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Contents
Afghanistan
 Taliban Unable to Reverse Afghanistan’s Economic Decline ................................................. 7
 One Year of Taliban Rule ........................................................................................................... 10
 America’s Allies and the War in Afghanistan ........................................................................ 12
 Afghan humanitarian crisis ....................................................................................................... 18

Book Reviews
 Islam and Economics .................................................................................................................. 20
 Political Order and Political Decay........................................................................................... 22
 The Ministry of Utmost Happiness .......................................................................................... 23

Climate Change
 Endless Words, Where’s The Action? ...................................................................................... 27
 Educational Oversight on Climate Change ............................................................................. 30
 The Climate Threat ..................................................................................................................... 34

Covid-19
 Covid - A Way Forward with Sustainability & Biodiversity ................................................ 36
 Profits before Lives Response by Capitalism to COVID-19 ............................................... 38

CPEC and OBOR

 CPEC and Afghanistan’s Development .................................................................................. 41
 Why BRI will Chiefly Benefit China ......................................................................................... 42
 Future of China’s Belt and Road lies in Middle East ............................................................. 44
 A Ray of Hope for Balochistan Development ......................................................................... 45
 Countering Growing Propaganda against CPEC ................................................................... 47

Domestic Politics
 Pakistani Politicians Ride the Merry-Go-Round .................................................................... 49
 The Vulnerabilities of Online Voting ....................................................................................... 53
 Evolution of Democracy in Pakistan ........................................................................................ 54
 Article 63A ................................................................................................................................... 56
 Pakistan Needs More Reforms Not Politics ............................................................................ 58
 Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime is Coming to an End .................................................................... 59
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Economy
 Pakistan’s Economic Potential .................................................................................................. 63
 Formalisation of the Informal Economy .................................................................................. 64
 Pakistan’s ‘Toxic’ Economy ....................................................................................................... 66
 Pakistan-IMF Deal....................................................................................................................... 67
 How Going Digital can Bridge the External Financing Gap................................................. 68
 Reasons for Economic Insolvency ............................................................................................ 70
 Managing External Financing Gap ........................................................................................... 74
 How to Combat Fiscal Deficit and Current Account Deficit of Pakistan ............................ 76

Education
 The State of IT Education ........................................................................................................... 79
 Revisiting Education................................................................................................................... 81

Energy Crisis
 Pakistan Needs Immediate Steps to Improve Energy Efficiency ......................................... 83
 Transformation to Clean Energy............................................................................................... 84
 No Light Matters ......................................................................................................................... 86
 Energy Sector Reforms ............................................................................................................... 88

Essays
 The Scourge of Mob Violence.................................................................................................... 93
 Constitutionalizing State-sponsored Terrorism ..................................................................... 96

Foreign Policy and Relations

 Domestic Foreign Policy Issues............................................................................................... 101
 Pakistan and Germany ............................................................................................................. 103
 Cementing Ties with China ..................................................................................................... 104
 Changing Geopolitics .............................................................................................................. 107
 Fixing Image Abroad ................................................................................................................ 108
 New Horizons ........................................................................................................................... 109

Floods 2022
 Pakistan’s Floods are a Failure of Governance ..................................................................... 112
 Pakistan Floods ......................................................................................................................... 113
 Climate Chaos in Pakistan ....................................................................................................... 115
 Systemic Response to Disasters .............................................................................................. 116
 Floods in Pakistan ..................................................................................................................... 118
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Globalization
 The Irreversibility of Globalization ........................................................................................ 121
 Is a World Order Even Possible? ............................................................................................ 122
 If America Refuses to Lead Globalization, China Will ........................................................ 126

Governance
 Economic Governance Framework ........................................................................................ 128
 Violent Extremism and Community Resilience.................................................................... 129
 Exploring Issues in the Implementation of the Rule of Law in Pakistan .......................... 131

History
 Pakistan’s Political Paralysis .................................................................................................. 134
 Pakistan and the Soviet Occupation ....................................................................................... 136
 The 1973 Constitution............................................................................................................... 138

International Issues
 The Arrival of the “Far East” Century ................................................................................... 142
 The Dangerous Decade ............................................................................................................ 146
 Prospects for Stability across the Taiwan Strait ................................................................... 153
 Geopolitical Linkage of Anti-US Powers ............................................................................... 155
 Economy for the People ........................................................................................................... 157
 Reunification Stance Laid out in White Paper ...................................................................... 159
 America and the Chinese Ascent ............................................................................................ 160
 The Longest War ....................................................................................................................... 162
 Beginning of Closeness in China-Afghan Relations ............................................................ 164

International Law
 Great Power Competition and International Law................................................................ 166
 Universal Jurisdiction Lawfare against India’s War Crimes in Kashmir.......................... 172
 Myanmar Must End its Egregious Breach of International Law........................................ 176

International Relations
 New World Order or the Systematic Plundering of Nations ............................................. 178
 The Battle between Globalism and Sovereignty ................................................................... 179
 Is Dependency Theory Relevant in the Twenty-First Century? ......................................... 182

Interviews
 India and Pakistan at 75. .......................................................................................................... 187
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 Daniel Markey & Ambassador Hesham Youssef ................................................................. 190

Kashmir
 Is Kashmir a Territorial Dispute or Regional? ...................................................................... 193
 Kashmir Dispute ....................................................................................................................... 194
 Criminalizing Dissent in Kashmir .......................................................................................... 196

Law
 US Supreme Court’s Controversial Decision ........................................................................ 198
 Fixing Judicial Appointments ................................................................................................. 199
 Dissolving A Political Party..................................................................................................... 202

Middle East
 China, Saudi Arabia on Way to Expanding Ties .................................................................. 205
 The Palestinian March for Freedom is Relentless................................................................. 206
 The Changing Middle East Regional Order .......................................................................... 208
 Iraq Heading for Civil War ...................................................................................................... 212
 The Destiny of the JCPOA ....................................................................................................... 213

National
 Food Insecurity and War ......................................................................................................... 215
 Life in Freedom ......................................................................................................................... 216
 A Tale of 75 Years ..................................................................................................................... 219
 Haphazard Urbanisation ......................................................................................................... 220
 Population and Environment .................................................................................................. 222

Nuclear Issues
 At the Brink of Nuclear War.................................................................................................... 224
 Is Nuclear War Inevitable? ...................................................................................................... 228

Organizations
 UN’s Relevance ......................................................................................................................... 230
 A Shift in Nato ........................................................................................................................... 231
 Geoeconomics, Not Geopolitics, Will Drive I2U2 Alliance................................................. 232
 Why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Matters? ..................................................... 234
 The International Criminal Court at 20.................................................................................. 236

Pakistan@75
 Seventy-five Years of Education ............................................................................................. 238
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 Seventy-five Years of Pakistan’s Economy............................................................................ 242

 Agri’s 75 Years of Success and Stagnation ............................................................................ 244
 The Paths not Taken ................................................................................................................. 246
 Balancing State and Human Security in Pakistan ................................................................ 249
 Pakistan’s Universities at 75 .................................................................................................... 251
 Pakistan-India Relations @ 75 ................................................................................................. 253

Reports
 Narrowing the Disaster Risk Protection Gap in Central Asia ............................................ 255
 The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era ..................................... 264

Sustainable Development Goals

 Tracking Loopholes in SDGs Attainment .............................................................................. 278
 Can Technology Play a More Meaningful Role in Meeting the SDGs?............................. 280
 Global Food Crisis..................................................................................................................... 281

South Asia
 Blue Economy may be the Key to South Asia’s Upswing ................................................... 284
 Realpolitik Drives Engagement Between India and the Taliban ....................................... 285
 The Facade of Indian Democracy ........................................................................................... 287
 South Asia Debt Woes Evoke Fears of Another 1997-style Crisis...................................... 289
 How Can Sri Lanka Escape Crisis .......................................................................................... 291
 Why Sri Lanka’s Collapse Looms Large over Bangladesh ................................................. 293
 Understanding the Proposed Bangladesh-India (CEPA) .................................................... 294

Ukraine Crisis
 Strange Events and the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War.............................................. 297
 Six Months of War in Ukraine ................................................................................................. 298
 A New World Order Ensues Ukraine War............................................................................ 300

Water
 Water Sector Suffers from Bad Governance .......................................................................... 302
 Emerging Solutions to A Global Water Crisis ...................................................................... 303

Women
 The Race to the Bottom ............................................................................................................ 306
 Mapping the Conditions of Women and Children in Pakistan.......................................... 308
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Afghanistan
TALIBAN UNABLE TO REVERSE AFGHANISTAN’S ECONOMIC DECLINE
William Byrd, Ph.D. (Senior Fellow on Afghanistan at USIP)
Afghanistan’s economy was already deteriorating before the Taliban takeover of the country
on August 15, 2021, suffering from severe drought, the COVID-19 pandemic, declining confidence in
the previous government, falling international military spending as U.S. and other foreign troops
left, human and capital flight, and Taliban advances on the battlefield. Then came the abrupt cutoff
of civilian and security aid (more than $8 billion per year, equivalent to 40% of Afghanistan’s GDP)
immediately after the Taliban takeover. No country in the world could have absorbed such an
enormous economic shock — exacerbated by sanctions, the freezing of Afghanistan’s foreign
exchange reserves and foreign banks’ reluctance to do business with the country.
USIP’s William Byrd discusses the economic situation in Afghanistan a year since the Taliban
came to power; the Taliban’s economic management performance; the economic, humanitarian and
aid outlook; and priorities for the United States and other countries.
What is the state of the Afghan economy today?
The economy has shrunk by 20% to 30% since August 2021, a great many people have lost jobs
and livelihoods, social services have been decimated, poverty and hunger as well as the
humanitarian crisis have greatly worsened, hundreds of thousands of people have left the country,
government agencies have been denuded of managerial and professional staff, many Afghan
businesses have closed or downsized and the bottom has dropped out of already low investment.
After a free fall that lasted many months, the Afghan economy is stabilizing but at a much
lower equilibrium, leaving people poorer and more vulnerable to privation, hunger and disease.
There is no prospect for the economy to resume high growth let alone recover to pre-2021 levels in
the foreseeable future.
Externally, the Afghan currency’s exchange rate has bounced back and is no lower than a year
ago. Imports have declined sharply (reflecting the economic collapse and lack of international aid to
finance imports) while exports have doubled in recent months. A series of U.S. Treasury
announcements, culminating in General License 20 in February 2022, belatedly clarified that existing
sanctions do not apply to Afghanistan as a jurisdiction, the Afghan government or government
agencies, and public and private banks or firms.
Internally, Afghan businesses appear to have stopped further job losses and closures (while
not coming anywhere near restoring pre-2021 levels of activity), goods are generally available in
markets and wages seem to have stopped declining. Inflation remains high but is now the result of
rising global food and energy prices not exchange rate depreciation or other domestic factors as was
the case earlier. Mining has been a bright spot, with coal output and exports (mainly to Pakistan) on
track to double this year to some four million tons.
This is not to say the economic situation is at all good, just that the free fall has stopped. The
new equilibrium leaves most of the Afghan population — up to 70%, according to a World Bank
survey — unable to afford food and other necessities, a “famine equilibrium” where many people
would starve in the absence of humanitarian help.
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How have the Taliban handled economic management over the past year? What have they done
well?
Revenue collection at border crossings has been remarkable despite the steep drop in imports.
Total revenues are on track to fall but by far less than the decline in the economy.
Arguably, the Taliban have taken a more positive (albeit simplistic) approach to the Afghan
private sector than the previous government. Private firms have sometimes negotiated successfully
with the Taliban over tax rates and other business issues of direct concern to them.
Taliban actions have greatly reduced corruption in customs and at road checkpoints (most of
which have been removed). As a result, the overall burden on the private sector has been reduced
even while formal tax receipts have held up. Also helping are the much-reduced financial inflows
into the country which had previously enabled enormous corruption and waste. However, there are
signs of some petty corruption in Taliban-controlled government agencies, extortion of
nongovernmental organizations and the like.
Less large-scale corruption and the aid cutoff mean the adverse impact of the economic shock
and subsequent adjustment has been disproportionately felt at the upper end of the Afghan income
scale which benefited most from corruption, with smaller percentage reductions in incomes at the
lower end.
The Taliban administration has generally kept to a responsible macroeconomic and monetary
stance, unable to print new Afghani banknotes or to flood the country with dollars (limited to the
U.N. cash shipments), and with withdrawals from banks limited to prevent their collapse.
What have the Taliban done badly?
Their complete lack of transparency on budget expenditures is unacceptable and may mask
irregularities or more likely allocation of large amounts of funds to the security sector and other
Taliban priorities.
Efforts to control the foreign exchange market and edicts not to use foreign currencies — even
though not effectively implemented — betray a lack of understanding of market functioning and the
advantages Afghanistan gains from free markets.
The large increases in coal and other mineral exports may further damage Afghanistan’s
crumbling roads, and it is not clear whether the Taliban will be able to maintain roads and other
essential infrastructure better than the previous government, let alone oversee large new
infrastructure investments. Not to speak of the problematic environmental and social consequences
of mining.
Taliban ideology is getting in the way of sound economic management. Their recently
announced ban on opium, if implemented, would further shock the Afghan economy and take away
the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of rural people — an additional economic hit the country
is simply unable to take. It remains to be seen whether the ban will be implemented.
Taliban restrictions on girls’ education and women’s roles in work would have disastrous
longer-term economic consequences by limiting the participation of over half of the population in
the economy.
What has been the impact of the economic situation and Taliban economic management on
Afghans?
The improvement in security brought about by the Taliban victory and the end of major
fighting has been favorable for the Afghan economy, benefiting many businesses and individuals.
The same is true of the closure of most road checkpoints and much less corruption in customs.
In other respects, however, people are generally much worse off — though this is due
primarily to the economic shock from the aid cutoff and should not be attributed solely or mostly to
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the Taliban’s management of the economy. Where the Taliban are more directly implicated is in the
deterioration in social services (stoppage of female secondary education, less and lower-quality
health care, especially for women and girls), the related loss of employment for a great many women
and policy instability in certain areas such as foreign exchange and banking.
What is the outlook for the Afghan economy?
Unfortunately, Afghanistan is stuck in a low-level equilibrium trap with very slow economic
growth (around or below the population growth rate — meaning the lives of most people will not
improve anytime soon). Even this unattractive scenario is precarious and could be derailed by
continuing drought, lower humanitarian aid, the Ukraine war’s impact on food prices or
worsening security.
The continuing drought strikes at Afghanistan’s most precious natural resource — water —
and will make it all the more difficult for agriculture to play its essential role in economic recovery
and supporting livelihoods. Serious implementation of the opium ban would create a perfect storm
for the rural economy, risking outright famine and large movements of people out of the country.
Though down sharply from pre-August 2021 levels, Afghanistan’s aid dependency remains
high and is a continuing source of vulnerability. U.N. cash shipments, on the order of $1 billion to
$1.5 billion per year, plus another perhaps roughly equal amount of non-cash humanitarian aid
transfers, are essential both for human survival and for maintaining the degree of macroeconomic
stability that has emerged. It is far from clear that this level of mainly humanitarian support can be
sustained.
Other risks include the lingering effects of sanctions — really the fear of sanctions now that
their scope has been clarified and narrowed, the weakness of the central bank partly reflecting its
lack of access to frozen foreign exchange reserves and continuing problems with international
financial transactions.
In the face of the current economic and humanitarian situation, what can the United States and
other international donors do to help everyday Afghans?
Continuing current humanitarian aid is essential to avoid or mitigate a humanitarian
catastrophe. But this is no long-term solution and would leave the country permanently dependent
on such aid and vulnerable to any interruption. Humanitarian and other aid must be well-
coordinated and cost-effective.
Donors will need to continue to strike a balance between maintaining food and other
lifesaving assistance and providing some degree of support to basic services, livelihoods and modest
economic growth, while not overly legitimizing or strengthening the Taliban regime. This is hard
and will necessitate difficult trade-offs among these objectives.
The Taliban bear their own responsibility for the current economic situation. By ignoring and
often openly flouting international priorities, they are making it more difficult for donors to sustain
current aid let alone increase it (to compensate for rising food and other costs), and to restore normal
international financial relations. They need to build on the more positive aspects of their economic
management; appoint qualified, experienced officials to lead key economic agencies (the central
bank and finance ministry); and become more responsive to international concerns not least in the
economic field.
(Source: USIP)
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ONE YEAR OF TALIBAN RULE

Hameed Hakimi (Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme and Europe Programme)
Dr Gareth Price (Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme)
One year after the Taliban’s ascent to power in Afghanistan, the plight of Afghans is
worsening. The economic situation is dire, malnutrition rates are increasing, women’s rights are
being curtailed, there is continuing migration and internal displacement, and the health care system
is crumbling – the already high maternal mortality rates are thought to have increased four-fold.
Since seizing power, the Taliban claim they have achieved full territorial control, established
security and removed ‘islands of illegitimate power’. However, while physical security has
improved by some measures – aid agencies report enhanced access to some provinces – a significant
rise in attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) targeting Shia and other minorities is
one of many reminders that Afghanistan is far from secure. In addition, targeted killings of high-
profile Taliban supporters and members, some claimed by the IS-KP in suicide attacks mimicking
Taliban tactics, underline the vicious nature of the ongoing conflict.
The West, led by the United States, had hoped that their threat of reduced financial support
would help influence the Taliban’s behaviour, in particular to ensure that women’s rights are
protected and that international terrorists are not given sanctuary in Afghanistan. The demand for
women’s rights was simply ignored while the demand about cutting links with international
terrorism was provided lip service. The recent killing of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a
US drone attack drew international attention to the Taliban’s inability or lack of willingness –
perhaps both – to break with Al-Qaeda. The fact that Al-Zawahiri was residing in the heart of
Kabul’s upscale diplomatic neighbourhood in a house that is reportedly owned by a top aide of
the de facto regime’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani – himself the subject of a $10 million
US bounty – seems to confirm earlier warnings by the UN that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
‘remained close’.
An economy on life support
The catastrophic economic cost of the Taliban takeover has arguably had the most profound
impact on ordinary Afghans. Mass unemployment, a collapse of the housing market, and increased
rates of malnutrition are only some of the many tangible signs of an economic catastrophe. But the
Taliban inherited what was, at best, an already weak state. Even before events in August last year,
Afghanistan ranked at the bottom of several socioeconomic indices, such as the Human
Development Index, was ravaged by conflict, dependent on aid and plagued by weak institutions.
Government spending on development projects had also fallen in recent years as spending switched
to security in anticipation of expanded Taliban onslaughts.
Over the past year, Afghanistan’s economy has been on life support. Crippling sanctions
against senior Taliban leaders have paralysed the banking sector and prevented Afghanistan from
engaging with the international financial system and its institutions. The value of its currency, the
afghani, has plummeted, raising the cost of imports and exacerbating inflation and a cost-of-living
crisis. The civilian government institutions that were previously the country’s largest employer are
now unable to pay salaries even to the reduced number of remaining personnel. To make matters
worse, Afghanistan’s agriculture sector has been affected by drought and natural disasters, such as
flash floods and the June 2022 earthquake.
How does the Taliban govern?
The Taliban largely works through the remnants of the structures and state institutions it
inherited, with the exception of entities it dissolved such as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the
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Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commissions and offices dedicated to the management of
parliamentary affairs, as the Afghan parliament has been dismantled.
Following the political and military transition of 2014, when most US and NATO troops left
Afghanistan and the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) was formed, the Taliban adapted
their tactics in the rural areas where they held influence. A key aspect of this change involved
intervening in local dispute resolution mechanisms, such as resolving land disputes. Since seizing
power, the Taliban has continued to rely on a heavy-handed approach towards matters of justice
and dispute resolution. However, there is no evidence that the regime has a penal code, a
functioning judiciary or that it has provided the necessary guidance to Afghanistan’s few remaining
judges. Everyday matters relating to the rule of law are mostly about ‘morality’. The Taliban has
reinstated its Ministry of Vice and Virtue to oversee such matters, which range from severe
restrictions on women’s role in society to a ban on music and dress code for men and women.
The current de facto regime, announced in September 2021, is supposed to be an interim
administration. But there is no timeline or clarity on a potential transition to a more permanent set-
up. Crucially, if the alleged rifts and apparent schisms among the Taliban intensify, it is highly
unlikely that a transition to a more inclusive government will ever take place. Recent Afghan history
bears painful reminders. In 1992, Mujahideen factions failed to establish a broad-based government
after creating an interim administration, leading to a brutal civil war that ultimately paved the way
for the Taliban to seize power in 1996.
Regional engagement
Regional actors and Afghanistan’s neighbours have attempted to engage with the Taliban.
Several countries, such as Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia, have kept their embassies open to enable
active channels of engagement with the Taliban regime – without giving it formal recognition. The
killing of Al-Zawahiri and the failure of the Taliban to demonstrate it had cut ties with Al-Qaeda
will undoubtedly make it harder for the regional actors to do so, raising the likelihood of greater
tension between the regime and the outside world. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan is also
affecting the security situation for its neighbours. Taliban’s closest ally, Pakistan, is facing increased
activity by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an insurgent group allied to the Afghan Taliban.
Since August 2021, the Taliban’s main focus has been maintaining internal unity and this is
unlikely to change in the near term. Paying their fighters and soldiers, maintaining harmony
between hardliners and more pragmatic elements, and ensuring territorial control remain central to
Taliban rule. Against the backdrop of economic collapse, the Taliban will seek to extract a share of
any aid flows into the country.
The West’s strategy of aid conditionality – asking the Taliban to moderate their behaviour on
women’s rights and other issues in return for funding – has clearly failed. It is imperative for the
West to develop mechanisms that prevent the Afghan population from being punished for the
Taliban’s takeover, while not formally affirming the Taliban’s de facto government.
Afghanistan’s history over the past half a century suggests that alternative fronts resisting the
regime in power do not take long to emerge. It also demonstrates a tendency for external actors to
support their proxies in Afghanistan. But even if the country does not fall back into outright conflict,
in the short term there is no end in sight to the suffering of the Afghan people.
(Courtesy: Chatham House)
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AMERICA’S ALLIES AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Bryce Klehm (Associate Editor of Lawfare)
One year ago today, the Taliban entered Kabul as the Afghan government collapsed. The
Taliban’s entrance into Afghanistan’s capital city marked the failure of the United States’ 20-year
war and attempt to build a sustainable Afghan government. The Taliban’s military victory also
touched off two weeks of chaos at Hamid Karzai International Airport as Afghans who had worked
to support the U.S tried to escape. The final images of the withdrawal included Afghans clinging to
U.S. military aircraft and handing their children over barbed wire fences to U.S. soldiers.
Earlier this summer, Lawfare and Goat Rodeo released Allies, a podcast series that traces the
United States’ efforts to protect Afghan interpreters, translators, and other partners through the
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. The seven-episode series covers the invasion of Afghanistan,
the origin of the SIV program, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and ongoing evacuation efforts
and resettlement issues. In honor of the one-year anniversary, Lawfare is rereleasing Allies in its
entirety on the Lawfare Presents podcast feed.
A podcast series that dives into a government visa program might appear to be a strange
vehicle through which to explore the history of the United States’ war in Afghanistan. But, as we
found in researching the series, America’s treatment of its allies reflects a broader ambivalence
toward the war. The day-to-day operations and the local populations’ perception of the U.S.
depended pervasively on interpreters and translators. This was a war in which language, and those
who had access to it, shaped the fighting deeply. The SIV program’s creation, like the war’s
inception, was punctuated by a flash of bipartisan support. Its execution, however, often became the
subject of partisan infighting in Congress and bureaucratic paralysis in the executive branch. And
the SIV program’s failure, like the withdrawal from Afghanistan, ultimately victimized the Afghans
who trusted the U.S. the most.
The story begins just before 9/11, when the U.S. government had little regional, let alone
linguistic, expertise for Afghanistan. As Kori Schake, who served on the Bush administration’s
National Security Council (NSC) from 2003 to 2005, told us, “I bet we had less than 20 language
experts within the entire U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy.” When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, that
knowledge gap needed to be filled rapidly, so the U.S. began hiring local partners through military
contractors. As we detail in Episode 1, they became essential partners, and it was nearly impossible
for any U.S. platoon, provincial reconstruction team, or diplomat to operate without interpreters and
translators. They were the United States’ eyes and ears.
The interpreters themselves decided to work for the U.S. for different reasons. One Afghan
interpreter called “Fred” told us that by working for the U.S., he was actually working for “two
governments.” His logic was that, by working for the U.S. government, he was helping the Afghan
government build a better future for Afghanistan. When these interpreters fought in the field, they
served as crucial advisers to U.S. personnel. Their service ranged from translating direct
conversations to intercepting and interpreting Taliban communications over the radio to collecting
intelligence from local sources to a wide array of other critical tasks.
Another factor in the value of their service was its duration; some interpreters worked for the
U.S. for a long time. In Fred’s case, for example, he worked for the U.S. for more than 13 years. The
translators became some of the best sources of institutional knowledge in Afghanistan because U.S.
service people deployed to Afghanistan for only a few months or a year at a time. Just as a unit
became familiar with an area, in the words of Gen. John Allen, “a new unit coming in wouldn’t have
that kind of situational awareness,” so in the beginning of the rotation “there were early casualties
among the Afghans and, civilian casualties …. that came from our forces not really knowing the
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operational environment.” The translators and interpreters often helped smooth transitions for
incoming units.
The Taliban recognized that these interpreters and translators were essential to the U.S.
mission. During combat, Taliban fighters shouted over the radio “shoot the eyes first.” And aside
from direct combat, the interpreters and their families came under threat as the insurgency slowly
gained momentum in the late 2000s. The Taliban left threatening letters at the homes of interpreters
and their family members. One U.S. soldier recalled the Taliban sending body parts of killed
translators to bases. At the same time, the U.S. war in Iraq also faced an insurgency that targeted
anyone who worked with the Americans. Politicians, diplomats, veterans, and journalists took note
of the trend.
Up to that point in the war, the Bush administration’s narrative was that a refugee crisis in
Iraq didn’t exist because Iraqis had been “liberated.” And with Republicans in control of the Senate
until 2006, little attention was paid to the crisis. That changed when the Democrats took control of
the Senate after the 2006 midterm elections, and Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) chaired the Judiciary
Committee, which has jurisdiction over immigration. As a solution to the growing problem,
Kennedy’s office looked to a preexisting visa program known as the Special Immigrant Visa. The
SIV had previously been used within the State Department as a reward to local embassy employees
who had demonstrated exceptional service.
In January 2007, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing titled “The Plight of Iraqi
Refugees.” The hearing, initiated by then-Chairman Kennedy, came amidst the peak of sectarian
violence in Iraq. The witnesses included a 27-year-old Iraqi interpreter who worked for the U.S. and
went by the alias “Sami” in order to protect his identity. Sami appeared before the committee
anonymously, behind a screen, and the committee asked the press not to photograph or film Sami as
he entered and exited the room. The dramatic moment opened with Kennedy, who, referencing the
growing number of refugees, noting, “Like other aspects of the war, we bear a heavy responsibility
for their plight.” He continued by noting that the SIV program for Iraqi interpreters and translators
had a six-year waiting list and said, “[W]e have a special obligation to keep faith with the Iraqis who
have bravely worked for us … by providing them with safe refuge in the US.”
In addition to congressional attention, there were people like Kirk Johnson, a former USAID
employee in Iraq, who began collecting names of Iraqis who worked for the U.S. and faced threats
against their lives as a result of their service. George Packer, writing for the New Yorker, wrote an
article about the threat to interpreters and translators titled, “Betrayed: The Iraqis Who Trusted
America the Most,” which had such an impact it made U.S. infantry officers in Iraq reconsider their
efforts to protect their interpreters and translators. In the words of Col. Steve Miska, “I just realized
after reading George Packer’s article in the New Yorker, that I just couldn’t look myself in the mirror
unless we tried to help. …. [T]hese guys were on patrol with us every day. … So that’s when we
started trying to figure out the SIV.”
The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, saw two of his embassy employees kidnapped
and killed as a result of their work, and vowed to promote the SIV program. All of those Americans
who worked in Iraq—Miska, Crocker, Johnson, and others—began making noise about the ongoing
crisis. Johnson started the List Project, Crocker wrote urgent memos to the administration, and
Miska eventually got dozens of his interpreters SIVs.
In 2006, the SIV program was limited to 50 spots per year for Iraq and Afghanistan—an
incredibly small number considering the footprint of U.S. troops in those countries. With Kennedy’s
help, Congress increased that number to 500. And with bipartisan support, the Refugee Crisis in Iraq
Act passed in early 2008 and increased the number of SIVs to 5,000 per year. Johnson, who had met
with Kennedy and lobbied for the legislation, was thrilled, “I just had my ‘Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington’ thing where in the span of six months or eight months, I spoke out about a problem,
 14

and then we just had some meetings and we passed a law and now we fixed it.” Two years later, the
Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 increased the Afghan SIV allocation to 1,500 per year.
But the system wasn’t fixed.
After the passage of that legislation, it may have appeared as if the system was working as
intended. Government employees, the press, the public, and members of Congress had been made
aware of an issue, and then Congress passed a law to solve the problem. The only remaining step
was for the executive branch to fulfill the promise by processing applications and giving out visas.
Many who had advocated for the expanded SIV program were hopeful that the Obama
administration would implement the program as intended. But as the administration withdrew
from Iraq in 2009, Kirk Johnson noticed that it wasn’t implementing the program with enough
urgency and many Iraqis were coming under threat. As Johnson recounts in his book “To Be a
Friend Is Fatal,” during the first term of the Obama administration, “the Special Immigrant Visa
created by the Kennedy legislation to resettle 5,000 interpreters each year was in shambles,
granting visas to only about 150 Iraqis each month.” Johnson eventually advocated for a massive
airlift of Iraqi allies, known as the “Guam Option.” Johnson’s account is an eerie foreshadowing of
what was to come in Afghanistan, where many advocates would later advocate for the “Guam
Option” for Afghan allies in 2021.
The Afghan SIV program has been plagued by executive branch paralysis. It proved to be
nearly impossible for the administration to fully implement the program. According to the
Congressional Research Service, the State Department issued just under 850 SIVs for Afghans from
2010 to 2013, about 15 percent of the visas that Congress had allocated.
Officials in the Obama administration argued that allocating the maximum number of SIVs
would cause a “brain drain” in Afghanistan. In 2010, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl
Eikenberry, wrote in a cable that the SIV program “could drain this country of our very best civilian
and military partners—our Afghan employees.” Eikenberry’s cable reveals a contradictory fact
about the SIV program: Its mere existence was evidence of the failure of the United States’ efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Why would the U.S. need a program to protect its own local employees if it
was succeeding in stabilizing a country? If the U.S. wanted to stabilize the country, wouldn’t it need
local partners with institutional knowledge? Eikenberry’s cable also came at the height of the surge
in Afghanistan—another development in the broader war that revealed how mismatched the SIV
program was for the size of the problem it was attempting to confront.
Congress passed the original Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 a few months before the
Obama administration announced “the surge” of troops and resources into Afghanistan. That act
allocated just 1,500 visas per year for Afghan SIVs, a number commensurate with the approximately
25,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. (For comparison, the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 allocated
5,000 spots per year, with a U.S. troop level of approximately 150,000.) Although U.S. troop levels
rose to nearly 100,000 by 2011 and more translators would be required, the number of visa spots
remained the same.
Additionally, the interagency security screening process often resulted in the rejection of
deserving SIV applicants. For example, one former State Department official who screened SIVs and
refugees told us that analysts often deal with ambiguous information like if an applicant “once made
a phone call to such and such a person who … turns out at a later date was involved in some crime
or terror incident.” In other cases, an applicant may have had to pay a ransom to a terror group for a
kidnapped family member, which might constitute “material support” to terrorism. The security
screening and application process was not tailored for applicants in a country like Afghanistan
where an insurgency had its reach in every part of society.
 15

The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 had allocated visas only through fiscal year 2013.
With that expiration date approaching, lobbyists like Katie Reisner, then-policy director at the
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), and Matt Zeller, a veteran and SIV advocate, fought
to extend the program. In their successful effort to do so, they added several key amendments,
including allowing applicants to have legal representation; establishing an appeals process for
rejected applications; requiring the State Department to establish an Afghan SIV coordinator; and
requiring all applications to be processed in a nine-month time frame. Those amendments,
combined with the Obama administration’s dedication to the program during its second term,
allowed the SIV program to begin to work as intended. By the end of 2016, the State Department
was administering nearly 3,500 SIVs per year.
But alongside those amendments, legislative mechanisms revealed another weakness in the
Afghan SIV program. After 2014, the SIV program’s allotment of visas had to be renewed on a yearly
basis. The logic behind a yearly allocation process seems pretty straightforward: The situation in
Afghanistan might change, so why extend the SIV program past a date where the U.S. might not
even be in Afghanistan? Although that might sound benign, the effects of that yearly allocation
process were tragic. They appeared in two forms.
First, opponents of the program in Congress would have the opportunity to voice their
opposition each time the program was up for renewal. After 2014, Congress renewed the SIV
program through the National Defense Authorization Act or some other must-past bill. The
negotiations would sometimes result in opponents constricting eligibility for the SIV program. For
example, in 2015, the work requirement for those eligible for an SIV applicant was increased from
one to two years. Would the Taliban not attempt to kill an interpreter or translator because they
worked for the U.S. for only one year, not two? But the supporters of the program had to agree to
the change because a failure to reach an agreement would terminate the program. The shifting
application requirements were the results of a divided legislature, which then placed the burden on
the applicants themselves. For instance, even though the legislation noted that the new work
requirement applied to those submitting applications after Sept. 30, it was unclear whether the new
requirements would apply to resubmitted applications.
The second effect of a yearly allocation process impacted resourcing at the State Department.
The department’s inspector general report on the SIV program noted that the “uncertainty of visa
availability” affected the implementation of the program. The report “determined that the
Department is unable to conduct long-term planning because of the uncertainty of visa availability
and the temporary nature of the Afghan SIV program.” That absence of long-term planning resulted
in the government not investing in new technology or personnel for SIV processing. For example,
the Defense Department’s database for keeping track of military contractors, known as the
Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT), might have been used “as a
potential method for verifying employment” for an SIV applicant. But the government did not use
or update that database because “it was not cost effective to establish a new system of record or
extend the functionality of SPOT … likely because the Afghan SIV program was expected to expire
in FY 2014.” Additionally, from 2016 to 2020, “staffing levels to process Afghan SIVs ha[d] generally
remained constant” even as the backlog of applicants grew.
The Trump administration’s harsh immigration policies exacerbated both problems. Even in
2016, as then-candidate Trump advocated for a total ban of Muslims entering the U.S., Sens. Chuck
Grassley (R-Iowa) and Jeff Sessions’s (R-Ala.) objection to the SIV program further restricted
eligibility for the program. As the Huffington Post reported at the time, Grassely and Sessions said
publicly that the program was too expensive but allegedly said in private that they didn’t want more
immigrants in the country. To those Republican senators, it simply didn’t matter that the SIV
program was created for people who served alongside U.S. soldiers (and had already undergone
 16

several background checks in order to obtain employment with the U.S.). One spokesman for Sen.
Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), a staunch supporter of the program, said that the Republicans’ move
“reeks of Donald Trump.” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), another supporter of the program, accused
some Republicans of “signing the death warrants” of those waiting for SIVs.
In September 2017, President Trump issued an executive order calling for “extreme vetting” of
refugees. As Ambassador Mark Storella, the former deputy assistant secretary of state for the Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration, told us, the security vetting of SIV applications was already
“the most rigorous screen[ing] process for anyone entering the United States of any type.” The
Trump administration’s new security procedures were more labor intensive and harder to
implement. For instance, the administration added a new requirement of screening applicants’ social
media accounts. Storella thought that the State Department could work with these requirements,
but, just as the new security policies added more work to the screening process, they also pulled
resources from the vetting agencies. Storella remembered that, at the time, the FBI, which has an
essential role in the process, had “only one person left, assigned to all of the vetting for all refugees
and all special immigrant visa applications.”
Inside the Trump White House, some officials tried to fight for the program. Olivia Troye, the
Department of Homeland Security adviser to Vice President Mike Pence, recalled the vice president
circling a story in the Washington Post about delays in the SIV program and asking her to look into
it. She followed up and was told that the applicants were undergoing “security checks.” Troye and
other officials raised these issues at White House meetings, but she remembered that Trump’s senior
immigration adviser, Stephen Miller, would say things like, in her words, “What is it that you
people want? You want a bunch of Iraqi and Afghan communities around the country?” According
to Troye, Trump advisers aligned with Miller’s views began classifying meetings and agendas in
order to push out those who they perceived to be pro-SIV advisers.
The numbers of SIVs issued over Trump’s term underscore the devastation to the SIV
program. In 2017, before a lot of these procedures were in place, over 4,000 Afghan SIVs were
issued. But each of the next three years would see not even half that number. Iraqi refugees fared
even worse. NBC News reported that, in 2018, only two former Iraqi interpreters received visas.
Trump was closing the exits for America’s allies in Afghanistan just as he sought to withdraw U.S.
forces. His deal with the Taliban effectively sealed their fate and locked them in a country where the
Taliban continued to hunt them.
The Biden administration chose to abide by Trump’s deal but extended the withdrawal
deadline from May 2021 to September 2021. SIV advocates were hopeful that the new administration
would prioritize SIVs. As George Packer recounts in his article “The Betrayal,” several national
security officials in the Biden administration had worked at SIV advocacy groups and nonprofits:
“The ties between these organizations and the new administration were nearly incestous.” Packer
lists Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who had been on the board of Human Rights First; National
Security Council official Jon Finer, who helped found IRAP in 2008, and Samantha Power, the new
head of USAID, who sat on IRAP’s board.
SIV advocates began once again promoting the “Guam Option” for Afghan allies as they did
for Iraqi allies a decade before. For Congress’s part, there was broad bipartisan support for Afghan
SIVs, and the passage of amendments raised the visa allotment and tried to expedite the process
over the summer. But it was too little too late. Many felt that the administration simply wasn’t
moving quickly enough. The Biden administration announced “Operation Allies Refuge” in July
2021. In a speech on the status of the withdrawal, Biden said: “[W]e’ve already approved 2,500
Special Immigrant Visas to come to the United States. Up to now, fewer than half have exercised
their right to do that. … [T]he other half believe they want to stay.” As Packer writes, “The
president, echoed by his officials, was trying to blame Afghans for their own entrapment.”
 17

During this time, the U.S. military withdrawal proceeded ahead of schedule. Jonathan
Schroden, an Afghan military analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, told us that, because Biden
wanted to minimize U.S. casualties, the military had no choice but to withdraw as quickly as
possible because the Taliban could renege on the deal and attack at any moment. In Schroden’s
words, the military “had to treat the withdrawal as a withdrawal under fire, or at least potentially
under fire. That is one of the most dangerous military operations that one could try to undertake.”
As the Taliban advanced rapidly, many American veterans of the war were in constant
communication with their Afghan counterparts and friends. One U.S. veteran who had trained the
Afghan National Army’s Female Tactical Platoon said that she began looking into the SIV for the
Afghan women she had trained, but they didn’t qualify because they didn’t work directly for the
U.S. This underscores an important shift in the withdrawal that ultimately culminated at the Kabul
airport. Since the establishment of the SIV program for Afghans, the translators, interpreters, and
other partners who worked directly for the U.S. had been undergoing a slow-motion evacuation for
over a decade. But now, as Afghanistan fell under Taliban control, the SIV recipients and applicants
would be joined by members of Afghan society who didn’t work directly for the U.S., but aligned
themselves with the ideals that the U.S. promoted throughout the war. These ideals included
Afghan women’s inclusion in public life and a free and open press. And they faced many of the
same bureaucratic catch-22s that SIV applicants had. Did they have the right paperwork? Do they
have adequate proof that their life is under threat from the Taliban?
So on Aug. 15, when the Taliban entered Kabul, thousands of Afghans who had built their
lives around the promises of America’s mission in Afghanistan descended on the Kabul airport. In
the U.S., active-duty military, veterans, politicians, and other private citizens stood up operations
like Operation Eagle, Digital Dunkirk, and Task Force Pineapple to evacuate Afghans. The Post has
reported that the informal efforts of private citizens placed some burden on the military. For those
veterans involved in the effort, they believed they didn’t have any other choice but to try and help.
We asked one veteran what he made of the government’s claim that informal efforts hurt the
evacuation. He said, “Where was the number that I was supposed to call? When an Afghan says, ‘I
need help getting out.’ What was the number or the email or the person we are supposed to put
them in touch with? ‘Cause that did not exist.’”
Some Afghans made it inside the airport with no outside help. Hakimi, a 22-year-old Afghan
activist, told us that he made it into the airport on Aug. 26 a few hours before an Islamic State
suicide bomber killed 13 U.S. service members and more than 170 Afghans. He remembers seeing
the bodies of U.S. service members, and thinking, “Why they died? They died because of me,
because of my family, because of Afghan people.”
In total, the U.S. military and State Department employees processed and evacuated nearly
78,000 Afghans in a stunning feat of logistics. But since August 2021, the legal status of the vast
majority has remained uncertain. In March, the Biden administration extended their temporary
protected status for another 18 months. Groups like the #AfghanEvac coalition are lobbying for the
Afghan Adjustment Act, which would provide a path to permanent residency in the U.S. for those
Afghans who don’t qualify for the SIV program. This May, there was hope that the act would be
attached to the Ukraine supplemental aid bill. But, as has happened so often in the history of the SIV
program, opposition to the bill from Republican senators like Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Rob Portman (R-
Ohio), and Grassley blocked its inclusion. The senators’ objections once again rest on vague
“security” and screening process concerns that simply do not match with reality. A 2019 study by
the CATO Institute found that “the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack by a
refugee is about 1 in 3.86 billion per year” (emphasis in the original). As Ambassador Storella told
us, “Since the 1970s, not a single American citizen has been killed in a terror attack by someone who
 18

came into the United States as a refugee, not a single one.” A group of bipartisan senators
introduced the Afghan Adjustment Act last week, but it is still unclear if the bill will pass this year.
If there are any real national security concerns with the SIV program, they concern the
downstream effects of America’s poor treatment of its allies. When we asked Kori Schake about the
end of America’s involvement in Afghanistan, she said, “[N]ot only is that a disgrace of our honor,
but it’s going to make it harder to find allies, interpreters, translators, civil society, activists,
journalists, political figures, willing to run risks alongside us for what we’re trying to create in the
world. It will make everything we do going forward harder and costlier because we have
demonstrated we’re unreliable.” Elliot Ackerman, a former Marine Corps special forces adviser to
the Afghan National Army, argued that the botched exit is already impacting global security: “Are
we actually going to argue that there is no correlation between NATO losing this war decisively to
about 50,000 Talibs and this catastrophic evacuation and how weak it made NATO look … to what
Russia has done in Europe in February a few months later?”
And with national media attention focused on Ukraine, Americans have turned their attention
away from Afghanistan. But the trauma from the withdrawal lives with everyone who was involved
in the evacuation effort. Many veterans have spoken out about the moral injury of the withdrawal.
And, with an ongoing humanitarian crisis unfolding in Afghanistan, many Afghans who were
evacuated last August fear that their country will be forgotten about. When we spoke with Mahnaz,
an Afghan woman who served in the Afghan National Army’s Female Tactical Platoon, she had one
request for anyone listening: “Don’t forget Afghanistan … they need somebody, they need help,
people are hungry. The soldiers … the Taliban [are] hunting them. They are killing them. … Don’t
forget about my country.”
(Source: The Lawfare Institute)

