all political parties for
improvement in NAB working and the law. There have also been observations and judgments of
superior courts about the NAB working and prosecution.
Though the Parliament has tried to address many issues through these amendments relating
to NAB working and prosecution and certainly there are among some good amendments, which
include appointment and tenure of chairman, jurisdiction and cognizance of NAB, role of prosecutor
general NAB, case management and trial of offences, arrest, investigation, enquiry & remand of
accused, tender of pardon, the definition of willful default, prior approval of the State Bank of
Pakistan in banking matters, tenure of security of judge of accountability court, quantum of offence
for declaring the offence against public at large and restriction on issuance of public statements, bail
granting power to Accountability Court, providing filing of appeal mechanism against
Accountability Court judgment and that more importantly if the accused has been acquitted by the
court on the ground that the case was initiated with mala fide intention or based on false or
fabricated evidence, the person responsible shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
Some amendments have also been introduced in the present NAB law by the Parliament
which might receive a great difference of opinion from various quarters and would have a chance to
challenge in the constitutional courts for final determination and application which include that the
proposed amended Bill shall come into force at once and shall be deemed to have taken effect on
and from commencement of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, the definitions and
application of corruption and corrupt practices & the applicability of the definition of Benamidar
and that that the convict shall be entitled to benefit under section 382-B of the Code.
It is also important for the future continuity and credibility of NAB as an institution that some
amendment should also be introduced to redraft its mandate and should act and perform as
Commission and not under the authority and whims of one man. The NAB should also work
vigorously to create an impression that it is not the agency of political victimization and to set up a
cell with a group of professional experts for improving governance, to rectify systemic issues which
are the root causes and responsible for corruption and corrupt practices like other similar agencies in
the world. It is also important to start working to improve the image of independent and
professional investigation and prosecution within and outside NAB, and to establish a vigilant cell
to monitor the working of NAB officials to check their misuse of authority.
The patchwork in NAB law would not address the real issues of corruption and legal
controversies in future unless the whole law was redrafted through the Parliament after a debate by
adding modern requirements and strategies to the law to deal with white-collar crimes, corruption
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and corrupt practices and to as well streamline the governance trends in Pakistan by issuing
National Anti Corruption Strategy for a period of ten years.
(Source: Daily Times)

A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Muhammad Waqar Rana (Former Additional Attorney General for Pakistan)
A split advisory opinion was given by the Supreme Court (3:2) on a presidential reference
under Article 186 of the constitution. The reference sought an interpretation of Article 63A of the
constitution.
The verdict raised some questions about the interpretive powers and jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in such matters, while also providing an opportunity to consider the idea of
establishing a constitutional court on the federal level – one that can exclusively deal with important
constitutional and political questions affecting the federation and its political system.
Several questions were raised about the advisory opinion given on the prudential reference.
Courts all around the world give decisions which may not be liked by a large segment of society.
The edifice of a judicial system stands on surer foundations of impartiality and independence and
therefore the recognition and validity of judicial decisions are respected as judicial opinions based
upon higher wisdom.
Most of the criticism on this verdict was unfounded as the judiciary in Pakistan remains
independent and impartial. The country’s superior judiciary has dealt with hard questions, faced
tough situations, and increasing criticism, which is mainly due to an increasing polarization of
society that is divided at many levels. The courts have, through their opinions, answered some of the
hardest legal questions. In difficult times, our courts have protected and defended the constitution
and the liberties it guarantees. The bringing of these constitutional and political questions before the
Supreme Court reflects a confidence and a hope and increases the courts’ prestige, powers and a
resultant trust therein.
Constitutional controversies with high political stakes and consequences largely relate to live
political issues. One of the reasons for bringing these matters to the courts is that over the years
other branches of the government were not allowed to work either by the dismissals of government
and assemblies or due to imposition of martial law that made them ineffective, indecisive, less
trusted and somewhat disputed owing to blatant violations of democratic norms for power. It then
became the duty of the Supreme Court to enter in the arena to save the system for which there was a
heavy cost in the form of criticism.
In order to deal with these apparently constitutional issues having political overtones that
were also connected with fundamental rights for the purpose of jurisdiction the Supreme Court
decided to exercise its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the constitution. This original
discretionary jurisdiction, along with other jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, was fundamentally
limited for the adjudication of political controversies. In the British constitutional tradition,
ultimate state authority rests with the elective branches and the courts’ jurisdiction is limited to
enforcing individual rights. A look at the 1973 constitution would show that primacy is attached
to parliament and the parliamentary form of government where all political questions are decided
outside the courtroom.
Pakistan genuinely needs a constitutional court. It was agreed to in the Charter of Democracy
of 2006 but the idea was dropped while passing the 18th Amendment without assigning any
reasons. Something like this would require an overhaul through a re-writing of the constitution –
which is next to impossible given the political, social and economic polarization – or by large-scale
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amendment. The federation has become weak due to centralization of state power and an unequal
distribution of resources and political polarization. These pseudo-democratic governments could not
deliver public goods like education, health and shelter. The balance of power amongst the three
branches of government has also been disturbed. Some state institutions are unwilling to account for
their performance and purse. Moreover, with the increased power of social media this status quo is
being seriously challenged and a demand for bold measures to maintain unity of the state and
integrity of the system is rising for which patchwork is no longer the answer.
The constitution has been amended several times to keep this system working. A system of
caretaker governments was used to manipulate elections and their results. A judicial commission
was introduced to address abuse of power in judicial appointments by the executive, but it resulted
in favouritism, cartelization and groupings as alleged by many members of the bar. The answer to
all these issues is a constitutional court.
A fractured political system that is easily influenced and coerced cannot be easily and suitably
overhauled to revive and establish a real parliamentary democracy. The existing constitutional
institutions including the Supreme Court cannot be loaded with more political cases and expected to
decide every political controversy. No effective, safe and sufficient mechanism is provided where
the Election Commission which can guarantee a fair and free and uncontroversial election when its
head and members are under constant attack.
Constitutional courts are successfully working in many countries of Europe and have proved
to be an effective aid to other political institutions. South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea and many
other countries too have established constitutional courts which have strengthened democratic
systems. Pakistan can learn from their experiences and strengthen its democracy the same way.
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Middle East
PALESTINE’S RESISTANCE MODEL
Ramzy Baroud
What took place between May 2021 and May 2022 is nothing less than a paradigm shift in
Palestinian resistance. Thanks to the popular and inclusive nature of Palestinian mobilization
against the Israeli occupation, resistance in Palestine is no longer an ideological, political or regional
preference.
In the period between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and only a few years ago,
Palestinian muqawama – or resistance – was constantly put in the dock, often criticized and
condemned, as if an oppressed nation had a moral responsibility in selecting the type of resistance to
suit the needs and interests of its oppressors.
As such, Palestinian resistance became a political and ideological litmus test. The Palestinian
Authority of Yasser Arafat and, later, Mahmoud Abbas, called for ‘popular resistance’, but it seems
that it neither understood what the strategy actually meant, and certainly was not prepared to act
upon such a call.
Palestinian armed resistance was removed entirely from its own historical context; in fact, the
context of all liberation movements throughout history, and was turned into a straw man, set up by
Israel and its western allies to condemn Palestinian ‘terrorism’ and to present Israel as a victim
facing an existential threat.
With the lack of a centralized Palestinian definition of resistance, even pro-Palestine civil
society groups and organizations demarcated their relationship to the Palestinian struggle based on
embracing certain forms of Palestinian resistance and condemning others.
The argument that only oppressed nations should have the right to choose the type of
resistance that could speed up their salvation and freedom fell on deaf ears.
The truth is that Palestinian resistance preceded the official establishment of Israel in 1948.
Palestinians and Arabs who resisted British and Zionist colonialism used many methods of
resistance that they perceived to be strategic and sustainable. There was no relationship whatsoever
between the type of resistance and the religious, political or ideological identity of those who
resisted.
This paradigm prevailed for many years, starting with the Fidayeen Movement following the
Nakba, the popular resistance to the brief Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1956, and the decades-long
occupation and siege starting in 1967. The same reality was expressed in Palestinian resistance in
historic Palestine throughout the decades; armed resistance ebbed and flowed, but popular
resistance remained intact. The two phenomena were always intrinsically linked, as the former was
also sustained by the latter.
The Fatah Movement, which dominates today’s Palestinian Authority, was formed in 1959 to
model liberation movements in Vietnam and Algeria. Regarding its connection to the Algerian
struggle, the Fatah manifesto read: “The guerrilla war in Algeria, launched five years before the
creation of Fatah, has a profound influence on us. […] They symbolize the success we dreamed of.”
This sentiment was championed by most modern Palestinian movements as it proved to be a
successful strategy for most southern liberation movements. In the case of Vietnam, the resistance to
US occupation carried out even during political talks in Paris. The underground resistance in South
Africa remained vigilant until it became clear that the country’s apartheid regime was in the process
of being dismantled.
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Palestinian disunity, however, which was a direct result of the Oslo Accords, made a unified
Palestinian position on resistance untenable. The very idea of resistance itself became subject to the
political whims and interests of factions. When, in July 2013, PA President Abbas condemned armed
resistance, he was trying to score political points with his western supporters, and further sow the
seeds of division among his people.
The truth is that Hamas neither invented, nor has ownership of, armed resistance. In June
2021, a poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), revealed that
60 per cent of Palestinians support “a return to armed confrontations and Intifada”. By stating so,
Palestinians were not necessarily declaring allegiance to Hamas. Armed resistance, though in a
different style and capacity also exists in the West Bank, and is largely championed by Fatah’s own
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. The recent Israeli attacks on the town of Jenin, in the northern West Bank,
were not aimed at eliminating Hamas, Islamic Jihad or socialist fighters, but Fatah’s own.
Skewed media coverage and misrepresentation of the resistance, often by Palestinian factions
themselves, turned the very idea of resistance into a political and factional scuffle, forcing everyone
involved to take a position on the issue. The discourse on the resistance, however, began changing in
the last year.
The May 2021 rebellion and the Israeli war on Gaza – known among Palestinians as the Unity
Intifada – served as a paradigm shift. The language became unified; self-serving political references
quickly dissipated; collective frames of reference began replacing provisional, regional and factional
ones; occupied Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque emerged as the unifying symbols of resistance; a
new generation began to emerge and quickly began to develop new platforms.
On May 29, the Israeli government insisted on allowing the so-called ‘Flag March’ – a mass
rally by Israeli Jewish extremists that celebrate the capture of the Palestinian city of al-Quds – to
once more pass through Palestinian neighborhoods of occupied East Jerusalem. This was the very
occasion that instigated the violence of the previous year. Aware of the impending violence which
often results from such provocations, Israel wanted to impose the timing and determine the nature
of the violence. It failed. Gaza didn’t fire rockets. Instead, tens of thousands of Palestinians
mobilized throughout occupied Palestine, thus allowing popular mobilization and coordination
between numerous communities to grow. Palestinians proved able to coordinate their responsibility,
despite the numerous obstacles, hardships and logistical difficulties.
The events of the last year are a testament that Palestinians are finally freeing their resistance
from factional interests. The most recent confrontations show that Palestinians are even harnessing
resistance as a strategic objective. Muqawama in Palestine is no longer ‘symbolic’ or supposedly
‘random’ violence that reflects ‘desperation’ and lack of political horizon. It is becoming more
defined, mature and well-coordinated.
This phenomenon must be extremely worrying to Israel, as the coming months and years
could prove critical in changing the nature of the confrontation between Palestinians and their
occupiers. Considering that the new resistance is centered around homegrown, grassroots,
community-oriented movements, it has far greater chances of success than previous attempts. It is
much easier for Israel to assassinate a fighter than to uproot the values of resistance from the heart of
a community.
(Source: Counterpunch.org)
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AMERICA’S NEW REALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

F. Gregory Gause III (Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public
Service at Texas)
U.S. President Joe Biden’s upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia has unleashed a gusher of chatter
in the American foreign policy community. Some reactions, including from influential Democratic
politicians, have been unreservedly negative. Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff said, “Until
Saudi Arabia makes a radical change in terms of human rights, I wouldn’t want anything to do
with him,” referring to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS. But
defenders of Biden’s decision to visit argue that U.S. interests and the realities of power in the
Middle East require a strategic relationship with the Saudis, despite their poor record on human
rights and democracy.
This level of disagreement and controversy is striking and unusual because American
presidents have been meeting with Saudi leaders regularly since the 1970s—and on occasion before
that. But the Biden administration had signaled, in no uncertain terms, that it would treat Saudi
Arabia differently than did previous administrations. During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden
said he would make the Saudis “pay the price” for the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in
2018 and the Saudi participation in the war in Yemen and would treat them as “the pariah that they
are.” Once in office, Biden authorized the release of a U.S. intelligence report holding that MBS was
responsible for Khashoggi’s murder by Saudi operatives in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Biden
refused to deal directly with the crown prince and took policy steps that aggravated the Saudis,
including lifting the official designation of the Houthis (the Saudis’ opponents in Yemen) as
terrorists, removing U.S. air defense batteries from Saudi Arabia, and restarting nuclear talks with
Iran. So the upcoming visit to Riyadh represents a reversal—and a climb-down for a president who
is facing an increasing number of political problems at home.
Earlier this year, I wrote in Foreign Affairs that American policy in the Middle East should
privilege order over other goals, and that meant dealing with regimes and leaders that have blood
on their hands if it serves U.S. interests. Reengagement with Saudi Arabia fits this agenda. Although
Biden’s visit may sit uneasily with his earlier rhetoric and stated values, it will help to right a
relationship that can, if played correctly, help to stabilize world oil markets, extend the truce in the
Yemeni civil war, and contain Iranian ambitions.
OUT OF ORDER
Since taking office, Biden has been at least partly open to prioritizing order in the Middle East
over other aims, such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy. After all,
Biden reopened talks with Iran (mediated by the Europeans) about restoring the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, which had succeeded during the administration of President Barack
Obama in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. When President Donald Trump withdrew the United
States from the JCPOA, Iran renewed its nuclear program and has since grown closer to potential
weaponization. The Biden administration has been willing to put aside a long list of issues with
Tehran—including its support for terrorist organizations and the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in
Syria, and its growing ballistic missile arsenal—to try to halt or slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear
program. Nothing would be more likely to lead to increased conflict and instability in the region
than the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia is another step toward order and stability. With the Russian
invasion of Ukraine disrupting world energy markets, Riyadh’s role as the largest oil exporter takes
on renewed importance. Order in the oil market requires the Saudis to use their idle production
capacity to make up for at least some of the Russian supply lost through sanctions. Spurred in part
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by the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which brokered the normalization of relations
between Israel and a number of Arab countries, Saudi Arabia has begun to tentatively reach out to
Israel, a development that will also contribute to a more orderly and predictable Middle East.
Achieving these concrete American interests justifies de-emphasizing Biden’s objections to
Saudi human rights abuses and reducing tensions in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The shift is already
paying dividends. The cease-fire in the Yemeni civil war, a result in part of American diplomacy
with Saudi Arabia, was extended for another two months in June. And the Saudis have already
agreed to accelerate planned oil production increases over the summer.
It is not only the Biden administration that is putting aside more ideological goals in search of
a more orderly Middle East: so, too, are governments in the region. In recent months, Saudi Arabia
and Iran have conducted a series of bilateral talks mediated by the Iraqi government. The United
Arab Emirates has also reengaged directly with Iran. In recent years, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan publicly berated MBS over the killing of Khashoggi and has more broadly sought to
challenge Saudi Arabian leadership of the Sunni Arab states of the Middle East. But at the end of
June, Erdogan received the crown prince in Ankara. In a more controversial step, at least from a U.S.
perspective, the UAE government hosted a visit by the Syrian president in March, after supporting
the revolt against him for a number of years. It was Assad’s first trip to an Arab country since the
Syrian civil war began in 2011.
None of these developments means that peace is about to break out in the region. The chances
for conflict on several axes—Iranian-Israeli, Iranian-Saudi, Israeli-Lebanese, Syrian-Turkish, and
Saudi-Yemeni, among others—remain high. But the steps toward rapprochement do indicate that
regional leaders are beginning to reconsider the costs of instability and the benefits of order. U.S.
diplomacy should encourage this trend and participate in it.
BACK ON TRACK
The foundations of the sometimes difficult, clearly transactional, but mutually beneficial U.S.-
Saudi relationship have eroded during the last three U.S. presidencies. The combination of increased
U.S. energy production, low oil prices in the second half of the 2010s, and concern for climate change
led many in the United States to conclude that Saudi Arabia and its oil were no longer that important.
Obama, Trump, and Biden all campaigned on redirecting U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle
East. The Saudi leadership’s fear of American “withdrawal” from the Middle East is exaggerated,
given the continuing U.S. military and political presence in the region, but the feelings are real.
On the U.S. side, Trump’s tight public embrace of MBS dragged the relationship into
polarized partisan politics; Democrats now increasingly see the Saudis as taking the Republican
side. Trump’s involvement in Saudi domestic politics, encouraging the rise of the crown prince, was
unseemly and unnecessary. When Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and key policy adviser, and
Steve Mnuchin, Trump’s secretary of the treasury, solicited Saudi investments in their hedge funds
soon after leaving public service, it created the appearance of a quid pro quo. The Saudis deserve a
substantial part of the blame for this and need to alter their approach to Washington to put the
relationship back on a more solid, bipartisan footing.
Biden’s move to bury the hatchet with the Saudi crown prince is a necessary and
understandable reaction to the world as it is: not just the broken politics of the Middle East but also
the global disruptions caused by the Russian war in Ukraine. It is an acknowledgment that working
for some amount of order in the messy Middle East requires dealing with rulers who preside over
relatively stable states and who exercise influence outside their borders. Such rulers might be found
in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and even Syria. They can certainly be found in Saudi Arabia.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
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HOW IRAN TRANSFORMED TODAY’S MIDDLE EAST

Seyed Hossein Mousavian (Former Iranian ambassador to Germany)
Since the Iranian 1979 Revolution, but also more recently, the geopolitics of the Arab World
vis-à-vis Iran has undergone a significant transformation. Iran has strengthened its alliance with
Russia and China and has remained a hostile force resisting U.S. hegemony. Its influence has only
grown as a number of armed non-state or quasi-state groups spread across the region. Another
development in favor of Iran has been the rise of sectarianism in the Islamic world, which—with the
exception of Tunisia—has reached its pinnacle. Finally, the Arab Spring, which heralded democracy
to people, failed to do particularly that in the end. These events and others require us to adjust the
prism through which we examine the geopolitics of the region today.
Prior to the 1979 Revolution, what shaped the geopolitics of the region was the Nixon
Doctrine. The doctrine influenced Nixon’s foreign policy decision to arm its allies, both Iran and
Israel, to the teeth in the 1970s. The United States consistently sold the latest, most sophisticated,
conventional weapons to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the Shah of Iran). It is estimated that the
Shah purchased a total of 15 billion dollars of the most-advanced U.S. arms—weapons that were
technologically superior to most of those available to other US allies, except Israel. Adjusted for
inflation, 15 billion dollars in 1970 amounts to almost 115 billion dollars in 2022. This leaves analysts
with no doubt that both Nixon and Henry Kissinger believed that strengthening Iran’s military
would stabilize the Middle East; because the Shah was considered to be the “police” of the region,
Iran was assigned the role of a buffer state whose function was to prevent the spread of communism
and ensure a steady supply of oil.
The strategic support of the United States to the Shah was due to the geographic proximity of
Iran to the former Soviet Union. As American analyst Gary Sick once said, Iran was the site for the
United States to watch over the activities of the Soviet Union. By heavily arming Iran, the United
States sought to build a shield against its rival, making sure that the Russians would never realize
their dream “to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf”. Hence, the Shah of Iran was at the
forefront of receiving the largest and most advanced U.S. military weapons such as the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), which was then the most sophisticated and expensive radar
that the United States and Iran used to conduct reconnaissance operations on the Soviet borders.
Moreover, Washington decided to help Iran build its nuclear program as early as in the 1950s under
the “Atoms for Peace Program”. It may be interesting to the reader to note that the CIA reported to
then-President Gerald Ford that the Shah would have an atomic bomb by 1984.
Armed by the United States, Iran’s U.S.-assigned role as the police of the region manifested
in many instances. One was during the Dhofar rebellion against the Sultan Qaboos of Oman from
1963 to 1976. The civil war began with the formation of the Dhofar Liberation Front—a communist
group which aimed to create an independent state in the Dhofar area in the south of Oman. The
Dhofar Liberation Front was heavily supported by the Soviet Union and had launched serious
attacks on the central government in Qaboos. Were it not for the Shah of Iran’s intervention in
sending troops to put down the Dhofar rebellion, the Dhofar Liberation Front would have
continued to challenge the rule of Sultan Qaboos. The fact that Iran intervened in the so-called
“Arab affairs” as it saw fit; that it sent troops to another sovereign country; and that no country
opposed the Shah for his interventions in the domestic affairs of other countries clearly shows
Iran’s political might in the region.
Another example is related to Bahrain. The Shah had claimed uninterrupted Persian
sovereignty over Bahrain since the pre-Islamic era. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, the
Shah expressed objections to London over the 1930 treaty to recognize the sovereignty of Bahrain. In
fact, in 1927, Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s father, took the dispute with Britain over Bahrain to the
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League of Nations, albeit with no resolution. In the end, in 1971, the Shah agreed with Britain to
grant Bahrain independence from Iran, but insisted that the Greater and Lesser Tonb and Abu Musa
islands would remain under the Iranian sovereignty.
With the onset of the 1979 Revolution, the regional affairs of the Middle East were the subject
of tremendous change. The revolution brought about a completely different discourse by bringing
down millennia of monarchical rule to an Islamic Republic. Iran, once an ally of the United States,
turned into one of its avid foes, resisting its imperial tendencies. Although one could argue that the
principles on which the Islamic Republic crafted it foreign policy have more or less remained the
same particularly when it came to resisting U.S. presence in the Middle East region, bringing down
millennia of monarchical rule through the transformations that led to the rise of an Islamic Republic
as a result of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and in particular, the effect of Iraq–Iran War, forces us to
rethink the ways we look at the geopolitics of the region.
Before that, it is important to examine Iran’s current standing in the region in comparison to
similar countries in the region including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.
Iran’s Standing in the Region as U.S. Ally
In the 1960s, Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was greater than that of both Iran and
Pakistan, but in the 1970s, this trend changed. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the price
of oil dramatically increased, which gave the Shah a large inflow of foreign exchange, which also led
to a staggering growth in the relative size of capital. As the price of oil increased right after the 1973
oil crisis, Iran’s GDP became greater than that of Turkey. Iran under the Shah also spent twice as
much as Turkey and Pakistan. In 1975, Turkey and Pakistan spent 4 and 6 percent of their GDP on
military expenditure whereas Iran spent 12 percent.
These figures clearly demonstrate Iran’s weight and significance as the most influential ally of
the United States in the Middle East region. Indeed, as the most powerful U.S. military ally in the
Middle East at the time, the Shah pursued a policy that minimized the risk of confrontation with the
Soviet Union, and this “zero-problem” approach with the Soviet Union is one of the success stories
of its foreign policy.
Buttressed by its role as an ally of the United States, Iran was also able to exhibit regional
superiority in terms of sheer exhibition of power. Take, for example, the 1975 Algiers Agreement
between Iran and Iraq to settle any disputes and conflicts concerning their common maritime border
on Shatt Al-Arab River. In exchange for the Shah’s withdrawal of support to the Iraqi Kurdish
rebellion, Iran’s borders were to be respected. However, following an eight-year war with Iran, the
Algiers Agreement was abandoned, not to be revisited again, and Iraq stood to lose the most from
the treaty abrogation, losing benefits it had once acquired from the border river.
The Geopolitics of the Middle East and the 1979 Revolution
The popular demonstrations in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini against the dictatorship of the
Shah and the U.S. domination of the region gave rise to the “last of great revolutions”. The 1979
Revolution was accompanied by certain events that altered the geopolitics of the Middle East region
as Iranian-U.S. relations faltered. The occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4,
1979, and the hostage-taking of U.S. diplomats that lasted for 444 days, was among the first major
post-revolutionary shocks after the 1979 Revolution. Although it was a reaction to twenty-five years
of U.S. dominance of Iran (1953–1979), to this day, this very event looms over Iran’s relations with
the West, and in particular the United States. Iran became the flag-bearer of hostile countries to the
United States to the extent that none of the Soviet allies in the region were as threatening to the
United States the way Iran was.
The second event that altered Iran’s position in relation to the region and the United States
was the severance of diplomatic ties with Israel, following which the Israeli embassy in Iran was
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closed. Iran went from a country that was friendly to Israel to one of its stubborn foes. The severing
of ties with Israel and the subsequent hostilities between Iran and Israel had—and continues to
have—consequences for Iranian-U.S. relations.
The third event was the promotion of revolutionary political culture. The most telling example
of this was Khomeini’s slogan of “exporting the Islamic Revolution” to other countries in the Islamic
world. The transformation of the political culture of the region under the influence of the 1979
Revolution frightened the Petro-Arab monarchies in the region, because their regimes were similar
to that of the Shah’s dictatorship, which meant that they feared popular uprisings the most. It is
crucial to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union feared the possibility of the 1979
Revolution being exported to countries in the Middle East, but also to the satellite states of eastern
Europe. Exporting a revolution based on the Iranian model meant that developing countries that
were dependent on either of the superpowers would demand independence.
The 1979 Revolution brought many consequences for the broader region. First, it produced a
state that had an anti-imperial ideology and identity, one that purported that resisting U.S.
hegemony was the only way to liberate the “oppressed” nations in the post-colonial world. Due to
the spread of this ideology, the Iranian state has actively opposed U.S. imperialism in the region for
the past four decades. Second, it caused Iran to support the freedom and/or resistance movements
across the region, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. Third,
during the 1980s, when Iraq had launched a protracted war against Iran, including launching
hundreds of missiles and chemical weapons on civilians, the state faced tremendous shortages in
military equipment due to the embargo imposed by the United States. This caused military generals
to start manufacturing missiles and other heavy artillery equipment by the mid-1980s. Largely due
to the United States’ economic sanctions on Iran, coupled with an arms embargo by all world
powers, Iran was forced to develop domestic technical capabilities in the production of heavy
artillery and missiles.
Despite economic sanctions and the arms embargo, Iran developed significant industrial and
manufacturing sectors in steel, rubber, cement, and iron that other countries in the region lacked, as
well as cutting-edge sectors such as auto aerospace, nanotechnology, and stem cells. In the later
decades, particularly after the fall of Saddam Hossein, Iran emerged as a country that exerted power
and influence in the region, and developed a rivalry particularly with Saudi Arabia, which has
greatly influenced the geopolitical dynamics of the region. On the political front, Riyadh has
continuously tried to check the growing role of Iran in the Arab World, but the Kingdom’s attempts
at doing so have all but failed. Saudi attempts to curtail the power of Iran’s ally Hezbollah in
Lebanon, to contain the role of Iran in Iraq, to stop its support for the Houthis have fallen short.
These failures offer enough incentive for the Saudis to be obsessed with Iran as a legitimate
geopolitical competitor.
Yet, another watershed event that would have even greater influence on the geo-politics of the
region is the Iran–Iraq War.
The Iran–Iran War’s Role in Shaping the Geopolitics of the Region
In September 1980, Iraqi forces launched a full-scale invasion of Iran—a conflict that lasted for
eight years, killing at least a half million lives, injuring over a million, and displacing millions more.
The Iran–Iraq war remains one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars since World
War II. Throughout the 1980s as Iraq invaded parts of Iran’s territory, it continued to enjoy the full
support of the Arab World. The economic cost of the war is estimated to have been over a trillion
dollars. After eight years of warfare, the armies ended in virtually the same positions in which they
had started in September 1980. It was also the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons
were used on a massive scale along with ballistic missiles to attack cities. It was the most extensive
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use of weapons of mass destruction since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan
in 1945.
On January 15, 1991, Reuters quoted King Fahd of Saudi Arabia saying that the sum of Saudi
Arabia’s financial support to Iraq topped 27 billion dollars while estimates of support from the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) to Saddam reached up to 80 billion dollars in the 1980s.The tremendous
physical and human cost that Saddam Hussein inflicted on Iran is one thing, but the consequences of
this destructive war on the geopolitics of the region are quite another. In fact, the Iran–Iraq War set
the trajectory for the future geopolitics of the region, and remains one of the most critical junctures
in contemporary history of the Middle East region.
First, the Iraq–Iran War and the subsequent embargoes imposed on Iran gave Iran a strong
incentive to develop an indigenous military complex after it had been one of the largest buyers of
sophisticated conventional weapons in the region. Indeed, securing conventional weapons in order to
defend its people against the aggression of Saddam’s regime was one of the major challenges of the
Iranian government. Virtually no country was willing to sell conventional weapons (i.e., Scud missiles)
to Iran to be used in defense when its cities were showered with the same missiles by the Iraqi army. It
is now well-documented that hundreds of Russian missiles were launched by the Iraqi forces on Iran’s
civilian populations and tens of thousands of Iranians were either wounded or martyred.
The massive cost of the war forced Iran to establish an independent local missile industry. As
a result, Iran went from being a major purchaser of missiles to one of its major producers by the late
1990s. Today, Iran’s ability to produce long-range missiles is on par with those of global powers.
Missiles are not the only conventional weapons that Iran manufactures. Fighter jets, tanks, artillery,
submarine, drones, and speedboats are among the other high-tech military equipment it also
manufactures. Groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Houthis in Yemen
have been able to achieve considerable missile power with the help of Iranian knowhow and have
played a decisive role in confronting Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, the three countries that are
actively united against Iran.
Second, Saddam’s use of unconventional weapons such as chemical weapons against Iran was
a sheer violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and all treaties on weapons of mass
destruction. The Western world not only turned a blind eye from Saddam’s extensive and
comparatively greater use of chemical weapons against Iran’s civilian population, but also supplied
and sold his Baath Party more of them. Additionally, the failure of negotiations with the West (1980–
1995) to operate Tehran Research Reactor, built by the United States in 1967 and to complete the
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant whose construction began in 1975 by German companies but was not
completed, was another major reason that Iran sought to produce its own nuclear power. In 2003,
Iran achieved enrichment and heavy water technology, and its access to these two technologies
meant that it could build a nuclear bomb if decided to. Although Iran could now challenge Israel’s
monopoly over possessing a nuclear weapon in the Middle East, its nuclear capability has become
the biggest political and security issue between Iran and world powers in the last fifteen years. The
fact that Iran does have such technical capacities in the nuclear field—and other countries in the
region (except Israel) do not—gives Iran a competitive edge.
Third, Iran’s relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf fundamentally worsened after
the Iraq–Iran War due to their one-sided support of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The GCC states
moved toward purchasing the latest and most sophisticated weapons from the United States. To
them, the first and biggest threat in the region came from Iran. The United States has increased its
military presence to support its allies, establishing 46 military bases in eleven Middle Eastern
countries, which is considered to be a staggering number of military bases in one region.
Fourth, the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated to Iranian officials that countries in the region are
willing to do whatever it takes to bring regime change in Iran. From uniting themselves with Israel
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to using non-conventional weapons against civilians, the aim for the Arab states was to change the
revolutionary governing system in Iran. Iranian officials knew that they needed to transcend their
national borders to resist the aggression of the neighboring countries including Israel. Hezbollah of
Lebanon is a telling example of the proxies Iran propped up to project its influence in the region.
Over time, Hezbollah acquired significant power and remains a strong force to this day. It defeated
Israel in its 2006 invasion of Lebanon. In fact, Arab countries lost all military wars against Israel, but
Hezbollah prevented Israel from advancing onto Lebanese territory. Today, Hezbollah’s increasing
power is a major source of concern for the United States and Israel. It remains a military force with
tens of thousands of missiles and 100,000 troops and has political representation in the Lebanese
parliament and government.
Fifth, one of the most crucial geopolitical transformations has been the emergence of armed
non-governmental or quasi-governmental groups in the Middle East. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the
Houthis in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Fatimids of Afghanistan are
among the major Shiite groups that have been supported by Iran. Iran built alliances with these
groups in response to the security situation in the region. For example, when ISIS conquered Iraq in
2014, occupying 40 percent of the country within two years and capturing the large and oil-rich
cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, the Iraqi cities Baghdad and Erbil were on the verge of collapse. In
response, Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa to form the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is
reminiscent of the Iranian Basij Forces, established in 1979 as a volunteer paramilitary organization
operating under Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and later formed a “people’s militia”
to aid in the war against Iran (The Quds Force of Iran used its experiences of forming the Basij
popular force in countering Saddam’s aggression to help the Lebanese Hezbollah with its popular
mobilization). The Popular Mobilization Forces militia, with the help of the Iraqi army, eventually
defeated ISIS and cleared Iraqi territory of terrorists, and as a result, new influential political-
security-military dynamic entered the balance of power in Iraq. During the Syrian crisis, the Shiite
group “Fatimids of Afghanistan” with the support of Iran, played an important role in Syria and in
the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda. To be sure, Iran’s alliance with organized groups is not limited
to the Shiite ones, but also Sunni groups such as Hamas. This clearly shows that the alliance that
Iran has built is not organized around sectarian lines.
Sixth, Iran’s pivot to the East was a result of the world powers’ support of d Saddam’s
aggression in the Iraq war. After the war, Eastern powers, namely Russia and China, pursued a
form of rapprochement with Iran, whereas those of the West—particularly the United States and
Western Europe—pursued a hostile approach to Iran. The upshot was that after Trump’s
withdrawal from the JCPOA and Europe’s unremitting compliance and subservience to Trump’s
maximum pressure strategy, Iran’s Supreme Leader officially declared that Iran no longer trusts
Europe and that Iran should count on the East. Hence, the continuity of Western powers’ hostility
toward Iran after the war has provided the strongest incentives for Iran to turn toward the East. The
twenty-year strategic agreement with China and the twenty-year strategic agreement with Russia
are two clear examples of Iran’s lack of mistrust of the West. Today, China and Russia are Iran’s
main trade partners, whereas in the early 2000s, it was Germany.
Back to Diplomacy
For Iranians, it is not easy to forget the magnitude and the scale of death and destruction of
the Iraq–Iran War. However, massive death and destruction aside, the long-term consequences of
that war shaped in many ways the geopolitics of the region. Indeed, many of the hard problems of
today’s Middle East have originated in those eight years.
The Iraq–Iran War set the political trajectory of the region in some important ways for the
decades to come. But that is not the only war the Middle East has witnessed. If one war has that
many pernicious consequences for peace and stability in the region as I examined above, one might
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ask in horror, what would be the long-term consequences of the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by
the United States in early 2000s and the Saudi-led war on Yemen for the future of the region? These
questions are hard to even contemplate. But they give us enough reason to believe that exhibition of
power in the form of warfare is doomed to failure. Sooner or later, the United States will have to
realize that its policy of domination has led to disastrous outcomes for the region and beyond. To fill
the vacuum left behind by the United States when it leaves the region is an invitation to create a
regional security and cooperation system among the countries of the region. A regional security and
cooperation system in the Persian Gulf engulfing Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the other GCC
member states would be the first vital achievement. To move toward such a strategy, we need an
end to war and to choose diplomacy as the only choice.
No doubt the 1979 Revolution shaped the geopolitics of the region. However, Iraq’s
aggression against Iran and the support of regional countries and international powers was the most
important factors shaping Iran’s foreign policy strategy and its geopolitical shift. The Iran–Iraq War
bolstered the resistance discourse against hegemony and neo-imperial forms of domination by the
world powers, including and most importantly by the United States. Iranian officials remember
when Saddam enjoyed the support of powers from both the West and the East, from both the United
States and Soviet Union. If the Iranian leaders are suspicious of the United States when it comes to
holding its end of the bargain on any negotiation table, the suspicion almost entirely can be
attributed to the hard lessons they learned during the Iraq–Iran War. The experience of the war
shows that the terrible consequences of a war remain a stumbling block to peace efforts. To achieve a
lasting peace, belligerent thinking must be thrown into the dustbin of history, focusing only on the
option of diplomacy.
(Source: Cairo review)

ANNEXATION STRATEGY
Ramzy Baroud
The Israeli Court’s decision regarding Masafer Yatta, which is already being carried out with
the expulsion of the Najjar family on May 11, is an important step towards the annexation of Area C.
If Israel can evict the residents of twelve villages, with a population of over 1,000 Palestinians,
unhindered, more such expulsions are anticipated, not only south of Hebron, but throughout the
occupied Palestinian territories.
The Palestinian villagers of Masafer Yatta and their legal representation know very well that
no real ‘justice’ can be obtained from the Israeli court system. They continue to fight the legal war,
anyway, in the hope that a combination of factors, including solidarity in Palestine and pressure
from the outside, can ultimately succeed in compelling Israel to delay its planned destruction and
Judaization of the whole region.
However, it seems that Palestinian efforts, which have been underway since 1997, are failing.
The Israeli Supreme Court decision is predicated on the erroneous and utterly bizarre notion that the
Palestinians of that area could not demonstrate that they belonged there prior to 1980, when the
Israeli government decided to turn the area into ‘Firing Zone 918’.
Sadly, the Palestinian defense was partly based on documents from the Jordanian era and
official United Nations records that reported on Israeli attacks on several Masafer Yatta villages in
1966. The Jordanian government, which administered the West Bank until 1967, compensated some
of the residents for the loss of their ‘stone houses’ – not tents – animals and other properties that
were destroyed by the Israeli military. Palestinians tried to use this evidence to show that they have
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existed, not as nomadic people but as rooted communities. This was unconvincing to the Israeli
court, which favored the military’s argument over the rights of the native population.
Israeli firing zones occupy nearly 18 percent of the total size of the West Bank. It is one of
several ploys used by the Israeli government to lay a legal claim on Palestinian land and to,
eventually, years later, claim legal ownership as well. Many of these firing zones exist in Area C, and
are being used as one of the Israeli methods aimed at officially appropriating Palestinian land with
the support of the Israeli courts.
Now that the Israeli military has managed to acquire Masafer Yatta – a region spanning 32 to
56 sq km – based on completely flimsy excuses, it will become much easier in ensuring the ethnic
cleansing of many similar communities in various parts of occupied Palestine.
While discussions and media coverage of Israel’s annexation scheme in the West Bank and the
Jordan Valley have largely subsided, Israel is now preparing for a gradual annexation scheme.
Instead of annexing 40% of the West Bank all at once, Israel is now annexing smaller tracts of land
and regions, like Masafer Yatta, separately. Tel Aviv will eventually connect all these annexed areas
through Jewish-only bypass roads to larger Jewish settlement infrastructures in the West Bank.
(Source: Counterpunch.org)
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National
MAKING PAKISTAN AN ECONOMIC HUB
Kiyoshi Taniguchi (Principal economist at ADB Pakistan)
With around 220 million people and a strategic location at the crossroads of South, Central,
and West Asia, Pakistan has the potential to become a regional economic hub. However, much
needs to be done to foster the economic stability and sustained growth that Pakistan needs to realize
this potential.
One way to get there is by developing economic corridors — defined geographic areas with
modern transport and trade infrastructure, facilities, and policies that will spur economic activity
within the country and with its neighbors. Economic corridors involve infrastructure, industrial, and
urban developments. Done well, these can be fertile ground for investments and opportunities that
will result in more economic activity, jobs and faster movement of people and goods.
The CAREC Program is a partnership for countries in Central Asia and beyond, to promote
sustainable development through regional cooperation. One of its priorities is economic corridor
development, and it has supported a significant number of projects to enhance infrastructure
connectivity between its member countries including Pakistan.
An ADB publication examined the potential of economic corridor development to support
Pakistan’s sustainable growth. It found that structural reforms in key areas, including rationalizing
regulations and taxes for businesses and improving trade facilitation and logistics, are crucial to
unleashing the country’s economic growth.
With progress in these areas, coupled with more investments in people, improved labor
markets and financial inclusion, the study suggests some targeted interventions that can help to
build out its economic corridors.
Infrastructure development
Good infrastructure is the backbone of economic corridor development. Efficient multimodal
transport networks, including roads, railways, and ports, link urban centers to domestic and
international markets, encourage travel, and enhance trade.
Pakistan can maximize its strategic location through connectivity and economic integration
with other member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)
Program, which can help to harmonize standards within the region to increase cross-border trade.
It is also crucial to simplify customs and border crossing procedures by establishing a national
single window among other measures. Pakistan is already developing this system, which will
connect all stakeholders and enable document processing through a single digital platform.
Industrial development
A key element of economic corridors is the clustering of industries in strategic areas. To thrive,
industry needs more than mere proximity to roads or railways – it also needs an investment-friendly
environment and a skilled workforce.
The government can incentivize such growth through tax incentives or other mechanisms.
And it is critical that whatever is created inside an economic corridor can move beyond it—not only
to the rest of Pakistan but to the world, linking the country’s outputs to the global supply chain.
Pakistan is well positioned to become a bigger player in international trade if it increases and
diversifies its exports to include higher-value products that are growing in global demand.
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Ready-made garments — Clothing exports are already high, but the country needs to adapt to
changing global trends and upgrade technologies to address production bottlenecks. Sporting goods
— Significant investments in technology, compliance certifications, engineering innovations, and
sustainable joint ventures are needed to secure viable contracts with international brands to grow its
sporting goods sector.
Surgical, cutlery and hunting knives — Addressing the labor shortage in this cluster through
skills development and training is crucial. The industry also needs to invest in research and
development to diversify into more sophisticated products.
Urban development
When properly planned, developed, and managed, cities can be important sources of labor,
goods, and innovation. This is why urban development is vital to the success of economic corridors.
Pakistan should aim to improve the livability of its cities and provide access to quality public
services such as affordable housing, reliable water supply and other public services. Green public
spaces must be developed, and the education system strengthened to enhance the labor market.
This will not only create jobs and livelihood opportunities, but will also greatly improve
people’s health and well-being.
Economic corridor development does not fall on the government’s shoulders alone. The
private sector also has a crucial role to play, and this can be encouraged through structural reforms.
Capitalizing on its membership in the CAREC Program, Pakistan can work with development
partners and other countries in the region to gain the technical and financial support needed to help
the country realize its tremendous economic potential.
(Source: ADB)