AFGHAN HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Javed Iqbal (MS in Media Studies)
Afghanistan has a long history of destruction and suffering, be it man-inflicted or natural.
Since the Russian invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan has become a battleground of world
superpowers and is surrounded by an unending wave of destruction.
After the foreign forces withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan hosted an exclusive
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference to discuss the Afghanistan issue. The
conference focused on the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and exploring new avenues to address
the rapidly worsening humanitarian situation in terms of food shortage and potential economic
collapse. Foreign ministers of member countries, special invitees from the United Nations (UN),
international financial institutions, and non-member states, including the US, UK, European Union,
and Russia attended the session. Afghanistan’s delegation was headed by the acting foreign
minister.
Pakistan’s initiative to host the 17th session of the emergency meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers of the OIC demonstrated Pakistan’s strong will to promote peace and stability in
Afghanistan. All member countries unanimously agreed that peace and stability in the region can
only be achieved by forming a broad-based and inclusive government that is representative of the
entire Afghan society.
Decades of conflict and instability in Afghanistan have left millions of people on the brink of
starvation. Some 24 million Afghans were already in need of humanitarian assistance because of the
economic crisis and lack of development aid. The situation was further exacerbated after the recent
earthquake in Paktia and Khost, which left nearly 1,500 dead and many more injured.
 19

Following the earthquake, the Afghan government appealed for international support to
address the crisis. The Pakistani government responded immediately by dispatching consignments
of relief goods. On 22nd June, the first convoy of 8 trucks carrying tents, tarpaulin, and blankets
from the National Disaster Management Authority reached Afghanistan. On 24th June, another
consignment of relief assistance was sent through aircraft. Besides this, Pak-Afghan Cooperation
Forum (PACF) also sent 5 trucks carrying 37.5 tons of food, winter bedding, tents, tarpaulins, and
clothes.
Earlier, PACF had also organised free eye camps in the hospitals in Kabul and Khost where
thousands of Afghan patients were provided free treatment by Pakistani doctors. The forum also
facilitated the first batch of Afghan children with congenital diseases who will receive free medical
treatment in Pakistan.
To promote bilateral trade with Afghanistan, the Pakistani government decided to relax the
visa policy to ensure long-term and sustainable trade between the two countries. Under the new
policy, six months of multiple entry visas will be issued to transporters from Afghanistan. Pakistan
has also decided to import coal from Afghanistan, which can help Pakistan generate cheaper
electricity and save nearly $2.3 billion.
Since August 2021, the economic crisis and collapse of the banking sector have made it
extremely challenging to get money into Afghanistan. International humanitarian organisations and
the UN have scaled up assistance to address rising needs, but aid cannot replace the services of the
state. To institutionalise financial support, a trust fund was established at the OIC conference.
However, the international community remains reluctant to allow cash inflow.
During this difficult time, the international community must lift sanctions and release Afghan
funds as the country has descended into a serious economic crisis. The international community
must realise that this is not the time to settle scores or debate on issues of legitimacy or recognition.
They must resume aid and support the Afghan people to mitigate their miseries.
(Source; Express Tribune)
 20

Book Reviews
Ali Salman’s

ISLAM AND ECONOMICS

A Primer on Markets, Morality and Justice
Reviewed by: Farah Adeed (Research Assistant at San Diego State University)
Pakistani public intellectual Ali Salman’s new book, Islam and Economics: A Primer on
Markets, Morality and Justice, is a much-needed work, offering a slightly non-academic overview of
Islamic economics.
I found myself developing an interest in the book after witnessing a wave of recent public
display of hatred and anger in the name of Islam. The volume gives hope for imagining that a vision
and determined will can help us alter the focus of our attention, from the stagnant notions of
salvation through the humiliation and lynching of humans, to the greater meaning of life that may
be found in the domain of ideas and economic activity.
The book is a fairly reasonable read if one is interested in the following questions: does Islam
promote capitalism? Can there be Islamic capitalism? Does Islam present a case for socialism?
Should we strive for Islamic socialism? Does Islam offer a unique theory for an economic framework
and social justice? What are the ethical tenets of the Islamic economic framework?
Salman’s book can be divided into three sections. First, he outlines the basic principles of the
Islamic economic framework by chiefly relying on the classical understanding of Islam. Second, he
outlines structures and institutions that can ideally play a role in regulating markets in an Islamic
state. Finally, he comments on the applicability and functioning of these principles and institutions
in Muslim as well as non-Muslim societies.
Contrary to popular debates and scholarly literature, Salman addresses three fundamental
questions to present his distinctive model of an Islamic economic framework: Who owns what? How
is wealth created? How is the wealth distributed?
He explores these questions from both doctrinal and historical perspectives to offer an
alternative view. He clarifies that he does not intend to offer any new interpretation but, as the book
reveals, he does end up offering a certain perspective for looking at Islamic economics.
Islam respects the idea of private ownership, but it also establishes that natural resources are
divinely owned and belong to humankind, Salman argues. He elucidates that though such resources
are gifts of nature, human efforts to extract them are not free. Islam respects private ownership and
does not offer any justification for the nationalisation of private industry.
In response to the second question, Salman focuses on a verse from Surah An Nisa: “Believers,
do not consume your wealth among yourselves in vanity, but rather trade with it by mutual
consent.” Trade is a key feature in Islamic theory about wealth creation.
Finally, in analysing how wealth is circulated, Salman argues that “the circulation takes place
through trade as well as through taxes, which in the case of the Islamic economic framework
constitutes zakat [obligatory charity], ushr [levy on agricultural produce] and a possible land value
tax.”
After outlining broad theoretical and conceptual principles, Salman outlines certain
institutional settings that will regulate economic affairs in an Islamic state: price freedom, free trade,
 21

market regulations, riba [usury, fiscal policy], waqf [“social protection of people by people”] and the
law of inheritance.
He points out that though the Holy Quran does not explicitly talk about price control, Prophet
Muhammad (PBUH) declared that tasir [price control] is forbidden. However, later Muslim jurists
were found to be divided on the question of price freedom. Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik were
conditionally in favour of tasir for the larger public good.
This idea was further developed by the scholar Ibn-i-Taymiyyah, who said that it was
obligatory to intervene in special circumstances such as wars and famines. On the other hand, Imam
Shafi and Imam Hanbal were against the idea of price control, arguing that it would increase
people’s miseries.
After offering various accounts from Islamic history, Salman maintains that the general
consensus is that price control is forbidden by Shariah under ordinary circumstances.
However, like early jurists, Salman admits that there can be problems regarding distortion of
price in the market. To ensure the smooth functioning of the market, the office of muhtasib was
created by the Prophet, the first appointee being Hazrat Umar. Notably, the muhtasib’s role was to
ensure undisrupted economic activity, not to obscure it through official means.
Salman repeatedly reminds us that the state’s role is to ensure free trade and it is not
empowered to disrupt the market without any legitimate reason. To put it differently, one chief
argument of the book is that Islam projects and defends economic freedom. Freedom appears to be
at the heart of the Islamic economic framework. Broadly speaking, economic freedom is what
ultimately translates into all other forms and expressions of freedom.
In chapter three, Salman mentions that the Islamic state can intervene in commodity markets
in case of “cheating, coercion or theft.” He also outlines some other scenarios and conditions under
which the Islamic state can intervene. The question is: what does an Islamic state mean? This pushes
economic theory into other spheres, ie political.
Salman extensively quotes theologian Javed Ahmad Ghamidi’s work, also mentioning that
“Ghamidi does not consider the establishment of an Islamic state as a religious obligation.”
However, Ghamidi talks about the economic framework and calls it “economic Shariah.”
I contend that politics cannot be completely delinked from economics. Practically, one main
objective of political organisation is to create order where economic stability is ensured and
undisrupted growth is achieved. So how can an economic framework based upon the principles of
Shariah be implemented in a secular state? Will implementation of economic Shariah ultimately lead
to the creation of an Islamic state?
Ghamidi’s work mentioned in Salman’s book does not offer any answer. Similarly, Salman
also does not talk about the formation and structure of an Islamic state. For an economic theory to be
considered inclusive and meaningful, it has to have a link with politics.
Moreover, Salman suggests that the iqta [assignment of tax revenue] system can provide “a
workable arrangement for the development of natural resources.” Here, he does not recognise the
fact that iqta during Seljuk rule caused a major blow to Muslim intellectual and economic
dominance.
Andrew Watson, in his book Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World: The
Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques, argues that iqta was responsible for the agricultural
downfall of the Muslims around 1000 CE. It not only restricted private property, but also damaged
entrepreneurship.
Though Salman quotes several contemporary Islamic scholars, he doesn’t focus on existing
socio-political realities. For instance, he does not address how an Islamic economic framework will
 22

operate under the current international system, where not only complex interdependence exists, but
also several institutions of global governance. Salman’s model appears to have evolved in isolation,
as it seems to have no connection with existing global challenges.
But despite its certain deficiencies, in a country such as Pakistan — where the youth is being
indoctrinated to become extremist defenders of the self-styled idea of religion — books such as this
are much-needed oxygen for ensuring the survival of reason and promotion of dialogue.
Rather than glorifying extrajudicial killings in the name of faith, and preparing youth to die in
the name of religion, Pakistan’s youngsters need to be told about economic activity,
entrepreneurship and prosperity rights.
(Source: Dawn B&A)
Francis Fukuyama’s

POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY

Reviewed by: Nick Fraser (Commissioning Editor of Storyville)
Just after the end of the cold war, a young American-Japanese political scientist published an
arresting essay entitled The End of History?, followed in 1992 by a book, The End of History and the
Last Man. Many chose to interpret Fukuyama’s dense, aphorism-studded argument as an arrogant,
misguided spelling out of the triumph of liberal capitalism. But Fukuyama had something subtler to
say. He wanted us to think of what we should do with ourselves now democracy was installed
globally. Would we be happy as humans – or would we not enter some zone of deep, anti-climactic
dissatisfaction? And would liberal democracy be superseded?
Fukuyama mistakenly endorsed the neocon imperial project. Later, after the Iraq invasion, he
wrote an admirable short book trashing his ex-associates. He supported Obama, and wrote
eloquently of the failures in Congress organised by the latter’s enemies in the name of democracy.
Now he has finally and triumphantly completed what must be his life’s work, telling the story of the
evolution of the world’s political institutions in two fat volumes loaded up with wisdom and stuffed
with facts.
Volume two skids through the 19th century to the present, but to appreciate the astounding
ambition of Fukuyama’s project one must reach back to volume one, The Origins of Political Order:
From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (2011). We begin somewhere remote with primates
and family hunter-gatherer groups. Then we visit scattered tribes. Something like an ordered state
comes earliest in China. Now we rush through Athens and Rome. Authentic states with functioning
bureaucracies come into existence. The Catholic church proves unexpectedly to be an innovator with
respect to law. Life becomes less brutish and short in places such as Denmark, England, and, later,
the United States, Japan, Germany. There are wars, famines, breakdowns, but some sort of
amelioration of the human condition can be seen to occur.
Fukuyama has a gift for catchy, repeatable phrases, and he refers to democratic development
as “Getting to Denmark” – a 17th-century pre-Borgen vision of property laws, parliaments governed
by a live-and-let-live pluralistic ethos. In Fukuyama’s view “Denmark” is a metaphor of moderate
tempers, a good legal system, credible parliamentary democracy, a dose of healthful end-of-history
tedium. Denmark, defined both as a real place or a metaphor, is the closest we can get to collective
perfection.
Political Order and Political Decay is somewhat less of a good read than the first volume. This
is a consequence of the material, which is more complicated and less susceptible to being rendered
as a narrative. As Tocqueville did in the 19th century, Fukuyama examines the real prospects for
 23

democracy. He wants us to ask ourselves not just whether the world we have can be improved, but
whether it can survive at all.
The nearer we get to the present, however, the less this simple narrative appears sustainable.
Instead of ascending in orderly fashion, humans begin to behave like demented and exhausted
marathon runners. They go in different directions, following often contradictory signs – labelled
Democracy, Law, Social Mobilisation – stumbling and falling. There is no finishing line.
There are omissions (modern India is one, and the passages about the Middle East are
perfunctory) but the ground covered is astonishing. There are brilliant passages about modernity in
Argentina and Japan. A chapter comparing the civil service in Britain, France and Germany left me
wondering how such potentially dull subjects can be made so interesting.
Most Americans pay deference to the notion of American exceptionalism, but not Fukuyama.
Anyone who thinks that Americans could do without the federal government, or should be happy
with the way it is run, should be forced to read the 50-odd subtly argued pages about American
railroads and forests. The “vetocracy” (another good Fukuyama word) of US democracy is a fact of
contemporary life.
What he calls “repatrimonialisation” is the lock applied to democratic institutions by the
wealthy and powerful in the pursuit of their exclusive interests – and dominance by wealthy
individuals and corporations is more pervasive than at almost any time in American history.
Without political change, it is clear that America faces decay. But Fukuyama is honest enough to say
that he cannot see how that change will take place.
You cannot have democracy without a functioning legal system. Just as important, it would
seem, is the creation of a state to which citizens can at least feel some minimal attachment – and that,
too, takes time, and isn’t easy to bring off. If you choose one aspect of modernity, such as efficiency,
you may rule out another. It proved easy to turn the modern bureaucratic states of Japan and
Germany into tyrannies; no civil society existed capable of mobilising opposition. Fukuyama does
acknowledge this, yet he forces us to see, too, how liberty has been oversold in recent decades.
Should we believe in the cause of liberal democracy – or is it time to shed what many, after so
many botched efforts, see as the last, doomed western obsession with remaking the world in its
distorting image? Fukuyama makes us see that such things as good government and laws that
protect the weak are more or less universally desired – impulses towards them are to be found
wherever political activity exists, and they are surprisingly durable.
Whether humankind can get to Denmark, alas, is less certain. We can all try, but there is no
guarantee of success. Decay, meanwhile, is pervasive, easily attained and terrible. Read these
wonderful books so that you can never again say that we haven’t been warned. And read them, too,
for the way they make uncertainty seem not just tolerable but the only sane way to look at the world.
(Source: Guardian)
Arundhati Roy’s

THE MINISTRY OF UTMOST HAPPINESS

Reviewed by: Parul Sehgal (Senior Editor at The New York Times Book Review)
On the night she won the Booker Prize in 1997 for her novel, The God of Small Things,
Arundhati Roy had a strange and frightening dream. She was a fish being ripped from the water by
a bony emerald hand. A voice instructed her to make a wish. Put me back, she responded. She knew
she was on the cusp of cataclysmic fame, she later said an interview. She knew her life would
explode—“I’d pay a heavy price.”
 24

She has. It is almost impossible to see Roy clearly through the haze of adulation,
condescension, outrage, and celebrity that has enveloped her since the publication of The God of
Small Things, a gothic about an illicit intercaste romance in South India. She was feted as a symbol
of an ascending India, paraded along with bomb makers and beauty queens. Much was made of the
author’s looks—she was named one of People magazine’s most beautiful people—and lack of
literary background; there was titillated interest in her days living in a slum and working as an
aerobics instructor. Praise for her novel was extravagant—she was compared to Faulkner and García
Márquez—but it was also frequently patronizing. “There is something childish about Roy. She has a
heightened capacity for wonder”—this from one of the judges who awarded her the Booker Prize.
(Meanwhile, a writer who had judged the Booker the previous year publicly called the book
“execrable,” and the award a disgrace.)
Roy appeared to want no part of any of this. She chopped off her hair after the Booker win,
telling The New York Times she didn’t want to be known “as some pretty woman who wrote a
book,” and donated her prize money to the Narmada Bachao Andolan, a group protesting the
construction of a series of dams that threatened to displace millions of villagers. She turned her
attention from fiction to people’s movements all over India—Kashmiris resisting the Indian
military’s occupation, tribal communities fighting to protect their ancestral lands. She decried
India’s nuclear testing (a source of much national pride at the time) and became an outspoken critic
of America’s war in Afghanistan. She was praised for her commitment and derided for her naïveté,
and faced charges of obscenity and sedition (later dropped). She was invited to model khakis for
Gap (she declined) and to march through the forests of central India with Maoist insurgents (she
accepted). And now, after 20 years, she has finally returned to fiction with a new novel, The Ministry
of Utmost Happiness.
Is novel the right word, though? I hesitate. The Ministry of Utmost Happiness, hulking,
sprawling story that it is, has two main strands. One follows Anjum, a hijra, or transwoman,
struggling to make a life for herself in Delhi. The other follows Tilo, a thorny and irresistible
architect turned activist (who seems to be modeled on Roy herself), and the three men who fall in
love with her. But as was true of The God of Small Things, there is more than a touch of fairy tale in
the book’s moral simplicity—or clarity, if you’re feeling charitable. Roy will say of a character, “He
was a very clean man. And a good one too,” and he is swiftly, unequivocally pinned to the page.
The world she conjures is often brutal, but never confusing or even very complex. Manichaean
dualities prevail: innocence (embodied by puppies, kittens, little girls) versus evil (torture, torturers,
soldiers, shopping malls). If this tendency felt less troubling in her first book—think of handsome,
heroic Velutha, the untouchable, and his foil, the almost comically evil Baby Kochamma—it was
perhaps because the narration was trained so closely on children. Given that the central characters
were a pair of young twins, Rahel and Estha, it felt natural that the world would be read this way.
Yet to simply find fault with the lack of psychological shading would be, I think, a genre
mistake. Roy’s indifference to precisely that problem suggests that something interesting is afoot.
Consider the book’s dedication—“To, The Unconsoled.” Note the cover photograph, a grave, and
the setting: The story begins and ends in a graveyard. More than a novel, this book wants to be an
offering. It isn’t concerned with the conventional task (or power) of fiction to evoke the texture and
drama of consciousness. Instead, it acts like a companion piece to Roy’s political writings—collected
in books such as The Algebra of Infinite Justice (2001) and Walking With the Comrades (2011). It
tours India’s fault lines, as Roy has, from the brutal suppression of tribal populations to the 2002
pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat.
Just about every resistance movement is embodied in a character, and the lives and struggles
of these characters intersect. The queers, addicts, Muslims, orphans, and other casualties of the
national project of making India great again find one another and form a raucous community of
 25

sorts. And this novel—this fable—is as much for them as about them; it commemorates their
struggles and their triumphs, however tiny. You will encounter no victims in this book; the smallest
characters are endowed with some spit. A kitten, about to be drowned by a group of soldiers, bares
her fangs, unafraid to take on the Indian army. At night, a dung beetle lies on his back in the
graveyard, pointing his feet to the sky, to help prop it up should it fall. Even he is given a name:
Guih Kyom. Even he does what he can.
“I’ll have to find a language to tell the story I want to tell,” Roy said in an interview in 2011, as
she discussed returning to fiction. “By language I don’t mean English, Hindi, Urdu, Malayalam, of
course. I mean something else. A way of binding together worlds that have been ripped apart.” As it
happens, she didn’t really settle on a new way of telling the story—this novel shares the same
playful, punny argot of The God of Small Things (more on this later)—but she tries to pull all those
worlds into an unwieldy embrace.
It may seem like the pamphleteer has subsumed the novelist. But Roy’s enterprise is less
dutiful than it sounds. There is no grudging marriage of art and politics in her work; as John Berger,
one of her longtime interlocutors and a formative influence, wrote, “Far from my dragging politics
into art, art has dragged me into politics.” Roy’s work conveys a similar spirit. She is a great admirer
of the world. Her strongest writing is always at the margins of the main story—the pleasure of
finding “an egg hot from a hen,” or this passing detail from The God of Small Things: “A thin red
cow with a protruding pelvic bone appeared and swam straight out to sea without wetting her
horns, without looking back.” From the fine-grained affection that stirs her imagination springs an
ethical imperative—after all, how can one appreciate the world without desiring to defend it? And it
must be defended not merely from war or political calamity, but from that natural, more insidious
phenomenon: forgetting.
This is the literary tradition that Roy belongs to—and that was intimately transmitted to her
by Berger and her other great friend, the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano (she has called him her
twin), for whom the great tragedy of humanity wasn’t that we die or suffer or make each other
suffer. It was that we forget. And because we are so prone to forgetting—because it is so easy to
make us forget—we accept the conditions of our suffering as inevitable and cannot fathom
alternatives. (“The world, which is the private property of a few, suffers from amnesia,” Galeano
once said. “It is not an innocent amnesia. The owners prefer not to remember that the world was
born yearning to be a home for everyone.”)
Like Galeano’s Mirrors, an ode to “human diversity” in which a history of the world unfolds
in 600 short stories, Roy’s novel is a compendium of alternatives—alternative structures of kinship,
resistance, and romance. Anjum lives in a multigenerational joint family of other hijras; together
they raise a child. Later, she and a few other characters move into a graveyard. They sleep between
the headstones, plant vegetables, create a new kind of human family that can obliterate the divisions
between the living and the dead. Roy has imagined an inverse of the Garden of Eden—a paradise
whose defining feature, rather than innocence, is experience and endurance.
And what better place to set this graveyard, and this book about forgetting, than in Delhi,
Roy’s home for much of her adult life. It’s a palimpsest of a city—occupied continuously for at least
3,000 years, surviving and absorbing the Mughals, the British, the refugees after India’s partition
from Pakistan. A city whose own founding myths tell of amnesia, and of the power of texts to resist
it. As one story goes, Brahma the creator god suddenly forgot the scriptures. He performed various
rites and austerities and plunged into one of Delhi’s rivers. During the monsoon, the waters rose and
flung up the sacred texts onto a riverbank that is still known today as Nigambodh Ghat, “the Bank
of Sacred Knowledge.” Even the gods may be wired to forget, but we are also wired for narrative, to
build what bulwarks we can.
 26

In this context, any notion of a fissure between art and activism would seem absurd. To be
both artist and activist, to expend oneself in both places, on the page and in the world, is the duty of
the writer. It is to be “integrated,” as Vivian Gornick described Grace Paley; it is to be “a writer in
the most comprehensive sense,” as the biographer Richard Holmes wrote of Shelley. But to live and
write with the consciousness of this integration is trickier than it sounds.
To so confidently believe oneself to be on the right side of history is risky—for a writer
especially. In that balmy glow of self-regard, complacency can easily take root. And good prose
demands a measure of self-doubt—the worry that nags at a writer, that forces her to double back on
her sentences, unravel and knit them up again, asking repeatedly: Is this clear? Is this true? Is this
enticing? This book has a slackness to it that suggests Roy has abdicated some of these anxieties.
Roy has said that she never revises her books, that her essays and fiction write themselves,
and that she rarely takes edits. I’ve always interpreted—and enjoyed—such statements as a bit of
swagger. It’s dispiriting to see that they might be true. The Ministry of Utmost Happiness is plagued
by almost rudimentary errors: There is near-total confusion about point of view. Messages and
morals come ponderously underscored. The two central stories never convincingly come together. In
the absence of psychological development or real suspense, chapters end with portentous rhetorical
ellipses. Worse still, the creation of characters as stand-ins for causes results in formulaic depictions
of the very people she is trying to humanize. Anjum, for example, never becomes more than her
“patched-together body and her partially realized dreams.”
The voice that carried The God of Small Things emanated from the characters. The elasticity of
language, the silliness and sappiness, felt very much like the expression of the twins. It captured
their way of being, of merging with each other and the world. Here that voice feels distracting,
imported from a different universe. I thought often of Walking With the Comrades, Roy’s account of
traveling through the forests with Maoist insurgents. She was full of admiration for their discipline,
for the care they took of their woods and of one another. She was awed by how everything in their
world was “clean and necessary.” Something of this aesthetic stole into her style in that book. Roy
trusted the reader enough to just point the camera, to let us see what she saw: “Three beautiful,
sozzled men with flowers in their turbans walked with us for about half an hour, before our paths
diverged. At sunset, their shoulder bags began to crow. They had roosters in them, which they had
taken to market but hadn’t managed to sell.” Details gleam (a woman’s anklets shine in the firelight)
and horrify; she hears the story of three Maoist girls raped by the army: “ ‘They raped them on the
grass … But after it was over there was no grass left.’ ”
The epigraph of The God of Small Things is a line from John Berger: “Never again will a single
story be told as though it’s the only one.” What’s disappointing about The Ministry of Utmost
Happiness is that it can feel like a collection of so many single stories and stock figures—heroic
martyrs and tragic transgender characters. Roy has a ready response to the criticism that she isn’t an
especially subtle writer. She cops to it directly: “I want to wake the neighbors, that’s my whole point.
I want everybody to open their eyes.” I remember something Cézanne supposedly said: “I know
what I am looking at, but what am I seeing?” Roy is a champion at waking the neighbors, at getting
our attention, and as an offering, this book is a beautiful act of witness. But harnessing our
attention—getting us to see as well as to look—that is perhaps a different, and more intricate, matter.
It’s a matter of tactics, a matter of art.
(Source: The Atlantic)
 27

Climate Change
ENDLESS WORDS, WHERE’S THE ACTION?
Graham Peebles (The Founder of The Create Trust)
There is virtually no time left, many believe we are already too late to do much to arrest
climate change and the destruction of the natural world. Even climate scientists are stunned by the
pace at which the climatic conditions of planet Earth are being altered, disrupted by the ignorance
and deep-rooted selfishness of humanity; well, a relatively small percentage of humanity in fact.
Every day, complacency – politically, individually and commercially – greed and political
short-termism continue, the environmental crisis intensifies, moving systems closer to tipping
points, when nothing can arrest the destruction, nothing can stop the demise. Some of the vandalism
inflicted on the planet is already judged by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
to be irreversible.
The most recent reports from the IPCC (made up of the world’s leading
climate/environmental scientists) are, like many before them, exasperated, infuriated calls for action
– radical urgent action. And yet despite the warnings and pleas, made by scientists, activists,
concerned citizens, over decades, little of substance is happening and still ‘the environment’ is not
the top priority for governments. Yes, awareness is growing and some changes are underway:
Dozens of countries have committed to achieving Net-Zero (not actual zero) greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG) by 2050, or 2060 as with China. But there is a gaping chasm between political
rhetoric and policies/action to meet their commitments – the ‘Implementation Gap’ is huge. As
Antonio Guterres put it, “Government and business leaders are saying one thing, but doing another.
Simply put, they are lying.” The US has just passed a major climate change bill – inadequate by most
assessments, but better than nothing, so too has Australia’s new government, which seems keen to
throw off the country’s reputation as an environmental liability, – also totally inadequate, but like
the US step, better than nothing.
Solar panels are booming – China leads the world in installation and manufacture – and
hundreds of wind farms are being planted – again China is the vanguard, erecting more than three
times those of any other country in 2020. Energy efficiency has advanced, but because of humanity’s
insatiable appetite for stimulation of all kinds, energy use keeps rising, and with it GHG emissions;
sales of electric vehicles are booming and renewables are now far cheaper than fossil fuels. Despite
this fact the percentage of electricity (not total energy) being generated by renewables, is only
around 10% of the global total; and ‘Green’ ideas, initiatives and concerns are talked about in a way
not seen before.
Positive, but in the face of the challenges, such measures, including hundreds of local
community-led schemes, are little more than gestures, a paper fan against a 40°C heat wave. GHG
emissions are still growing year on year, investment in fossil fuels continues, rain forests continue to
be felled, habitats crushed, waters polluted, air contaminated, soil eroded, and the “long drawn out
tragedy of unprecedented scale”, as Extinction rebellion Co-Founder, Claire Ferrers, put it, goes on,
as does human brutality – to one another and the natural world.
An atlas of human suffering
Set up in 1986, when climate change was first openly talked about, the IPCC
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is the United Nations (UN) body that assesses the
science around climate change. Free from ideological/political bias or influence, it “provides a
framework for governments, scientists and IPCC staff to work together to deliver the world’s most
 28

authoritative scientific assessments on climate change.” This year two reports (of three) from the
agency have so far been published, AR5 and AR6. They make crystal clear the dire situation the
planet, humanity and all other forms of life are in as a result of human behavior. Behavior that has
set in motion a series of interconnected environmental catastrophes: Climate change, species
extinction, air and water pollution, soil erosion and deforestation. With every major area of impact
comes a series of sub-sections, localized issues affecting ecosystems/wildlife/habitat, food
production, indigenous peoples, displacement of persons/migration, mental health and so on. These
in turn trigger further echoes of destruction and disruption – complex environmental and social
problems – destructive ripples expanding and multiplying, revealing unforeseen consequences;
unforeseen because corporate decisions, government policies, individual human activity, proceed, in
the main from a conditioned foundation of ignorance, of false assumptions and wrong conclusions
about ourselves and the nature of life.
We understand little about our nature and the laws that underpin life, but arrogant and self-
centred, believe we are planetary custodians; we cannot even live peacefully together in community,
let alone be responsible for the planet and the unbelievable abundance of life that exists within its
orbit. Humility, the quality most lacking within the race – totally absent within politicians/leaders
and big business, is essential if we are to begin to live gracefully as one interconnected family,
forming part of a global life, which in truth we are.
The IPCC AR5 is “an atlas of human suffering…..….the facts are undeniable.” And pointing
the finger of blame directly at politicians and corporate bosses — “this abdication of leadership is
criminal. The world’s biggest polluters are guilty of arson of our only home.” Comments made not
by Extinction Rebellion or Greenpeace, but the UN Secretary General (who stands tall among the
current collection of backward looking inept world ‘leaders’), António Guterres.
We have caused an environmental catastrophe, and by we, I mean the rich developed nations
of the world, because it’s the behavior of this relatively small percentage of humanity that is the
major culprit. The environmental catastrophe was not, and is not being fueled by over-population,
although there are certainly too many people in the world, it is the result of over-consumption by
wealthy societies. It is not the hundreds of millions in sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan or
China who are responsible, or the billion desperately poor Indians that are behind it, nor is it fed by
the inhabitants of South-Sea Islands, many of which will probably disappear. It is the western
lifestyle of unrestrained irresponsible consumption, including diets centered on animal produce.
And within these industrialized wealthy (more or less) societies, that are obsessed with with stuff –
most of which is totally unnecessary, it is the richest one percent that are overwhelmingly to blame.
Oxfam’s shocking report, ‘Confronting Carbon Inequality,’ published in 2020, revealed that,
“between 1990 and 2015 – 25 years when humanity doubled the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) in
the atmosphere…..The richest 10 percent accounted for over half (52 percent) of the emissions added
to the atmosphere, [and] the richest one percent were responsible for 15 percent of
emissions…..more than twice that of the poorest half of humanity.”And as inequality grows the
disproportionate impact this tiny group has will increase. By 2030, Oxfam estimate that the GHG
emissions of the world’s richest 1% will be 30 times higher than a level compatible with 1.5°C
increase.
But, while people everywhere are beginning to feel the impact of climate change and
environmental degradation, it’s populations in the poorest nations that are being most severely
battered; and despite repeated promises from western politicians, they are receiving pennies to
assist with so called ‘adaptation’ plans. It is nothing less than an act of war, perpetrated by rich
countries against the poorest most vulnerable people on the planet.
 29

Fantasy 1.5°C
The fabled target of 1.5°C (above pre industrial levels) of global warming agreed at COP 21 in
Paris in 2015, and held up as tolerable, is a fantasy at the moment. Governments have signed up to
Nationally Determined Commitments (NDC’s). But even if these are honored, and there is little or
no sign they will be (they are non-binding), warming is still estimated to pass 1.5°C; because the
NDC’s do not go far enough, because governments are still placing short term economic gain and
the perpetuation of a socio-economic model, which has done enormous harm, both to the planet and
humanity, first. Antonio Guterres makes clear that, “Governments and corporations are not just
turning a blind eye, they are adding fuel to the flames.They are choking our planet, based on their
vested interests and historic investments in fossil fuels, when cheaper, renewable solutions provide
green jobs, energy security and greater price stability.” The level of complacency is beyond belief.
Currently the global ground temperature increase is around 1.3°C, and looking at the climatic
chaos being experienced, imagine what 1.5 would be like – total disaster, let alone a rise of 3 – 4°C ,
which is the present trajectory. Oxfam state that if 1.5°C is to be realized, “the per capita emissions of
the richest 10 percent will need to be around 10 times lower by 2030 – this is equivalent to cutting
global annual emissions by a third.” But even 1.5 °C, described as “a physical threshold or boundary
for the planet’s climate” will create an unknown world; a world that, according to a recent study,
would be too warm “for the ecosystems on the frontline of climate change,” including coral reefs,
many of which are forecast to disappear under such conditions.
A file of shame
China, which is leading the world on renewable energy, energy storage and electric vehicles
(in 2019 more electric cars were sold in China than the rest of the world combined) also has the
highest total GHG emissions in the world, but the per-capita figure is relatively low, around half
those of the US e.g. The high levels of overall GHG emissions are due in large measure to the fact
that the country has become the world’s manufacturing hub, producing goods that are sold in the
West as well as throughout developing countries.
Rich nations have, in varying degrees, exported their GHG emissions to China and other
Asian states. The UK, for example has reduced gross GHG emissions by about 44% since 1990, but
that is largely because virtually all large scale manufacturing has closed down, rather than any
successful national transition away from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. In fact the UK
government continues to invest in fossil fuels, and Liz Truss, who looks likely to become the leader
of the Conservatives and therefore the new Prime-Minister (just when we thought things couldn’t
get any worse), is glibly talking about freeing up gas from the North Sea and investing in Shale Gas
to combat rising fuels prices. Investing in fossil fuels is madness (from 2016 – 2020 countries and
banks around the world are estimated to have invested 3.8 USTrillion in fossil fuels), and should be
made illegal. At the same time Truss is threatening to essentially outlaw peaceful protest by groups
like Extinction Rebellion, who are heroes and should be listened to and admired for their efforts to
alert people to the depth of the emergency and the level of government and corporate inaction.
The environmental assault is mass vandalism on a global scale, and despite the calls for action
and change, apathy reigns. In his response in April, Antonio Guterres said the IPCC report was “a
file of shame, cataloguing the empty pledges that put us firmly on track towards an unlivable
world.” An “unlivable world”: “Major cities under water. Unprecedented heatwaves. Terrifying
storms. Widespread water shortages. The extinction of a million species of plants and animals. This
is not fiction or exaggeration. It is what science tells us will result from our current energy policies,”
he screamed. Those current policies and the way we are now living, will result, scientists estimate, in
at least 3°C warming, possibly higher.
It is impossible to overstate the severity of the situation, or the level of indifference and
complacency within governments, most businesses, and among many people, the majority perhaps.
 30

Governments must lead the way, but when they don’t and currently they are not, the people must
take up the challenge. Some are doing this – Extinction Rebellion, the Schools Strike for Climate,
Indigenous People’s groups and many civil society organisations, and they should be given
unconditional public support. For the environmental impacts to be limited and planetary healing to
begin, fundamental systemic change is needed as well as a major shift in collective attitudes and
behavior; a shift away from selfishness and excess to social and environmental responsibility; a
move away from lifestyles driven by consumption to lives rooted in awareness and sufficiency.
No gadget is going to save the planet, there is no magical tool on the horizon that will suck
GHG emissions out of the atmosphere. Belief in such ‘Unicorn Technology’ as Extinction Rebellion
describes it, is simply another convenient excuse by ambitious politicians and greedy corporations to
continue with the destructive, unjust Ideology of Greed, that is crucifying the planet and suffocating
society.
Globally the switch from fossil fuels to renewables must be intensified, this requires, as
Antonio Guterres makes clear, transferring subsidies in fossil fuels to renewables, “Now. It means
Governments ending the funding of coal, not just abroad, but at home.” It means working
collectively, breaking down national barriers, ‘The World First’, should be our collective
slogan/mantra. The key factor, the essential factor in facing the environmental catastrophe is unity;
no matter where we happen to be born or live we have but one home, and we all have an equal and
total responsibility for its well-being.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

EDUCATIONAL OVERSIGHT ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Ghania Usman (Formerly associated with Army Public School, Bahawalpur)
Saud Bin Ahsen (Works at a public policy institute)
Climate Change is a global phenomenon caused by Green House Gas emissions due to the use
of goods containing carbon like motor gasoline or the commodities whose manufacturing needs
carbon-containing inputs. The more such activities by humans, the larger would be the emissions. It
is forecasted that the planet would be inhabitable if these emissions are left unchecked. Pakistan has
little contribution to global GHGs emissions. However, Pakistan is one of the most vulnerable
countries to CC due to its water-dependent agriculture and electricity. Pakistan’s 40 per cent labour
force is employed in agriculture and is most vulnerable as they cannot afford to adopt mitigation
and adaptation strategies. This population is at risk and requires consistent help for transitioning out
from CC adversities. Pakistan, thus, has to save itself through adaptations and by becoming energy-
efficient in terms of usage and expanding renewable energy.
Moreover, we must reduce emissions by consuming less as everyone must act to avoid
extinction. In this regard, there lies another critical concept when considering the issue of climate
change: Ecological Footprint (EF). EF is a measure of the demand that a person makes on the global
natural resources. In 2008, humanity’s ecological footprint was 18.2 global hectares whereas the
earth’s total bio-capacity was 12.0 billion. It means there is at least a gap of 6.2 billion between the
demand and supply. However, the EF of a person is not the same everywhere, or for all persons in
one place. It is linked to their consumption levels. An average EF for low-income countries is 1.0
GHA/person, whereas that of high-income countries is 6.2 GHA/person. A study shows that to
bring every person of today’s 7.1 billion population to the same level of EF as in the UK (whose per
person EF is 4.9 GHA) in terms of resource consumption, we need 2.9 earth-like planets. EF is not
 31

only based on consumption but it is also based on the wastage amount a person adds to earth. Less
consumption and a modest lifestyle can, therefore, help reduce pressure on earth and reduce EF.
There are two types of intervention at this vital time i.e. Hard Intervention and Soft
Intervention. When taking hard intervention into account in the case of Pakistan, the federal
government has provided institutional & policy frameworks under Climate Change Policy 2012,
Pakistan Water Policy 2018, National Food Security Policy and many Multilateral Environment
Agreements, to tackle this massive CC issue.
But the previous government, under the radiant leadership of former Prime Minister Imran
Khan, who has a very keen interest and serious concern about Pakistan’s high vulnerability to the
adverse impacts of climate change had gone further by taking initiatives for the promotion of
renewable energy and conservation of energy like Renewable Energy Policy of Pakistan, 2019,
setting up of Alternate Energy Development Board (AEDB), and National Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Agency (NEECA). The focus is not only on renewable energy sources but also on
promoting energy conservation like efficient lights and motors etc. Under the vision and policy
guidelines by former PM, Imran Khan, the State Bank of Pakistan, through its Financing Scheme for
Renewable Energy as a Green Banking initiative, has disbursed PKR 79.7 billion as of February 2022.
Thus, there appears an urge on the state level to promote renewable energy sources, particularly
given the stringent Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) agreed by Pakistan at COP-26
aiming at the generation of 60 per cent of all energy from renewable sources by 2030.
On the other hand, soft intervention in the form of mass awareness proves a more sustainable,
long-term, and efficient yet entirely ignored means from the state institutions’ perspective. Mass
awareness via education is the most important part of the strategy for tackling CC because it
prepares children in schools and youth in universities to understand CC. Since the issue is man-
made and involves the masses, legal and administrative remedies may not be of much help as
compared to proper curriculum-based education. And, Education for Climate Change should go
beyond science and address values, customs, actions and lifestyles, which are responsible for CC.
The design and methodology of education, however, need to be ascertained. Environmental
Education (EE) was previously a discipline to teach Climate Change (CC), and now under Education
for Sustainable Development (ESD)’s global framework 2030 for the next ten (10) years, Education
for Climate Change (ECC) is integrated with ESD because climate change is not purely a scientific
discourse but has socioeconomic, cultural and psychological dimensions as well. China, Australia
and Denmark in a top-down approach follow this approach. Australia already had all solar schools
by 2016.
Regarding the design of ECC, there are two schools of thought. CCE can be only scientific
education about causes and consequences, or it can be inter-disciplinary pursuit like in South Korea
and Australia aimed at transforming lifestyles. Science-based education imparts knowledge but does
not bring behavioural change. Inter-disciplinary education engaging the social sciences for
developing societal understandings, cultural keys, and political will can change attitudes. For
example, scientific knowledge of the adverse effects of smoking is not enough to motivate people to
stop smoking. Instead, education aimed at changing lifestyle toward more sports etc. can help.
Interdisciplinary education aimed at changing cultural values is even preferred over mass
awareness campaigns.
Academic literature reveals that ‘Climate Change’ education has two parts. ‘Climate’ part
needs to be told in scientific terms. The second part is education for ‘Change’ which aims to promote
positive change. The latter part must challenge normative values that shape our behaviour. It helps
transition from unsustainable normative values like an exorbitant lifestyle to more sustainable
values. As John Dewey, psychologist and educationist, said, ‘The conception of education as a social
process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind’.
 32

Similarly, ECC should work towards a sustainable futuristic society. We know that dozens of daily
activities contribute to GHG emissions and individuals EF. Through the ECC part, we need to create
a willingness to make the voluntary choice of actions for reducing GHG emissions and ecological
footprints. ECC change component aims for behaviour change as was required in COVID to secure
larger-scale change. The change portion of CCE also involves issue analysis, community and
personal decision-making, political processes, social justice, inter-cultural sensitivity and
intercultural competence, and most importantly behaviour change.
Consequently, the methodology of CCE components must be flexible. Some students will
learn through science-observing natural phenomena, analyzing data etc. Others will engage through
arts like music, painting etc. Yet, others will earn through taking action like volunteering for a social
justice issue.
Moreover, the social dilemma discourse in CC emphasizes inherent tensions between
collective versus individual interests at various scales, from the individual to the international: for
example, the value of individual action on climate change may be seen as futile where others do not
act; international solutions may be viewed as unattainable due to multiple conflicting national
interests. These conflicts driven by factors have roots in both normative and pragmatic terms and
can be addressed through the change part of ECC.
Secondly, CC is a wicked problem emanating from capitalism and consumerism. We need to
learn what is necessary for building a sustainable future and enabling7-8 billion people to make life
dignified on a finite planet. Under capitalism, happiness is pursued through more consumption and
profit maximization and that leads to individualism and competitiveness. A competitive global
culture that works toward economic efficiency works against the pursuit of the common good.
When valuing things even relationships monetarily, joy becomes diluted as nothing. More
scientifically, material gains do not bring happiness as the concept of marginal utility sets in after
meetings basic needs. The importance of material things decreases when people reach more social
capital. However, happiness does not necessarily mean more and more consumption. Happiness
pursuit is possible to be realized in sustainable and resilient societies, comprised of personally
fulfilled people, who use their potential fully for individual and common good-meaning people
fulfilling lives amidst trust, participation and personal expression and civil rights. More aptly, the
change of means to happiness by transforming societies from consumerism to personal fulfilment is
a very important issue to address through the change part of ECC.
Transforming the entire world population from a capitalistic approach to the pursuit of happiness
to fulfilling lives with collective good can be secured only through the change part of ECC. A similar
approach is used in Finland in 2016 where the viability of ecosystems and human sharing of its earth
resources are given priority and markets and consumerism are placed lower just as means to the end
rather than an end in itself. It is called an Eco-Social Approach to ECC in Finland.
The education systems in Pakistan like most countries currently lack these attributes. There is
no systemic approach to ECC in Pakistan at the school and university levels. At the school level,
there is only some scientific know-how in the subject of geography or social science. At the
university level, it is only available in some undergraduate and postgraduate programs as a course
predominantly on scientific lines. Some schools have been adopted by civil society organizations as
‘Green Schools’ for informally educating students through workshops and seminars and practicing
water and conservations strategies. Some civil society organizations like Pakistan Kissan Rabita
Committee (PKRC), Green Squad, and Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change (CSCCC) conduct
walks and seminars for informal CC education to general public, students and other stakeholders.
Thus, Climate Change policy has missed out the component of helping education department and
private education system of incorporating Education for Climate Change (ECC) formally as a
discipline on the line of having its two components ‘Climate’ and ‘Change’ as discussed in above.
 33

Recommendations Hence, keeping in view the severity of the climate crisis, everyone should
act as a stakeholder in Climate Change. If UNDP is a global advocate, the government of Pakistan
should assume the role of national advocate and engage with people-peasants, students, individuals,
businesses, civil society organizations etc. Everyone must play their part in advocacy to address this
wicked issue of Climate Change.
As far as recommendations and way forward are concerned, ECC needs to be introduced like
in Finland with its ‘Climate’ and ‘Change’ components. It should be made compulsory at all levels
with an emphasis on reverting to our somewhat forgotten values of simple and collective lives.
Schools should be funded to act on CC activities. Universities should also promote CC research to
strengthen local action. In this regard, curriculum design with a specific focus on, content-based
knowledge like climate, deforestation, habitat loss, water cycle, soil erosion, and air pollution should
be introduced. Likewise, awareness of strategies to address pressing environmental concerns for
example reducing carbon consumption, encouraging low carbon development, reducing
deforestation through sustainable forest management, and improving water and waste
management, should also be made in school-level textbooks.
At the university level, possible topics, like the annual flood cycle and how to manage it;
sustainable agricultural methods; existing areas of pollution and potential strategies for improved water,
soil and waste management; sustainable forest management; and awareness of valuable endemic species
(both flora and fauna) and how to protect them should be factored in for graduate-level studies.
Mass awareness campaign for CC be launched to provide location-specific and need-based
information to energy consumers for solar and other renewable options such as ‘Million Green
Homes’ in Vietnam; to farmers for acceptability of various agriculture and water conservation
related adaptations; to the urban population for water conservation and wastewater management; to
the general public to reduce emissions by shifting from exorbitant to simple lifestyles. This
awareness campaign must be at the mass level at pandemic proportion by using print and electronic
mass media, social media, experts and connectors like teachers, mosque leaders, national heroes and
CSOs. The awareness campaign should use all options including debates, symposiums, walks,
volunteering etc. at all levels and on all platforms. Everyone should advocate for CC no matter how
small that person is and how big is the audience.
Cleaner energy options include the construction of dams, micro-hydel (run-of-the-river)
power plants, solar panels and wind potential. Among these options, solar is the one which even
common households and small businesses or commercial activities can benefit from. Given the
specific context of Pakistan, more and more focus on solar power can, therefore, help us to meet or
get closer to the 2030 target. Adaptation to solar must be smoothened by low-cost financing with
minimum requirements like using solar systems as collateral; and a 20 per cent subsidy for first-time
users. Moreover, various kinds of incentives for local manufacturing of panels should be given.
The solar sector is growing and there are several IPPs, which have been issued licenses in
different parts of Pakistan. The main hurdle for the promotion of solar power is its upfront cost, for
which SBP with the help of the Asian Development Bank, has introduced a refinancing scheme.
Some projects have been completed under the SBP refinancing scheme by providing loans at two per
cent by SBP and four per cent by commercial banks. Besides businesses, people have also benefited
from this scheme at the household level. Thus, there is a need not only to spread awareness,
education and advocacy for solar but to couple it with some concrete measures that take care of the
hindrances in the way of shifting a sizeable population to solar power.
For this message to be of epidemic proportion, it has to be well polished and tweaked so that
the general public can absorb adaptations. And agents in the forms of a well-connected network of
experts (e.g. scientists), and connectors (e.g. social media influencers, mosque imams, CSOs, etc.)
should carry out mass awareness campaigns. Thus, there is a need to intensify the awareness
campaign to ensure that the next time someone calls climate change a hoax, people question that
person’s basic knowledge instead of cheering him/her (Source: Daily Times)
 34

THE CLIMATE THREAT

Malik Amin Aslam Khan (former minister of climate change, former SAPM and former vice president of
the IUCN)
“We are close to the tipping point – where global warming becomes irreversible” — Stephen
Hawking
Pakistan is perilously caught in the eye of a perfect climate storm. It is a crisis which had been
brewing since the past few months with events closely mirroring the early warning predictions
given by our meteorological department.
A spate of climate-triggered natural disasters fired up with an unprecedented early heatwave
which sent temperatures prematurely soaring to scorching levels in very early summers. In May,
parts of the country recorded the highest temperatures on the globe. The resultant heat stress hit an
unprepared agriculture sector causing productivity drops especially for fruit orchids. It also created
the dry flammable conditions for ravaging forest fires across the country, destroying a large part of
the valued Chilgoza forests on the borders of the Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
The next domino fell in the northern mountainous parts of the country with heat-enhanced
glacial melting which has, subsequently, caused bursting flash floods destroying critical roads and
encroaching infrastructure. This situation had hardly settled when a freak monsoon season, which
again had been ominously predicted, came true and hit Pakistan from the south overcoming an
unprepared and exposed urban infrastructure, especially in Karachi. The enhanced glacial melting
coupled with almost way above normal monsoon rains have now collectively generated the slow
onset flooding which inundates almost half the country and has wiped off many rural villages which
stood in harm’s way. Almost a 1000 people have died with thousands now homeless – hapless
climate refugees in their own country.
Although the above crisis was clearly predicted by the PMD weeks, if not months, in advance
of the heatwaves, glacial melts and freak monsoon patterns it again caught us totally unprepared.
The ensuing human catastrophe which is painfully unfolding has more to do with a crisis of
governance which has accentuated this climate crisis. The lethargic and mostly absent relief and
response measures to this predicted disaster have laid bare the apathetic state of governance systems
in Pakistan. Instead of climate compatible infrastructure, we see infrastructure greedily encroaching
in flood plains being engulfed as nature mercilessly regains its pathway. All leading to human
misery at an unprecedented scale.
The Ministry of Climate Change needed to be at the forefront coordinating and directing
adaptive response measures across provinces. Instead, while climate change has forcefully gate
crashed into Pakistan and is clearly not affording us the luxury of time, we have unfortunately
chosen to callously dampen, delay or altogether shelve a spate of clearly thought out, and globally
acclaimed, response measures to this ensuing crisis.
The climate response vision built up by the previous government was based on two solid pillars
– one being to become a part of the solution to climate change by shifting towards cleaner energy and
electric mobility and driven by clear time-bound targets. Unfortunately, this process now stands
derailed with coal power making a comeback, the construction of zero carbon hydro projects put on
the back burner and the momentum for the electric mobility transition totally broken.
The other pillar, and the more important one in Pakistan’s current situation, was to build up
resilience based on nature-based solutions to climate change. This shift to invest and trust in nature
was driven by four targeted initiatives, which were not just pies in the sky but translated into actual
projects on the ground. All of them were collectively designed to build up the country’s climate
adaptation backbone and do so by strengthening nature-based systems.
 35

These four initiatives included the globally acknowledged ‘10 billion tree tsunami’ initiative
which was not just about planting trees but about creating sinks to sequester carbon, create green
jobs and create a natural defense against the ravages of climate change from strengthening the
mangroves to fight sea level rise to expanding alpine forests to combat mountainous land sliding.
The funding for this ongoing initiative has been slashed by almost 40 per cent and an aimless witch-
hunt initiated to dig out menial dirt for political point scoring – all just aimlessly diffusing the
momentum of this excellent initiative just when Pakistan needed it the most. While this nature-
based remedy has motivated similar billion tree initiatives in New Zealand, USA, UK and Saudi
Arabia we seem to be looking for ways to tear it down.
The ‘protected areas initiative’ was the second nature-based initiative which was designed to
not only expand the national parks, protect its flora and fauna and conserve the country’s unique
and valued biodiversity but most importantly create huge wetland and wilderness reserves of
nature to act as shock absorbers for climate impacts. The number of national parks was increased by
50 per cent in just over a year and funds allocated for creating properly managed protected areas.
However, this initiative has also dampened in its implementation and all at the cost of enhancing
Pakistan’s exposure and vulnerability to climate change while losing out on a chance to build up its
adaptive capacity.
Similarly, the ‘Recharge Pakistan’ initiative was designed to turn the floods crisis into an
opportunity by diverting this yearly deluge towards degraded wetlands along the Indus, enact
urban rainwater harvesting and capturing the mountainous hill torrents which pillage through some
northern districts in Pakistan. This would not only soften the impact of the floods but also capture
and direct the flood waters to restore degraded wetlands while recharging the sinking groundwater
aquifers in the country. The funds for immediately initiating two pilot projects were allocated
through World Bank financing while the larger initiative was approved for possible funding
through grant GCF financing. Again, the present regime has failed to carry forwards the momentum
on this and we now risk losing the allocated and approved financing owing to lethargic utilization.
Finally, the ‘Living River Indus’ initiative was conceptualized and put in motion with the aim
of reviving the dying ecology of the river Indus basin which is really a non-negotiable lifeline for
Pakistan. An international consortium led by the UN was hired and tasked to bring forward a clear
action-based implementation strategy. The excellent draft report has been produced and includes 25
time-based actions which need to be taken to restore the ecology of the Indus as it flows from the
glaciers to the mangroves. If Pakistan is to adapt to inescapable climate impacts this ecological
backbone of the country needs to be the foundation of its resilience. Unfortunately, this report is also
gathering dust while it should have been urgently launched and globally pitched for attracting
adaptation financing for Pakistan.
The above nature-based framework for climate adaptation in Pakistan has been globally
acclaimed, by the UNEP and WEF, and collectively the four initiatives define the core of the
country’s adaptive response to climate change. The sooner they are put in motion the better it is
going to be for the country as the climate crisis is neither going to go away nor will allow us to
escape from it. This is not just an ecological challenge but an issue of human survival and national
security for Pakistan. We can just not afford to play political games with it or else we risk being
engulfed by this existential threat to the country.
(Source: The News)
 36

Covid-19
COVID - A WAY FORWARD WITH SUSTAINABILITY &
BIODIVERSITY
Attiya Munawer (Columnist, essayist and blogger)
Since the onset of the COVID- 19 pandemic, a new unprecedented situation has arisen many
new challenges including social, health, sustainability and world economic issues. COVID -19 is a
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus II, first identified in Wuhan city of China on
December 19, 2021 and until now this virus has reached its sparks to 218 countries and killed 3.9
million people across the world. It magnifies the everlasting impacts of inequality, batting the poor
the hardest. Periods of fortified unemployment, global shortage critical medical and personal
protective equipment including masks, protection sheets, gloves and medicines further afloat
economies resilience by foster sustainable economic systems- low- carbon investment and green
infrastructure planning. The G7 and G 20 ensure to finance least developed and developing
countries in flattening the pandemic curve along with the extreme focus on sustainable resource
development, climate change mitigation measures and fair economies.
Up till now 25% of plant and animal species are on the verge of extinction, therefore, countries
should consider biodiversity in their COVID19 response and economic recovery plans because land
use changes and wildlife exploitation increase the risk of many diseases by bringing humans and
domestic animals closer to pathogens and disrupting disease-sustaining ecological processes.
The economy and human well-being depend on food, clean water, flood protection, erosion
control, the drive for innovation, and more. More than half of the world’s national production relies
heavily on moderate biodiversity. Thus, decline in biodiversity poses a major threat to society. As
part of the policy to respond to COVID19, investing in biodiversity can help mitigate these risks
while creating jobs and economic incentives.
Although government and business leaders have recognized the importance of green
recovery, and their focus is now on climate change. As part of the restoration and environmental
protection system, they should talk to each other. Many countries have taken comprehensive
measures to protect biodiversity in response to their COVID19 policies. Examples of biodiversity
measures include changes to regulations on the wildlife trade to protect human health, and
employment programs focused on ecosystem restoration, sustainable forest management, and
control of invasive species.
Analysts suggest that the amount of potentially harmful costs incurred as part of the economic
recovery from the COVID-19 crisis far outweighs the benefits to biodiversity. Governments should
take the necessary steps to integrate biodiversity policies into COVID-19 recovery projects, ensure
that COVID-19 economic recovery measures support biodiversity without jeopardizing it, maintain
regulation, and reduce land use. , wildlife, wildlife trade and pollution and attach the environmental
condition to the bailout to improve stability, screen and monitor stimulus measures of their
biodiversity effects due to plastic pollution and now due to mask pollution in seas or Covid- 19 poor
disposal of protection equipment. In order to combat such drastic conditions, large investments
should be made in the conservation, sustainable use and restoration of biodiversity.
There is no socio-economic development in the current global panorama. These problems and
challenges directly affect human psychology, leading to the loss of psychological stability and the
escalation of the financial crisis. Especially, because people are threatened by so many threats, there
are more and more cases of mental crisis because people are locked at home and told to be As a
 37

result of people being told to confine themselves to their homes and maintain self-loneliness,
someone is more likely to be severely affected psychologically, further affected by a lack of proper
guidance or treatment.
When no resources are provided to manage the well-being of the people, the situation
becomes profitable and affects mental health. Regarding the effects on sustainable psychology, the
importance of better mental health should be discussed as it affects individual development and
counters limit personal activities.
We have had many epidemics in the past. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS
outbreak) has hit Asian countries, and West Africa has also been infected with the Ebola virus. They
also affected the socio-economic balance, affected public health, and caused numerous similar
deaths to what we are experiencing with COVID-19 but the new thing now is that Coronavirus
affected us mentally, physically and well-being of the ecosystem with its drawbacks of limiting
resources by humans while staying at homes due to partial or national lockdown where they put a
burden on economy and ecosystem by overconsumption of natural resources instead at the same
time human enclosure at homes give a chance to ecosystem for its resource restoration, replenishing
disastrous effects caused by anthropogenic activities like decline in air pollution, soil erosion,
mineral leaching, hunting, poaching and wildlife trade.
Humans are deteriorating the habitat of wild animals and the normal cycle of pathogens and their
hosts. In such situations, we are becoming more and more prone to new diseases. Human pathogens
such as the coronavirus are not fully understood to date and several other strains or wildlife as host of
this virus (and many other viruses and bacteria) in nature that could be a matter of global health in the
future. The COVID-19 pandemic is calling into question our ongoing efforts to improve the Earth’s
environment. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is even more important now.
Emphasis should be placed on the adoption of strict wildlife trade regulations and comprehensive
measures to protect the natural environment. Most importantly, consider comprehensive ways to
improve our relationship with the environment that will lead us to sustainability. Agricultural stability
and reduction of dependence on animal products is one such example.
There is no doubt in saying that there are some important lessons to learn from COVID-19. It
is about our survival, preparedness and responsibility against nature that will lead to the control of
future epidemics. Shutdowns are proving to be viable not only in breaking the chain of infection but
also in the healing of the ecosystem. Air and water pollution levels have dropped in many parts of
the world and nature has begun to regenerate. The important thing is that what we as human beings
learn from it. Will we reduce greenhouse gas emissions evenly, will unnecessary travel be curtailed,
will we allow the reduction of pollutants in the ecosystem to let nature breathe, and will we promote
and adopt sustainable agricultural practices? And stop disturbing wild habitats? Most importantly,
will all stakeholders, including governments, organizations and individuals, unite to fight the
epidemic that has been going on for decades and resulting in loss of life and biodiversity? There will
be a decrease sooner or later, the deadly coronavirus, and one of the most explosive epidemics of the
century will be tackled through vaccines or other means through united efforts across borders of
countries and continents. But this is not the first novel pathogen that has targeted us, nor the last.
There is a need for a fresh perspective to address some of the key issues we have learned from this
pandemic. Therefore, humanity must work together to stop the root causes of these pandemics. The
way to deal with such pandemics in advance is to make every effort to achieve the goals of
environmental sustainability.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
 38

PROFITS BEFORE LIVES RESPONSE BY CAPITALISM TO COVID-19

Philip Guelpa ()
Following the initial discovery in July of an infected individual in Rockland County, evidence
that polio is continuing to spread in New York state has now come to light. In addition to previous
detection of the virus via wastewater testing in New York City and two suburban counties—Orange
and Rockland—it has now been found farther away in Sullivan County, in samples taken in July and
August.
A pattern of geographic spread is indicated. Rockland County lies immediately northwest of
New York City, across the Hudson River. Orange County is adjacent to Rockland to the northwest
and Sullivan to the northwest of Orange. Given the highly interconnected economy of the New York
metropolitan region, which encompasses portions of the adjacent states of Connecticut and New
Jersey, there is no reason to believe that the virus would not already be in those areas as well.
However, wastewater testing so far has been extremely limited, making it impossible to
comprehensively trace the spread of the polio virus.
Dr. Mary T. Bassett, New York State Health Commissioner, exemplified the official response
to these developments in a guest essay published in the New York Times. She exclaimed that, “The
case of a young adult paralyzed by polio in New York is not simply unexpected. It’s shocking.” No
public health expert could be genuinely shocked.
It has long been recognized by those who have seriously considered the matter that, although
it came close to achieving its goal, the underfunded and incompletely executed world campaign to
eradicate polio, led by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, would not only fail in its stated
mission but would open the door to the resurgence of this dread disease. This failure provides an
object lesson regarding the necessary approach to combating all infectious diseases. A brief review
will make this evident.
There are two basic types of polio vaccine—the inactivated (“killed”) virus vaccine, the Salk
vaccine, first deployed in 1955, and the attenuated virus vaccine, the Sabin vaccine, released in 1961,
which contains live virus that has been weakened so that, although still infectious, it does not
normally cause disease. Both are highly effective in preventing disease in vaccinated individuals.
However, each has advantages and disadvantages, which affected how and where they were
employed.
The killed-virus vaccine requires three to four injections, depending on the age of the
recipient, to reach full effectiveness. The doses require special handling and must be administered
by a medical professional. Therefore, it is expensive and logistically difficult to deploy. By contrast,
the Sabin vaccine, which also requires multiple doses, is administered orally as a liquid, which can
be done by minimally trained individuals, making it easier and cheaper to use. Consequently, while
the advanced capitalist countries in North America and Europe have for many years employed only
the Salk vaccine, less wealthy countries with underdeveloped medical infrastructure rely primarily
on the Sabin vaccine.
Unfortunately, there is a significant difference between the two vaccines. While the Salk
vaccine prompts an immune response using “killed” virus, which cannot propagate or cause
disease, the virus particles in the Sabin version, although they have been altered to inhibit their
ability to cause disease, can still reproduce in a vaccinated individual and be spread via that
person’s feces or by other means. This has been viewed as a benefit in that, when the non-virulent
form is transmitted to other, unvaccinated community members it will result in the development of
immunity without disease, thus further lowering the cost of the vaccination campaign.
 39

However, in rare, but nonetheless significant cases, the “attenuated” live virus can mutate into
a disease-causing form. When spread to unvaccinated individuals, new outbreaks of polio are
triggered. This has resulted in the sporadic recurrence of polio in a number of countries, mostly in
Africa, where vaccination rates are low. The disease also is endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
where vaccination efforts have been hampered due to political unrest and chronic warfare. This
situation creates a pool of virus which, in a highly integrated global economy, provides new sources
of infection anywhere in the world, in populations where vaccination rates are low.
The community spread of vaccine-derived virus has been identified in the recent episodes in
Israel, the UK, and the US, as has been confirmed by genetic assay. Since systematic wastewater
testing, which could provide early warning of a new outbreak, has largely been eliminated in many
countries to reduce cost, and vaccination programs have been inconsistent, leaving pockets with low
rates of vaccination, especially since the spread of COVID-19, the terrain is ripe for the “vaccine-
derived” disease to spread.
The failure to adequately fund the vaccination campaign, prompting the use of the attenuated
version of the vaccine in many countries, has resulted in a failure to eradicate the disease. In 2021, a
total of 688 cases of paralysis due to vaccine-derived virus polio infections were reported in 20
countries. By contrast, only six cases of naturally occurring wild-type polio were identified in three
countries.
An additional ill-conceived decision has increased the likelihood of polio outbreaks in areas
where the Salk vaccine is used. There are three wild types of polio virus, designated 1, 2, and 3. The
“trivalent” oral vaccine provided immunity to all three types. Due to a substantial reduction in the
type 2 virus, in 2016, based on a recommendation by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, type 2
was dropped from the oral vaccine. This premature move has resulted in a resurgence of type 2,
against which a substantial number of vaccinated individuals do not have immunity. Most of the
vaccine-derived virus that is now circulating is of the mutated type 2. A specific vaccine targeting
type 2 is under development but is inadequately funded.
Experts had already described the initial detections in Rockland and Orange counties as just
the “tip of the iceberg,” since polio has the capacity to propagate asymptomatically from an infected
individual for days or weeks. On average, only one in 200 infections leads to paralysis, and
sometimes death, meaning that the virus can spread widely before detection. The latest discovery,
coupled with the totally inadequate level of testing, strongly indicates that the polio virus has
already spread widely in the region and possibly in other parts of the US as well.
The initial discovery of the symptomatic individual in Rockland County took place in July.
Wastewater testing, which was initiated only following that discovery, then confirmed presence of
the virus in New York City and Orange County as well. Retroactive testing of samples from Orange
and Rockland subsequently determined that the virus was already circulating at least as early as
April. It has now also been detected in Sullivan County.
The initial symptomatic case was a young man in Rockland County who was unvaccinated.
The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has reported that he is infected with
the vaccine-derived type 2 polio virus, indicating he had been infected by someone who had
received the oral vaccine. He had not traveled out of the country, further confirming local
community spread. Genetic testing of samples from the stricken individual identified similarities
with the viruses recently detected in Israel and the UK.
The New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) has issued an urgent warning to
individuals who are either unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated to do so as soon as possible. The
inactivated-virus vaccine, which is used exclusively in the US, requires a series of three or four
injections at spaced intervals, depending on the person’s age, to reach full effectiveness. Therefore,
 40

the disease will continue to spread among previously un- and incompletely vaccinated individuals,
even if a comprehensive program is now initiated.
In a statement issued by the CDC, “As of August 1, 2022, Rockland County has a polio
vaccination rate of 60.34 percent, Orange County has a polio vaccination rate of 58.68 percent, and
Sullivan County has a polio vaccination rate of 62.33 percent, compared to the statewide average of
78.96 percent, among children who have received 3 polio immunizations before their second
birthday. A rate of well over 90 percent is NYSDOH’s goal.”
While the specifics of each disease differ, the necessity to deploy a comprehensive, systematic,
and adequately financed global campaign tailored to the particular characteristics of each is evident.
The example of the global eradication of the smallpox virus, officially declared in December 1979,
demonstrates that such a goal is possible.
Equally evident is the criminal failure of the capitalist system, now in severe crisis, to
marshal the necessary resources and strategies to meet the challenges posed by the growing
number of epidemic disease outbreaks. COVID-19, monkeypox, and now polio are only the
beginning. The combination of economic crisis, the decades-long attack on the public health
system and other social services, and accelerating climate change leading to the growing danger of
new zoonotic diseases, demonstrate that humanity is faced with devastating consequences due to
wave after wave of pandemics.
The ruling class can marshal trillions of dollars to bail out the financial and corporate elites
or to prosecute imperialist wars which could very well lead to nuclear holocaust. But when it
comes to the health and welfare of the working class, “there is no money.” Only a socialist
reorganization of society, in which human wellbeing rather than the maniacal pursuit of profit,
can avert this dire future.

(Source: World Socialist Web Site)

 41

CPEC and OBOR

CPEC AND AFGHANISTAN’S DEVELOPMENT
Muhammad Zamir Assadi
China, the 2nd largest economy of the world and initiator of the historical plan of
international development ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ has come forward to help the war-ravaged
Afghanistan by extending China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs in America has stated that since invading
Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spent $2.313 trillion on the war, which includes
operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Note that this total does not include funds that the United States government is obligated to
spend on lifetime care for American veterans of this war, nor does it include future interest
payments on money borrowed to fund the war. This $2.313 trillion spent on Afghanistan is a portion
of the total estimated cost of the post-9/11 wars.
The longest American war fought in Afghanistan has killed thousands of Afghan citizens and
damaged the fabric of the society.
The responsibility of destruction of Afghan society and halting its development process leads
to the US.
By withdrawing from Afghanistan with its allies, the United States also did everything bad
with the war-torn country by seizing Afghan’s assets of $7 billion frozen in the United States.
Following the US act, Afghanistan’s economy is on the verge of collapse. Inflation is soaring,
and millions of Afghans are on the brink of starvation looking forward towards the international
community.
The major responsibility of the development of Afghanistan and Afghan people lies on the
United States and its allies who have destroyed the country in the last years during the war period
by using every kind of lethal and destructive weapon.
In this time of crisis for Afghanistan, China has stepped forward to help the war-torn country
by discussing the idea for the extension of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.
The idea to extend the flagship programme of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was discussed
during a meeting between China’s special envoy on Afghanistan Yue Xiaoyong and Foreign
Secretary Sohail Mahmood at the Foreign Office in Islamabad.
In the context of regional connectivity, both sides exchanged views on extension of CPEC to
Afghanistan to promote economic development and prosperity.
Afghanistan at this stage of time is in a dire need of financial assistance from the international
community for developing the better life standard of locals who have faced the wrath of the US-led
war in the last years.
One of the reports by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) states that focusing on
infrastructure development will help bring about long-term growth in Afghanistan and address
persistent issues affecting the country’s economic prospects, apart from security, including poor
connectivity, poor access to limited energy supply and low agricultural productivity.
Better infrastructure can strengthen economic growth, enlist improved mobility to energize
commerce and agriculture and boost government revenues available for development spending.
 42

China, as a major country pursuing the development patterns for all in the region, holds very
clear, coherent and exclusive development policies for all including Afghanistan that is passing
through the critical times of it’s history.
Initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisions
trade and infrastructure networks connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk
Road routes.
Over the past 10 years or so, the BRI has followed the guiding principles of extensive
consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.
CPEC being a flagship project of the BRI that has gained marvelous achievements in various
sectors has huge opportunities of development to Afghanistan.
China with its global agenda of development for the fulfilment of the development needs of
various countries maintains an independent policy which reflects China’s priorities even for
Afghanistan.
The idea of extension of CPEC towards Afghanistan shows the initiative has gained the
desired results and with its productive development it is ready to extend its scope of work beyond
the borders.
The landlocked Afghanistan in a very first may avail and connect itself with international
destinations for the exposure of its trade.
The move also shows that China is well aware of the development needs of its neighbouring
countries as the destroyers of Afghanistan do not belong to Asia and they will not come back for the
contribution of the development process in Afghanistan.
So the expansion of CPEC based in mutual consultation for the development of Afghanistan
will be a key of growth in the region as well that is hit with economic hardships in the wake of war
on terror.
The needs of Afghanistan in the sectors of infrastructural development, vocational training,
education, health and others may be fulfilled under CPEC that has attracted billions of dollars from
China in Pakistan and many more billions of dollars are yet to be invested.
The development of Afghanistan will be the development of the region that needs integration
for the extended economic activities for the betterment of locals.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)

WHY BRI WILL CHIEFLY BENEFIT CHINA

China’s well-publicized Belt and Road Initiative to invest in infrastructure projects in other
countries has helped it expand its political influence around the world. But a newer, lesser-known
development program has launched with apparently similar objectives.
There is no question that China is a major player in world affairs, representing the second-
largest economy in the world after the United States. In his role as a world leader, China’s President
Xi Jinping periodically announces global projects designed to promote China on the world stage and
to demonstrate global influence.
A year after assuming power in 2012 he announced the creation of the so-called Belt and Road
Initiative, a massive infrastructure project designed to increase investment and promote economic
development in many of the world’s poor nations.
The resulting bridges, ports and roads built in developing nations throughout the world have
cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and questions have been raised about whether they are harming
 43

nature. By accepting Chinese loans with stringent conditions, developing nations with weak
bargaining power and limited options for raising funds externally carried a large part of these costs.
In addition to this infrastructure objective, the Belt and Road Initiative was a push for China to
gain more economic and political power. Many developing nations that took loans from China are
finding it difficult to repay them while fighting COVID-19 and dealing with faltering economies.
As poor nations have become more financially dependent, China has attempted to expand its
influence at a global scale. This state of affairs has led to criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative by
the U.S. and its allies.
In the past year, Xi has advanced another idea – the Global Development Initiative.
China’s global plan
Xi proposed the Global Development Initiative at the opening of the 76th session of the U.N.
General Assembly in September 2021. Although this initiative is described as “improving the
process of global development,” its two stated and most important goals are to help the U.N.
achieve its 2030 agenda for sustainable development and to help all nations, particularly developing
countries, respond effectively to the shock caused by COVID-19 with a focus on “greener and
healthier global development.”
Xi states that China would like to concentrate on “people-centered development” by helping
poor nations recover in the post-pandemic era and by strengthening international development
cooperation. More than 100 nations support the Global Development Initiative. My research in
international economics with an emphasis on China shows that Beijing has other goals as well, both
developmental and political. These political goals might be problematic for many nations in the
world that would like to pursue independent policies.
Three GDI questions
First, the Global Development Initiative thus far has been couched in generalities. It is, so far,
unclear in what ways China will help other nations, and how much money it will spend.
Second, Western concepts of economic development place considerable emphasis on freedom
and human rights. China talks about freedom and human rights but emphasizes the “right to
subsistence” or the right to food and clothing, as the most salient human right. All other rights are
secondary.
Focusing primarily on economic subsistence – and, by extension, economic betterment – does
not guarantee, for instance, the right to free speech or the right to vote. So, it is unclear whether
Zhang Jun, the Chinese ambassador to the U.N., is correct when he says that the Global
Development Initiative “will surely make an important contribution to the international human
rights cause.”
Third, the fact that the development initiative is not solely about development is clear from its
connection to another of Xi’s new projects, announced in April 2022 at the Boao Forum for Asia,
which promotes economic integration. This project, named the Global Security Initiative, seeks to
challenge the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and to question “Cold War mentality” that would
“exacerbate security challenges” in the 21st century. Global development and security initiatives are
linked because Xi has explicitly stated that security is a precondition for development.
The threat of war
The Global Security Initiative represents, in part, Beijing’s response to Russia’s war with
Ukraine. Xi stated that security was a precondition for development and that nations ought to
respect the legitimate security concerns of all nations. In a counterpoint to NATO and the actions of
the U.S.-led alliance among Western nations, Xi also pointed out that nations ought to reject the Cold
War mentality and oppose the wanton use of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.
 44

Taken together, it is not clear whether China is truly interested in promoting global
development, in increasing security and human rights for all people, or in replacing the U.S.-led
world order by proposing development initiatives without specifics or accountability. It will be
important to look not only at what China says it wants to do on the world stage but at what it
actually does.
(Source: The Milwaukee Independent)

FUTURE OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD LIES IN MIDDLE EAST

Joseph Dana (Former senior editor of Exponential View)
China’s “project of the century” is undergoing some profound changes.
Less than a decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) to connect China to Eurasia through extensive maritime and overland trade routes. Despite the
grand rhetoric of the BRI physically linking the global economy to Beijing, the initiative’s aims are
straightforward.
The BRI is a Chinese investment platform that employs Chinese capital across infrastructure
projects in emerging markets for geopolitical gains. Remarkably, this investment strategy is now
turning away from traditional countries like Russia and African nations to focus on Saudi Arabia
and the Middle East.
Critics have argued that the BRI is a form of debt-trap diplomacy by another name. The
economic saga unfolding in Sri Lanka gives weight to these arguments. Yet this narrow focus misses
the larger geopolitical dimensions of the BRI’s true aims.
Like many wealthy countries worldwide, China will always engage in predatory lending.
That’s just how the global economy works. What’s more interesting is how the BRI has evolved into
a vehicle of Chinese geopolitical influence and how this influence has shifted to focus on the Middle
East.
The countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council have been on the official list of BRI
countries since its inception, but they weren’t a primary focus of the initiative in its earlier phases.
This is partly because GCC countries don’t need access to cheap Chinese credit like some African
and East Asian countries.
Aside from being vital nexus points for trade in emerging markets, the GCC’s role in the BRI
has traditionally been focused on regional partners, construction projects, and energy.
From the Gulf region’s perspective, the BRI is a vital support link for allied countries such as
Pakistan and Egypt. China has played a pivotal role through the BRI in the Gwadar port and
pipeline project in Pakistan as well as Egypt’s Suez Canal Area Development Project.
In recent years, the Chinese have grown more aggressive in their interest in the Middle East,
specifically the Gulf region. When Saudi Aramco was exploring various ways to become a publicly
traded company, Chinese investors (some of which were backed by the government) were ready to
buy large stakes in the economy. We will come back to why this interest belied deeper goals.
BRI investment has grown in Saudi Arabia recently as China has drawn down investment in
other countries like Russia. The Financial Times reported last month that BRI spending in Russia
dropped to zero, with no new deals taking place in the first half of 2022. In the same period, Beijing
struck US$5.5 billion worth of deals in Saudi Arabia.
The full extent of what these deals include is unclear, as not all have been made public, but
analysts believe that many are focused on energy resources.
 45

This shift reveals how China will use the BRI in the future and the extent of Beijing’s long-
term ambitions in the Middle East.
The quick reallocation away from Russia and into other parts of the world demonstrates the
flexibility of the BRI. This is not a monolith investment vehicle that is resistant to change. Rather, BRI
capital can be easily diverted based on geopolitical considerations.
In this case, Russia is at the mercy of Western sanctions stemming from the Ukraine conflict.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the US is anything but warm. Sensing an
opportunity to solidify its position in the region, Beijing has shifted the funding focus of BRI to ride
the geopolitical tides.
Instead of thinking about the BRI as a way of connecting the global economy to China,
perhaps we need to think of the BRI as a way of China exporting its geopolitical will on to the rest of
the world.
With the end of its combat mission in Iraq and the complete withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan, the US is pulling back its interests in the Middle East. US President Joe Biden’s recent
trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel revealed a tepid American interest in the region. China has long
sought a significant foothold in the Middle East in its battle with the US for global hegemony.
The ultimate realization of this goal will be upending the US-dollar-dominated global oil
trade. That’s one reason China took an early interest in a significant stake in Saudi Aramco. While
that bid was unsuccessful, China’s recent BRI investment push at the precise time that the US pivots
away from the region will surely bring Beijing’s goal one step closer.
China’s long-term plans to replace the US as the world’s superpower aren’t a secret. Just track
BRI funding for clues of what Beijing will do next.
(Source: Asia Times)

A RAY OF HOPE FOR BALOCHISTAN DEVELOPMENT

Saima Afzal
Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan, is a junction point of South Asia, Central Asia
and a gateway to the Middle East.
The abundance of natural resources enhances its importance as a centre of gravity for regional
powers including Afghanistan, China and Iran. It is the largest province of Pakistan, composes 42%
of the total land area, but the population density is very low due to the mountainous terrain and
scarcity of water.
The economy of the province is largely based upon the production of natural gas, coal and
minerals. The province’s natural resources significantly help meet the energy needs of Pakistan as a
whole.
Over the years, the deprivation of the people of Balochistan has caused several uprisings
against the federal government due to its natural resources. It is still the least developed region of
the country.
Efforts have been made by different governments to address the grievances of the Baloch
people through various development projects.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative
launched in 2015.
Various analysts viewed it as a game-changer because of its connectivity plan and regional
markets from China to South Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe.
 46

CPEC aims at promoting economic development and inter-regional connectivity which are
partially achieved with both infrastructural, industrial and socio-economic development projects,
especially in Balochistan.
Its strategic location increases its importance not only in Pakistan but also across the globe.
Therefore, the CPEC project has the potential to open new avenues of socio-economic development
and employment opportunities for the masses of Balochistan.
It has been assessed that the project will contribute to the development of the whole province
and address various economic and social problems of Baluchistan.
Gwadar would also soon be transformed into an economic hub after the completion of several
projects under the CPEC.
Balochistan in general and Gwadar in particular, is the linchpin of CPEC. It is being
successfully implemented in Balochistan. The Gwadar port and Balochistan are at the nerve centre of
this corridor.
Some States assume that in Gwadar port China’s strategic design is to strengthen its maritime
power in the Indian Ocean, both in terms of commercial and naval, thus adding to Beijing’s “string
of pearls” including in Sri Lanka, Djibouti and Seychelles; under BRI, this string of ports will extend
across the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Africa and the Mediterranean.
In the same vein, the completion of projects under the CPEC is going to change the socio-
economic landscape of Balochistan and it will be at par with other developed areas in Pakistan.
However, various nefarious elements have always opposed development in Baluchistan. They
are also opposing and targeting CPEC with false propaganda and creating a sense of negativity in
the minds of the people of Balochistan about the CPEC.
These vested interests and selfish elements want to continue deciding the fate of the Baloch
people by keeping them under-developed, uneducated and economically dependent.
However, in the changing geopolitical environment of the region, Pakistan is desirous to
strengthen itself domestically and bring a change to the much-needed province of Balochistan.
The restive province has been remained much neglected due to various factors including
political, administrative, security, and lack of funds. Some Baloch assume China as a colonial power
that wanted to occupy Gwadar their resources and land due to the lack of Chinese communication
and interaction with the local people thus adding to their fear of being colonized.
However, large numbers of Baloch people are hopeful that CPEC would bring jobs,
employment, and economic activity to them. This would make it difficult for the spoilers to exploit
youth against the state.
In a nutshell, for the further enhancement of the economic situation of the province, a
comprehensive provincial development strategy for Balochistan is required which outlines the key
areas of investment for inclusive growth and provides the roadmap for integrated development in
the province.
It is a need of the hour that people of Balochistan should be involved more and more in
development projects like CPEC and their grievances should be addressed by providing them job
opportunities in public sector, giving special waivers and increasing the education quota in
universities.
If these issues related to Baloch grievances would be addressed, it will further widen the gap
between the state and the Baloch community. (Source: Pakistan Observer)
 47

COUNTERING GROWING PROPAGANDA AGAINST CPEC

Shakeel Ahmad Ramay (Political Economist)
The announcement of 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has triggered
a new wave of propaganda and smear campaign against Beijing.
International media, in collaboration with think tanks, is targeting different initiatives of
China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of them. It is the most favourite
punching bag for the opponents, as they want to achieve multiple goals by targeting CPEC.
Although the campaign against CPEC started even before the launch of the programme, in
recent months we have witnessed unprecedented acceleration. Thus, it is necessary to present facts
and data to counter the propaganda.
CPEC started at a time when Pakistan was entangled in multiple problems including
terrorism, load-shedding, energy shortages, declining FDI, increasing debt and shrinking economic
and livelihood opportunities.
Pakistan was paying the price of being the frontline ally in the war on terror. Regrettably, our
allies disowned us and let us to suffer. Rather, they ran campaigns to malign Pakistan and paint
image of an unsafe country for investment.
Pakistan lost 70,000 citizens and many more sustained lifelong disabilities. Economic cost
crossed $100 billion. Pakistan needed $1.5 billion to rehabilitate the transport infrastructure, which
deteriorated due to NATO supplies.
Apart from these, energy crisis brought the economy to its knees as the country was losing $4-
5 billion annually. Through CPEC, Pakistan has built an extensive network of infrastructure like
Peshawar-Karachi Motorway, Multan-Sukkur Section (392 km), KKH Phase-II Havelian-Thakot and
Orange Line Metro in Lahore, which are major achievements of the first phase.
There are also a good number of projects that are near completion which include Khuzdar-
Basima N-30 (46%), Awaran-Hoshab Section of M-8, Eastbay Expressway (84%) and the motorway
from Burhan-Hakla on M-I to DI Khan (85%).
Fibre optic and Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast are major milestones on the digital
front for improving the connectivity infrastructure.
CPEC has created 85,000 direct jobs and much more indirect jobs. A majority of the
beneficiaries of job creation are from Pakistan.
For instance, China Overseas Port Holding Company created more than 4,000 jobs during the
first phase. The count of local employees was 3,800 while Chinese employees were only 200. Sahiwal
plant created 8,436 jobs during the construction phase and the ratio of Pakistani and Chinese
employees was 63:37. Now, it is employing 1,683 people and the proportion is 61:39. China also
trained 245 engineers and 377 officers and lower staff.
Port Qasim project helped to create 4,000 jobs during the construction phase and employed
Pakistani and Chinese employees in the proportion of 75:25.
Moreover, China trained 600 engineers and 2,000 officers and lower staff. Now, it is
employing 1,270 employees with the proportion of 76:24.
These facts are entirely different from the propaganda that claims Chinese companies are
bringing labour from China.
Under CPEC, Pakistan and China have expanded cooperation in agriculture and signed
specific MoUs. The agreed areas of work are technology transfer and collaboration in R&D,
enhancing agricultural trade, cooperation in agro-industry, and livestock and dairy.
 48

There is special focus on marginalised areas and Balochistan has been identified as a priority
region.
Both governments are also working to establish eight research centres for joint research across
Pakistan through government-to-government cooperation.
These research centres and laboratories will be equipped with state-of-the-art machinery and
technology. Each research centre will take care of specific research areas according to the needs of
Pakistan and agro-ecological zones.
The practical implementation of projects has started. For example, this year rice and cotton
crops have shown excellent growth in productivity, which is due to the provision of better quality
seeds through this cooperation.
Moreover, during the last fiscal year, the export of agricultural commodities from Pakistan to
China almost touched $1 billion.
Energy is another area where CPEC has helped Pakistan immensely. Prior to CPEC, Pakistan
was going through the worst energy crisis. Therefore, both countries selected energy as the top
priority. Chinese companies, in cooperation with Pakistani institutions, launched a series of energy
projects.
It is satisfactory to note that Sahiwal Coal Power Plant, Port Qasim plant, Hubco plant, Engro
Thar Coal Power Plant and Mine, Hydro China Dawood Wind Farm, Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park,
UEP Wind Farm, Sachal Wind Farm, Three Gorges Second and Third Wind Power Project and Karot
Hydropower Project have been completed.
These projects have immensely contributed to managing load-shedding and reviving the
industry and economy.
In 2019, the World Bank published a series of studies including Common Transport
Infrastructure, A Quantitative Model and Estimates from the Belt and Road Initiative, The Belt and
Road Initiative Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts, The Belt and Road Initiative
Economic Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors to decode the potential benefits of BRI
and CPEC.
These reports highlighted that CPEC would help Pakistan to accelerate economic growth and
development, especially in low developed areas like Balochistan.
China is cognisant of the fact that Pakistan needs assistance in the social sector, especially in
the field of skills development. Hence, it offered $1.1 billion for social development, especially for
skills development. Moreover, China is building a skills development institute in Gwadar.
There should be no doubt about the potential of Gwadar. It will not only act as a hub of
connectivity, but it will also help Pakistan to attract foreign investment through the Special and Free
Economic Zones.
In the end, we can draw four lessons. First, the propaganda against CPEC has no ground in
the face of credible data. Second, CPEC is a long-term programme and its full potential will be
realised after completion of the programme. Third, do not mix Gwadar Port with Gwadar city
development, because the city is the responsibility of Pakistan. Fourth, Gwadar should not be
discussed in isolation.
(Source: Express tribune)
 49