THE STRATEGIC COMPULSION AND ECONOMIC

MELTDOWN OF PAKISTAN
M Alam Brohi (Former member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan)
Though strategically situated, Pakistan came into being with certain security compulsions.
The bigger dominion in the east acceded to the division of the Sub-continent with a heavy heart and
never spared any chance to destabilise Pakistan or undo the division of the Bharat Mata. Ignoring
the principles of the division, it sent its troops into Srinagar to annex Jammu and Kashmir,
Hyderabad Deccan and Junagarh, withheld Pakistan’s share from the divisible military hardware
and finances and tried to divert the waters of the rivers. Inciting the Afghan leaders, it also squeezed
Pakistan from the west.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had a grand ideal of seeing independent India as the true
hegemon successor of the British imperialist power in the Sub-continent. He idealised a grand
confederation of all the small states emerging out of the former British imperialist possessions with
New Delhi as its capital. His earlier writings and statements as leader of India which I have
extensively quoted in articles on Pak-US relations bear eloquent evidence of this historic fact.
The international scenario after the Second World War was fast-changing with China passing
through a devastating revolutionary upheaval; the Arab Muslim states still under the British and
French Protectorate and the Cold War dividing the world into two antagonist camps with the US-led
western bloc frantically looking for partners to stem the thrust of communism in Asia and the
Middle East terming the neutrality of small states as amoral. The small states had to take sides.
These were the circumstances Pakistan developed a security-centric or India-centric policy and
opted for the tight embrace of the US. The policy had its merits and demerits.
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The glaring mistake on our part, in my view, was to remain too long in the US embrace
though we had started laying the foundation of our friendship with China and had many openings
from the Kremlin for durable defence cooperation. We became too dependent on the US economic
and military aid and borrowings from the Western international financial institutions with a
delusion to stand as countervail to the Indian hegemony in South Asia. The three military
confrontations with India including the wars of September 1965 and December 1971 and the Kargil
Conflict of July 1999 were devastating exercises in futility which showed the political and strategic
bankruptcy of our political and military leaderships taking a heavy toll on our military and
economic resources.
The relative economic stability in Ayub Khan’s era was due mainly to the US economic and
military aid. The industrial development supervised by the World Bank trained economists with the
massive patronage of the government concentrated the national wealth within the well-known 22
families leaving the teeming millions on crumbs struggling hard to meet both ends. The military and
bureaucratic elite from the bigger province took a sigh of relief at the secession of East Pakistan
thinking that they finally got rid of the burden of Bengalis. The time proved them grossly wrong.
Bengalis had no hangover of countervailing to India or the strategic apprehensions of being
squeezed by hostile states in their neighbourhood as is the case with Pakistan or they had no dispute
with India as strategically serious as Jammu and Kashmir. They forged ahead to secure economic
stability.
Though a close ally of the West in the Cold War, we failed to secure the support of the
Western bloc to bring enough pressure on India to honour the UNSC resolutions on Jammu and
Kashmir. The indigenous uprising of Kashmiris against the occupation of India in the 1980s and
1990s was marred by our support of dubious Kashmiri militant organisations. Almost all these
organisations as put by Riaz Muhammad Khan were based outside the Jammu and Kashmir. The
Indian diplomacy successfully created convincing linkages between militant organisations within
the valley and Pakistan weakening our otherwise principled stance on the issue.
We remained addicted to foreign economic aid throughout from 1951 to this day always
looking to the US, World Bank, IMF, ADB and borrowings from affluent Arab and Western
countries and postponing the structural reforms in the economy with the indulgence of the elite
masquerading as representatives of an affluent nation. Stepping in Islamabad, a foreign envoy or
tourist is amazed to notice the elegant structures of our Federal Secretariat; the Presidency; the
Prime Minister’s Secretariat and the Prime Minister House; the Parliament; the Supreme Court
edifice; the Federal Bureau of Revenue and the sprawling Ministers’ enclave.
The coalition government of PMLn adopted a new narrative while increasing the prices of
petroleum products and utilities that they have to take hard decisions. To withdraw subsidies
from petrol, oil, gas and electricity which directly impact the masses is not a hard decision. Hard
decisions lie somewhere else. Can you, Mr Prime Minister, slash your and provincial cabinets by
half; reduce federal divisions as far as possible; withdraw the privilege of petrol and electricity
and gas from Federal and Provincial Ministers, Federal Secretaries, Additional Secretaries,
Provincial Secretaries, bring the military businesses within the tax network, impose income tax on
agriculture income and freeze non-developmental expenditures for five years including the
development funds extended to MNAs and MPAs, ban the import of non-essential foreign goods
including the chewing leaves (Paan) and avoidable foreign visits by the Ministers and
bureaucrats? In this economic crunch, there is no letup in foreign visits. Finance Minister has the
temerity to spend Rs. 5 million to renovate his house.
The biggest drag on our budgetary outlets is the defence allocation. The Generals are patriotic
citizens of this country and understand the economic predicament of the country more than the
common populace. We can ask them to apply a voluntary cut of 30 per cent on the defence budget
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reducing the perks and privileges of the senior military officers and meeting their requirements by
judicious management of the resources available to them after such budgetary cut. This will require
us to reorient our foreign and security policy notwithstanding the fluid geo-strategic situation
within the region.
Geographically, Pakistan occupies a significant place sitting on the mouth of the three most
important and volatile regions including the South, South West and Central Asia with land and
maritime links with equally important countries including India, China, Iran, Afghanistan and the
world at large. It has access to Central Asia through China and Afghanistan. The territorial location
portends both economic opportunities and strategic challenges. This is what Pakistan has been
confronted with.
India has never reconciled with the episode of the division of the sub-continent. All its efforts
have been directed to reduce Pakistan to a vassal state at par with Bhutan, Maldives, Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Our relations with Afghanistan were impacted by the greater Pakhtunistan
movement and later the military intervention of superpowers in that luckless country. As allies of
the Western world, Pakistan and Iran maintained close ties during the Pahlavi monarchy. The
clergy-led revolution brought a sea change in the region.
Pakistan made every possible effort to show neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, and the growing
US antagonism towards Iran. But Pakistan’s close relations with the Arab monarchies and its close
strategic alliance with the US in Afghanistan kept fuelling the suspicions of Iran’s ruling clergy. The
sectarian proxy war on our territory and the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan further
negatively impacted relations between the two countries.
The disgraceful flight of the US from Afghanistan and the ascendancy of the Taliban to power
have added to the security woes of Pakistan. The Taliban are as usual non-cooperative in countering
the terrorist activities of TTP and IS-Khorasan in Pakistan using the Afghan territory. The TTP
demands threaten the territorial integrity of the country. We are caught in a challenging situation.
Iran reportedly has a soft for the Baloch insurgents who have relocated their camps close to
the Iranian border. Now the Baloch insurgency has echoed in the corridors of the US Congress
where the US Congressmen have called upon the Joe administration to support the Baloch right to
self-determination. Narendra Modi is already hell-bent on helping Baloch to secede from Pakistan.
The Indian support for the insurgency has been fuelling the alienation of the Baloch population from
Pakistan. This is a real security threat, indeed.
India has altered the situation in Jammu and Kashmir by doing away with its special status
and annexing it as a Federal Union. Its next purported move is to claim this part of the valley. Its
atrocious treatment of the hapless Kashmiris in terms of blatant human rights violations including
killing, maiming, abducting, arson and rape continue unabated with systematic propaganda to paint
Pakistan as a state sponsoring and using terrorism to achieve its policy objectives. India under
Narendra Modi has become unpredictable. We can expect anything worse from Modi.
The antagonism between US and China has further intensified adding to the predicament of
Pakistan. The economic challenges force the country to accept the humiliating conditions of IMF,
the World Bank and the other international institutions. The hostility of the US, India and the
International financial institutions towards CPEC and Pakistan’s close strategic relations with
China needs no elaboration. The budding regional alliance spearheaded by China and Russia to
change the unipolar international system into a bi-polar or multi-polar one has received a
momentous setback by the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and the abrupt
regime change in Pakistan.
The Russian-Ukrainian war is already having its devastating impact on the world economy
giving rise to apprehensions of serious food deficiency slowing economic and commercial exchanges
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between countries. Pakistan is no more self-sufficient in food. It imports huge quantities of wheat.
Though Pakistan produces sufficient wheat but has failed to stop its smuggling to Iran, Afghanistan
and India. Hoarding of wheat and sugar is another menace that has evaded all punitive measures of
the governmental machinery.
These are the strategic circumstances surrounding the country which we have to take into
consideration before demanding a drastic cut in our defence budget. Will our leadership be able to
prepare the nation particularly the Punjab to put the Kashmir dispute on the backburner at this
moment when the Kashmiris are confronting a serious move by the Modi Sarkar to change the
Muslim majority into a minority by the massive settlement of non-Muslims in the valley? How shall
we deal with the Taliban and TTP? We have seen in the past that the TTP has never adhered to any
agreement. Their demands for reversing the merger of the tribal territories into KPK and the
enforcement of Sharia of their version in those territories and the Malakand division will open a new
Pandora’s Box in the country.
The unpredictable US policy in Afghanistan is yet another challenge. The US and its Western
allies do not seem willing to give the Taliban any chance to settle and rule the country. Their
policy is to keep the Taliban starved of cash and economic and financial resources dealing with
an impoverished nation. There will be further punitive military action against the Taliban onc e
the US and its NATO allies get out of the Ukraine situation. Should Pakistan be part of the US
military measures in Afghanistan angering the Taliban and their apologists including TTP sleep
cells in the country?
The economic and strategic challenges are daunting. It is also not easy to recalibrate our
strategic policy without a realistic appraisal of the security threats staring us in the face. Without
economic stability, the army cannot fight a war or guarantee the security of the country. Economic
affluence alone is also no guarantee to the security of a country. Both military and economic strength
go hand in hand. We are living in a Hobbesian world where one is always vulnerable to predators if
all the elements of state power don’t work in unison. The choice lies with us. Either the ruling elite
should come forward for the needed economic sacrifices or sacrifice the masses at the altar of their
extravagance being the chronic bane of this country.
(Source: Daily Times)

TO BECOME A KNOWLEDGE-ECONOMY
Muhammad Omar Iftikhar (independent researcher, author and columnist)
The advent of the industrial revolution – in particular to advancement in mechanical
production replacing manual labour from 1760 to 1840 – gave birth to a new form of economy. It
brought to the fore faster methods of production – mainly because the labour worked with
machines. The invention of the steam engine geared the first industrial revolution. The concept of
mass production and an assembly line propelled the second industrial revolution (the 1900s). The
third revolution (1970) surfaced when computers and automation were widely used while cyber-
physical systems resulted in the fourth revolution (2000). We are now entering or have partially
entered the fifth revolution with mass customization and cyber-physical cognitive systems. The fifth
phase began spreading its influence in 2020.
The school system during the 1700s aimed at producing disciplined students who knew just
enough information to survive the cutthroat competition. They worked in factories completing the
repetitive tasks every day while the industrialists went home with most of the profit. Our
educational system – even today – facilitates the industrial revolution. The students who graduate
from universities do not stand in assembly lines but work for national and international
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corporations. It is indeed time for Pakistan to move toward a knowledge economy. A knowledge
economy refers to an economic system where knowledge-intensive activities produce goods and
services. Such activities that are based on knowledge promote innovation in the scientific and
technical domains.
We are now entering or have partially entered the fifth revolution with mass customization
and cyber-physical cognitive systems.
Companies such as Apple, Google, Sony, Samsung, and Amazon to name a few use
knowledge to strategize their product or service offerings. They use insights gathered through
detailed market research, observe and record consumer behaviour, learn from their mistakes and
study the competitors’ analysis to ascertain the market needs they should focus on fulfilling.
Organizations must utilize the knowledge of their employees to add value to their business
development process. In a knowledge economy, there is a greater dependence on an intellectual
matter that is gathered and shared when plans, strategies, and processes are exchanged and
discussed. Such ideas are translated into actionable plans with a timeline.
While such a model can be pursued by the organizations in Pakistan, we must reflect upon the
dynamics of our society. We are not a tech-driven society. We use technology to communicate. It is
indeed admirable to see the freelance sector of Pakistan use digital media to offer services to national
and international clients. The common man is using smartphones for communication and
entertainment. The development of skills is another facet of a knowledge economy. In such a setup.
the educational institutions offer education that enhances skills here the industries create jobs to
utilize them. Pakistan also lags in this aspect. Our educational institutions are not producing skilled
graduates. It is imposing upon the student’s information that they are forced to rote learn.
Universities must shun the idea of uniform learning. Education must be customized according to the
interest and inclinations of the student. A student may be good in biology but may not be interested
to study chemistry. Moreover, the outdated syllabus taught in primary and secondary classes should
be changed. Why are the students not being taught about crisis management, effective
communication, finances and budgeting, interpersonal communication, etc.? Schools should help
develop the students’ cognitive and creative skills, adaptability, flexibility and the ability to work in
multiple disciplines. Why don’t schools and colleges offer courses that uplift the students’ thought
process, and inspires them to think and enhance their skills? A knowledge economy is based on the
accessibility of information, its quality and how it facilitates the means of production. This kind of
change in the thought process can only manifest if those in power – of the country and the
organizations – are themselves well-educated, skilful and experienced.
(Source: Daily Times)

SPECIAL TECHNOLOGY ZONES

Dr Muhammad Ali (Director (Research & Market Intelligence) at the Special Technology Zones Authority)
A Special Technology Zone (STZ) is a knowledge ecosystem designed on the triple helix
model of innovation where the government offers special incentives to catalyse the development,
promotion, and proliferation of the latest technologies. It is a cluster where innovation is the primary
driver of all core and peripheral activities. The enterprises and individuals working to develop and
proliferate technologies are themselves immersed in a smart city lifestyle. The government supports
and incentivises enterprises to help them to thrive and create wealth and avail opportunities for
others at a fast pace. People and technology enterprises, from near and afar, are attracted to these
ecosystems. Gradually, the Zones expand beyond their originally intended boundaries and form
townships and eventually cities. In this way, any given STZ helps the supporting government to
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ultimately execute a broader reform agenda and deliver socioeconomic progress to their
constituents.
The Silicon Valley in California (USA) and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina (USA)
are the earliest examples of such zones from the 1950s; however, at the time these were referred to as
Research Parks and catalysed by universities which hosted cutting edge technology firms. The
budding Asian economies wanted to emulate the model and therefore created the Zhongguancun
Science Park (Z-Park) in Beijing (China), Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen (China) and
Daedeok Innopolis in Daejeon (South Korea) in the 1970s. The Asian zones were catalysed by
massive government intervention as their local academia and industry were not mature enough at
the time. Examples of technology giants which emerged from such zones include Apple, Google,
Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Huawei, Lenovo, Baidu, Tencent, and Xiaomi. These giants now boast
revenues larger than many sovereign nations and human resource headcounts equivalent to many
small cities. From the 2000s and onward, a new phenomenon was seen where entire zones were
developed by private enterprises, such as the Samsung Digital City and the LG Science City (both in
South Korea).
Industry-Academia collaboration has been discussed in Pakistan for several decades;
however, none of the proposed models provided a true and workable solution to harnessing local
academia and industry for the broader socio-economic benefit of the country. These solutions never
really enabled industry, and in particular, the technology industry, to truly play their role in national
development. The missing part was a specifically tailored and holistic incentives package. Whereas
the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) model provided the closest set of incentives, however, in the
Pakistani context, the SEZs were far away from urban centres and academia. In other words, we can
say that the needs of the technology sector and the SEZ model had a mismatch of the factors of
production.
The Special Technology Zones Authority (STZA) Act 2021 has changed this mismatch—the
industry has now been given the driving seat through unparalleled incentives and technology-
specific programming in policy and systems development. A true pivot, in letter and spirit, has
taken place to shift the industry to the forefront in the triple helix. In support of all of this, the
Authority STZA is the architect, the facilitator, as well as the regulator of the ecosystem. STZA, since
becoming a legal entity has not only obtained major incentives (10-year corporate tax and custom
duty waivers, special forex provisions, subsidised land and utilities, and much more) but also
created a system of rules, regulations, and other statutory provisions which will enable it to support
the technology industry in a specialised way. Relationships with other government agencies (OGAs)
in all units of the federation and national and international support entities have also been forged.
Outreach to local and foreign technology entities has been fruitful and several technological
giants have been engaged in discussions to enter the STZs, which will form anchors for other
enterprises. Applications for Zone Developer (ZD) and Zone Enterprise (ZE) licenses have been
opened and a large number of applications have been received in diverse technological fields which
will bring in sizable investment and contribute to the strategic objectives of the Authority. The
strategic objectives include the transfer of technology, technology exports, import substitution, job
creation, human capital development, R&D, and innovation.
A typical urban 100-acre zone is expected to attract the equivalent of USD 1 Bn of investments
and generate an equivalent annual activity of USD 1.6 Bn for the GDP. The quantum of investment
estimated indicates that the country will attract 20 dollars of investment for each dollar invested in
land, infrastructure, and connectivity. At the moment, the total area of all expected zones coming
online in the near future is 1500 acres. Utilising the above conservative estimates, the overall
technology investments in these zones could be equivalent to USD 15 Bn and economic activity
equivalent to USD 24 Bn (> 6 percent of GDP) maturing in the next several years.
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The first Technology Zone to be established is the Islamabad Technopolis—a 140-acre zone in
the Chak Shehzad, Islamabad. The zone will host technology companies, advanced tech production
units, R&D centres, universities and training centers, offices of science and technology support
organisations, and support services. Since the operationalisation of this zone will take some time due
to trunk infrastructure development, the arrangements for ZE tenants in a central location in
Islamabad have already been made. A 300,000 sq ft tower in Blue area Islamabad will house ZEs
working in the areas of Artificial Intelligence, Financial technologies, Electronics Design, Venture
Capital management and deployment, amongst others.
Other STZs announced as a result of ZD applications include Lahore Technopolis in Lahore,
Pakistan Digital City in Haripur, and the Pak-Austria Fachhochschule Institute of Applied Sciences
and Technology (PAF-IAST) in Haripur. PAF-IAST also happens to be the first university to apply
for a ZD license and since then many others have applied. This represents a transformative aspect
where numerous S&T universities can move their R&D towards technology transfer and
commercialisation. Besides these five zones, over a dozen other zones are presently under
consideration across Pakistan.
Many of STZA’s alliances and partnerships will lead to an influx of foreign technology
companies. Mastercard and STZA have signed a Digital Country Partnership for cashless zones and
digital payment solutions for SMEs. Shorooq Partners, which is a MENAP focused venture capital
firm, and STZA have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with plans to have a
Pakistan-specific venture capital fund to support local entrepreneurs. Through the President’s
initiative of engaging the USA diaspora, STZA has actively attracted enterprises from the USA.
Several agreements with Chinese associations such as Zhongguancun Belt & Road Industrial
Promotion Association (ZBRA) and Z-Park have paved the way for attracting Chinese technology
companies to Pakistan. Similarly, Russian technology enterprises will be attracted via the MoU with
Skolkovo Technology Park.
The above represent a watershed opportunity for the country to accelerate its scientific and
technological development. As the national rollout of zones progresses and technology enterprises
begin entering and operating from the zones, the impact of the STZA initiative will become visible.
This impact will not only be restricted to one technology vertical or a particular subject, rather it will be
across the entire spectrum of technologies and driven by contemporary and futuristic economic needs.
(Source: The Nation)

UNTAPPED MINERAL ASSETS

Khaleeq Kiani
Pakistan is engaging international development partners and expert groups to channelise local
and foreign funds for equity investments in strategic mining assets and targeted high-value projects
through utilisation of pension funds, project-specific sovereign bonds and portfolios of welfare
organisations and state-owned entities.
Background interviews with some key stakeholders suggest efforts are afoot to develop a
strategy to get out of the bad patch in mining and minerals caused by mishandling of the Reko Diq
dispute now nearing an absorbable close.
In the first go, the government is planning to very shortly conduct roadshows for a few
selected projects, having bankable feasibility studies and ready to attract investors. Starting with
Chiniot Steels Mills and Iron Ore Development for which a couple of countries like Saudi Arabia
and China have already shown strong interest, five strategic projects would be part of this
marketing campaign.
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Chiniot is being described as `the best internationally benchmarked metallic mineral

exploration project` confirmed by top international experts and is ripe for bidding. Officials
indicated the above-mentioned governments wanted to secure the project on a G2G basis but given
the lessons learnt from Reko Diq, the overwhelming leaning is towards bidding.
The project was found unexpectedly in 1969 near Sargodha, Punjab with magnetic mapping in
a joint search effort for oil and gas surveys by Oil & Gas Development Company and the Soviet
Union but there was no effort for its development for the next two decades. In 1989, the Geological
Survey of Pakistan went back to the site and drilled five boreholes with good results of iron deposits
by 1992. There was again complete silence for the next eight years until 2000 when another detailed
magnetic survey was conducted in Rajoa and Chiniot regions by Punjmin a mineral company of the
Punjab government. By 2007, nine additional boreholes were conducted, taking the total to 14, which
confirmed a decent quantity of iron ore underground.
In 2008, the Punjab government entered into a controversial contract with a company whose
credentials were publicly questioned but was given control along with a 75 per cent share of the
Chiniot Iron Ore Project. The project became suspicious and declared void ab initio by Lahore High
Court in 2010. An appeal led the Supreme Court of Pakistan to uphold the Lahore High Court
decision and order a detailed techno-economic study for the establishment of a steelmill in 2013.
German Consultants, Swiss Laboratories, British financial, Turkish contractors and Canadian and US
technical and corporate experts concluded proven reserves of 150 million tonnes of iron ore
involving 33pc of iron content.
This meant the deposit is sufficient to operate a steel mill of the size of Pakistan Steel Mills for
33 years. In fact, around 80,000 meters of oblique drilling established 250m tonnes of iron resource,
31m tonnes of copper and 1m tonnes per annum of steel production, with an attractive 20pc internal
rate of return on capital expenditure of $1.3 billion and a payback period of nine years. The project
has an estimated life of over 30 years and can support adjoining special economic zones (SEZ),
particularly Allama Iqbal SEZ Faisalabad. The deposit has a thick iron ore layer of about 1.5km a
rare blessing that contained 20pc of Hematite and 80pc of Magnetite resource commonly considered
a shipment grade iron. The in situ (on the spot at mine mouth) value of the iron deposit is estimated
worth $6-8bn and justifies a robust case for a local refinery to support Chiniot, Kalabagh and
Balochistan iron ore development.
The project was originally made part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the
6th Joint Coordination Committee meeting in December 2016 but could not see major progress
because of an ongoing research phase at Chiniot. The project was ranked among the best projects to
be offered for investment when Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman visited Islamabad in
February 2019.
The project has two components of mining worth $150-200m and process worth $200-300m
and leads the second phase to set up of a smelter mill worth $950 million.
Unfortunately, the project could not be taken to the bidding stage because the new political
government stopped funding to Punjmin the Punjab government entity and did not appoint its chief
executive officer since 2018, apparently to avoid credit going to the previous government.
The project has been presented to the Prime Minister afresh a few days ago with a request to
support roadshows to generate investor appetite before formal bidding at the start of the new
calendar year.
Some other but relatively smaller strategic and ready for bidding projects also included
Kalabagh Steel Mills, East Ore Body (EOB) at Saindak, Barite-Lead-Zinc Project and Bolan Mining
Enterprises (BME, Khuzdar) and North Waziristan Copper Deposit the last one currently with
Frontier Works Organisation (FWO).
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This is part of a Strategic Plan for Mines Sector Development cleared in principle by Prime
Minister Imran Khan for implementation through consultations among the relevant institutional
framework that could lead to integrated development and mining of value chain with a target of
achieving 10pc of GDP in 10-15 years.
At the current rate that works out to about a $30bn contribution from mineral resources tothe
national economy. This has to be achieved through foreign and local investment for economies of
scale and commercial viability for employment generation, import substitution and export
enhancement.
In the short term (before December 2022), the stakeholders had been given targets to conduct
roadshows, complete feasibility studies, establish a national mineral data centre and harmonise legal
framework with the provinces, to be followed by fiscal incentives and the government`s strategic
invest-ments by December 2023 so that credit facilitation, critical infrastructure development and
local and foreign investment could be lined up till 2030.
The prime minister has constituted a progress review committee headed by the minister for
planning to fine-tune the strategic plan and come up with a `PM Mineral Development Package`.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has been asked to secure technical assistance from the World Bank
and Asian Development Bank.
(Source: Dawn)

ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Mohiuddin Aazim
The recent resetting of ties with the USA, in particular, and with the West, in general, may or
may not help Pakistan attract more foreign investment. It depends on how quickly Islamabad can
convince the world that it has no intention of becoming part of any power bloc. It also depends on
how soon the current turbulent phase of local politics is over and a new phase of stability takes hold.
Apart from geopolitical considerations, foreign funds traditionally land in the countries where
doing business is easier, fair market practices prevail, dispute resolution system works smoothly,
intellectual property rights are protected, policies affecting foreign investors remain consistent and
above all where foreign investors can feel at home.
Judged on these matrices, Pakistan remains a poor candidate for attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI). According to the World Bank, net FDI inflows into Pakistan equalled less than one
per cent of GDP during the past 11 years, between 2011 and 2021. And, if the current trend persists,
net FDI inflows cannot reach 1pc of Pakistan`s projected GDP even in 2022.
However, recent interest rate tightening by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) followed by
skyrocketing treasury bill rates should accelerate net inflows of foreign portfolio investment (FPI).
The SBP`s dramatic, unscheduled interest rate hiking by 250 basis points on April 7,
coincidingwith the last day of the PTl government, triggered large increases in T-bills and bonds
yields, providing further incentives to foreign investors. Even before the 7th April increase in the
SBP policy rate from 9.75pc to 12.25pc interest rates were high enough to lure foreign investment in
zero-risk, T-bills and Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs). Foreign investors had already invested half
a billion dollars in these bonds and bills in nine months of FY22 between July 2021 and March 2022.
Whereas during the same period of the FY21, they had not invested in the government debt papers,
SBP data shows.
Why net FDI inflows into Pakistan remain below 1pc of GDP even after the launching of the
multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a question that merits serious
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deliberations. The structure of Chinese funding of CPEC projects includes loans and foreign
investment made by the Chinese state-run agencies as well as private sector parties.
But since Pakistan often struggles with balance of payments issues, seeking the loan part of
CPEC-related funding (over and above the occasional forex support funds from China) becomes a
priority. That said, the bulk of Pakistan`s net FDI comes from China ($751 million out of a total of
$1.82 billion in FY21). Other main sources include UAE, UK, USA, Netherlands and Hong Kong.
Now, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey are also willing to make increased foreign direct investment
in multiple sectors.
After the change of government in Pakistan, prospects for the faster materialisation of the old
US investment pledges have brightened and US investors may even look for new investment
opportunities. According to a late January update of the State Department`s Office of Investment
Affairs, `over the last two years, US companies have pledged more than $1.5bn of investment in
Pakistan.` Only a small fraction of the promised investment has come in, though.
The new government must ensure that those investment pledges materialise as early as
possible. The areas of interest for American investors include fast-moving consumer goods, agri-
business, financial services, franchising and information and communication technology. Pakistan
has a dire need in each of these areas and enough scope-for inward foreign investment. In the
financial sector, particularly, lots of foreign direct investment could flow into the proposed digital
banks on a local-foreign partnership basis.
SBP has received 20 applications for digital banks. These applications include some moved by
international investors, others by local investors and yet others jointly.
New investment pledges could be sought easily not only from the US but from all over the
developed world. However, it must be ensured that the impediments to the fast materialisation of
old pledges are removed.
Kuwait plans to invest $750m in the near future in Pakistan`s water management and financial
sector. Kuwait Investment Authority`s Enertech Holding Co. and Pak Kuwait Investment Co have
already applied for a digital bank license in Pakistan, according to media reports. The two entities
are already working on a $200m water pipeline.
We need to diversify the main origins of FDI inflows with better economic diplomacy.
Investment pledges from such countries as Saudi Arabia (in the oil exploration and refining
sector), Turkey (construction and retail sector) and Kuwait must be pursued vigorously.
Given the fact that Pakistan often remains short of foreign exchange and exports and
remittances fall short of meeting even the country`s merchandise imports bill, the importance of
attracting as much foreign investment into the country as possible is obvious. Foreign investment
coming into the government debt papers has a limitation. Such `hot money` which comes when the
T-bills and bonds rates are very high, flies away within days and weeks once interest rates start
falling. Foreign investment in the stock market is also often temporary in nature.
Foreign direct investment is the real thing. But to get this real thing in a big way Pakistan
needs to change. In a country still seen by many in the world as one plagued by the menace of
terrorism and extremism, it would be too much to expect that large amounts of FDI would flow in
unless we as a nation eradicate the twin evils. Can we do this? •
(Source: Business & Finance)
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DIGITIZATION OF PAKISTAN
Sheroz Khan Lodhi (Chartered Accountant)
Digitalisation is the use of digital technologies to change a business model and provide new
revenue and value-producing opportunities; it is the process of moving to a digital business. We
hear every day that digital transformation is important for market performance and growth. Every
company aspires to become digital, but only a fraction are successful in doing so and reaping the full
benefits of the revolution.
As per the predictions and forecast for digital transformation for the year 2022 by the
International Data Corporation (IDC), investment levels for 2022–2024 are expected to be $6.3 trillion
and represent 55 percent of all ICT investment by the end of 2024.
Global spending on the digital transformation of business practices, products, and
organisations would expectedly reach $2.8 trillion in 2025, more than double the amount allocated in
2020. Digital transformation spending will have a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 16.4
percent over the 2021–2025 forecast period as organisations pursue a comprehensive digital strategy
for people, processes, technology, data, and governance.
The tremendous acceleration of business digitalisation around the world has made it
necessary for businesses to be technologically responsive; otherwise, they risk substantial setbacks in
growth and revenues. When the global pandemic Covid-19 wreaked havoc on humanity in the
recent past, it also served as a stimulus for digitisation. The Covid-19 lockdowns showed just how
quickly the world can change and how important going digital is.
The pandemic has undoubtedly been a catalyst for digital transformation and adoption
worldwide. Several enterprises that were not technologically advanced went obsolete. There's not
even a single industry that has not been affected by the digital revolution.
Individual consumers are cautious about how producers have crafted their services to align
with rapidly shifting trends and how ecology is integrated into every element of a company today.
Organisations may not be able to ignore the importance of digitalised practices in achieving a
customer-focused approach and future diligence. Digitalisation drives critical decision-making and a
solution-driven approach to coping with global difficulties, regardless of industry, whether in
marketing innovation or financial business strategy.
Fortunately, it is not too late to continue (or even begin) our digital transformation journey —
and join many others as we have done in the past. Mobile internet (5G), digital literacy, e-commerce,
and digitising potential sectors are key technologies with transformational potential for businesses
and the potential to create significant economic value for Pakistan.
With blazingly fast linked gadgets that will catalyse digital transformation, the fourth
industrial revolution of networking technologies will revolutionise our planet. 5G, the next-
generation of high-speed mobile wireless communication, is leading the charge. It will connect
nearly everyone and everything, including machines, objects, and gadgets.
The impact of 5G on the digital transformation industry, on the other hand, will be enormous.
Think about the vast volumes of data that are now flowing through all of our smart devices today.
Now consider all of the features and opportunities that will be available when all of this technology
communicates more quickly and consistently.
However, smartphones, are the missing link in Pakistan's quest to become a truly digitally
inclusive society. The affordability barrier to smartphone adoption has increased as a result of new
taxing and fees associated with smartphone ownership.
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Before 5G can be implemented in the country, we must make cell phones accessible and
inexpensive for the common citizen. Reducing mobile-specific taxes and duties would help to
increase mobile ownership.
Furthermore, Pakistan has a long way to go in terms of digital literacy. Increased digital
literacy benefits the economy in a number of ways. The fourth industrial revolution can create a
“digital divide” that will widen the economic disparity between those who are digitally literate and
those who are not.
According to the World Economic Forum, Pakistan boasts the world’s most affordable
internet service. So, where we are lacking? We must acknowledge that the traditional concept of
literacy is no longer adequate. In light of current dynamics, literacy should be defined as the
capacity to read and write as well as the ability to use digital technology (such as tablets). Providing
people with digital skills can help us achieve our goals.
There is a lot of untapped potential ahead, and with the type of new technology and features
being offered every day, the landscape of e-commerce will transform into live commerce in the
coming days, months, and years.
We witnessed a Pakistani e-commerce behemoth live stream the Cricket World Cup 2021 on
its app, and this tactic was crucial in luring customers who would not have otherwise signed on and
made purchases. In China and South Asia, live selling and live commerce accounted for around 10
percent of the gross merchandise value (GMV) of e-commerce giants’ sales.
Pakistan is one of the remaining few countries with an underdeveloped e-commerce sector,
despite having a sizable digital economy. The government should focus on e-commerce to move
forward towards a digital Pakistan and promote a knowledge economy through a Digital Pakistan
Policy to facilitate growth of e-commerce.
We cannot discuss the digital world without discussing un-digitized agricultural sector that
carries a heavy potential and contributing a good share in our country GDP yearly. Around 90
percent of the country’s farmers had small holdings (less than 12.5 acres of land) and could not
afford to invest in technology to improve their operations.
They were compelled to use low-yielding seed varieties and obsolete farming techniques. We
are experiencing an agricultural catastrophe, and we must tackle it properly through widespread
digitalisation.
There is need to emphasise the importance of investing in agricultural businesses that are
developing solutions. Digital technologies can also help Pakistan’s agricultural sector in another way
as well. An agriculture information portal can be established given that the majority of people have
access to mobile phones.
It will provide price, weather, water quality, and supply data from agricultural markets to
farmers. The government should consider making the shift to digitalisation since it will help the
country overcome various obstacles and ensure smooth procedures.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan faces significant social, economic, geopolitical, and administrative
challenges. Many countries have experienced comparable obstacles in the past and effectively
transformed them into opportunities via strong economic planning, good governance, and policy
implementation consistency.
Our issues, we believe, present unparalleled chances for dramatic advancement once
adequately addressed. As we enter a period of tremendous change and complexity, it is critical that
we update our economic development framework and advance our country towards digitisation.
(Source: Money Matters)
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WILL TO REFORM PECA

Shmyla Khan (Director of policy and research at Digital Rights Foundation)
In August 2016, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA) was passed after over a
year of back and forth between the then Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz government,
parliamentarians and civil society. The law was conceived in the aftermath of the National Action
Plan to address terrorism and extremism. It was borne out of a realisation that the internet was
increasingly emerging as a space for discourse, association and narrative-building, and thus must be
controlled.
Control has been at the heart of the logic underpinning the PECA. Instead of a law focusing on
protecting online rights such as freedom of expression and privacy and guaranteeing equitable
access the PECA relied on criminalisation of speech and wide powers of content regulation. It soon
became apparent through implementation that its purpose was to penalise dissent and content
moderation. Since 2016, a number of cases have been filed against journalists, activists and women
speaking out under the #MeToo movement through weaponisation of the infamous Section 20 of the
PECA. This section, criminalising defamation, has been used to insulate powerful individuals and
institutions from critique and accountability.
It was also this section that was subject to amendment through the Prevention of Electronic
Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance, 2022, passed by the then-Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf government in
February 2022. While Section 20 was being used to file FIRs for criticism of ‘state institutions’, there
was emerging consensus among the legal community and civil society that it only applied to the
reputation of natural persons rather than institutions. To address this supposed “lacuna” in the law,
the government amended the PECA via an ordinance to include office holders and public
institutions in its ambit. The law, expectedly, received unprecedented backlash across the board—
from journalists and opposition parties to civil society.
At a time when states across the world are in the process of de-criminalising defamation and
introducing anti-SLAAP legislation, Pakistan was moving in the opposite direction by further
strengthening criminal defamation laws.
The backlash was not in vain as the PECA Ordinance was struck down by the Islamabad High
Court in the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists vs The President of Pakistan case. In his order,
Chief Justice Athar Minallah held that the ordinance was “in derogation of the Constitution and the
fundamental rights guaranteed thereunder, particularly Articles 9, 14, 19 and 19-A.”
The order passed on April 8 and the incumbent government indicated its opposition to the
ordinance. Despite the assurance, a plea challenging the IHC order was filed at the SC by the FIA on
May 8. However it was withdrawn by the government within hours. Information Minister
Marriyum Aurangzeb stated that the petition was contrary to “the government’s stated policy and
principle of standing for and ensuring freedom of expression.”
While the current government’s stance on the ordinance has been clear and sweeping, it is
unclear where it stands vis a vis Section 20 as a whole. The IHC, in its order striking down the PECA
Ordinance, also stated that the portion of Section 20 dealing with “harms the reputation” was also
unconstitutional, invalid, and, therefore, struck down.
The original section dealt with online speech that “intimidates or harms the reputation or
privacy of a natural person,” and in light of the order the phrase “harms the reputation” stands
removed and is now restricted just to “privacy of a natural person.” Further complicating the issue,
legal experts are unclear regarding the constitutional status of the section as the Lahore High Court
declared as recently as in March 2022 in the Meesha Shafi vs Federation of Pakistan case that Section
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20 was constitutional, particularly “in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution and promotes
the right to dignity enshrined therein.”
These conflicting judgments indicate a lack of consensus on the harms caused by criminalising
defamation. Given the political rights and democratic values at stake, the law regarding the impact
of the section on freedom of expression must be clear—the judiciary can only argue within the law,
the parliament can take a more unequivocal stance.
The challenge to the PECA is not restricted to its criminal sections; Section 37 which vests the
Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) with vast powers to block and remove content from
digital spaces has also come under intense scrutiny. The notification of the Removal and Blocking of
Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards), Rules 2021 brought this debate to
the fore, calling into question the suitability of the PTA in determining “illegal” content on the
internet particularly in the backdrop of arbitrary and wholesale bans on applications like TikTok
and PubG.
In the case of Muhammad Ashfaq Jutt vs Federation of Pakistan, the court shied away from
directing the parliament to review the PECA but urged political parties to“initiate the process for
review of the provisions of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the impugned rules”.
In nearly six years of the PECA, it has become increasingly clear that the internet is far too
complicated and important to be governed by legislation that fails to strike an appropriate balance
between governmental control and citizens’ rights. Advocacy by civil society has brought the
conversation firmly within the ambit of human rights. The time has come for a legislative review of
the PECA in the wake of mounting evidence of its misapplication and draconian nature through a
process that is open, transparent and participatory. Without a thorough revision of the law that
includes repealing Sections 20 and 37, the reassuring statements by the government ring hollow. We
must be vigilant and press the government to put its words to practice. We would do well to
remember that the PECA was promulgated under a PML-N tenure in the first place.
(Source: TNS)

SUPER TAX
What the state giveth, the state taketh away
Ammar H Khan (Independent macroeconomist)
The Shehbaz Sharif-led government has announced the imposition of a super tax of 4 per cent
across all sectors and 10pc on 13 sectors, including banks, automobiles, cement, chemicals, sugar,
energy and textile companies, in a bid to shore up tax revenues and bridge the fiscal deficit, which is
critical for the resumption of the IMF programme.
On the face of it, the move makes sense: the continuation of the IMF programme remains
critical for the country's external solvency, and to avoid a potential default scenario — thereby
making it essential that tough decisions are taken, even though they may not be feasible in the mid-
to long-term.
The imposition of the super tax also comes after record profitability of companies across the
spectrum as the economy started to show some cracks after a two-year binge of 5pc plus growth
rates, fuelled by subsidised financing and amnesty schemes.
As is typical of the boom-bust cycle that we have become all too familiar with, the import-
driven consumption eventually led to a burgeoning balance of payments crisis, which can only be
managed through a timely closure of the IMF programme, followed by restructuring, or rollover of
other multilateral, and friendly sovereign debt.
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Giving back
A review of the segments on which the 10pc super tax has been imposed reveals that the
sectors have largely benefited from government’s largesse in one form or another, either through the
government being the largest customer, or through the government guaranteeing returns via a
virtual monopoly, or by simply providing concessional financing in one form or another.
Segments benefiting from such largesse may not feel the heat by sharing some of the profits
they had generated through public finances, and guarantees. It is estimated that more than 80pc of
the tax collected in this way would be from banks and oil and gas companies.
The government is itself the largest customer of banks, with the sector's exposure to the
government being greater than 60pc of its asset base. In effect, due to the government's insatiable
funding requirements, it continues to crowd out private-sector funding. Meanwhile, the banks are
all too happy to lend to it at ever-increasing interest rates, considering it to be ‘risk-free’.
For the last few years, banks have essentially been conduits for sovereign borrowing, and
most of their profitability can be traced back to the sovereign as well. In such a scenario, the state is
simply taking back some of the profits from the banks to manage its deficit. After all, it is also not in
the banks' favour for the country to default, in which case they will be carrying sovereign papers
worth a few paisas to the rupee.
Similarly, a tax on LNG terminals is also basically the government taking back some of the
profits it allowed the companies to accumulate through various off-take guarantees issued earlier on.
Inflationary pressure
There is also an expectation that due to the imposition of the super tax, prices would increase,
which would feed into the overall inflationary spiral. That may not necessarily be true, as the world
isn't really as linear.
Pricing is a function of demand and supply. Any entity increasing prices may eventually see a
fall in demand of their product, as another entity would try to capture their market share with a
lower price.
Inflation, during the next twelve months is certainly going to be in double digits, but the
impact of additional taxation on it would be minimal, as pricing will follow market dynamics. The
impact of a higher one-off tax on inflation would be minimal at best, and would be dwarfed by other
supply side considerations.
The risk
But will the move pay off? Or will it do more harm than good?
Finance Minister Miftah Ismail has said that the super tax is a one-off event, and will not be a
recurring feature. One hopes that is the case, and that it doesn’t become a precedent, eventually
leading to higher effective tax rates. Moreover, arbitrary changes in tax rates significantly hurt policy
continuity, and reduces faith in a government that is already operating on very low levels of trust.
Due to such arbitrary decisions, future investment and injection of fresh capital in the
economy take a back seat as investors reevaluate, often notching up the risk associated with an
economy due to policy inconsistency.
Furthermore, through arbitrary imposition of taxes, as well as arbitrary amnesties,
governments continue to maintain an environment of uncertainty where any serious long-term
capital decisions cannot be taken. This hurts the formal investment activity in the country, as capital
holders are more inclined towards areas of the economy that remain untaxed, or are favoured by
policy makers.
This further perpetuates the incentive to reallocate capital towards real estate, agriculture, and
other largely untaxed, and undocumented segments of the economy — thereby keeping the formal
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investment rate at levels much below other peer economies. A band-aid driven approach can only
take an economy towards the next crisis, unless serious reforms are done.
The end goal
In this case, however, most entities on which the 10pc super tax is being levied have been
benefiting from taxpayer money in one form or another — and it may be kind of justified for them to
cough up some of the profit to ensure the solvency of the sovereign. It is estimated that the after-tax
profits for these entities would reduce by an average of 10pc.
The measure is crude at best, but does provide the necessary impetus to ensure solvency.
Nonetheless, it remains essential that the government initiates a reform programme and plugs
the infinite amount of leakages that exist in the machinery, and within state-owned enterprises.
Similarly, it is imperative that real estate and agriculture holdings be brought into the tax net,
such that a sizeable recurring source of taxation can be developed, instead of exclusively relying on
a handful of corporate taxpayers to bail out the government in every crisis.
The corporate tax needs to be lowered to incentivise more investment and more
corporatisation. Pakistan has had a lost decade where per capita income has largely stagnated, and
we now have a recurring solvency crisis every three years — if reforms are not done, things are only
going to get worse, and there will be no golden goose to cull at that point.
(Source: Prism)