Domestic Politics
PAKISTANI POLITICIANS RIDE THE MERRY-GO-ROUND
Abdul Moiz Jaferii (Lawyer and political analyst)
When the British created the penal code and the criminal laws and procedures through which
they controlled the Indian subcontinent, they did so with the preservation of the colonial order in
mind.
After all, there were a few thousand of them lording over hundreds of millions of us. A rigid
framework of dominion was hence necessary to the propagation of their rule.
When they left, the class of Pakistanis who took over the role of colonial extraction of national
resources kept the British laws and legal system as carefully in place as possible. On the premise that
our people were not ready, or that there may be chaos if the standards of liberty were updated,
reform was left to another time.
Because it was the easier method of elite capture, these laws were made even more rigorous.
As the waves of time struck against social strictures and ground them to dust the world over, we
opted instead to cover them with concrete and strengthen them further.
Law of the laathi charge
Pakistanis who have watched cricket games from the general enclosures through the 1990s
have perhaps experienced the perfect example of our rule of law — the laathi charge.
An officer in charge of maintaining discipline in an area sees a bunch of youth getting too
feisty. He sends in a couple of uniforms to slap rowdy boys about and reduce them to conformity.
The few being rowdy now sit down with arms crossed, but many more around them take heart,
thinking perhaps that lightning doesn’t strike twice in the same place; and become louder and more
boisterous.
The officer fears it might reflect badly on him if his senior superintendent catches a glimpse of
this from the air conditioned boxes. Queue the hand of justice — he sends in all his subordinates to
charge at the crowd with sticks and empty the stand. Better safe than sorry. Best yet, empty.
In this collective punishment of the public, decided by a bunch of men in uniform for selfish
reasons, lies the perfect example of our systems of governance and justice. The common folk are
getting too noisy, hurting the sahab’s ears. The crowd needs to be disciplined, they are looking too
rowdy. Smack them about a bit, remind them of their place. Fun is freedom, and too much freedom
is dangerous.
Don’t have too much fun
Despite all the changing laws and systems of government, there has been one steadfast
constant in the entire history of Pakistan. If you’re having too much fun, the state will find a way to
punish you. If you’re getting too big or going too fast, someone from officialdom, wearing shoes
they don’t shine themselves, will either step on you or hold you back. If you’re talking too much, the
state will remind you of the virtues of silence.
You would think that political parties that have come through an electoral process and enjoy
mass support would want to put an end to the oppressive and domineering framework of laws and
the state apparatus that facilitates them.
You would think that the PPP, birthed through student unions raging against the machine
would do something about the nightmare fusion of the colonisers’ desire for control and religion
which gives us our concept of crime and propriety. You would think the PML-N and its ignored
 50

middle class merchant voter base would have gotten over seeking tax avoidance and protected their
own right to speak.
Of late, the young and the old ‘youth’ of the revolutionary PTI could be taken as promising a
new order where you were free to say and think what you wanted.
You would be disappointed, and repeatedly mistaken.
You are free ... almost
Let’s trace one strand of freedom through the past 10 years.
A political push in 2012 during the PPP government gets YouTube banned, because it is the
easy thing to do, an easy posture to pose. The tool used at the time, the Pakistan Telecommunication
Authority (PTA), realises that this power feels pretty good. So thereafter, it is used by the really
powerful to ban and censor at will, despite there being absolutely no legal authority to do so.
No one takes the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) seriously during
the PPP era, because media freedom is the one thing they tolerate better than most of the third
world. When I say they tolerate it, I obviously don’t mean them, as the Saleem Shahzad incident
showed us in 2011. Najam Sethi at the time enjoyed an unimaginable freedom to analyse on
television as well as all did, and explained that it was probably an attempt to teach him a lesson that
went too far.
Imagine that today. A journalist being able to tell you on television how they think another
journalist died due to false imprisonment and torture by the state. Without anyone arresting or
disappearing the journalist and without them losing their job.
Then it is 2014 and suddenly it’s the PML-N deciding who can say what by regulating
government advertising spend, having learnt a very bitter lesson from the television coverage of the
2013 elections, where they felt they were completely marginalised by a media then drunk on Imran
Khan.
Then Hamid Mir gets shot. And Geo decides to get one step ahead in its coverage of
whodunnit. Too much freedom, too much speech. Queue the laathi charge. Geo is forcibly shut
down, the tax man wakes up against Geo’s ownership, and it’s just never the same again.
Around comes October 2016, and Cyril Almeida writes what could not have been written.
‘Too free!’ cry the overlords, and demand an inquiry into what they call treason. The prime minister
sacrifices a senator and an assistant, this paper loses its star writer, and a committee is formed to
inquire into the crime of truth.
When the results are shared by the government, they are rejected through a tweet which could
never be deleted, and is still available for all to see today.
A rejection announced by the spokesperson of an institution that reports to a secretary who
reports to a minister who reports to the prime minister who approved the results that were notified.
It is a miracle that the article is still available to read on this website.
It’s all a matter of control
At this emergency inflection point, there is a glaring problem faced by those that matter. What
do you do if the civilians control the money that controls the media? You make sure everyone takes
the regulator seriously.
Pemra starts issuing ‘opinions’, unfounded in any law, which sound identical to the opinions
tweeted by people who want you to protest the taking of Kashmir by standing outside on Fridays.
Along comes top judge Saqib Nisar, who adds further steel to Pemra’s newly forged teeth,
using its hollow claims of billions of rupees as a percentage of gross advertising revenue as a sword
to dangle over media owners, whom he calls to his court on weekends to scare.
 51

Then comes 2018 and Imran Khan arrives — finally the same page, only hope and saviour. No
longer would you need any coercive tool of state control, for the saviour has come — the end that
justified all the erstwhile means.
Naya Pakistan, same old story
Under Khan, we have social media journalists picked up and tortured. Imran Khan said at the
time that he wasn’t aware who these people were and whether they were journalists.
After Matiullah Jan is picked up and tortured, when the PTI leadership is asked about
journalists being abducted, Fawad Chaudhry denies it ever happened and says Mati isn’t a
journalist anyway.
This has been replaced with trademark Fawad candor: nowadays, he says it wasn’t his
government calling those shots. The problem with Fawad candidly saying something the opposite of
what he used to say in power is that it comes without any apology or acceptance of his own
misstatements when in power. There is no reconciliation with the lies that came when in power,
before the truth that comes when out of power.
The Supreme Court had already called Mati to face their contempt, and when he got there
after being released from the enforced disappearance which was blissfully caught on camera,
perhaps shortening his ordeal, the court the next day called his claim of abduction ‘alleged’ and
never listed his case again.
Absar Alam is shot during Imran Khan’s tenure; and his Twitter followers mock the incident.
Today, Imran Khan tells Hamid Mir he never knew this happened.
According to Hamid Mir, who recently met him, Imran Khan thinks he would have been an
even bigger hope and saviour had the establishment not rigged the elections to get him less than a
simple majority in 2018. The same elections that the entire PTI has defended as the paragon of
freedom and fairness, even as the RTS crashed and burned upon all the predictions.
Under Khan, Shehryar Afridi as minister swears he has seen the video footage where heroin is
being discovered in Rana Sanaullah’s vehicle, leading to months in pre-trial custody. Today, he
swears he was sworn to by a major general that the drugs were there.
His own party members decry the case as bogus and not of their creation. Shehryar is not
sorry. He doesn’t feel there is any fault in his actions. When he wasted his vote by ignoring proper
procedure in the Senate elections, he wasn’t sorry either. Instead, he blamed the staff for failing to
guide him, while also saying he was feeling unwell and had missed his party meetings, which
would have reduced the need for guidance.
Under Khan, Pemra banned the speeches of Nawaz Sharif, and the courts were too hesitant to
declare it illegal and baseless. Who gives a convict airtime, asked the PTI and Imran in response.
Perhaps the best bits from Imran Khan’s rule were always when he was questioned about the
Uighurs or when he was asked about the increasing footprint of the state’s security apparatus. Imran
would say the Uighur problem doesn’t exist because his ambassador told him so. As we would learn
later, what his ambassador tells him is sometimes different to what his ambassador says he told him.
About surveillance, Imran would then say that he welcomes the monitoring, and that he
knows he is monitored as well. Because, according to Imran, this happens the world over and it’s for
everyone’s own safety. Whether the world over, the organisations doing the monitoring are as
opaque and unanswerable to the people they are supposedly protecting was a question no one
dared ask Imran at the time, for fear of the same page laathi charge.
Two steps back
Pemra today, in the age of vote ko izzat do, bans Imran Khan’s speeches from television, as
illegally as it did before, but now with the illegal precedent they created with Nawaz to stand upon.
 52

And what does the recently suffering PMLN do?

It adds further fuel to the censorship fire. Nawaz wants Imran ‘sorted’ before he fixes the
country and goes for election. This is the Nawaz who, for one brief autumn when the state was
actually stepping down on him and refusing to deal, decided he was the second coming of Nelson
Mandela and demanded the respect of the vote.
A peculiar form of arbitrariness has also come to define our legal progress. Instead of an
evolutionary process, where ridiculously restrictive and anachronistic laws are taken off the books
because society should not be subjected to them, they are just ignored and not enforced. Until they
are.
By this act of applying or ignoring, our state plays favourites with the people. While keeping
the strictures upon them ever present. Just on standby.
Television anchors who got away with years of slander against politicians suddenly find
themselves removed from their seats because of making a statement they cannot prove. It’s the
Pemra’s opinions or the tax notices to ownership at play.
YouTube journalists who have been abusing the families of politicians they don’t support for
years are arrested for far lesser transgressions against the unelected. This comes from our state’s
ancient colonial criminal defamation laws, designed to keep the local in his place and to silence him
when he asks where the kohinoor went and why it’s in a white person’s crown.
Conspiracy theorists who got away with throwing around false allegations of blasphemy on
television suddenly find themselves pursued for defaming the police on YouTube.
Shehbaz Gill, who made a career out of peddling filth against people like Rana Sanaullah
when Rana was out of favour with the establishment, is arrested by Rana for daring to take on the
establishment. Currently, the big debate is about exactly how he was tortured rather than whether
he was tortured.
Designed to conform
These actions and abuses of power are built upon a system of laws designed to control and
regulate. They have no place in a country that promises in its Constitution the rights to liberty and
expression.
But why is our legal evolution circular?
Because Pakistan pretends to evolve whilst actually being on a merry-go-round. The only
thing that changes is the kid whose turn it is to sit on the pony. The pony is pretend. The ride is
temporary. The ticket master is permanent. But the children do not know any better. In the time they
have to sit on the pony, they feel like they are on top of the world, and that it will never end.
How can Rana Sanaullah, latterly the sufferer of the heroin on footages and formerly the
endurer of the forcibly shaved moustache, allow for what is happening to Shehbaz Gill?
How can Nawaz Sharif, who suffered terror charges himself, not be called anything but short
sighted when his government attempts to charge Imran khan with terrorism?
Either Nawaz on a pony now thinks the ride won’t stop, or he has such a strong desire for
vengeance that he doesn’t care. Or perhaps he knows that it will stop and it will be his turn off the
pony and time to throw Rana under the boot yet again, so might as well enjoy it. Because if you
don’t get off when you’re told to by the ticket master, beware the long stick he has tucked into his
armpit.
But one thing is clear in all our dalliances into Sharif’s mind — that Nawaz is obviously the
one calling the shots, because this article has to be published. The ticket master is simply looking at
the children play. (Source: Prism)
 53

THE VULNERABILITIES OF ONLINE VOTING

Aasiya Riaz (An analyst working in the field of politics, democratic governance, legislative development
and rule of law)
The UK’s Conservative Party is going through its internal electoral process of choosing Prime
Minister Boris Johnson’s successor. The final contest is between two Conservative MPs: MP for
southwest Norfolk, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and
Minister for Women and Equalities Ms Liz Truss, 47, and MP from Richmond and former chancellor
of the exchequer Mr Rishi Sunak.
The members of the Conservative Party from across the UK will vote to choose the next party
leader in the final round. Each member of the party who joined the party on or before June 3 is
eligible to vote. While the exact membership numbers are not announced by the Conservative Party,
an estimated 160,000 members of the party were eligible to vote in the latest party leadership
contest, and the party claims that the membership numbers have grown further since. Voting in the
final round of elections is to close on September 2 and the final results, declaring the winner of party
leader, and consequently the next prime minister, are due to be made public on September 5.
The Conservative Party had announced that eligible members of the party could choose to
vote both by postal ballot and online. However, if they vote twice, by postal ballot and then online,
only their last vote received will be counted in deciding the leadership contest.
However, recently the party has announced that due to security concerns relating to online
voting, it has had to change the voting process. This has come about after the party received advice
from the UK’s National Intelligence, Security and Cyber Agency which has warned that hackers
could change party members’ online votes. The national cyber security agency has shared that the
online voting system may create a vulnerability which a foreign state or hackers could try to exploit.
The online voting system proposed by the party, therefore, exposed the party, and the country, to
the risk that the decision about who becomes UK’s next prime minister might be tainted due to the
weaknesses of online voting.
In its statement, the agency has said that it has provided advice to the Conservative Party on
security considerations for online leadership voting based on the principle that it is the agency’s job
to ‘defend [the] UK’s democratic and electoral processes.’ The party has now announced to its
members that after their postal vote is received, members’ online codes will be deactivated to reduce
the risk of any online voting manipulation and fraud in the leadership election.
Despite tremendous advancements in technology, internet voting has not become the leading
global norm to decide the outcome of politically-binding national and sub-national elections. A Pew
Research Center 2020 report shares that paper ballots remain the most common form of voting in 209
out of 227 countries. Due to the vulnerabilities inherent in the system of internet voting, only a few
countries have experimented with internet voting with Estonia being the only country which has used
online voting nationwide in local, national and European Parliament elections. Even though Estonia
began to use internet voting in 2005, reports as late as 2017 suggest that the country has had to take
several measures to fend off potential hacking attacks due to fears relating to cyber security.
Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA)
surveyed that in 2020, only eight countries used online voting in some elections while some others
have carried out limited pilots for specific populations but decided not to continue internet voting.
Pakistan has also experimented with internet voting or I-voting as a pilot exercise to facilitate
voting by overseas Pakistanis from their place of residence. The Elections Act, 2017 mandated the
ECP to conduct pilot projects in this regard to ascertain the technical efficacy, secrecy, security and
financial feasibility of such voting. An iVote system was developed by NADRA. In April 2018, the
 54

Supreme Court directed the ECP to form an Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF) to conduct a technical
audit of the iVote system. The IVTF found the system to be insecure and prone to hacking and
manipulation and recommended that deploying internet voting for overseas Pakistanis in General
Election 2018 would be a hasty step with grave consequences.
NADRA implemented certain technical points recommended by the IVTF and the system was
deployed as a pilot by the ECP at the cost of Rs95 million in the by-election held in October 2018
across 35 constituencies including National and provincial assembly seats. In its report after the
pilot, the ECP highlighted that the iVote system violates ballot secrecy, enables voter coercion, lacks
auditability, and is vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
Not satisfied with the ECP report, the PTI government hired Minsait Indra, a Spanish
consultancy firm, to carry out an audit of the iVote in May 2021 with considerable cost to the
exchequer. The audit report corroborated the ECP report that the iVote system does not fulfill the
constitutional requirements of vote secrecy, and if employed, neither the voters nor the ECP would
have any guarantee that the results obtained from the system represent the choices made by the
voter. It also found various internal and external technical vulnerabilities in the system and made
multiple recommendations requiring technical and financial resources spread over time.
Despite serious technical flaws pointed out in the internet voting system by these audit
reports, the PTI has continued to propose and demand to facilitate internet voting for overseas
Pakistan in the next general election. After its ouster from government, the party has approached the
Supreme Court to direct the ECP to grant necessary approvals and funds to NADRA for developing
a new I-Voting System for use of overseas Pakistanis in the next general election. The party’s
petition has challenged the amendment passed by parliament in the Elections (Amendment) Act,
2022 section 94 regarding facilitation of the right to vote of overseas Pakistanis from their countries
of residence which was reverted almost to the language of the Elections Act, 2017 authorising the
ECP to conduct out further pilot projects to facilitate voting by overseas Pakistanis.
There is no disagreement on facilitating the right to vote by overseas Pakistanis from their
places of residence. At the moment, they can only vote physically by travelling to Pakistan.
However, it is the constitutional and legal responsibility of the ECP to ensure that vote facilitation
does not subvert the credibility and fairness of elections. The ECP must actively look into the postal
ballot option used by many countries to facilitate voting by non-resident citizens. Where cyber
security considerations are not allowing online voting in the internal electoral process of political
parties, how can these be ignored in the national and provincial electoral processes?
Pakistan’s electoral process has continually suffered from lack of political and public
credibility. The issue of extra-constitutional meddling and influencing of the electoral process in
Pakistan cannot be mitigated by the introduction of technology. Pakistan’s social and political
context requires very different remedies that begin by state institutions working strictly within their
constitutional remit. Short of that, introduction of technology would only expose our electoral
system further to its existing vulnerabilities.
(Source: The News)

EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Dr Muhammad Moiz Khan (Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Karachi)
Pakistan was conceived as a modern democracy; the whole struggle for the attainment of
Pakistan was based on the basic principle of democracy, that the people must have their say in the
government. Although during the early days of Muslim political activism, Muslims of the sub-
continent were propagating the safeguard of their rights as a minority, the founding fathers of
 55

Pakistan firmly believed that only through democracy Muslims can have their rightful place in the
political body of India. Allama Iqbal reiterated the fact that the creation of a Muslim majority
province in the Northwest of India would be very beneficial for the whole of India, and such a
province would protect India from any invasion of ‘ideology or bayonet’ from the West. After
independence, several impediments were faced in the path of establishing democracy in Pakistan.
Allan McGrath, in his book ‘Destruction of Democracy in Pakistan’, elaborated all such elements that
did not allow democracy to find a strong foothold.
Democracy in Pakistan was never allowed to establish and function. One of the major factors
in this regard is the fact that Pakistan is still following several characteristics of medieval society in
its rural areas. It is important to understand that the quantum of the rural seats in the national and
provincial assemblies is much greater than those of urban areas. Feudalism still has strong existence
in Pakistan. In such political setup, the masses under the influence are not allowed to have their own
opinion and they only vote for those who are supported by their feudal lords. Although these
shackles are being challenged, and in some cases broken, there is still a lot to be done before people
are completely free to have their opinion and exercise it.
Another major impediment in the path of democracy is the Sardari and Tribal system.
People practising the Sardari system hardly deviate from the decision taken by their Sardars and
the whole vote bank goes to the candidate of their liking, which may shift from election to
election. From a political evolutionary point of view, democracy was introduced by the British in
the sub-continent over a century earlier, amidst the shifting of education from tradition to the
modern. The exponents of modern education at that time were able to soak the ideologies of
politics and understood the significance of it. However, the quality education provided by the
British was only available and limited to handful of people living in urban centres, especially
centres which had British presence in them.
Unfortunately, the Muslim majority provinces that became Pakistan in 1947 were mostly
ignored by the British, resulting in the masses there being unable to aboard the ship of modern
politics, which is why they are still far away from true political democracy. One major evidence of
this fact is that until now ‘electables’ play a pivotal role in the formation of the government in the
national and provincial assemblies. In the 1937 election, the first general election in the history of the
region, the results showed that independent candidates were able to secure around 30 to 40 percent
of total seats in Muslim majority provinces. The fact that independent candidates still dominate
electorates against major political parties in their respective constituencies speaks volumes about the
gulf between political democracy and the masses of Pakistan.
On top of these foundational issues, the tug of war between the institutions of Pakistan
accounted for further delay in achieving a true democracy. On the eve of independence, Pakistan
was forced to prove its right to exist as an independent nation and faced existential challenges in the
form of refugee crises, financial issues, hostility on both Eastern and Western borders, and
administrative crises. Quaid-i-Azam made a plea to British officers after taking charge as first
Governor-General that they should stay in Pakistan and continue their services. There was a vacuum
in almost every occupation, and the most evident one was the complete lack of political leadership
that could cater to the whole of Pakistan as one nation and uphold the singularity of Pakistan over
provincialism.
The vacuum was filled by bureaucracy, immediately after the assassination of Liaquat Ali
Khan in 1951. The bureaucratic elite, which consisted of the able administrators recruited and
trained by the British to work efficiently, took charge over the country and pushed the political
leadership to the back seat. Their greed for power made them avoid democracy and continue their
administration. In their bid to keep politicians away from governance, they introduced service
members into politics by making General Ayub Khan the Defence Minister. Later in 1958, Ayub
 56

Khan gave the bureaucrats a taste of their own medicine by removing bureaucracy from politics in
the same way the bureaucrats had replaced politicians earlier.
Since then, Pakistan moved away from true democracy. Even the constitution of 1962 was
unable to provide any hope of democracy and met eventuality by the hands of its creator in 1969.
The prolong denial of sharing of power and electoral representation based on the democratic
principles culminated into the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971. Unfortunately, as a society we did not
learn our lesson and once again entangled in the same power struggle.
The constitution of 1973 came as a ray of hope for democracy; however, too many clouds were
caste over it by the altercations it endured at the hands of various regimes that ‘amended’ the
document to further their cause - to the point that the original constitution was completely
mutilated. Major amendments, such as the 8th amendment in 1985 and the 17th amendment in 2003,
changed the nature of the constitution and favoured centralism and authoritarianism, which was
utilised by their creators to push their own agendas.
The 18th amendment, passed in 2010, was an attempt by all political entities of Pakistan to
restore the constitution to its original form. It was developed and passed through the parliament
with consensus. However, once again, the basis of the constitution - the parliamentary system - is
being challenged by one major political party, which favours the presidential form. They have
embarked upon the debate and are even hinting towards constitutional amendment once they
regain power with 2/3 majority according to their claims.
Pakistan has gone through a long and uneasy evolutionary process as a democracy. We have
had three constitutions, several amendments, dictatorial authoritarianism, midterm elections and
dismissals of popular governments and recently, the passing of the first successful vote of no-
confidence against the sitting Prime Minister. Still, it seems that in the coming years major
overhauling is needed to have a stable political democracy. Pakistan, after 75 years of its creation, is
still waiting for its first ever democratic government to complete the full parliamentary term of five
years without any glitches. If we as a society let an elected government complete its five-year term,
regardless of our liking or disliking, it would go a long way toward establishing true democracy and
establish its legitimacy.
(Source: The News Independence Day Supplement)

ARTICLE 63A
An Instrument of Family Politics in Pakistan
Raza Shahani (Teacher at department of Pakistan Studies, Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur)
After a successful revolution, the movements work painstakingly to retain the cohesion and
lead the people to the promised destiny. Paradoxically, soon after creating the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, the machinations and splits erupted in the Muslim League. Barring a few, the rest
independence stalwarts entered the power-grab orchestrations. Thus, the factionalism ensued. Since
then, the marked feature of the Pakistani politics has been the multi-party system. The political
shenanigans eventually rendered the political class impotent; and resultantly, it paved the way for
non-political forces to replace them. Henceforth, the non-political forces reduced the political forces
to the position of puppets: they kept making and breaking the political parties without scruple and
forced them into shifting their loyalties. Consequently, the rampant political instability, weak
governments and the inconsequential parliament became the norm. To pull the plug on the rot, in
1997, the parliament passed the two amendments – 13th and the 14th – to restore the parliamentary
sovereignty and supremacy, empower the government and bring the political stability. However,
the 14th amendment which inserted the article 63A into the constitution to prevent the desertions
 57

has, in fact, diminished the parliament itself to the preserve of the political party; and by extension,
the preserve of the head of a political party, who is invariably a patriarch of a political
dynasty/family.
Great Britain is generally called the mother of the parliamentary democracy and is the model
for the parliaments across the world. In a parliamentary democracy, the parliament is a sovereign
and a supreme institution. Thus, the supreme power lies in the state with the parliament. Therefore,
the Swiss political theorist Jean-Louis de Lolme had rightly said that the British “Parliament can do
everything but make a woman a man and a man a woman.” This is so because the members of
parliament are directly elected by the people of eighteen years age. Thus, the parliament is a
representative institution, which represents the people. Moreover, parliament chooses the cabinet
from within itself and holds it responsible to itself for its actions. Accordingly, the parliamentary
form of the government is duly called the representative and responsible form of the government, in
which the parliament represents the people in general and the government is responsible to it.
Although the government influences the parliament through the party in the parliament, the
parliament since the government is made detaches itself from the government and acts as a separate,
coherent and independent institution and places check on the government. Furthermore, if the
government turns out to be corrupt, incompetent, indolent, inefficient, autocratic, arbitrary, and
violent or dictator, the parliament dismisses it and replaces it with another government.
Similarly, the article 95-1 stipulates that if a resolution for a vote of no-confidence against the
Prime Minister is submitted in the parliament with no less than twenty per centum; and according to
the article 95-4, if the majority of the members vote in favor of the no-confidence motion, the Prime
Minister shall cease to hold office. However, the article 63A undermines the article 95-1 and 95-4.
The article 63A, in fact, scuttles the parliamentary sovereignty and supremacy. It divests the
parliament of its prerogative of replacing the unwanted government with another untried one.
The article 63A (ii) proclaims that the party members in the parliament are bound to vote
according to the directions of the party in parliament in regard with the vote of confidence and the
vote of no-confidence. If they vote against the directions of the parliamentary party, the party head
will charge them with defection and will get them disqualified through the courts. Here flagrantly
the supremacy, sovereignty and the independence of the parliament is made subservient to the
party head who is always the patriarch of a political family.
Besides, the article places various other checks on the parliament and the elected members of
the house. It strips off the parliament and its elected members of their right to exercise and express
their authority, power and the will. Additionally, the article compromises the representative and
responsible character of the parliament. With this article in place, the government is responsible to
the party head, not to the parliament. Also, the article contravenes the right of the elected members
to disagree with the party head on the matters of the money bills. Even if the budget is harmful to
the voters of the member, one cannot disregard the directions of the party head in matters of the
budget.
In countries, like Pakistan, concentration of powers in a single hand happens to be the wish of
every ruler. The 63A has, in fact, made the party head a dictator in the parliamentary affairs and in
the political system as well. Since there is no internal democracy in the political parties – the apex
leadership of the parties is not elected on the basis of merit, but it comes on the connections with a
political family –, the head of a political family wields more powers even than the Prime Minister. If
the head of a political party himself is not the Prime Minister or he is not from the political family,
the Prime Minister, he may be a party meritorious stalwart, is never let act on his own will. He is
usually directed by the family political party head.
Thus, instead of stabilizing politics, empowering parliament and the government, the 63A has
made the family political party head a dictator. The article should be scraped to restore the
 58

parliamentary supremacy and the sovereignty. To stabilize politics, strengthen parliament and the
government, parties crucially need intra-party democracy. Their leadership should be elected on the
bases of merit, not on the bases of their family roots. Moreover, turncoats should not be retaken in
their respective ex-parties. Instead of coaxing old and tested deserters, the parties should invest on
new young stuff.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

PAKISTAN NEEDS MORE REFORMS NOT POLITICS

Saad Hafiz
Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy is in a mess. It’s not a pretty picture. Deliberation,
discourse, and the engagement integral to a functioning democracy have been abandoned. Instead,
head-on confrontation and strong-arm tactics pursued by the government and opposition alike are
order of the day.
Hope for a much-needed political compromise has been strangled. It is an unhealthy sign for a
struggling democracy and a fractured polity. Political oratory and self-serving propaganda has
failed to build a national resolve for an average citizen.
Voters have a tough choice between the dynastic and corrupt old elites, and the incompetent
and inexperienced new crew. And political leaders and parties must play second fiddle to an
aggressive, superior judiciary and an entrenched military bureaucracy to survive in power. It makes
a difficult situation worse.
It is unlikely that national and provincial elections can prevent the impending catastrophe.
Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic will not help in a polarised and adversarial environment.
The central focus right now is to manage the crisis of governance and legitimacy at the
national and provincial levels that endanger the common good. In the present circumstances, it is
necessary to maintain a semblance of domestic political stability and the status quo.
It is unlikely that national and provincial elections can prevent the impending catastrophe.
Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic will not help in a polarised and adversarial environment.
Leaders from both sides of the aisle should take a breather from hatching plots to topple
governments in place. Squabbling legislatures and bickering leaders have done enough damage to
the country. Incendiary and polarising politics, and raking up controversies do not serve the
national interest. Dealing with double-digit inflation and rupee free-fall is vital now.
At present, securing the IMF programme and preventing sovereign default is critical.
Ensuring macroeconomic stabilisation, exercising fiscal prudence, and practicing responsible
governance can improve the frayed relationship with lenders and investors. Garnering international
support for economic consolidation must override uncompromising politics and needless point
scoring.
Consistent non-partisan economic policies must be followed. The country must find
additional revenue streams, increase foreign reserves, reduce debt, discourage tax evasion, decrease
indirect taxes, lower fiscal deficit, increase exports, and cut government expenditures.
Once the economy stabilises, the government should announce a date for free and fair
elections. The country urgently needs political, economic, and social reforms. The wish list is long,
challenging, and probably unachievable in the near term:
For instance, the parliamentary system requires structural changes to work. A functioning
separation of powers and checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judiciary is
crucial. The country wants empowered legislatures and confident leaders, undeterred by external
 59

pressures. Unfortunately, the current power dynamics favour unelected branches of the
government. Any changes will require the support of an informed and involved citizenry.
The country wants empowered legislatures and confident leaders, undeterred by external
pressures. Unfortunately, the current power dynamics favour unelected branches of the
government. Any changes will require the support of an informed and involved citizenry.
In addition, political forces must agree on a charter of economy that ensures that the country
avoids frequent boom-and-bust cycles. Political consensus to reform the economy has remained a
pipedream. Probably, the current economic crisis is the last opportunity to change course from low
growth, high inflation, and a chronically ill economy burdened by a mountain of debt.
Finally, Pakistan must address abysmal human development statistics, particularly for
women’s education and literacy. Yet, with over 50 percent of the budget going towards debt
servicing and national defense, there is little fiscal space for investment in infrastructure, health, and
education, crucial to social and economic progress.
Perhaps the time has come to replace the rent-seeking national security state to free up
resources to build a sustainable, inclusive, modern country.
(Source: The Friday Times)

PAKISTAN’S HYBRID REGIME IS COMING TO AN END

What next?
Uzair M. Younus (Director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center)
Pakistan’s hybrid democracy is facing unprecedented upheaval. The ousting of Imran Khan in
the country’s first-ever successful vote of confidence has shaken up the system, primarily due to
Imran’s rising popularity in the wake of his ouster. Refusing to cool down his narrative, Imran is
facing contempt of court proceedings and an anti-terrorism case, which may lead to his
disqualification from contesting public office.
The temperature has risen once more after Imran’s remarks at a political rally in Faisalabad,
where he said that his political opponents “want to bring in an army chief of their choice through
joint efforts”. This has led to a reaction, with the ISPR saying that the military was “aghast at the
defamatory and uncalled for” remarks by Imran.
This most recent flashpoint only sharpens the confrontation between Imran and the military
establishment, increasing the likelihood that Imran and his party will be squeezed in the coming
weeks.
Should a scenario where Imran is disqualified or jailed plays out, massive protests are likely to
erupt across urban Pakistan, raising questions as to whether it could lead to an undemocratic
intervention in the country.
While there are some open questions about Imran and his party’s ability to openly confront
the military establishment and survive the onslaught without making compromises, the resulting
instability will deal a body blow to an economy that has been devastated by floods. This instability,
should it lead to economic and political collapse, will also have negative spillovers for the region
and possibly global consequences.
Emergence of hybrid democracy
Pakistan’s ongoing democratic transition began when elections were held on February 18,
2008. As Musharraf’s dictatorship weakened in 2007, foreign mediators led by the United States
made efforts to bring about a restoration of democracy in Pakistan. These discussions allowed for
the return of Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the PPP and Nawaz Sharif, who was the leader of the
 60

PML-N. While Benazir was assassinated on December 27, 2007, after a political rally in Rawalpindi,
the agreement broadly remained in place, leading to elections in February 2008.
The democratic transition was part of a deal brokered by internal and external guarantors of
economic and political stability in the country. The external guarantors included the United States,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; Pakistan’s military establishment, which was then led
by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was the internal one.
It was this agreement that led to the emergence of Pakistan’s hybrid democracy, which has
since survived many sabotage attempts, including an attempted coup.
But elections did not lead to parliamentary sovereignty in Pakistan. Soon after coming to
power in 2008, a coalition government led by the PPP began experiencing an onslaught aimed at
destabilising the government, initially through pressure exerted on it to restore Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry, who had been ousted by Musharraf towards the tail-end of his regime.
Once Chaudhry was restored, the Supreme Court emerged as an institution that sought to
keep the PPP government off-balance, with the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif playing an active role
as a spoiler during the Memogate controversy. Delivered in May 2011, the alleged memo was
written by Husain Haqqani, who was serving as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States. It was
claimed that the PPP government was seeking the Obama administration’s support to reign in the
Pakistan military after the Osama bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The controversy
eventually led to the resignation of Husain Haqqani as ambassador and significantly weakened the
PPP government.
This was not the end of the government’s struggles. Yousuf Raza Gilani, the country’s prime
minister at the time, was dismissed from office by the Supreme Court for contempt of court,
becoming the first prime minister in Pakistan’s history to be removed from office by the superior
courts.
Elections in 2013 led to the first-ever peaceful and democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s
history. Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N emerged victorious, but it soon realised the limits of civilian
supremacy in Pakistan’s hybrid democracy.
Hounded by an emerging contender to power in the form of Imran Khan’s PTI, who alleged
mass rigging in the elections, the PML-N government also remained off balance. A protest in
Islamabad that lasted from August 14 to December 17, 2014, was held against alleged rigging in the
2013 elections.
It was later stated in political analyst Shuja Nawaz’s book “The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter
US Friendship and a Tough Neighborhood” that Zahirul Islam, who was leading the ISI at the time,
was mobilising for a coup in September 2014. This alleged coup, according to the writer, was
thwarted because General Raheel Sharif, who was the COAS at the time, was unwilling to go along.
Nawaz was ultimately ousted from power in the wake of the Panama Papers revelations, with
the Supreme Court of Pakistan carrying out daily hearings on a case related to the Sharif family’s
assets which were revealed in the papers. He became the second prime minister in history to be
dismissed from office by the superior judiciary, but his PML-N hung onto power until the 2018
elections, which led to the emergence of PTI as the largest political party in Pakistan’s national
assembly.
Enter the PTI
Elected with a narrow four-vote majority in the lower house of Pakistan’s parliament after the
2018 elections, Imran’s power was also severely constrained by Pakistan’s hybrid democracy. While
his ministers frequently talked about the civilian and military leadership being on the same page,
with the then-PM even endorsing the extension in General Bajwa’s tenure as COAS, the divide only
grew with the passage of time.
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The disagreements revealed themselves fully in 2021 with the delay in the change of
leadership at the ISI, following which opposition parties soon began to mobilise to oust Imran.
Once more, a prime minister had stretched beyond his limits, leading to his eventual ouster,
this time in the first-ever successful vote of no confidence in Pakistan’s 75-year history.
In Pakistan’s hybrid democracy, the military establishment had always remained all-powerful.
Imran’s ouster and the deal that his political opponents had purportedly struck with the military top
brass — as the PTI chairman continues to allege — reinforced the primacy of the military in this
hybrid regime.
End of the hybrid democratic compact
The compact between the civilian and military elite that underpinned this hybrid democracy
now lies in tatters, which is why we are seeing unprecedented political chaos and upheaval in
Pakistan.
Three key reasons have led to the ongoing chaos — the dramatic increase of Imran’s
popularity, particularly in urban and middle-class households; the disengagement of external
guarantors of political stability in Pakistan; and the discrediting of the current military
establishment.
Complicating the situation further is the fact that what was previously a three-player game
involving the military establishment, the PML-N and the PPP, has now become a five-player game
with the addition of the PTI and the superior judiciary in Pakistan. This has made the situation
extremely unstable, especially in the wake of economic instability in the country, with the nature of
the political game having changed due to the addition of new, powerful players in the contest.
But it seems as if the traditionally dominant players, which includes the establishment, the
PML-N, and the PPP are not fully internalising how the sands have shifted beneath their feet.
In recent weeks, these actors, especially the military establishment, have been outfoxed by
Imran’s PTI and his narrative. Imran’s increasing popularity, as evidenced by the size of his rallies
and recent electoral wins, has led to a growing belief within his party that the PTI can dominate the
contest by taking on all its political and non-political opponents.
This confidence is pushing Imran and the PTI to cross well-established red lines: the anti-
military social media campaigns, Imran’s own remarks about the military establishment during his
speeches, and the most recent remarks made by his chief of staff following which he was arrested,
showcase this shift.
These developments have now led to increased tensions, with the coalition government,
seemingly backed by the military establishment, seeking to rein in Imran and his supporters through
arrests, filing of cases against Imran, and efforts to weaken his social media machinery. But the
apparent interventions have so far only emboldened Imran’s followers, reinforcing his own belief
that he can emerge victorious in this fight.
What comes next?
Many political analysts within and outside Pakistan expect that things will stabilise in the
coming weeks, especially once a new COAS takes over in November, later this year. But these
perspectives ignore that the nature of the game has changed dramatically, meaning that a return to
the post-2008 hybrid democracy is not possible.
The anti-military narrative crafted first by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and
subsequently by former prime minister Imran Khan, which has targeted the military establishment
for interfering in political affairs, has captured the imagination of a significant number of Pakistanis,
especially its youth. This makes it extremely difficult for the country’s two largest parties to once
again engage in backroom deals that bring them to power; the PML-N’s own strategic
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communication troubles after the widely rumoured collusion with the military to oust Imran are a
case in point.
What emerges in the coming weeks and months remains to be seen, and a new COAS (as is at
least expected in November), may calm things down. Given the current situation in Pakistan and the
complexities involved in this new five-player contest, such a scenario is unlikely. What is more
plausible is that many of the actors involved, especially the PTI and the military establishment, push
for maximalist gains, leading to unintended consequences.
As Pakistan’s politics spiral out of control, its economy is going to remain dysfunctional,
meaning that the country will continue to rely on external support to stay solvent. This chaos could
provide terrorist groups, including the militant Islamic State, which has found safe havens in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, to foment chaos within and outside Pakistan. A military establishment
facing internal chaos may not be able to focus as much as it should on this emerging threat, leading
to increased challenges for regional actors and the international community.
These developments will eventually lead to the emergence of a new model underpinning
Pakistan’s political economy — which may or may not be more democratic than the hybrid
democracy that has existed since 2008. What is certain, however, is that Pakistan’s political economy
is undergoing a major upheaval, which means that stability is going to remain a distant dream not
only for Pakistan and the South Asian region, but for the global community.
(Source: Prism)
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Economy
PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
Shahid Mehmood (An economist and research fellow at PIDE)
As Pakistan celebrates its 75th independence anniversary, it is sad to witness the economy
again mired in difficulties. One could argue that it’s a global phenomenon, with Covid-19 and the
Russo-Ukraine war sending the global economic machine into a tailspin. But this overlooks the fact
that Pakistan’s topsy-turvy performance is actually the hallmark of its economic story in which there
are some years of promise, followed by a downward trajectory. As I indicated in my article ‘An
economic collapse?’ published in January, we tend to be at a ‘nazuk mor’ every few years.
But this article is not intended to be critical. On this occasion, and given our current tough
times, it’s better to infuse a bit of positivity and enthusiasm in the mix, with the message that,
despite the difficulties, there are many aspects that offer considerable potential in terms of economic
growth.
We can start by realising that there is, perhaps, no other country in the world on whose two
borders lies a combined economic might of more than $20 trillion. China and India are economic
giants with a global footprint and influence. It is embarrassing if not outright criminal that Pakistan
trades so little with them. Their combined imports are around $3tr, and Pakistan’s contribution is
not even one per cent of this. Even if we set aside India, given our less-than-cordial relations (thanks
mainly to adventurers who dreamt up futile ventures like Operation Gibraltar and Kargil) with it,
why haven’t we been able to catch a larger slice of the $2tr Chinese imports?
Acting as a transit route alone would bring in substantial benefits. The income from transit
trade with Afghanistan (duty plus taxes), with an economy that is nothing compared to that of India
and China, was more than Rs11 billion in FY20-21, besides the considerable business activity and
jobs generated in erstwhile Fata and KP. Just imagine what increased transit trade with India and
China could achieve. This is where the much-touted ‘geographic dividend’ would really be achieved
rather than by renting ourselves out repeatedly.
Pakistan’s cities offer great potential, not just in terms of being large consumer markets, but
also in terms of the possible renovation that could bring in considerable investment — without
having to resort to ‘amnesty’ schemes or any trillion-rupee real estate subsidy. Cities have always
been the harbingers of civilisation, innovation and ingenuity. Importantly, they are the engines that
drive economic growth. But the poor management of Pakistan’s cities has made the latter problem
kegs that retard their potential as drivers of the country’s growth. Take, for example, the outdated
zoning laws that have created a messy sprawl in cities which, as a result, become difficult to manage
administratively.
But the redesign of cities, especially with regard to vertical development within urban spaces,
carries tremendous potential. Calculations made recently by a PIDE researcher, for example,
estimate that merely redesigning the government residential block in Sector G-6/I can bring in
Rs52bn in revenue through auctioning the freed-up space. Similarly, the institute’s PIDE RAPID
Growth Strategy publication estimates that redesigning GOR-I in Lahore would bring in billions in
investment besides generating 190,000 jobs.
From a strictly consumer point of view, significant potential also lies in the Pakistani market
for quality goods and services. Go around Pakistan and what is encountered frequently is the lack of
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quality in goods and services. Markets are flooded with low-quality products, and the services
sector is especially bereft of quality. Whether one buys something as mundane as erasers and pencils
for kids, or bicycles, a worthwhile steak or bakery product, or spends millions on procuring a
vehicle, quality is seriously lacking in the Pakistani consumer market. Much has to do with the
government’s counterintuitive market policies over time (like protecting vehicle manufacturers from
outside competition through high tariffs). The low quality of our human capital is another apt
reflection of this, reflecting the absence of quality in the market for education.
A persistent point raised against this is that the income level is such that it cannot support
quality. Not necessarily. With the advent of the Motorway came a now-famous bus service, which
was deemed ‘expensive’ at that time. But its success spawned many copycats, forcing others to
upgrade their quality and standards too. Put another way, quality would induce spillover effects
that usually cover the expense aspect.
The last example has to do with how little we understand our comparative advantage.
Examples abound. It’s understood well that the amount of sunlight the country receives makes it
ideal to develop photovoltaic (solar)-based industry and services. Yet, it’s only now that we are
moving towards this aspect. And even then, we don’t manufacture the end product (solar cells),
which has to be imported. Things could have been different if we had started earlier on developing
this industry, which would probably have saved us billions of dollars in energy imports by now.
This failure to understand our advantage is manifest in almost every field and every place.
The very mention of Tirah in Khyber district, for example, likely brings to mind extremists and
military operations. But how many of us know that its fertile soil and environment is ideal for
growing mushrooms? Amongst these is a particular variety — morel — highly sought after and
valuable in the mushroom market, which grows there naturally.
I’ll conclude by suggesting that the above is but a small reflection of the potential of economic
opportunities existing in the country. An exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this piece. Readers
should also note that the maximum benefit of the potential would require a complete reorientation
of the present governance model, whereby the state has remained a dominant player in economic
affairs, to the detriment of the country.
The good aspect though is that the above can be achieved with little government intervention.
Although the history of economic management in this country is stacked squarely against such a
happenstance, let’s hope for its sake that things take a turn for the better.
(Source: Dawn)

FORMALISATION OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

Nauman Ali (A certified public accountant)
Every venture that earns money but pays no taxes, employs people but does not follows the
labour laws or runs a business but holds no licence is part of an informal sector of economy. So
basically, the informal sector is the part of an economy that does not comply with the laws.
Where does this sector stand in Pakistan? Does it stimulate economic growth or exploit the
poor? How does it impact the society as a whole? As per Pakistan Businessmen and Intellectuals
Forum (PBIF), informal economy constitutes 35 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. It stimulates business
activities and provides jobs to millions in need. It also exploits the poor when it comes to wages and
working hours. It demoralises the taxpayers and those who comply with the laws.
Pakistan needs to formalise its informal economy and overcome all impediments to the
process of formalisation. One such impediment is the extensive use of cash that poses a serious
threat to formalisation and makes it difficult for the government to trace most transactions.
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In real estate business, for example, cash transactions are used to avoid documentation of
wealth. To tackle this issue, there needs to be an effective policy. Everyone who buys a property
should be asked to attach a banking instrument with the ownership documents as proof of
legitimate funding. Besides, we also need to have an easier digitised payment system to minimise
use of cash for off-the-books transactions.
Secondly, the government should work to extend its tax base so that it gets easier for all to run
legal businesses while paying reasonable amount of taxes. Every budget brings new rates and
burdens for those already paying their taxes. Meanwhile, those who work outside the law do not
have to pay anything. This discourages every taxpayer who abides by the law and helps the state in
collecting its revenues.
The informal sector gets stronger when the formal sector is over-taxed. Resultantly,
competitiveness of tax-compliant industry is impacted both domestically and globally.
Thirdly, the world has digitised tax systems but the Federal Board of Revenue still has to
upgrade its system for some very basic issues. There are thousands of high income individuals who
file no income tax returns and still avail benefits of being a tax filer.
A filer pays one percent tax on property whereas a non-filer pays two percent. So when such
an individual buys a plot he pays only 1 percent to the government by claiming that he or she is a
filer. The government never tries to check whether the plot was even shown in his wealth statement
or not.
Fourthly, all institutions relevant to business must be linked so that nobody tries to work
outside the law. For example, after registration of a company with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan, there needs to be a proper system in place at the Federal Board of Revenue
that should verify whether the company exists or not. If it does, it should be ascertained whether its
sales tax registration has been completed or not.
Sometimes companies are registered but they file nil returns. That is usually because they use
personal bank accounts. The company is an independent entity and has nothing to do with its
owners. However, people often take this route and use their personal bank accounts instead of the
companies’ accounts to hide their sales.
The governments need to have a database at the FBR that showing when a particular CNIC
number is searched. In this way, it would be easier to trace those who hide their sales.
Fifthly, it is not all about money. FBR’s attitude too makes some businesses evade taxes and
discourages them from legal compliance. Most of the entrepreneurs do not register their businesses
because they think the government’s officials would blackmail them if they showed them their
assets. This trust deficit needs to be reduced, personal involvement of officers with entrepreneurs
should be limited and businesses should be given the respect and recognition they deserve.
Lastly, some businesses are legally registered but hide a portion of their production and thus,
partly evade taxes. Some of these provide raw materials to informal businesses.
In this regard, policy of the previous government should be reintroduced. It required a CNIC
copy for every purchase order of more than Rs 50,000. Resultantly, every legal business would show
their sales and provide CNIC details of their buyers. This way, raw materials supplied to informal
sector would be traceable.
When an informal economy formalises everyone gets its benefits; legal as well as corporate.
Employees get their due share and the state and the law stand by them in case of exploitation by
employers. The employers get legal status, become eligible for bank credit and are exposed to
accountability by customers.
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No government so far has been able to fully integrate the informal sector into the formal.
What we need to do is to reduce its size without impacting the poor employees.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN’S ‘TOXIC’ ECONOMY

Farhan Bokhari (Noted Economist)
As the rupee recovers some of its lost ground after China gave a loan of $2.3 billion to
Pakistan, key realities surrounding the economy point towards an all-encompassing harsh
conclusion – the toxicity of the nation’s economic framework.
For years, Pakistan has lived well beyond its means and in the process has witnessed an ever
growing gap between its highest income households versus lowest income ones. Even with the
resumption of a $6b IMF loan programme in the near future, the quality of life for Pakistan’s
mainstream population is set to remain adverse for the time being. Growing hunger, the risk of
another currency collapse, high inflation and periodic shortages of key commodities potentially
surround Pakistan for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, in an election year leading up to next years’ parliamentary polls, the ability of the
federal government in Islamabad to truly step on heels of individuals and groups tied to powerful
vested interests, remains in doubt.
Friday’s announcement of a 10 percent ‘super tax’ on some of Pakistan’s industrial giants only
promises to fuel inflationary trends across the country. With protection of consumers across
Pakistan virtually non-existing, the burden from this gigantic tax is set to be passed on to
ordinary consumers. This outlook is set to aggravate further as Pakistan’s main stream
households brace themselves for the fallout from one of the highest spikes in domestic energy
prices. During the next year, the tariffs for electricity and gas are set to rise 50 percent and 45
percent respectively in addition to the recent petrol price increase by a third. Together, these
heavy burdens have already discarded the official target rate of inflation clocking in at 11.5 per
cent during the next financial year.
Meanwhile, growing economic challenges surrounding Pakistan are firmly embedded in the
way the country is governed. The ability of any government to firmly enforce price controls remains
weak, especially in the absence of efficient administrative mechanisms performing robustly across
the country. This is the net result of the decay surrounding the administrative order put in place,
under former president Pervez Musharraf’s widely publicised devolution network. That order was
meant to deliver a more efficient government which eventually could become much more
accountable to the mainstream population. Instead, the administrative order has clearly gone in
reverse. Neither the perceived new arrangement has come up to speed across the districts and
tehsils, nor has the previous order survived enough to pick up the pieces of its own destruction and
move on.
On the economic front, two inter-related challenges have come to increasingly haunt Pakistan
over time. First, the national leadership that is now overseeing largely inflationary policies can
simply not inspire popular confidence in their ability to rid Pakistan of the challenges it faces today.
With cases of blatant corruption surrounding some of Pakistan’s most prominent ruling politicians,
it is hard to imagine the country’s rank and file preparing to fall in behind their leaders in the hope
of a better future. With a clear disconnect between the rulers and the ruled, Pakistan’s journey into
an unknown future has become increasingly prone to a harsh backlash. For the moment, ruling
politicians have taken comfort from few signs of a popular disquiet turning in to a larger public
movement. But that comfort is just not enough to fuel complacency among the ruling class.
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A cursory view across global history of the last century amply highlights unpredictable trends
emerging from controversial pursuits. And Pakistan now faces the danger of a ‘surprise’ backlash as
the squeeze intensifies across neighbourhood after neighbourhood.
Second, exactly what combination of a leadership is capable of meeting both complex and ever
growing challenges surrounding Pakistan’s economy? In today’s charged environment, it’s hard to
imagine a complete national consensus on the best way forward. Notwithstanding their harsh
rivalry, Pakistan’s political parties are led by controversial leaders who are often surrounded by
equally controversial supporters.
For each effort to break new ground in the service of economic reforms, there’s likely to be
resistance from a vested interest with deep ties to one business sector or another. Often, the idea of a
government led by apolitical individuals has been promoted by some as the best way forward to
take Pakistan trajectory towards a more promising future. But in the midst of a harsh political
divide, it’s hard to imagine opposing political players agreeing on anything including how best to
reform Pakistan’s troubled economy.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN-IMF DEAL
At long last, the IMF bailout programme designed to help Pakistan avert default on external
obligations is back on track. While now is a good time to acknowledge the hard work that went into
achieving this end, it is equally important to realize that this is not time to take a respite. It is also
important to recognize that the lion’s share of hard work that went into bringing the Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) back to life came from the common folk – who shouldered the burden of runaway
inflation arising out of the rollout of energy subsidies, high fossil fuel prices, a struggling rupee, etc.
The ruling PDM coalition no doubt played its part in the odyssey – but its part was largely limited to
expanding its political capital by making the right albeit unpopular calls.
Just ahead of his ouster, Imran had laid landmines for the succeeding government by
strapping the already battered economy with a further unfunded energy subsidy, which was hard to
reverse because of the already high inflation and high energy prices. Immediately after his exit, he
started an epic political circus that hurt market sentiment and created the perception of heightened
political risk. This led the IMF to slow-walk the negotiations in order to be sure that the political
ownership of the programme had legs to stand on. The current government did well to keep its nose
to the grindstone all along, continuing unbothered on the path it had charted. Despite the PTI’s
attempts to scuttle the deal at the eleventh hour, the IMF executive board put its seal of approval on
the staff level agreement made with Pakistan in July.
All that is now history. The bourse has surged and the rupee has started to recoup its lost
value once more on the news of the revival of the EFF. There is every hope the investment climate
will improve and the easing of imported inflation will relieve the headline inflation ever so slightly.
The government may be justified in thinking their number one priority right now is to get on with
relief and rehabilitation of the tens of millions of Pakistanis battered by historic floods. Expanding
and bolstering the safety nets to protect the vulnerable of society is also important in view of the
economic hardship squeezing the citizenry. But the government must not forget that the IMF
programme’s original and only purpose was to help Pakistan turn around its economy rather than
affording it the luxury of instituting patchwork policies to bide its time. Monday’s IMF decision is
the starting pistol shot for the structural reforms our economy needs to become solvent. Equally, it is
the beginning of the countdown for the repayments on the $34 billion the government raised in
financing to support the IMF programme.
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One of the foremost challenges facing the government at the moment is staying on -budget
in the face of the gigantic calamity that has hit the nation. The only pathway to that will be
raising fresh revenues for new expenditures. This will inevitably involve enhancing tax rates,
cutting down tax evasion, and imposing new taxes. With the requisite political will, this task can
be accomplished so that it furthers the strategic objectives of the economic reform programme
supported by the IMF. The rollout of the petroleum levy and the withdrawal of any residual
energy subsidies must continue in the interest of the energy sector despite the inflationary
pressures these measures are likely to assert. Our ultimate aim here is to put the energy sector
firmly on its feet so that it can sustain the nation’s energy security rather than being a liability
and a constant drain on the exchequer. Turning to renewables is also important to wean away
the economy from imported fuels, which is the greatest drain on our forex reserves. The already
tight monetary policy provides a good handle on inflation, which has to remain right for the
foreseeable future, although the economic managers will have to remain on their toes in view of
the challenging external environment. An imported recession is the last thing we need,
especially as the body blow delivered by the floods to the farm sector in four provinces has all
but wiped out the growth we were projecting for the current fiscal.
State-owned enterprises and the financial sector have their own problems which must be
resolved before our economy can hope to prosper. The former must improve governance and
turn profit or be offloaded forthwith. The latter must accept the yoke of greater oversight and
meet more stringent capitalisation requirements to guard against any speed bumps. At the end
of the day, we must ensure a level playing field for all kinds of business, conducive to the
development of a vibrant private sector, which can begin to create jobs and reverse our trade
deficit. That is our only road to cutting our yawning current account deficit and hopefully
balancing our budget. These are all difficult decisions and will take both technical capacity and
political will to execute. Here’s hoping the PDM government either has the requisite technical
capacity or can muster it in a timely fashion. As for political will, PM Sharif and Finance
Minister Ismail have demonstrated over the last five months that they can be cucumber cool
burning political capital. Now is their time to prove they can take on the demons that have
haunted our economy for decades – and they may not get a second chance.
(Source: The News)

HOW GOING DIGITAL CAN BRIDGE THE EXTERNAL FINANCING GAP

Syed Salim Raza (Former governor of the SBP)
Zafar Masud (President and CEO of the Bank of Punjab)
The digital revolution is truly transforming Pakistan`s economy and has become an important
source of income from abroad. In the last fiscal year, total exports of digital services stood at $2.6
billion with an average of 40pc growth per annum over the last four years. The growth in the digital
ecosystem is still in its early stages and Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce & Industry
(OICCI) estimates its potential at $10bn.
In comparison, India leads the world with information technology (IT) exports of $150bn,
while Philippines` annual IT exports were $30bn in 2021. This sector should be a priority and the
government must focus on addressing key areas related to payment gateways, tax treatment and
international certifications.
The government has revoked the tax exemption given to the IT sector till 2025, which will be
counterproductive to the growth of this priority sector.
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One way the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) can bring down the money in circulation is through
digital financial inclusion and incentives for mobileTHE digital revolution is truly transforming
Pakistan`s economy and has become an important source of income from abroad. In the last fiscal
year, total exports of digital services stood at $2.6 billion with an average of 40pc growth per annum
over the last four years. The growth in the digital ecosystem is still in its early stages and Overseas
Investors Chamber of Commerce & Industry (OICCI) estimates its potential at $10bn.
In comparison, India leads the world with information technology (IT) exports of $150bn,
while Philippines` annual IT exports were $30bn in 2021. This sector should be a priority and the
government must focus on addressing key areas related to payment gateways, tax treatment and
international certifications.
The government has revoked the tax exemption given to the IT sector till 2025, which will be
counterproductive to the growth of this priority sector.
One way the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) can bring down the money in circulation is through
digital financial inclusion and incentives for mobilebanking solutions.
They also need to bring to the table solutions for how large onshore dollar holdings (discussed
in detail in yesterday`s article) can be brought into the banking sector without causing a flight of
capital.
One possible solution can be a limited-time exemption for citizens to invest in Roshan Digital
Account (RDA) products. We need to recognise and appreciate the fact that policy concessions shall
be driven by the country`s economic needs, with export and forex flows being at the centre of the
plate. Unfortunately, we didn`t see these aspects being pronounced in previous policy actions or
stimulus packages. Future policy actions shall revolve around such obvious economic compulsions.
Not only do the IT and digital sectors offer immense potential for foreign currency flows
through service exports, but with Web 3.0 becoming a reality, we need to be prepared to explore
possibilities of harnessing those foreign exchange flows through regulatory actions, which are
currently out of reach for the formal system.
While there are no specific regulations required for Web 3.0 as such, central banl(s are,
however, working on Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) or writing regulations on crypto
currencies and their use-cases. In fact, several countries have started pilots, including China,
Sweden, Nigeria, India, etc.Regarding regulations on crypto currencies, there are a few countries
that are looking to attract digital asset owners into the formal forex system. For example,
Switzerland introduced crypto banks and a couple of pilots are underway. This is being tested
mainly to solve the issue of digital custody and legal ownership of crypto currency. In addition, an
amendment in the regulation on electronic money and payments is being proposed to include crypto
by use of Stablecoins or Bitcoins for payments in UK.
Interestingly, Visa and Mastercard payment networks are also starting to experiment with
issuing cards for specific crypto currencies in selected countries for premium clients, e.g., Visa had
started bitcoinblack in Dubai and Mastercard is piloting a similar idea in Indonesia.
Digital currency is the future, particularly in our case, where 68pc of the population is below
the age of 30 and we need to gear up for it. In fact, there is a need to work on regulations to make
this reality deliver in our favor if we are to meet our exceeding foreign currency requirements.
However, the most critical element to limiting the external financing gap is ensuring that the
recent growth in exports and remittances is sustained over the medium term. FY2022 was a
landmark year for Pakistan, as both exports and remittances were recorded at around $31bn each.
There are concerns that we will not be able to sustain these levels in the current year due to fears of
global recession, growing power shortages and roll back of subsidies.
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According to the World Bank, Pakistan`s export potential is over $88bn, but we are hampered
by low productivity in agriculture and manufacturing. The report identifies power tariffs as a major
impediment, saying that average tariffs on final goods in Pakistan are 50pc higher than the average
for South Asia, and almost three times higher than the average for East Asia.
The other major area identified is the cost of doing business, with customs tariffs and duties
escalating input costs for our export industry. All these measures are, at best, medium term in
nature. The immediate requirement, however, is to identify opportunities which provide a
muchneeded breather in financing external account deficits.
While we wait on the IMF and friendly countries to bail us out one more time, we must
develop a homegrown reform agenda. Our charter of the economy must focus on boosting our
productivity and competitiveness, leading to sustained growth in the exports of goods and services.
The charter of the economy must also commit to ensuring policy consistency, especially in priority
sectors, such as IT and light engineering/export industries.
In the short term, we must address our large external financing needs by boosting inflows into
RDA accounts, giving incentives to both overseas Pakistanis and onshore holders of foreign
currency.
(Source: Dawn)

REASONS FOR ECONOMIC INSOLVENCY

Syed Asad Ali Shah (Public Policy expert)
The debate on whether Pakistan is close to a sovereign default on its obligations has been
raging for a while now, notwithstanding a staff-level agreement signed a few weeks back for the two
last tranches of the 23rd IMF programme.
The financial crisis has further aggravated owing to intensely divisive politics, sharply
declining foreign exchange reserves, which are currently below $8.5 billion, the collapse of the stock
market, hyperinflation and the massive devaluation of the rupee, making the country most
vulnerable to a risk of economic meltdown, which one hopes will be averted with the likely
approval of the IMF programme.
Why have Pakistan’s economic conditions continued to deteriorate, necessitating bailouts
from a lender of last resort at regular intervals of three to four years, irrespective of changes in
governments, which have been receiving advice from top economists and wise counsel from the IMF
and other international financial institutions (IFIs)?
There are several interconnected reasons that underpin the poor performance of the economy;
they include poor governance, divisive politics, a huge mess in the energy sector, flawed socio-
economic policies and poor implementation due to incompetence and lack of accountability.
These issues have often been the subject of debate from time to time, without any workable
solutions. One major factor that has eroded Pakistan’s productivity and competitiveness is the
prevalent culture of seeking government jobs; this has led to overexpansion of governments with
adverse consequences on businesses. This article will discuss the consequences of this culture, and
its second part will cover what needs to be done to promote entrepreneurship/business.
Let us briefly discuss why the country is on the brink of a sovereign default. The basic issue
is low levels of exports (what our businesses produce and sell to the world) and high amounts of
imports (what we consume but do not produce), resulting in a large trade deficit every year. We
also receive remittances almost equal to our exports from overseas Pakistanis, but the trade deficit
is much larger than these remittances, leaving a major deficit in foreign exchange – current
account deficit.
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Since this has been happening for decades, we have also acquired a large amount of foreign
currency external debt and liabilities, accumulated to over $115 billion. In the past, we closed this
gap by taking more external loans from the IMF, IFSs and some friendly countries. The problem this
time has compounded owing to a high cost of energy (oil and gas) imports made expensive by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Consequently, a significant gap exists between what the IMF and IFIs are willing to give to us
and what we require to meet current account deficit and loan repayments that are due. While I am
reasonably certain that with some difficult decisions, including placing even greater restrictions on
imports (making them more expensive), we should be able to find a temporary solution to finance
our gap, the problem is that every time we manage this with the help of an IMF programme, the
chronic issue of current account deficit returns after a few years as the external debt continues to rise
and our exports remain stagnant or grow much slower than imports.
So the fundamental issue is a large trade deficit as we do not produce, in terms of quantity,
value and quality, goods and services that are needed by our own people and for the export to other
countries. Goods and services are produced by businesses. The reason our businesses are not
generating sufficient goods and services for exports or to substitute imports is due to three major
reasons: first, low productivity (we produce less or low quality goods from given resources). Second,
lack of innovation, which refers to using technology and processes that enhances productivity,
reduces cost, improves quality and customer satisfaction. And, third, we have not yet identified
goods and services that we can produce economically with our local resources, and do not have
adequate knowledge, technology and talent to do so (what can be described as our inability to
identify new opportunities/ideas).
Key factors of production include land, labour, capital, technology and entrepreneurship. We
clearly have no dearth of land and labour, and capital can also be mobilized given the opportunities.
Our biggest weakness is a lack of a robust business/entrepreneurial ecosystem.
It is common knowledge that except for a few small communities, an overwhelmingly large
part of society heavily relies on and seeks jobs. Children from a very young age are told, rather
indoctrinated at home and school, that they have to get education, focusing on certificates or degrees
primarily to get jobs, especially government jobs, which come with security of service and
progression, irrespective of job performance.
As our politicians come from the same society, the key promises made to voters in elections
include the provision of government jobs. For decades, all regimes expanded governments at all
levels to accommodate their voters’ demand for jobs. Consequently, not only is the government now
the biggest employer in the country (it is so in most countries), it also employs the most incompetent
segment of society. Owing to job security in the government sector, which is accepted as unalterable
gospel and no accountability, there is double jeopardy: high demand for government jobs on the one
hand and poor delivery and decision-making of the government on the other; this incurs huge cost
for the economy.
One may argue that while this is true for low-level jobs, the bureaucracy comes through merit
based on competitive examinations and a rigorous selection process through federal and provincial
public-service organizations. While this may be correct to some extent, the quality of civil service
recruitment and training has not kept pace with the fast changing world over the years. Also, once
bureaucrats get appointed, they work in an environment where performance is not the criteria for
their postings and promotion; they have to largely work to meet political interests.
A country and its people progress only when they produce high-quality goods and services
efficiently at low cost for both the domestic and global markets, and this is done by businesses not
governments. A government’s primary role should be to create jobs in the private sector through
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promoting businesses and entrepreneurship rather than providing jobs itself by expanding the
government.
An excessive number of people in the government has already eroded efficiency and
effectiveness of our public sector, besides leading to a huge increase in the cost of the public sector
that translates into a big fiscal deficit despite heavy taxation, placing a huge financial burden on the
people and businesses in the form of inflation and making our businesses non-competitive.
The rise of western Europe started with the Renaissance, a remarkable period in world
history, which began in 14th-century Italy and later spread to other countries. Italian city state
Florence, considered as the birthplace of Renaissance, became the hub of art, architecture and other
fields of learning, patronized by rich business families like Medici, an Italian banking family.
The family ruled Florence for 60 years and was the owner of the Medici Bank, the most
profitable enterprises of that time; this highlights how entrepreneurial culture uplifts society. The
fortunes of western Europe started to skyrocket when they started exploration and discovering new
worlds in the 15th century as Columbus and Vasco da Gama discovered the US and India in 1492
and 1496 respectively.
The development of shipping and sea trade through chartered companies in the 15th and 16th
centuries laid the foundation for wealth creation and colonization in the subsequent two centuries.
The most prominent of them was the English East India Company, formed in 1600 through the
charter of Queen Elizabeth I, which became the world’s largest enterprise in the 17th and 18th
centuries and created the largest empire the world had ever known. At its peak, it had an army of
260,000, twice that of the British army. This indicates the power of business enterprise.
From the Renaissance to the fourth Industrial Revolution in the 21st century, confirms that
two critical factors have a massive impact on development and progress of nations: first, the quality
(knowledge and skills) of people; and second the quality of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. These
factors are conspicuous in almost all nations across the globe, which have achieved a high level of
progress and prosperity. Unfortunately, Pakistan is lagging in both, and must focus on them to
provide a strong foundation for socio-economic progress.
With a large proportion of the population either unskilled or semi-literate and poor quality of
tertiary education, it is no surprise that our country’s human resource is deeply messed up. This is
the biggest impediment to its progress, which needs separate discussion. Nevertheless, a sizable
population out of 230 million has reasonable education and capacity to contribute towards building
a more dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem than what we have, given the right initiatives and policy
framework.
This article will discuss some inherent cultural traits of society that hamper our
entrepreneurial ecosystem – why are the innovation and productivity of businesses low, making the
country uncompetitive? In the next part of the article, I will discuss policies and governance aspects
that have hindered growth of businesses.
As discussed in the first part, except for a few small communities which are engaged in
business in most sectors of the economy, an overwhelmingly large portion of society does not think
beyond government or other traditional jobs. The first strategy should be to expand this pool by
motivating more young people towards entrepreneurship. The second step is to develop and
implement a strategy to change the mindset of wider society by addressing the following cultural
attributes that seriously undermine innovation, productivity and growth of our enterprises:
Ambition and big vision: An essential attribute for big accomplishments in any field,
especially for business, is largely missing in our people, perhaps owing to beliefs in fate and a tribal
mindset. People are generally complacent, satisfied or accept pathetic conditions in which they live
as they think it’s their destiny.
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Courage and risk taking: Only people who are risk takers can set up businesses and achieve
success. As most of our society is risk averse; they would rather take government or other jobs
where monthly salary is assured than venturing in business and lose their capital.
Curiosity and questioning: Perhaps, the biggest societal weakness is lack of curiosity and
appetite to raise questions. From a young age, children are discouraged from asking questions; more
inquisitive ones are advised to either keep quiet or confine to discrete questions. Parents, teachers,
managers in government and businesses discourage openness. Creativity and disruptive innovation
happens when people are encouraged to raise disruptive questions.
Hierarchy: It is pervasive from home, government to private organizations. The eldest male in
the family, the CEO of a company, the prime minister/chief minister/minister/secretary exercise all
authority for decisions, and cannot be questioned or challenged by juniors. In political parties, party
heads call the shots, all others are obedient followers.
Promotions in government and most organizations largely based on seniority, not
competence. The judiciary is a prime example, where senior judges, irrespective of competence,
become chief justice. This culture does not promote thinking and innovation. Anti-hierarchical ethos
is a key driver in robust societies, where young people are empowered to raise questions, challenge
existing norms leading to discovery of new ideas, ways and approaches.
Mistakes: In most organizations, people are expected to perform routine tasks. Mistakes are
sinful and penalized, so people fear to try new ways or approaches.
Failure is a sin: Failure in business, especially if a person or organization becomes insolvent, is
considered a big stigma. If people or organizations fail, they become pariahs. For instance, in all
cases, where a business fails and defaults on loan repayments, even in genuine cases owing to
unexpected adverse situations like change in government policies or adverse economic events, its
sponsors and directors are put on defaulters list, a kind of black list for getting future loans from the
banking system. In dynamic cultures, failure is considered as the best teacher. Many leaders talk
about failures openly to analyze what went wrong to learn from it. Great enterprises are built after
multiple failures.
Lack of empowerment and experimentation: Another serious problem is the lack of
empowerment of young people to make decisions, encouraging them to try new ideas, challenging
existing norms and processes for improvisation. Consequently, the culture of the status of quo
remains supreme. Innovation happens when we promote a culture of ideation and experimentation,
out-of-box thinking and empowering young people to benefit from their creativity, energy and
enthusiasm.
Sycophancy and submissiveness: Both in government and the private sector, the culture of
‘the boss is always right’ – directions/orders of the boss have to be carried out without questioning –
reigns supreme. People do not challenge past and existing practices to see whether they remain
appropriate in the fast changing world or whether they need improvement. What has been
happening for decades is considered the right way.
Continuous learning: The best entrepreneurs are made not born. They never stop learning. In
our culture, most entrepreneurs stop learning after achieving a degree of success. For continuous
success and achieving scale, one must have the passion for ceaseless learning.
Collaboration and teamwork: No one person, no matter how smart, can excel in everything. A
large number of people who achieve some success continue to rely on themselves, instead of
developing teams and relying on talent.
Continuous investment and search for talent: an overwhelming majority of businesses in
Pakistan are family businesses. And while many of them produce brilliant minds, they do not
appreciate that there are more brilliant minds beyond their family. Also, most organizations have
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traditional systematized hiring practices, looking only for routine degrees and experience, and
missing outliers. As they say, “only thing more important than your ability is your ability to
recognize the ability”.
No tolerance to crazy ones: the best description of people who cause disruptive innovation
was given by George Bernard Shaw in his play ‘Man and Superman’ in these words “The reasonable
man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to
himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.” Unfortunately, our society does
not tolerate the ‘unreasonable man’.
In my humble view, as a society, we need to enhance the number and size of businesses,
through a comprehensive strategy. I also believe that most of the top business groups in the country
are highly under-scaled compared to their potential, owing to limited vision and appetite to take
risks.
There is a serious need to address inherent weaknesses discussed above to build a more
robust entrepreneurial ecosystem and enhance the pace of innovation and productivity.
(Source: The News)

MANAGING EXTERNAL FINANCING GAP

Syed Salim Raza (Former Governor of SBP)
Zafar Masud (President and CEO of the Bank of Punjab)
The global economy is passing through a perfect storm. The commodity super-cycle has led to
record high prices of essential imports.
On the other hand, emerging marl(ets face capital flight with rising interest rates in the US and
EU markets. Emerging economies are facing stress with rising import bills and depleting central
bank reserves. Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Suriname, and Zambia are already in default.
Pakistan has done better as proactive measures taken by the government have averted the
threat of default. These include measures to curb imports and budgetary measures to restore the
IMF programme. Markets are reacting positively to these policy measures; yieldson Pakistan
sovereign international bonds have declined sharply to 22pc, from peak levels of 50pc in July 2022.
The stock market has rallied 7pc in August, while the rupee has strengthened over 10pc in the last
week days.
However, despite the recent improvements in sentiment, the large external financing needs
over the medium-term continue to cast a long shadow over the economy. According to the IMF staff
report in February 2022, Pakistan`s external financing needs will remain high around $35bn to $40bn
annually over the medium term.
Stability in the foreign exchange market is crucial for creating a conducive environment for
local businesses: attracting new investments, supporting growth, and managing infiation
expectations. However, given the largeexternal financing needs, the rupee will likely remain under
stress as the demand for dollars remains significantly higher than the available supply in the market,
at least in the immediate run.
With overall global sentiment on capital markets being negative, and the rating outlook
downgrade by international rating agencies, we are effectively priced out of the international bond
markets. This leaves the economy too dependent on borrowing from multilateral agencies and
bilateral loans from friendly countries. The large funding requirements in emerging markets have
put us in a weak position to negotiate better terms and conditions.
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Therefore, other than ensuring that existing forex flows continue to trickle into the country
without delays to avoid any see-sawing of the exchange rate in the market, as recently witnessed
alternative sources of dollar-funding need to be explored and managed in the medium term to
ensure stability.
When the going is good, as is the case in the currency market right now, it is the right time to
introduce certain measures so that the exporters and remitters can be incentivised or coerced to
bring in the existing foreign currency remittances stuck outside the country, and ensure that they
continue to arrive without delay and keep the markets calm.
The central bank requires better engagement with banks, perhaps on a daily basis at the
treasury level, and with money changers. Better and aggressive enforcement of discipline is also a
need of the hour.
On the other hand, the most significant alternative source of external ñnancing in the last 3
years is the Roshan Digital Account (RDA) initiative of the StateBank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Naya
Pakistan Certificates (NPC) of the government of Pakistan.
Approximately $4.8bn inflows have materialised under this scheme since September 2020, out
of which $3.1bn is investments in NPC.
However, inflows have slowed down sharply in the last few months due to unfavorable
global market conditions. While global interest rates have risen sharply with the benchmark six-
month Libor trading around 3.6pc today compared to 0.15pc in the same period last year the profit
rates offered on NPCs have remained unchanged at5.5pcto 7pc across different tenors.
The profit rates on NPC instruments need to be market-based and linked to Libor rates. Even
at a spread of 500 basis points over the Libor, the NPC profit rate of 8.5pc will be significantly lower
than the borrowing cost from international bond markets, currently at 22pc.
Urgent attention is needed to keep NPC products attractive to incentivise fresh inflows and
discourage existing investors from pulling out.
The second area that needs to be addressed is the large and growing onshore holding of
foreign currency assets, mostly cash held by individuals for saving or payment needs. No formal
estimates exist of the size of these holdings, but their signiEcance can be gauged from the following
data points; first of which is the size of the foreign currency deposits of the banking sector.
These stand at around $5.8bn today, down from $7.1bn last year. In 1998, before the freezing
of foreign currency accounts, the size of these deposits used to be as high as $11bn.
The second data pointis currency in circulation: the latest SBP data shows that this has
increased to Rs8 trillion ($35bn) and makes up around 30pc of the total money supply in the
economy and 40pc of bank deposits.
High currency in circulation is also highly inflationary in nature. In previous episodes of
market turbu-lence, the low deposit base of banks struggled to meet the deficit financing needs of
the government, leading to money-printing by the SBP.
During periods of uncertainty and exchange rate volatility, many private investors convert
their cash holdings into dollars. The reason investors prefer to hold foreign currency assets `under
the mattresses` (in cash or in their bank lockers) is the lack of returns offered by commercial banks
and lack of alternate investment avenues. There is also reluctance to declare these assets to tax
authorities for obviousreasons.
Therefore, the primary objective should be to cut down on currency in circulation and that is
only possible with reduced financing requirements of the government, either by keeping the debt-
servicing lower by managing the policy rate at the right levels (as the demand for currency in
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circulation isn`t amenable to policy rate changes), or by avoiding fresh debt by enhancing tax and
non-tax revenues. We need to remind ourselves that we have to borrow to service our existing debt.
The other option is to ensure that the enhanced moneysupply will be used to meet the
mainstream requirements of the economy, which at this stage is dollar inflows ideally in the form of
exports or other sources of investment (bank deposits or otherwise)to enhance the forex pool in the
country and ease-off pressure on the government`s reserves. Today, an investor will get only 0.2pc
to 0.75pc on their foreign currency deposits, while big depositors can negotiate a higher rate. In
comparison, commercial banks in India offer returns of 2.85pc or higher on foreign currency
deposits.The centralbankin India has recently waived the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) and
Statutory Liquidity Requirement (SLR) requirement on incremental foreign currency deposits,
incentivising banks to raise them.
(Source: Dawn)

HOW TO COMBAT FISCAL DEFICIT AND CURRENT ACCOUNT

DEFICIT OF PAKISTAN
Muhammad Ihsan Khan (Member of Pakistan Society of Development Economists)
There are two common ways we can combat the fiscal deficit: increasing revenue through
higher taxes and by more economic activity, or cutting expenses by cutting back on government-run
programs.
Pakistan for the decades has been confronted with serious issues of fiscal deficit and current
account deficit due to which the country has reached the verge of a vulnerable economy and now
Pakistan must take drastic decisions as already it is much belated.
The Policy leaders and experts from across the political spectrum must have to put forward a
number of comprehensive plans that can reduce the long-run debts and chalk out a holistic strategy
and a strong foundation for future economic growth. By examining such comprehensive indigenous
plans according to the set priorities, the policymakers and the public at large should gain a better
understanding of what is required for the country, as well as what we have to get our objectives by
putting out actions to combat the huge fiscal as well as current account deficit. Comprehensive plans
may encompass generally changes slowly in order to give people time to plan and to protect short-
term economic growth. While some other plans may rely more on reductions in aggregate spending
and others might depend more on tax growth. We must keep in mind that Pakistan is an import-
oriented economy and its inflation is cost-push inflation, not demand-pull inflation which depicts
general well-being and economic prosperity and increases in income and employment, whereas the
cost push inflation only originates due to increase in cost of production with lower income and
employment with overall gloomy and desperate economy. Our economy is gradually moving
toward stagnation which means both inflation and unemployment are rising parallel and this can
lead to recession in economy. The fiscal deficit and current account deficit are daringly increasing in
tandem. The average Per capita income of the country has been reported drastically decreased to Rs.
300/- per day including cyclical and seasonal unemployment.
Pakistan’s Current Trade Deficit
Foreign exchange strapped Pakistan's trade deficit has surged to a record USD 48.66 billion in
the current financial year 2022-23 up from USD 30.96 billion in last financial year flatly 57 per cent
jump. Pakistan's import has been reported increased 43.45 per cent to USD 80.51 billion during
current year from USD 56.12 billion in last year.
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Immediate Actions to be taken

Constitution of National Commission on Fiscal Reforms
It is the high time that in line with Simpson-Bowles Plan in the United States, the National
Commission on Fiscal Reforms must be constituted in Pakistan on bipartisan approach to deliberate
the issues of fiscal and current account deficit of the country at length by raising awareness of the
stark projections of foreign debt and by putting forward a series of proposals designed to set the
nation on a sustainable fiscal path so as to combat the hazardous current account deficit. The
National Commission encompassing high expertise from National Assembly, Senate, Ministry of
Finance, Federal Board of Revenue, Stakeholders and Businessmen from notable Chambers of
Commerce& Industries representing all federal units and mainstream political parties of the
country. The necessary legislation should be initiated and passed in National Assembly and Senate
to formulate the laws for the purpose of constitution of such National Commission on Fiscal
Reforms. The commission will deliberate the subject at length and give insight into this very crucial
issue and chalk out the holistic strategy to combat both fiscal and current account deficit. The
commission will materialize different pragmatic plans and capitalize the given opportunities and
then explore the new avenues to raise the revenues and the GDP.
Some of the following key decisions must be taken up by the commission,
1. The holistic strategy about subsidies to some crucial segments like electricity,
petroleum products and fast consumer items to provide relief to white collar poor and lower class so
that they can also play their healthy role in increasing economic activities.
2. The percentage raising revenue targets to GDP and percentage reduction in spending.
3. To project the target of GDP growth in the next five years.
4. To project the target of reducing the debt servicing in the next five years.
5. Setting out the Tax Reforms, and simplifying the tax codes to raise revenue.
6. Stabilizing Social Security’s finances and strengthening the safety net for seniors.
7. Transparency and Governance
8. Eradication of Corruption and Red Tape to expedite the public projects
9. Associated Legislation
10. Best utilization of IMF Programs and all other foreign funding, loans and assistance.
11. To upgrade the standards of technical education to increase employment.
12. To curtail the huge losses of PIA, Pakistan Railway, Pakistan Steel and others.
13. To set desirable targets and plans to raise foreign remittances.
14. To accelerate the facilities and talents of overseas Pakistanis.
15. To negotiate for enhancing the employment opportunities for overseas Pakistanis.
Making Pakistan A Documented Agrarian Country For Reformed Taxation& Revenues
This is the high time now when we must decide whether Pakistan is an agrarian country
because after 75 years of independence we have still not decided on the direction of our country.
Despite all its limitations, the agriculture sector has still absorbed 44% of labour force and is yielding
23% of our GDP and only the Livestock sector is producing 10% of the GDP. Therefore in order to
strengthen the Agriculture and Livestock Sector, Pakistan must focus on food grains, cash crops like
cotton and sugarcane, cultivation of palm oil, enhancement of milk & meat production and to give
rewarding incentives to Livestock breeders and set forth the specific targets and then we must
achieve them. This is how we could enhance the contribution of Agriculture and Livestock in
national economy. After desirable strengthening we can move forward to document the economic
activities in this combined sector, so that proper and substantive reformation of taxes in Agriculture
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and Livestock sector could be designed and then be supported with necessary legislation. Once we
establish the Agriculture sector then the agricultural based industry will automatically be
established, which will gear up our revenues and this will be another one step ahead to combat the
huge and widening fiscal deficit.
All challenges can only be met if renowned Lawmakers, Economists and Policy Organizations
from across the political spectrum sit together and demonstrate leadership to put everything on
table. They should deliberate the issues at length to chalk out comprehensive plans to achieve long-
term fiscal sustainability. Although this is a difficult task but it must have to be done to improve the
efficiency of government and strengthen the economy of the country.
(Source: Dawn)
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Education
THE STATE OF IT EDUCATION
Dr Ayesha Razzaque (PhD in Education)
The Information Technology (IT) and IT Enabled Services (ITES) sector has been among the
fastest growing in Pakistan’s economy. IT exports for 2021-22 are expected to clock in at around $3.5
billion, up from $2.1 billion the previous year, a massive 66 per cent increase.
Over the last 15 years, in most years, annual export growth of the IT & ITES sector has been
solidly in the double digits. Fully developed, this sector has the potential to become a huge
contributor to the foreign exchange needs of the country. During this time, at different times,
successive governments have exhibited various degrees of support (by introducing policy reforms),
indifference and neglect (by inaction), and at times greed (by milking the cow prematurely by
significantly raising taxes) towards it.
What is more, the Board of Investment’s (BOI) data of forex earned from exports vs forex
spent on imports by the IT sector from 2006 to 2019 shows how incremental additional forex
spending has coincided with a disproportionately larger increase in exports.
In August of last year, the Pakistan Software Houses Association (P@SHA) issued its Salary
Survey 2021, a detailed report that goes well beyond documenting compensations of a wide variety
of roles in Pakistan’s IT industry. The data is sliced by location, roles, experience level, company
size, company types, gender.
Despite the mushroom growth of computer science and related programmes in colleges and
universities over the past few decades, the IT and ITES sector still faces a shortage of skilled, capable
professional workers. This is evidenced by the fact that 50 per cent of companies cited the lack of
experienced human resources in the market, and 17 per cent cited employee retention as the reason
for higher salary increments. High staff turnover rates provide further evidence that this is an
experienced and qualified worker’s market - staff turnover rate went from the 14-18 percent range in
the years from 2017 to 2020, up to a whopping 30 percent in 2021.
The report dedicates a significant section to industry-academia linkages and university
rankings. It contains several rankings of universities, such as by companies’ willingness to offer their
graduates higher salaries, reputation for research and innovation, number of graduates on company
staff, rankings sliced by regions as well as an overall nationwide ranking. The universities listed in
almost all these rankings, in descending order, are: NUCES-FAST, NUST, LUMS, COMSATS, GIKI,
IBA, UET-Lahore, NED UET, Bahria University and SZABIST. Industry-academia linkages and,
closely related to it, employer reputation also factor into global university rankings, such as the
Times Higher Education (THE) and QS rankings.
Region-specific rankings add more names to this list. Almost all universities featuring
prominently on these rankings are located in the three technology hubs: Islamabad, Lahore and
Karachi. These three cities account for 97 per cent of the companies and more than 99 per cent of the
more than 30,000 employees surveyed for the P@SHA report.
Note how most names are private universities or public universities that enjoy better levels of
financial support than most public universities. The university rankings in the P@SHA report are the
market’s evaluation of graduate employability (and worth) of computer science and related
programs of universities.
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A few months ago, I wrote about some of the insights that were buried in the data set of
applicant profiles for batch-3 of the Kamyab Jawan programme (‘Not skilled for work’, The News
International, March 7, 2022). The programme offered 240 different skill trainings of various
duration typically intended for those with a high school education or less. As an education
researcher, I was very interested in applicants holding university degrees. Out of 279,000 unique
applicants, 74 had PhD degrees, 29,225 had MA/MSc degrees and 76,899 had BA/BSc degrees.
Unsurprisingly, interest was strongly skewed towards technology-sector skills. The top-five
programmes by applications were: 1) Digital Marketing and Search Engine Optimization (SEO); 2)
Amazon Virtual Assistant; 3) IT (Web Graphics & Mobile App Development); 4) Cyber Security; and
5) Computer Application & Office Professional, which received between 24,000 and 18,000
applications each.
Based on data available at the time, the following were the 10 universities that supplied the
most university graduates to the applicant pool: 1) University of Punjab, 2) various degree colleges
across the country, 3) Allama Iqbal Open University (AIOU), 4) University of Sindh Jamshoro, 5)
University of Karachi, 6) Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, 7) Islamia University Bahawalpur,
8) University of Peshawar, 9) Government College University Faisalabad and 10) University of
Balochistan Quetta. Applicants from each institution range from many thousands to about 1300.
This can be interpreted as a list of the top large universities whose programmes fail to make
their graduates employable. Note that all of them are public. Also note that this list is
complementary to the list of university names found in the P@SHA report’s rankings by IT and ITES
companies.
Also noteworthy is that almost all universities with sought-after programmes are located in or
near Pakistan’s three tech hubs. On the other hand, several universities whose graduates feel the
need for a vocational / skills training programme post-degree are located outside those tech hubs.
The geographical distance of a university to relevant employers is an important factor that
determines the ease with which industry-academia linkages can be established and, ultimately, how
many graduates can transition into jobs.
Institutions located in far-flung areas or even tier-2 and tier-3 cities also have difficulty
attracting and retaining qualified faculty members on staff. This is particularly the case for
technology programmes which end up wallowing in mediocrity. This is something politicians need
to keep in mind when they demand or announce the establishment of a new university for their
constituency. The faculty talent pool available to small-town and far-flung universities affects the
level of skill that can be expected from graduates of their programmes.
P@SHA’s university ranking is, in essence, an assessment of that all-important feature the
HEC and universities claim to champion but have so much trouble quantifying: the quality of
(computer science and associated) programmes. The results of the HEC’s one-size-fits-all approach
to programme rankings lumps vastly different programmes into the same basket and that is why
they do not align with the public’s perception of institutional reputations.
I have said it before, and I will say it again: the myriad of factors that are taken into account to
arrive at the HEC’s rankings are for the most part irrelevant for the purpose of most undergraduate
students who make up the bulk of university students. Undergraduate students largely do not care
how many papers their faculty published in (often) obscure venues, grant proposals they won or
patents they have to their name.
It ought to be universities’ own responsibility to collect, publish and disseminate data that
proves their programme’s quality and effectiveness. The HEC stepped in and tried to fill that void
with its own ranking but clearly lacks sufficient resources for this task. In that regard, P@SHA is
providing valuable information to the public that at least covers computer science and IT education.
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Prospective computer science and IT programme students and their parents should take full benefit
from P@SHA’s – the industry’s – own report which provides a useful, actionable, and outcome-
based evaluation of local university programmes; one hopes it is able to continue publishing them in
years to come.
(Source: The News)