FIVE THINGS TO WATCH IN THE

ISLAMABAD-PAKISTANI TALIBAN TALKS
Asfandyar Mir, Ph.D. (Senior Expert at USIP)
After several months of intense fighting, the Pakistani government and the anti-Pakistan
insurgent group the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are talking once again. In early June, the TTP,
also known as the Pakistani Taliban, announced a cessation of hostilities with Pakistan for three
months. This cease-fire resulted from weeks of secret talks in Kabul between the TTP and Pakistani
military officials, followed by a more public meeting between the TTP and Pakistani tribal leaders —
both mediated by the Afghan Taliban. For the first time, the Afghan Taliban also confirmed the talks
and their role as mediators between Pakistan and the TTP.
Discussions on next steps of the process between Pakistan and the TTP, including on release of
more TTP prisoners, continue. Will the talks lead to an enduring political settlement between
Pakistan and the TTP? Five factors will determine the trajectory of Pakistan-TTP negotiations.
1. TTP's Demands vs. Pakistan’s Interests
Since their onset, the talks remain shrouded in secrecy with Islamabad concealing both the
aims of the negotiations as well as what it is willing to offer the TTP. Reports suggest that Pakistani
military negotiators, led by Faiz Hamid, a former chief of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) agency and current commander of the army’s Peshawar Corps, offered to accommodate the
TTP with a safe passage back to Pakistan from Afghanistan in exchange for the TTP agreeing to a
long-term cease-fire, dissolving its organization and joining mainstream politics.
This offer appears to be tempting but insufficient for the TTP, which is making two major
demands. First, it wants a substantial reduction of Pakistani military forces from the country’s
former tribal areas, known as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Second, it wants the
2018 merger of the tribal areas into mainland Pakistan through an amendment to Pakistan’s
constitution — known as the FATA merger — reversed. While Pakistani negotiators indicate being
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open to a reduction of military forces in FATA, the merger reversal demand appears a bridge too far.
For its part, the TTP insists that the FATA merger reversal is non-negotiable.
2. Who Will the Afghan Taliban Side With?
Given this deadlock, the Afghan Taliban’s mediation role takes center stage. Will the Taliban
compel the TTP to settle for less or push Pakistan to concede to the TTP’s terms? There are three
moving parts to the Taliban’s calculus.
First, the Taliban’s position is likely to be shaped by their own foreign relations and level of
reliance on Pakistan — which is a function of the political and material support Taliban enjoyed
from Pakistan during the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. One reason the Taliban appear to have
pushed the TTP to negotiate in recent months is Pakistan’s mounting pressure amid Afghanistan’s
deepening economic and humanitarian crisis. This pressure peaked with Pakistan’s airstrikes in
eastern Afghanistan in the month of April. Pakistan may have also threatened more coercive
pressure, including through restrictions on the Taliban leadership with homes and families in
Pakistan as well as an economic squeeze on the Taliban’s revenues by restricting Afghanistan-
Pakistan border trade. That seems to have shaken some Taliban leaders, like Pakistan’s long-
standing ally Siraj Haqqani, the acting interior minister in Kabul, into action. They seem to believe
that their regime is likely to remain isolated for the foreseeable future and more hostility with
Pakistan will make their life more difficult, maybe even threaten the regime’s survival.
Yet this concern isn’t sufficient for the Taliban to completely reverse their alliance with the
TTP. Haqqani continues to openly praise the TTP for its contribution in the insurgency against the
United States and the former Afghan government, reiterating that the Taliban can’t abandon the
TTP. Perhaps for this reason, the Taliban may be looking for strategic breathing room to offset their
dependence on Pakistan. Among the recent moves the Taliban have made is reaching out to India,
expending major political capital by reportedly assuring the Indian government it will take action
against Pakistan-backed jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammed, as well as al-
Qaida in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS). If India responds to the Taliban’s entreaties, this may open
up new avenues of assistance for the Taliban, but it is unclear when.
If the Taliban’s level of reliance on Pakistan doesn’t change, two factors will be key to their
medium-term position on the TTP. One is the Taliban’s internal politics. There is a reservoir of
support for the TTP, both for its own contributions to the Taliban’s insurgency as well as for its anti-
Pakistan politics. A faction of the Taliban which appears to have stepped up its support for the TTP
and wants to shield it from Pakistan is the Kandahari Taliban leadership, including Taliban Defense
Minister Mullah Yaqub. The extent to which this constituency will offset Haqqani’s preference for
working with Pakistan is crucial.
Second, the Taliban’s position on the TTP’s demands will be important. While the Taliban
generally back the TTP’s quest for a Shariah-based order in Pakistan, it is unclear where they stand
on the TTP’s negotiating positions. It is plausible that the TTP’s demands (in particular, FATA
merger reversal and reduction of Pakistani forces from FATA) are, in fact, the Taliban’s demands, as
they could advance the Taliban’s interests. For example, they can create a buffer zone between
Pakistan and the Taliban’s Afghanistan while elevating the political status of the TTP, which
subordinates itself to the Taliban. Fulfillment of the TTP’s demands can also soften a critical chunk
of the Durand Line and make it more consistent with the Afghan nationalist position on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
On the other hand, some in the Taliban — in particular, those concerned about ISIS-K as a
threat to regime survival — may fear that if the TTP is unable to assert control of the territorial carve
out it may get if Pakistan concedes in talks, anti-Taliban armed factions may take root and challenge
the Taliban from across the border.
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3. TTP Internal Politics

Even though much of the TTP has responded to the Taliban’s insistence on giving negotiations
another chance, the TTP is torn on the political implications of talking to Pakistan. There appear to
be three camps. The first camp, which is most influential, seems to calculate that the group’s
campaign of violence following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has achieved a major political
end at relatively low cost: Pakistan is close to making major concessions which will boost the
political status of the TTP inside Pakistan while granting some territorial control and regional
autonomy in the FATA. This faction also sees Pakistan’s release of TTP prisoners and offer of
compensation as ultimately strengthening the group.
A second camp, however, seems to worry that no matter what the terms of the settlement are,
Pakistan could renege and will retain the power to pull the rug from under their feet once they
disarm. This camp remembers the history of deals with Pakistan military, which largely ended up in
failures and culminated in major military campaigns. This camp is also unwilling to compromise on
the ideological goal of a Shariah-based political order. Some leaders also resent the Taliban for
asking them to talk to the Pakistani military and worry about the implications of reducing violence
— and fear that Pakistan is likely to offer them less if they foreclose the option of violence.
A third camp, mainly dotted by families and extended tribal networks of refugees linked to
TTP rank-and-file who moved to Afghanistan after Pakistan’s last major military operation called
Zarb-e-Azb, seems to favor any settlement with Pakistani government that will ensure their swift
and safe return to Pakistan from Afghanistan. Many in this camp have suffered from extreme
poverty in eastern Afghanistan for several years — and the Taliban’s support remains insufficient
for them. Amid Afghanistan’s growing humanitarian crisis, this camp’s access to food and other
public goods has decreased.
4. Pakistan’s Domestic Politics
Pakistani politicians have been quiet on the military’s negotiations with the TTP — which is
consistent with the longstanding outsourcing of the country’s Afghan policy to the military and
intelligence services. Even retired military elites and military-aligned social media, who aggressively
shape Pakistani national opinion on key national security and domestic political issues, have been
relatively restrained on the talks. But there is unease below the surface. Even within the military
there may be some divergence on how to proceed.
One source of tension is General Faiz Hamid’s role leading the current round of talks with the
TTP. Due to his domestic political role as the chief of the ISI over the last few years and his previous
activism being a source of tension between Army Chief Bajwa and former Prime Minister Imran
Khan, he is a controversial figure. That he is leading the process as the Peshawar Corps commander
is an added wrinkle. Previous attempts at deal-making led by the Peshawar Corps (like the
infamous 2004 Shakai agreement) have ended in failure, with the ISI and the military working at
cross-purposes. Hamid appears to have the full blessing of Army chief Gen. Qamar Bajwa on the
talks but it is unclear the extent to which the current ISI chief Nadeem Anjum will get behind the
terms Hamid could settle for.
There is also a question of how Pakistan’s parliamentary politics will shape the next phase of
the talks, especially if the military asks for constitutional changes to support a settlement. Pakistani
political elites generally fall in line with the military’s major priorities — and one report suggests
that a Pakistani parliamentary delegation is likely to travel to Kabul to meet with TTP negotiators.
For now, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the second major party in Prime Minister Shehbaz
Sharif’s ruling coalition, is voicing concerns on the talks. This could be because the PPP is opposed
to a settlement with the TTP, given its secular political credentials and the involvement of TTP
operatives in the 2007 attack against PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. Additionally, the PPP championed
the FATA merger in 2018, so it may be unwilling to concede on that to the TTP. A more cynical but
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plausible view is that the PPP’s opposition is due to some alignment between its top leader, Asif
Zardari, and elements of the Pakistani military not on board with the talks.
Any moves to undo the constitutional merger of the former tribal areas will have a direct
impact on parliamentary politics that determine the razor-sharp margins in Pakistan’s National
Assembly and the ability to form governments.
5. Role of Transnational Terrorists
Transnational terrorist groups remain a wild card in the current scenario. Al-Qaida, which is
focusing on its anti-India campaign, is likely to support a political pathway by which the TTP
regains some territorial influence in the FATA, which gives al-Qaida core and AQIS more options
for safety and operations.
On the other hand, ISIS-K will see this as an opportunity, hoping to not only poach from TTP’s
fighters and commanders distrustful of the Pakistani state and the Taliban but also leverage
reductions in Pakistani security forces’ presence in the former FATA region to assert territorial
control of its own.
Implications for U.S. policy
There are versions of a TTP-Pakistan political settlement that may be acceptable for U.S.
foreign policy interests. One such settlement can be demobilization of the TTP combined with the
TTP guaranteeing it will not cooperate with transnational militants. A reconciliation process, which
rebuilds trust between Pakistani state authorities, the insurgents and conflict-affected populations
on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to realize a shared future will also be important.
Such a settlement, by reducing the threat of violence, may alleviate concerns about nuclear-armed
Pakistan’s fragility to anti-state armed actors and of safe havens emerging in semi-governed regions
— at a low cost. This would be especially welcome as U.S. policy shifts away from counterterrorism
and increasingly focuses on strategic competition with China. It can also advance the ongoing
rightsizing of U.S. attention and resources to both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The current expedient settlement under discussion is not the deal which will reduce threats. In
fact, it could do the opposite. Far from demobilizing or embarking on a reconciliation process, the
TTP wants to become a more formidable political actor with some type of regional autonomy in
Pakistan through a settlement. Additionally, one takeaway for militant groups in Afghanistan and
Pakistan from watching the lead up to Pakistan-TTP negotiations is that short, intense bursts of
violence can enable major political gains. And if Pakistan agrees to the reversal of the FATA merger,
it will go against a major thrust of U.S. counterterrorism strategy toward Pakistan to end semi-
governed spaces and expand Pakistani state’s writ to all parts of the country. It will also worsen law
order and local governance, which will be a major recruitment tool for militants in the region. The
TTP is likely to be emboldened and other militant groups — in particular al-Qaida and ISIS-K — are
likely to find more space in the region from such a deal. And it is unlikely to stop with an initial
settlement, as the political momentum will shift in favor of the TTP.
To be sure, nothing is set in stone yet. And Pakistani leadership may just look to sustain the
cease-fire with the help of the Taliban without making costly concessions for as long as possible. But
things can change as Pakistan is under pressure from the Taliban’s backing of the TTP on the one
hand and deepening economic challenges on the other hand. American leverage with Pakistan is
limited yet it is important U.S. policymakers dissuade Pakistan from making dangerous concessions
to the TTP.
(Source: United States Institute of Peace)
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COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT NAP

Attiya Munawer
LAW and order is necessary to deal with the difficulties that the country is currently facing
and this is the responsibility of all national law enforcement agencies including the defence forces as
well as the entire nation.
Under the National Action Plan, the defence forces have been able to thwart not only
terrorism and sabotage through Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad but also foil
other conspiracies against the country.
The role of the police and civilian law enforcement agencies which are subordinate to the
provincial governments, is also crucial to bolster their efforts.
All the resources would have to be utilized to eradicate such crimes and the dream of peace in
the country would remain unfulfilled till the provincial governments fulfil their elected
responsibilities together with the Federation.
It is clear that until law and order is restored in the country, no one will come from abroad to
invest nor will local investors will invest.
A comprehensive National Action Plan was prepared, the twenty-point agenda of the plan set
out what steps would be taken to combat terrorism across the country with some responsibilities
placed on the provinces as well, so that they will work with the federation to fight the scourge of
terrorism but the provinces have not played their part and the federation has not fulfilled its
responsibility correspondingly, Pakistan can’t even get out of the FATF’s grey list.
It has been the practice of every government to lay the blame for its shortcomings on others.
Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has also said that in the last four years, ignoring the role of the
provinces in the National Action Plan has led to an increase in terrorism.
It has also been argued that legal and judicial reforms have not been made to ensure
implementation of the National Action Plan, nor have the usual changes been made to the police
and madrassa system.
The federal government’s National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NCTA) Pakistan was
supposed to work with the provinces, but nothing has been done except claims that everything is
fine.
This is not a time to blame each other but to make up for our shortcomings. National security
is not a matter to be overlooked again or twice, each side has to do its job responsibly.
In this regard, it is also important to review the performance of the state mechanism, because
if this mechanism was active, the provinces would implement the National Action Plan.
It would not take four years for the shortcomings to come to light, but we need to reconsider
our shortcomings and move forward and implement this National Action Plan in its true spirit.
Whether it is our National Action Plan or any other plan at the national level, its full
implementation is possible only when all the federating units work together with the Centre in the
same direction and to achieve the same goal.
If the Federation and the provinces do not agree with each other or their efforts are not
coordinated, then national development and stability become a dream, so it is necessary for the
provinces to work with the Federation to ensure implementation of all points of the National Action
Plan.
The nature of the threat is universal at the moment, national security and safety measures
should be of the same level, otherwise the risk of instability increase is not out of the question.
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There is no doubt that full implementation of the National Action Plan will go a long way in
eradicating the scourge of terrorism, but despite the remarkable success in the war on terror, State
measures in the plan to eradicate terrorism do not appear to be comprehensive and coherent.
Implementation of military operations, crackdowns and other measures can be used to control
terrorism to some extent, but much more needs to be done to eradicate it.
Terrorism is becoming a disease across the country and social illnesses like physical illnesses
can be cured not only by treating the symptoms or its effects, but also by treating its causes,
otherwise the risk of recurrence after a while remains in place.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)

PAKISTAN’S ESCAPE FROM FATF’S GREY LIST

Shahbaz Rana (T Magazine)
In February of 2020, the president of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gave Pakistan a
stark warning: either enact laws in line with the body’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and
Combating Terrorism Financing (CFT) standards along with bringing the country’s regulatory
framework in line with international standards or be ready to face consequences.
And the consequences were grave – so much so that they could have completely dried up the
already low levels of foreign direct investment estimated at hardly $1.6 billion in this year. Had
Pakistan not complied, it would have had to deal with an increase in the cost and time it takes to
send foreign remittances back home from abroad. Its banks would have struggled to carry out
international transactions, leading to an eventual slowdown of the wheel of an economy already
teetering on the brink of being crippled.
But almost two and half years down the line – in June 2022 – the FATF says that the initial
determination of Pakistan’s efforts to comply with two separate action plans “warrants an on-site
visit to verify that the implementation of Pakistan’s AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being
sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation
and improvement in the future”. Where four years ago the country was fully or largely compliant
with hardly 10 out of the 40 universal FATF recommendations, it now stands compliant with 35,
placing it among the top five nations that have AML and CFT regimes compliant with FATF
standards. The top three, just for context, are the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy.
“Pakistan is not being removed from the grey list today. The country will be removed from
the list if it successfully passes the onsite visit,” FATF president Marcus Pleyer said last week. The
purpose of the onsite visit, he said, is to verify the completion of reforms to check whether they are
sustainable and irreversible. In between these two timelines is the story of the use of lawfare
approach against Pakistan, efforts by Pakistani authorities to put laws and regulatory frameworks in
the right shape to avoid blacklisting and reverse decades-old policies and strategies that also
allowed New Delhi to change the constitutional and demographic status of Indian Illegally
Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
A stern warning
In February 2020, the FATF plenary had warned that “all deadlines in the action plan have
expired and should significant and sustainable progress, especially in prosecuting and penalizing
terror financing, not be made by the next plenary, the FATF will take action, which could include the
FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to advise their investors to give special
attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan.” It was a clear warning to blacklist
Pakistan. Exactly two years before, in February 2018, the FATF had decided to place Pakistan on the
grey list with effect from June that year and handed it over a list of 27 conditions that it needed to
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implement to exit the grey list. For the first time, the IMF had also included exit from the grey list
part of its conditions set for the $6 billion bailout programme for Pakistan.
The FATF is an inter-governmental body that enjoys the backing of the United Nations. Its
enforcement arms are strengthened by FATF-styled regional bodies and it also gets support from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to enforce financial punitive measures. The
France-based FATF, founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G-7, an organisation of the world’s
seven largest advanced countries, monitors countries’ money flow and penalises those whose
financial systems are abused for money laundering and terrorism activities.
The FATF had taken a decision without waiting for a fresh Mutual Evaluation Report (MER)
by the Asia Pacific Group (APG) – the FATF styled regional body in whose jurisdiction Pakistan lies.
The MER is usually a requirement to see whether the country’s AML and CFT related laws, rules
and risk frameworks are technically compliant, the inter-agency coordination, judicial system for
prosecution and convection are effective and the nation also cooperates with foreign jurisdictions to
curb menace of terrorism and money laundering.
A country can be put on the grey list for one of three main factors: it is not a member of the
FATF or a FATF styled regional body, it performed poor on the MER or any of FATF or regional
body member may nominate a country for being placed on the list due to deficiencies in its AML
and CFT regimes. In Pakistan’s case, there was more than one reason to put it on the grey list.
Missed opportunities
In October 2019, the Asia Pacific Group – one of the nine FATF styled regional bodies –
released its comprehensive Mutual Evaluation Report. The report had been based on Pakistan’s
performance against 40 recommendations of the FATF till October 2018. The report showed that out
of FATF’s 40 recommendations on curbing money laundering and combating the financing of
terrorism, Pakistan was fully compliant only on one. It was largely compliant on nine, partially
compliant on 26 and non-compliant on four recommendations. On the level of effectiveness of
Pakistan’s AML/CFT, Pakistan was found moderately effective only on one benchmark while on the
remaining nine its effectiveness was declared as low as of October 2018 cut-off date.
The APG 2019 report highlighted that Pakistan faced significant risk of terror financing both
from legitimate and illegitimate sources as well as weak or no, regulation and supervision of certain
sectors such as hawala/hundi, NPOs and DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and
Professions) and porous borders. The implementation situation was so bad that the APG had asked
Pakistan in 2009 to have proper DNFBPs framework, which we did not implement till 2020.
“The terror financing cases are identified by a number of mechanisms but not via financial
intelligence,” according to the APG report. Here too, the APG had made similar observations a
decade ago about the country’s risk assessment framework but no action was taken. At the very
least, it was a pathetic report for Pakistan that also underscored that the country did not improve
even on areas that had been identified in 2009 by the APG.
The report also underlined that key Pakistani regulators – the State Bank of Pakistan and
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan – had very limited understating of the money
laundering and terror financing regimes. “Pakistan should adequately identify, assess and
understand its money laundering/terror financing risks including transnational risks and risks
associated with terrorist groups operating in Pakistan such as Da’esh, AQ, JuD, FiF, LeT, JeM and
HQN, and this should be used to implement a comprehensive and coordinated risk-based approach
to combating money laundering and terror financing,” the report stated. “Also terrorist groups
operating in Pakistan are reported to include but not limited to, ISIS-Khorasan, Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (including its affiliates
Jamaatud Dawa and Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation), which raise funds through a variety of means,
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including direct support, public fundraising, abuse of NPOs, and though criminal activities,” APG
2019 report added.
The report said that corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, smuggling, human
trafficking, and organised crime were major predicate offences to money laundering and areas of
high risk. The APG advised that Pakistan should significantly enhance the use of financial
intelligence in money laundering, terror financing, and predicate crime cases, particularly the use of
financial intelligence to target terrorist groups and higher- risk predicate crimes. It also sought
improvement in asset confiscation that should commensurate with Pakistan’s money laundering
and terror financing risks, including cross-border currency.
The situation was so bad that back in 2018 Pakistani authorities had very little understanding
of the country’s money laundering and terror financing risks, and the private sector also had a
mixed understanding of risks. While Pakistan established a multi-agency approach to implementing
its AML/CFT regime, it was not implementing a comprehensive and coordinated risk-based
approach to combating money laundering and terror financing.
For money laundering, there was no clear understanding among competent authorities,
including LEAs. “Competent authorities are focused on predicate crimes and are unable to clearly
differentiate money laundering from predicate offences which generate illicit proceeds,” the APG
pointed out. “For terrorism financing, Pakistani authorities had a mixed understanding of risk.
Federal Investigation Agency had a low level of terror financing risk understanding, while
provincial police, counter-terrorism departments (CTDs) have a better understanding of those risks
within their provinces.
“The State Bank of Pakistan did not have a clear understanding of the money laundering and
terror financing risks unique to the sectors it supervises,” stated the APG report. There was little
evidence that the SECP’s supervisory activity was improving AML/CFT behaviour. Pakistan Post,
CDNS, and DNFBPs were not supervised for AML/CFT compliance. Also, Pakistan’s law
enforcement efforts to address money laundering were not consistent with its risks.
Most banks and larger exchange companies had an adequate understanding of their
AML/CFT obligations but all other financial institutions had limited understanding of their money
laundering and terror financing risks; they were in a nascent stage of implementing the risk-based
approach and internal controls; smaller entities lacked proper systems to identify Politically Exposed
Persons (PEPs). Pakistan had limited mitigating measures for legal persons and there was no
supervisory oversight for AML/CFT purposes.
The use of lawfare
Many countries, particularly the United States and India, had long been demanding through
the FATF forum that Pakistan should target eight groups – the Afghan Taliban, Jamaat-ud-Dawa
(JuD), Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Falah-e-Insaniyat
Foundation, al-Qaeda and Islamic State.
After the poor evaluation report, Pakistan made its Director-General of Military Operations
(DGMO) in-charge for the implementation of FATF recommendations while the then federal
minister for economic affairs Hammad Azhar was nominated for coordination from the civilian side.
This was a turning point when Pakistan finally decided to take the FATF threat serious and
started delivering on conditions that it had resisted long. Pakistani courts started handing over
sentences to JUD chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, with latest one given in April this year when he
was awarded a combined sentence of 33 years imprisonment in two cases of terror financing. It was
unthinkable till few years ago.
Pakistan also amended 14 laws to ensure technical compliance with the FATF
recommendations, including few for the sake of avoiding being blacklisted. Still, the world powers
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were not satisfied and they wanted effective implementation of these laws. The journey has not
ended yet and there is no time to relax. India will not let the pressure off from Pakistan.
In July last year, India’s Minister for External Affairs S Jaishankar said the Modi-led Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) government had ensured that Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list. It had
achieved what Dehli otherwise could not think even.
India and the US jointly proposed on June 1, 2022 to list Pakistan based terrorist Abdul
Rehman Makki under the UN Security Council’s Al-Qaeda (Dae’sh) and ISIL Sanctions Committee,
also known as the UNSC 1267 Committee. Both India and the US have already listed Makki as a
terrorist under their domestic laws. Abdul Rehman Makki is the deputy Amir/Chief and head of the
Political Affairs of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) /Jamat ud-Dawa (JuD), which itself is a UN proscribed
terrorist entity.
Pakistan has in the past publicly expressed its concerns about use of the FATF for political
purposes. In an interview to Anadolu Agency -a Turkish media outlet – last year, Pakistan’s then
law minister Barrister Farogh Naseem had said that “Even [though} the FATF people are good
people. I’m not being critical against them…But as long as these (FATF) standards are universally
applied, and not applied to only Pakistan, and as long as there is no international politics, then we
welcome FATF. Let it be applied to everyone,” he said, questioning why Pakistan was still on the
list. “There should be no international politics, but FATF is being used to arm twist. Then what can
we say?”
Need for compliance and vigilance
The FATF will soon send a mission to Pakistan to kicking off the process to remove Pakistan
from the grey list. Any of the FATF or APG member countries can opt to be part of the on-site
mission team and India may not like to lose the opportunity. The mission will see progress on the
ground, the commitment of the political leadership to stay on course and importantly to make sure
that all the steps that have already been taken are irreversible, including actions against leadership
of terror outfits.
All the Pakistani stakeholders still need to prove to the FATF upcoming mission that no
serious deficiency remains in its AML and CFT regimes. The on-site inspection team will submit its
report to the FATF and on the basis of on-site team report, the FATF will announce the decision of
keeping or removing Pakistan from the grey list in the next plenary.
It is also the responsibility of the FATF that its on-site mission remains focused on
strengthening of the AML and CFT regimes, rather on any specific individual on behest of any
member country.
Pakistani authorities need to consolidate their efforts and make sure that all actions taken in
past two years are irreversible, this time for the sake of people and prosperity. World now knows
our games.
(Source: T Magazine)
 287

Nuclear Issues
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE
Dr Muhammadi (Associate Director of Research at the CISS)
Dr Rahat Iqbal (Associate Director of Research at the CISS)
The notion of deterrence in South Asia was triggered, after the acquisition of nuclear
capability by Pakistan in May 1998. The two states that are India and Pakistan had an informal
deterrence before becoming the nuclear power states. The Indian nuclear programme had
commenced in the 1970s, after the explosion of a nuclear test in 1974, under the garb of Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy. Thus, compelling Pakistan for achieving the nuclear weaponry capability.
India openly declared itself as a nuclear weapon state after conducting the nuclear test on May 11th
and 13th 1998 while Pakistan on May 28th, 1998.
Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weaponry capability has played a significant role in limiting the
conventional war with India as has been experienced in the past. Hence, captivating India for
indirect postures to achieve national interest. Again, capturing of Kulbhushan Yadav, a serving
commanding officer in the Indian Navy and an agent of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
from Baluchistan province (Pakistan) indulged in terrorist and spying activities for India, is the
evidence to support the argument on any forum.
It may be assumed that minor conflicts as occurred in the recent past such as the Balakot
incident in February 2019 and the Brahmos Missile Incident in March 2022 may infiltrate the
conviction of deterrence between the two states, however, this might not be the reality. In a broader
spectrum, the possession of a nuclear arsenal is the constant factor in maintaining the equilibrium
among the conflicting states, particularly between India and Pakistan. During the Kargil crisis of
1999, both India and Pakistan adopted the ladder of de-escalation from escalation, as both were the
nuclear power states by that time. Since then, it’s been almost 24 years that both the states did not
venture into full-fledged or limited war.
Not only this but the significance of nuclear weapons can be also assessed from the
perspective of the Russian-Ukraine crisis. Ukraine, the newly independent country with the
disintegration of the USSR in 1991, was the third-largest nuclear-weapon state. By 1996, Ukraine had
given up all its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurance and economic assistance.
Pertinent to the Budapest agreement on Memorandum of Security Assurance in 1994, US, UK and
Russia itself, were key players in ensuring security against any emerging threats from within and
outside boundaries for Ukraine. Sadly, the countries that promised the security assurance to the
poor country failed to comply with the memorandum, leading the country to suffer from the
Russian invasion since March 2022. Hence, proving the nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent
posture to the invasion, not only in the case of India and Pakistan but also in weaker states such as
Ukraine. Analyzing strained relations with India, Pakistan is blessed to have its nuclear weaponry
capability.
Some of the Indian officials did claim to have changed their nuclear policy after the Balakot
incident from a no first use to the first use. That is from preventive strike to pre-emptive strike.
Despite this move, to initiate a nuclear assault by any of the South Asian states is a hard decision to
make, as the fear of retaliation exists. This has already been experienced in the episode of Operation
Swift Retort. The use of nuclear weapons and capability will not have a severe repercussion on India
and Pakistan only but will endanger other peripheral states of the region as well.
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Since the nuclearisation of South Asia, both India and Pakistan are indulged in the nuclear
arms race. US-Indo strategic partnership signed in 2008 may give an edge to India for flourishing
and furnishing much-advanced technology in security perspectives as it is in developing stature
both economically and strategically. Even so, the use of nuclear weapons in an uncertain situation
against Pakistan is a difficult decision to take on the Indian end. Pakistan has and is trying hard to
equally compete with India in technological advancement. The development of several missiles such
as Shaheen-III, Ababeel, Babur, Nasr and some others could be considered a tool of deterrence for
the state. Therefore, a stable nuclear deterrence is intact and does exist in South Asia.
There is a possibility that scenarios such as the Balakot incident, revocation of articles 370 and
35A, illegal annexation of Kashmir and the Brahmo Missile incident may have negative implications
in the region and also on the strategic stability of the South Asian which can lead to minor military
retaliation. But even during the heightened tensions internally and externally, Pakistan has always
responded as a mature and responsible nuclear state.
Pakistan is a state that got independence with limited resources and with a disputed border
confronting three full-fledged wars with India. It is a state, which is striving for progress through
self-help with several challenges on different fronts. While discussing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program, one must not forget the remarkable efforts and contributions made by the two legends that
is Late President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Late Dr Abdul Qadeer as well as his team in making the
program successful. For instance, if there had been no nuclear weapons, the existence and
sustainability of Pakistan would have become difficult like Ukraine.
(Source: Daily Times)

AUKUS SUBMARINES
Beasts of Nuclear Proliferation
When faced with the option of acquiring nuclear technology, states have rarely refused. Since
the splitting of the atom and the deployment of atomic weapons in war, the acquisition of a nuclear
capacity has been a dream. Those who did acquire it, in turn, tried to restrict others from joining
what has become, over the years, an exclusive club guarded by self-justified psychosis.
Members of the nuclear club engage in an elaborate ceremonial in claiming that their nuclear
weapons inventory will eventually be emptied. Non-nuclear weapons states allied to such powers
go along with appearances, taking comfort that nuclear weapons states will offer them an umbrella
of security.
This insane hypocrisy underlines such arrangements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. Central to the document is the discouragement of non-nuclear weapons states
from weaponizing nuclear technology as long as members of the nuclear club pursue “good-faith”
disarmament negotiations. While it is true to say that the NPT probably prevented a speedier, less
infectious spread of the nuclear virus, it remains a constipated regime of imperfections that has
merely delayed proliferation.
Most tellingly of all, most non-nuclear-weapon states have complied with their undertakings.
Nuclear weapons states have not, disregarding serious multilateral nuclear disarmament. Nor do
they have an incentive to alter current arrangements, given that any changes to the NPT can only
take place with the unanimous support of the three treaty depositories: Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
The NPT supporters pour scorn at alternative approaches to nuclear weapons, such as the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which had its first meeting of state parties in
Vienna from June 21 to 23. While the Albanese government did send Susan Templeman MP to the
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meeting as an observer, Canberra has remained consistently opposed to the TPNW as a threat to the
accepted disarmament and NPT framework. Dated and spurious concepts such as extended nuclear
deterrence and the interoperability of Australian and U.S. military systems tend to be common
justifications.
The AUKUS security partnership that was announced in September 2021 by Australia, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, has muddied the pool of non-proliferation. A central
component of the agreement is a promise to share nuclear propulsion technology with Australia,
enabling it to acquire eight nuclear submarines to be supposedly built in Adelaide, South Australia.
While much of this is wishful thinking (Australia has no expertise in the field, and will have to rely
wholeheartedly on expertise from the other two), the glaring problem in the arrangement is what it
does to non-proliferation arrangements.
While the previous Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison was ignorantly confident that
the agreement would comply with Australia’s own non-proliferation commitments, such confidence
is misplaced. For one thing, Article III of the NPT exempts naval reactors from nuclear safeguards,
which threatens a pillar of the regime, namely, limiting the production and use of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) which can be used, in turn, to make nuclear weapons.
Non-proliferation experts have not been enthusiastic with these promised new beasts for the
Royal Australian Navy. Daryl G. Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, notes the salient
difference between deepening defence cooperation on the one hand with allies and proliferating
“sensitive HEU nuclear propulsion tech in contravention of the U.S. and global nonpro principles.”
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American
Scientists, greeted AUKUS with much gloom when it was announced. Its provisions on nuclear
technology would “further intensify the arms race in the region and the dynamics that fuel military
competition.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Director General Rafael Grossi is visiting Australia
to discuss the issue of safeguards regarding nuclear material used for naval propulsion. This is
nothing short of problematic, given that IAEA inspectors are unable to inspect such material for
extended periods of time when the vessel is at sea.
Grossi, in mild understatement, calls this “quite complex,” though is keen to accommodate
Australian commitments to non-proliferation alongside the acquisition of nuclear technology.
“There is a period of 18 months which was given by the three partners – the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia – to define how the project is going to be implemented but, already we
have started this interaction, this joint work of technical levels so that we can reconcile both things.”
In a statement made prior to Grossi’s visit, Foreign Minister Penny Wong reiterated
Australia’s “longstanding” support of the “IAEA’s mission to harness the peaceful use of nuclear
technology in areas like medicine, industrial processes, and environmental monitoring, as well as
upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”
This world as described by Senator Wong is distinctly pre-AUKUS. Despite promises of “open
and transparent engagement with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards,” the whinnying horse of
proliferation has bolted from the stable. Assurances to avoid the future development of an
Australian nuclear weapons capability or a national nuclear fuel cycle also ring hollow.
The precedent of permitting Australia to be the only non-nuclear weapons state with HEU-
propelled technology is also seismic on another level. There will be nothing stopping China and
Russia from doing what the United States and the UK promise to do: proliferate naval reactor
technology and long-range missiles with a nuclear capability.
(Source: International Policy Digest)
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STIGMATISE NUCLEAR WEAPONS!

Anne Balzer (Advisor for public relations and educational projects at the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons – ICAN)
The first Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
(TPNW), which took place at the United Nations in Vienna from 20 to 23 June, was signal just at the
right time: threats to use weapons of mass destruction are unacceptable. After the treaty was
adopted at the United Nations in 2017, the first Conference of the States Parties was held a good year
after its entry into force in January 2021, with 49 states parties and 34 states participating as
observers. Among the observers were representatives of the German government, who emphasised
for the first time that the conference was ‘seen as an important event in international disarmament
diplomacy.’
The TPNW builds on existing norms, such as the ban on nuclear weapons testing and the
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Treaty (NPT). For the first time, the treaty comprehensively
outlaws nuclear weapons because of their catastrophic humanitarian consequences and prohibits the
use, development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, and stockpiling as well as the threat
of use of nuclear weapons for member states.
Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine demonstrates clearly how necessary the stigmatisation
of the threats of nuclear weapons really are. Suddenly, the international community and above all
the Europeans are confronted with a long-forgotten threat: a confrontation between nuclear-armed
Russia and the nuclear alliance of NATO, whose members support Ukraine. In the process, Russia’s
President Putin is expanding on this by his implicit nuclear threats – ‘Whoever tries to stop us and
threaten our country and our people should know that there will be consequences. Consequences
like you have never seen in the West in their history’ – the concept of deterrence in a disturbing way.
The reference to nuclear weapons is not only used in case of an existential threat, but to contain the
room for manoeuvre of Ukraine’s supporters.
The Conference’s results
That’s why it is so crucial right now that states have united in a multilateral UN forum to raise
their voices against nuclear weapons. Every step in the practical design of the TPNW strengthens the
norm of the ban on nuclear weapons and undermines the practice of the nuclear-weapon states. The
TPNW Conference of States makes it very clear once again: it is a political decision on which
concepts states build their foreign and security policy. Nuclear deterrence is an outdated technology
from the last century, which even a bitterly poor state like North Korea could develop. It offers no
answer to the challenges of our time and is an additional risk in a multipolar world with accelerated
communication and decision-making structures.
The agenda for the conference, which lasted only three days and was chaired by the Austrian
diplomat Alexander Kmentt, was understandably packed. Even the short negotiation time of the
2017 treaty, with only two times two weeks, left some legal and technical questions unanswered.
Nevertheless, the states were able to find solutions to some issues, including:
First, with regard to the accession of nuclear weapon states, existing arsenals must be
destroyed within 10 years in a verifiable process. Second, with regard to the accession of nuclear
sharing states, nuclear weapons must be withdrawn in advance or within 90 days. Third, an action
plan has been adopted that provides for concrete steps to strengthen the norm against nuclear
weapons and to promote the accession of more states. Fourth, formalities and structures for the
further implementation of the treaty were elaborated. Fifth, a political declaration was adopted
emphasising that ‘the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law,
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including the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats,
whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.’
In the midst of new arms race
In order to make the best possible use of the limited time available at the conference, the states
parties have already worked out so-called ‘working papers’ on urgent topics in advance in working
groups. A novelty of the TPNW, for example, is the focus on the victims and environmental
destruction caused by nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment. Therefore, states led
by Kiribati and Kazakhstan have been working for months to initiate a kind of international trust
fund to provide funds for victim assistance and environmental clean-up. The idea of this fund now
needs to be further developed, but it can be a practical step in the process towards nuclear justice.
The statement of the representatives of the German Foreign Office was perceived as
particularly constructive in this context. Ambassador Rüdiger Bohn said: ‘We are interested in
learning more about the “positive obligations” of the treaty. Indeed, we believe that helping victims
and cleaning up the environment after the long-term damage of nuclear testing deserve broader
attention and commitment’. If the working groups continue to cooperate so effectively and
constructively in the future and prepare the actual conferences in the intersessional meetings now
planned, ground-breaking results can also be expected for the second Conference of the Parties at
the end of November 2023 under the chairmanship of Mexico.
The conference was a signal at the right time. For a recent SIPRI report warns of a new nuclear
arms race and research by ICAN highlights the increased investment in nuclear weapons systems.
The German government is also joining this new nuclear arms race with the planned acquisition of
the new F-35 fighter jets worth billions for nuclear sharing. This step also thwarts the commitment to
a ‘Germany free of nuclear weapons’ as formulated in the coalition agreement. The investment in
nuclear sharing will make Germany’s position as a credible actor for disarmament and non-
proliferation more difficult in the future, among other things in the negotiations with Iran.
The first Conference of States has shown: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is
an important piece of the puzzle in the international disarmament and arms control regime. It is a
treaty of the 21st century: multilateral, inclusive, and anchored in civil society, with a focus on
human security. Only with a norm that fundamentally prohibits nuclear weapons, states that shape
this norm concretely, and a civil society movement that pushes this norm, is there a chance for
future initiatives for bilateral or multilateral disarmament. The resources of the treaty’s member
states are limited. But last week’s first conference made it clear that members are serious: they do not
accept the nuclear threat, but will use available resources, expertise and dedicated diplomacy to
outlaw nuclear weapons.
(Source: International Politics and Society)
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Organizations
HOW NATO WILL CHANGE
… If Finland and Sweden Become Members
Russia’s assault on Ukraine has pushed Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), putting them on a fast track to join the transatlantic
alliance if political hurdles can be overcome. Their accession would dramatically expand NATO’s
border with Russia and mark a further entrenchment of the geopolitical rivalry.
What’s happening?
The Finnish and Swedish governments formally applied for membership on May 18, kicking
off an intensive diplomatic process that could see the two countries join NATO within months.
Supporters worked to build momentum around NATO’s annual summit, this year on June 28-30 in
Madrid, where alliance leaders are meeting to discuss the war in Ukraine, China’s increasing
influence, and a new Strategic Concept. “Finnish and Swedish NATO membership is a no-brainer on
all counts. It is a win-win proposition for the Baltic Sea region, the alliance and European security,”
writes Alexander Stubb, former prime minister of Finland. “Applicants do not get more NATO
compatible than this.”
The two Nordic states, like all applicants, must meet political, economic, and military
requirements, and demonstrate that they will uphold all of the policies and principles set out in the
1949 Washington Treaty, the alliance’s charter.
To grant membership, the governments of all thirty current NATO members must sign and
ratify the so-called accession protocols for Finland and Sweden. In the United States, this requires
the president’s signature and the approval of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Both President Joe Biden
and Congress are expected to move quickly in support of the process.
The most significant hurdle has been objections from Turkey regarding the two countries’
support for a Kurdish militant group in Syria, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Ankara views the
group and its alleged ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist threat. However, on
June 28, Turkey agreed to lift its objections to their membership after Helsinki and Stockholm
pledged to toughen their approach to these groups and lift their restrictions on arms sales to Ankara.
Are they ready to join?
Finland and Sweden have worked with the alliance for nearly thirty years, and they are
widely regarded as capable security partners. They joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and
both contributed personnel to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq. In 2014,
they became two of just six Enhanced Opportunity Partners and have since worked to increase their
militaries’ ability to operate with NATO forces. Sweden recently hosted more than a dozen NATO
allies and Finland in BALTOPS 22, a major maritime exercise in the Baltic Sea.
What would be the security implications of membership?
Finnish and Swedish membership is expected to bolster the alliance’s eastern flank and its
collective defenses in northern Europe. Perhaps the most significant impact would be the stretching
of NATO’s border with Russia. Bringing in Finland would more than double the length, adding
roughly 800 miles of frontier. And Finland and Sweden together would vastly expand the alliance’s
presence in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Circle.
Prior to its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russia heavily criticized U.S. and allied leaders
for NATO’s post–Cold War expansion into the former Soviet bloc and sought binding security
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guarantees from them, including a permanent ban on any new members. In recent weeks, President
Vladimir Putin said Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids posed “no direct threat to Russia,”
but he has warned the two countries about becoming bases for NATO forces or equipment. Swedish
leaders have stated that they don’t want to host NATO assets; Finland has yet to indicate its
preferences. Neighboring Norway, a NATO member, allows allies access for exercises but does not
permit permanent installations or nuclear weapons.
The proposed expansion is expected to enhance security for the Baltic states, who have been
NATO members since 2004 and whose defense planners have long worried that Russia could seize
Finnish and Swedish islands in the Baltic Sea, particularly Gotland, and use them as bases to launch
attacks on their territories. Some Western military analysts have said that NATO would almost
certainly need basing rights in Finland and Sweden to defend the Baltic states. Baltic leaders
strongly support the Nordic states’ accession and continue to press other alliance members to boost
NATO’s military deployments in their countries.
Bringing Finland and Sweden into the fold is also expected to strengthen NATO’s deterrence
in the Arctic, a region where Russia has invested heavily in commercial and military infrastructure.
Finnish and Swedish accession would bring all Arctic states, except Russia, into NATO, allowing the
alliance to pursue a more coherent strategy in the region.
(Source: CFR)