REVISITING EDUCATION
Zulqurnain Ul Haq (Founding Director of Youth Centre for Research)
This year Pakistan turns seventy-five. An average person the same age today has seen three
generations grow up before. Factoring in socio-economic divisions, the diversity in this multi-
generational population increases further. This begs the question whether Pakistan’s journey thus
far means the same for all its citizens.
Traversing seven decades of its independent existence, Pakistan’s education landscape
requires a thorough revisit. The country, vowing to provide education for all, echoes the mantra of
socio-economic egalitarianism that ideally benefits the middle class. 75 years down the line, it is time
to evaluate if education that underpins social mobility has enabled the desired social equity. The
revisit can begin by reconsidering the approach to education planning in Pakistan’s K-12 and four-
year undergraduate education, which serve as stepping stones to economic empowerment.
In view of economic returns for investment in education, universities have assumed an
important role in societal development. They have the potential to build human capacities, enhance
employment, enable innovation and promote good governance. The earlier years of education serve
as a preparatory ground for the tertiary level, which eventually connects with socio-economic
participation. Considering the connection across multiple stages, it is important to determine if this
stage sees what the feeder stage ought to prepare and send forth.
Education planning in Pakistan is disconnected across several stages of its education system.
These stages are relatively more pronounced for public education, where primary school is distinct
from secondary education, followed by college and then tertiary education. In the case of private
schools, there is no disconnect between the primary and secondary stages since the transition is
mostly smooth. Discourses around education in the development sector often consider important
aspects of quality, access and equity. Unfortunately, the focus on education provision often remains
divided between stages viewing each in isolation. This divided approach disregards an
interconnection and interdependence between various stages that can hamper students’ educational
journey passing through multiple choke points.
According to its Vision 2025, Pakistan aims to attain the status of an upper-middle income
country by the year 2025. This requires building human capital, which in turn requires investing in
higher education. Pakistan has vowed to increase its expenditure on tertiary education from the
current 0.2 percent of the GDP to around 1.4 percent by 2025. The national education policy 2017
says that the state shall provide access to professional, vocational and tertiary education on merit.
Unfortunately, according to UNDP’s Human Development Report 2020, Pakistan’s gross enrolment
ratio in tertiary education remains 9 percent against Afghanistan’s 10 percent, India’s 28 percent,
Maldives’ 31 percent and Nepal’s 12 percent. Moreover, the percentage of gross enrolment is also
lower for Pakistan than that of Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Although the percentage of gross enrolment in tertiary education has remained dismal, there
has been a general increase in student enrolment from 276,000 in 2001 to almost 1.29 million in 2014-
15. The government aims to further increase this to 5 million by 2025. This apparent increase in
enrolment in tertiary education is optics of egalitarian higher education access since the choice of
education institute is defined by one’s financial position. Admission in quality tertiary institutes has
remained not only a testing ground for merit, but also an evaluation stage for one’s financial
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standing, leaving relatively lower quality options for the underserved. In many instances, the
completion of tertiary education is also greatly impacted by one’s socio-economic position.
According to the UNESCO, the rate of tertiary education completion in Pakistan between 2008 to
2015 was 32 percent for the richest and 1.5 percent for the poor.
Universities and governments often offer scholarships to exhibit egalitarianism and to ensure
that their student body remains diverse and that students’ education is not disrupted based on their
financial backgrounds. This invites an academic discussion on the idea of accessibility based on
merit and the notion that individual capabilities tested in a meritocracy are a product of
circumstantial advantages. This is where K-12 education comes into play. Unfortunately, access to
every level of education is circumstantial. Hence the connecting chain of these circumstances does
not always result in an egalitarian output – that is, equitable access to the multi-stage education
system in Pakistan.
A child born in an underserved community will most often go to a public or low-cost private
school. On the other hand, a privileged child will most likely study in a costly private school that
will certainly rank higher in terms of quality education. These differences in quality education pile
up at every stage owing to circumstantial choices and reflect differences in student competence and
learning. Seventy percent of the students in public schools drop out until they reach matric. Those
who survive have to compete against students from private schools initially for quality public
colleges and later for private colleges if they are affordable. The same contestation continues
eventually to secure admission in undergraduate education.
The idea of merit certainly presents the most justifiable and pragmatic approach to
educational justice. However, it sidelines the struggles of the underprivileged students and the way
they navigate their path through multiple stages of education. For instance, differences in quality
education during matric render underprivileged children unprepared for higher secondary
education. If they do manage to secure the required percentage and enter a college, their
affordability leaves them with public colleges where compromised quality is padded through
coaching centres. If they manage to complete their higher secondary and in case they are eligible for
quality tertiary institute, they fail to pass entrance exams which test students’ competence in English
language, mathematics or other subjects depending upon the desired field of further studies. These
struggles reflect that the underprivileged students require an education booster or equaliser at every
transitionary stage to ensure that they are fit to compete against those who did not have to put this
extra effort.
Education planning in Pakistan, therefore, demands a renewed language and concentration
where disparate focus on the constituent stage is also complemented with a systemic approach to
encapsulate a multi-level education trajectory. Holistic education planning should look at the
requirements of every stage and the preparedness needed to be attained by the preceding stages.
Considering the circumstantial differences, there need to be alternative learning pathways in place
to ensure that the playing field is levelled across the board irrespective of one’s socio-economic
position. Without this approach, no matter how many scholarships are provided by universities,
egalitarianism will remain a distant goal.
Economic prosperity underpins quality human resource development. The path to this human
development should not be restricted to the privileged. Poor students have long suffered from poor
quality education, but from school to college completion and then to tertiary education, the gap is
growing. With educational success defining one’s economic participation, future employability and
a means to cross class barriers; its inequitable access is only serving as a system perpetuating and
fortifying class differences. To ensure that every passing year post-independence means the same for
all, we need a more just and egalitarian outlook for collective societal progress.
The idea of merit certainly presents the most justifiable and pragmatic approach to
educational justice. However, it sidelines the struggles of the underprivileged students and the way
they navigate their path through multiple stages of education. (Source: TNS)
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Energy Crisis
PAKISTAN NEEDS IMMEDIATE STEPS TO IMPROVE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
Saadia Qayyum (Energy Specialist at the World Bank)
Pakistan’s energy problems are not new but have been exacerbated manifold by the Russia-
Ukraine war and the global supply crisis. The country’s high dependence on imported fuels has
exposed it to energy insecurity, including price shocks and supply disruptions, and sustained
exorbitantly high energy costs. We are heavily dependent on fossil fuels (residual fuel oil, liquefied
natural gas and coal), which make up 86% of Pakistan’s primary commercial energy supply,
according to the country’s 2021 energy yearbook. Pakistan’s fuel import bill surged to USD 23 billion
in the 2021-22 financial year, a 105% increase from the previous financial year.
Pakistan’s energy intensity (the energy required to produce one US dollar of GDP) was 4.6
megajoules (MJ) per dollar in 2018, higher than that of other countries in the region or elsewhere.
This inefficiency worsens the country’s dependence on imported fuel because it increases the
demand for energy.
Data in the State of Industry reports of the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority
shows that homes consume 50% of the total electricity delivered. This demand is largely driven by
cooling and lighting. The projected increase in average temperatures in Pakistan, combined with
poor levels of building energy efficiency, will continue to put pressure on energy demand, which is
estimated to increase from 106 terawatt-hour (TWh) in 2020 to 234 TWh in 2030 – a 121% increase –
according to an industrial decarbonisation report that is due to be published by the World Bank.
Governments have neglected energy efficiency
Energy efficiency and conservation have been neglected in Pakistan for decades. All
governments have focused on adding generation capacity rather than reducing the demand for
energy demand, even though demand-side measures cost far less and can give quick wins.
The first national energy efficiency policy was notified in 2006 but was ineffective in
delivering any results. The energy efficiency authority ENERCON was established in 1988. Since
then, it has been transferred from one ministry to another five times. The situation did not improve
after it was renamed the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (NEECA) after the
promulgation of the NEECA Act in 2016.
In the World Bank’s Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) ranking last year,
Pakistan scored 28 out of 100 in energy efficiency. Our policies, regulations and financing
mechanisms lag far behind other countries.
Energy efficiency has huge scope
Energy efficiency and conservation can provide highly impactful and cost-effective ways for
the government to quickly respond to the energy crisis. Given the high energy intensity of Pakistan’s
economy and the nascent energy efficiency market, there is tremendous scope for demand-side
improvement. NEECA should fast-track implementation of minimum energy performance
standards for appliances such as motors, lighting, air conditioners, refrigerators, and water and
space heaters which could bring substantial cost savings for households. It should also work with
the relevant authorities to amend the bylaws of development authorities, mandating the inclusion of
building energy efficiency in new construction. A combination of passive (building orientation,
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green roofs, insulation) and active measures (energy-efficient heating and cooling systems) can
reduce the energy needs of these buildings.
It will be important to show the value proposition of energy efficiency to scale this up and
mobilise private sector investment. The government can set up a super-ESCO – a publicly owned
but commercially operated energy servicing company (ESCO). The super-ESCO can design,
implement, finance and manage energy efficiency projects especially in the public sector. It can also
play a role in facilitating financing for large commercial and industrial consumers. There are
examples of super-ESCOs from other countries, including EESL in India, Tarshid in Saudi Arabia,
and Etihad in the UAE.
It will be important to target quick wins such as replacing lights, fans and streetlights which
can give projected energy savings of 4,750 GWh, equivalent to 95 billion Pakistani rupees (USD 431
million) in reduced electricity bills and 142 billion Pakistani rupees (USD 647 million) in fuel cost
savings annually, according to our calculations.
The power regulator determined a tariff increase of Rs 7.9/kWh for the 2023 financial year,
which the government decided to implement in three phases: Rs 3.5/kWh in July, Rs 3.5/kWh in
August and Rs 0.91/kWh in October. Given that the previous benefit for those who use little
electricity has been removed for non-protected consumers, several households will have a 150%
increase in electricity bills. Non-protected consumers have been defined as those who used over 200
units of electricity in the last six months.
Most low-income households only have lights and fans at home. These are energy inefficient
as people are still using incandescent bulbs and inefficient fans. Replacing incandescent light bulbs
with LEDs can save 80% energy while a 3-star (Pakistan Energy Label) fan consumes at least 50%
less power than an inefficient fan.
Wind energy is part of Pakistan's long term change in its energy sector
The government should roll out a lights and fans replacement programme through the super-
ESCO – either at federal or provincial level. This can be done quickly through public procurement.
For other household appliances such as electric motors and water heaters an on-bill financing
scheme can be used where consumers can pay for these appliances through monthly instalments in
the electricity bill. This on-bill financing mechanism can also be used for financing solar energy
generation at the consumer level.
The government must launch a national energy conservation campaign encouraging everyone
to do their bit in alleviating the energy crisis. The campaign should emphasise no-cost measures
such as setting the air-conditioner temperature at 26 degrees Celsius especially in malls, hotels, and
offices; using natural lighting; unplugging IT equipment when not in use; and wearing weather-
appropriate clothes to reduce the need for cooling or heating. There are examples from countries
such as Spain.
The current energy crisis, because of its impact on macroeconomic stability, is a national
emergency and everyone has a role to play in defusing the situation. The best way in which millions
of consumers can play their role is through energy efficiency.
(Source: The Third Pole)

TRANSFORMATION TO CLEAN ENERGY

It can do wonders in Pakistan
Complete transformation of energy sector shifting from fossil fuel to clean energy, mainly
solar, will achieve miracles in the country, Gwadar Pro reported on Wednesday. The report says the
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rapidly changing nature of socio-economic partnerships, conflicting realities of geopolitics and

complex & compelling geostrategic scenarios has forced all the countries to take concrete policy
measures to mitigate spillover repercussions of energy security and Pakistan is not any exception.
Moreover, the increasing threat of non-state actor of climate change has produced devastating
ripples in the world due to which even the basic human survival and pace of productive channels
are under tremendous pressure.
In this connection, ongoing heat-waves and wild spread fires in the European Union and the
US, reducing agro-production in South East Asia, abnormal rise in global warming in Africa and last
but not the least, record high green gas emissions in Latin America have encouraged countries,
communities and organizations to shift from fossil fuels to clean and green energies. Therefore, the
government of Pakistan must seek assistance to overcome the energy deficit from China, as the
country is one of the biggest promoters and investors of clean energy, especially solar and wind in
the world.
Four of the world’s five biggest renewable energy contracts were signed by Chinese private
companies in 2016. The country built nearly 31 gigawatts (GW) of new solar power capacity from
January to June, up 137 percent from a year earlier, with full-year installations on course to hit a
record high.
The International Energy Agency said that China’s holistic and comprehensive policies and
innovation have made solar power more affordable. China has been instrumental in bringing down
costs worldwide for solar photovoltaics (PV), with multiple benefits for clean energy transitions.
Thus, the government of Pakistan and its private sector should take this golden opportunity to
further strengthen the solar energy cooperation with China. Moreover, China plans to build mega
wind and solar power projects to achieve the target of lesser carbonization and carbon neutrality.
Critical analysis reveals that China is set to add at least 570 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar power
in the 14th five year plan (FYP) period from 2021 to 2025.
It is estimated that China’s other plans for clean energy expansion, the new wind and solar
power may be enough to enable China to peak its fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions before
2025. It seems that diversified expertise of the Chinese companies in solar energy installation and
production opens a new window of opportunity for the government of Pakistan to further enhance
energy mix and production alike in the country. Furthermore, China plans to speed up the
construction of the second batch of massive wind and solar power projects in the Gobi Desert and
other arid regions, which may also be replicated in the deserts areas of Pakistan.
The latest published report from the Pakistan’s board of investment, out of the $144 million
foreign investment in Solar PV plants, $125 million is from China, accounting for nearly 87 percent
of the total.
Among the 530MW cumulative generation capacity in Pakistan, 400 MW (75 percent) is
generated from Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park, the first ever power plant capable of generating solar
energy in Pakistan, owned by the Punjab government and built by China’s Tebian Electric
Apparatus Xinjiang New Energy Co. With 400,000 solar panels spreading over 200 hectares of flat
desert, the plant was initially launched with a capacity of generating 100 MW of power for Pakistan.
Moreover, there has been the addition of 300 MW power generation capacities with 3 new projects
in Pakistan, and there are numerous planned projects reported for the Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park
with a cumulative capacity of 1,050 MW in the country which should be started as soon as possible
and the best solution for its early execution is to seek help from Chinese companies. Thus, enhanced
solar energy cooperation should be mantra of the incumbent government in the country.
Chinese companies are also the major suppliers to many PV Projects in Pakistan such as Mini
Solar grids in KP and ADB Access to Clean Energy Program,this means that Chinese companies
have been supporting the Pakistani government and its private sector in the solar energy installation
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and production. The Chinese sponsored and supported solar mini-grid stations in Jandola, Orakzai,
and Mohmand tribal districts are nearing completion, they will provide uninterrupted, cheap, green,
and clean energy.
Pakistan Solar Energy Market is expected to record a Compound Annual Growth Rate
(CAGR) of 2.5 percent from 2022 to 2027. Unfortunately, the Average Utilization Rate (AUR) of the
operational Solar PV plants is approximately 19 percent far from the over 95 percent utilization rate
in China, representing huge opportunities to be tapped. Therefore, both countries should extend
their cooperation in solar energy production as soon as possible. In Pakistan, the inadequacy of
power always leads to surging electricity tariffs and foreign exchange expenditure on imported
energy is aggravating the necessity for the country to be more independent in power generation.
Thus, solar energy cooperation between China and Pakistan is a must.
Currently, thermal power is still the main producer of electricity in Pakistan, accounting for 59
percent of the total installed capacity. Imported fuel has put a heavy burden on our treasury. Solar
PV is significantly cost-effective when compared to imported energy, LNG, and gas. According to
World Bank, Pakistan requires only 0.071 percent of its total land area, mainly in Baluchistan and
interior Sindh, to achieve the benefits of solar power.
It is estimated that complete transformation of the energy sector shifting from fossil fuel to
clean energy, mainly solar, will achieve miracles in the country. In this regard, the Chinese
companies have already shown keen interest to support Pakistan and its people alike for initiating
robust growth trend of Pakistan’s solar consumption.
(Source: Daily Times)

NO LIGHT MATTERS
Engr. Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui (Former Chairman of State Engineering Corporation)
In a major development, the government plans to use indigenous Thar coal, instead of
imported coal, for generation of 3,960MW.
The three power plants that would be shifted to indigenous coal are Sahiwal Coal Power
(Sahiwal), China Hub Coal Power (Hub) and Port Qasim Coal (Port Qasim, Karachi), each of
1,320MW installed capacity. It is indeed a landmark and timely decision since when implemented it
would reduce reliance on costly imported coal, and bring down electricity rates, resulting in energy
security and overall economic development.
Various measures have already been taken by the government in this direction. Consultants
have been appointed to work out feasibility of substitution of existing import-based fuel mix to Thar
coal. These power plants would require conversion of existing plant machinery partially, involving
lead-time and additional capital cost for the conversion, since coal-based power plants are custom-
designed and technology selected depends on coal analysis and characteristics. Also, the
government will develop Thar Rail Project, a 105km long rail link for bulk transportation of coal
from Thar coalfields to various power-plant destinations through main railway line at the New
Chhor station. The project (track and rolling stock) will be established on BOT basis.
Thar lignite (brown coal) is suitable for thermal power generation, and a series of integrated
mine-mouth power projects are being established. Two power plants of cumulative capacity of
990MW are operational. The pioneering project Engro Powergen Thar Coal of 660MW (2x330MW)
installed capacity, is successfully generating billions of units (kWh) of low-cost electricity on an
annual basis since July 2019, whereas Thar Energy Ltd (Hubco) of 330MW has been commissioned
this month and will achieve commercial operations soon. Both power plants, which are connected to
the national grid, are part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) energy programme.
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Today, Pakistan stands 7th in the list of top coal-rich countries of the world, with total
estimated coal reserves of 185 billion tonnes. But its global ranking is 19th with 3.38 billion tonnes
proven coal reserves and 22nd in coal extraction. Thar coalfield, spread over an area of 9,100 sq km
located in Tharparker District having 175.5 billion tonnes of assessed coal reserves, is known as the
16th largest coal reserve globally. When developed fully and effectively, Thar lignite coal could
generate 30,000MW for next hundred years or so. A total of 13 specific blocks having an area of 1,192
sq km have been allocated for development of mine-mouth power projects. Total estimated coal
reserves of these blocks are 40 billion tonnes, out of which 11.23 billion tonnes have been measured
and proven, whereas the remaining deposits are indicated or inferred.
Sindh Engro Coal Mining Co (SECMC) is engaged in coal mining from Block-II, one of the 13
blocks of Thar coalfields. Currently, SECMC extracts 3.8 million tonnes of lignite annually, which
will increase to 7.6 million tonnes of coal by end of this year, and further to 12.8 million tonnes in
near future. Under the coal off-take agreements, SECMC supplies lignite coal to Engro Powergen
Thar Coal and Thar Energy power plants, and has committed to making regular supplies of coal to
these power plants for a period of 30 years of plant life.
Total yearly requirement of these two mine-mouth power plants is about 6 million tonnes,
which works out to be 180 million tonnes for 30 years. Total estimated coal reserves at Block-II are
about a billion tonne, but so far, the measured and mineable reserves are 640 million tonnes. For
generating 3,960MW as per installed capacity of the three imported-coal-based power plants,
additional coal of 24 million tonnes will be required to be extracted from Thar Block-II to meet their
annual demand. This will be beyond the envisaged yearly mining capacity of SECMC, which has
also to supply coal to the 330MW project of Thal Nova Power Thar Ltd currently under construction
at Block-II, scheduled to generate electricity in 2024. SECMC has also signed an agreement with
Lucky Electric Power for delivery of 3.6 million tonnes of Thar coal annually for its 660MW power
plant at Bin Qasim (Karachi).
Another three blocks, namely Block-I, Block-V and Block-VI, have been allocated to other
international and local investors for coal exploitation and development, but unfortunately work on
these projects is progressing very slowly. Mine-mouth 1,320MW power project at Block-I of SSRL
Thar Coal is now in advanced stage of construction, but there is no progress on 1,320MW Thar Mine
Mouth Oracle Power Plant and Surface Mine project at Block-VI. Remaining nine Thar coal blocks
are currently available for investment.
At present, understanding about the nature of Thar coal is limited insofar as its physical
properties, chemical analysis, and behaviour are considered. Thar coal, which is classified as lignite-B
and subbituminous-A (ASTM classification) having heating value in the range of 6,244-11,054 BTU/lb,
is suitable for power generation. Lignite of similar character and quality is being used for power
generation on commercial scale in India, Germany, Hungary and Serbia. Its chemical composition and
heating values vary from block to block, which have not been largely tested in use. Coal at Block-II has
moisture 48.80 percent, ash 5.21 percent, sulphur 1.05 percent, fixed carbon 19.37 percent, and volatile
matter 25.57 percent, having heating value 5,780 BTU/lb. High moisture is a major contributor
restricting its transportation to long distances due to a variety of problems and risks.
According to experts, the best option for Thar coal is at the mine-mouth for power generation.
Coal, especially newly mined coal, emits methane, an inflammable gas when mixed with air and
liable to gas explosion in certain conditions. Thar coal having high moisture and moderate sulphur
content will be liable to create chemical action, particularly in summer, causing spontaneous
combustion, in spite of ventilation and thus is not suitable for long-distance movement. However,
transportation of Thar coal by trucks to Karachi (Port Qasim) is said to be feasible. Handling and
transportation to long distances of Thar coal, besides presenting adverse environmental effects, can
result in corrosion to railway wagons and other coal carriers of steel.
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A viable and sustainable option would be using major coal reserves at Lakhra and adjoining
areas in southern Sindh, such as Sonda-Jherruk, Metting-Jhimpir and Badin, which all are suitable
for power generation, instead of Thar coal.
The developed Lakhra coalmines have total estimated coal resources of 1.33 billion tonnes of
lignite and sub-bituminous coal of which 244 million tonnes are measured and mineable. Current
extraction of Lakhra coal is about 3 million tonnes per year which can be enhanced progressively.
For over 20 years a 150MW power plant operated by Lakhra Power Generation Co in public sector
had been generating electricity using Lakhra coal, which was shutdown indefinitely in 2018 in the
wake of its privatisation. Lakhra coal, which has low moisture content--about 30 percent-- can be
transported to the existing imported coal-based power plant sites without risks and additional
expenditure on creating infrastructure. Also, the washed coal of Lakhra is more feasible to save the
environments as it produces less emissions.
It is imperative therefore that a detailed techno-economic feasibility study of the proposed use
of indigenous coal at upcountry power plants using imported coal be carried out ensuring regular
and reliable supply of coal to identified power plants. It is considered a pre-requisite for
implementation of indigenous coal replacing imported coal on long-term basis. The nation can no
longer afford expensive experiences with Thar coal. Our memory is still haunted by the
controversial Underground Coal Gasification (UCG) project to generate100MW (2x50MW) by
December 2010, which proved to be unsuccessful even after spending more than a decade and
making huge investments, and thus plan for generating 1,000MW electricity at Thar Bloc-V using the
UCG technology remains a pipedream.
(Source: Money Matter)

ENERGY SECTOR REFORMS

In a letter addressed to the government, major politicians, and decision-makers, over two
dozen independent experts from the energy, education, security, and monetary sectors proposed
various reforms required to be introduced as soon as possible by the government. The experts
suggest immediate overhauling of governance while building institutional capacity, as excessive
government involvement is the central cause of the present state of af f airs in the energy sector.
According to them, for the sector to function properly, it must be decentralised and deregulated.
Following is the text of the letter:
Pakistan is presently in the midst of one of the worst economic crises in its history. High
inflation, large twin deficits, dwindling forex reserves, fast weakening currency, and elevated
Eurobond yields were all symptoms of an economy in severe distress.
This is the consensus of this open letter written to all the politicians and the authorities by the
country’s eminent economist, former and present heads of prestigious institutions, and technocrats.
Pakistan’s external and fiscal finances are crumbling under the overwhelming weight of
energy costs. The share of imports, which was 43 percent of total primary energy supply in FY2020,
has been continuously increasing. At more than $26 billion, energy imports (oil, LNG, and coal)
were the single biggest contributor to Pakistan’s current account deficit of $17.4 billion in FY2022. It
is tragic that a country endowed with large fossil fuel reserves and huge renewable resources meets
more than two-fifth of its energy needs through imports.
Decades of misguided policies have fostered energy inefficiency and favoured imports over
development of indigenous energy resources. Misgovernance and policy failures have created a
monster in the form of circular debt which has devoured trillions in budgetary resources and yet
there is an outstanding circular debt stock of over Rs3.2 trillion in power and gas sectors combined.
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National dignity and security are compromised with each economic bailout that we seek from
our close friends, international donors, and multilateral lenders. As the nation celebrates the
diamond jubilee of its independence, we must take a moment to introspect as to why our country
has failed to achieve economic sovereignty in the last 75 years?
Fortunately, the energy sector has the potential to swing from being the biggest burden on the
country’s economy to propelling it towards economic security and prosperity.
This course reversal, however, will require unflinching commitment by our leaders and
decision-makers to energy sector reforms in the face of inevitable resistance from the current
beneficiaries and deeply-entrenched vested interests. Just as national security transcends politics,
there is a dire need for non-partisan commitment and support for energy sector reforms. Below we
offer a high-level blueprint for the critical reforms to transform the energy sector into a vibrant
contributor to power the economic and social development dreams of our nation.
Overhauling governance & building institutional capacity
Excessive government involvement is the central cause of the present state of affairs of the
energy sector. For the sector to function properly, it must be decentralised and deregulated. The
energy ministry’s role must be restricted to policy making and not actually running the energy
sector entities. The energy ministry needs to be staffed with professionals with relevant sector
knowledge and experience.
NEPRA and OGRA must be turned into first class regulatory bodies manned with
professionals. There should be a formal mechanism for coordination between the two regulators and
considering the growing convergence in the energy sector with increased electrification, a transition
towards unified energy regulator may also be considered.
The top commissioners/members must be appointed based on their professional competence,
integrity, and relevant experience instead of being political nominees.
The institutional capacity of NEPRA and OGRA should be enhanced making them more
progressive and strong regulators entrusted with ensuring supply of reliable and affordable energy,
while maintaining high standards of efficiency in the system.
Public Sector Entities (PSEs) that are not to be privatised should be made autonomous, not just
on paper but in reality. Fully autonomous integrated petroleum state companies are very successful
in other parts of the world while competing with the private sector at equal footing and can
undertake strategic energy projects, which the private sector will shy away from. So, while most
PSEs can be privatised, some may have to remain within the state domain but without bureaucratic
controls.
Energy conservation
Immediate relief to Pakistan’s external and fiscal finances can only come from adherence to
strict energy conservation measures. A five percent energy savings would reduce the energy import
bill by 12 percent or over $3.0 billion. The ongoing turmoil in the global energy markets is taking a
heavy toll on even the most secure economies in the world forcing them to adopt unprecedented
measures to reduce energy consumption. Disregard for energy efficiency has made wasteful
consumption endemic in the system.
The following instant measures can help achieve meaningful reduction in energy
consumption: i) introduction of daylight saving timing by moving clocks forward by at least one
hour, ii) closure of shopping centres by 7.00 PM and restaurants/wedding halls by 10.00 PM, iii)
closure of bank branches by 2.00 PM, iv) closure of all public/private offices at 5.00 PM, v) reduction
of school working days to four per week with longer hours per working day, vi) keeping minimum
temperature setting for air-conditioning at 26 degrees in all public and private offices, and vii)
switching off alternate streetlights.
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While there will be resistance and push back from traders and businesses against the energy
conservation measures proposed above, the successful enforcement of health measures during the
first year of COVID-19 proved that if there is strong political will, the governments can ensure
compliance with mobility restrictions and early market closures and people adjust their shopping
habits without causing any loss to the businesses.
Harnessing indigenous resources The need for exploiting Pakistan’s domestic energy potential
cannot be overemphasised. Imports met 80 percent of oil, 73 percent of coal, and 24 percent of
natural gas supplies of the country in FY2020. Domestic natural gas production peaked at 4,250
MMCFD in FY2012 and has fallen by more than 21 percent over the last 10 years. Domestic oil
production peaked at 94,500 BPD in FY2015 and has since dropped by 19 percent. Bureaucratic
delays, security risks and dissuasive wellhead pricing regime are major obstacles to increasing
domestic production from existing gas fields and to more aggressive exploration activities.
Reallocating unused gas commitments, encouraging third party sales at bilaterally negotiated prices
and increasing wellhead prices for older fields and tight gas reserves can significantly increase
natural gas production in the short term.
Public sector companies are the biggest players in the upstream oil and gas sector but there
has been a noticeable lack of effort by these companies to arrest the country’s rapidly declining
production streams. This slackness has, in part, resulted from unwarranted interventions and often
unfair actions by accountability institutions, which have hurt, and in some cases killed, the morale
and motivation and initiative at public sector institutions. We must regain the trust and confidence
of public sector decision-makers to encourage them to take initiatives and risks without having to
worry too much about the consequences of their decisions. The government should form
independent committees comprising professionals with relevant knowledge and expertise who
should evaluate complaints of indiscretions and only cases approved for further investigations by
these committees should be investigated further by the relevant accountability institutions.
Expansion of Thar coalfields should be a national priority. Having potential reserves of over
175 billion tonnes, Thar coal alone can substitute the country’s coal imports of over 19 million tonnes
costing almost $3.0 billion annually. With international coal prices at record levels, Thar coal can help cut
the cost of production for the large coal consumers, namely, cement and power generation. Increasing
mining capacity, setting up coal processing plants and connecting Thar with the Pakistan Railways
network should be carried out on a fast-track basis. Gasification of Thar coal can help compensate for
declining domestic natural gas supplies with increasing risks to local fertiliser production. All these
projects can be carried out by the private sector and the government simply needs to act as a facilitator to
help the private sector capitalise on the opportunities that Thar coal holds.
Pakistan is blessed with huge potential of renewable energy resources including hydro, wind
and solar. The country holds over 40,000 MW of unharnessed hydroelectric potential. While
hydroelectric plants require several years to construct, solar and wind projects can be developed
within 6 to 12 months and also in a modular manner to fit more precisely with the demand
projections. The Gharo-Ketibandar corridor alone has an exploitable power generation potential of
more than 60,000 MW. Chaghi (Balochistan) also possesses excellent wind and solar potential.
According to the World Bank, utilising less than one-tenth of one percent of the country’s area for
solar PV (photovoltaic) power generation would meet Pakistan’s current electricity demand.
Moreover, achieving a least cost electricity mix in Pakistan would require a rapid expansion of VRE
(solar/wind), reaching at least 20 percent of installed capacity by 2025, and at least 30 percent by
2030, as per World Bank study.
Conversion of existing wind farms to wind/solar hybrid models should be allowed where it is
economically feasible. Expansion of rooftop solar installations can be further accelerated through
financing schemes and ensuring faster net-metering approvals. Private investment in export-
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oriented green hydrogen projects should also be encouraged by offering fiscal incentives and
development of energy parks in suitable coastal locations.
Setting up a state-of-the-art refinery with integrated petrochemical complex is another key
requirement given the present redundant inefficient refinery infrastructure and the need for
substitution of imported petroleum products. Refining of imported crude saves dollars and can even
earn foreign exchange through exports as refined products sell at premium to crude oil. Global
shortage of petroleum products has seen record price levels for diesel and gasoline in recent months
resulting in added burden on Pakistan’s fragile external account.
Electrification of energy use
Out of the 80.6 million TOEs of Pakistan’s primary energy consumption in FY2020, 50 percent
went into electricity generation, 21 percent in transportation and 11 percent in the residential sector.
With rapid technological advancements, electricity’s role is rapidly expanding in meeting the energy
needs for transport, process heating demand in industries, and space and water heating.
Electrification of energy use and increased reliance on domestic resources, in particular from
renewable resources, for electricity generation shall reduce the energy imports, while contributing to
the country’s GDP growth.
China’s Shenzhen city offers a model for conversion of its entire public transport system of
buses and taxis to electric vehicles in a short period of time. The same can be replicated in major
cities of Pakistan beginning with Karachi to address the lack of decent public transport and growing
pollution. Hybrid wind/solar farms could be set up to power the electric buses by wheeling
electricity through KE’s network.
Given the rapidly shrinking domestic gas production, high UFG in distribution networks, low
efficiency of natural gas appliances and to encourage the shift towards electrification, the supply of
piped gas to households should be phased out gradually. Only less than 30 percent of the country’s
population and that too in urban areas, has access to pipeline gas. The rest relies on biomass, wood,
and LPG.
Use of natural gas should be eventually restricted to power generation and industry. Time-
bound plans should be put in place to shift residential consumption of natural gas to electricity or
LPG and conversion of all public transport and passenger cars to Electric Vehicles (EVs).
Energy efficiency and removal of price anomalies
From production to consumption, Pakistan’s entire energy chain is riddled with inefficiencies
and wasteful practices. Abysmally inefficient power plants continue to operate, wasting precious
and fast-dwindling natural gas reserves. Large quantities of diesel are consumed in moving
petroleum products by road and ironically even water is supplied to many parts of large cities
including Karachi via tankers. Building code and appliance energy standards are not enforced.
Moreover, energy price anomalies, especially the supply of massively subsidised natural gas to
households and industry, encourages wasteful use of the commodity.
To reduce energy inefficiency in captive power generation, minimum thermal efficiency
standards for different fuels should be defined and enforced. Moreover, a uniform gas tariff should
be charged to all natural-gas-based IPPs (independent power producers) except those being
supplied by low BTU gas fields.
Oil pipeline networks should be expanded to reduce road transportation of petroleum
products. Moreover, water supply infrastructure in the country’s large cities should be revamped to
ensure supply of water via pipelines.
A national effort is required to create awareness and enhance capacity for energy efficiency in
the construction industry. In addition, development and enforcement of new efficiency standards in
manufacturing household and industrial appliances to reduce consumptive load requirements.
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Prices are the biggest motivator for energy conservation and efficiency improvement efforts.
On average, the natural gas price for domestically produced gas is about 50 percent lower than the
cost of supply and much cheaper than the imported LNG and other energy substitutes. Abysmally
low gas tariffs for domestic categories encourage wasteful consumption by households that
constitute the biggest consumer category. Industrial tariffs for domestically produced gas are also
very low and hence provide little incentive to energy efficiency.
There is an immediate need for rationalisation of natural gas tariffs by implementing
Weighted Average Cost of Gas (WACOG) and eliminating all explicit and implicit natural gas
subsidies. This will help arrest the build-up of natural gas sector circular debt and encourage energy
conservation and efficiency. Only targeted subsidies should be provided to deserving households
through subsistence schemes.
Deregulation and privatisation
Competitive markets, if designed and operated properly, perform much better than regulated
industries. Pakistan has a successful track record of deregulation and privatisation. With improving
service standards and efficiency, consumers turn out to be the biggest beneficiaries. Telecom and
banking sectors are clear examples. K-Electric, the only privatised power utility, reduced its T&D
(transmission and distribution) losses from 37.8 percent in FY2005 to 17.5 percent in FY2021.
Deregulation of price controls and privatisation of energy sector PSEs is the most logical path
to achieving energy sector sustainability in Pakistan. Unwarranted fears about the cost of stranded
assets to the government are used to stymie progress towards competitive energy markets. The
Competitive Trading Bilateral Contract Market (CTBCM) model must be implemented in letter and
spirit. The gas markets should also be opened up on a similar model.
Transmission and distribution is the weakest link in Pakistan’s energy supply chain. High
T&D losses and billing under-collection are the biggest contributors to the circular debt problem.
Large investment is required in energy transmission and distribution (both in electricity and natural
gas sectors) for rebuilding, modernising and expansion of energy networks in a short period of time.
This is a task better left to the private sector.
Let’s make it Pakistan’s last economic crisis
While Pakistan has faced recurring economic crises throughout its 75-year history, the
frequency and intensity of crises have been increasing in recent decades.
Moreover, there is a deepening sense of national despondency that we as a country are falling
behind our regional peers that embarked on the journey as independent states at the same time as
Pakistan or even later.
Pakistan is not a ‘resource-poor’ country but it has certainly been ‘leadership-poor’. All
stakeholders in the system must realise that time is not on our side and we must set our house in
order before it is too late. Pakistan’s energy sector has the potential to pull the country out of the
economic tailspin. Let’s make the current economic crisis our last one by transforming the energy
sector along the lines suggested in this note.

(Source: Various Newspapers)

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Essays
THE SCOURGE OF MOB VIOLENCE
Umair Rasheed (PhD student at University of Illinois)
Mob attacks have risen exponentially in Pakistan.Compared to a mere seven cases from late
19th Century (when the blasphemy law was instituted by the British colonial administration) till the
late 1980s, rights watchdogs have reported at least 1,800 cases in the post-1986 period where mobs or
vigilantes targetted racialised neighbors, religious and sectarian minorities, liberal academics,
bloggers and workplace superiors.
From a policy standpoint, mob or vigilante action is often seen as a problem of law and order,
i.e. there is a state apparatus that ideally ought to prevent such action from occurring in the first
place (by producing law abiding citizens) or come into action against mobs and vigilantes post facto
(involving the capacities of the judicial and policing apparatuses). Those of us who wouldn’t mind
entering into a Hobbesian social contract with the state would much rather have the first course of
action prevail. In the absence of ideal circumstances, one would also settle for the second as the next
best option.
The problem with such a policy-centred perspective is that it operates at an abstract level,
whereby a normative citizenry needs state protection against proverbial mobs or vigilantes. From a
sociological perspective, however, we must reckon with questions like what issues lead to violent
mobs or vigilantism; what kind of actors are involved in such action as perpetrators and victims;
how do the perpetrators and victims relate to the state and its nationalism on the one hand and the
global economic and political order, on the other; and, last but not the least, why violent mobs and
vigilantism became more pronounced in the post-1986 context compared to earlier years.
Asking such questions helps demystify violent mobs and vigilante action and frame it in more
accurate and useful terms. For instance, looking into the social composition of mobs and personal
biographies of vigilantes and comparing those to the rest of the society reveals that such action is
neither irrational nor spontaneous. Also, there is no necessary evolutionary path along which one
can trace mob or vigilantism as lagging behind purportedly more modern and, as framed in some
narratives, ‘civilised’ forms of collective action like peaceful assemblies and demonstrations, legally-
sanctioned forms of labour strikes or work stoppages and petitioning etc.
Where early research in sociology of collective behaviour had analysed mobs and vigilantes as
irrational, undisciplined, spontaneous and fundamentally opposed to civil action, subsequently,
these categorisations have been dismissed and attributed either to the elitism of those studying mobs
and vigilantes or to the limitations of their analytical frameworks. Thus, mobs and vigilantes are not
irrational per se, it is just that they demonstrate a kind of rationality that does not sit well with the
sensibilities of the researcher or analyst. Similarly, in early scholarly analyses and in much of the
public discourse around mobs and vigilantes to date, the prevailing analytical framework continues
to be informed by assumptions of modernisation theory.
Within such a framework, liberal democratic values and political secularism are considered
the norm against which all other kinds of public values and actions – that flow from such values –
are to be studied. The drawback is that such a framework mostly sees and recognises purportedly
modern forms of social and political organisation associated with liberal democratic values. Thus,
peaceful assemblies and demonstrations are recognisable not only because they’re peaceful and
within constitutionally prescribed parameters but also because they are organised by ‘legitimate’
actors like political parties, NGOs, charities and professional associations etc.
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Mobs and vigilantes appear spontaneous not because they lack any organisational or
disciplinary mechanisms per se, but because those mechanisms mostly aren’t taken into account in
the prevailing frameworks. Overtime, however, scholars of collective action have developed a range
of concepts like ‘weapons of the weak’ or ‘subaltern consciousness’ to explicate such mechanisms.
These scholars have demonstrated that the purportedly irrational or spontaneous types of action
(mobs, crowds, vigilantes etc) are just another kind of civil action, with their specific forms of
organisation and discipline, undertaken mostly (but not always) by actors lacking the resources or
capacity to undertake the purportedly rational forms of action. These works have also highlighted
that those not able to access or form archetypical modern organisations like parties, unions or
professional associations, etc, engage in collective action through kin-, friendship- or space-based
networks.
These networks are based on specific organising logics which may not always be legible from
the standpoint of distant observers whether those are researchers, public officials, elite politicians or
media pundits. It is also important to not exceptionalise mobs or vigilantes as always distinct from
familiar and normatively desirable forms of collective action associated with political parties,
electoral politics, professional associations etc. The two may be symbiotically linked.
How do these observations fit the Pakistani case? Firstly, we must take into account that while
mob violence and vigilantism around blasphemy have increased exponentially in the post-1980s
context, contentious and violent forms of collective action are neither specific to the issue of
blasphemy nor irrelevant to the political order in the country in the pre-1980s.
From the anti-Ahmadiyya riots of the 1950s to the labour unrest in the ’60s and early ’70s and
the jalao, gherao and pahya jam (burn, siege and suspension of movement), contentious forms of
action were endemic to the pre-1980s political order in Pakistan. The one constant that stands out in
all these episodes but isn’t often factored in adequately in analyses of mobs or vigilantes is the role
of the state. State apparatus cannot always meet the Weberian ideal type of having complete
monopoly over violence. Most state apparatuses in the post-colonial contexts operate less as
Hobbesian leviathans and more like the description presented by political sociologist Charles Tilly –
that of organised racketeers who produce the threats against whom they then offer protection.
That said, the periods of relative calm and their disruption with episodic collective violence in
the form of riots, mobs and vigilante action highlight the importance of the conditions under which
the need arises for coercive state institutions like police and paramilitary forces to assert their control
over means of collective violence.
Secondly, where blasphemy mobs and vigilantism have increased exponentially in the post-
1980s, we must also contextualise this rise in the broader political and social changes that
transpired during the period. Arguably the most important of these changes has to do with the
transformation of the civil society – the analytical space between the state and the family where
associational life proliferates and individuals join and identify with various collectives that aren’t
prescribed to them at birth like their nationality or their sub-national identities. The state
repression against the organic struggles of workers, peasants, and ethno-nationalist minorities and
the state facilitation of the religious right in the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, are well documented. These
two processes laid the foundation for the post-1980s civil society dominated by religious identities
and affiliations on the one hand and religiously-informed forms of organisations (religious parties,
seminary- and mosque-based networks and associations, philanthropies and charities etc). The
post-80s economic changes must also be factored in to get to the social whole from which mob or
vigilante action emerges. Coincidentally, the decade that marked the passage of reforms targetting
the religious minorities was also the decade when the Pakistani state signed on to the IMF-WB
funded Structural Adjustment Programmes that continue to be the linchpin of our macro-
economic ‘stability’ to this day.
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The Pakistani state had been reliant upon foreign loans and aid from day one, but the ’80s
programme was qualitatively different since it came as part of the Washington Consensus around
neoliberal economic policies under which formerly Third World states like Pakistan were pushed to
‘reconfigure.’ Reconfigure here mostly being a euphemism for active withdrawal of state-led
developmental or social protection and welfare-based policies in favour of greater role of the market
in managing social life through trade liberalisation, deregulation of key sectors like media, banking,
telecommunications and privatisation of major state-owned enterprises as well as provisioning of
public good. The consequences of these policies have been wide-ranging. The neoliberal economic
mantra has led to unprecedented economic inequalities, concentration of extreme wealth at the top
and fiscal tightening for the rest, including not just those on the bottom of the hierarchy (the urban
poor, landless rural labour etc) but also the proverbial middle classes who had prospered across the
globe in the post-World War II era all the way till the fall of the Berlin Wall as a result of what
Marxist geographer David Harvey categorised as “a web of political and social constraints” on the
free and, more often than not, destructive forces of market and capital.
Thus, in the post-1980s environment in which mobs and vigilantes have gained an oversized
public presence, there have occurred two kinds of reconfigurations in Pakistan. The reconfiguration
of the civil society, making religious identities and organisations into the glue that binds together the
social life. This is evident not just insofar as we have religious political parties, most recent of whom
was formed singularly on the issue of blasphemy, but also in the sense that all mainstream parties in
the country now situate their politics with reference to religious belonging, in one form or the other
(Islam ka qila, Islami riasat, muashara, nizam, are some of the most generic phrases and ideals). It is
evident also on multiple occasions when blasphemy mobs have included men affiliated with non-
religious parties (Mashal Khan case).
The parallel reconfiguration of the economy has made the formal state and its regulatory
apparatuses into a relatively minor player among market interests of the economic elites that operate
as cartels and oligopolies. This is evident in the state’s inability to manage the economy without
reliance upon transnational financial institutions and the state’s various foreign patrons. The result
has been widespread economic precarity, among not just the income- and asset-poor households but
also those previously safely cushioned into middle class professions.
The first reconfiguration has made religious identity and its associated communal solidarities
into the master signifier that orients the sense of self and of the other for the perpetrators of
vigilantism, the victims as well as many bystanders. However, borrowing from the psychoanalyst
Jacques Lacan, the master signifier of religion in the Pakistani case is in itself primarily an empty
signifier, insofar as it doesn’t have any essential content of its own to which the people in question
relate to. It is the second reconfiguration, that of the economy, that provides the material content
to fill the emptiness of the master signifier insofar as religious identities, values and the
accompanying forms of collective action are shaped by as they then shape the actually existing
social and economic relations.
For instance, a database of media reports on blasphemy cases maintained by the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan shows that at least half the cases documented in 2014 through 2016
occurred in informally-developed urban and peri-urban neighborhoods in north and central Punjab
districts. One such neighborhood in the periphery of Lahore where this author conducted fieldwork
in the summer of 2021 had been the site of significant demographic shifts in the post-1980s period,
bringing together people from different kin-, communal- and (middle- to lower- middle and
working) class- backgrounds. The social geography of the neighborhood suggests an overbearing
presence of communal organisations (there were five mosques and four churches in the immediate
vicinity of the street where the blasphemy mob action took place against Christian teenager Patras
Masih in 2018), and an underwhelming presence of the formal state: the nearest police station is
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away on the Shahdara main road and the lone higher-secondary public school is overshadowed by
the various private schools and tuition centres.
The two major political parties (the PML-N and the PTI) were operational in the
neighborhood not through any formal organisational structure, but through economically
influential patrons. Meanwhile, the perpetrators of the 2018 mob violence had been organising in
the neighborhood under the banner of the TLP. Based on a series of interviews, the mob action of
2018 could be reconstructed as follows: it took place not immediately but after about a month of
the original incident (sharing on Facebook of an image deemed blasphemous). When the ‘trigger’
incident took place, the mob did not have unanimity, as one would expect based on the accounts
that present mobs as irrational collectives. On the contrary, there were those (mostly shopkeepers
from nearby streets) who insisted on immediate reparations in the form of expulsion and
threatened with lynching if their demand wasn’t complied with. There were also those (a prayer
leader and an MPhil student at a major public university) who preferred appeal to legal and
juridical apparatuses of the state.
This single case corroborates the framing of mob action in recent sociological literature
discussed above as organised, albeit under its own specific form of rationality. It also shows that the
kind of organiaation and rationality one witnesses in Pakistani blasphemy mobs has less to do with
the issue of blasphemy per se, and much more to do with the way in which the state and the
economy have reconfigured in the post-1980s environment and have shaped social life in urban- and
urbanising settings.
(Source: TNS)

CONSTITUTIONALIZING STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Critical Review of Indian Delimitation Commission in IIOJK
Dr Asma Shakir Khawaja
The demographic changes in the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK)
through the Delimitation Commission manifest the nefarious designs of Hindutva supremacy in the
region. The move not only disempowers the indigenous Kashmiri Muslims, but also intensifies
Islamophobic trends within the Indian society.
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Mr. Narendra Modi has created a
perception of “peace as a zero-sum game,” among the Indian public. The BJP proponents have used
lack of communication, false perceptions and hypernationalism, to create a conducive environment
for Hindutva extremism by employing ideology, political capital, realpolitik, and geopolitics in
India. This has reduced their appetite for peaceful coexistence with all alternate voices or ideologies.
The parochial Hindutva approach has made Pakistan and Islamophobia a political dividend for
them, an election winning slogan. It would be pertinent to mention that Islamophobia is used as a
strategic weapon by the BJP leadership to not only further their Hindutva policies but also to
delegitimize the Kashmiri freedom struggle by equating it with the rhetoric of “Islamic terrorism.”
Despite deploying nine hundred thousand occupying armed forces, BJP’s Kashmir policy aims at
diluting the intensity of the conflict through state-sponsored terrorism, while applying forceful
constitutional changes, ethnic and religious cleansing, creating fear, political remapping, use of
excessive torture/violence, human rights violations, economic terrorism, identity politics and
electoral engineering.
Using the aforementioned tactics, BJP is trying to fulfil the promises made to radical Hindu
voters to bring IIOJK under Hindu rule. The illegal occupation and colonization of IIOJK by India
complements their ideology of greater India (Akhand Bharat) and satisfies their territorial definition
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of nationalism. Historically, BJP has always been critical of Congress for their inability to dissolve
and dilute the Kashmir conflict. Here it would be noteworthy to mention that before 2014, the
political presence of BJP was negligible in IIOJK. However, it was only after creating a working
relationship with Mehbooba Mufti’s Peoples Domestic Party, BJP found little space in the political
structure of IIOJK. But soon after the revocation of article 370, Mehbooba Mufti openly criticized the
decision, leading towards her house arrest by BJP along with other Kashmiri leadership. After losing
all political sympathizers in IIOJK and realizing the inability of Hindu vote bank to bring BJP into
power, BJP strategized the political remapping of the region to facilitate the Hindu population,
encourage Hindu vote bank and construct space for BJP in the political structure of IIOJK. Such non-
democratic, radical and authoritarian orientation of BJP is the reason that international institutions
like V-Dem, now consider India as an electoral autocracy which is continuously declining further on
democratic values and scales.
Despite deploying nine hundred thousand occupying armed forces, BJP’s Kashmir policy
aims at diluting the intensity of the conflict through state-sponsored terrorism, while applying,
forceful constitutional changes, ethnic and religious cleansing, creating fear, political remapping, use
of excessive torture/violence, human rights violations, economic terrorism, identity politics and
electoral engineering.
Against the will and wishes of the indigenous Kashmiri population, the BJP government
constituted a three-member Delimitation Commission on IIOJK, headed by Justice Ranjana Desai in
May 2020, to materialize the BJP’s political ambitions in IIOJK. Only a day before the given deadline,
on May 5, 2022, the commission issued final orders of delimitation of political constituencies of the
IIOJK, published in The Gazette of India. There also were two other ex-officio members, Chief
Election Commissioner, Sushil Chandra and Chief Electoral Officer of Jammu and Kashmir, K.K.
Sharma of the said commission. The Commission also worked with five Lok Sabha MPs from IIOJK,
nominated by the Lok Sabha Speaker as Associate Members. Those members were Farooq Abdullah,
Mohammad Akbar Lone from National Conference, Hasnain Masoodi, Union Minister of State in
the Prime Minister’s Office, and Jitendra Singh and Jugal Kishore Sharma of BJP. Indicating the
manipulative politics of BJP, the commission consisted of only likeminded puppet members and was
neither inclusive nor democratic.
This Delimitation Commission can be compared with the Radcliffe Award, which was
constituted by the Britain for the demarcation of Sub-continent. However, the decisions of the said
award only benefitted India, leading South Asia towards the deadliest genocide (Jammu Genocide
was one of them), which caused brutal killings of millions of innocent people and as a result,
millions of people were displaced. It is noteworthy that history does not change its course and if
such political demarcation could not bring any good for the region in 1947, then one would be living
in a fool’s paradise to assume that it would bring any good now. Such politically motivated moves
triggered by self-interest, while ignoring the rights and demands of indigenous people aiming at
silencing their voices, can only harm the already fragile and volatile security structure of South Asia.
The Delimitation Commission recommended seven additional constituencies, six for Jammu,
and one for Kashmir. As a result, the total number of seats in the state assembly of IIOJK are
increased from 83 to 90.
Review: Decisions of Delimitation Commission
The Delimitation Commission recommended seven additional constituencies: six for Jammu,
and one for Kashmir. As a result, the total number of seats in the state assembly of IIOJK are
increased from 83 to 90. This will increase the number of seats in Jammu to 43 from 37 earlier, and
that in the Kashmir Valley to 47 from 46 earlier. The fact should not be ignored that the only seat in
the Kashmir Valley that has been created is in frontier Kupwara district, which is a stronghold of
Sajad Gani Lone’s led People’s Conference, a former BJP ally. Interestingly, the state assembly of
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IIOJK has 24 symbolic seats for Azad Jammu & Kashmir which remain vacant. Ironically,
Delimitation Commission’s biases and malafide intentions are substantiated by the fact that this
controversial commission considered the average population of an assembly constituency in the
Muslim majority Kashmir valley to be 1.4 lac and in Hindu majority Jammu region, to be 1.2 lac.
The delimitation notification mainly focuses on reorganization of the parliamentary
constituencies, such as the five Indian Lok Sabha seats are made up of exactly 18 assembly
constituencies each, taking the total number to 90; reservation of nine assembly seats for Scheduled
Tribes,1 six in Jammu and three in Kashmir; and removal of the regional distinction between Jammu
and Kashmir and treating it as one, as is reflected in the combining of Anantnag region in Kashmir
with Rajouri and Poonch in Jammu to create Anantnag-Rajouri as a parliamentary constituency.
Ironically, the commission made this decision only to facilitate BJP as it has considerable following
in these Hindu majority areas and disempowers ethnic Kashmiri Muslims. They also recommended
that the state assembly of IIOJK will have at least two members (at least one of them should be a
woman) from Kashmiri migrant community. This political engineering only highlights the
desperation of BJP leadership to seek maximum seats in the forthcoming elections. Various political
analysts have also stated that these modifications only aim at facilitating the Hindutva proponents
under the patronage of BJP.
The increase of assembly seats of the Jammu region is considered as a move to increase the
Hindu representation in the state assembly.
The increase of assembly seats of Jammu region is considered as a move to increase the Hindu
representation in the state assembly. This move becomes more controversial when on the one hand,
the Jammu region with 44 percent share in the population of IIOJK, gets 48 percent seats in the state
assembly and on the other hand Kashmir valley with 56 percent of the total population only gets 52
percent share in assembly seats. Moreover, Kashmir Valley has thirteen hundred thousand more
population than Jammu as per the census of 2011. It is apparent that if BJP repeats the history of
assembly elections of 2014 and manages to politically conquer the Jammu region through radical
Hindu vote bank, it may become the single largest party in the state assembly through unfair means
and political remapping. The Kashmir Valley’s electoral politics is a tug of war between National
Conference, PDP, Peoples’ Conference, Congress and others while All Parties Hurriyat Conference
boycotts the elections.
Traditionally, the right to vote was only restricted to the state subjects in the whole region of
IIOJK, however, this Delimitation Commission has suggested to extend this exclusive right to non-
state subjects. This move is not only a violation of the rights of indigenous Kashmiri population but
also facilitates Indian government to alter the political realities. This move is not only in violation of
the international law but also in violation of the UN resolution regarding Kashmir and Simla
Agreement.
BJP’s politics of changing the names of cities and towns to create a false link with Hindu
religious scriptures has been adopted through this Delimitation Commission as well. The
delimitation order changed old names of the constituencies of state assembly and claim that it was
on popular demand. The commission renamed Tangmarg as Gulmarg, Zoonimar is Zaidibal,
Sonwar is now Lal Chowk, Padder is Padder-Nagseni, Kathua North is Jasrota, Kathua South is
Kathua, Khour is Chhamb, Mahore is Gulabhgarh and Darhal is Budhal. Changing names is also a
part of the strategy of disengagement with their Islamic past to tarnish the identity of indigenous
people. Almost all colonial powers adopted this as a tactic in the sub-continent to prolong and
sustain their illegal occupation.
Response by Political Parties of IIOJK
Under the disguise of administrative measures, this politically motivated act was criticized by
the political parties of IIOJK. The chief of PDP, Ms. Mehbooba Mufti expressed her concerns and
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stated, “The Delimitation Commission has overlooked the basis of population and acted as per their
wish. We outrightly reject it. We don’t trust it.” She rightly called the commission as an “extension
of BJP.” National Conference’s chief spokesperson, Tanvir Sadiq stated that the Delimitation
Commission’s suggestions to redraw the political map “will disempower the people of Kashmir.”
The people’s Alliance for GOPKAR Declaration (PAGD), a political alliance of five regional political
parties of IIOJK, headed by Farooq Abdullah, criticized the move and mentioned how the
commission has “worked beyond its mandate,” to propose, “sweeping changes,” which will “alter
the demography” of the occupied region. The GOPKAR Alliance is campaigning for autonomy of
the occupied region by restoring the special status along with Article 35A. A senior CPI (M) leader,
M.Y Tarigami stated, “In the long run, this exercise is bound to disempower the people of Jammu
and Kashmir.” The spokesperson of National Conference, Mr. Imran Nabi Dar said, “The very
exercise of the Delimitation Commission is constitutionally suspect. The commission has completely
ignored the important and only parameter of population in the exercise.” Sajad Lone, the head of
People’s Conference, and a former ally of BJP, stated that the Delimitation Commission has
“discriminated against Kashmir.” He further added, “Over the last six decades, Kashmir’s share of
assembly increased from 43 to 47 while Jammu’s share rose from 30 to 43.” After analyzing the
reaction of these political parties, one wonders how can BJP establish its whole premise of popular
demand in complete contradiction to the ground realities.
The people’s Alliance for GOPKAR Declaration (PAGD), a political alliance of five regional
political parties of IIOJK, headed by Farooq Abdullah, criticized the move and mentioned how the
commission has “worked beyond its mandate,” to propose, “sweeping changes,” which will “alter
the demography” of the occupied region.
Pakistan’s Position
While responding to this illegal action of Indian government, the government of Pakistan has
called Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad and expressed concerns through a diplomatic letter.
The letter emphasized that “the ulterior motive of the Indian government was evident from the fact
that under the garb of so-called delimitation, the representation of Muslims in the re-designated
constituencies had been reduced to their disadvantage. This shattered the rationale pushed by the
Indian government that the ‘delimitation effort’ was aimed to ’empower’ the local population.
However, in reality, the new electoral boundaries would further disempower, marginalize, and
divide the people of the occupied territory. It would only pave the way for installing yet another
puppet regime backed by the BJP-RSS nexus.”
The delimitation notification by the commission only indicates BJP’s manipulative mindset
aimed at diluting the significance of Muslim vote bank in IIOJK. It reflects their shortsightedness to
only serve their self-interests at any cost. These acts are only to strengthen the Indian occupation of
Jammu and Kashmir through silencing Kashmiri Muslims. Silencing the alternate discourse is one of
the basic tools of oppression used by the BJP government. Consequently, India went down eight
positions on the Freedom of Speech Index and is now on 150th rank. A famous Kashmiri journalist,
Mr. Iftikhar Gilani, rightly called this move as “Gerrymandering.’
It would be pertinent to write that such unconstitutional changes and disempowering
indigenous Muslim population of IIOJK will only worsen the situation. Kashmiri diaspora and
Kashmiris living in Azad Jammu and Kashmir should raise their voice at the international
institutions and forums to highlight the political restructuring of IIOJK by BJP government at the
cost of the rights of indigenous Kashmiris. The well-articulated trends of Modi regime regarding
their approach to Kashmir conflict reflect their malafide intentions. First, they released a movie The
Kashmir Files, an outright propaganda to trigger Islamophobia, followed by the decision of
Delimitation Commission. Through this strategy, BJP first created a false perception of the Kashmir
conflict and then strengthened Islamophobia through the decisions of Delimitation Commission, all
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the while fanning the communal conflict. Since day one, India intends to portray the Kashmir
conflict from a communal lens and several incidents of mass murders by Indian security forces, such
as Chattisinghpora (mass murder of Kashmiri Sikhs) substantiates this.
However, Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s statement that “Kashmiriyat, jamhooriyat and insaniyat,”
(Kashmiri identity, democracy and humanity) are the only frameworks to facilitate a sustainable and
peaceful solution of the conflict. The decisions of Delimitation Commission not only violate
international law but also the UN resolutions on Kashmir conflict. BJP government has provided
constitutional cover through incorporating such discriminatory and non-democratic laws in their
colonial policies. Pakistan, being the primary party to the conflict, should consult all international
institutions and forums to highlight the evil designs of the Indian government and the plight of
Kashmiris.
(Source: Daily Times)
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Foreign Policy and Relations

DOMESTIC FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
Touqir Hussain (Former ambassador, adjunct professor at Georgetown University)
A country’s leadership is supposed to serve its economic and security interests, advance
people’s wellbeing, and respond to their aspirations for progress.
These objectives are achieved with a combination of domestic and foreign policies that are in
synch. A dynamic home front is the platform for success abroad; and poor domestic policies
undermine the foreign policy.
If there is something wrong with the foreign policy, it is thus often because something is
wrong with the domestic policy. And that is largely due to the context in which the policy is made,
such as the country’s political system, social structure, power balances, and the relationship between
people’s interests and those of the ruling elite. It is the context that provides the enabling or
disabling environment for the emergence of good leadership, and crystallization of national
priorities. All that affects the integrity of the governing institutions and quality of policies.
The country’s 75th anniversary is a compelling moment to see how Pakistan has fared as a
nation, particularly as far as the foreign policy is concerned. For Pakistan, which faced existential
challenges in its early years, the foreign policy was the critical external arm to its inevitable struggle
for survival and stability. The pioneering spirit of the population, and the clarity of purpose,
idealism and ambition of the powerful civil-military bureaucracy set the country on the road to
survival and stabilization, giving its diplomats abroad something to defend and be proud of.
Foreign policy and domestic polices worked hand in hand in pursuit of common objectives.
The bureaucracy succeeded where the politicians had failed. And in the process took
advantage of the leadership vacuum to permanently stake a share in power. Politicians had missed
the bus; and never recovered to establish their supremacy. Nor did they try.
In the 60s the military regime continued Pakistan’s successful trajectory of advancing security
and stability – though sadly at the expense of political process, for which Pakistan had to pay dearly
later on. To its credit, it went on to generate economic development policies and institutions that not
only provided a platform for future progress but also gave Pakistan an enviable image abroad.
Pakistan had arrived. And it looked like a reliable and viable partner for the international
community. Pakistan’s diplomacy both bilateral and multilateral was boosted by its domestic
performance.
Pakistan had taken good advantage of the cold war and exploited regional geopolitics, first
towards an alliance with the US and then to open the door to China. The alliance with Washington
reduced the power imbalance in South Asia, increasing Pakistan’s sense of security. And the
opening to China gave Pakistan an alternative to the American support. Geopolitics, China’s
regional rivalry with India and Pakistan’s security needs were in perfect fit.
But with the wars of 1965 and 1971, Pakistan frittered away much of this advantage. Since
then, neither the country nor its foreign policy have been the same. It continued to have pockets of
good foreign policy like strengthening, with the help of China, the foundations of Pakistan-China
strategic relations, Pakistan’s help in facilitating US-China dialogue, the establishment of close ties
with oil rich Arab countries, and a brief spell of Bhutto’s bilateralism. But after 1977 the best days of
Pakistan’s foreign policy were behind it.
Since then Pakistan has no doubt benefited from the strategic interests of big powers, like the
US and China, on account of its geopolitical location and the services of its professional army. But
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except for the relations with China and the successful completion of the nuclear programme there
has been no lasting achievement. Pakistan withstood pressure on the relationship with China as well
as on the nuclear programme. Diplomats defended the programme admirably to resist bilateral
pressures specially from the US, and fight multilateral challenges.
To their credit, the security establishment and the diplomats helped Pakistan hold its own
against India. But the country did not try to derive lasting benefit from its external relationships by
developing its own strengths.
Pakistan became a rentier nation. Politicians had joined other centres of power for the
common defence of their class and institutional interests. As all institutions, with the help of the
religious orthodoxy, undermined the political process, contributing to its crisis of governance, the
country became dependent on external financiers serving their strategic purposes sometimes at the
expense of Pakistan’s own interests. And at home the ruling elite pursued political power to the
sacrifice of people’s interests.
The world was changing but unfortunately Pakistan’s foreign policy kept beating to the
rhythm of an extinct world. Prolonged neglect of the economy and the obsession with geopolitics
and a misplaced focus on religion that served the interests of Pakistan’s benefactors as well as its
own regional ambitions cost the country dearly, and Pakistan began losing its way in the 90s both at
home and abroad.
Pakistan came to be seen as a source of security concerns by many countries. It did become a
frontline state yet again in another war – the war on terror. But along with this status came greater
scrutiny of Pakistan itself as it had become both a part of the problem and the solution, a partner as
well as a target, an ally but not a friend.
Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban is a good study of our policy paradoxes. You cannot
blame only the security arena. Taliban had also duped Pakistan’s intelligentsia – the Islamist and the
liberal alike. One hailed them for reviving Islam’s glory, and the other nursed its anti-Americanism
by applauding the Taliban as ‘anti imperialists’. Both billed them as liberators but the fact is that the
Taliban were not fighting for the liberation of Afghanistan. They were fighting to replace American
occupation with their own.
As for the revival of Islamic glory, it is not their brand of Islam that had achieved civilizational
heights in history. And now we are paying the cost of our support for them as the Taliban-led
Afghanistan has come to present a new set of problems for Pakistan without solving the old ones.
One more example of how bad domestic policy affects foreign policy.
And CPEC is another area where our domestic problems might have repercussions for the
foreign policy by dimming China’s confidence in us. It is a classic case of dependency syndrome as
Pakistan is expecting China to take upon everything. Besides, the CPEC’s progress is being
hampered by managerial conflicts, provincial rivalries, internal security issues, civil military
tensions, power struggle and political uncertainty, bureaucratic bottlenecks, circular debt, and last
but not least Pakistan’s underlying economic weaknesses. All this hardly makes Pakistan a serious
partner. We are – as they say – living from pay cheque to pay cheque or to be more precise from loan
to loan.
Pakistan’s elite has now lost all the confidence of the people. It is confused and polarized –
and presiding over a fractured society. A section of the elite continues to live in the past, tapping old
beaten formulae to solve Pakistan’s problems as it knows no new tricks. And another section led by
a populist leader is blaming foreign powers for Pakistan’s misfortunes. A populist leader relies on
charisma or emotions to bond with his followers. Then he gets addicted to adulation and keeps
repeating the same medicine. As the ‘last hope’, he becomes the cause, not the country whose
problems never really get properly examined and explained. Imran Khan has simplified his
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message. You have to get rid of “ghulami”. But it is not ‘slavery’ that has made Pakistan weak. It is
weakness that has enslaved Pakistan. And to gain strength you conciliate not alienate, and befriend
not confront big powers.
Though for years diplomats tried to overcome Pakistan’s diminished international standing
and problems at home to punch above their weight, that is no longer possible. The gap between
Pakistan’s diplomacy and its foreign policy has now closed.
Pakistan may not be isolated but is certainly stranded. And it continues to live dangerously.
That is sad. Pakistan had so much going but it has squandered its strengths and treasured its
weaknesses.
(Source: The News)

PAKISTAN AND GERMANY

Turning a new page
Dr Mohammad Faisal (Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany)
Foreign Minister of Pakistan Bilawal Bhutto Zardari would be commencing his official visit to
European countries with Germany, the political and economic powerhouse of European Union, as
his first point of engagement on the invitation of his German counterpart, Foreign Minister
Annalena Baerbock. Building on a solid foundation of mutually beneficial bilateral engagements, the
visit is expected to usher in a new phase of comprehensive cooperation between Pakistan and
Germany.
Trade and Investment are critical to any country’s prosperity- fueling economic growth,
supporting jobs at home, raising living standards and helping the people provide for their families
etc. With the mission of ensuring the livelihood and uplifting the living standards of its people, the
government has trade and investment at the heart of its Foreign Policy and Economic Diplomacy.
Despite challenges by the Covid-19 pandemic, bilateral relations between Pakistan and
Germany continue to deepen and strengthen. Various global and regional developments have
brought the two countries even closer, giving further momentum to high level exchanges. Spring
time visits by the new German Foreign Minister and Special Representative on Afghanistan
followed by Pakistan’s Ministers of Commerce & Trade, Climate Change and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs have accentuated these growing ties and brought out Pakistan’s unique geo-strategic
location and our role as an important regional player.
The visits this year have also built on the upward trajectory of exchanges last year when the
foreign minister and Chief of Army Staff visited Germany proceeded by two successive visits to
Pakistan by the then German foreign minister.
During these recent exchanges, both, Pakistan and Germany have expressed mutual
agreement to diversify existing relations to include greater, tangible cooperation in the fields of
climate change, renewable energy, labour mobility and transfer of technology. These are also in line
with the priority areas of the new governments in Germany as well as in Pakistan. Building on this
foundation of mutually beneficial engagement, we are working to develop synergies between
Pakistan-a resource rich country with abundance of cheap skilled and semi-skilled labour, raw
materials and thriving consumer market- and Germany’s search for new markets to reduce its
dependence on traditional trade partners.
Putting our plans into motion, Pakistan has already signed a letter of Intent toward its Climate
Partnership with Germany, as a pioneer country. The Letter of Intent is an important precursor to
the broader Climate Partnership which would provide avenues of cooperation to mitigate the
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adverse impact of climate change in Pakistan including the use of green financing. We are also
working to bridge Germany’s dire shortage of skilled labour and Pakistan’s huge youth bulge
through a mechanism of Labour Mobility that would allow Pakistani skilled and semi-skilled labour
to easily access German employment market. Curriculum development, its recognition and
verification on European standards form important aspects of our efforts.
Presently bilateral trade between the two countries continues to record a steady growth. It
stands at $3,875 million with the balance of trade in favour of Pakistan. European Union’s award of
the GSP plus scheme for Pakistan, in January 2014, has been a major contributor to this gradually
improving trade figure. Diversification of our trade portfolio beyond traditional textile and surgical
goods, addition of value-added items into our export mix suitable for European market and
ensuring greater access & outreach of our businesses in the German market would be game changers
for our trade. Many German business giants like BASF, BMW, Daimler AG, DHL, Linde plc
(Chemicals), Lufthansa Cargo, Merck Group, Metro Cash and Carry and Siemens are Metro Cash
and Carry (Wholesale), and Siemens are running profitable operations in Pakistan. We continue to
attract German companies to invest in Pakistan through public-private partnerships in the key areas
mentioned above.
People-to-people contacts are quintessential vehicle for creating awareness of one’s culture,
history and traditions. In a bid to deepen our footprint in Germany and to facilitate our growing
diaspora, we are opening our new Consulate General in Munich, shortly. The Consulate General
would provide a much needed platform to reach out to one of Germany’s richest regions, home to
many industrial powerhouses. Coupled with the opening of a state of the art, Iqbal-Goethe Cultural
and Trade centre, these new developments will be instrumental is promoting people-to-people
contact which form the bedrock of bilateral relations.
As we make preparations to welcome the foreign minister, I am confident that the decades of
mutual goodwill and cooperation between the Pakistan and Germany, energised by recent
exchanges, will set the ball rolling for further important high level exchanges in the near future.
(Source: The News)

CEMENTING TIES WITH CHINA

Zafaruddin Mahmood (Former special envoy on CPEC)
Ever since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1951, Pakistan and China have enjoyed a
close and mutually beneficial relationship. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the
People’s Republic in 1950. It remained Beijing’s unwavering ally during China’s years of
international isolation in the 1960s and early 1970s. China has long provided Pakistan with military
and economic support as well as nuclear technology and equipment for power generation.
The relationship between the all-weather friends took a new turn when China announced
infrastructure investment worth billions of dollars in Pakistan around the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015. The work on the
Corridor initiative has helped Pakistan overcome crippling power shortages and build critical social
and economic infrastructure across the country.
Over the last four years, however, there has been a notable slowdown in progress on projects
related to the CPEC initiative. One of the major reasons for the slowdown in the momentum on
CPEC-related projects was the political changes in Pakistan.
Former prime minister Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) had always had
reservations about the utility of the corridor project for Pakistan and associated the initiative with
the rival Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. So, when the PTI came into power it halted work on
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several projects for a fresh review of its benefits for Pakistan. At that time, several PTI ministers
issued public statements about alleged corruption in the CPEC projects and overpricing of the
power generation schemes by the Chinese firms. This created an element of mistrust between the
two sides. Unfortunately, the PTI government was unable to engage Beijing to remove this mistrust.
By the time the PTI had realised the need for closely working with China and the significance of the
CPEC for Pakistan’s economy, much harm had been done.
Then, Pakistan’s fiscal and balance of payments problems too caused delays in payments to
the Chinese power companies. Likewise, the procedural hitches also impeded progress on the CPEC
projects already agreed upon or undertaken. Pakistan’s economic and political risk also increased
sensitivity among the Chinese banks and companies, which grew quite reluctant to finance the
projects.
The outbreak of the Covid-19 that led to a global shutdown didn’t help either. These factors
led to the suspension of several projects including the ML-1 and Karachi Circular Railway (KCR).
Work on several other schemes, including the Gwadar International Airport and Gwadar coal power
plant was delayed.
However, the situation is changing. I have noticed the old warmth in the bilateral relations
returning in the recent months even though it will take some time before the CPEC regains its lost
momentum. The government led by Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif is now engaging the Chinese
authorities. He has spoken with top Chinese leaders and is personally striving to remove the
problems and issues facing Chinese investors in Pakistan. He is also working to resolve the issue of
payments to Chinese independent power producers and to find a long-term solution. He has been to
Gwadar twice to support the CPEC and the Chinese companies working in Pakistan. There is
however, still a lot of scepticism in Pakistan on account of the experience of the last few years.
The recent scepticism about the bilateral ties between Islamabad and Beijing doesn’t originate
only from a deceleration in progress on the CPEC-related economic cooperation. As someone who
has been visiting, living and working in China since 1976, let me share with readers that I have
found discussions on Pakistan-China relationships evoke varying reactions in different settings.
The West views the relationship as based on “expediency and geopolitical considerations”.
But this assessment is far from being accurate. When we describe our relationship with China as
“higher than the mountains, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey”, we are not merely
reiterating rhetoric. These phrases actually convey the depth and substance of the bilateral ties. No
relationship between two nations can thrive if it is driven only by rhetoric.
Some local think tanks too view Pakistan’s relationship with China through the Western
perspective. Hence, we saw a lot of hullabaloo over Pakistan’s exclusion from the recent Global
Development Initiative (GDI) dialogue organised around the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) conference in Beijing. Many have criticised China for not inviting Pakistan to attend
this dialogue without realising that Pakistan’s participation was blocked by India.
The Chinese authorities have informed our Foreign Office about it. Pakistan is an important
member of the Friends of the Global Development Initiative group and China attaches great
importance to Pakistan’s important role in promoting global development, promoting the
implementation of the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and regional
cooperation. The recent Islamabad visit of a high-ranking Chinese politician and Politburo member,
Yang Jiechi, is an indicator of the old warmth between the two nations.
Yang is considered a personal representative of President Xi Jinping due to his position in the
Chinese hierarchy. He is the first such high-ranking Chinese official after the foreign minister to
undertake a foreign visit since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic and the consequent lockdown in
China. That he chose Pakistan as his first destination testifies to the importance the Chinese
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authorities attach to Pakistan. It reflects China’s support for Pakistan and is a manifestation that
Islamabad remains an important ally of Beijing.
I have also seen some Pakistanis succumb to the Western propaganda of inhuman treatment
meted out by the Chinese authorities to the Muslim minority living in the Xinjiang Uygur
autonomous region. I have been reading a lot of negative stories in the Western media about
Xinjiang. These are then repeated by news organisations in other countries without verifying the
facts. Most of the commentators look at Xinjiang through the eyes of the Western media outlets.
Some people in the media and think tanks in Pakistan have also been influenced by these
reports and have been making comments without any research or making any effort to verify the
facts. Most of these commentators have never visited China, let alone Xinjiang.
I’ve been visiting Urumqi, and other parts of the region since 1984. I have found Muslims
enjoying complete religious and other freedoms. Their children are free to seek religious education
at mosque schools. During my visits there I have seen visible advance in infrastructure
development, including new and wider roads, improved street lights, airports, hotels, buildings and
shopping malls. The number of vehicles on the roads has been increasing, too. Many people are
dressing in fashionable clothes. Shopping malls, restaurants and hotels are crowded, a clear sign of
growing prosperity.
I have always found mosques open. The number of students at the schools attached with
select mosques has been either the same or increasing. Moreover, students are regularly sent to
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Qatar for religious studies. I have also had the opportunity of
visiting Kashghar, Shihezi, Turphan and Karamay. There is evidence of development and economic
prosperity everywhere. The rail and road network is as good as in any other part of China. The
number of vehicles on the expressways is impressive.
During the years the number of flights from Urumqi, Kashghar and other cities in the
autonomous region has increased substantially. This shows enhanced connectivity not only with
other parts of China but also to foreign countries. The number of small-and medium-sized private
businesses is growing and a new cohort of private entrepreneurs is emerging not only in big cities
but also in small towns.
I have met a number of Uygur students at Shanghai and Beijing. They were studying at best
schools and universities under a special programme to uplift the minorities. Local governments
were subsidising the expenses.
There are miscreants in every society and nationality and China is no exception. Anyone
disturbing law and order and harmony in the society or is engaged in criminal activities is dealt with
according to the law.
Pakistanis must understand that a strong bilateral relationship is much more important for
Islamabad than for Beijing. We must fight false propaganda being spread to sour people-to-people
relationship. Pakistan is already the largest recipient across the world of Chinese grants and
assistance. China has developed the Gwadar deep seaport at a cost of $198 million – its own money.
It is establishing an international airport in Gwadar at a cost of $250 million besides undertaking
several socioeconomic projects across the country. Progress on the CPEC will help China send the
message across the world that the BRI is good for developing countries. Pakistan is the primary
beneficiary of the Corridor project.
That China has always stood by Pakistan through thick and thin despite terrorist attacks on
and killings of its nationals working here shows its deep commitment to our people. Given its deep
economic turmoil, it is important that Pakistan should strengthen its relations with Beijing.
(Source: TNS)
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CHANGING GEOPOLITICS
Mohiuddin Aazim
As we celebrate the completion of 75 years of freedom, the time is ripe for choosing a wiser
course of action for future economic development.
Historically, foreign aid played an important role in Pakistan’s economic development in the
1960s and 1970s. During this period, the country made a massive investment in physical
infrastructure, electric power and irrigation projects with the help of foreign aid. Mega projects such
as Tarbela and Mangla dams were constructed during this period.
Foreign aid during these two decades, mixed with domestic private and public investment,
enabled Pakistan to undertake crucial public sector projects including the construction of road
networks, electric power generation, construction of the Indus Superhighway and the establishment
of Pakistan Steel Mills. These and other similar projects were launched during the governments of
General Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
In the 1960s, yearly net inflows of development assistance and foreign aid into Pakistan
ranged between $252 million and $501m and in the 1970s, between $282m and $1.01 billion,
according to the World Bank. (The current value of $1.01bn received in 1976 comes to around
$5.21bn after adjusting for US inflation during this period).
The separation of then East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh on Dec 16, 1971, however,
changed the dynamics of foreign aid inflows towards the South Asian region. Aid inflows to new-
born Bangladesh grew in terms of percentage of Gross National Product leaving Pakistan behind,
scanning of the World Bank stats reveals.
Besides, even during the 1970s, foreign aid disbursement into Pakistan markedly fell during
1977-78 and 1978-79 to $593.3m and $631.7m, as the US curtailed aid because of Islamabad’s nuclear
policy.
But as soon as Pakistan (under Gen Zia’s regime) became a front-line ally of the US in its war
with the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Afghanistan, inflows of net development
assistance and foreign aid got thicker again. During the 1980s, yearly inflows oscillated between
$625m in 1984 and $1.19bn in 1989. The current value of $1.19bn in 1989 is about $2.844bn. This
amount is still higher than what Pakistan got in development assistance and foreign aid in 2020 —
$2.59bn.
That provides us with a clue about how Pakistan’s positioning in geopolitics plays a part in
determining the size of international economic assistance and foreign aid. The shift in the US policy
of foreign aid to Pakistan — from aid sanctions between 1985 and 1995 on concerns regarding
Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions to the wide opening of the gates of foreign aid after 9/11 — is
another, more recent example of how foreign aid into Pakistan remains linked with the geopolitical
interests of the donor countries in particular and the Western world at large.
History offers us a few lessons even in the case of net development assistance and foreign aid.
The first and foremost lesson is that inflows of such aid and assistance, too, remain tied to our
positioning in geopolitics.
The second lesson is that foreign assistance and aid contribute to future economic
development only when we employ them in development projects wisely. Both Gen Ayub Khan and
Z.A. Bhutto deserve credit for using foreign development assistance with a futuristic outlook of the
then Pakistan’s economy.
Even during Gen Musharraf’s era foreign funds received (in addition to the compensation
paid to Pakistan for the economic fallout of being a front-line ally of the US in its War on Terror)
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were spent on capacity building of institutions, for introducing the required improvement in the
social sector, particularly in education — and for strengthening district governments. Earlier
Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s governments had also channelised foreign aid and assistance into
social sectors, particularly in health and education.
The third lesson, which can be drawn easily from the ongoing China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) funding, is that partnering for progress with the world’s economic superpowers is
fast replacing the concept of development assistance. This is truer in the case of the relationship
between emerging economies (with geopolitical aspirations) and developing countries.
Advance economies still provide assistance and aid to developing countries but unlike in the
past, their assistance has become more target oriented. They now want to ensure that such assistance
is used in the recipient countries for meeting Social Development Goals or for partnering in progress
in common areas of interest.
It was easier to build mega projects in the 1960s and 1970s with the help of foreign aid and
assistance because those inflows covered a significant portion of the total cost of those projects. But
just look at the financing mix of any large CPEC-related project and you will find that commercial
Chinese loans and foreign direct investment, or in some cases interest-based Chinese state financing,
form the bulk of the financing even where the requirement of counterpart Pakistan’s domestic
financing is low. You will not see foreign aid and zero-rated development assistance featured in the
financing mix except in very few cases where the projects fall in the areas of knowledge sharing or
strengthening of cultural ties.
(Source: Business & Finance Weekly)

FIXING IMAGE ABROAD

Fahd Humayun (Political scientist at Tufts University)
The PTI isn`t the first political party to hire a PR firm to fix its image in the US. But the
perceptions that other countries harbour towards Pakistan are nearly always a function of national
reputation, less so the reputation of individual parties that make up our shifting political landscape.
When international players like the US, the EU or China consider their investments in Pakistan, that
calculation is based on a lot more than our electoral time horizons.
What, then, are some ways that political parties can work towards two synergistic goals:
improving Pakistan`s image abroad, while advancing a complex set of foreign policy objectives
(which by their definition should be non-partisan)? The first recommendation is to urgently promote
women`s empowerment at home.
This year, the World Economic Forum ranked Pakistan at 145 out of 146 countries in gender
parity. Regardless of the WEF`s methodology, for a country that boasts a woman minister of state for
foreign affairs, and was the first Muslim nation to elect a female prime minister, this is a dismal
distinction that needs to be rectified, not just for the sake of prosperity at home, but to overhaul the
country`s image as one that is proactively responsive to improving women`s safety, mobility and
economic and political participation.
Making women`s rights and participation a national priority instantly services critical agendas
that are both internal and external, and which incidentally include the credibility with which we can
lean on a Taliban-led regime next door to allow all girls to attend school (itis worth noting that
Pakistan is second only to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the WEF`s list of worst-performing
countries, and yet among those that have consistently been calling on the Taliban to respect the
rights of girls and women).
The second recommendation in service of foreign policy abroad concerns the state of
democracy at home. Pakistan`s inability to hold free and fair elections discredits the country
internationally and creates a moral hazard for governments that try to conduct foreign policy on the
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tail-coats of dubious authority. This year, the Economic Intelligence Unit ranked Pakistan 104 on 167
states on its global Democracy Index (Pakistan received a score of 5.67 in the category of electoral
process and pluralism; 5.36 on the functioning of government; 3.33 on political participation; 2.50 on
political culture; and 4.71 on civil liberties).
In short, the ability of any government to project stature abroad will remain compromised
unless these numbers go up and remain up. All parties and institutions must realise that their
individual interests aggre-gate on this one fundamental issue: subverting democratic processes hurts
us all.
The third recommendation in service of a reinvigorated reputation is to be bolder and more
imaginative in who we appoint to key missions abroad. With no disrespect intended to those filling
top diplomatic posts in New York and D.C., an imaginative foreign policy is one that leverages the
technological and demographic changes and dividends of our times, optics that are presently not on
display. Swapping out a familiar cast of septuagenarian retirees with younger, savvier talent may
not be a popular choice, but it will be a bold one that can be the basis for a more dynamic,
professionalised foreign policy that proactively protects and promotes Pakistan`s interests abroad,
including on Kashmir, counterextremism and climate change.
The fourth recommendation relates to a regional country that has not traditionally been on the
receiving end of much of our foreign policy attention: Bangladesh.
There are many reasons for a reinvigoratedfocus on ties with Dhaka. While Bangladesh`s
undeniable economic success story on the back of export-oriented growth is one, there are also
political advantages to building strategic ca-pital here. Notwithstanding the pathologies of Sheikh
Hasina`s government, Bangladesh has the potential to be a critical pivot and swing player in South
Asia`s power politics in the coming decades.
While an RSS-inspired regime in New Delhi is likely to continue to explore ways to flex
muscle in the neighbourhood (it is already attempting to build inroads with the Afghan Taliban),
pragmatism dictates that Pakistan be bolder and more creative in its approach to engaging the
neighbourhood, especially Dhaka. To start with, it could consider apologising for the events leading
to 1971. Doing so on the 75th anniversary of independence won`t diminish our sovereignty. In fact,
it would signal Pakistan`s evolution into a mature, self-confident republic, and be the basis of a bold
reset that shores up our geostrategic reservesin the neighbourhood.
These are just a few ideas in service of national image, and therein a more ambitious, strategic
and results-oriented foreign policy with 21st-century shelf life.
(Source: Dawn)