WAR IN UKRAINE AND NEW NATO MEMBERS

Atle Hetland
A few days ago, I had the opportunity to talk with two young men from Ukraine in
Islamabad, one a doctor and the other still a student. They said that they wanted to return to
Ukraine because the situation had improved in their hometown. Besides, the doctor’s wife wanted to
go home soon, showing their one-month-old baby to their relatives. So, they hoped they could travel
soon, not directly to Ukraine, but through a neighbouring country.
Our conversation turned to the terrible Russian War in Ukraine, and, as a pacifist, I suggested
that maybe it would have been better if Ukraine had not fought back militarily when they were
attacked by Russia, and now supplied by weapons from the West. That thought was not new to the
doctor; he said that when Russia in 2014 had annexed Crimea, the direct conflict was over in four
days; now, the war has lasted for three months and the devastation is unimaginable in the eastern
parts of the country, in Mariupol, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and other cities and towns. Many civilians have
died or been injured, physically or mentally; and thousands of soldiers, on both sides, have died,
and many are victims every hour and every day; as many as 14 million out of the country’s total
population of about 45 million have been displaced internally or have become refugees abroad.
Had Ukraine made it clear to Russia before the war started that they would not fight back
militarily, but instead engaged in talks and negotiations, the war might not have begun. We should
also be aware that there has been a war-like situation in the eastern parts of Ukraine for eight years,
between the Russian speaking people, supported by Russia, and other groups. Most people, in the
militarised mindset and world we live in, would disagree with me on not fighting back militarily
when attacked. However, if we consider the terrible loss of life that has taken place, and still take
place, a peaceful solution would have been better. Even if Ukraine would have had to give up land
to Russia, the borders could possibly be renegotiated after the end of the current regime and
presidency in Russia. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggested this yesterday to
strong objection from Ukraine President Zelensky. It is likely that Russia will win the current war in
the east and south of Ukraine, but lose sympathy worldwide. If Russia continues with the aim to
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‘finish Ukraine as an independent country’, local and international resistance will be huge and it
could lead to expansion and a new war with the West.
Furthermore, we must realise that the current war is not only a Russian War in Ukraine; it is a
war between Russia and the West, notably USA and NATO countries in Europe. After the war,
Ukraine’s facilities to make arms will be very limited for a long time as many of the country’s high
tech industrial plants were in the east, now destroyed. The weapons export was big, and Ukraine
has been listed as the eighth or tenth largest exporter in the world. Now that market is open for
Russia, the US, and others under their wings. This gives a hint of the superpowers’ roles in all wars.
My new friends from Ukraine said that the superpowers are behind all wars, and a country like
Ukraine may be pushed to play a role in the interest of the West.
The other top theme in international politics that I would like to discuss today, related to the
war in Ukraine, is the expansion of NATO as both Finland and Sweden have submitted their
applications. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said he is against their membership,
especially that of Sweden. He has claimed that Sweden and Scandinavian countries harbour
terrorists from groups who operate against Turkey, including such affiliated to Kurdish Labour
Party, PKK, and affiliated PYK, in Syria. It would be impossible for Sweden to expel Kurds or others
who have been granted asylum, and as for being lenient on terrorists, it is a fact that Sweden and
Turkey both have termed as terrorist some of the groups in question this time. Yet, Turkey may get
other advantages, for example related to weapons trade with the US and more. In the end, it is likely
that Turkey and the other 29 NATO members will approve the entry of the two new members,
which must be made anonymously. We should also know that once a member is in NATO, the
member cannot be expelled. All in all, I believe it is healthy to question any new NATO member,
and Sweden and Finland shouldn’t take for granted, a priori, that they become members. Turkey
does also have some real concerns, said the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Tuesday
this week in a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
In Sweden, the current debate over its entry into NATO may have positive sides, too. True, it
may delay the entry by some weeks, till the ‘horse trading’ is over, but since entering NATO is a
major change in Sweden security and foreign policy, it is good if it is not rushed more than it already
is. It is good that here will be some more time for the Swedish public to discuss the NATO
membership issues. We know that Sweden has stayed outside direct military conflicts for some 200
years, and that during the Cold War, Sweden felt independent and free to criticise both the Soviet
Union and USA, indeed the American War in Vietnam. Sweden’s highly respected PM Olof Palme
(assassinated in 1985) feared none when speaking about foreign policy issues, indeed war, peace,
development aid, and more. When Sweden now becomes a NATO member, part of an alliance
which to a major extent builds its deterrence on nuclear weapons, Sweden must reconsider how it
will work on many international issues, indeed issues related to reduction and abolition of nuclear
weapons. Sweden’s voice on international issues will be less bold and less independent in the future.
People all over the world often become nostalgic when talking about Olof Palme, and indeed the
eminent Swedish Secretary General of the United Nations from 1953-1961, Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-
1961). The Nordic countries may together be able to fill some of the space that Sweden leaves empty. I
hope the Nordic countries together manage to create a new, liberal block within NATO, probably in
close contact with Germany and others, certainly with the US at an arm’s length distance.
This is indeed an important opportunity that I hope the Nordic countries manage to shoulder.
The slightly slower entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO, caused by Turkey, may be very
positive. There is a need for a deeper, broader and more democratic debate in Sweden, and probably
also in Finland, before the NATO memberships are confirmed. It is also useful to listen to Turkey’s
concerns, and maybe questions from other countries will also come. After all, expansion of NATO
has only been on the concrete political agenda since the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24
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February 2022. The Nordic countries can play a progressive and peaceful role within NATO. In
addition, the whole NATO alliance must focus on modernising and renewing its thinking to meet
today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. NATO must contribute to a safer and more peaceful world, not
a more insecure and militarised world; that also includes dialogue and cooperation with Russia,
China, and other countries.
(Source: The Nation)

I2U2
The West Asian QUAD
Imran Malik
The contours of US’ grand strategic design for the world and in particular, the Asia Pacific, are
now emerging unmistakably, (The Strategy of Alliances, by this scribe, The Nation, 30 October 2021).
They reflect its compulsive obsession to reassert its unquestionable, unchallengeable hegemony in
the world. To that end, it intends to neutralise the Russian and Chinese challenges, individual as
well as combined.
It has already entrapped Russia in the Ukrainian quagmire and continues to feed the war
effort in a carefully crafted and measured manner that guarantees its longevity—much to Ukraine’s
utter destruction, its European allies’ increasing economic woes, Russia’s swelling losses and the rest
of the world’s horror. (Not unsurprisingly, no meaningful international efforts have been made to
mediate and initiate a credible peace process, yet!). It is also positioning itself strategically in the
Asia Pacific in particular, to effectively counter China’s phenomenal rise; its evolving ascendancy in
global affairs, its rampaging economy, and emerging sphere of influence and strategic reach.
The US has therefore crafted a very forward-looking strategy. It is creating the necessary
regional/subregional organisations, structures and infrastructure in the Asia Pacific around which
military alliances and coalitions can be built, operationalised and employed, at will. In the Indo-
Pacific it has the QUAD, in the South Pacific, AUKUS, in the GMER, I2U2 (Israel, India, US, UAE)
and in the SCAR, a Quadrilateral Dialogue, where it might engage Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan.
The I2U2, a vital part of this US strategy, is a natural progression of the Abraham Accords,
which laid down the paradigms for interstate relations between some Arab states and Israel. The
Abraham Accords is bound to eventually envelop the KSA too. Critically, the US has lured India into
this very compelling alliance as well. This will herald the transformation of a supposedly innocuous
grouping under the Abraham Accords into a tangible economic, diplomatic, technological and political
behemoth with the capacity to morph into a powerful military alliance as well.
Once this formidable bloc has been formalised and formulated, it will radiate its own power
potential and influence around the region. Will it be poised against Iran, China, both or all assumed
adversaries? This lack of a distinct and agreed-upon strategic direction will create a clash of interests
over the JCPOA, Iran, nuclear Pakistan, the BRI-CPEC, China et al.
Furthermore, the Arabs and Israelis will be compelled to co-exist as allies under US
leadership. Will they readily share the same collective/national interests, strategic aims, objectives
and desired end states or as enunciated by the US?
Do they have the same view of the region’s geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic
construct/imperatives for now and for the future? Time alone will tell how this alliance overcomes
these and other basic fault lines.
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A massive paradigm shift in the geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic dimensions of

the GMER is inevitable and will engender consequential realignments.
The US accrues many advantages from the I2U2. It reaffirms its global leadership, gets Israel
more international legitimacy and recognition, reiterates its sphere of influence, further solidifies its
strategic reach and brings the Arabs and the Israelis under one banner.
Israel gets to neutralise all threats from the Arabs and importantly acquires a tangible access
to the Persian Gulf; bringing Iran and others further East ominously within its strategic reach!
The US, wary of the BRI’s global reach, will tend to circumscribe it by denying it that critical
space essential for its natural progression further into the GMER, Africa, the Mediterranean and
beyond.
With the I2U2 in place, the US and its allies will dominate the Persian Gulf region, straddle the
Hormuz Straits and exercise controlling oversight on the most vital oil and trade SLOCs through the
region. Can it realistically browbeat Iran or contain/block the BRI east of the Persian Gulf? Even
militarily, if required?
India is fast emerging as an inevitable pivot for US’ Asia Pacific strategy. It is the world’s
second-most populous country, has a very vibrant economy and market, an evolving technological
base, a very large military and above all a great (geo)strategic location. The Indian peninsula juts out
phenomenally into the Indian Ocean and helps dominate all global East-West (read Chinese) trade.
Its proximity to the Malacca Straits, through the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, makes it
inevitable to US operational strategies, thereabouts. It is thus perfectly located to pursue US interests
in both the Indo-Pacific and the GMER; therefore, its accorded roles in the QUAD and I2U2.
Currently, India is flirting with both camps. It is a strategic partner of the US and has joined
the QUAD, I2U2, et al while it is simultaneously hobnobbing with the Sino-Russia Combine in the
BRICS, SCO, AIIB et al. It might be able to run with the hare and hunt with the hound for a while
but at some stage its famed strategic autonomy is bound to give in and force it to pick a side.
Neutrality might not be a very viable option or a virtue, in potentially trying, testing circumstances!
Iran will be directly threatened by the I2U2, regardless of the avatar it eventually acquires. It
will be used to pressurise it on the elusive JCPOA, Russia, China, BRI-CPEC and other diplomatic,
economic and trade issues. A militarised I2U2 will increase the threat levels for Iran manifold. Will
India (pro)actively threaten Iran’s vital national interests under the I2U2 ambit?
Pakistan needs to evaluate the evolving strategic environment minutely. It must note the
inherent contradictions in the I2U2 which will lead to a veritable clash of interests over itself and its
nuclear programme, the BRI-CPEC, Iran, China, India, Kashmir, Palestine et al.
It must never forget that the CPEC is its future economic lifeline. It will require sublime
diplomacy, visionary statesmanship and statecraft, courageous leadership, unyielding nationalism
and an unshakeable iron will to unambiguously, fearlessly pursue its vital national interests.
Pakistan will do well to follow a balanced foreign policy that maintains its great relationship
with the US-led West and allies without prejudice to its unbreakable, immortal bonds with China
and its prodigious BRI-CPEC!
(Source: The Nation)

REFLECTIONS ON G7 LEADERS’ SUMMIT 2022

Dr Omer Javed (PhD in Economics from the University of Barcelona)
G7 Leaders’ Summit 2022 was held recently in Germany, a little over a year later after the last
such meetings were held in the United Kingdom (UK). Given the severity of the pandemic back
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then, vaccine equity dominated the agenda along with related issues of climate change crisis and
rising supply chain bottlenecks.
There was focus on improving the COVAX initiative and with regard to provision of Covid
vaccines the communique for June 2021 meetings indicated: ‘Total G7 commitments since the start of
the pandemic provide for a total of over two billion vaccine doses, with the commitments since we last
met in February 2021, including here in Carbis Bay, providing for one billion doses over the next year.’
It is quite strange that while the commitment by G7 as clearly indicated in its communique
(see above) from meetings last year in the UK was to provide one billion doses in the next year, and
overall around 2 billion doses, it provided significantly lesser amounts as indicated by communique
for 2022 G7 meetings that ‘We have successfully exceeded last year’s commitment of sharing 870
million vaccine doses; in fact, we have made available a total of over 1.175 billion vaccine doses’, but
still made it a moment of achievement!
In fact, the recently released figures show quite a dismal performance of G7 countries with
regard to providing pledged number of vaccines with serious consequences for life as pointed out in
June 27 published article ‘G7 vaccines failures contribute to 600,000 preventable deaths’ whereby it
indicated: ‘Less than half (49 percent) of the 2.1 billion Covid vaccine donations promised to poorer
countries by G7 countries have been delivered, according to new figures published today by Oxfam
and the People’s Vaccine Alliance.
On the eve of this year’s G7 Summit, taking place in the German Alps, a new analysis shows
that had the missing donated doses been shared in 2021, it could have been enough to save almost
600,000 lives in low and middle income countries, the equivalent of one every minute.’
Moreover, the recent denial of World Trade Organization (WTO) to allow for waiver of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) on Covid vaccine, in its 12th Ministerial Conference, sent a big
blow to increasing the rate of vaccination globally, yet the G7 Summit 2022 did not comment on this
at all insofar as the communique is concerned.
The extent of this disappointment over the decision could be understood, for instance, from a
recently released article ‘Why a new international vaccine deal is being called a “devastating global
failure”’ which argued, among other things, that ‘…despite a thumbs-up from more than 100
countries, a two-year effort to accomplish just that withered in the early hours Friday in Geneva, as
the World Trade Organization released a new agreement that advocates say is a watered-down
version of the original plan. … “It’s a mix of extreme disappointment and a touch of anger, and then
some real embarrassment on behalf of the wealthier countries at the WTO, who really rammed this
one through,” said Ronald Labonté, a professor and distinguished research chair in globalization
and health equity at the University of Ottawa.’
To utter shock with regard to steps towards greater and much equitable vaccination outcomes,
on the contrary, the Summit lauded the performance of the Ministerial Conference, whereby the
communique on the Summit stated: ‘To this end, we applaud the outcome of the 12th WTO
Ministerial Conference in response to major global issues such as fisheries subsidies, the emerging
food security crisis and equitable access to vaccines and the commitment to work to towards
necessary reform of the WTO.’
The most pressing issue challenging the very existence of life on Earth as we know it, the
climate change crisis was dealt with perhaps least consideration, given the tight timeline with regard
to global warming target of net-zero carbon emissions.
With regard to climate finance, no detailed timelines were provided on the annual provision
of $100 billion to developing countries, whereby it was stated in the recently released communique:
‘We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective USD
100 billion climate finance mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through to 2025.’ Provision of
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pledged climate finance by developed countries should be fast-tracked in view of the fact that very
strong inflationary pressures globally — like higher costs of imported goods, overall higher
domestic prices due to increasing cost-push inflation, and steeper cost of capital — are significantly
taking away fiscal space from developing countries to make needed levels of climate-related
expenditures.
Moreover, in the wake of global energy crisis — a supply-chain crisis, accentuated by war in
Ukraine — G7 showed far less commitment than needed to reduce investments into fossil fuel
industry, instead of pushing harder to cover the energy gap with working towards better decisions
with regard to improving oil supplies, and with greater focus on renewable options.
A recent Financial Times (FT) published article ‘G7 accused of “backsliding” on climate goals
over energy security fears’ indicated in this regard: ‘G7 leaders have been accused of “backsliding”
on climate goals after they watered down pledges to halt fossil fuel investment because of fears over
energy security. …In its final communique from this week’s summit, the G7 said investment in
liquefied natural gas was a “necessary response to the current crisis”.
It added: “In these exceptional circumstances, publicly-supported investment in the gas sector
can be appropriate as a temporary response.” …Some countries, including Germany, have already
said they will restart mothballed coal power stations in an attempt to keep the lights and heating on
this winter. Climate groups criticised the G7 for failing to deliver new climate finance pledges, and
for its renewed focus on gas. “We cannot afford this kind of backsliding. There are lives on the line,”
said Laurie van der Burg, campaigner at Oil Change International, a US-based campaign group.’
Given the urgent need to move away from fossil fuel usage as pointed out by recent
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, not to mention a very difficult
heatwave and flood situation in South Asia, that shows quite clear signs of the workings of fast
unfolding climate change, the response of G7 is indeed worrisome, to say the least.
Moreover, just a few days before the G7 Summit, CEOs of major global companies in an open
letter had asked to increase the effort with regard to climate change, as pointed out by a June 17
published FT article ‘Global CEOs urge G7 leaders to step up climate action’ in the following words
‘In an open letter ahead of the three-day gathering that begins on Sunday in the Bavarian resort of
Schloss Elmau, more than a dozen heads of large corporations including Bank of America and Shell
pleaded for ambitious government climate policies “that offer the private sector clarity and
stability”.’
Having said that, the dismay over the allowances by G7 with regard to investing in fossil fuel
industry was indicated for instance in a June 28 press release titled ‘CSOs condemn G7 leaders for
caving in to gas industry and weakening pledge to end international public finance for fossil fuels’
whereby ‘experts at Oil Change International and partner organisations’ registered their
disappointment.
In the press release it was indicated, for instance: ‘Today, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and
other G7 leaders watered down a commitment made in May by their energy, climate and
environment ministers to end international public finance for fossil fuels by the end of this year,
drawing a swift rebuke from climate and development campaigners. … Today’s G7 leaders’
statement adds new loopholes to the commitment and says that “with a view to accelerating the
phase out of our dependency on Russian energy … investment in [LNG] is necessary” and that
“publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response”.’
Given high inflation, which is adding to likelihood of stagflationary and recessionary
headwinds on one hand, and the rising cost of capital and debt serving, in the wake of global supply
shock and which has been accentuated by the war in Ukraine by Russia on the other, it was hoped
that a meaningful, concrete plan of action would be brought forward by the G7 countries. So, in
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addition to a disappointing attitude on vaccine availability and climate change, there was also a very
lukewarm response with regard to much-needed debt moratorium/relief for developing countries.
Instead, in addition to not inviting China – a major global economic and political power, and a
significant lender to many developing countries, not to mention its significant stakes/role in the
fight against climate change and Covid vaccine provision to the G7 summit in Germany, as was the
case in the 2021 G7 summit in UK, some very general-natured and rather insignificant focus was
given by G7 as pointed out, for instance, by the communique as: ‘We underscore our commitment to
successfully implementing the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt
Service Suspension Initiative. We encourage further efforts to ensure an accelerated implementation
of the G20 Common Framework and increased predictability.
We call on all G20 partners to join us in this regard. We urge all relevant creditors, including
non-Paris Club countries such as China, with large outstanding claims on low-income countries
facing debt sustainability challenges, and private creditors in line with the comparability of
treatment principle and mutual accountability to contribute constructively to the necessary debt
treatments as requested.’
Moreover, there was no mention of the Bill pending in the US Congress with regard to the
release of enhanced SDR allocation. In addition, there was no concrete, detailed action plan indicated
with regard to how SDR relocation (from last August) from rich, advanced countries to developing
countries could be fast-tracked, and how the size of the envelope with regard to the overall financing
amounts needed by developing countries in the wake of the pandemic could be fattened.
Ironically, however, only a general-natured focus, and insignificant amounts overall in terms
of financing – when according to UNCTAD $2-$3 trillion by December (and now it is six months into
the next year) were needed by developing countries in financing in the wake of the pandemic —
could be seen mentioned in the communique, as could be seen as follows: ‘With the support of our
partners we have made significant progress towards and are approaching the targets agreed last
year by the G7 and G20 to complement the 2021 general SDR allocation for countries most in need,
especially in Africa, including through voluntarily channelling SDRs or budget loans, to reach a total
global ambition of USD 100 billion. … We call on MDBs to urgently assess how to step up their
policy and financial support, and maximise the pace of their disbursement, including of USD 170
billion committed by the World Bank Group to respond to the current crisis…’
(Source: Business Recorder)

THE SECOND-COMING OF THE BRICS

Zongyuan Zoe Liu (Fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations)
When the inaugural BRIC summit took place in 2009, it was a moment of relative triumph for
its members. While the West dealt with the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, BRIC
countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — enjoyed temporary shelter from the turmoil. When
South Africa joined the bloc in 2010, the BRICS agenda expanded beyond economic cooperation and
now includes a wide array of global governance issues, including security.
The BRICS will likely hold their 14th summit in June 2022 under China’s chairpersonship. It is
expected to be the third virtual BRICS summit as China sticks with its zero-COVID policy.
The world is dramatically different to the one in which BRICS leaders last met in Brasilia in
2019. Neither China nor Russia, the two key pillars of the bloc, are growing as fast as they were then.
Compared to 13 years ago, China–India territorial disputes have escalated via the Ladakh skirmishes
of 2020. The far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s anti-China rhetoric has provoked the
Chinese government to go on a diplomatic offensive. The COVID-19 pandemic, subsequent
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economic shock and the global supply chain reconfiguration have exacerbated the group’s
divergent interests.
But the BRICS are not necessarily losing momentum as a political bloc. If anything, this
upcoming summit will be a testament to BRICS solidarity. If held, it will be convened at a time when
a key member is waging war against another sovereign state and is under severe punitive sanctions
imposed by the West. In early March 2022, India, China and South Africa all abstained from a UN
General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Brazil voted to condemn
Russia, but it criticised the ‘indiscriminate’ sanctions imposed by the West.
Like it or not, the BRICS as a global governance architecture representing the Global South is
here to stay with an expanded policy agenda. The BRICS may even try to entrench their unique role
by developing an alternative global financial system that is not based on the US dollar.
Russia has been preparing to deal with the consequences of Western sanctions since it
annexed Crimea in 2014. It has launched two critical pieces of financial infrastructure to increase its
financial autonomy and maintain some access to global liquidity under sanctions. One is an
independent national payment system featuring MIR cards as an alternative to Visa and Mastercard.
The other is a proprietary financial messaging system called the ‘System for Transfer of Financial
Messages’ (SPFS) — the Russian analogue to SWIFT.
Within the BRICS bloc, Russia has already developed financial architecture to achieve de-
dollarisation in collaboration with China and India. After Russia was cut off from the dollar-based
global financial system and half its foreign exchange reserves were frozen by the West, Russia called
on its BRICS partners to extend the use of national currencies and integrate BRICS payment systems
in April 2022.
An integrated BRICS alternative financial system is not completely unfathomable. It could be
achieved through the connection and extension of the proprietary national payment systems
developed by China and Russia. The BRICS could alternatively advance their proposed BRICS Pay
system — part of their attempt to establish a common payment system between members.
In 2020, the Russian BRICS Presidency proposed the idea of an expanded commercial ‘BRICS
Pay’ system for ‘BRICS+’, a broader grouping of developing countries proposed by China on the
sidelines of the BRICS Xiamen Summit in 2017. The concept could incorporate other regional
institutions — the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union, South
African Customs Union, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and Mercosur — into a
wider BRICS dialogue.
The synergies between the BRICS and the SCO are particularly salient. Three of the five BRICS
members are SCO members and the SCO has been looking into economic and financial cooperation
since 2006. Members of the SCO have also considered establishing an SCO Development Bank and
an SCO Development Fund mirroring the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB).
Established in 2014, the NDB actively promotes the use of local currency in development
finance. In 2021, the NDB welcomed its first four non-BRICS members — Bangladesh, Egypt, the
UAE and Uruguay. Through the expansion of membership and the provision of local currency
lending to members, the NDB is en route to becoming the premier multilateral development finance
institution led by the Global South, for the Global South.
BRICS gatherings were initially held alongside G20 meetings, but they have set their own pace
and pursued a growing agenda over the past 13 years. With US President Joe Biden declaring that
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Russia should be removed from the G20, the G20 may never regain its status as the world’s
preeminent intergovernmental forum. BRICS members may have reiterated their support for the
G20’s global economic leadership in their recent Joint Statement — but the BRICS grouping has
already grown out of the shadow of the G20.
There remain concerns over the credibility of India as a committed BRICS member given its
membership of the Quad and participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
(IPEF). But India’s foreign policy pivot from non-alignment to multi-alignment suggests that India
will not abandon the BRICS.
The good thing about the BRICS being a heterogeneous group is that its members have
learned how to seek common ground despite having divergent interests. The BRICS have never had
any internal coherence, so there is little worry of losing it.
(Source: East Asia Forum)
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Religion
ISLAM AND THE NATURE
Muhammad Ahmad (Former In charge, Higher Secondary Institution for Inclusive Education, Srinagar)
The environment is the most precious gift from Almighty to humans on this planet and there
is an inseparable relation between the environment and our soul. The Holy Qur’an offers a
completely integrated view of the universe, where the human soul and the environment, mind and
matter are all part of one living. Therefore, it exhorts man to live a balanced, moderate and an eco-
friendly life without causing any harm to nature.
Prophet Muhammad (SAW) left a noble example of being eco-friendly and going green in his
life. He spent his entire life in an eco-friendly effort, helping humankind, caring for other creatures
of Almighty, preserving the earth, planting trees and protecting the environment. Right from his
young age, he was inclined towards preservation of trees. When he was just 12, he travelled to Syria
with his uncle and took shelter under a tree. Today, after more than 14 hundred years, the same tree
is still alive in the northern deserts of Jordan. This tree, which sheltered the Prophet (SAW), is the
only living tree in hundreds of square miles of emptiness. It speaks eloquently of the Prophet’s
utmost care for the preservation of trees.
The Prophet (SAW) was keen on planting trees and exhorted his Companions, too, to do so.
He said, “Whoever plants a tree and diligently looks after it until it matures and bears fruit is
rewarded” (Source: Musnad). This saying is sufficient to apprise us of the eco-friendly nature of
Islam. Planting a tree is a sadaqah jariyah (continued charity) in Islam, for the poor and the rich
alike. Whenever a human being or even an animal shelters under the shade of a tree or relishes a
fruit that it produces, the planter will earn rewards, even after his or her death. Islam teaches its
followers to take care of the earth. Muslims believe that humans should act as guardians, or khalifah
of the planet, and that they will be held accountable by the Almighty for their actions. This concept
of stewardship is a powerful one, and was used in the Islamic Declaration on Climate Change to
propel change in environmental policy in Muslim countries.
One day Prophet (SAW) passed by Sa`d ibn Abi Waqas (R.A) while he was performing wudu’.
The Prophet (SAW) asked Sa`d: “What is this wastage?” Sa`d replied: “Is there wastage in wudu
also?” The Prophet (pbuh) said, “Yes, even if you are at a flowing river.”(Ibn Majah). Likening a
believer with a growing tree, the Prophet (SAW) said: “The example of a believer is that of a fresh
tender plant; from whatever direction the wind comes, it bends it, but when the wind quietens
down, the plant becomes straight again…” (Bukhari). Considering tree-planting a renewable source
of reward, the Prophet (SAW) said: “If a Muslim plants a tree or sows seeds, and then a bird, or a
person or an animal eats from it, it is regarded as a charitable gift (sadaqah) for him.” (Bukhari).
Allah (SWT) says in the Quran in Surat Al-Baqarah,“Thus, We have made you a justly
balanced community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness
over you”. Allah (SWT) sys in the Quran, Allah created the earth and all that is in it, including
animals and its resources – it is people's heritage. “The world is sweet and green, and verily Allah is
going to install you as vicegerents in it in order to see how you act”-Sahih Muslim.
Reminding how important it is to keep the environment sanitary to maintain the community,
the Prophet (SAW) gave paramount importance to street clean-ups, when he said: “Removing
harmful things from the road is an act of charity (sadaqah).” The Quran says in Surat Al A’raf, verse
85 "And do no mischief on the earth after it has been set in order: that will be best for you, if ye have
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Faith” and "Eat and drink: But waste not by excess, for Allah loveth not the wasters". In Surat Al
Qasas “And do good as Allah has been good to you. And do not seek to cause corruption in the
earth. Allah does not love the corrupters”. Again in Surat Al-A’raf “Children of Adam, dress well
whenever you are at worship, and eat and drink (as we have permitted) but do not be extravagant:
Allah does not like extravagant people.” In Muslim, it is said “The world is beautiful and verdant,
and verily God, be He exalted, has made you His stewards in it, and He sees how you acquit
yourselves.” (In Bukhari it is said
Prophet Muhammed (SAW) established a hima (protected area) to the south of Madina and
forbade hunting within a four mile radius and destruction of trees or plants within a twelve mile
radius. The creation of inviolable zones shows the importance placed by Prophet Muhammad
(SAW) on use of natural resources and protection of wildlife and agricultural land. Besides, the
Prophet (SAW), his Companions also practically taught us how to protect the rights of animals. They
took special care of crippled animals, rescued strays and guarded birds’ nests. One of the
Companions was named ‘Abu Huraira’ (‘father of kittens’) because he was very fond of kittens. The
Prophet accorded great value to animals.
The Companions said, “O Allah’s Messenger! Is there a reward for us in serving the animals?”
He replied: “There is a reward for serving any living being.” (Bukhari)
“If a Muslim plants a tree or sows seeds, and then a bird, or a person or an animal eats from it,
it is regarded as a charitable gift (sadaqah) for him.” – Imam Bukhari.
“And do no mischief on the earth after it has been set in order: that will be best for you, if ye
have Faith” (The Holy Quran, Surat Al A'raf, verse 85)
(Source: Rising Kashmir)

INTRODUCTION TO HAJJ
AElfwine Mischler
The fifth Pillar of Islam is the pilgrimage to Makkah and its surroundings known as Hajj. All
Muslims are obligated to make Hajj once in their lifetimes if they can afford it and are otherwise able
to do so. The Hajj is made from the eighth to the twelfth of the Islamic month of Dhul-Hijjah.
Muslims travel from all over the world to perform Hajj. The rituals are themselves simple, but the
amount of walking necessary, the hot climate, and the crowds make the Hajj a rigorous exercise in
faith. Still, between 2 and 3 million people perform Hajj every year, and millions more yearn to do
so. To perform the Hajj, pilgrims enter a state of consecration known as ihram. In this state they may
not clip their nails, cut or pluck any hair, or have any sort of sexual contact. Male pilgrims wear
special clothes consisting of two seamless strips of cloth, one covering the back and shoulders, the
other covering from the waist to the knees. Female pilgrims can wear ordinary clothing that covers
everything but the face and hands. The rituals of Hajj date back to the time of Prophet Ibrahim
(Abraham) and commemorate his willingness to sacrifice his only son, Ismail (Ishmael). During the
days of Hajj, the pilgrims attempt to forget all but their most basic worldly needs and to focus their
attention and devotion on Allah Alone. Upon arriving in Makkah, the pilgrims first circumambulate
the Kabah seven times in a ritual known as Tawaf. This ritual reminds the pilgrims that Allah (God)
should be the focus and center of their lives. The Symbolism and Related Rites of the Kabah The next
ritual is Sai, which is walking back and forth seven times between the hillocks named Safa and
Marwah. This commemorates the search for water made by Hajar (Hagar) when Prophet Ibrahim
(peace be upon him) left her and her infant son Ismail (peace be upon him) in the desert. On Dhul-
Hijjah 8, pilgrims head to Mina, where they spend the day supplicating Allah. Early the next
morning they go to Arafah (or Arafat). They spend the day supplicating Allah and begging for His
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forgiveness. Many stand on the Mount of Mercy to supplicate, though this is not necessary. When
the sun sets on the Day of Arafah, the pilgrims’ sins are forgiven. After sunset the pilgrims move on
to Muzdalifah, where they spend the night and collect pebbles to be used in the next ritual. The next
morning, Dhul-Hijjah 10, is the Day of Sacrifice. Most pilgrims slaughter a sheep or goat, and the
meat is distributed to the poor. (Muslims who are not on Hajj also slaughter that day, which is
known as Eid Al-Adha.) The ritual commemorates Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ismail
(peace be upon them both) and Allah’s provision of a ram as a substitute sacrifice. But before
slaughtering, the pilgrims go to throw pebbles at the stone pillars known as Al-Jamarat. This ritual
commemorates Ibrahim’s stoning of Satan when the latter tried to tempt him to disobey Allah. After
this, the pilgrims cut or shave their hair (women cut off only a small amount) and return to Makkah
to repeat Tawaf and Sai. They sleep at Mina and repeat the stoning of the pillars on the next two
days. A final Tawaf before leaving Makkah completes the Hajj. Many pilgrims also go to Madinah
before or after Hajj in order to pray in the Prophet’s Mosque and visit his grave, although this visit
to Madinah is not necessary. The above is only a summary. There is some variation in the
performance of Hajj, depending on whether the individual pilgrim chooses to also performUmrah
(often known as the lesser pilgrimage) beforehand and whether this will be while in one prolonged
state of ihram or two separate ones for `Umrah and Hajj.
(Source: Islamonline)

ISLAM – THE RELIGION OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND HONOR

Dr. Spahic Omer (An award-winning author, and an Associate Professor at the International Islamic
University Malaysia)
Islam is a religion that aims to ascertain, uplift and sustain the honor and dignity of man. In
Islam, man is God’s vicegerent on earth. Every terrestrial component has been created for the
purpose of accommodating and facilitating the fulfillment of man’s noble mission of vicegerency.
Man resides in the center of Islam’s universe. As such, the creation of man stood for the last segment
in a long formative process of creation during which everything that there is came into existence. It
signified the pinnacle of God’s act of universe creation that went through six stages. Moreover, God
created Adam, the first man and father of humanity, with His own Hands and in His own Image, as
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) revealed. (Sahih Muslim) This means that “Adam has been bestowed
with life, knowledge, power of hearing, seeing, understanding, but the features of Adam are
different fromthose of Allah, only the names are the same, e.g., Allah has life and knowledge and
power of understanding, and Adam also has them, but there is no comparison between the Creator
and the created thing. As Allah says in the Qur’an: ‘There is nothing like Him, and He is the All-
Hearer, the All-Seer’ (al-Shura, 11).”
Hence, when God created Adam, angels, the most sublime and infallible creatures, were
summoned to witness the final divine act of creation.
Upon its completion, they were asked to prostrate themselves before Adam, that is, to
prostrate to God, for there is no prostration except to God alone, and to acknowledge thereby the
merit and wisdom of God’s handiwork, and to accord respect to Adam and his existential capacities
as the crown of divine invention. The Qur’an describes the dramatic occurrence as follows: “And
(mention, O Muhammad), when your Lord said to the angels: ‘Indeed, I will make upon the earth a
successive authority (khalifah, vicegerent).’ They said: ‘Will You place upon it one who causes
corruption therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?’ Allah said:
‘Indeed, I know that which you do not know.’ And He taught Adam the names - all of them. Then
He showed them to the angels and said: ‘Inform Me of the names of these, if you are truthful.’ They
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said: ‘Exalted are You; we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it is You
who is the Knowing, the Wise.’ He said: ‘O Adam, inform them of their names.’ And when he had
informed them of their names, He said: ‘Did I not tell you that I know the unseen (aspects) of the
heavens and the earth? And I know what you reveal and what you have concealed.’ And (mention)
when We said to the angels: ‘Prostrate before Adam’; so they prostrated, except for Iblis. He refused
and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers.” (Al-Baqarah, 30-34).
Islam exists because of man; it is meant for him. Man, in turn, exists because, and for, Islam, to
be shown how to live in complete service to his Creator and Master, and to be shown the way to
self-assertion and deliverance in both worlds. Thus, the most important knowledge that Islam
grants man is the knowledge about himself, his Lord and his relationship with Him, and about the
life phenomenon and his place as well as role in it. Indeed, this is the greatest blessing that man
enjoys in Islam. It is a demonstration of man’s honorable and dignified position that he occupies in
the hierarchy of Islamic beliefs, values and principles. It is due to this that the Qur’an often
articulates such testimonials as, for example, “We have indeed created man in the best of moulds.”
(Al-Tin, 4); “Verily We have honored the Children of Adam…” (Al-Isra’, 70); “Do you not see that
Allah has made subject to you whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth and amply
bestowed upon you His favors, (both) apparent and unapparent?” (Luqman, 20); “Read and your
Lord is Most Honorable, Who taught (to write) with the pen, taught man that which he knew not.”
(Al-‘Alaq, 3- 5).
It goes without saying that the ultimate objective of the Islamic message is the preservation of
a believer and his honor and dignity.
This translates into the preservation of his religion, life, lineage, intellect and property. There
is nothing on earth that is more inviolable than a believer, his blood, property and honor. There is
nothing that supersedes him in importance. Everything on earth exists in order to make possible and
then sustain a believer’s lofty position. All things and events play second fiddle to his status. Even
holy messengers were sent and revelations revealed for the purpose. Based on the divine Will and
Letter, life systems, ordinances and practices are concocted for this same end as well. Accordingly,
cultures and civilizations are judged only on the basis of how genuinely they were human honor
and dignity- oriented and how much they succeeded in making such enterprise a reality. It was due
to this that the Prophet (pbuh) is reported to have communicated to the Ka’bah while
circumambulating (tawaf) it: “How pure you are! And how pure is your fragrance! How great you
are! And how great is your sanctity! By Him in whose hands lies the soul of Muhammad, the
sanctity of a believer is greater with Allah than even your sanctity (i.e., the Ka’bah). That is (the
sanctity) of his property, his blood and that we think nothing of him but good.” (Sunan Ibn Majah)
A companion of the Prophet (pbuh), ‘Abdullah b. ‘Umar (d. 74 AH/ 693 CE), once when he
looked at the Ka’bah, reproduced the gist of those Prophet’s words and said to the Ka’bah: “How
great you are! And how great is your sanctity! But the sanctity of a believer is greater with Allah
than even your sanctity (i.e., the Ka’bah).” (Sunan al-Tirmidhi) The Prophet (pbuh) also said during
his farewell pilgrimage in a sermon which denotes a blueprint for every Muslim civilizational
awakening:
“Verily, your blood, property and honor are sacred to one another (i.e., Muslims) like the
sanctity of this day of yours (i.e., the day of Nahr or slaughtering of the animals of sacrifice), in this
month of yours (the holy month of Dhul-Hijjah) and in this city of yours (the holy city of Makkah).”
(Sahih al-Bukhari)
It is thus natural that at a collective level, believers are seen as brothers and sisters to each
other. (Al-Hujurat, 10). They constitute one Ummah or community. The best among them are only
those who are most God-conscious, or most righteous. (Al-Hujurat, 13). The best among them,
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furthermore, are those who are most beneficial to the Ummah as well as to the whole of mankind. In
their unity, mutual compassion and cooperation, the similitude of believers is like a wall whose
bricks enforce and rely on each other. They are like a solid cemented structure held together in
harmony and strength, each part contributing strength in its own way, and the whole held together
not like a mass, but like a living organism. Believers are further related to each other in such a way
that if one of them (a part of an organic and formidable formation called the Ummah or the
community) is troubled by a problem of any kind, the rest of the body parts will remain disturbed
and restless until the matter became cured. As a result, some of the most outrageous sins in Islam are
those which are related to violating and damaging the honor and dignity of a believer, as well as
those which are related to the betraying, dividing, weakening and undermining the Ummah or the
community. The Qur’an proclaims:
“Indeed, those who like that immorality or scandal should be spread (or publicized) among
those who have believed will have a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter.” (Al-Nur, 19)
“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember
the favor of Allah upon you—when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you
became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you
from it. Thus does Allah make clear to you His verses that you may be guided.” (Alu ‘Imran, 103).
At any rate, Islam is as much a personal experience and struggle as it is a collective endeavor
and mission. Islam cannot be totally and thoroughly accomplished individually, or in small groups.
Islam is a religion of, and thus aims at, society, life in its totality, and civilization.
Islam is a religion of collectively inhabiting the earth and making together the world a better
place. Islam is a religion of pragmatismand human nature. It is a simple and natural thing. It
denounces everything that is unnatural, injurious and inhuman. It denounces everything that stands
on the way of people’s individual spiritual and intellectual advancements, and collective
civilizational affirmation and rise. Simply put, Islam denounces anything that puts man’s honor and
inviolability, as well as his communal predilection and responsiveness, at stake.
It was because of this underlining character of Islam, surely, that after Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) had received in the cave of Hira his first revelation, and with it his divine appointment as the
final messenger of God to people, where heretofore he used to spend long periods contemplating
and reflecting on the spiritual depression and failures of the world around him, he subsequently
never returned to the cave. He did not return because Islam is not a religion of isolation and
separation to be practiced by certain ascetic individuals or groups away from the masses and the
pressing realities of life. It must be pointed out that the whole process of the Islamic transformation
project started right in the cave of Hira, but not with the words of, for example, “pray” or “fast” or
“perform pilgrimage”, etc., but rather with the words “Read (iqra’) in the name of your Lord Who
created. He created man from a clot. Read and your Lord is most Honorable, Who taught (to write)
with the pen, taught man that which he knew not.” (Al-‘Alaq, 1-5). The Prophet (pbuh) was asked –
as is anyone who subscribes to Islam and Muhammad’s mission – to read, study, try to solve and
make known the problems and maladies of his people, as well as of the world and life in general.
This is strongly suggested by the notions of God as the Creator and Guardian, and man as the
guided and taught mortal completely dependent on God, which are enfolded in the above
mentioned verses. Accordingly, the Prophet (pbuh) once said that a Muslim who socializes with
people and puts up with their provocations and annoyances, is better than a Muslim who does not
socialize with people – i.e., lives alone—and does not put up with their unpleasant deeds. (Sunan al-
Tirmidhi)
(Source: About Islam)
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Reports
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
Executive Summary
The world economy continues to suffer from a series of destabilizing shocks. After more than
two years of pandemic, the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine and its global effects on
commodity markets, supply chains, inflation, and financial conditions have steepened the
slowdown in global growth. In particular, the war in Ukraine is leading to soaring prices and
volatility in energy markets, with improvements in activity in energy exporters more than offset by
headwinds in most other economies. The invasion of Ukraine has also led to a significant increase in
agricultural commodity prices, which is exacerbating food insecurity and extreme poverty in many
emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Numerous risks could further derail what is
now a precarious recovery. Among them is, in particular, the possibility of stubbornly high global
inflation accompanied by tepid growth, reminiscent of the stagflation of the 1970s. This could
eventually result in a sharp tightening of monetary policy in advanced economies to rein in
inflation, lead to surging borrowing costs, and possibly culminate in financial stress in some EMDEs.
A forceful and wideranging policy response is required by EMDE authorities and the global
community to boost growth, bolster macroeconomic frameworks, reduce financial vulnerabilities,
provide support to vulnerable population groups, and attenuate the long-term impacts of the global
shocks of recent years.
Global outlook: Following more than two years of pandemic, spillovers from the Russian
Federation’s invasion of Ukraine are set to sharply hasten the deceleration of global economic
activity, which is now expected to slow to 2.9 percent in 2022. The war in Ukraine is leading to high
commodity prices, adding to supply disruptions, increasing food insecurity and poverty,
exacerbating inflation, contributing to tighter financial conditions, magnifying financial
vulnerability, and heightening policy uncertainty.
Growth in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) this year has been
downgraded to 3.4 percent, as negative spillovers from the invasion of Ukraine more than offset any
near-term boost to some commodity exporters from higher energy prices. Despite the negative shock
to global activity in 2022, there is essentially no rebound projected next year: global growth is
forecast to edge up only slightly to a still-subdued 3 percent in 2023, as many headwinds—in
particular, high commodity prices and continued monetary tightening—are expected to persist.
Moreover, the outlook is subject to various downside risks, including intensifying geopolitical
tensions, growing stagflationary headwinds, rising financial instability, continuing supply strains,
and worsening food insecurity.
These risks underscore the importance of a forceful policy response. The global community
needs to ramp up efforts to mitigate human-itarian crises caused by the war in Ukraine and conflict
elsewhere and alleviate food insecurity, as well as expand vaccine access to ensure a durable end of
the pandemic. Meanwhile, EMDE policy makers need to refrain from implementing export
restrictions or price controls, which could end up magnifying the increase in commodity prices.
With rising inflation, tightening financial con-ditions, and elevated debt levels sharply limiting
policy space, spending can be reprioritized toward targeted relief for vulnerable households. Over
the long run, policies will be required to reverse the damage inflicted by the dual shocks of the
pandemic and the war on growth prospects, including preventing fragmentation in trade networks,
improving education, and raising labor force participation.
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Regional prospects: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is affecting EMDE regions to different

degrees via impacts on global trade and output, commodity prices, inflation, and interest rates. The
adverse spillovers from the war will be most severe for Europe and Central Asia, where output is
forecast to sharply contract this year. Output growth is projected to slow this year in all other
regions except the Middle East and North Africa, where the benefits of higher energy prices for
energy exporters are expected to outweigh those prices’ negative impacts for other economies in the
region. Risks for all EMDE regions are tilted to the downside and include intensifying geo-political
tensions, rising inflation and food shortages, financial stress and rising borrowing costs, renewed
outbreaks of COVID-19, and disruptions from disasters.
This edition of Global Economic Prospects also includes short analytical pieces on the risk of
global stagflation and the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the global economy through
global energy markets.
Global stagflation. Global inflation has risen sharply from its lows in mid-2020, on
rebounding global demand, supply bottlenecks, and soaring food and energy prices, especially since
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Markets expect inflation to peak in mid-2022 and then decline, but to
remain elevated even after these shocks subside and monetary policies are tightened further. Global
growth has been moving in the opposite direction: it has declined sharply since the beginning of the
year and, for the remainder of this decade, is expected to remain below the average of the 2010s. In
light of these developments, the risk of stagflation—a combination of high inflation and sluggish
growth—has risen. The recovery from the stagflation of the 1970s required steep increases in interest
rates by major advanced-economy central banks to quell inflation, which triggered a global recession
and a string of financial crises in EMDEs. If current stagflationary pressures intensify, EMDEs would
likely face severe chal-lenges again because of their less well-anchored inflation expectations,
elevated financial vulnera-bilities, and weakening growth fundamentals.
This makes it urgent for EMDEs to shore up their fiscal and external buffers, strengthen their
monetary policy frameworks, and implement reforms to reinvigorate growth.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Implications for energy markets and activity. Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine has disrupted global energy markets and damaged the global economy. Compared with
what took place in the 1970s, the shock has led to a surge in prices across a broader set of energy-
related commodities. In energy-importing economies, higher prices will reduce real dis-posable
incomes, raise production costs, tighten financial conditions, and constrain policy space.
Some energy exporters may benefit from improved terms of trade and higher commodities
production. However, on net, model-based estimates suggest that the war-driven surge in energy
prices could reduce global output by 0.8 percent after two years. The experience of previous oil price
shocks has shown that these shocks can provide an important catalyst for policies to encourage
demand reduction, substitution to other fuels, and development of new sources of energy supply.
For South Asia Region
Recent developments: The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine has weighed on growth in
the South Asia region (SAR) after a solid recovery in the second half of last year and amplified pre-
existing vulnerabilities. While the direct impacts from trade and financial exposure to Russia and
Ukraine are minimal, spillovers from rising commodity prices, higher borrowing costs, and weaker
external demand are significant. In India, the recovery is facing some headwinds from accelerating
inflation. Rising inflationary pressures led to an unscheduled policy interest rate hike in May.
In the rest of the region, activity has been mixed, with stronger-than-expected rebounds from
the pandemic helping to boost growth through early 2022 in Bangladesh and Pakistan. In Sri Lanka
and Afghanistan, however, conditions are dire. The government of Sri Lanka announced a cessation
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of external debt repayments, and the country faces dual balance of payments and sovereign debt
crises. With international reserves down to one-fourth of their pre-pandemic levels, the government
abandoned its exchange rate peg in early March, leading to a rapid depreciation of the rupee. Sri
Lanka’s unsustainable external debt will require debt restructuring to start the process of fiscal
rehabilitation. Despite increased international humanitarian support in Afghanistan, the economy
has collapsed, and most households do not have sufficient incomes to meet basic needs.
Rising food and energy prices have led to a rapid increase in consumer inflation in the region.
Average annual consumer inflation and one-year-ahead inflation expectations are now at their
highest level in almost a decade.
Outlook: Growth in South Asia is forecast to slow to 6.8 and 5.8 percent in 2022 and 2023,
respectively following a robust 7.6 percent rebound in 2021. This is 0.8 percentage point slower for
2022 than was projected at the start of the year and similar to average growth in the decade prior to
the pandemic. The revisions to growth reflect the expected erosion of purchasing power of
consumers, elevated uncertainty, and weaker external demand.
In India, growth is forecast to edge down to 7.5 percent in fiscal year 2022/23, with headwinds
from rising inflation, supply chain disruptions, and geopolitical tensions offsetting buoyancy in the
recovery of services consumption from the pandemic. Growth will also be supported by both private
and public fixed investment, buoyed by government incentives and reforms to improve the business
climate. In Pakistan, growth is expected to moderate from 5.7 percent in FY2020/21 to 4.0 percent in
2022/23 as foreign demand slows significantly and policy support is withdrawn to contain external
and fiscal imbalances.1 In Bangladesh, growth is forecast to ease to 6.4 percent in FY2021/22, as
pent-up demand subsides, before picking up to 6.7 percent in 2022/23 as investment recovers and
remittance inflows accelerate. The outlook for Sri Lanka is highly uncertain and subject to significant
downside risks.
Risks: Risks to the regional growth outlook remain to the downside and have been magnified
by geopolitical developments. Additional increases in commodity prices, particularly wheat, could
put further upward pressure on food prices eroding real incomes and reducing consumption. The
region consumes about one-fifth of its calories from wheat products, houses more than one-third of
the global poor, and food accounts for a greater share of its consumption basket compared to other
emerging and developing economies. Rising energy prices, in a region that is highly dependent on
energy imports and in some economies where significant shares of government budgets go to
subsidies, could further increase inflation, worsen current account positions, and divert resources
away from productivity-enhancing investment and social protection.
(Source: World Bank)

THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE

Executive Summary of OHCHR Report
This report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) covers
violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law that have
occurred in the course of the ongoing armed attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. It
covers the period from 24 February 2022 until 15 May 2022 and is based on the work of the United
Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.1 2. In the morning of 24 February, the
Russian Federation launched an armed attack against Ukraine.2 The armed attack and associated
hostilities have led to a grave deterioration in the human rights situation across the country.
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During the reporting period, OHCHR recorded a total of 8,368 civilian casualties, with 3,924
persons killed and 4,444 persons injured. At least 95 girls, 98 boys, 985 women, 1,519 men and 1,227
persons whose sex is still unknown were killed from 24 February to 15 May, and at least 104 girls,
126 boys, 604 women, 907 men and 2,703 persons whose sex is still unknown were injured.
However, actual casualty numbers are much higher, since these figures only include the cases that
OHCHR has been able to fully verify.
As a result of hostilities, civilian infrastructure and housing have been severely impacted.
OHCHR recorded damage or destruction to 182 medical facilities and 230 educational facilities as a
result of attacks. The attacks also endangered the lives of civilians and infringed on the enjoyment of
other human rights, including the rights to health, work, education and housing.
Hostilities have also had a severe negative impact on people and groups in situations of
vulnerability, including persons with disabilities and older persons. OHCHR has found that many
of them were not able to access bomb shelters or quickly evacuate and had to rely on the assistance
of their family members and others, when such assistance was even available.
The intensive and wide-scale hostilities have caused mass displacement of the civilian
population, with grave implications for the enjoyment of their human rights, including economic
and social rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over
6.2 million persons had fled the country by 15 May, and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) indicated that over 8 million were internally displaced.3 OHCHR also has concerns
that the volatile security situation and other factors are restricting freedom of movement to and from
regions occupied by Russian armed forces or affiliated armed groups, reducing civilians’ access to
medical assistance, social protection and other basic services in Government-controlled territory.
OHCHR has received reports that people attempting to leave Kherson, for example, have been
denied permission to exit the region at checkpoints.
OHCHR monitored the processes of evacuating civilians from Mariupol towards
Government-controlled territory, or towards territory controlled by Russian armed forces and
affiliated armed groups and further towards the Russian Federation. OHCHR is concerned about the
manner in which the ‘filtration’ process, which evacuees are obliged to go through when passing
Russian armed forces’ checkpoints, is carried out.8. The armed conflict has led to a wide range of
human rights violations of both civilians and combatants, including the rights to life, liberty and
security of persons.
OHCHR verified numerous allegations of killings and summary executions, of arbitrary
detention and enforced disappearance, of torture and ill-treatment, and of conflict-related sexual
violence.
OHCHR has documented and verified allegations of unlawful killings, including summary
executions of civilians in more than 30 settlements in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions,
committed while these territories were under the control of Russian armed forces in late February
and March. In Bucha alone (Kyiv region), OHCHR documented the unlawful killings, including
summary executions, of at least 50 civilians. Most victims were men, but there were also women and
children. As the recovery, exhumation and identification of mortal remains is not yet over, the scale
is yet to be fully assessed.
OHCHR is also concerned about the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of
representatives of local authorities, journalists, civil society activists and other civilians by Russian
armed forces and affiliated armed groups.
OHCHR documented 248 cases of arbitrary detention (214 men and 33 women, 1 boy), some
of which may amount to enforced disappearance, attributed to Russian armed forces and affiliated
armed groups. Among those cases, OHCHR recorded that six victims (one woman and five men)
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were eventually found dead. OHCHR also documented 12 cases of enforced disappearance (11 men
and 1 woman) by Ukrainian law enforcement of people suspected of providing support to Russian
armed forces and affiliated armed groups.
OHCHR documented numerous cases of the widespread use of extrajudicial punishment
against individuals alleged to be marauders, thieves, bootleggers, fake volunteers (fraudsters), drug
dealers and curfew violators. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented 89 such cases (80
men and 9 women) in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine and 3 cases in territory
controlled by the Russian Federation and affiliated armed groups.
OHCHR is also looking into mounting allegations of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV),
although it remains difficult to properly assess the extent of violations, as survivors are often not
willing or able to be interviewed. Many referral pathways are not functional and law enforcement
authorities have limited capacity to address CRSV cases. OHCHR verified 23 cases of CRSV, mostly
attributable to Russian armed forces. They occurred in different regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv
and Chernihiv regions. Women and girls constitute the majority of victims, with rape, including
gang rape, being the most common form of CRSV. A few cases concern acts such as forced public
nudity, where the victims (both male and female) were alleged to be law-breakers in both
Government-controlled territory of Ukraine and in territory-controlled by Russian armed forces.
The treatment of prisoners of war by the parties also raised serious concerns. OHCHR viewed
an abundance of videos publicly available online depicting interrogation, intimidation, insults,
humiliation, ill-treatment, torture and summary executions of prisoners of war on both sides. It has
also received numerous other allegations of torture of prisoners of war by both sides, including
through 44 interviews with prisoners of war. As of 15 May, OHCHR still had no reliable information
about the exact numbers of prisoners of war on both sides.
OHCHR is alarmed at the security risks faced by journalists and media workers in Ukraine.
OHCHR documented 16 cases of deaths of journalists and media workers during hostilities and
recorded 10 more cases of injured journalists (21 men and 5 women), including four cases where
survivors reported they may have been targeted because of their status as journalists. Moreover,
many human rights defenders (HRDs) have been unable to perform their human rights work due to
ongoing hostilities and large-scale displacement, which in turn has deprived vulnerable groups of
their support. There are growing concerns about possible reprisals and retaliation against HRDs in
areas controlled by Russian armed forces and affiliated armed groups.
(Source: OHCHR)

UN REPORT ON THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

The continued occupation by Israel of Palestinian territory and discrimination against
Palestinians are the key root causes of the recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict in
the region, according to the first report by the new United Nations Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel,
issued today.
The Commission also noted that impunity is feeding increased resentment among the
Palestinian people. It identified forced displacement, threats of forced displacement, demolitions,
settlement construction and expansion, settler violence, and the blockade of Gaza as contributing
factors to recurring cycles of violence.
“The findings and recommendations relevant to the underlying root causes were
overwhelmingly directed towards Israel, which we have taken as an indicator of the asymmetrical
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nature of the conflict and the reality of one State occupying the other,” Navanethem Pillay, chair of
the Commission, said.
The Commission released its 18-page report after conducting an assessment of
recommendations made by previous Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions, as well as
other United Nations mechanisms and its own hearings.
The Commission undertook two missions to Geneva and one to Jordan, and held
consultations with various stakeholders, including Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations.
“We also found that these recommendations have overwhelmingly not been implemented,
including calls to ensure accountability for Israel’s violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law and the indiscriminate firing of rockets fire by Palestinian armed groups into
Israel. It is this lack of implementation coupled with a sense of impunity, clear evidence that Israel
has no intention of ending the occupation, and the persistent discrimination against Palestinians that
lies at the heart of the systematic recurrence of violations in both the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and Israel,” Ms. Pillay added.
In its report, the Commission focused on the findings and recommendations directly related to
underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict. In its assessment,
key recommendations have not been implemented and this lies at the heart of the conflict. The
Commission identified several overarching issues that lay at the core of most recommendations,
including Israel’s failure to uphold the laws and customs of war, including those of belligerent
occupation, violations and abuses of individual and collective rights, and a lack of accountability.
“Our review of the findings and recommendations of previous UN mechanisms and bodies
clearly indicates that ending Israel’s occupation, in full conformity with Security Council resolutions,
remains essential in stopping the persistent cycle of violence. It is only with the ending of occupation
that the world can begin to reverse historical injustices and move towards self-determination of the
Palestinian peoples,” Commissioner Miloon Kothari noted.
Commissioner Chris Sidoti added: “Israel clearly has no intention of ending the occupation. In
fact, it has established clear policies to ensure complete permanent control over the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. This includes altering the demography of these territories through the
maintenance of a repressive environment for Palestinians and a favourable environment for Israeli
settlers. Israel's policies and actions build Palestinian frustration and lead to a sense of despair. They
fuel the cycle of violence and the protraction of conflict.”
The report also noted that the Palestinian Authority frequently uses the occupation as a
justification for its own human rights violations and as the core reason for its failure to hold
legislative and presidential elections. At the same time, the de facto authorities in Gaza have shown
little commitment to upholding human rights, and no adherence to international humanitarian law.
The report, which will be presented to the 50th session of the Human Rights Council on 13
June 2022, concludes by laying out that the Commission will conduct investigations and legal
analysis into alleged violations and abuses, and will work with judicial accountability mechanisms
toward ensuring individual, State and corporate accountability. It will also carefully assess the
responsibilities of third States and those of private actors in the continued policies of occupation.
Background
The UN Human Rights Council mandated the Commission on 27 May 2021 to “investigate, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel, all alleged violations of
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international humanitarian law and all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights
law leading up and since 13 April 2021”. In July 2021, the President of the Human Rights Council
announced the appointment of Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), Miloon Kothari (India) and
Christopher Sidoti (Australia) to serve as the three members of the Commission and indicated that
Ms. Pillay would serve as Chair. Resolution A/HRC/RES/S-30/1 further requested the commission
of inquiry to “investigate all underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction
of conflict, including systematic discrimination and repression based on national, ethnic, racial or
religious identity.” The Commission of Inquiry was mandated to report to the Human Rights
Council and the General Assembly annually from June 2022 and September 2022, respectively.
(Source: United Nations Human Rights Council)
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Science
WHY WE SHOULD REJECT ‘METAVERSE’
Tom Valovic
When I heard that Facebook had changed its name to Meta, I was reminded of the aphorism:
“A leopard doesn’t change its spots.” But in this case, there’s more to the name change than meets
the eye: a strategic ‘vision’ of the future and an overly powerful, profit-hungry corporation’s
misguided attempt to shape human destiny. Facebook’s new moniker is shorthand for metaverse, a
major new technology and culture shift that Big Tech is trying to force feed anyone who uses the
Internet. And in the words of a friend who works for another Big Tech giant, this new direction is
‘terrifying.’
We’ll all be hearing a lot about the metaverse in the guises of cleverly crafted tech language
over the months and years ahead. Technical descriptions such as the one found in Wikipedia can be
confusing and lacking in ‘big picture’ implications. It’s useful to note that this is a seismic shift,
comparable to the Internet in scope and scale, and it’s planned to become the dominant paradigm
for human communications, transitioning our business, social, and cultural life from physical to
online environments.
But I want to be careful not to mince words in describing what this technology coup is really
all about: nothing less than an attempt to fabricate an alternate ‘reality’ other than the physical one
we now inhabit. This new reality can be accessed, of course, only by paying customers and those in a
position to afford and understand it. It is a technology designed by elites and for elites and implicitly
leaves behind much of humanity in its wake.
For anyone concerned about the fate of the planet given the climate and biosphere crises and
large-scale species extinction (and why do we hear so little of this in the mainstream media?), it is
vitally important to understand not only what Meta has up its sleeve but also the larger picture that
all the Big Tech players are peddling – a velvet steamroller promoting a massive existential shift that
may come much sooner than we think.
Virtual reality and augmented reality have been around for some time but have never really
taken off as practical and useful technologies other than in gaming. But that’s about to change and, if
Big Tech has its way, it will have huge implications for all of us. This radical change in how we live
our lives is something that no one will get to vote on as a new and unprecedented kind of
technocratic governance begins to replace many of the functions of traditional government and, I
believe, even democracy itself.
As Planet Earth and our physical world continue to experience massive biospheric
degradation and disruption, the elites that are now in many cases pulling the strings of governance
at the country level are heading for the exit doors. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are exploring the realm
of space and Musk has a Mars mission planned. Globally oriented elites have a huge head start on
the rest of the population for one simple reason: they had advance warning of just how serious the
problems are we now face would be (as did, it must be said, many prominent Western
governments). These elites looked out for themselves which is what they do best. And governments
just kicked the can down the road, something they’re also quite adept at doing (and are still at it as
the results of COP26 have shown).
Paralleling the notion of space flight as a form of existential escapism is the metaverse. So
what if our cities are crumbling, infrastructures falling apart, and the biosphere is seriously
degrading? So what if our wasteful consumer-driven lifestyle has created unprecedented levels of
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pollution so extensive that it’s now the number one of cause of health problems globally? No
problem…we’ll just kick back and don our Meta headsets (or worse get a brain implant) and escape
into an artificially fabricated world that lets us turn our back on the massive ecological and
environmental problems we now face.
The metaverse appears to be part of a larger effort to implement technocratic governance and
dovetails nicely with the agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF). This organization is the
official mouthpiece of the billionaire class. The Davos elite is also promulgating its agenda through
the mainstream media, ownership of which has been gradually appropriated by representatives of
Big Tech. Jeff Bezos now owns the Washington Post; The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation makes
huge million-dollar level ‘contributions’ to mainstream media outlets including PBS; and the CEO of
Salesforce Marc Benioff now owns Time magazine. (Time, incidentally, recently ran a special issue
on climate change which served up a very long-winded article on the importance of developing lab
grown meat.)
Other huge technocratic changes are in the works. Large-scale (i.e., globally implemented)
genetic modification is another initiative on the WEF agenda. Everything in sight is targeted as a
huge profit-making opportunity including the food supply, animal populations, and human bodies.
If re-designing animals stretches your credibility, here’s what a recent WEF newsletter said about
the need to genetically modify animals as a beneficial way of dealing with the climate crisis: “The
process of resurrecting traits from extinct animals is commonly referred to as ‘de-extinction,’ and
scientists hope to bring back the woolly mammoth to preserve the tundra. Engineering other
animals and plants can help revive the ocean, protect food systems, and remove carbon from the
atmosphere.”
It is no secret that technology has become increasingly invasive since the Internet became
commonplace. Originally, it did empower us with a rich array of resources. Many of those resources
still exist even as some are being gradually clawed back, modified to suit corporate interests, or in
some cases outright censored. On balance, the Internet is now increasingly about social control,
technology dependence for profit purposes, surveillance, and sometimes cynical corporate
manipulation of hearts and minds.
As more and more corporate control was levied, Internet-based technology began to intrude
subtly on our personal spaces in exchange for the Faustian bargain of a new set of technological
‘conveniences’. Now Big Tech is aiming to not only extend this intrusion with technologies like
Alexa but to make life impossible to live without it…hence the notion of a metaverse. Working in
conjunction with elites and Big Tech social engineers, this next big initiative will be even more
intrusive and dehumanizing and is being carried out under the rubric of a specious ‘philosophy’
called transhumanism – a set of values that has declared our own humanity as deficient in need of
technological enhancement.
The first wave of transhumanism’s new invasiveness will come with so called wearable
devices i.e., headbands, virtual reality glasses, body attachments, skin implants, and others. The next
phase will be an attempt to physically wire our bodies into an electronic alternate reality where
privacy and individual autonomy will be nonexistent. (The WEF received a huge wave of pushback
when they posted a video with the message: “You will own nothing, have no privacy, and be
happy”.)
As a lifelong Democrat, I feel that it’s important to recognize that these issues are not in any
way partisan in nature. Rather they relate to our right to shape, safeguard, and control the quality of
our own lives and the future direction of humanity at a precarious moment in history. On a more
personal note, I’ve studied and written about the cultural impacts of technology for many years
including essays on the flight from physical into virtual in my book Digital Mythologies. I believe
that these issues require critical thinking skills for deciding what kind of world we want to live in
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since the mass of humanity is not being asked if these invasive technologies are acceptable or
desirable.
I passionately believe that we must not be seduced by this chimerical and false vision of
reality which further removes our awareness from the natural world and (worse) even seeks to
replace it by encouraging us to divert attention from the task of healing the planet and repairing our
biosphere. We should not trust Mark Zuckerberg or any other members of the corporate elite with
self-serving agendas to guide us through an increasingly precarious future.
(Source: Commondreams.org)

WHY CAN'T THE ISS OPERATE FOREVER?

Since November 2000, the International Space Station (ISS) has been a permanently crewed
laboratory.
Assembled in stages over several years, the data collected on board the ISS have helped
advance everything from climate change studies to dark matter research.
In January 2022, NASA released a plan to begin deorbiting the ISS in 2030, culminating with
the space station plunging into the Pacific Ocean by 2031. But after an eventual 30 years in orbit,
why does NASA want to deorbit the ISS at all? Why not continue the mission well beyond 2030?
As much as NASA and its partners may want the ISS to last beyond 2030, it just might not be
possible.
The ISS’s "check engine" light is on
Long-term installations like the ISS require regular maintenance. But just like the maintenance
for a car or an old house, that maintenance continually grows more expensive.
The systems the ISS needs to use for power, communication with Earth, and life support for
the crew are all designed to be repairable in orbit by astronauts or robotic operations. While
maintenance and upgrades to these systems happen all the time, the degradation of the station’s
structure will limit its time in orbit.
The structure of any spacecraft is exposed directly to the harsh environment of outer space can
cause damage, but additionally — in the case of the ISS — stressful docking and undocking
maneuvers from other spacecraft lead to wear.
Too hot or too cold with no in-between
Without an atmosphere protecting it, the ISS is subjected to enormous temperature variations,
along with intense radiation.
The exterior surface of the ISS regularly experiences temperature shifts from -120 degrees
Celsius (-184 degrees Fahrenheit) to 120 degrees Celsius (248 degrees Fahrenheit) as it travels around
the Earth passing from sunlight to shadow. These fluctuations cause expansion and contraction
unevenly over the whole structure, weakening the hull needed to keep the crew safe.
Engineers plan for thermal fluctuations and design exposed surfaces with a variety of coatings
to try and minimize these temperature swings. But over time in orbit, the direct exposure to UV
radiation along with atomic oxygen found at high altitudes degrades these coatings to the point
where they no longer reflect or absorb sunlight as expected. This results in even more uneven
expansion and contraction with every 90-minute orbit.
Does docking damage the ISS?
The ISS structure has to withstand the docking and undocking of spacecraft continually. The
relative velocities between docking spacecraft and the ISS are on the order of 0.1 ft/s (0.07 miles per
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hour, 0.11 kilometers per hour, 0.00003 kilometers per second), which, while small, still results in
dynamic stresses on the ISS structure. (You can try docking with the ISS for yourself using SpaceX’s
docking simulator).
The ISS’s docking mechanisms and structures are robust enough to survive the necessary
impacts, but they are also designed to be as mass minimal as possible. When constructing anything
off Earth, the cost of the mission goes up significantly with any additional mass, so these
mechanisms have an upper limit on how much wear they can take.
Spacecraft dock with the ISS roughly every three months, which comes out to a ballpark of 120
docking events and 120 undocking events between 2000 and 2030. Some dockings are assisted by the
station’s robotic arm, with others more recently being able to berth without the station’s robotic arm.
However, all still strain the structure of the ISS and weaken the hull incrementally.
While internal electronics and life support equipment can be repaired by astronauts or
robotics, the structure of the ISS itself cannot be so readily maintained as the decades go by.
If the ISS is not expected to be operable past 2030, what is next for a peaceful human presence
in space?
In the updated International Space Station Transition Report, NASA outlines several goals for
avoiding disruption to a human presence in space, which take the form of enabling Commercial
Low earth orbit Destinations (CLDs) by 2030.
NASA is encouraging the development of commercially operated space stations or habitats
that can take over some of the functionality the ISS has provided for several decades. Axiom, Blue
Origin, Nanoracks, and Northrop Grumman have all stepped forward as companies wanting to
provide the international community with access to a CDL, supported by NASA funding. This
progression from commercial resupply to commercial crew to a commercial space station
demonstrates the trust NASA has gained in private companies being able to provide the reliability
and cost-effectiveness to improve access to space.
The ISS needs to maintain its health until CLDs can be operational. If NASA's estimates are
correct, then the CLDs will be operating in time for the ISS to pass the torch before deorbiting in
2030, continuing a human presence in space.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FORCES

Forces are all around us. The force of gravity holds Earth in orbit around the sun. The force of
magnetism makes bar magnets attract iron filings. And one known as the strong force glues together
the building blocks of atoms. Forces affect every object in the universe — from the biggest galaxies
to the smallest particles. All these forces have one thing in common: they cause objects to change
their motion.
In the late 1600s, physicist Isaac Newton came up with a formula to describe this relationship:
force = mass × acceleration. You may have seen it written as F = ma. Acceleration is a change in an
object’s motion. This change could be speeding up or slowing down. It also could be a change in
direction. Because force = mass × acceleration, a stronger force will cause a larger change in an
object’s motion.
Scientists measure forces with a unit named after Newton. One newton is about how much
you’d need to pick up an apple.
We experience many different types of forces in our daily lives. You apply a force to your
backpack when you lift it up, or to your locker door when you push it shut. The forces of friction
and air drag slow you down when you skate or bike around. But all these forces are actually
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different manifestations of four fundamental forces. And, when you get right down to it, these are
the only forces at work in the entire cosmos.
Gravity is a force of attraction between any two objects. That attraction is stronger when the
two objects are more massive. It’s also stronger when the objects are closer together. Earth’s gravity
holds your feet on the ground. This gravitational tug is so strong because Earth is so massive and so
close. But gravity acts over any distance. This means that gravity also pulls your body toward the
sun, Jupiter and even distant galaxies. These objects are just so far away that their gravity is too
weak to feel.
Electromagnetism, the second force, is exactly what it sounds like: electricity combined with
magnetism. Unlike gravity, the electromagnetic force can attract or repel. Objects with opposite
electric charges — positive and negative — attract each other. Objects with the same type of charge
will repel each other.
The electric force between two objects is stronger when the objects are more charged. It
weakens when the charged objects are farther apart. Sound familiar? In this sense, electric forces are
very similar to gravity. But while gravity exists between any two objects, electric forces exist only
between objects that are electrically charged.
Magnetic forces can also attract or repel. You may have felt this when bringing the ends, or
poles, of two magnets together. Every magnet has a north and south pole. The north poles of
magnets are attracted to south poles. The opposite is also true. Poles of the same type, however,
push away from each other.
Electromagnetism is behind many kinds of pushes and pulls we experience in everyday life.
That includes the push you exert on a car door and the friction that slows your bike. Those forces are
interactions between objects due to the electromagnetic forces between atoms. How are those tiny
forces so powerful? All atoms are mostly empty space surrounded by a cloud of electrons. When the
electrons of one object come close to the electrons of another, they repel. This repelling force is so
strong that the two objects move. In fact, the electromagnetic force is 10 million billion billion billion
times stronger than gravity. (That’s a 1 followed by 36 zeroes.)
Gravity and electromagnetism are the two forces we can feel in our daily lives. The other two
forces act inside atoms. We cannot directly feel their effects. But these forces are no less important.
Without them, matter as we know it could not exist.
The weak force controls the interactions of tiny particles called quarks. Quarks are the
fundamental bits of matter that make up protons and neutrons. Those are the particles that make up
the cores of atoms. Quark interactions are complex. Sometimes, they release huge amounts of
energy. One series of these reactions happens inside stars. Weak-force interactions cause some
particles in the sun to transform into others. In the process, they release energy. So the weak force
may sound wimpy, but it causes the sun and all other stars to shine.
The weak force also sets the rules for how radioactive atoms decay. The decay of radioactive
carbon-14 atoms, for instance, helps archaeologists date ancient artifacts.
Historically, scientists have thought of electromagnetism and the weak force as different
things. But recently, researchers have linked these forces together. Just as electricity and magnetism
are two aspects of one force, electromagnetism and the weak force are related.
This raises an intriguing possibility. Could all four of the fundamental forces be connected?
No one has proved this idea yet. But it is an exciting question on the frontiers of physics.
The strong force is the final fundamental force. It’s what keeps matter stable. Protons and
neutrons make up the nucleus of every atom. Neutrons have no electric charge. But protons are
positively charged. Remember, the electromagnetic force causes like charges to repel. So why don’t
the protons in an atomic nucleus fly apart? The strong force holds them together. At the scale of an
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atomic nucleus, the strong force is 100 times stronger than the electromagnetic force that is
attempting to push the protons apart. It is also strong enough to hold the quarks inside protons and
neutrons together.

CELLS AND THEIR PARTS

A cell is the smallest living unit. Inside every cell is a host of structures known as organelles.
“Every cell has essential structures that are the same, like every house has a kitchen sink and a bed.
But how big and complex they are, and how many of them there are, is going to vary from cell type to
cell type,” says Katherine Thompson-Peer. She’s a cell biologist at the University of California, Irvine.
If cells were homes, the simplest ones — prokaryotes (Pro-KAER-ee-oats) — would be one-
room studio apartments. The kitchen, bedroom and living room would all share one space, explains
Thompson-Peer. With few organelles, and all of them next to each other, activities all take place in
the middle of these cells.
Over time, some cells became more complex. Called eukaryotes (Yu-KAER-ee-oats), these
now make up animals, plants and fungi. Some one-celled organisms, such as yeasts, also are
eukaryotes. These cells are all like single-family houses — with walls and doors making up separate
rooms. A membrane encloses each organelle in these cells. Those membranes “segregate different
things that the cell does into different compartments,” explains Thompson-Peer.
The nucleus is the most important organelle in these cells. It houses a eukaryotic cell’s DNA.
It’s also what distinguishes these cells from prokaryotes. Even one-celled eukaryotes, such as the
amoeba, have a nucleus. But cellular complexity is most obvious in multi-celled organisms. If we
follow the house analogy, a multi-celled organism would be a high-rise apartment building, says
Thompson-Peer. It contains lots of homes — cells. “And they’re all a little bit different in terms of
shape. But they all work together to be a building.”
Cells from organisms big and small include:
 a cell membrane (also called a plasma membrane). This thin, protective outer layer
surrounds a cell, like the outer walls of a house. It protects the structures inside and keeps
their environment stable. This membrane also is somewhat permeable. That means it allows
some things to move into and out of a cell. Think of windows in a house with screens. These
let air flow in but keep unwanted critters out. In a cell, this membrane allows nutrients in
and unwanted wastes to leave.
 ribosomes. These are little factories that make proteins. Proteins are important to every
function of life. We need proteins to grow, to repair an injury and to transport nutrients and
oxygen in our bodies. To build proteins, a ribosome binds to a specific part of a cell’s genetic
material known as messenger RNA. This allows it to read the instructions telling this factory
which building blocks — called amino acids — to assemble in making a protein.
 DNA. Every organism has a genetic code called DNA. That’s short for deoxyribonucleic
acid. It’s like a huge instruction manual, telling cells what to do, how and when. All that
information is stored in nucleotides (NU-klee-uh-tides). These are chemical building blocks
made of nitrogen, sugar and phosphate. When new cells develop, they make an exact copy
of the old cells’ DNA so the new ones know what tasks they’ll be expected to do.
Every cell in an organism’s body has the same DNA. Yet those cells can look and function
quite differently. And here’s why: Different cell types access and use different parts of the DNA
instruction book. For example, an eye cell is translating the parts of its DNA that tell it how to make
eye-specific proteins. Similarly, a liver cell translates the sections of DNA that tell it how to make
liver-specific proteins, explains Thompson-Peer.
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You might think of DNA as the script for a play, she says. All the actors in Shakespeare’s
Romeo and Juliet have the same script. Yet Romeo reads only his lines, Thompson-Peer says, before
going off to do Romeo things. Juliet reads only her lines and then goes off and does Juliet things.
Key features of cells from multi-celled organisms include:
a nucleus. The nucleus is a protective membrane surrounding a cell’s DNA. It keeps this
genetic “instruction manual” safe from molecules that could damage it. The presence of a nucleus is
what makes a eukaryotic cell different from a prokaryotic one.
Endoplasmic Reticulum This place, where a cell makes proteins and fats, has a long name.
But you can call it “ER” for short. It’s a flat sheet that gets folded tightly back and forth. Those
known as rough ERs makes proteins. The ribosomes that attach to this ER give it that “rough”
appearance. Smooth ERs make not only lipids (fatty compounds such as oils, waxes, hormones and
most parts of the cell membrane) but also cholesterol (a waxy material in plants and animals). Those
proteins and other materials become packaged into tiny sacs that pinch off from the edge of the ER.
These important products of cells are then transported to the Golgi apparatus.
Golgi Apparatus. This organelle modifies proteins and lipids in much the same way auto
parts are added to the body of a car in the factory’s assembly line. For example, some proteins need
carbohydrates attached to them. After these additions are made, the Golgi apparatus packages up
the modified proteins and lipids, then ships them in sacs known as vesicles to where they will be
needed in the body. It’s like a post office that receives lots of mail for different people. The Golgi
apparatus sorts the cellular “mail” and delivers it to the proper body address.
cytoskeleton. This network of tiny fibers and filaments provides structure to a cell. It’s like the
frame of a house. Different cells have different shapes and structures based on their function. For
example, a muscle cell has a long, cylindrical structure so that it can contract.
Mitochondria. These power generators of the cell break down sugars to release their energy.
Then the mitochondria package that energy into a molecule called ATP. It’s the form of energy that
cells use to power their activities.
Lysosomes. These organelles are the cell’s recycling centers. They break down and digest
nutrients, waste or old parts of the cell that are no longer needed. If a cell is too damaged to repair,
lysosomes help the cell destroy itself by breaking down and digesting all the structural supports as
well. That type of cell suicide is known as apoptosis.
Vacuoles. In animal cells, several of these small sac-like structures work a bit like lysosomes,
helping to recycle wastes. In plant cells, there is one large vacuole. It mainly stores water and keeps
a cell hydrated, which helps give a plant its rigid structure.
Cell Wall. This rigid layer jackets the outside of a plant’s cell membrane. It’s made of a
network of proteins and sugars. It gives plants their stiff structure and provides some protection
from pathogens and from stress, such as water loss.
Chloroplasts. These plant organelles use energy from the sun, along with water and carbon
dioxide in the air, to make food for plants through the process known as photosynthesis.
Chloroplasts have a green pigment inside them called chlorophyll. This pigment is what makes
plants green.
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Sustainable Development Goals

SPORTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Aamir Bilal (Eminent sports analyst)
COVID 19 was a tipping point for the entire human race that influenced every sphere of life
including sports and outdoor activities. The developed world with all its resources and leadership is
committed to achieve the 2030 global agenda and its 17 Sustainable Goals with an overarching
aspiration of bringing people and the planet together, thus leaving no one behind in the delivery of
quality education, good health and wellbeing, decent work and economic growth, reduction of
inequalities and ensure peace and justice for development of strong and sustainable societies that
offer equal opportunities of growth for rich and poor.
Pakistan over the past three decades badly suffered from institutional decay and leadership
crisis that affected almost every aspect of national growth. Though individual assets and lifestyle of
common urban residents improved in terms of cars, wealth and real estate development based on
borrowed economy, there is hardly any investment by successive governments in development of
national human capital and improvement in systems and institutions.
Pakistan is not only a victim of global recession but its poor and corrupt leadership, coupled
with its unique political and sectarian landscape complicates the issues further. Our slow progress
on achievement of eight MDGs is a testimony that our institutions lack capacity and capability to
grapple with global demands and requirements of human development. This lack of capacity
restricts our ability to think out of the box and use cost effective measures like sports and games that
can help serious governments in developing sustainably developed communities with equal growth
opportunities.
Harnessing the tremendous potential of sports beyond competitive and elite sports
development, the United Nations Office on Sport for Development (UNOSDP) had been bringing
people together through sport for peace initiatives, from mega sports to grass roots activities. It's
worth mentioning that UNOSDP and Sports Development Foundation in Pakistan (SDF)
collaborated in this unique programme by providing opportunities for Pakistani youth to undertake
this unique experience through Youth Leadership Program (YLP) before it was formally closed and
handed over to IOC in May 2017.
In order to educate the readers, I must elucidate that Sports for development programmes are
quite different from competitive and elite sports, that falls in the ambit of sports development, thus
it offers no threat to well entrenched sports mafia which enjoys complete hegemony over elite sports
programmes and sports bodies in the country.
Sports for development offers inimitable training programmes and opportunities for youth
leadership in disadvantaged communities to develop and enhance the much needed life skills
through skillfully designed Sports Education (SE) and Olympic Education programmes. Here I must
clarify the misunderstood myth that sports for development programmes may require elaborate
infrastructure and large resources like elite sports programmes but in fact such programmes can be
easily managed in limited space, time and resources through specialised programmes and training
of teachers and community leaders.Just to give readers and policy makers an insight that
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG NO 4) i:e to Enhance Inclusive & Quality Education For All
and promoting lifelong learning, sport is combined with school curriculum under Sports Education
(SE) programmes as its integral component. As sports for development practitioners, we strongly
believe that sports provide lifelong learning and alternative education for children who even cannot
attend school. By taking part in sport and physical activity which may not necessarily be hockey or
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Cricket that requires large space and expensive equipment, children are exposed to tailor made
sports and games which are organised in limited space with defined out comes so that life skills like
teamwork, leadership, fair play, respect of rules, cooperation, discipline and tolerance are learnt.
These skills later help individuals in group activities and professional life and even help in
developing educated elite athletes who later decide to adopt sports as a full time profession because
such athletes are the true brand ambassadors of a country at international forums.
Similarly, it's an established fact that female participation in sports challenges the stereotypes.
Sports not only help young girls and women to demonstrate their talents and achievements to society
but also boost their self-esteem and confidence. It helps them raise awareness about gender roles
among male counterparts and convey social and psychological benefits, thus helping in achieving goal
5 of SDG, which is to achieve gender equality and empowerment for all women and girls. The Diyar
consortium implemented in Palestine under the Diyar women sports unit is an excellent example to
develop understanding of how women empowerment is carried out through sports.
Goal No 16 of SDG is to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies. From Pakistan's
perspective this goal along with quality education and health for all holds the key for human
development. In the absence of institutional effort on part of the government, NGOs like Legal Aid
Society (LAS) are doing a wonderful job to bridge the gaps and simplify the judicial system for the
common man.
As a common denominator and shared passion sports helps in building bridges between
communities regardless of their political divisions. In times of conflicts or extreme polarization and
extremism as of today, sports can provide participants with a sense of normalcy. For detailed
understanding of the subject readers may refer to my article "How sports can help combat
extremism in polarised society" published on 08 May 2022.
The fact remains that the 2030 global agenda for sustainable development sets out an ambitious
transformational vision with its 169 targets of 17 MDGs by targeting young people on priority for
pursuing inclusive and sustainable growth. The agenda explicitly states that the growing contribution
of sports to the realization of development and peace in its promotion of tolerance and respect and the
contribution it makes to the empowerment of women and young people, individuals and communities
as well as to health, education and social inclusion objectives is of tremendous value.
This statement extends previous key international declarations that recognize and advocate
the use of sports as a catalyst for human and social development for which much has not been done
at our end.
It's worth mentioning that nine such resolutions were passed by the UN General Assembly
between 2003 and 2014. The Commonwealth governments also provided consistent endorsement for
the role of sport in contributing to the development and peace but successive governments remained
confused on the subject of sport and education in particular.With 18th amendment in place and
sports and education being devolved the provinces lack capacity and knowledge to execute such
productive initiative which has international recognition and support. Pakistan today stands at 134
among 177 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) thus there is a need to formulate all-
inclusive development policies where sports for development should also be incorporated in short,
medium and long term national policies. Unfortunately, the PTI government despite having the
services of a leader with a sports background failed to capitalise on the low hanging fruits of sports
for development initiatives that could have opened many new doors of development for youth in
the country.
We understand that Sports for Development is a specialised area but it's not a rocket science
that cannot be understood or is so resource heavy that it can't be integrated in national policies. In
our series of articles on Sports and STGs we would make an endeavor to bring all stakeholders on
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one page so that this cost effective and out of the box solution may be put to use for contribution in
sustainable national growth.
(Source: TNS)

SPORTS AND SDG 3

Aamir Bilal (Sports analyst with expertise in sports management and sports for development)
Good health is central to mankind's happiness that contributes significantly to the economic
progress of any nation. A healthy population is, therefore, more productive, earns more income and
lives longer and healthy lives. Good health and nutrition thus play a pivotal role in socio-economic
development of countries, whereas malnutrition, poor health and increased load of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) are considered barriers to socio-economic development.
Due to uncontrolled increase in population the public health service delivery infrastructure
remains under constant pressure.
Despite focus of successive governments with the help of international organisations like
WHO the public health expenditure remains insufficient to meet the requirements and the gap
between health delivery and expenditure is constantly increasing.
After the 18th constitutional amendment, health like education has become a provincial
subject. However, the federal government has supported various health initiatives through Public
Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for attainment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and to bring improvement in overall health status of the country.
The PSDP programmes are Sehat Sahulat Programme, Ehsaas Programme, Family Planning &
Primary Health Care Programme (FP&PHC), Expanded Programme for Immunization, Polio
Eradication Initiative (PEI), National Health Emergency Preparedness & Response Network
(NHEP&RN), Safe Blood Transfusion Services (SBTS), Malaria Control Programme, Tuberculosis
(TB) Control Programme & HIV/AIDS Control Programme.
According to UNDP, the Goal 3 of SDG is to "ensure healthy lives & promote wellbeing for all
at all ages".
Most of the developing countries remain off track to achieve the health related SDGs and cost
effective measures like use of sports and physical activity in achieving the desired SDGs are not
discussed in the media. Excessive use of social media and sedentary lifestyle have led to a significant
decline in physical activity.
According to a report, 3.2 million people die every year around the world due to physical
inactivity and it is the fourth leading risk factor for global mortality. According to Dr Minhaj us Siraj,
a senior public health practitioner and former Executive Director of PIMS hospital, the most
common diseases related to lifestyle include high blood pressure, obesity and diabetes type 2, which
contributes to constant swelling of health budgets that can be easily reduced through regular
participation in sports and exercise.
Dr Minhaj, who has led the national anti-tobacco drive in the country, also considers smoking
a problem that can be effectively addressed by adopting healthy lifestyle and through regular
participation in exercise and sports.
Participation in sports is associated with improved psychological and social health, as well as
prevention and treatment of substance abuse (SDG 3.5). Regular participation in sports supports
healthy development of children and adolescents, including their cognitive and physiological
development.
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Sports events and large-scale physical activity programmes can provide cost-effective
platforms for community and national health messaging component of almost all PSDP
programmes, including anti-tobacco drives in the country.
While doctors prescribe long list of medicines and expensive investigations to address routine
illnesses of patients, and fat pharmaceuticals keep doubling their profits by selling expensive
medicines to poor masses in the name of healthcare, little attention is paid by the policymakers to
make use of physical exercise and sports to improve the general physical fitness level of masses, so
that they can effectively overcome a number of diseases without sacrificing a large amount of their
hard earned money.
The policymakers can take a lead from the Chinese who launched China 2030 plan to achieve
health-related SDGs through sports and physical activities. The young and elderly population in
China participate in sports and physical activities to improve national fitness, and prevent NCDs
and also support in achieving "Healthy China" 2030 goal.
In a country like Pakistan, where health expenses are increasing on a daily basis, adoption of
sports to attain SDG 3 can be a very cost-effective and sustainable method, which must be included
in the national health policy.
Physical activity is a universally accepted and economical intervention that has been
demonstrated to reverse and prevent many NCDs.
(Source: The News)
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South Asia
IS SOUTH ASIA MOVING TOWARDS CONTACTLESS WARS?
Qudrat Ullah (Freelancer and media activist)
Since February of this year, Russia has started a special military operation in Ukraine in order
to neutralize the enemy. Moscow has referred to the operation to “eliminate a serious threat and
demilitarize Russia’s southern neighbor. For the last four months, Russian and Ukrainian forces are
battling and the losses are numerous on both sides.
Meanwhile the whole West is helping Ukraine with military aid, equipment and financial aid
to rein in Russia, but no such results have been seen, despite the additional factor of keeping
Moscow isolated from international market.
This war could have been contactless as Moscow has world’s best arms/ammunitions and
military. But in order to get its interests secured, the forces were brought into the battle field.
Similarly, in Afghan war, United States and allied forces brought in their armies in Afghanistan on
the name of war on terror, but left out by leaving a bleak future for the people of the country.
As it is reported that all the powers are importing arms to cement their defence capabilities
but it consume a larger chunk of the countries budget. Same is the case with India, it has a large
military and the country remain one of the largest importer of arms.
To minimize the defence expenditures, India has announced a recruitment plan, called
Agneepath, also known as the “path of fire” on 14 June. PM Modi’s government announced an
overhaul of recruitment for India’s 1.38 million-strong armed forces, looking to bring down the
average age of personnel and reduce pension expenditure.
The proposed scheme will bring in men and women between the ages of 17-and-a-half and 21
for a four-year tenure, with only a quarter retained for longer periods. But the aspirants, who had
dreams of joining the forces, were shattered, with analyst criticizing the short sightedness decision.
The whole country was on protest and the youth were saying that they were cheated,
wondering where they will go after four years of service.
India’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval, in an interview said that the scheme will
not be rolled back, adding that there is a change in the armed forces’ make-up is necessary if the
country wants to prepare for future wars and conflicts. NSA Ajit Doval explained that “The idea of
war is undergoing a great change. We are going toward contactless wars, and also going towards
the war against the invisible enemy. Technology is taking over at a rapid pace. If we have to prepare
for tomorrow, then we have to change”.
The term of contactless wars and invisible enemy can be understood to some extent, but when
it comes to India, it is complex. The country is in logger heads with China in Arunachal Pradesh and
Line of Actual Control. With Pakistan, though it had agreed to hold the ceasefire, but the recent past
shows, the normalcy is hard to be maintained. In Kashmir valley, its armed forces are on their toes,
when it comes to fight the militants and rebels.
In India itself, the issues in Assam, Nagaland and other areas are facing insurgency from time
to time. In such case the idea of contactless wars and fighting the invisible enemy is hard to digest.
Though Indian central leadership argues that it is best for the country’s defense and economy, but
many believe it is politics, and now has been trumped by the reality of economics.
The government later announced that quarter of forces recruited through the scheme will be
hired in government departments, but the stark reality is otherwise. With the visible religious,
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political and ethnic fault lines, the decision can backfire. Minorities are experiencing the diminishing
pluralism and violence against them is on the rise.
The effect of India’s “Agniveer” proposal will not solely be on its military or the economy. It
will also have a direct bearing on Indian society. The demobilized short-term contractual soldiers
could provide a major recruiting pool for such groups who wish to use violent means to pursue their
ideological goals. The consequences of such an eventuality will be catastrophic.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

SRI LANKA’S GREAT CRISIS AND THE FAILED REGIME CHANGE

Dr. S. I. Keethaponcalan (Chair of the Conflict Resolution Department, Salisbury University, Maryland)
On May 9, Mahinda Rajapaksa met his supporters at the Temple Trees, the prime minister’s
official residence, before stepping down. His emotionally charged supporters came out and violently
attacked the protesters camped in front of the building. They proceeded to the so-called Gota-Go-
Gama and destroyed the protest site igniting a nationwide anti-government riot. The day’s events
also ignited the fear that the country could fully or partially drift into military rule. It was against
this backdrop Ranil Wickremesinghe, the lone member of the United National Party (UNP) in
parliament, was appointed prime minister. He was sworn in on May 12.
Failure
Despite the total lack of parliamentary strength of his own, his appointment was accepted for
two main reasons. One, the suffering masses believed that he could effectively resolve the
“scarcity”problem. Two, the ruling party knew that Wickremesinghe had the potential to mitigate
the strength of the protest. In an essay entitled, Sri Lankan Crisis and Regime Change
(Eurasiareview, May 15, 2022), I pointed out that “Wickremesinghe may be acceptable to a part of
the resistance as the new prime minister. His experience and the people’s desperation could
influence some Sri Lankans to accept him to run the country.” As expected, with the appointment of
Wickremesinghe as prime minister, the ferocity of the resistance weakened, and public protest
almost disappeared. Therefore, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s strategic calculation in appointing
Wickremesinghe to lead the government proved effective.
Nevertheless, the two-month experiment with Wickremesinghe as prime minister proved a
failure. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe had three significant problems to deal with: (1) resolving
the economic crisis, (2) closing the deal with the IMF, and (3) mitigating presidential power through
the 21st Amendment to the Constitution.
Scarcity of Essential Commodities
Ever since the Great Crisis started, India has been helping Sri Lanka with immediate needs by
extending, for example, credit lines, which enabled Sri Lanka to purchase essential commodities
from India. Therefore, when Wickremesinghe ascended, supplies also increased. This was another
reason why the protests dwindled. However, the supplies dried up as India could not continue the
strategic assistance. Inflation continued to escalate, and the queues, especially for petroleum
products, increased steadily. The governed-introduced token system for fuel also failed. In late June,
the government announced that orders for new fuel supplies had not been placed due to talk of
foreign currency. Consequently, the country came to a standstill. For example, schools were closed,
and even parliament restricted its activities. In essence, Wickremesinghe could not help resolve the
supply issues, let alone the economic crisis. In fact, he warned that the economy could completely
collapse in the coming weeks. In the last two months, he served better as an explainer (of the
situation) than a crisis resolver.
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IMF Deal
Since the inception of the Great Crisis, many independent analysts urged the government to
approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The government was hesitant, mainly
due to the belief that China would bail out. For example, the pro-China Central Bank Governor Ajith
Cabraal announced that the country does not need IMF relief. This was in January 2022. It is
important to note that Cabraal played a pivotal role in the creation of the crisis. Realizing the need
for an IMF relief package, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced that the country will “work”
with the IMF to resolve the economic crisis. He made the announcement while addressing the nation
in March. However, the government did not impart the impression that it was keen on getting the
IMF help. The process was slow, and a first-time politician with hardly any experience in economic
issues or international negotiation was sent to Washington for discussion with the IMF.
Serious discussions started after Wickremesinghe became prime minister. An IMF team
visited Sri Lanka in June to explore the situation. On June 30, the visiting team declared it conducted
“constructive and productive discussions” with Sri Lankan authorities and will continue the
“discussions in support of Sri Lanka and its people.” It also meant that Wickremesinghe could
convince the IMF to help Sri Lanka so far. Another failure, given the urgency of the issue.
21st Amendment
Although Sri Lanka’s Great Crisis is an economic problem, it entailed a political element. The
conventional wisdom is that the enormous powers vested on the president led to the present
economic calamity because they facilitated extreme corruption. The 1978 Constitution created a
powerful president. Even though the current president consolidated presidential powers recently
through the 20th Amendment to the Constitution, Gotabaya Rajapaksa offered to reform the
Constitution to reduce presidential powers. Addressing the nation on May 11, Gotabaya Rajapaksa
said, “I will take steps to amend the Constitution to re-enact the contents of the 19th Amendment to
empower the Parliament.”
On his appointment as prime minister, Wickremesinghe also promised to curtail presidential
powers. In a tweet dated May 15, Wickremesinghe declared, “21st Amendment: This will be taken
up for discussion with the Attorney General’s Department tomorrow (Monday) and then be
presented to Cabinet for approval.” The problem was that he had no parliamentary power to adopt
the Amendment. Approval depended entirely on the wishes of the SLPP, which has the majority in
parliament. According to media reports, the SLPP is opposed to some of the proposed measures.
Nevertheless, a deeply watered-down version of the new Amendment was gazetted on June
29. Some provisions would come into effect only when a new parliament is elected. In other words,
Gotabaya Rajapaksa would not lose any powers due to the new Amendment, even if approved in
parliament. It is also unclear if the SLPP would vote for the proposed Amendment to the
Constitution. Therefore, as of today, the reform program also did not succeed.
Another Regime Change?
As underscored, Ranil Wickremesinghe could not fix the problems in the last two months. It
seems that he has a long-term imagination for a solution. In a parliamentary speech on July 5,
Wickremesinghe stated that the “economy which was bankrupt, cannot be revived overnight and it
would take several years to do so.” However, it is clear that the people are not ready to wait for
“years” to overcome the situation. They want a quick fix, at least for the scarcity problem. Now, the
protesters are also chanting “ranil-go-home.” They want the Gota-Ranil duo to quit. With this aim, a
mass rally will be held on July 9. Wickremesinghe might quit if adequate pressure is applied.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa is different. He has sacrificed many people, including his brothers, to
save his skin. He would not mind sacrificing Ranil Wickremesinghe either. He does not want to lose
any powers vested on him currently by the Constitution. He also does not want to step down as a
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“failed president.” Gotabaya Rajapaksa seems determined to complete his term and step down at
the end of 2024. The only consolation prize the people received from him was the promise that he
would not contest for a second term. Therefore, Sri Lanka seems to be moving towards another
stalemate after July 9. Another regime change cannot be ruled out either.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

A Brief Introduction
The year 2020 marked the 70th anniversary of Sino-Indian relations and also became one of
the watershed years in the history of bilateral ties between India and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Following disagreements between the two countries over territorial delineation and their
armies setting up military posts in or near disputed areas, Chinese and Indian troops clashed
fiercely at Galwan Valley near Ladakh on 15 June 2020, leading to the death of 20 Indian soldiers
and an unidentified number of Chinese troops (BBC 2020). The localized conflict escalated rapidly
into a full-blown crisis, with both sides deploying additional troops, missile launchers, and armed
helicopters. By all appearances, China and India were on the brink of another war. Further
escalation was prevented by a timely intervention by political and military officials, however, the
brutality and magnitude of the violence witnessed during the few days that the crisis lasted has
complicated the disengagement process, since neither country wanted to be seen as compromising
on its national interests (Peri 2021). The Galwan Valley clash was significant for two reasons; first
because it shattered the 1988 consensus of keeping the border dispute divorced from the broader
relationship and repositioned the border dispute at the centre of bilateral ties, making diplomatic
and economic relations contingent upon developments on the border (Vasudeva 2020). Second, the
animosity exhibited by the two sides reversed years of hard-won diplomatic and political
improvements that had strengthened cooperative structures, setting bilateral ties back years and
placing the Sino-India relationship at crossroads where prospects for a major reset appear bleak. The
first attribute is perhaps more damaging because the border dispute was already a major driving
factor in Sino-Indian rivalry, and its increased prominence is likely to intensify feelings of hostility in
New Delhi and Beijing. Moreover, as the existing bilateral border management framework appears
to be severely compromised, the rise of border tensions portend a new era of uncertainty where
bilateral interaction will be more adversarial, conflict-prone, and volatile.
This chapter examines the origin of the border dispute, its colonial legacy, and the factors that
have contributed to its recent entrenchment. It will then discuss the divergent positions held by the
two countries on the border issue, and the various bilateral dialogues and confidence-building
measures adopted by the two countries. It concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of these
bilateral endeavours toward effective border management, addressing the trust deficit, and finding a
final resolution of the border dispute, followed by policy recommendations the two countries can
contemplate.
Genesis of Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Over its seven decades, the Sino-Indian border dispute has become an intractable
disagreement, with no resolution in sight. The question of a disputed border emerged in the early
1950s when the PRC effected its occupation of Tibet, a move which created for China and India one
of the longest undemarcated borders of the world. The proximity of the Chinese military presence so
close to the undemarcated frontier created considerable consternation in New Delhi. Factions of
Indian policy elites led by India’s first home minister and also its first deputy prime minister, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, and then-Bombay Governor Girija Shankar Bajpai urged the government of then-
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Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to enhance the military and administrative presence along India’s
north-east region (Raghavan 2012, 80). However, both Nehru and India’s ambassador to China, K.M.
Pannikar, were reluctant to annoy their powerful northern neighbour and decided that India would
not actively pursue the border question with Beijing, but would explicitly announce their
endorsement of the McMahon Line as India’s border (Luthi and Das Gupta 2017, 8–10). Beijing, on
the other hand, was less perturbed by the status of the common border as the new communist
regime was more engaged in consolidating its authority at home, supressing rebellions, dealing with
poverty, agrarian crises, and fears of invasion by the United States and the exiled nationalist
government of the Republic of China, then in exile in Taiwan. Accordingly, the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw fit to put the boundary issue on the backburner until they
were well-prepared to address it (Chaowu 2017, 70).
The border dispute came to the fore in 1958, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, responding to
Nehru’s protests against the Aksai Chin Road – 179 kilometres of which ran through the Aksai Chin
region claimed by India – as well as acquisitive Chinese maps, denied for the first time the presence
of any formalised border between China and India. Central to the border dispute was two flanks of
territories lying at the two extremities of the vast border; the Aksai Chin region in the western
sector, and the India-controlled and administered North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), now
Arunachal Pradesh, in the eastern sector. While New Delhi extended its claims on the basis of maps
inherited from the British, Beijing claimed that these territories were historically part of Tibet. Over
the next few years, the territorial disagreements between the two countries only deepened as the
Tibet crisis, Dalai Lama’s refuge in India, and New Delhi’s Forward Policy only intensified the
mutual distrust and led to the 1962 war (Shankar 2018, 29–34).
The Border Dispute: A Colonial Legacy
Ambiguity about the Indian frontier with China dates back to the colonial era, and can be
attributed as one of the foremost causes of the territorial conundrum facing the two countries (Sidhu
and Yuan 2001, 11). The British initiatives to demarcate the Himalayan frontiers were guided
primarily by its strategic competition with Russia. Accordingly, the urgency to delineate the
boundaries of the British Empire arose only when the Great Game intensified between the two
superpowers. British administrators up until then held no clear view of India’s territorial limits
along the massive Indo-Tibetan boundary. In the western sector, the first attempt to fix a boundary
line was taken in 1865. Then-Surveyor General of India Sir W. H. Johnson, in a bid to impress the
Dogra ruler, produced expansive boundary claims stretching the Dogra state border to the Kunlun
Mountains and including all of Aksai Chin (Chakravarty 2020). Since other British officials were
sceptical about Johnson’s claims, the boundary proposition died a natural death, until it was revived
in 1897 by the director of the British military intelligence Sir John Ardagh, who believed that
implementation of the forward positions in Johnson’s line would secure strategic leverage against
Russia in the event of an Anglo-Russian confrontation. This boundary came to be known as the
Ardagh-Johnson line, and later formed the basis of India’s claims to Aksai Chin.
It is noteworthy that between 1865 and 1897, colonial administrators depicted different
versions of the northern and north-eastern boundary of Kashmir, the line fluctuating according to
the degree of perceived threat from Russia (Palit 1991, 32). Also, China never acquiesced to any of
the boundary propositions made during this period. The 1899 Macartney-MacDonald Line, which
was the only formal boundary proposition ever presented to Beijing, was never officially
acknowledged by the Manchu dynasty then ruling China (Palit 1991, 32).
The urgency to secure British India’s northern boundaries was lost with the removal of threat
of invasion due to fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917. Post-1945, a map published by Survey of India did
imply claims to the Aksai Chin region, but the British military remained non-committal on that
boundary (Chakravarty 2020). In effect, the British administration exercised such benign neglect that
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sometimes the Macartney-MacDonald or the Ardagh-Johnson Line were treated as informal

boundaries, depending on the administration’s inclination. Therefore, when the British left in 1947,
there was no clear indication of exactly where the northern boundaries were. Major General D.K.
Palit, who was a brigade commander during the 1962 war with China, opined that, had the British
suggested that the newly formed Indian government follow the 1899 boundary proposition that left
out the north-eastern Aksai Chin (through which the strategic Chinese road runs), the Nehru
government would have certainly accepted the suggestion, and consequently the whole
confrontation could have been avoided (Palit 1991, 34–36).
A similar reticence was displayed by colonial administrators in the eastern sector as well. The
British had long been content to occupy the Brahmaputra plains, and did not extend their
jurisdiction to the mountains, for these mountains were neither of commercial nor strategic value.
However, in order to delineate the limit of British responsibility, the foothills were divided by an
Outer Line representing the external territorial frontier of the British Empire, and an Inner line
which was forbidden to cross without a permit. In the absence of any perceived threat from Russia
or China, the vague demarcation continued.
The British began consolidating India’s eastern boundaries with Tibet in the early 1900s, as the
administration became paranoid about Russia’s increasing influence in that country. A military
expedition under Francis Younghusband was sent to Lhasa in 1903 to secure British India’s
diplomatic and economic rights, which in turn triggered the perception of a threat by China, which
responded with an expedition of its own to assert control over Lhasa. The operation’s leader Zhao
Erfeng, who had earned the nickname ‘the Butcher of Kham’ for his actions extending Chinese rule
into that Tibetan province, reached Lhasa in 1910 with 2,000 troops, securing the city and spurring
the 13th Dalai Lama to flee toward India.
Britain, sensing the potential of a threat from China’s counter-moves, for the first time ordered
a series of surveys to determine the extent of the tribal areas and to bring the area of Assam
Himalaya (later NEFA) under British jurisdiction. Although, the sudden collapse of the Manchu
dynasty in 1911 eased some of the pressure, the new republican government appeared equally
assertive toward Tibet. At this point, the British government began to contemplate a tripartite
conference to settle such issues as the eastern borders of Inner and Outer Tibet, China’s degree of
control in Inner Tibet, and alignment of the Indo-Tibetan border.
A tripartite conference which ultimately convened at Simla in October 1913 was fraught with
controversy from the very beginning. For instance, the Chinese objected to Tibet’s equal
representation, and were adamant about pushing Tibet’s Inner Line as the Outer Boundary. After
negotiations dragged on, eventually in March 1914 the Chinese representative reluctantly agreed to
a line drawn by McMahon on the map that ran along the highest crest of the Assam Himalayas and
included Tawang within British Indian territory.
The Simla Conference ultimately failed to align the Indo-Tibetan border: the Chinese
government never ratified the McMahon line, and since the Assam government was never informed
about the Simla Conference proceedings, areas of Dirang and Tawang claimed by the McMahon
Line remained under Tibetan control. In 1938, the Assam government attempted to occupy Tawang,
but it back-pedalled after vehement protests from Lhasa, as well as when the British government
during World War II excluded Tawang from its defensive efforts against a Japanese invasion,
despite fortifying nearby Walong and Dirang. China too, its hands full fighting both the Second
Sino-Japanese War (the Chinese theatre of World War II) as well as the Chinese Civil War against
communist revolutionaries, paid scant attention to the Indo-Tibetan border issue. Therefore, the
British left the Indian subcontinent without making any definite provisions for either NEFA or
Tawang (Palit 1991, 38–44).
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The Entrenchment of the Border Dispute

After India’s independence, three major factors contributed to the entrenchment of the border
dispute. First was the reluctance of both India and China to broach the subject in the initial phase
from 1950 to 1957, when Sino-Indian ties were peaceful and amicable and the two countries had
many high-level diplomatic exchanges, which provided the leaders with ample opportunities to
settle the ambiguities left over from the colonial period. However, the two countries not only
circumvented the boundary issue but also followed unilateral policies. The Indian government
failed to consult China before declaring the forward-most posts in the eastern and western sectors
(EPW 2020); it annexed Tawang in 1951; and it published new maps reflecting India’s unilateral
demarcation, interpreted China’s silence as tacit consent. Nehru himself admitted in 1953 that even
while India inherited the McMahon Line from the British, he was not willing to raise the subject lest
it awaken sleeping dogs (Luthi 2017, 32). Similarly, Mao Zedong’s instructions, the PRC followed a
delaying strategy, with China deciding to refrain from formally protesting against New Delhi’s
unilateral moves until they had consolidated their administrative and military position in Tibet, as
China had begun building the Xinjiang National Highway in 1951 – a road that would not be
completed until 1957 (Chaowu 2017, 69–71). Moreover, during 1954 negotiations on Tibet, China
chose not to raise the issue of border alignment despite having the opportunity, and in 1956, when
Nehru for the first time referred to the boundary issue, Zhou Enlai suggested that the Chinese
government would be willing to recognize the McMahon Line (Das Gupta 2017, 53).
Later scholarly works reveal that a combination of domestic and international factors
influenced the policy choices of both countries. For instance, New Delhi’s trauma from previous
territorial losses due to Partition and also Nehru’s desire to maintain friendly relations with China
weighed heavily on Indian decision-makers. Simultaneously, Beijing, too embroiled in China’s
internal struggles and facing international diplomatic isolation, was reluctant to immediately open
another confrontational front with India. In retrospect, however, the deferral policy followed by
both countries proved to be disastrous, because as suspicion and misperceptions mounted on both
sides, the window of opportunity to settle the border dispute only became narrower.
Tibet is the second factor which contributed to the entrenchment of the border dispute. From
the very beginning, Tibet had become a point of contention between India and China. China’s
military occupation of Tibet in 1950 was seen as a security threat in New Delhi and led to massive
public outcry against China. Similarly, India’s close ties with the Dalai Lama and Nehru’s attempts
to mediate between Lhasa and Beijing was perceived by the Communist regime as interference in
China’s internal matters. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement provided only partial relaxation of
tensions as China’s coercive practices to Sinicize Tibet, and India’s clandestine aid to the unarmed
Tibetan resistance, kept suspicions lingering on both sides. In this context, the spontaneous 1959
Lhasa uprising further aggravated mutual misgivings, which in turn hardened their positions on the
border dispute (Sikri 2011).
At the outbreak of the insurgency, Beijing immediately held India responsible for inciting the
violence. Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) quickly crushed the rebellion, the 14th Dalai
Lama’s flight to India and his subsequent granting of political asylum by New Delhi infuriated the
CCP and strengthened its conviction about Indian malfeasance. An internal intelligence report even
suggested that India had been complicit in fomenting rebellion in Tibet to compel China into
accepting India’s territorial claims. Accordingly, Beijing directed intense criticism against Nehru,
accusing him of continuing imperial policies in Tibet. The polemical attack not only shocked Nehru
but also created trepidation in New Delhi that China might now try to push through the disputed
areas (Westcott 2017). Evidently, an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion surrounding events in
Tibet strained bilateral political and military ties. At the operational level, the PLA and the Indian
army began to clash quickly since both militaries had begun conducting forward patrols, primarily
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in the eastern sector, and in August 1959, the first exchange of fire took place at Longju, NEFA,
which significantly impacted relations (Raghavan 2012, 126). Concurrently, an exchange of letters
between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru in September demonstrated significant hostility between
the two leaders over the border dispute: China retracted its earlier willingness to accept the
McMahon Line and accused the government of India of pressuring China, and Nehru replied by
demanding the withdrawal of Chinese forces from posts on the Indian side as a precondition to
border talks. Over the next few months, as bilateral ties continued to deteriorate following more
clashes, deaths of Indian soldiers, rhetorical statements, and unfriendly correspondence, both China
and India increasingly developed unyielding and aggressive attitudes toward the border question
(Raghavan 2012, 132–149). Therefore, even though the original incident sparking the Tibet uprising
had subsided, the resultant bitterness persisted to such an extent that in 1960, when representatives
from the two countries met for final talks before the fateful war, there was little room left to
manoeuvre.
Compounding the impact of the first two factors discussed above, the post-imperial ideology
harboured by the two countries contributed to the entrenchment of the border dispute. While the
deferral policy and the Tibet crisis both underscore how the border dispute had attained such
complexity by 1960, the post-imperial ideology helps understand why the 1960 negotiations failed,
ultimately leading to a deadlock.
Due to the intense trauma and violence suffered during colonization, China and India
operated under a post-imperial ideology after their independence, which was aimed at gaining
recognition of their victimhood and maximizing their prestige due to the humiliations suffered in
the past (Chatterjee 2013, 253–260). This tendency was observed at the 1955 Bandung conference, at
which the leadership of both newly decolonized countries highlighted their intense suffering and
anti-colonial struggle. However, it also resulted in a simmering competition between India and
China that intensified in the months following the Tibetan crisis, due to China’s negative publicity
and India’s loss of territory and military casualties (Chatterjee 2013, 261). Accordingly, establishing
their claims of victimhood over the other and resistance to further humiliation in the form of
territorial loss heavily informed China and India’s attitude when their delegates met again in 1960 to
try to resolve the boundary question.
Both Zhou Enlai and the Indian leaders were insistent on securing acknowledgement of their
victimhood and acceptance of the disputed territories as historically significant and integral to their
respective countries. For instance, the Chinese premier emphasised in the aforementioned meetings
that Tibet – which he averred had been part of China since the Manchu dynasty – was made a
protectorate by the British government of India through the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty in
1904 and the Simla Convention, where the McMahon Line was determined. This, Zhou maintained,
was essentially a humiliation imposed on China. With regard to Aksai Chin, Zhou asserted that the
region was under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang province, and therefore indisputably part of China. It is
noteworthy here that one of the major national goals of the CCP was to restore China’s former glory,
and therefore regaining control of Xinjiang and Tibet was seen as essential to this restoration
(Chatterjee 2013, 266–267). On the Indian side, Nehru and other Indian leaders argued along similar
lines, stating that the British Raj merely formalised boundaries that had been in place for centuries.
In the case of Ladakh-Tibet, the boundary was historically accepted and recognised, and did not
require any formal delimitation, and for the western sector the McMahon Line established a
boundary that had been administered by Indian rulers since even before the Christian era. In other
words, the government of India proclaimed a civilizational glory on the basis of timeless borders
which were only concretised during colonial rule (Chatterjee 2013, 268–269). Following the logic of
post-imperial ideology, the 1960 border talks failed on two accounts; first, neither party made any
new territorial claims but simply reiterated what was rightfully theirs; and second, both were eager
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to establish that they had been victimised in the past and were being victimised again (Chatterjee
2013, 270).
Divergent Positions on the Border Dispute
The negotiations between Zhou and Nehru continued for five days and ended in complete
failure. Nehru rejected the Chinese premier’s package deal that offered Beijing’s acceptance of the
Indian position in the eastern sector in return for New Delhi’s acceptance of the Chinese position in
the western sector. The Chinese delegation returned to Beijing with the conviction that the Indians
were not interested in negotiating. Tensions escalated over the next two years, with the Indian army
pushing northward via the controversial Forward Policy, and PLA units responding tit-for-tat,
resulting in small skirmishes. War erupted on October 20, 1962, when the PLA launched a massive
offensive across the entire disputed border. It was a short and swift campaign that lasted a month
and resulted in the complete defeat of the Indian army (Sidhu and Yuan 2003, 15). However, the war
failed to ensure a permanent solution to the border dispute. Instead, the political rift that was
created continues to dampen bilateral ties, especially as regards border negotiations. Indeed, the
divergent positions adopted by India and China on the border dispute have seen their differences
evolve and widen in the post-war years.
India argues that the western sector was demarcated by the 1842 agreement between Tibet
and Kashmir and that the eastern sector was finalised by the Simla Agreement in 1913–1914.
Therefore, no further demarcation is required. China in turn states that no formal treaty or
agreement has ever been signed between the Indian and Chinese governments, for China neither
sent any representative to the India-Tibet negotiations nor ratified the McMahon Line. In this
context, China views the establishment of the state of Arunachal Pradesh as a unilateral step by
India, and that this amounts to an illegal occupation of China’s Tibet (Fang 2014, 88; Panda 2017, 35).
From a broader perspective, the two countries disagree first on the size of the border and the
locations which are disputed. The Indian position is that the Sino-Indian boundary is a total of 3,488
kilometres in length (including 523 km of what India calls the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir-China
section), with the western sector being 1,597 kilometres, the middle sector 545 kilometres, and the
eastern sector 1,346 kilometres in length (Kumar 2020). Here, India accuses China of occupying 38,000
square kilometres of land in the Kashmir region, along with 5,180 square kilometres of land in the
Kashmir region which was ceded to it by Pakistan. Also, India claims Aksai Chin to be part of India’s
Ladakh region, and India has no dispute as far as the eastern sector is concerned (Panda 2017, 35).
The Chinese position is that the Sino-Indian border is not more than 2,000 kilometres, the
western sector roughly covers Karakoram Mountain and is about 600 kilometres long, the disputed
area in this sector is 33,000 square kilometres and currently lies under Chinese control. The middle
sector is roughly 450 kilometres long and has a disputed area of 2,000 square kilometres, and the
eastern sector is 650 kilometres and has a disputed area of 90,000 square kilometres occupied by
India (Lin 2020). Contrary to India’s position, China asserts that the eastern sector of the border is
the most contentious part as the McMahon line is illegitimate and China therefore claims the Indian
state of Arunachal Pradesh. In the western sector, China contends that Ladakh is a disputed region
(Panda 2017, 35).
Another major area of contention between the two countries is the determination of the Line
of Actual Control (LAC). India rejects the Chinese version of the LAC, describing it as a series of
disconnected points on the map. New Delhi also claims that the LAC should be based on military
positions before China’s 1962 attack, discounting any gains made during that war (Menon 2016, 14).
China on the other hand insists that the LAC should be the status quo attained after the 1962 war;
which is incidentally the territorial arrangement suggested by Zhou Enlai during the 1960
negotiations. On the eastern side, it coincides mostly with the McMahon Line, while in the western
and middle sectors, the LAC follows the traditional customary line pointed out by China. However,
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China only describes it in general terms without precise scales on the map (Menon 2016, 15–16).
Owing to such disagreements between the two countries, the LAC, even after fifty years of conflict,
remains undemarcated.
The demarcation and implementation of the LAC is intrinsically associated with the larger
process of negotiations on border alignment. The Chinese leadership and officials hold the
determination of the LAC to be a critical matter, and have usually followed an extremely reserved
approach. In 1999, the issue of demarcation of the LAC gained momentum, during the visit of
India’s then-External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh. The two sides also formally exchanged their
respective maps of the middle sector in 2001, however one-year later, an Indian proposal to set a
time frame for exchanging maps and addressing the clarification of the western and eastern sectors
failed to elicit a cogent response from China, and the matter stagnated (Yuan 2007, 133).
Indian experts observe that the Chinese lack of interest in providing clarification on the LAC is
related to Beijing’s shift in policy on the border dispute. In the post-war period, China has
withdrawn the package deal originally proposed by Zhou Enlai and now claims the entire state of
Arunachal Pradesh. Although initially, Chinese interests in Arunachal Pradesh were limited only to
Tawang, in recent years their claims have expanded to include the entire state. For instance, in 2006,
before the visit to India by China’s then-President Hu Jintao, the PRC ambassador to India Sun Yuxi
declared all of Arunachal Pradesh to be Chinese territory, and that Tawang was merely a small
portion of it. Chinese commentators lament that it was a great political mistake on China’s part to
give up NEFA or modern day Arunachal Pradesh (Chaudhury 2006; Panda 2017, 39). In 2007,
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that mere presence in populated areas would not affect
China’s claims: a stance that is problematic because it is a clear reversal of Beijing’s earlier agreement
to abide by the principle to safeguard the interests of the settled populations in the border areas. It
also suggests that, in the future, China might unilaterally reject any principle that is inconvenient to
its national interests (Panda 2017, 40). In response to Indian allegations, China argues that there are
two reasons why China is reluctant to demarcate the LAC; first because such a process will take both
countries back to the historical disputes and once again entrap bilateral ties within the historical and
legal approach, which in turn will inhibit the overall development of Sino-Indian relations. Second,
China is charging New Delhi with taking advantage of the clarification process to increase the
disputed area into places where no dispute existed before, although Beijing is unable to provide any
concrete evidence to support this claim (Lin 2020, 83).
Managing the Border Dispute
After 1962 war it took India and China ten years to restore diplomatic ties, and post-
normalisation, the two countries were faced with the dual challenge of resolving the border dispute
while simultaneously maintaining peace along the undemarcated border. The Indian foreign
minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited China in 1979, helping to ease tensions in bilateral ties, and
Sino-Indian talks on the border dispute started in the 1980s. However, confidence-building measures
were initiated only in the 1990s when border patrols of the two countries had begun to clash again
(Hussain 2019, 262).
In 1981, border talks commenced at the vice-ministerial level, and were followed by seven
more separate rounds of meetings. Although bilateral ties deteriorated due to the military standoff
during the Sumdorong Chu crisis, however, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit turned out to
be a definitive moment. The two countries agreed to set up the Joint Working Group for settlement
of the boundary question with a twin mandate of ensuring peace and tranquillity along the LAC and
working toward a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question
(Scott 2012, 204; Sidhu and Yuan 2003, 23–24).[1] A major breakthrough was achieved in 1993,
during P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing. The two leaders penned the Agreement on the
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, which called for a renunciation of the use of force,
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recognition of and respect for the LAC, and the resolution of the border issue through negotiations
(Stimson Centre 1993). Another high point of border dispute management was reached with 1996
signing of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in
the India-China Border Areas (United Nations 1996). The agreement laid down pledges on non-
aggression, prior notification of large troop movements, and exchange of maps to resolve
disagreements over the LAC. The two documents remain significant in the context of Sino-Indian
border negotiations, because both countries finally acknowledged that certain problems exist in their
border regions and that there is need for institutional mechanisms to manage these problems.
Following the successful conclusion of these two agreements, China and India in June 2003
adopted the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation between India
and China, whereby each side agreed to appoint special representatives to explore ways for
settlement of the boundary dispute keeping in view the political perspectives of both countries
(Sidhu and Yuan 2001). It should be noted that the Special Representative Dialogue[2] mechanism
has become one of the crucial negotiation strategies in recent years, and through the Special
Representative talks the two countries have reached a broad consensus on outlining guidelines for
the settling of the boundary dispute. A supporting mechanism for the Special Representative Talks
was established in 2012 in the form of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Co-ordination
on India-China Border Affairs. This apparatus was specially tasked to address and manage issues
arising out of tensions in the border regions (Panda 2017, 43–45).
A more concrete framework for settlement of the territorial dispute was instituted in 2005 with
the signing of The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China
Boundary Questions. According to this protocol, the two countries recognised the need to initiate the
process of early clarification and confirmation of the alignment of the LAC along with undertaking
meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary
question. The most recent document inked between the two countries, the Border Defence Co-
operation Agreement (2013), was signed following the Depsang Valley incident (Panda 2017, 43–45).
Assessing the success of Border Dispute Management Talks and Confidence-Building
Measures
The success of the bilateral dialogue mechanisms and confidence-building measures described
above needs to be assessed according to three aspects; management of border conflict, addressing
the bilateral trust deficit, and resolution of the border dispute.
A cursory review of the state of affairs indicates that, in all three aspects, both countries have
achieved minimal success. For instance, in the matter of border conflict management, the
maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the LAC has been one of the most important stated
objectives. Although China and India have been able to avert a major 1962-style confrontation, the
number of military incursions by China has risen sharply, from 334 in 2014 to 606 in 2019 (Bhonsale
2018). Also, military standoffs between the two countries have grown longer and more difficult to
resolve; the 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff continued for eight months, the 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi
incident continued for a full month, the Doklam crisis in 2017 lasted for 70 days, and the Galwan
Valley military standoff led to severe military clashes; and the stalemate continues. Simultaneously,
local feuds between the armies have inclined toward more violence, that is from fist fights and
throwing stones, the armies of the two sides have resorted to more violent measures including the
use of clubs studded with nails or wrapped with metal barbed wire (Gettleman, Kumar, and Yasir
2020). These instances point toward a lack of local-level communication and understanding, which
persists amid the backdrop of diplomatic proclamations of friendship and cooperation.
Likewise, despite high level political and diplomatic exchanges and frequent meetings of the
top leadership, the trust deficit between the two countries has only widened. There exists the
perception of a considerable security threat on both sides as India and China have moved rapidly to
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upgrade their border infrastructure and military capabilities along the disputed border on the
sidelines of the Special Representative Talks and Joint Working Group meetings. In recent years, a
vigorous border infrastructure race has developed between the two countries, wherein both sides
have engaged in building extensive road and railway connections on their respective sides of the
border, upgrading military facilities, and increasing overall troop deployments for quick
mobilisation. This in turn has aggravated insecurities in both countries and is considered one of the
primary reasons for the frequent border skirmishes along the LAC. In particular, the Doklam (2017)
and Galwan Valley (2020) clashes were triggered by road-building activities undertaken by China
and India, respectively (Jakhar 2020). Apart from upgrading military infrastructure along the border,
both sides have also invested heavily in modernising their conventional and non-conventional
combat forces as an indication of battle preparedness to the other (Ramachandran 2016). In view of
increasing military capabilities, assertive behaviour and intense distrust, the notion of peace along
the LAC seems dependent on the political wisdom of their respective governments.
Even after fifteen rounds of Joint Working Group meetings and eighteen rounds of Special
Representative Dialogues, the border dispute is far from being resolved. Even though the
negotiation process follows a generous principle of package settlement through a sectoral approach,
the two countries have failed to go beyond routine delegation meetings and joint declarations. The
ascent to power of Xi Jinping in China and Narendra Modi in India, known for their strong
leadership and corporate style of politics, had raised hopes for a final settlement of the border
dispute, but domestic political considerations and strategic threat perceptions continue to severely
constrain the ability of these political leaders to undertake sweeping decisions to resolve the dispute.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead
The border dispute undeniably remains one of the major issues impinging on Sino-Indian
bilateral ties. Experts contend that there are multiple factors today which sustain the border dispute.
The first is the geographical constitution of the disputed areas: The rugged, featureless terrain and
extreme weather conditions make determination of the precise alignment challenging. Subsequently,
implementation of border agreements on the ground also remains elusive. Second, there is
asymmetry in the level of urgency for the settlement of the border dispute. In contrast to New
Delhi’s endeavours seeking a quick settlement, Beijing has staunchly resisted any fast-tracking of the
resolution process, arguing that the border dispute is a complicated question and should be
negotiated only when conditions are favourable. The primary reason for this difference in
approaches is that the disputed border does not pose a security threat to China, and therefore Beijing
is willing to wait for a more beneficial resolution. In contrast, New Delhi sees the border dispute as
source of instability and worries and that China would use the unresolved border to bully India. The
third factor inhibiting the resolution of the border dispute is intense nationalism in both countries.
For China, the border dispute is intrinsically linked to Tibet and the Dalai Lama, and since the CCP
has always projected the Tibetan government-in-exile in a negative light, territorial concessions
involving Tawang will not only endanger China’s own rule in Tibet but will also be seen
domestically as sign of weakness; a terrifying prospect for the Chinese leadership. As for India, no
political party would be able to propose a territorial exchange with China without seriously
jeopardising its electoral prospects, as the memories of 1962 war continue to haunt the Indian
national psyche. Lastly, along with the boundary dispute, new issues have begun to stir trouble in
Sino-Indian bilateral ties. India’s concerns regarding China’s diversion of the Yarlung-
Tsangpo/Brahmaputra river water, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and China’s growing
influence in South Asia have emerged as new irritants for Indian policy makers. Similarly, Beijing
too is annoyed by India’s increasing proximity with Southeast Asian countries and its diplomatic-
military exchanges with the United States, Japan, and Australia. These issues further erode political
will in both countries and in this context territorial exchange by swap or political settlement appears
a daunting task.
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As evinced by the recent Galwan Valley clashes, managing the border dispute is both a
political and an economic exigency for India and China because any major confrontation between
the two countries will not only hurt the long-term prospects for development of both, but will also
have significant repercussions on Asian stability and prosperity. Therefore, the policy-making elites
of both countries need to frame innovative solutions like creating soft borders through civilian,
cultural, and economic exchanges, and involving local communities in managing the border (Ranjan
2021). Such an approach can help reduce the number of military encounters between the two
countries and create an enduring peace in the border region. The two countries should also aim
toward building strategic trust through open dialogue, exchange of information, and verification
mechanisms along the disputed border. Enhancing military-to-military communication,
technological collaboration and engagement on multilateral platforms remain indispensible toward
building trust. Public perception is another key area that needs to be urgently addressed through
civilian exchanges. This would go a long way toward dispelling stereotypes and negative
perceptions. Track-II dialogue involving strategic-affairs experts and academics from the two
countries could also be organized to identify new areas for cooperation. For the foreseeable future,
the border dispute will remain a pressing challenge in Sino-Indian ties, however, it is in the national
interest of both countries to prioritise their larger bilateral relationship, while at the same time
erecting confidence-building measures and dialogue mechanisms to better preserve the benefits
accruing from the relationship.

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN INDIA
What’s really happening?
Farhan Mujahid Chak (Associate Professor of International Affairs, Qatar University)
Nowhere in the world has Islamophobia as dangerously manifested as it has in India today.
Well-known academic and Islamophobia specialist Khaled Beydoun has categorically described
India as the “epicenter of global Islamophobia.” This is not just because of the frequency of
Islamophic attacks – a daily occurrence now – or the depth of depravity when listening to the
demonizing language or even the level of violence perpetrated against Muslims. Beyond that, the
gravity of Islamophobia in India is twofold: first, the unabashed institutional support for
Islamophobia in the highest political offices in the country documented by Human Rights Watch
(HRW) and second is no recourse for Indian Muslims to appeal to the judiciary, police or any other
legal authorities for meaningful protection.
Today, it’s open season on Muslims in India. With such hubris, there isn’t even the pretence of
abiding by the rule of law or acknowledging the rights of minorities. It is a rabid, unadulterated,
hate-mongering that demonstrates in the most obscene of ways. This includes well-documented,
blatant prejudice and discrimination against Muslims and other minorities that has stripped
citizenship from millions of people and demagoguery that threatens to lynch Muslims in broad
daylight – with police watching. In a twisted way, there seems to be a sense of amusement, even
glee, at the rising levels of hate speech and violence directed toward Muslims, Christians, Dalits,
Sikhs and other minorites.
All this makes the unabashed nature of Islamophobia in India a monstrosity. Now, as if all this
wasn't enough, two official, highly ranked representatives of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
Nupur Sharma and Naveen Jindal, have made inexcusable comments about the Prophet
Muhammad. The Muslim world has been enraged, and the Arabian Gulf has led the pushback and
are openly condemning the slippery-tongued, two-faced Hindutva fascists who benefit from the
Gulf economy and still insult its most sacred values. Even though, both perpetrators have had
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charges filed against them, it does not seem to be enough. In fact, Sharma was online balking at the
charges and suggesting that the Indian people and the BJP stand with her. What now?
First, the Arabian Gulf has been closely watching, with considerable concern, the violent
nature of Hindutva fascism in India. More and more, leadership in Gulf countries have expressed
concern, now outright anger, at attacks on Muslims in India. This is because the Arabian Gulf is
home to millions of Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Afghans. Not only that, there are deep
historical, cultural and religious links between South Asian and the Gulf region. If any region
understands South Asia, it is here. Therefore, it should be of no surprise that the Gulf has finally
thrown down the gauntlet. In a pointed tweet, Qatar’s Assistant Foreign Minister Lolwah al-Khater
said: “The Islamophobic discourse has reached dangerous levels in a country long known for its
diversity and coexistence. Unless officially and systemically confronted, the systemic hate speech
targeting Islam in India will be considered a deliberate insult against 2 billion Muslims.”
Likewise, Kuwait lodged a strong protest against India's ambassador, amid growing calls on
social media for a boycott of Indian goods in the Gulf. The Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman
described the “obscene rudeness” of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party towards Islam as
a form of “war.” At the time of writing, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran,
Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all condemned the comments. In
addition, both the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) also condemned the remarks. India is, rightfully, in panic mode.
India and the GCC countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE –
have strong economic ties. The Arabian Gulf is home to about 9.3 million Indian residents and is a
major source of remittances for India. In fact, Indian expats in the Gulf remitted about $49 billion in
2019 – %2 of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) and two-thirds of total remittances to the country
that year. That is huge, and considering the economic difficulties India is currently facing, it is
bewildering that it continues to toe an Islamophobic line the way it does. Any economic sanctions
from the Arabian Gulf to India would have a devastating impact on its troubled economy.
The BJP has long faced accusations of stoking anti-Muslim sentiment in India and pursuing
policies that discriminate against Muslims and other religious minorities. In March, India objected to
the creation of a United Nations-recognised international day to combat Islamophobia that was
deftly coordinated by Pakistan under the leadership of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. But, still
there was no large-scale condemnation of India for doing so. Now, the situation has turned. And the
Arabian Gulf is furious at this Hindutva demagoguery.
To understand the origins of Islamophobia in India, its important to consider its direct link to
the Hindutva social imaginary, a poisonous social imaginary that paints a misleading, false,
monolithic image of India and then positions Muslims as its nemesis. Unless this imagainary is
challenged, Islamophobia and violence will continue to rise. Already, that demonizing narrative is
being used to justify acts of violence such as “cow vigilantism,” also known as “gau rakshak,” which
has led to lynching of Muslims on the dubious, perverse rationale that they are secretly killing cows.
Ironically, a country where cows are sacred is among the largest beef exporters in the world, “ghar
wapsi” – forced conversion. India is encouraging Muslims to convert to Hinduism under the threat
of violence. All in all, there is a carefully orchestrated strategy with clear political support to
demonize Islam and Muslims to rationalize crimes against them both in India and Kashmir. Finally,
now, it seems enough is enough and the Arabian Gulf has decided to retaliate, and it remains to be
seen how India will respond.
(Source: Daily Sabah)
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THE MAKING OF HINDU INDIA

Yasmeen Serhan
When the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, paving the way for the
independence of the newly partitioned nations of India and Pakistan, the Muslims of the region had
a choice. They could resettle in Pakistan, where they would be among a Muslim majority, or remain
in India, where they would live as a minority in a majority-Hindu but constitutionally secular state.
For Shah Alam Khan, whose great-grandparents were among the roughly 35 million Muslims
who opted to live on the Indian side of the Radcliffe Line in the aftermath of Partition, his family’s
decision was in many ways a political gamble. “They didn’t want to go to a theocratic state,” Khan
told me from his home in Delhi. Indeed, when Pakistan finally adopted a constitution, nine years
after Partition, it enshrined Islam as the state religion.
For his family, the promise of a pluralist India, as envisaged by the country’s founders,
trumped the warnings of the pro-Partition Muslim League (which went on to become the party of
Pakistan’s founders) that a Muslim minority would inevitably be subordinate to the Hindu majority.
Seventy-five years later, those warnings have gained a new prescience. Nominally, India
remains a secular state and a multifaith democracy. Religious minorities account for roughly 20 per
cent of the country’s 1.4 billion people, who include about 200 million Muslims and 28 million
Christians.
But beneath the country’s ostensible inclusivity runs an undercurrent of Hindu nationalism
that has gained strength during the eight-year rule of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The concern
shared by many among the country’s religious minorities, as well as by more secular-minded
liberals within the Hindu majority, is that the country’s secular and inclusive ethos is already
beyond repair.
Muslims and Christians alike have faced a surge in communal violence in recent years. A raft
of new laws has reached into their daily lives to interfere with the religious garments they wear, the
food they eat, where and how they worship, and even whom they marry.
Many of the Indian journalists, lawyers, activists, and religious leaders I’ve spoken with for
this article say that the institutions on which the country once relied to keep this kind of ethnic
supremacism in check — the courts, opposition parties, and independent media — have buckled.
To Khan, it feels as though the India he has inherited is gradually becoming another version of
the theocratic state his family turned away from all those years ago. “They were promised a secular
nation,” he said. For them, and for the country’s religious minorities today, “the unmaking of
secular India is a betrayal.”
This ideal of a pluralist, secular India is popular not only among its religious minorities. A
2021 study conducted by the Pew Research Centre found that by a wide margin, Indians of all faiths
consider religious tolerance an essential part of what it means to be “truly Indian.”
This civic value is as old as the country itself: Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister,
rejected any concept of the nation as Hinduism’s answer to Pakistan. His India would not be
“formally entitled to any religion as a nation,” he said, but a place where all faiths could coexist and
be celebrated equally.
That founding ideology, however, has long been disputed by Hindu nationalists. “To be a
Hindu means a person who sees this land, from the Indus River to the sea, as his country but also as
his Holy Land,” wrote the politician and activist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1923 book,
Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (Hindutva, meaning “Hindu-ness,” has become shorthand for Hindu
nationalism itself.) In Savarkar’s view, only those who regard India as both their country and their
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sacred Hindu homeland could be truly Indian. While Christians and Muslims could fulfil the first
requirement, of patriotism, they would never be able to achieve the second. “Their holyland is far off
in Arabia or Palestine,” Savarkar wrote. “Consequently their names and their outlook smack of a
foreign origin. Their love is divided.”
Modi’s own Hindutva credentials run deep. Before he went into mainstream politics with the
Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, he cut his teeth as a member of its allied paramilitary
organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or RSS.
After his landslide re-election victory in May 2019, one of the first things he did with his new
mandate, in August of that year, was to fulfil a long-standing demand of the RSS by revoking the
special autonomous status of illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir, India’s sole Muslim-majority
territory (over which Pakistan also claims sovereignty).
That same month, the northeastern BJP-led state of Assam published a national registry that
left nearly two million people, many of them Muslim, off the list, casting their Indian citizenship into
doubt. Perhaps the most contentious decision came at the end of the year, when Modi’s government
pressed through a new law granting non-Muslims from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan the
right to seek fast-tracked citizenship in India.
Critics likened the move to a religious test for citizenship, and warned that it would open the
door to additional forms of legal discrimination against Muslims.
These events loom large in Indian politics, but when I spoke with members of India’s Muslim
and Christian communities about how life in India has changed under Modi’s rule, they rarely
came up.
People attested instead to the smaller, often more insidious ways in which the experience of
India’s religious minorities has been altered.
To belong to a religious minority in India today is to feel “there is no future,” an Indian
Muslim from Kashmir, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of government retaliation, told
me. That sentiment is echoed by Ajit Sahi, a former journalist who left India for the United States
days after Modi’s re-election.
“I have friends who are desperate to get out,” Sahi, a secular-inclined Hindu who now serves
as the advocacy director of the Indian American Muslim Council in Washington, D.C., told me.
“There is no future for somebody like me back in India.” Nandita Suneja, who moved from
her native Delhi to Australia in 2019, told me that the communal tensions made her Hindu family’s
decision to leave much easier. She didn’t want to raise her daughter in an “atmosphere of stifling
freedom and hate.”
For Indian Muslims, in particular, the situation is dire. During the recently passed holy month
of Ramazan, they saw their houses and shops bulldozed, their businesses boycotted, and their
religious gatherings heckled by Hindu-nationalist mobs. Open calls for genocide against Muslims
have become commonplace, as have violent clashes and lynchings.
Although the authorities generally avoid the appearance of explicitly endorsing these kinds of
actions, they rarely go out of their way to condemn them. A recent open letter signed by more than
100 former civil servants accused the Indian government of being “fully complicit” in the
subordination of the country’s religious minorities as well as in the undermining of the country’s
constitution.
Shah Alam Khan, who teaches orthopaedic medicine at Delhi’s All India Institute of Medical
Sciences, considers himself relatively privileged compared with most Indian Muslims, who tend to
be among the country’s poorer and more marginalised citizens. But even for him, he says, the
country’s majoritarian turn has forced a change in his quotidian habits. He thinks twice before using
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the greeting Assalamualaikum, or using any other obviously Islamic phrase, in a crowded public
space. Asked for his name, he typically offers only Shah, because it’s more common and less
identifiably Muslim than his surname.
This type of self-surveillance has affected other members of his family. “Whenever I used to
go meet my mom, she used to give me food,” Khan said. “But ever since [Modi] came to power, she
stopped giving me that food, because a large part of that food used to be meat.”
Cows are considered sacred to the Hindu faith, and their slaughter has been proscribed in
most states — a rule often enforced by vigilante mobs. If Khan were stopped by a hostile crowd on
suspicion of carrying beef, his mother feared, he could be arrested, even lynched.
Akif — who asked to be identified by only his first name for fear of persecution — grew up in
what he describes as comfortable circumstances in Aligarh, southwest of Delhi. But that comfort has
slipped in recent years. He won’t leave home wearing traditional Islamic attire if he is going to an
unfamiliar neighbourhood.
His wife, who works in academia, has been asked by colleagues about why she wears a hijab,
the Muslim headscarf, and why she doesn’t work at an Islamic institution. Some of the most
incendiary comments, Akif says, have come from people he considered friends.
These restrictions, compounded by public debates at the local, state, and even national levels
over whether Muslim students should be allowed to wear headscarves in school or how loudly
mosques should broadcast the call to prayer (known as the azaan), have left many Indian Muslims
feeling unwelcome in their own country. “Initially, they came for our dietary habits, now the azaan,”
Rana Ayyub, an Indian journalist and author, told me.
“Every day you wake up and it’s like, ‘Okay, what part of our identity are you going to attack
today?’”
Indian Christians face similar hostility. Attacks on Christians have been rising steadily since
2014, and 2021 was the most violent year on record for the community: The United Christian Forum,
an ecumenical organisation based in Delhi, reported a tally of more than 500 violent incidents — an
80 per cent increase over the previous year.
A human-rights lawyer who works on minority-rights and religious-freedom cases, who
requested anonymity in order to speak candidly about their work, told me that most of these
incidents originate with Hindu-nationalist mobs, which descend on religious gatherings at churches
and in homes to accuse those involved of forcing Christianity upon unsuspecting Hindus, in
violation of the country’s anti-conversion laws. In the violence that ensues, pastors have been
beaten, churches vandalised, and religious schools attacked.
In many cases, rather than intervene to maintain public order, police officers join the mobs,
ready to arrest the suspected Christian proselytisers. In one incident, on April 14, dozens of
worshippers were gathered at a church in the state of Uttar Pradesh to observe Maundy Thursday
when a mob showed up with police. “Everyone was arrested,” the lawyer told me. “‘Who are you
converting? Everyone is detained.’ It was a little bizarre.” That case is still pending.
Hindu-nationalist groups and BJP lawmakers claim that forced conversions are rampant in the
country. But there is little evidence for this. None of the arrests have yet resulted in a single
conviction, A. C. Michael, a former member of the Delhi Minorities Commission and the national
coordinator of the United Christian Forum, told me.
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But if the real purpose of the harassment is to intimidate members of a religious minority, it
has already had its desired effect. “Earlier, we were very proud to display our faith, like wearing a
cross or, if we were travelling, we would say our prayers aloud,” Michael said. “All that has now
stopped.”
This is so far from the India that Nehru’s vision promised that Muslims and Christians now
have little expectation that the state will protect not just their rights but their very lives. “The year I
left India, in 2015, there were several attacks on churches in Delhi,” Dominic Emmanuel, a former
spokesperson of the Delhi Catholic Church who is now based in Vienna, Austria, told me. When he
and his fellow congregants staged a protest against attacks within their church compound, they
were arrested.
(Source: The Atlantic)
 343

Ukraine Crisis
A WAR OF IMPERIALISM
Yemad Fayed Ahmed
The world is once again witnessing a tragic conflict between Russia and Ukraine and Ukraine
is bleeding this time. On Twitter, a photograph of a Ukrainian father bidding farewell to his
daughter has been trending as of late. Anyone with a smidgeon of humanity in their hearts would
never go to war. Will such photographs have an impact on Russian President Vladimir Putin? Will
the plight of innocent children sway the hearts of generals, legislators, and media commentators
who feel that war is a successful business in our sophisticated and civilized world?
Hundreds of such heartbreaking photographs of screaming, wounded, bleeding, and
defenseless children have recently surfaced in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Kashmir,
Palestine, Yemen, and elsewhere. Invading armies crushed humanity for the sake of fake glory, and
people became victims. As Ukraine drowns in blood, I, like millions of others across the world, am
watching the scenario unfold on TV screens and following Twitter trends and social media in
general. After all, before I am a professional, I am a human being and a father, and I cannot suppress
my feelings.
Power and wealth are important to governing elites, emotions and relationships are not;
perhaps this explains why imperialists have never learned from history. From Vietnam through
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, America and Russia have never won a war in my lifetime. Before
entering Afghanistan, Russia was a part of the Soviet Union, and since the humiliating loss that
resulted in the fall of Kabul, many analysts have warned that “the end of America's empire would
not be peaceful.”
But imperialist America would never allow that to happen without a fight, as another war is
always around the corner.
Ukraine has become the battleground for the imperialists now. The Russian invasion of
Ukraine is likely to alter the direction of European and global history. Even though history
demonstrates that the only answer to the Ukraine crisis is peace, not another imperialistic war.
However, the truth is that we simply read and quote history, we seldom learn anything from
it. Once again, the developed and civilized world has failed miserably at establishing peace. It
appears like a new never-ending conflict is about to take shape, one that we will forget about soon.
Who is to blame now that the conflict has begun? Politicians, commentators in the media, or arms
manufacturers? After all, war is a profitable industry that makes billions for those vested.
In recent history, political and military elites, notably in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Europe, have waged merciless wars under the pretense of “establishing democracy”
and alleged terrorist threats, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The harsh reality is that America
and several Western nations have built, sponsored, and even tolerated various rebel and terrorist
groups themselves.
Since then, countries with colonialist pasts have pursued certain groups -- such as al-Qaeda
and other known terrorist groups -- across Europe, Asia, and Africa, particularly in Syria, Libya, and
Somalia, under the guise of establishing democracy in those nations. The results of the United States’
activities in these regions have resulted in nothing but devastation, death, and economic collapse.
Humanity collectively needs to move away from the very notion of war. In the past few
decades, instigating, sponsoring, and approving conflicts all around the world have brought nothing
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to any of the parties involved: What benefits have the United States and its allies reaped in their war
sponsorship? Nothing.
Several notable academics, defense professionals, politicians, and media commentators --
ironically from the United States and the United Kingdom -- have been warning of a full-scale
Russian invasion of Ukraine up until it became a reality. And now we are all left wondering what’s
to come next,
The big issue is whether Russia will stop its unabated devastation of Ukraine or if its invading
soldiers will continue marching westward. Would Russia invade Sweden's Gotland (again)?. Putin
has expansionary intentions for Europe and may seize sections of European territory. It’s safe to
assert that Russia has clear hegemonic designs.
The question is whether Russia will retain control of Ukrainian land if it controls Ukraine. Will
Russia be able to deal with a new opposition movement backed by the United States and its
European allies? Finally, what influence would Russia's invasion of Ukraine have on Asia?
Next, if territorial claims allow Putin to invade an independent nation and publicly assist and
acknowledge rebels in Eastern Ukraine, other powerful countries, such as China, may follow in
Putin's footsteps. So, what happens next? Where will it all come to an end? Has a peaceful world
ever been a part of Putin’s designs as a world leader? The answer to that last question is what
should concern us all.
(Source: Dhaka Tribune)

HOW UKRAINE WILL WIN

Kyiv’s Theory of Victory
Dmytro Kuleba
As Russia’s all-out war of aggression in Ukraine drags on for a fourth consecutive month, calls
for dangerous deals are getting louder. As fatigue grows and attention wanders, more and more
Kremlin-leaning commentators are proposing to sell out Ukraine for the sake of peace and economic
stability in their own countries. Although they may pose as pacifists or realists, they are better
understood as enablers of Russian imperialism and war crimes.
It is only natural that people and governments lose interest in conflicts as they drag on. It’s a
process that has played out many times throughout history. The world stopped paying attention to
the war in Libya after former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi was toppled from power, in 2011. It
disengaged from Syria, Yemen, and other ongoing conflicts that once generated front-page news.
And as I know well, the rest of the world lost interest in Ukraine after 2015, even as we continued to
fight Russian forces for control over the eastern part of the country.
But Russia’s current invasion is graver than its past one, and the world cannot afford to turn
away. That’s because Russian President Vladimir Putin does not simply want to take more
Ukrainian territory. His ambitions don’t even stop at seizing control of the entire country. He wants
to eviscerate Ukrainian nationhood and wipe our people off the map, both by slaughtering us and
by destroying the hallmarks of our identity. He is, in other words, engaged in a campaign of
genocide.
To avoid growing weary of the war and falling for misleading narratives, the West needs to
understand exactly how Ukraine can win, and then support us accordingly. This war is existential,
and we are motivated to fight. Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are
already exhausted—past the breaking point. We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s
south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect. To succeed,
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however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with
appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons. They must also maintain and increase sanctions
against Russia. And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help
Putin before he makes serious concessions.
Compromising with Russia may seem tempting to some abroad, especially as the costs of the
war grow, but bowing to Putin’s aggression will help him destroy more of our nation, embolden his
government to carry out attacks elsewhere in the world, and allow him to rewrite the rules of the
global order. His approach to talks could change; if we succeed in pushing back Russian troops far
enough, Putin may be compelled to come to the table and deal in good faith. But getting there will
require that the West exercise patient dedication to one outcome: a complete and total Ukrainian
victory.
WON’T BACK DOWN
From the minute Russian forces poured across Ukraine’s borders, some Western
commentators have called for a compromise with Moscow. We are used to these kinds of
suggestions and heard them many times between 2014 and 2022. But today’s war is different from
the war that raged before February, and in recent weeks these calls have started coming from
prominent foreign policy elites. In early June, French President Emmanuel Macron told journalists
that the West “must not humiliate Russia” so that it can “build an exit ramp” for the country to end
the war. Speaking to the World Economic Forum in May, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger went further, arguing that Ukraine should cede territory to Russia in exchange for peace.
These declarations are premised on the idea that Ukrainians, no matter how well they fight,
cannot defeat Moscow’s forces. But that notion is wrong. Ukraine has proved its mettle by achieving
important victories in the battles of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy, causing Putin’s blitzkrieg
to fail spectacularly. Winning these fights has come at a huge price for Ukrainians, but we
understood that the price of losing them would have been far, far higher. We know what Russian
victory means for our villages and towns. Look no further than Bucha, where hundreds of
Ukrainians were brutally slaughtered by occupying Russian troops in March.
Unfortunately, Putin’s sick imperialism means that Moscow also remains committed to the
war despite the shockingly high costs. Russia has already lost three times as many soldiers as the
Soviet Union did during ten years in Afghanistan, but it is continuing to sacrifice its troops in an
attempt to seize the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk (together known as the Donbas) and
to maintain control over the south of Ukraine. The death count may soon extend beyond just Russia,
Ukraine, and even Europe. By blockading Ukrainian grain to try to force sanctions relief, Putin could
provoke famines across the developing world.
Despite the carnage, Russia’s president appears to be in a good mood. According to leaders
who have recently spoken to Putin, he is sure that his “special operation” will, as we heard he told
one European leader, “achieve its goals.” It isn’t hard to see why: Russian invaders have been able to
crawl forward in the Donbas by resorting to total artillery terror. Putin has begun comparing himself
to Peter the Great—perhaps the Russian empire’s most famous conqueror. It’s an ominous
declaration, one that suggests that Putin will not settle for control over the Donbas or for control
over Ukraine as a whole.
The most effective way to end Putin’s expansionism, of course, is to stop it in eastern Ukraine,
before he can go further, and to kick his occupying forces out of southern Ukraine, which he plans to
annex. This fact requires helping Ukraine defeat Putin on its own battlefield. U.S. President Joe
Biden’s administration has made some groundbreaking decisions that can help us accomplish this
task, including a historic new lend-lease program that makes it easier for the United States to supply
Ukraine with weapons. Answering Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s call, the United
States decided in May to also provide us with four multiple-launch rocket systems. My counterpart
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and friend U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been closely engaged in crafting these steps,
and Ukraine’s military leaders have been in active contact with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin. General Mark Milley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has also been very
supportive of our cause.
This assistance has been a crucial first step, for which we are grateful. Yet we wish it had been
provided much earlier, and it is still too little. Now it is time to turn political decisions into real
game-changing actions. Russian artillery outguns ours by one to 15 at the most crucial parts of the
frontline, so a few U.S. rocket systems will not be nearly enough for us to gain the upper hand. We
urgently need more heavy weapons from various sources to turn the tide in our favor and save lives.
Our most pressing needs are for hundreds of multiple-launch rocket systems and various 155-mm
artillery pieces. These weapons would allow us to suppress Russia’s artillery barrage. But stopping
artillery is not Ukraine’s only concern. We also need antiship missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, air
defense, and combat aircraft to be able to launch effective counterattacks.
In short, we need weapons that prove that the West is committed to helping us actually win—
rather than to just not letting us lose.
LIVE FREE OR DIE HARD
Since the invasion began, Ukraine has repeatedly tried to find a diplomatic settlement with
Russia. But Putin has rejected any meaningful talks because he expects that Western support for
Ukraine will wane as the war grinds on. It’s natural to feel worn out by months of full-scale war. But
Russia’s war is driven by genocidal intent, and so Ukraine and the whole of the West simply cannot
agree to Russia’s demands. As Putin declared two days before the invasion, Ukraine’s very existence
is a mistake—the Soviet Union, he said, “created” Ukraine by casually drawing boundaries on a
map—and our country must be erased. In his view, Ukrainians can either become Russians or die.
Putin has made good on this promise. After taking territory, Russian forces have looked
through kill lists drawn up by the Federal Security Service and knocked on doors. They have
tortured and executed people who teach Ukraine’s language and history, civil society activists,
human rights defenders, former Ukrainian soldiers, local authorities, and plenty of others. They
have changed road signs from Ukrainian to Russian, destroyed Ukrainian monuments, banned
Ukrainian television, and prohibited the Ukrainian language from being used in schools.
We in Ukraine are not surprised by this brutal campaign. We have a deep knowledge of
Russia and have watched for centuries as Russian intellectuals and state-controlled media incited
hatred toward our nation. We have also seen how Moscow’s animosity extends beyond our borders.
Russian media routinely condemns other neighboring states, the West more broadly, and a variety
of minority groups—including Jews and LGBTQ people. The Russian political elite has a
generalized, deep-seated loathing of others.
This hatred is yet another reason why the West cannot afford to wave the white flag. A
Russian military victory would not just enable the torture, rape, and murder of many more
thousands of innocent Ukrainians. It would undermine liberal values. It would free up Russia to
menace central Europe. Indeed, it would allow Russia to threaten the Western world at large. There
is nothing more dangerous for the European Union and NATO than having an emboldened Russia
or pro-Russian proxy across more of its eastern borders.
Thankfully for Europe and the United States, Ukraine is fighting this dark force, and it is
motivated to keep doing so until it wins. But we cannot succeed alone, and the West must
understand the stakes and consequences of our failure. If we lose, there will not just be no more
Ukraine; there will be no prosperity or security in Europe.
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BAD TO WORSE
It is unrealistic to suggest that Ukraine sacrifice its people, territory, and sovereignty in
exchange for nominal peace, and these recent calls for compromise are merely a byproduct of a
growing fatigue. I have spoken with a number of decision-makers in African, Arab, and Asian states.
Some of them started our conversations by affirming their support for our cause before making a
hard pivot, politely proposing that we simply stop resisting. It’s an unthinkable proposition, but
their reasoning is simple: they want the grain trapped in our ports by Russia’s naval blockade, and
they are willing to sacrifice Ukrainian independence to get it. Other policymakers peddling
concessions have expressed concerns about similar Russian-provoked economic crises, including
spiraling inflation and energy prices.
But although rising food and energy costs are serious problems, giving in to Moscow is no
solution—and not only because of what it will mean for Ukrainians. Russia is a revanchist country
bent on remaking the entire world through force. It actively works to destabilize African, Arab, and
Asian states both through its own military and through proxies. These conflicts have created their
own humanitarian crises, and if Ukraine loses they will only grow worse. In victory, Putin would be
emboldened to stir up more unrest and create more disasters across the developing world.
Putin’s increased aggression wouldn’t be limited to the developing world. He would meddle
with more vigor in U.S. and European politics. If he succeeds in conquering Ukraine’s south, he may
march deeper into the continent by invading Moldova, where Russian proxies already control a slice
of territory. He could even trigger a new war in the western Balkans, where increasingly
antagonistic Serbian elites have looked to Russia for inspiration and support.
The West must therefore not suggest peace initiatives with unacceptable terms and instead
help Ukraine win. That means not just providing Ukraine with the heavy weaponry it needs to fight
off Moscow’s forces; it also means maintaining and increasing sanctions against Russia. Critically,
the West must kill Russian exports by imposing a full energy embargo and cutting off Russian access
to the international maritime shipping industry. The latter step may seem difficult to carry out, but it
is, in fact, highly achievable: Russia’s export-oriented economy relies heavily on foreign fleets to
deliver its goods abroad, and the fleets could stop serving the country.
These economic measures are key. Sanctions have undermined the Russian economy and
impeded its ability to continue the war. But Moscow still feels confident about its decision, and so
the West cannot afford any sanctions fatigue—regardless of the broader economic costs.
THE PATH TO VICTORY
Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how
we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With
sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories.
In the east, Ukraine can gain the upper hand with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing
us to gradually stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas. (The Kremlin’s gains in this region
may make headlines, but it is important to remember that they are limited and have resulted in
extremely high Russian casualties.) The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use
Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in
Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land,
forcing Russians to retreat here and there.
On the battlefront in the south, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already carrying out
counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses. We will
aim to put the Russians on the edge of needing to abandon Kherson—a city that is key to the strategic
stability of Ukraine. If we advance in both the south and the east, we can force Putin to choose between
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abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, in order to cling onto the Donbas, and
abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.
When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire
negotiations. Our goal will still be to get Russian forces out of Ukraine, and keeping up the pressure
may push Putin to accept a negotiated solution that entails Russian troops withdrawing from all
occupied territories. Putin, after all, pulled Russian troops from the areas around Kyiv after
encountering enough setbacks at the hands of our forces. If our military grows stronger and more
successful, he will have good reasons to do so again. For example, it will be easier to present a
retreat as an act of goodwill before further negotiations, instead of as an act of embarrassing
necessity, if it is organized rather than hasty. Putin could even claim that the “special operation” has
successfully achieved its goals of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, whatever this means for
him. By publishing images of destroyed Ukrainian units and equipment, Putin’s propaganda
machine will reinforce a message of success. Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal
as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.
But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until
he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s
internationally recognized border. And whether Russian troops choose to retreat or are forced to,
Ukraine will be able to speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic
settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia. It ultimately means that Putin will be
forced to accept Ukrainian terms, even if he denies it publicly.
THE ONLY THING TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF
Some Western decision-makers are also wary of doing too much to help Ukraine because they
are scared of what Putin might do if he is roundly defeated on the battlefield. In their view, an
angry, isolated Russian president might start new campaigns of international aggression. They
worry that he will generally become more dangerous and difficult to deal with. Some fear that he
might even use his country’s formidable nuclear arsenal.
But Putin is not suicidal; a Ukrainian victory will not lead to nuclear warfare. Such fears may
be deliberately fueled by the Kremlin itself for strategic purposes. Putin is a master of gaslighting,
and I am sure that Russians themselves are peddling worries of a cornered Putin in order to weaken
Western support for Ukraine.
The United States and Europe shouldn’t fall for it. Actual experience shows that whenever
Putin faces a failure he opts to downplay and conceal it, not to double down. Finland and Sweden’s
applications for NATO membership, for example, were a clear political defeat for Putin, who
claimed that he launched his invasion of Ukraine to prevent further NATO enlargement. But it
wasn’t followed by any escalation. Instead, Russian propaganda minimized its significance. The
Kremlin claimed that the withdrawal from Kyiv, another clear failure, was a gesture of “goodwill”
to facilitate negotiations. The same pattern will apply to a broader battleground defeat. (The strength
of his propaganda apparatus will help minimize the domestic backlash Putin faces for losing in
Ukraine.)
Instead of focusing on Putin’s feelings, the United States and Europe should focus on practical
steps to help Ukraine prevail. They should remember that a Ukrainian victory would make the
world more secure. It would deplete Russian forces, making it harder for Moscow to meddle in
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the western Balkans. It would promote global stability more
broadly by strengthening international law and demonstrating to other would-be aggressors that
barbarism ends poorly. The West, then, must give Kyiv what it needs to push Russian invaders back.
Committing to Ukraine’s victory will have one final advantage: it will eliminate the
uncertainty in the long-term strategies of the United States and Europe toward Russia, girding them
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for the long haul and helping them no longer be plagued by war fatigue. They will see that our
mission—substantially weakening Russia—will enable them, and the rest of the world, to seriously
negotiate with a humbled and more constructive Moscow.
We look forward to this day; any war ends with diplomacy. But that moment has not yet
come. Right now, it is clear that Putin’s path to the negotiating table lies solely through battleground
defeats.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)

NEW CONCEPTS BUT OLD PROBLEMS

NATO’s New Strategic Concept
Ed Arnold
The plans for NATO outlined at the Madrid summit include some major changes to the
Alliance’s posture. But the real work starts now in translating political rhetoric into action.
NATO has unveiled its new Strategic Concept, which defines the Alliance’s purpose to 2030.
It’s the eighth in its history and comes at a decisive time for the Alliance, as large-scale land warfare
returns to the European continent. Even excluding the war in Ukraine, this week’s Madrid summit
would have been significant.
NATO has struggled to articulate its purpose since the end of the Cold War and especially
since the 9/11 attacks, after which terrorism dominated the international security agenda. Since the
previous strategic concept the Alliance has had to weather rising political tensions – on both sides of
the Atlantic – during the Donald Trump presidency, including French President Emmanuel Macron
accusing the organisation of becoming ‘braindead’. Operationally, NATO experienced strategic
failure in Afghanistan – its most ambitious mission – brutally underlined by the 2021 fall of Kabul
and the chaotic withdrawal of Western forces. The 2011 intervention in Libya produced no better
outcomes. Fighting these expeditionary operations has bent the Alliance out of shape and made it
more difficult to reconfigure towards conventional warfighting in Europe.
Combined with the war in Ukraine and renewed Russian aggression, the Madrid summit was
an opportunity for NATO to draw a line under a 20-year period of ‘out of area’ crisis management
operations, and a chance to go back to basics and focus on its core purpose: the collective defence of
the Euro-Atlantic area.
Reprioritisation not Revolution
The new strategic concept is the first since the Lisbon summit 12 years ago and reflects the
changes in the strategic environment in several ways. First, Lisbon assessed that ‘the Euro-Atlantic
area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low’, whereas now
the ‘the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace… We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against
Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity’. Second, Lisbon described a desire ‘to see a true strategic
partnership between NATO and Russia’, a country now identified as ‘the most significant and direct
threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. Third, China did not
receive a single mention in 2010; now, it is described as a ‘systemic challenge’ to Euro-Atlantic
security. Furthermore, the relationship between Russia and China is described as a ‘deepening
strategic partnership’ which is also likely to threaten the Alliance. And then, the latest strategy
document declares that ‘hybrid operations against Allies could reach the level of armed attack and
could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty’ – a mention
which, although hazy, features for the first time in an official document.
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The wording has changed, but the core tasks remain broadly the same: defence and deterrence
(previously collective defence), crisis prevention and management (previously just crisis
management), and cooperative security. The document reprioritises away from crisis management
and towards defence and deterrence. Surprisingly, given the importance of environmental issues,
‘resilience’ does not become a core task, but the cross-cutting importance of technological
innovation, climate change, human security and the ‘Women, Peace and Security agenda’ all
support the core tasks.
The Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area
While it dominated the discussion, the Madrid summit was not just about the Strategic
Concept.
Operationally, NATO has announced a significant hardening of its defence and deterrence
posture to be able to ‘defend every inch of Allied territory’ and recommitted to a 360-degree
approach to security through several enhancements. First, there is a doubling from four to eight
multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe, which has already led to a near-tenfold increase in
troops deployed to the Eastern flank. Moreover, these battlegroups will soon include brigade
headquarters to rapidly scale up posture if necessary, with associated NATO reinforcement plans at
‘short and no notice’. Second, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been expanded from 40,000 to
over 300,000 troops, to be held at higher levels of readiness. Third, in a complete antithesis to
President Vladimir Putin’s intent, Sweden and Finland will now be able to join the Alliance, after
Turkey withdrew its objections in time for Madrid, significantly enhancing political unity.
The eventual accession of Finland and Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe’s (SACEUR) land area of operations by over 866,000 square kilometres. It also changes the
European security architecture in more subtle ways. For example, it means that seven out of eight
Arctic Council members will also be NATO members, changing the dynamic at a time when NATO
needs to cooperate with Russia on climate security, which is also heavily stressed in the new
Strategic Concept. Moreover, NATO and the EU are now more closely aligned in terms of their
membership – only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are members of the EU but not NATO – at
exactly the moment when European states need to step up defensively.
These announcements are politically momentous, but also entail a huge risk. The big troop
increases will be very expensive as member states experience increasing spending pressures. If these
statements are not backed up (there are a total of 71 ‘we will’ commitments across 11 pages), the
Alliance could lose trust and credibility, and therefore effective deterrence. There is also the real
possibility of opening old wounds on burden sharing, especially between the US and European
allies, which could further destabilise the Alliance, especially if a Trump-like character is able to
secure election to the White House in 2024. European security documents and communiques, both
from NATO and the EU, are graveyards of unrealised rapid reaction force ambitions which were
luckily never tested by the security environment. It is politically unacceptable to Eastern members to
continue to tolerate this risk. There are already reports that cast real doubt on the ability to realise
the new force model.
How Much Does the Strategic Concept Actually Matter?
Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However,
militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund
since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been
operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in
many ways the hard work starts now.
There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two
main plans – SACEUR’s Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the
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future NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept – have already matured. There was tacit
acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be
revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient,
and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it
fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now
becomes the backbone for its development.
Moreover, despite the collective might of NATO, it cannot do everything, and the
commitment at the 2015 Warsaw summit to a ‘360-degree approach’ to security – both thematically
and geographically – risks overstretch. In a hardening world, the Alliance must take the opportunity
to go back to its roots and seek support from other actors, such as the EU. It is still expected that a
NATO–EU joint declaration will materialise before the end of the year.
NATO’s Russia Problem
The new Strategic Concept identifies and defines the Russian threat for the remainder of the
decade. But threat identification is only half of the job, and ‘threat mitigation’ – or the actual activity
– is the priority. In this regard, the document lacks the vision and a realistic timeframe for
understanding the parameters of the NATO–Russia confrontation.
This is not just a NATO issue, but its self-declared ‘unique, essential and indispensable’ role in
European security is important in influencing and managing Russian behaviour. The Strategic
Concept states that ‘Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms
control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our
security’. To achieve this, it is first critical to understand which key tenets of European security, or
parts thereof, are still in play; what can be built on; and what must be discarded. This applies to the
Washington Treaty 1949; the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990; the
NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997; the OSCE Istanbul Document 1999; and the Vienna Document
2011. Moreover, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990, the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987, the Treaty on Open Skies 1992, and the Chemical Weapons Convention
1993 all appear moribund, albeit for different reasons.
It is important that future engagement with Russia is designed in a way that incentivises
cooperation and builds a structure for dialogue that reflects the future strategic environment, rather
than the context of the Cold War. The fundamental problem is a lack of trust on both sides, and
therefore a low likelihood of compliance if an agreement could be achieved. Collective security is
not necessarily dead, but it might have to take a back seat for a while as we return to balance-of-
power politics for the foreseeable future. NATO members need to be prepared for the consequences.
In for the Long Haul
Despite Ukraine not being a member of the Alliance, the outcome of the war is critical to
NATO, European security, and the principle that aggressors cannot redraw international borders by
force. NATO has now stated that ‘A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the
Euro-Atlantic area’, and it must follow through with action. However, the announced enhancements
to NATO’s defence and deterrence posture will come at an eyewatering cost to NATO common
funding, which will fall on national defence ministry budgets that are already under strain when it
comes to delivering extant equipment budgets. Moreover, with economies hit by the coronavirus
pandemic, the cost of living, and inflationary pressure, the ability to sustain political will on NATO
funding will diminish.
Critical to this will be the ability of governments to communicate the Russian threat to their
populations clearly and transparently. They need to effectively bring to life national security risk
assessments to make the case for sustained higher spending, and ‘Putin equals bad’ messaging is
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insufficient. This struggle goes beyond Putin, and we need to ensure we don’t make the mistake of
assuming that what comes next is automatically better.
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was a wakeup call that the Alliance didn’t fully grasp.
Some modest transformation did occur, such as the creation of the NRF and Enhanced Forward
Presence, as well as the recommitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2024 at the 2014 Wales
summit. However, the political rhetoric was not backed by commitment, which weakened NATO
deterrence and might have inadvertently influenced Putin’s decision-making calculus towards
Ukraine. If NATO fails to translate words into action now, it could be fatal for the Alliance.
(Source: RUSI)

DOES A PROTRACTED CONFLICT FAVOUR RUSSIA OR UKRAINE?

The typical war is short. Since 1815, the median duration of wars between states has been just
over three months, calculates Paul Poast of the University of Chicago. In 2003 America toppled the
government of Iraq in just 20 days. The conflict that Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 was over in 44. Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered
its fifth month, and shows no sign of drawing to a close. “I am afraid that we need to steel ourselves
for a long war,” wrote Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, in mid-June. Jens Stoltenberg, nato’s
secretary-general, echoed his warning: “We must prepare for the fact that it could take years.”
In the early days of the invasion the West worried that Ukrainian forces would be swiftly
overwhelmed by Russia’s superior firepower and resistance would collapse. Now the fears are
different: that Ukraine has not adjusted its strategy enough to fight a sustained war of attrition; that
it will run out of soldiers and munitions; that months of pummelling will cause its economy to
collapse; that the will to fight may ebb as the going gets even tougher. Russia, too, is subject to many
of the same pressures, with the conflict chewing up its young men, sapping its economy and
accelerating its descent into dictatorship. A protracted conflict will also test the resolve of Ukraine’s
Western allies, as the price of food and energy soars, inflation riles voters and Ukraine’s requests for
weapons and cash escalate. A long war, in short, will test both sides in new ways. Whether it
favours Russia or Ukraine depends in large part on how the West responds.
Start on the battlefield. Russia’s army is making headway, albeit slowly. Ukrainian forces have
been ordered to withdraw from the town of Severodonetsk, putting Russia within spitting distance
of controlling all of Luhansk province, one of two that together form the Donbas region. Slovyansk,
in the north-east of Donetsk, the other province in Donbas, is also under attack.
Ukraine’s forces, outgunned and until recently largely outranged in artillery, have been
mauled. The government says they are suffering as many as 200 casualties a day. On June 15th a
Ukrainian general said that the army had lost 1,300 armoured vehicles, 400 tanks and 700 artillery
systems, far more than previously thought. Many of Ukraine’s most experienced and best-trained
units have been destroyed, leaving greener reservists to take their place. On June 19th British
defence intelligence said there had been desertions among Ukrainian troops.
Yet this does not mean Russia will sweep through Donbas. Its advance has been slow,
grinding and costly, enabled only by massive, indiscriminate bombardments. New recruits are
getting just a few days of training before being thrown into battle, according to the bbc’s Russian
service. Morale is low: British intelligence points to “armed stand-offs between officers and their
troops”. It has taken more than two months to capture Severodonetsk, and Slovyansk and next-door
Kramatorsk are better fortified.
Russia still has plenty of munitions and equipment, says Richard Connolly, an expert on the
country’s economy and defence industry. Russian arms factories are said to be working double or
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triple shifts, he notes. Russia also has large stockpiles of old tanks to draw on. Over time, shortages
will bite, but they are more likely to lead to the deployment of outmoded or poorly maintained
weapons than to a total drought, Mr Connolly believes.
Men, not machines
Manpower is a bigger problem. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, has refused to call up
conscripts and reservists en masse. Instead of a general mobilisation, says Michael Kofman of cna, a
think-tank, his army is creating new reserve battalions by signing up new recruits. But finding
enough of them is difficult: the government has had to offer lavish pay, of almost three times the
median wage. The injured and bereaved have been promised generous settlements, too. The Duma,
Russia’s parliament, recently lifted the maximum age to join the army from 40 to 65. The authorities
are trying to lure recently retired soldiers back into service.
In an effort to create battle-ready forces much faster than usual, the newly enlisted are being
mashed together with serving officers who have not yet deployed and residual equipment from
existing brigades, Mr Kofman notes. But generating new units in this way amounts to “selling off
the family silver”, says a Western official. The officers and equipment assigned to them would
normally be used to train new soldiers or to relieve battle-worn troops. Russia is, in effect,
cannibalising its own forces, Mr Kofman says, which will reduce “the overall sustainability of the
war effort”.
Russia’s shortage of well-trained troops is one reason its advance in Donbas has been glacial.
Ukraine, despite a smaller population, has a larger supply of eager recruits. Training them remains a
bottleneck, but that could be overcome with a little help: on June 17th Mr Johnson proposed a
scheme whereby Britain would train as many as 10,000 soldiers every 120 days.
Ukraine is also receiving ever more sophisticated Western weaponry. To begin with, it sought
chiefly short-range, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to fend off advancing armoured
columns and marauding helicopters. More recently, however, America, Britain and others have been
supplying modern artillery and rockets, which will be much more useful in any counter-attacks. On
June 23rd Ukraine’s defence minister said that American himars rocket launchers, with gps-guided
munitions, had begun to arrive.
Indeed, some Ukrainian officials, including Volodymyr Zelensky, the president, argue that if
Western help arrives on a sufficient scale, Ukraine may be able to win the war before winter sets in.
A military intelligence officer says that Ukraine’s best window for a counter-offensive will come in
late October, when its stock of Western arms should be peaking. “We need the enemy to feel the full
force of the weaponry,” he says. There is talk of pushing Russia back to its positions at the start of
the war, and then negotiating a peace deal from a position of strength.
But this optimism glosses over several yawning pitfalls. For one thing, Ukraine’s forces have
used most of their munitions and, without the domestic manufacturing capacity to replenish them,
are now completely reliant on foreign benefactors. The recent fighting has centred on long, heavy
artillery barrages that consume vast amounts of ammunition. Russia, which has huge stocks, is
thought to be blasting away so indiscriminately that America’s entire annual production would be
enough to keep its guns firing for only two weeks, observes Alex Vershinin, a retired us Army
officer. Even though Ukraine has been trying to ration its consumption, nato countries may struggle
to keep it adequately supplied with shells.
What is more, Ukraine’s backers have already handed over a big share of their stocks of
certain weapons. The 7,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles America has provided, for instance, are
thought to amount to about a third of its total inventory. Western armies do not want to let their
own supplies run too low; in fact, many of them are hoping to add to them in light of Russia’s
aggression.
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Although America and Europe, with vastly larger economies than Russia, could eventually
gear up to produce whatever Ukraine needs, their output of shells and missiles will not double
overnight. America produces only 2,100 Javelins a year. Mr Vershinin notes that the number of
American small-arms plants has shrunk from five during the Vietnam war to one today.
Maintaining all the fancy nato kit is also hard. America and Germany taught Ukrainian
soldiers to use their howitzers in a couple of weeks, but learning how to fix them is another matter.
The use of artillery pieces is so intense that many have already broken down and have been sent to
Poland for repair. This problem will grow as complex weapons like himars arrive and Ukraine
gradually moves from Soviet hardware to weapons provided by nato.
Perhaps most important is how Ukraine deploys its new arsenal. Many of the weapons that it
is getting were designed in the cold war to face down precisely the adversary that Ukraine now
faces in Donbas: a Soviet-style army using heavy firepower. The worry in some Western countries is
that Ukraine will try to match Russia gun for gun, and so blaze through its ammunition at a
prodigious rate. “If you want to use himars as an area weapon,” warned Ben Wallace, Britain’s
defence secretary, on June 29th, “you’ll be running out of ammunition in 12 hours.”
The aim is to encourage Ukraine to use rocket launchers and other long-range systems in line
with their original purpose of fighting a “deep battle”: hitting important Russian targets, such as
command posts and railway hubs, many kilometres behind the front lines. There is evidence that
Ukraine is indeed making a concerted effort to strike deep inside Donbas. Mr Wallace says that five
ammunition dumps have recently been blown up, along with a number of Russian headquarters.
This offers a path, if not to outright victory, then at least to a standoff that imposes severe
costs on Russia. Western officials doubt that Ukraine will be able to take back all the land it has lost
since the invasion began. After all, the war has shown how much easier it is to defend than attack,
and Russian forces are well dug in. But if Ukraine can be kept supplied with arms and ammunition
and uses its new firepower judiciously, it could recapture pockets of territory, sow chaos in Russia’s
rear and inflict unsustainable losses in terms of men and materiel on a Russian army that is stretched
thin along a huge front.
It is not just weapons that Ukraine will need to pursue such a strategy, however; the
government is also desperately short of money. The war has smashed its economy: the central bank
and the imf reckon that output could shrink by more than a third this year—a blow on a par with
the Depression in America in the 1930s. More optimistic analyses hold that it is the occupied regions
that are most afflicted, and that activity elsewhere has recovered somewhat after a plunge in March,
with the current year-on-year contraction amounting to perhaps 15%.
Either way, Ukraine’s public finances have been upended. The government has had to spend
lavishly not only on the armed forces, but also to provide humanitarian assistance to the injured,
unemployed and displaced—even as it has cut taxes to succour the limping economy. The result is a
deficit of about $5bn a month.
Under the circumstances, investors are naturally reluctant to lend to Ukraine. Tax rises would
be counterproductive, given the atrophy of the economy. The government is trying to cut some
spending: it recently curbed unemployment benefits, for example. The West has pledged lots of aid,
but it is not arriving fast enough to balance the books. So the government has been reduced to
printing money. The central bank has been purchasing government bonds since the invasion began,
at an ever accelerating pace (see chart). At the same time it is burning through its foreign reserves in
an effort to stabilise the hryvnia. Inflation, already 18%, is rising. Should the West allow the
government’s finances to spiral out of control or the economy to cease to function, the military
outlook would inevitably darken, too.
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Bearing up
Russia looks in much better economic shape, by contrast. After a brief wobble brought on by
fierce Western sanctions, the rouble has recovered. Fears of a bank run have receded. Although
Western firms have pulled out as much of the $300bn or so they have invested in local outlets and
factories as they can, and many educated Russians have fled the country, most forecasters expect a
relatively manageable contraction this year, thanks in part to heavy government spending. Mr Putin
frequently insists that the sanctions hurt the West more than they do Russia.
In fact, sanctions are taking a toll, largely by depriving the economy of crucial imports. Car
production is down by more than 80% from its pre-invasion level—a reflection, in part, of the
difficulty that manufacturers have obtaining parts from abroad, but also of declining consumer
demand. In May dealers sold just 26 Porsches in Russia, 95% fewer than the year before. Output of
lifts has fallen by half, pointing to a slump in big construction projects.
The shortage of critical components is a worry for Russia’s generals, too. “We have reports from
Ukrainians that when they find Russian military equipment on the ground, it’s filled with
semiconductors that they took out of dishwashers and refrigerators”, Gina Raimondo, America’s
commerce secretary, told Congress in May. Although some Russian firms do make computer chips, and
are trying to boost output, their wares are more expensive and less sophisticated than imported ones.
But relatively few munitions factories seem to be affected so far, Mr Connolly notes, perhaps
because Russian defence firms tend to hoard important parts, a hangover from Soviet central
planning. What is more, Western sanctions are not watertight and, thanks to its oil revenues, Russia
has plenty of money to spend subverting them. The government has been seeking alternative supply
chains for some time. A new paper from rusi, a think-tank in Britain, points to “myriad companies
based around the world, including in the Czech Republic, Serbia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey,
India and China, who will take considerable risks to meet Russian supply requirements”. China has
signalled willingness to supply spare parts to Russian aircraft firms.
Indeed, Mr Putin appears confident that time and money are on his side. Even if Russia’s
forces fail to advance rapidly, they have succeeded in blockading Ukraine’s ports, contributing to
the strangulation of its economy. And although neither the Russian public nor the elite was eager for
war, Mr Putin’s ruthless security forces and energetic propagandists have kept dissent to a
minimum. It helps that most of the army’s new recruits—and casualties—appear to come from small
towns in poorer provinces, meaning that Russia’s big cities have been shielded from the worst
effects of the war.
But the lengths to which Mr Putin has gone to avoid a general mobilisation suggest that he is
not confident that Russians are willing to put up with a long and bloody war. By the same token, the
economic optimism currently displayed by businessmen and the broader population could also
evaporate as the longer-term costs of the war, Western sanctions and emigration start to sink in.
Many in Ukraine fear that Russia may resort to more ruthless tactics if the war drags on too
long for Mr Putin’s comfort. It could, for instance, target the power grid and heating facilities as
winter approaches—a move that would impose an enormous humanitarian cost on the general
population. Ukrainians seem to be steeling themselves for such privations, however. Data from
Rating, a polling agency, show that well over half of them now believe the war will last at least six
months, up from 10% in a sample taken in early March. Nonetheless, fully 93% of respondents say
Ukraine will prevail in the end, with varying degrees of confidence. “Ukraine has started to believe
in itself,” says Alexei Antipovich, Rating’s boss.
Ukrainians remain firmly against the idea of negotiations with Russia, with the mood against
compromise shifting decisively following the reporting of Russian atrocities in the second half of
March. They fear a repeat of the Minsk accords, the French- and German-brokered peace deals that
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drew new lines in Ukrainian sand but never satiated Russian appetites. Ukraine does not believe the
Kremlin will stop at anything other than complete surrender. “We either win or we lose,” says Oleh
Zhdanov, a former operational officer at Ukraine’s General Staff.
Ukraine’s allies may not take such a black-and-white view of things. Indeed, Mr Putin may
find them easier to dishearten than Ukrainians. By slashing exports of gas through the main pipeline
from Russia to Germany, he recently signalled that he is willing to take Europe’s economy hostage
to advance his war aims. Soaring gas prices and economically crippling shortages over the winter
would almost certainly induce some European governments to lean on Ukraine to accept an
imperfect truce.
Several European countries, most notably Germany, were painfully slow to start giving
Ukraine heavy weapons. Many are still reluctant to describe their goal in sending arms as helping
Ukraine to “win” the war. There is certainly no unanimity within nato about how to define victory.
The longer the war goes on, and the higher the cost in terms of punishing energy prices and
decelerating economies, the more reluctant Ukraine’s allies will become to provide endless weapons
and cash. Mr Putin, for one, seems to be counting on the West’s resolve to crumble.
(Source: The Economist)

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
Implications for Asian Geoeconomics
Ali Ahmadi (Executive Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy)
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has set off a series of sanctions from Western states and
many others that will have broad implications for some time to come, even in the unlikely scenario
of a relatively quick end to the fighting. The impact on the global economy and supply chains from
both the war and the escalating sanctions regime has already been significant but will have long-
term consequences on the geoeconomics of Asia and East-West trade that require closer
examination.
The term geoeconomics is poorly defined in academia. It is most frequently used to refer to
economies being instrumentalized for national security purposes. Here, I use the term specifically to
refer to how countries use geography to achieve their economic ambitions in light of security-related
issues. In that sense, my definition is closer to scholars who see geoeconomics as the interplay
between economics and geopolitics.
I argue that there are three interrelated and intersecting trends brought about by the Russian
invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedentedly fast succession of Western sanctions imposed on
Moscow, which redrew trade maps in Asia. Ultimately, Iran stands to be the primary beneficiary of
these changes.
The New Eurasian Land Bridge and China’s BRI
The first two implications are closely related to the fact that the war in Ukraine and the
associated economic embargoes have created significant blockages with regard to the New Eurasian
Land Bridge (NELB). While Beijing grounds its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the mystique of the
ancient Silk Road, its primary land route to its target markets in Western Europe goes through the
NELB, which passes through Central Asia and Russia to reach the European continent. This route is
so important that Chinese officials have in the past worried about overreliance on Russia for their
logistical needs.
Now those fears look prescient. As many experts have noted, the NELB route has become
increasingly problematic. The security issues brought about by the war aside, Western sanctions
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have made Russia increasingly difficult to work with. Major logistics firms withdrew from Russia
even before they were forced out by sanctions, and European countries like Poland and Ukraine,
who once held ambitions of being key hubs for the NELB, have eschewed economic relations with
Moscow and championed sanctions as they prioritize security needs. All these factors make it
increasingly necessary for China to look toward the lower tier of the “Belt,” going through Iran.
This route has faced various challenges mainly due to the major economic sanctions placed on
Iran throughout the vast majority of the BRI’s existence. While the Chinese government has been
willing to buck Washington’s edicts not to engage with Iran economically in many respects, the
Chinese private sector and even major state-sponsored enterprises that provide most BRI financing
are not immune to sanctions pressure.
Asian Countries Look to Iran for East-West Trade Routes
The second trend, which is also closely related to the NELB blockage, is the increased
logistical activity of other Asian countries, particularly from Central Asia and South Asia, to reach
their target markets in the West through Iran. Over the last number of weeks, there has been a flurry
of activity surrounding the expansion of trade access involving Iran and countries to its immediate
east.
This is buttressed by the Raisi administration’s ambitions to expand economic relations with
countries across Asia and to pay closer attention to diplomatic ties with Central Asia, matters
conservatives frequently accused the previous Rouhani administration of ignoring.
Russia Looks Eastward and to the INSTC
The third and perhaps least recognized trend is Russia’s own quasi “look East” strategy to
mitigate the effects of sanctions by diversifying its trade away from Western economies that seem
increasingly interested in weaponizing interdependence. While Russia’s route to China or Central
Asia is straightforward, its land route to India, a key trading partner that has refused to join the
Western sanctions coalition, is far more complicated. India, mostly surrounded on land by
adversaries Pakistan and China, must be reached by sea. While India-Russia trade is mostly carried
out by sea, traveling through the Suez Canal, the absence of a more direct route can become a
vulnerability, especially in the current charged political environment.
This enhances the importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC),
which traverses the Caucuses to connect Russia to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Strait of
Hormuz, from which point a shorter maritime route to India is available. This not only drastically
shortens transit time for goods shipped between India and Russia but also avoids narrow maritime
routes that are potentially susceptible to political blockages. China, for example, is famously
concerned about over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca for its maritime trade (the “Malacca
dilemma”).
If the increased need of many Asian countries and Russia results in an expansion of financing
and usage of these various trade routes, Iran could become a major global trade hub. Especially if
the current talks result in a resumption of sanctions relief under a reconstituted Iran nuclear deal,
investment and trade interest would likely expand dramatically. Critically, Russia has also
expressed a desire to use the INSTC to connect to Pakistan. This has important implications for the
BRI project.
While talking about “Asia” resonates in China and is frequently mentioned in Chinese
government pronouncements, the most important areas to the BRI have been the key subregions in
China’s near abroad: Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In academic literature, BRI
projects in these regions are often spoken of separately and on their own terms. But Chinese officials
seeing significant economic potential and trade complementarity between their economic
investments and zones in South and Central Asia, seem increasingly interested in connections
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between the two. This interest is underlined by China’s recent efforts to build a trade route through
Afghanistan, which is unlikely to be viable due to both security and economic governance issues.
Currently, these two regions are connected through an arduously long route through western China.
This is especially problematic considering that China’s investments in Pakistan are largely
located in the western Pakistani province of Balochistan and the port of Gwadar, which is a stone’s
throw from the Iranian border, while most of Central Asia’s population and economic potential are
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which border the Caspian Sea.
A much more logical transit route is through eastern Iran. This route is now in a position to
receive greater attention due to Russian interest in connecting the INSTC to Pakistan. Somewhat
ironically, transportation infrastructure in Iran also happens to be a major point of focus for India,
which sees connecting to the southeastern Iranian port of Chabahar as its best trade path to
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port project has largely been
suspended since the United States abandoned the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 but it could be revived if
a new agreement is struck.
There are major barriers still to Iran achieving its goal of becoming a key trade hub, the most
important being the resumption of sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
But Iran also requires more strategic planning and a strategy for turning trade routes into economic
corridors that can benefit its own citizens. If Tehran can rise to the challenge, it will have a key role
to play in the development of Asia and East-West trade moving forward.
(Source: The Diplomat)
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Water
ENSURING WATER SECURITY
Shafqat Kakakhel (Former UN assistant secretary-general)
During the past six months, Pakistan has experienced unusually hot and humid weather and
unprecedented shortages of water in the Indus Basin canal system, disruption of all kinds of farming
activities, reduced power generation by hydropower plants and drying up of drinking water sources
in urban areas.
Diminished canal flows also rekindled inter- provincial disputes over water allocations.
Climate experts have linked our water crisis to the effects of climate change, adding that such
calamities are likely to become a new normal.
The recent water crisis underlines the urgency of accelerated implementation of Pakistan’s
first and comprehensive National Water Policy (NWP) approved by the Council of Common
Interests (CCI) and signed by the then prime minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, and chief ministers of
provinces on April 24, 2018. It seems appropriate to recall how the NWP was agreed and its key
targets and means of implementation.
A decision to formulate a National Water Policy was made in 2003 and six successive drafts,
prepared with the help of foreign consultants, were considered by the CCI, but none could attract
consensus. Finally at its meeting held on November 24, 2017 the CCI constituted an inter-provincial
committee under Mr Sartaj Aziz, then deputy chairman Planning Commission, which included the
federal ministers of planning and development, energy, and water resources, federal secretaries of
water resources, power division, and planning and development and chief secretaries of the four
provinces to develop a water policy.
The committee finalized an earlier draft of the NWP after adding the means of
implementation, the estimates of financial resources and the institutional arrangements necessary
for implementing the policy. An agreed draft of the Policy was considered and approved by the CCI
on April 24, 2018. (It is interesting to recall that the 1991 Agreement on the Apportionment of Indus
Waters was also finalized by an interprovincial committee chaired by Mr Sartaj Aziz, then federal
finance minister).
The National Water Policy (NWP) addresses the spectrum of water-related issues such as the
decline in the quantity and deterioration of the quality of water due to population explosion,
increasing demands of all user sectors, loss of water during conveyance, over-abstraction of ground
water, archaic irrigation methods causing agriculture to use over 80 per cent of available water,
decaying water infrastructure, and policy and management deficits. It takes cognizance of the
impacts of climate change on water resources, especially more frequent, longer-lasting and severe
extreme weather phenomena such as drought, floods and heatwaves.
The main targets of the NWP for the period 2019-2030 include: one, reduction of 33 per cent in
the river flows that are lost in conveyance estimated at 46 MAF, through an accelerated programme
of water course lining, especially in saline or semi saline areas.
Two, increasing the existing water storage capacity of 14 MAF to 24 MAF, including the
Diamer-Basha Dam (6.4 MAF) and Mohmand Dam (0.7 MAF).
Three, an increase of at least 30 per cent in the efficiency of water use by producing ‘more crop
per drop’ by deploying micro-irrigation techniques like drip and sprinkler irrigation and more
realistic water pricing policy.
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Four, adapting drinking water and sanitation plans in line with relevant national policies and
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Five, gradual replacement and refurbishing of decades-old irrigation infrastructure in
accordance with an asset management plan.
Six, real-time monitoring of river flows by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) through
telemetric technology in order to maintain a transparent water accounting system.
Seven, a standardized and uniform mechanism for data collection of water resources at the
national and provincial levels including rivers/canals, rainfall, snowfall, depth of groundwater
table, surface/subsurface water quality parameters, and reservoir sedimentation.
To achieve the afore -mentioned targets, the NWP requires that at least 10 per cent of the
Federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) should be allocated for the water sector,
gradually increasing it to 20 per cent by 2030. It also calls upon the provinces to increase their
respective allocations for the water sector. In the PSDP for 2017-2018, the water sector had received
only four per cent funds. For 2022-2023, this allocation has been increased to 11.3 per cent – Rs91.6
billion out of a total PSDP of Rs800 billion.
The NWP recognizes that the integrated management of water sources requires the highest
level of skills and knowledge to effectively address the looming water crisis and calls for wide-
ranging institutional reforms and capacity building. These include: first, provincial water
authorities: each province is required to set up a provincial water authority to upgrade its capacity
to design and construct small and medium sized dams and irrigation infrastructure, while the
irrigation departments continue to handle water distribution and maintenance.
Second, ‘groundwater authority’: one of the most significant measures enshrined in the NWP
relates to the protection of the rich Indus Aquifer from unsustainable abstraction since the 1960s.
Each province is required to establish a regulatory body to curb the unrestricted extraction which
has pushed the water table down to dangerously low level, especially in Balochistan and other arid
areas. The provincial groundwater authority has to ensure that extractions from the aquifer are
sustainable.
Third, National Water Council: the NWP provides for the creation of a National Water
Council (NWC), chaired by the prime minister and comprising the four provincial chief ministers/
irrigation ministers. It is required to meet at least once a year to review and coordinate the
implementation of the National Water Policy, recommend legislation where necessary and support
provincial master plans for water development by providing matching grants. The NWC is to be
assisted by an inter-provincial steering committee, chaired by the federal minister for water
resources and comprising provincial irrigation ministers or secretaries and chairpersons of the
provincial water authorities.
The prime minister should convene a meeting of the National Water Council as early as
possible to review the state of implementation of the NWP and approve a roadmap for enhanced
action with timelines for the federal and provincial governments.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN’S AGGRAVATING WATER CRISIS

Imama Khan (Research Intern at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad)
Pakistan is predicted to be on the top ten list of countries battling water scarcity, according to
Munir Akram, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN). Water supplies in
the country were at their lowest level in five years as of April 2022, with the two major dams,
Tarbela and Mangla, at a dead level since February.
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On February 22, 2022, the Tarbela Dam reached the dead level, while the Mangla Dam
reached less than 1 percent of its ultimate capacity. According to the Pakistan Metrological
Department, the water situation is deteriorating, and a drought-like condition may develop in
several areas of Balochistan and upper Sindh in the coming days. Summer’s early arrival has already
aggravated the problem, while climate change is reducing water supplies from catchment regions.
Water scarcity is a scary scenario that Pakistan is currently experiencing
The country is ranked 14th of the world’s 17 “very high-water-risk” countries. Pakistan has
transitioned from a water-rich to a water-stressed country in the previous several decades, going
from over 6000 cubic meters per capita in 1960 to 1017 cubic meters per capita in 2021.
One of the causes of Pakistan’s water problems is the country’s rapid population growth. This
not only puts enormous strain on the limited water resources available, but it also has implications
for food security. Inadequate water storage is another cause of water scarcity in Pakistan, which
resulted in the loss of more than 120 BCM (billion cubic meters) of water during the floods of 2010,
2012, and 2014. The biggest water reservoirs’ current storage capacity is only 9% of total average
flow, but the global average storage capacity is 40%. Currently, 97 percent of Pakistan’s fresh water
is used in agriculture, which accounts for 18 percent of the country’s GDP. Water resources are being
depleted due to inefficient agricultural practices, flood irrigation, a lack of hybrid seeding, and
inadequate water management.
Water management challenges include a lack of basin-level water resource management and a
robust method to prevent evaporation and pilferage. The deterioration of water infrastructure
contributes to a large amount of water waste. With an overall efficiency of 39 percent, the country’s
irrigation system is one of the least efficient in the world, owing to ageing and poor maintenance.
Pakistan is also on the list of the world’s ten most susceptible countries to climate change. Changes
in monsoon patterns, melting glaciers, rising temperatures, and the recurrence of floods and
droughts show that the country is already confronting climate-related challenges to its water
resources.
In recent years, Pakistan has experienced a number of floods as well as long periods of
drought. The Indus River Basin, Pakistan’s main water source, is especially vulnerable to climate
change due to its reliance on glacial and snowmelt and precipitation. In Sindh Province, where a big
number of farmers have fled to urban areas due to a lack of water, it has already shrunk into a canal.
Given that snow and ice melt runoff now account for 50 to 80 percent of typical water flows in the
Indus River basin, this will cause landslides, catastrophic flooding, dam breaks, and soil erosion in
the short term, as well as drought and hunger in the long run.
Water pollution is another huge issue in the country, with over half of the two million tons of
human excrement annually polluting water. According to a study, 60 million people in Pakistan are
at risk of being exposed to high levels of arsenic in groundwater on the Indus Plain. In Pakistan,
water-borne infections are a primary source of mortality and misery. In Pakistan, around 60% of the
population is affected by one or more of the major diseases linked to a lack of safe drinking water
and better sanitation. They occupy around one-third of hospital beds and are responsible for almost
40% of all premature deaths in the country.
The whole political leadership, as well as all relevant stakeholders, must accept responsibility
for Pakistan’s water crisis and express their intent to address it. The government must implement a
massive paradigm shift that encourages water conservation. Water infrastructure upkeep, water
conservation technologies, and public awareness will all be part of this. Pakistan’s water governance
has to be reevaluated and made more compatible with other government programmers.
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Pakistan created its first-ever National Water Policy in 2018

For the first time, it admits that water is a finite resource and that Pakistan must at the very
least recoup the expenditures of its irrigation system. The strategy also considers the potential effects
of climate change on water, discusses water prices, and emphasizes the importance of regional
collaboration. However, it pays insufficient attention to water-sensitive urban designs, natural-
hazard risk management, and trading in water-intensive crops. Any policy addressing these issues
should include tailored, site-specific solutions that take into account the topography, source water
body, receiving water body, and socioeconomic context of the environment.
To reduce and manage the over-extraction of groundwater, a regulatory framework for the
installation and operation of tube wells should be developed and strictly enforced. For water
recycling, methods and techniques for the use of drainage water and wastewater treatment should
be created. Most significantly, a major social awareness campaign should be undertaken across the
country to educate the general public about the critical problem of water scarcity in Pakistan, as
most water-related problems are caused by illiteracy and a lack of understanding among the
population. The water crisis in Pakistan can be controlled if the essential steps are implemented in a
timely manner, and this can only be done with a strong commitment from all stakeholders,
including policymakers and water consumers.
(Source: Global Village Space)
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Women
GENDER-RESPONSIVE BUDGETING TO
REDUCE GENDER DISPARITIES
Dr Sumera Shams (MPA from KP)
Pakistan’s population comprises nearly 50 per cent of females. Access to and control over
resources, eligibility for rights, and power-sharing equation remain unequally distributed between
men and women in Pakistani society, and still, women are discriminated against to a great extent, in
all sectors of life, whether public, private or in a community environment; furthermore, men have
greater authority and a higher quality of life than women. While according to the Global Gender
Gap Index, Pakistan was the world’s second most unequal country in terms of gender equality.
Currently, Pakistan is ranked fourth-worst in the world in terms of gender parity, trailing only Iraq,
Yemen, and Afghanistan. Pakistan is rated 153rd out of 156 nations on the gender parity index,
according to the World Economic Forum’s “Global Gender Gap Report 2021.” Pakistan’s parliament
currently has only 21 per cent female members. If sixty reserved seats are not taken into account,
female representation in the National Assembly of Pakistan is only around three per cent of the total.
Certain initiatives have been implemented to close the gender gap between men and women
in all public spheres, including education, political systems, sociocultural, and economic spheres.
The budget is the most important policy tool of the government because the government
cannot successfully implement any policy without money. In terms of budget, Gender Responsive
Budgeting is one of the most important approaches to incorporating gender awareness into the
policies, planning processes, and programmes of all public entities. Gender Responsive Budgeting is
the process of incorporating the gender perspective into all stages of the budgeting process. Gender-
responsive budgeting examines the disparities in the effects of government policies including the
policies of spending and revenue on women, as well as men. Gender-responsive budgeting, in
addition to the impact analysis, proposes a reprioritization of expenditures and income that takes
into account the various needs and objectives of men and women. Other aspects of inequality, such
as age, religion, ethnic affiliation, rural/urban or any regional locality may also be focused on
depending on the country-specific situation.
GRBs can contribute to better economic governance and financial management. They can
inform the government about whether it is meeting the needs of various groups of women, men,
girls, boys, and transgender people. Examining budgets through a gender lens provides information
that can be used to make better public finance decisions in the pursuit of gender equality and
inclusive governance.
They promote openness, accountability, and participation. In 1984, Australia was the first
country to implement Gender Responsive Budgeting, Canada came next in 1993, followed by South
Africa in 1995. In Pakistan, in 2005, the government made Gender Responsive Budgeting necessary
in government activities in order to assist minimize gender imbalances and achieve the objectives of
developing skills in budget preparation, its review, and analysis utilizing a gender lens; promoting
gender-conscious policy and resource allocation; and improving the government’s and civil society
organizations’ lobbying skills for gender budgeting. The 2005-07 initiative was a test run as part of
the Medium-Term Development Framework, after which further measures were implemented over
time. Following that, the federal government worked on a gender-disaggregated analysis and a
gender-responsive budget review, which resulted in a baseline to promote gender equality in
education and labour force participation with scope to its application at the province level.
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Women’s empowerment has always been a priority for the PTI government, and gender-
responsive budgeting’s potential to minimize gender gaps in all sectors is being unlocked. The
government’s commitment to undertake GRBs in all sectors through each department, as well as the
associated education and training, resulted in considerable changes in government budget processes
and official behaviour. It also aided in the reduction of gender inequities by prioritizing the
establishment and up-gradation of girls’ schools and providing stipends to girls and women for
continuing their education which increased girls’ attendance.
To ensure gender equality, Ehsaas’ conditional cash transfer programmes provide cash
stipends for education and nutrition that are specifically geared in favour of girls. The PTI
government also instituted a ‘Graduation Stipend’ for girls who completed primary school under
the Ehsaas umbrella.
Increased spending on women’s specialized budget expenditures was a crucial result of
governments’ gender-responsive budgeting. A gendered study of federal and provincial budgets
can reveal that women’s specialized budget spending has increased dramatically.
In this wake the government has taken initiatives to capacitate women of the province,
especially focusing on the development of an integrated and comprehensive social protection system
for the women of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in addition to human resource building and focusing on
education. In the provincial budget of 2021-22, the department of social welfare was allocated funds
to uplift the economic standing of women in the province; a 25 per cent quota in Akhuwat was
allocated for women in Rs. 1 billion funds to be disbursed by Akhuwat SIDB.
The government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also believes that education remains one of the core
pillars to empower women and female-headed households. Hence, in the previous budget, special
focus and allocations had been diverted towards female education-centric projects, some examples
in this regard are; Girls’ cadet college in Mardan was allocated a total of Rs 2.5 billion out of which
Rs 1.25 billion, Girls stipend allocation worth Rs 2.4 billion through the Elementary and Secondary
Education department, functionalization of ‘Girls Community Schools through elementary and
secondary education funds with a total allocation of Rs 800 million and functionalization of the 105
Dastkari Centers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is currently in progress. A budget of 200 million was
allocated for strengthening the existing and establishing new DarulAmans across the province.
Additionally, the Bank of Khyber extended finances to women dairy farmers at concessional
rates, for the purchase of Dairy Animals, with the objective to empower rural women and create job
opportunities for them.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Women Parliamentary Caucus in collaboration with different
stakeholders has been dedicatedly working to gender sensitizing the provincial budgets. Together
with reviewing the allocations in the preceding year’s budgets and their implementation, the
upcoming budget is reviewed and gender-responsive proposals are drafted. These deliberated
efforts with respect to gender-responsive budget proposals, prepared every year, enhance the
positive impact of the provincial budgets and also contribute to the country’s efforts in meeting its
obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and the targets under Sustainable Development Goals.
Napoleon Bonaparte says that “give me an educated mother I will give you an educated
nation”. The PTI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has again put forth a concerted effort with
special budgetary allocation in the Provincial Budget 2022-23 to encourage young women to get an
education and this investment will indirectly reward our society with a civilized future generation.
2.4 billion rupees have been budgeted for monthly stipends. 2400 million rupees have been
budgeted for women’s share in BoK SAAF (collateral-free) and RAAST (collateral-based) financing
for SMEs. 500 million rupees have been allocated for indoor game facilities in divisional
headquarters for women. Where rupees 344 million is allocated for Women’s Universities, 85 million
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rupees are allocated for Women’s Skill Development Centers. A sum of 100 million rupees has been
budgeted for Women’s Empowerment, whereas 50 million rupees have been allocated for the
protection of women. It has been proposed in the current budget that Day care centres will be
established in MTI Hospitals, Whereas Women’s crisis centres will be established in Peshawar as
well as Women’s Business Park. 1.5 billion have been allocated to initiate the ambulance service for
Maternal and Child health.
It is imperative that policymakers and stakeholders be made aware of the gender viewpoint in
order for policies to be designed in a gender-sensitive way. Moreover, all the budgetary allocations
and programmes promised should be prioritized while they enter their implementation phase. This
approach must be implemented at all levels of government as well as in relevant agencies.
Parliamentarians, across the country irrespective of party affiliation, (now while they debate on the
budget and in future), should also advocate and urge the governments in federal as well as
provinces to include a “Gender Budget Statement” in the Budget Documents of their current
budgets, highlighting the funds set aside to ensure that public resource collection and allocation is
done in a way that is efficient and contributes to gender equality and women’s empowerment.
(Source: Daily Times)

GENDER PARITY
Zeeshan Sheikh (IFC`s country manager for Pakistan and Afghanistan)
Ehsan Malik (CEO of the Pakistan Business Council.)
IT has long been known that companies with gender-balanced workforces outperform those
dominated by men. Having women in leadership positions and throughout an organisation brings a
diversity of skills and perspectives. In Pakistan, companies have begun to appreciate this and are
increasingly instituting gender diversity policies to better attract female talent to their organisations.
At the same time, rules ensuring women are present on the boards of public companies have
resulted in more women in leadership positions.
We know that many firms are increasingly looking for ways to promote gender diversity.
But we don`t know how widely they are being implemented or how successful they are below
board level, where there are some regulatory requirements around gender reporting. A survey
conducted in 2021 by the Pakistan Business Council and International Finance Corporation, a
member of the World Bank Group, highlighted the fact that only a third of companies polled
publicly disclose gender-related employment targets and results. To help change that, PBC and IFC
have developed a scorecard that measures firms` performance regarding their gender diversity
policies and how they disclose those policies.
Through this effort we hope to encourage firms to be more transparent about their gender
strategies. The lack of publicly disclosed company information on gender-related policies and
results has many drawbacks.
First, it deprives investors of the opportunity to evaluate the human capital and employment
cycle of the companies they are putting their money into. Second, it means that companies face little
pressure to promote gender diversity in their human resources policies since there are few
benchmarks in the business community to compare with. Third, it makes it difficult for highly
talented people to select where they want to work.
There are simple ways to address these challenges. Companies can disclose through their
annual reports, their homepages, and their social media channels the types of policies they have in
place to promote gender diversity. Such disclosures could include: the percentage of women in their
workforce, including in senior positions; their policies around flexible hours, remote work, and
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inoffice childcare; the mentoring opportunities they offer women; and their policies and practices for
ensuring pay equity.
Firms can also go further than merely disclosing their policies. They can set genderspecific
targets, measure results against these targets, and disclose their results publicly. Such
transparency shows their commitment to creating a better, more equal work-place, helping them
to attract the best talent.
It also demonstrates to investors and consumers a commitment to being an employer of
choice.
At a societal level, improving women`s access to job and career opportunities and creating
more workfamily-friendly workplaces can also propel economic growth. As of 2021, in Pakistan just
21 per cent of women were part of the labour force, compared to 78pc of men, according to World
Bank data.
The IMF estimated that the country could boost its gross domestic product by 30pc, if women
participated in the workforce at the same level that men currently do in Pakistan.
For a country that is striving for growth, this type of gain would be highly significant.
Many companies in Pakistan have signed onto the United Nations Women Empowerment
Principles and have been recognised for their gender diversity work, including, awards such as the
IFC-PBC Employer of Choice for Gender Diversity Awards. Companies were judged through a
scorecard-based approach on gender princi-ples promoting gender equality at leadership and policy
level; ensuring a diverse workforce; eliminating gender pay gaps; creating an optimal workplace
culture; and providing coaching and mentoring for women employees.The scorecard based
approach enables companies to identify where they stand and what needs to be improved for
disclosure in terms of good practices. It has enabled them to identify and benchmark themselves
against their peers. Many countries have developed workplace gender equity strategies. Australia,
for example, has a dedicated workplace gender equality strategy with resources for companies
identifying the management approach for good practices and methods for disclosure. This has
enabled a measured progress in Australia.
Gender parity in the workforce needs to be targeted through initiatives which encourage a
positive competition amongst companies. Initiatives like awards are a clear sign that Pakistani
companies are beginning to level the playing field for their women employees. But to truly foster
equality, firms must continue to improve the reporting of their gender-related policies. To borrow a
phrase: disclosure, in this case, is power.
(Source: Dawn)

ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

Waqas Ashfaq Qureshi (Communications specialist and a freelance writer)
Pakistan is the world’s 5th most populated country, with a population of over 230 million
people. Women account for 49.2 percent of the population, or more than 113 million people. In
Pakistan, most women live in rural areas; it is believed that half of the country’s female population
(60 million) lives in rural areas.
Women in rural areas are mostly involved in agricultural activities and are usually unpaid.
Because women typically perform manual labour on farms or with livestock, they are frequently
denied the opportunity to master another skill.
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As a result of their unpaid job, they are frequently financially dependent on other family
members. They are vulnerable even when they are working, but if they stop working due to a health
condition or because they get old, their vulnerability increases.
Rural women are also involved in informal home-based work. They produce a vast range of
products which have a high demand and are well known both in domestic and global markets. This
includes making embroidered apparel, craft production, stitching footballs, shoes, bangle making
and carpet weaving.
It is estimated that around 8 million women in Pakistan are home based informal workers.
The ratio of informal women workers in rural areas is higher as compared to urban areas. These
women do not earn a fair price for their abilities and work since they do not have direct access to the
market. The middleman reaps big profits; and the middleman is frequently dealt with on behalf of
the women by male family members.
This makes women more vulnerable. They are frequently denied the income they deserve.
Furthermore, they are generally unrecognised and undocumented as contributors. Women are more
vulnerable in jobs where there is no formal contract and no job security. Poor working conditions, a
lack of facilities, low earnings, late or no payments are all examples of this.
Numerous measures can be taken to support these women in having sustainable and decent
work. If women already have skills, they can be empowered to be self-employed, reducing their
vulnerability and misery. This is where information technology and digitisation come into play.
It is important to enable women to use digital equipment and tools to have a better access to
market. Women can have their own bank accounts and can be trained to use online banking tools, so
that they can receive the funds without the need for a middleman. This access to digital technologies
and banking services will breathe a new life into rural women’s economic activity.
With some help from the government, we may see an increase in female entrepreneurs and
leaders in a variety of service industries. This will empower women, reduce poverty and improve
the life of women and their families.
This will also reduce women’s dependency on other family members. Instead, they will be
actively contributing to the family’s income, and their quality of life will improve. In the long run,
this will also empower women in their later years, as once the businesses are established and
functioning, older women would be able to benefit from them.
The lives of older women in rural areas are typically unstable. They are often reliant on their
children. Rising unemployment and inflation are making it more difficult for families to care for
elderly relatives. This is causing increased stress and anxiety.
Pakistan is one of just 15 countries in the world with a population of more than 10 million
persons over the age of 60 and above. Given its population of 16 million older persons, it is expected
that by 2050, the population of older people in the country will increase to 45 million.
Empowering women with digital technology, tools, and electronic financial services will
benefit them and their families not only in their younger years, but also in their later years.
Pakistan’s population is predicted to reach 400 million by 2050.
Considering the existing ratio, it appears that by 2050, Pakistan will have 200 million women.
The number of older women will increase accordingly. Therefore, now is a critical time to develop
and execute policies and initiatives aimed at empowering women economically.
(Source: TNS)