NEW HORIZONS
Dr Ejaz Hussain (Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad)
The early political leader of Pakistan, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, preferred the capitalist
over the communist bloc in the foreign policy realm.
The guiding principles of Pakistan’s foreign policy included peaceful and friendly relations
with neighbours, cooperation with the United Nations members and Pakistan’s projection as a
leading Muslim state.
By mid-1950s the then chief of Pakistan Army, Gen Ayub Khan, had been appointed a
minister. Gen Ayub’s input was crucial in Pakistan’s decision to sign a Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement with the US in May 1954. A few months later, Pakistan joined the US-led Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and, a year later, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Post-1958
coup, the Ayub-led military assumed direct control over the foreign policy.
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Little wonder, Khan visited the US and made Pakistan a closer US partner vis-à-vis the
communist USSR. Consequently, Pakistan received American military aid and hardware that helped
with military modernisation. However, Pakistan’s war with India in 1965 impacted bilateral
relations. In the post-war period, the Ayub regime tilted towards China whose relations with India
had already deteriorated due to 1962 war.
China remained relevant during the Yahya years when Pakistan played a crucial role in the
US-China rapprochement. Pakistan, it seems, wanted to balance its ties with the US by cultivating a
close defence partnership with China. Hence, China-Pakistan defence and military cooperation
strengthened under the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whereas US-Pakistan relations
remained at a low ebb Pakistan quit both the SEATO and the CENTO during the 1970s. Besides,
Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan remained hostile during the period. Its relations
with key Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, gained strategic confidence.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 invited American wrath coupled with the
Saudi money and ideology and logistical support from Pakistan. Hence, the US-Pakistan relations
improved tactically. Pakistan remained preoccupied with India in the 1980s too, i.e. Siachen Glacier.
The Geneva Accords (1988) paved a way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Subsequently,
the US-Pakistan transactional partnership saw a downward trend in the immediate post-Cold War
period. Hence, Pakistan faced nuclear sanctions during the 1990s. On the other hand, China-Pakistan
relations flourished in military-strategic terms. During this decade, the civil leadership particularly
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tried to control the country’s foreign policy. Under Musharraf, the
military played a pivotal role in making Pakistan’s foreign policy. Tactically, US-Pakistan relations
improved once again. Strategically, China-Pakistan relations remained intact. India remained a top
security threat in military calculations. In addition, Afghanistan was bracketed with India. The
latter’s influence increased in the post-Taliban period. Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Malaysia remained cordial. However, Iran-Pakistan ties did not improve owing largely
to mutual mistrust.
In the post-Musharraf period, the Obama administration pushed Pakistan to “do more” in the
global War on Terror. Contextually, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 commonly
called the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act was enacted. It committed US to providing $7.5 billion in non-
military aid to Pakistan over a five-year period. If US-Pakistan relations were off the hook, China-
Pakistan relations remained on track. President Zardari paid several visits to China in his five-year
tenure. From the Chinese side, Premier Li Keqiang visited Pakistan in May 2013. Besides, Pakistan’s
relations with key Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remained stable.
Pakistan-Iran relations during this period gained some limelight with the visits by President Zardari
to resume discussions on the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Operationally, however, the two countries
did not get over mutual misgivings.
As prime minister, Nawaz Sharif kept the portfolio of foreign minister to himself to
operationalise his foreign policy ideas. He had previously tried, among other things, to make peace
with India despite the military’s disapproval.
Sharif’s participation in the inaugural ceremony of India’s right-wing prime minister,
Narendra Modi in 2014, arguably manifested his desire to normalise Pakistan’s trade relations with
India. Another important development under Sharif related to China-Pakistan relations. The two
sides signed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, thus, adding the economic
dimension to bilateral engagement. As regards Riyadh, while Sharif enjoyed close personal relations
with the Saudi monarchs, the Raheel-led military made the key decisions on bilateral cooperation.
Under Imran Khan, the civil and military leaders appeared to be on the same page. However,
the military took the lead to determine the contours of foreign policy with China, Turkey, England,
Saudi Arabia and, above all, the United States. The latter under Trump cut off military aid for
Pakistan. This might have shocked some leaders in Pakistan but was in keeping with the US foreign
policy under Trump who also antagonized several NATO allies. However, US officials engaged with
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the Pakistani authorities especially the military on Afghanistan. In July 2019, Gen Bajwa
accompanied Prime Minister Khan to the US. The former met with key officials of the Trump
Administration and discussed Afghanistan affairs at length. Unsurprisingly, then, Pakistan had been
a key member of the quadrilateral group on Afghanistan. Militarily withdrawing from Afghanistan
in September 2021, the US urged Pakistan to work with the former to ensure a negotiated settlement
of political authority in Afghanistan.
Both the civil and military leaders pursued warm relations was Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince
Mohammed Bin Salman was accorded a warm welcome in February 2019 and the two countries
signed an MoU to promote trade and investment. The Saudis hinted at investing about $20 billion in
Pakistan. However, the relationship was not always smooth. In December 2019, Prime Minister
Khan was forced to withdraw at the eleventh hour from a visit to Malaysia to placate Saudi Arabia.
In August 2020, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to pay back a $1 billion Saudi loan on a short notice.
This prompted Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to issue a sharply-worded statement.
Further deterioration in bilateral relations was prevented by military authorities through
institutional engagement with their Saudi counterparts. Importantly, the COAS visited the Kingdom
ahead of the PM in May 2021.
Under the Khan government, Pakistan’s relations with India remained confrontational. After
India unilaterally revoked Articles 370 and 35A of its constitution in August 2019, Kashmir issue
assumed centrality in Pakistan’s extra-regional diplomacy. Constrained by international obligations,
the country has avoided seeking a military solution to the conflict.
The no-war policy and cooperation with the West have paid some dividends. Pakistan, for
instance, was not placed on the FATF black list and is expected to get off the grey list this year. A
crucial development under the Khan government related to Russia. Interaction between the two
countries increased over the last five years, resulting in military-to-military engagement.
Imran Khan made a crucial visit to Russia amid its Ukraine invasion. Good timing might have
served Pakistan’s interests better. While Pakistan wishes to improve bilateral relations with Russia,
it has condemned it for violating the sovereignty of an independent state.
One can conclude that for the past 75 years, Pakistan’s top-most foreign policy goal has been
dealing with the Indian threat to its security. It has tried to counter India through bilateral relations
with the US, China and countries like Saudi Arabia. Even in multilateral arrangements such as South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the United Nations, Pakistan it has been
preoccupied with India. As far as the Muslim world is concerned, Pakistan has projected itself as a
leading Muslim state with comparative strength in military capability and human resources. It has
taken a pro-Palestine stance since 1948. Its recent engagement with Russia can also be seen as an
effort to counterbalance India, at least, regionally.
For the future, however, Pakistan needs to incorporate some important insights from, for
example, US-China relationship. Despite the past, US-China bilateral trade has grown over the
years. Amid Covid-19, it retained a positive curve and, in the first half of this year, it has witnessed
an upward trend. China-India bilateral trade too has surpassed $120 billion despite Doklam and
Ladakh issue.
Pakistan must pursue economic cooperation with its neighbours and other regional and global
stakeholders for a stable economy with societal cohesion, military modernisation and durable peace.
Mere reliance on geography may not serve its larger interests. Indeed, without proper planning and
political will geography cannot guarantee socioeconomic wellbeing or territorial integrity as we
have witnessed in 1971.
Pakistan ought to buy peace at any cost by not indulging in any armed conflict. It ought to
engage the major powers in trade. It also needs to become a part of regional organisations like the
ASEAN to explore trade and investment opportunities. Above all, it must ensure political stability at
home. A stable polity and economy carry positive effects for a country’s foreign policy. (Source: TNS)
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Floods 2022
PAKISTAN’S FLOODS ARE A FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE
Shandana Khan Mohmand (Cluster leader and Research Fellow at Institute of Development Studies)
Miguel Loureiro (Research Fellow at Institute of Development Studies)
The floods in Pakistan have had a horrifying impact — over 1,000 people dead and almost 33
million ‘displaced’, a simple word that couches the absolute devastation of people’s lives, homes,
and everything they have worked for their whole life.
This is a climate change disaster, but it is not just about climate change. The Pakistan floods
underscore incredibly well a fact that is now well established — natural disasters are not caused by
nature, they are caused by humans (the UN has been saying this since the early 2000s and scientists
since the 1990s). This is because of the way we choose to live and spend, and what we choose not to
spend on. Disasters, such as the current Pakistan floods, are therefore a failure of governance on
multiple levels.
No lessons learned
These floods are not unique in Pakistan. The country was terribly affected in 2010 and then
again in 2011. There was very little time between the two to have learnt lessons. But there has now
been a decade since the last devastation, and many expert opinions, such as this one from journalist
Arifa Noor, suggest that no lessons have been learnt now either. This is the first failure of
governance.
Economic crisis
Pakistan is now going to need lots of money to deal with this devastation, and lots will flow in
too. Pakistani people are philanthropic and the global community has also been mobilised.
However, the country itself is in the midst of an economic crisis that has required an IMF bailout
and has made its economic survival dependent on tranche payments. Much of this has to do with a
very low tax-GDP ratio, very high debt-GDP ratio, and a major trade deficit. All in all, production
and exports are low, so the country spends more than the revenue it generates. This is not a new
situation, and every government has pursued further loans rather than economic reform as a
solution each time. The country has few resources to divert to this disaster, and if it does, it will sink
further into debt. This is the second failure of governance.
Delayed action
There has also been delayed responses from the government. The devastation has continued
for many days now and the floods began in mid-June but the formation of a new National Flood
Response and Coordination Centre was announced as late as 29 August. It is not uncommon for
governments to be slow to react. Back in 2005 in the immediate aftermath of the massive earthquake
that struck the north of the country the government of the time was also slow: it took two days to
create a military commission to coordinate relief work and two weeks to include civilians in
decision-making. Luckily the NGO sector was quicker to respond: a group of 34 national and
international NGOs came together to coordinate amongst them and with partners in the field,
conducted rapid assessments within 24 hours and started rescue and relief operations (in some areas
before the state). Many of these NGOs have now been restricted or thrown out of the country, based
on a closing of civic spaces and the growing securitisation of governance. This is the third failure of
governance.
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Political polarisation
Underlying all this is the fourth failure of governance that is rarely connected to disasters or
climate change — that of political polarisation and accountability. The links are easily drawn.
Pakistan is a deeply polarised country with populist leaders. In April this year, ex-Prime Minister
Imran Khan was removed through a vote of no-confidence. Both the new coalition government of
Shahbaz Sharif and the opposition now led by Imran Khan have since focused on each other
through corruption and terrorism charges rather than on the fact that there have been signs of an
impending disaster at least since June.
Only this week, the chief ministers of the provinces ruled by the opposition did not attend the
national flood emergency meeting called by the government to address the floods. Newspaper
headlines, television channels, and social media feeds have similarly prioritised the political battles,
scandals, and allegations. Pakistani voters need to hold their politicians to account, but this too is not
possible in a polarised environment when what matters is not what is said, but who said it.
Global governance failure on climate mitigation
Despite all of the above, this has not just been a disaster of Pakistan’s making – “Since 1959,
Pakistan has emitted about 0.4% of heat-trapping carbon dioxide, compared to 21.5% by the United
States and 16.4% by China.” The world is interlinked and so a volcanic eruption in the north of
Europe, a ship blocking the Suez canal, a subprime mortgage crisis in the USA, a war in Ukraine, or
an unfettered industrial revolution 200 years ago that created an unsustainable culture of
consumption, all impact us wherever we are. The larger ubiquitous fifth failure of governance is that
of global governance and its inability to move faster on mitigating climate change.
The impact of the floods will be felt in Pakistan for a long time to come — in the loss of
infrastructure, livelihoods, and crops, and in the implications for health and nutrition. The failures
of governance above suggest that these issues will not receive the policy attention and resources that
are required. Pakistan and the development community will need to think deeply about the
governance crisis in the country, brought into tragic relief by the floods, to have a hope against
climate crises that will keep coming.
(Source: Institute of Development Studies)

PAKISTAN FLOODS
What role did climate change play?
Jo Adetunji (Editor, The Conversation UK)
Pakistan is experiencing the most devastating and widespread floods in its history, with the
country’s climate minister saying waters have reached across a third of the nation.
The growing tally of impacts is dire. More than 1,100 people have been killed, a million homes
have been destroyed and 33 million people have been directly affected. Total damage estimates
exceed US$10 billion (£8.6 billion), and further disruption to the country’s economy and critical food
production is inevitable.
On August 25, the government declared a national emergency. António Guterres, the UN
secretary-general, said that this is a signal to the world to step up climate action, warning: “Today,
it’s Pakistan. Tomorrow, it could be your country.”
At a very broad level, this is certainly justified. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), extreme rainfall is becoming more frequent and intense in many parts of the
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world due to human emissions of greenhouse gases. And this effect will continue to increase with
emissions.
However, for individual events that have such profound impacts on society, it is critical to
investigate the influence of climate change (or lack thereof) in more detail. While the IPCC statement
holds globally, its most recent report states it has only “low confidence” in how much climate
change is to blame for increased heavy rains in south Asia.
It is vital we better understand cause and effect in the observed changes, to help us make best
use of our finite resources and ultimately save lives and money.
Record-breaking monsoon rainfall
It is tempting to ask if an extreme weather event was “caused by” climate change, but this is
often the wrong question, at least if you expect a binary answer. Instead, scientists like us ask
whether and by how much climate change affected the likelihood and intensity of the event. This is
known as “extreme event attribution”.
In this case, the flooding was caused by an extreme monsoon season. Pakistan is on the far
western edge of the south Asian monsoon region, with a mostly arid desert climate. It is only
sometimes affected by an offshoot of the monsoon, and generally receives far less rainfall than parts
of India at the same latitudes.
However, record rainfall fell over Pakistan in several bursts from mid-June to late August
with large swathes of the country receiving a completely unprecedented 500%-700% of their usual
August rain.
Yet another cost of climate change?
Officials from the Pakistan Meteorological Department blamed climate change for the unusual
monsoon activity and flooding, for a range of reasons.
In 2021, the IPCC reported that there has been a significant increase in heavy rainfall events in
south Asia in recent decades. There is some evidence that this is due to human-caused climate
change.
However, there is limited agreement between different assessed studies, and factors other
than climate change, such as irrigation, are known to influence monsoons. Confidence is therefore
too low to make any concrete attribution statements without further investigation.
Before a dedicated study is available, similar events in the recent past can hold clues to current
events. Pakistan last experienced flooding on a similar scale in 2010, which at the time was labelled
by Guterres’ predecessor at the UN, Ban Ki-moon, as the worst disaster he’d ever seen.
Two separate attribution studies assessed this event. Unfortunately, neither provided
evidence that the models used were up to the task. Therefore, even though one of them found an
increase due to human climate change, we cannot be very confident in this result.
Clues as to the role of climate change can also come from aspects that contributed to this
disaster. There are three main factors.
First, extreme rainfall. A warmer atmosphere holds more moisture. For every degree the
atmosphere warms it can hold about 6%-7% more moisture, which often results in more rain falling
during the most extreme events (south Asia has warmed around 0.7°C since 1900). Had this event
happened in a world where carbon dioxide concentrations were instead at pre-industrial levels, the
rains probably would have been less intense.
Second, the monsoon itself, which is highly complex and variable. It forms in south Asia in the
summer, when air over land warms faster than air over the sea, which creates a flow of air onto the
land. The winds bring great volumes of moisture that precipitate into deluges when they meet
higher ground, especially the Himalayas.
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Unusual monsoon rains over Pakistan have some predictability. They occur when multiple
phenomena coincide, including a La Niña event in the Pacific and large meanders in the high-
altitude jet stream, as was the case in both 2010 and this year.
There is emerging evidence that this confluence of factors may occur more regularly as the
climate changes. If such trends continue, then flooding in Pakistan and other simultaneous extremes
across the northern Hemisphere will happen more often in the future.
Pakistan also experienced extended and brutal heatwaves in May and June this year, which
were amplified by climate change. This heat amplified the monsoonal “thermal low” - a low-
pressure system created by hot air rising rapidly - which greatly enhanced the flow of moisture-
laden air onto southern Pakistan.
Third, Pakistan has more than 7,000 glaciers in its northern mountainous regions. As these
glaciers melt, their waters contribute to the flooding. This melting is driven to a large degree by
climate change and is especially prominent this year as a result of the heatwave.
Proactive is far cheaper than reactive
Pakistan is undoubtedly on the front lines of climate change. In the ongoing flooding, it is
clear that climate change has at minimum played a role in amplifying this event. At worst, it created
a compounding set of circumstances causing millions of additional people to suffer than otherwise
might have.
Projections are very clear that with further climate change, Pakistan is a hotspot for increases
in extreme rainfall. The country must prepare for future flooding to avoid similar or even worse
disasters. To do so, international adaptation funding must increase to match rich countries’
overwhelming contribution to this new climate.
(Source: The Conversation)

CLIMATE CHAOS IN PAKISTAN

Adapt to survive
The harm and distress caused by floods in Pakistan are difficult – if not impossible – to
quantify, as a crisis of vast proportions keeps unfolding. They have killed around 1,000 people so far
this summer, with at least 119 losing their lives in one 24-hour period last week. The number of
those who have lost their homes, or been evacuated, is in the millions, with 300,000 dwellings
destroyed. More than 33 million people are affected – around one in seven of the population. The
country’s climate change minister, Sherry Rehman, says the floods – caused by torrential monsoon
rains and melting glaciers – are the worst in living memory. Around a third of Pakistan is under
water. Vitally important agricultural land will take months to drain.
Hunger, homelessness and the spread of water-borne diseases are among the most immediate
problems, and humanitarian aid must be urgently ramped up if further suffering is to be prevented.
Supplies have begun to arrive from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, but Pakistan’s
government is right to expect more – especially from the rich western nations that bear the greatest
responsibility for global heating. Pakistan has more glaciers – 7,532 – than anywhere on Earth
outside the polar regions, and is thus one of the countries most endangered by fossil fuel use and the
temperature rises and other extreme weather that it causes.
Earlier this year, scientists reported their finding that human-made climate change made the
deadly heatwave then afflicting Pakistan and India 30 times more likely. (Another study found that
the deadly heatwave in 2010 had been made 100 times more likely.) Studies seeking to establish and
quantify the precise contribution of greenhouse gases to this catastrophic monsoon have yet to
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appear. The complexity of weather systems means it can never be stated categorically that global
heating was the single cause of a given event.
What is beyond question is that a human-made climate emergency is upon us. The floods in
Pakistan, like recent heatwaves, droughts and fires, are but a glimpse of the destruction ahead.
Pakistan’s government knows this. Rehman described the floods as a “climate catastrophe”. The
foreign minister, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, said: “We are devastated by climate disasters such as these
time and time again.”
The International Monetary Fund will decide this week whether to release $1.2bn in payments
tied to Pakistan’s bailout programme, and surely will not refuse. Rightly, critics including local
journalists have pointed to the need for Pakistan’s authorities to update planning rules and policies
to reflect current risks. Undoubtedly, the impact of the floods was made worse by a lack of
preparedness. One man spoke of having built a house on the understanding that flood defences
would soon be in place – only to see it washed away. In Pakistan, as elsewhere, people must adapt
to survive.
But far from being a get-out clause for western governments and institutions, the necessity of
adaptation in these worst-hit parts of the world makes it all the more imperative that they are
helped. Climate finance, as this form of support is known, was among the unfinished business of the
Cop26 summit last year. The principle underlying it goes beyond disaster relief or aid. Instead, the
transfer of wealth built up over centuries of fossil fuel extraction is meant to enable a global
transition away from carbon and towards a sustainable way of life. Pakistan’s devastation is a grim
reminder of what is at stake.
(Source: The Guardian)

SYSTEMIC RESPONSE TO DISASTERS

Successive governments haven’t learnt any lessons despite the 2010 recommendations by the
NDMA following the devastating floods. Failure to develop a robust systemic response, the country
is facing another mega disaster now where around 1,033 people have lost their lives during the
recent floods in various districts.
Figures collected from various sources revealed that during the last 24 hours, the total
reported deaths were around 119 while the total population so far affected by the devastating floods
was 5,773,063.
The figures further revealed that so far a total of 1,033 people have lost their lives, the total
injured was 1,527, the total people rescued were 51,275, the total houses damaged were 949,858, total
animals killed were 719,558 and people staying in relief camps were 498,442 since mid-June when
the monsoon floods began to wreak havoc.
After the floods of 2010, the NDMA came out with a detailed report titled “Pakistan 2010
Flood Relief–Learning from Experience, Observations and Opportunities and the Lessons Learned”
but unfortunately the ‘lessons learnt were not applied even after 12 years.
The 2010 flood report suggested that the disaster management capacity of the state needed
immediate focus as it was limited at multiple levels of government. At the federal level, NDMA
suffered from a significant paucity of resources in comparison to the monumental caseload. It has
not legislated authority to control the activities of any other agency such as a PDMA or a DDMA yet
public perception deemed it to be responsible for everything from planning to implementation. At
the provincial level, there was a distinct lack of capacity for the provision of relief, with the
exception of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which had a recent experience with humanitarian catastrophes.
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In the other two badly hit provinces, Punjab and Sindh, there were few people in the
government or PDMAs with enough experience in disaster operations, management or
organization. Though the capacity was strengthened over time following the disaster, the present
crisis has exposed many systemic flaws.
Capacity was an issue not only for NDMA but also for most stakeholders including UN
agencies, INGOs and national NGOs. The short-term deployment, sometimes for as little as two or
three weeks, of UN and INGO personnel to Pakistan from other emergencies was identified by
stakeholders as a problem area, as they had little time to understand the ground realities before
leaving again. Creating sufficient surge capacity both nationally and internationally as an area to be
addressed for future emergencies. Management and capacity issues presented a serious challenge in
Punjab and Sindh, the previous report revealed, which once again continue to haunt now.
The previous report also suggested that several government ministries and departments were
requested to send on secondment at least one person to NDMA to assist with issues particularly
relevant to their home agency’s role in the flood response. Regrettably, except for the armed forces,
the other ministries did not assist. It said coordination was one of the most challenging and complex
aspects of the relief phase, whether between centre-province, government-UN, inter-agency or
within the overall humanitarian community in general. The lack of coordination was seen between
the federal-provincial governments and between the government departments, organizations and
INGOs and NGOs.
The 2010 report suggested the launching of the Pakistan Floods Relief and Early Recovery
Response Plan (PFRERRP) but in practice no such system existed through which, the residents of the
flood-prone areas were informed before the time of the imminent danger. The government must
take the lead in setting the priorities and policy guidelines, the report further suggested and pointed
out that mushrooming of INGOs should be controlled. It is an obvious fact that parallel decision-
making bodies create confusion about mandates and the relief operations should be carried out as a
“One Window”.
The cooperation, collaboration or complementarities of civil and military stakeholders in an
emergency is integral to a successful response. However, there was a lack of clarity on some issues
regarding sharing of information between the military and humanitarian community that needs to
be resolved in future disasters to avoid overlapping and duplication in the distribution of relief
goods. This happened again in the present floods, which shows that no step was taken to improve
coordination.
The previous report also highlighted that one of the prominent features of the response was
the cash transfer mechanism for compensation and it was suggested that this could be done through
the Watan card. However, no such card was introduced in the present situation. The previous report
also criticized the role of media that was focused on criticizing the government and raising
allegations of corruption, which detracted from the impetus to contribute to the relief efforts by the
public and donors. Presently, the media was actively involved in covering the ongoing political
situation in the country and that was why the flood situation was not reported in the media as it
should be.
It had recommended developing a set of guidelines to provide a clear definition of roles and
responsibilities of all stakeholders including ministries/departments, military, donors, UN agencies,
humanitarian organizations, philanthropists and civil defence. In case of disaster response the
capacity development of the PDMA’s of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan in terms of increased
resource allocation, personnel training, warehousing and focal-point functionality, the previous
report said and also suggested that a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell must be established
immediately.
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An incident command system, as envisaged in the NDM Act 2010, needs to be operationalized
for future disasters and NDMA should ultimately have a dedicated air rescue team at its disposal to
facilitate immediate response and rescue in the event of any disaster, the report said. However, no
joint aviation coordination cell was seen actively rescuing people stuck in the flood and no NDMA
air rescue team was seen working also.
For infrastructure restoration and re-construction, the 2010 floods must be used as the
benchmark and there should be permanent threat-specific warehousing of required relief goods
while warehouses should be established in different regions. This important suggestion of the
previous report was also missing and NDMA has to rely on either the military resources or on the
resources of district administrations, which in most cases hired private vehicles and equipment for
rescue operations.
Contingency plans for all disasters – flood, earthquake, cyclones, landslides, industrial and
nuclear – must be prepared by NDMA in consultation with key stakeholders, and regularly
reviewed and updated. It also recommended mock exercises to be conducted by NDMA regularly
for all types of disasters with the stakeholders, the report said but we have not seen any mock
exercises done by NDMA to deal with any type of disaster.
As per the 2010 report, disaster risk reduction was a future investment and donors must be
encouraged to fund relevant programmes such as enhancing the capacity of districts to deal with a
disaster, multi-hazard risk assessment of major human settlements and economic centres, technical
studies on climate change associated hazards and preparation/updating of district and provincial
disaster management plans. But unfortunately, we didn’t learn any lesson from the past and
ultimately the flood victims have suffered more this time around.

FLOODS IN PAKISTAN
Response, relief and recovery
Zainab Naeem (Research Associate at Sustainable Development Policy Institute)
Climate change is no longer a threat rather it has now become a reality which cannot be
avoided. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 6th Assessment Report had
warned that the South Asian region will be hit by extreme temperatures, followed by draughts and
intense monsoon season which may cause floods . This warning has evidently materialized for
Pakistan which is currently experiencing the disastrous floods, preceded by the intense and
prolonged heatwaves earlier this year. Usually, in Pakistan, the monsoon season used to end after 3-
4 cycles, but this year, we have entered the 8th cycle and monsoon is still not over. As per the official
data, almost 33 million people have been directly affected from the recent floods and the death toll is
expected to cross the mark of 1000. The damage is colossal in comparison to the 2010 floods which
affected 20 million people in Pakistan. Since the early onset of monsoon in mid-June, floods have
affected or caused damaged to 3000km of road network, 495,000 homes and 130 bridges have swept
away in flood water as per the NDMA report. Roughly it has been estimated that every 1 in 7
Pakistani is sleeping out in open due to the current flood crises in the country.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province was hit by GLOFs and flash floods in the start of the
season. Currently, as per the recent reports, raging floods have caused devastation in Swat,
Charsadda, Kohistan and adjoining areas. In Swat, the multi storey hotel collapsed and submerged
in the floodwater. Furthermore, the Karakoram Highway in Kohistan has swept away by flash
floods and land sliding, blocking the land route which connects KPK with Gilgit Baltistan.
Moreover, the provincial government has imposed emergency in the affected areas especially near
Swat River which now has the largest volume of water in recorded history – far higher than during
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the 2010/11 floods. The city of Nowshera and Charsadda are also badly affected from the floods
while many tourists are stuck in Kumrat as the river gets flooded. Due to the damage to road
infrastructure, people in Ghizer and other districts in Gilgit Baltistan which are flooded are still
waiting for the rescue and relief operations.
In Sindh, Karachi experienced the unprecedented torrential and heavy downpour which
continued for days and caused massive urban flooding and drenched the entire city. The heavy rains
also affected other cities in the province and now 23 districts have been declared as calamity-hit by
the government. According to the Met Department, the province received 784% more rainfall than
the average and more rains have been predicted. Schools have been closed and business as usual is
no longer possible in many parts of the province. The people are forced to take shelters in school
buildings and are waiting for the rescue operations. As per the official data, standing crops of over
1.4 million acres in the province have been destroyed and more than 300 people have become
homeless. Larkana, Nosheroferoze, Thatta are drenched under floodwater and road networks which
connect Sindh with Balochistan and Punjab are also submerged in floodwater.
The province of Balochistan has been worst struck by the floods. Quetta, Bolan, Lasbela, Jhal
Magsi, Qila Saifullah and many other parts are completely submerged in floodwater as the province
experienced 500% more rainfall than the average over the last 30 years. Road transport, railways and
mobile phone networks and telecommunication networks got disrupted. As per the official report,
more than 36,469 households have been affected, of which 60% are in Balochistan. Many small dams
have been broken and connecting bridges and other infrastructure has been damaged completely in
the largest province of Pakistan.
In South Punjab, almost 200,000 acre of cropland which lies in Rajanpur and Dera Ghazi Khan,
has been completely inundated by the floodwater which resulted due to hill torrent from Suleiman
Mountain range. As per the latest warning by the NDMA, the Indus River will experience a high-
level flood in the coming days which will affect South Punjab and upper Sindh. Flood water has
reportedly entered houses and wreaked havoc in areas of Taunsa and Muzaffargarh where roads
have completely submerged under water.
For the rescue operation and relief assistance, civil governments assisted by army is trying to
reach out to the flood victims via helicopters and boats. Specifically, after the outrage on social
media, the rescue and relief operations have been expedited. People shared live videos and used
platforms like Twitter spaces to appeal for help. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has launched cash
schemes and funds for the flood affectees and has also appealed to the nation and international
partners for the humanitarian assistance of flood victims. Apart from the United Nations which has
announced 3 million USD as aid for flood victims, USA, European Union, China, and some other
countries have also announced financial assistance in this hour of need. Under the BISP social
protection program, the federal and Sindh government has also launched direct cash transfer and
ration program for the flood victims. The NDMA and PDMAs are constantly assisting the local
administration for the evacuation plans in areas which may further get affected. Also, many local
NGOs and private organizations have launched nationwide appeal for donations for the affected
people.
This year, the country has received unprecedented amount of rainfall, however that is not the
only reason for massive floods. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, people have encroached the floodplains,
hotels and buildings have been constructed by encroaching the river boundaries. Similarly, in
Balochistan, houses have been constructed along the flood plains or Rod Kohi areas which is a
system of irrigating fields using water from hill torrents. The unplanned construction has caused
massive devastation of the infrastructure in these two provinces. On the other hand, India released
171,797 Cusecs water in Ravi River via Ujh barrage which has further aggravated the flood situation
in low-lying rural and agricultural areas of Punjab.
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For now, rescue and relief operations are the top priority of the government. However, we
need to prepare and work for the post-flood recovery programs. Since the crop land has been
affected, we should brace ourselves for the imminent food crisis in the next few months. The
country, which was already, cash strapped and was suffering from high energy prices, will now get
affected from the food price inflation in the coming months. Wheat, rice, pulses, tomato production
has been damaged due to floods. Food insecurity was already a problem since the Russia-Ukraine
war, which will now get exacerbated due to the current flood situation. The government will have to
take serious measures to control hoarding and provide for the food and necessities in the areas
which have been hit by floods.
The country is in crises and so instead of political point scoring, the governments and the
nation need to unite and help the flood victims whole-heartedly. There is a need to develop
proactive and precautionary policy actions to avoid such disasters in future. Moreover, the
government representatives need to align their political agenda with climate change adaptation
because now this is a greatest threat to Pakistan both socially and economically.
(Source: Daily Times)
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Globalization
THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF GLOBALIZATION
Grzegorz W. Kołodko (Former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Poland)
Just over three decades ago, the Cold War ended, and former Soviet-bloc countries began their
transitions to market economies, which enabled them to engage with the rest of the global economy.
The world’s division into three segments – advanced capitalist economies, centrally planned socialist
economies, and the “Third World” – appeared increasingly outdated. It was not, as Francis
Fukuyama famously put it, “the end of history,” but it was an economic and political breakthrough,
and the beginning of the contemporary era of globalization. Is that era now ending, as many claim?
The face of globalization has changed significantly since those early years. While economic
and political globalization initially went hand in hand, economic globalization soon pulled ahead.
We now have a globalized economy, but without an effective system of global governance. The
European Union shows what an integrated economy with advanced policy-coordination
mechanisms looks like. But the institutions that were supposed to do this on a global scale – such as
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the International
Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization – lack adequate instruments for economic-
policy coordination.
As a result, the divergence between political and economic globalization is not only growing;
it has lately begun to look like a clash. A political backlash against “globalism” in many countries
seems set to unravel three decades of economic integration.
But looks can be deceiving.
It is true that political globalization is in retreat, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, the new
cold war between the United States and China, and the hot war in Ukraine, which spurred the
imposition of harsh sanctions on Russia. It is also true that these shocks have caused severe
economic disruptions; they have hampered the production and distribution of goods and services,
obstructed technology transfer, tested international financial arrangements, and undermined
multilateral cooperation.
Moreover, public opinion has increasingly turned against globalization, which many
mistakenly blame for trends like accelerating inflation and deepening income inequality. This has
often led policymakers to eschew pragmatism in favor of populism and protectionism – the nemeses
of global economic openness.
But politicians, media commentators, and economists have been far too hasty in predicting the
demise of globalization. In fact, economic globalization has only temporarily lost its momentum.
Despite its drawbacks, globalization supports economic growth, not least by enabling cross-border
trade, which enables producers to take advantage of economies of scale. Recent shocks have
strained, not doomed, global supply chains.
Likewise, cross-border capital flows, including portfolio and direct investment, support
efficiency by enabling resources to reach places where they can be used more profitably. Though the
pandemic and the Ukraine war are affecting these flows, the world is big enough to absorb liquid
savings. A capital surplus somewhere will soon be used elsewhere.
Furthermore, despite the apparent shift in public sentiment against globalization, the
connections that support it – such as tourism and sport – are alive and well. While these spheres are
under stress, people’s enduring desire to travel and connect will continue to facilitate demand and
growth.
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Ultimately, economic globalization is irreversible. After this period of turbulence – and the
difficult social, cultural, demographic, and technological adjustments it entails – greater openness
will win out. This process will be hindered, however, as long as political globalization fails to keep
up.
The world is currently at risk of splitting into two separate blocs: one led by the US and the
EU, and the other dominated by China and Russia. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that
these blocs “will cement themselves into the geopolitical landscape and use economic and military
levers to court countries that are not aligned with either side.”
But, even if such a split does occur, confrontation is not inevitable. The two groupings can
compete and cooperate peacefully, without reaching for “military levers” (which, in any case, could
be rendered useless if economic levers are used well). The key is a more effective form of political
globalization.
The EU will be critical here; it does not have to take sides in the Sino-American rivalry, and
could thus play a central role in both blocs. China, for its part, should seize the opportunity to
strengthen its international standing.
As for Russia, it will see its stature significantly diminished, owing to its despicable
aggression against Ukraine. Nonetheless, the country should not be excluded from global economic
exchanges; Russia is simply too big to be ignored, let alone “canceled.” Meanwhile, African
countries, as well as India, will play an increasingly significant role in the global geopolitical game.
This points to an unavoidable feature of future political globalization: multipolarity. If
forthcoming summits – from the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, to the United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt – are to be successful, participants must accept that
the days when one or two powers could impose their will on the rest are over.
Regional initiatives – such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity – can also provide political scaffolding for
economic globalization. Business – a natural ally of economic globalization, and thus an enemy of
political deglobalization – should work harder to support these processes.
Shortsighted politics can be allowed to override economic pragmatism for only so long. The
cascading challenges humanity faces can be managed, but only with enlightened political leadership
capable of providing the kind of strategic vision needed to support economic globalization and
achieve social and ecological balance.
(Source: Project Syndicate)

IS A WORLD ORDER EVEN POSSIBLE?

Parag Khanna (Political scientist and the author of The Future is Asian)
American "hyper-power," Pax Sinica, the "G-2 world," a "new Cold War." Confident slogans
announcing the grand geopolitical architecture of our age have appeared as frequently as Italy
changes governments. This polemical exercise betrays one foundation of what defines global order
at all: a stable distribution of power. But if our description of power dynamics changes with each
American administration or act of Russian aggression, is there even an order to speak of? Or is it
conjecture masquerading as analysis? In the age of Twitter, it’s easy to conflate the two.
Our received wisdom is an oversimplified historiography. How about this maxim: The age of
sovereignty began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Of course it didn’t. Not only did borders
and imperialism not disappear in Europe – Europe’s colonial ambitions also achieved global scale,
subjugating the rest of the world under its hierarchy for centuries. A world of sovereign but still
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unequal states has only meaningfully existed since the decolonization of the 1950s or the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991.
Take another Olympian fallacy: World order is a succession of unipolar orders led by
superpowers – Britain, America, and as the baton is (violently or peacefully) passed westward,
inevitably China. How neat and simple – and wrong. Neither British- nor American-dominated eras
were peaceful or stable. Britain faced rebellion from Ireland to India – policing yourself doesn’t
mean being a de facto global policeman. The Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars hardly
imply Britain dictating all global affairs. America soared in economic and military prestige after
World War I, but then came Hitler and World War II in Europe and Asia, followed by U.S.-Soviet
bipolarity with proxy wars from Latin America to Africa to the Middle East to Indochina. Again,
unipolarity can only be said to have emerged in 1991, but the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Balkan
wars, Rwandan genocide and Congolese civil war and the nuclear tests of 1998 by India and
Pakistan don’t suggest a world under America’s thumb. The 2003 invasion of Iraq backfired
spectacularly, and already by 2005, China was throwing commercial and military lifelines to a dozen
countries America had labeled "rogue states," from Venezuela to Iran to North Korea.
The word "order" implies an era stretching decades, but the "unipolar moment" coined by
Charles Krauthammer in 1990 proved to be just that. Ask yourself: When did the "global rules-based
international order" – the phrase always at the tip of any talking head’s tongue – really exist? When
did United Nations-centered multilateralism prove decisive in arbitrating among great powers? Our
vision of "orders" bears little resemblance to reality. A catalog of global mythologies matches our
national ones.
Measuring raw power – territorial and population size, economic weight and industrial
output, natural resources and technological prowess – denotes "order" on paper alone. But the
reality of order is a messier milieu shaped by geography, alliances and diplomacy. Even the deftest
statecraft has proven to be nothing more than a brief respite from the true norm of geopolitical life:
entropy. If we are to find any order in the future, it will need to be, paradoxically, within the
relentless diffusion of power rather than in its concentration.
Globalization is the singular force that has accelerated this ever more decentralized global
order. The foundations of global trade were laid by Britain and America, but Western outsourcing to
Asia hastened the rise of Japan and China, and now everyone else as well, allowing each region to
claim an active role in global value chains. Mapping supply chains for computers, cars and
semiconductors makes clear that so many goods should be relabeled "Made everywhere."
Globalization thus began with imperial power, but it has become something greater than its
progenitors. Its foundation is no longer the static territory of states but the dense networks within
which they and other units function. Connectivity is the system itself, a playing field that no one
power controls. Any two states across the globe can exchange goods, capital and technology.
Witness how globalization has been declared dead four times in just the past two decades: After the
9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, with the financial crisis of 2007, the twin shocks of Brexit and Trump
in 2016 and in 2020 during the COVID pandemic. Yet onward it marches in the flows of goods,
services, capital, technology and people.
Just because globalization is no longer only "made in America," doesn’t mean it must wither.
To the contrary, globalization is both our universally expanding physical and digital networks and
the sum of all cross-border interactions that rely upon them. It is made up of all international
transactions, not just the ones Washington likes. Today, we have not one version of globalization but
competing American, European and Chinese systems and rules for military hardware, satellite
technology, electric vehicles and Internet regulation. With so many spiders spinning threads of
transport, energy and communications infrastructures, the capacity for global connectivity has
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reached unprecedented heights. Great powers rise and fall, while the global matrix steadily
advances and subsumes us. America built the Internet but can no longer shut it down.
Globalization, then, has become a deeper layer of order than one power or the other, whether
America or China, or even the rivalry between them. It empowers ever more nodes – states, cities,
companies – that compete and collaborate with each other. State power is not absolute but relational.
Order, to the extent it exists, is a vignette of relative leverage. The 21st century far more resembles
medieval Europe on a global scale than Pax Americana or Pax Sinica.
There are many reasons China was never going to become a singular global hegemon. For one
thing, even as the world’s largest economy, it represents a mere 15 percent of global GDP. By
contrast, at the end of World War II, the United States accounted for 50 percent of the global
economy. Population and economic growth have created a world of many multitrillion-dollar
economies less dependent on a single anchor.
Perhaps even more importantly, no society on Earth, save for China itself, wants China to lead
the world. The ink was barely dry on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) before it was heralded as
China’s blueprint for global domination. But while BRI has offered Chinese-style modernization, the
African and Asian societies where it has been deployed have lasting memories of colonial
subjugation and Cold War manipulation. They are all on high alert against Chinese neo-
mercantilism. A debt trap and default such as Sri Lanka becomes the exception to the rule: One
should use China to stimulate industry and draw the interest of Western investors rather than
become a cog in its imperial machinery.
Rather than BRI recreating the British East India Company’s muscular ascendance, it is the
backlash against it that has become the more important story. Whereas it took 300 years for Afro-
Asian colonies to eventually oust the British, countries from Nigeria to Indonesia have pushed back
on BRI in a mere three years. European colonizers didn’t have to reckon with actual sovereignty;
China does.
The China Cassandras of 2016 also missed the West’s reactions to China’s actions. In the years
since BRI launched, America, Europe, and Japan have launched more than a dozen initiatives to
counter BRI, with G-7 governments – rallying under the banner of Build Back Better World (B3W) –
at their June summit at Schloss Elmau in Germany announcing $600 billion in financing for
sustainable infrastructure from Angola to Laos, precisely the countries China has most infiltrated.
Again, it is global networks at play, with the West shifting investment from China to friends and
allies elsewhere across Asia, accelerating the rise of confident new powers such as India and
Indonesia who will flex against China and forge their own new connections across the Indian and
Pacific oceans.
If global order has a visible emergent structure, then, it is a multipolar world of meaningful
continental regions, with North America, South America, Europe and Africa becoming ever more
coherent and integrated – and Asia itself multipolar with China, Japan, India, Australia and Russia
each asserting its interests. But no region is a bloc. Rather, they are sponges. Witness the rapid rise of
the "Quad" comprising the U.S. and Asian democracies, which some liken to a "Global NATO," and
Europe’s commitment to robust Indo-Pacific engagement through free trade agreements and naval
operations.
Last month, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s adviser Jens Plötner caused a firestorm by soft-pedaling
on Russia and China. An axis of Berlin, Moscow and Beijing – Ribbentrop, Molotov, and Mao – as a
counterweight to Anglo-American dominance evoked conspiratorial Orwellian imagery: Eurasia
and Eastasia forging an alliance against Oceania. But such a specter will never materialize amidst
each power’s multidirectional opportunism. Remember that the Soviets saw China as a threat in the
1960s after Mao’s nuclear tests, thus seeking detente with – and pipelines to – the West. Two
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generations later, an estranged Russia has tilted back to Asia’s giants China and India as its main
partners, even though India is also a founding "Quad" member.
My fellow academics excel at oversimplified models of geopolitics. But reality usually has a
different opinion. Beware grand proclamations aimed at defining our times and those that lie over
the horizon. Such coinage likely captures the moment that has just passed and is all but guaranteed
to soon be passé. The scarier the scenario we conjure, the more the actors in the system overreact to
prevent it from occurring. The system thus evolves in nonlinear directions.
This is the simplest definition of complexity, a situation that arises precisely because of the
innumerable connections and chain reactions enabled by a globalized world. States don’t singularly
impose their version of order on the system. Rather, they push within the system – and the system
pushes back.
Neither America nor China have proven particularly clever at deciphering this complexity.
This would entail anticipating the reactions to their actions, and thus acting differently a priori.
Perhaps this would have meant the U.S. not invading Iraq or pushing for Ukrainian membership in
NATO, which provoked Russia’s numerous spasms ever since. Better foresight from Beijing might
have meant China not dumping its excess steel and surplus workers on countries and turning their
populations against it.
World War III has been predicted a dozen times since the Cold War ended, especially in 2014
on the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I. But whenever it happens, World War III
won’t look like World War I or II, for they already happened. History doesn’t repeat itself, and even
its rhymes are off-key. If World War III does break out between the U.S. and China, count on Europe
to reap the rewards as a safe haven, and on other Asian powers to become the more trusted faces of
globalization. We don’t know which power, if any, will prevail, but we know that the system carries
on with each turn of the historical wheel.
If every power took to heart what we now know about complex system dynamics, we might
choose a new path. "Grand strategy" is the term for each power’s blueprint for channeling its
resources to promote its vision for the world. Yet each grand strategy – whether Rome’s or
London’s, Napoleon’s or Hitler’s, Washington’s or Beijing’s – has always met the same fate: imperial
overstretch, domestic decadence, backlash and decline. It’s become as predictable as time moving
forward.
Why not supplement our futile grand strategies with an element of global strategy, a rational
according to every society of some dignified role in the global division of labor? Beyond this, we
might share some resources to stave off global ills such as pandemics and climate change.
Technology transfer to promote renewable energy, robust new trade partnerships to expand value
chains and grow markets and skills partnerships to fill gaping labor shortages – these are just some
of the many obvious priorities that greater and lesser powers already agree upon but should more
formally codify into law and institutions. Such maturity – a super-ego for the world – is what
continued connectivity and globalization represent even as some powers seek to manipulate it for
their own narrow interests.
As a 20-year-old sitting on the hard carpet floor of the Freie Universität zu Berlin’s library on
Garystrasse, I encountered the works of famed British historian Arnold Toynbee. In his hastily
written book "Civilization on Trial," composed amidst the ashes of World War II with U.S.-Soviet
nuclear bipolarity firmly in view, he forcefully argued that we have no choice but to acknowledge
that we have become one global civilization – "Civilization with a big ‘C’," as he put it. He was wise
in observing the advent of an interdependent planetary system, but naive in prescribing a single
world government as salvation. The arc of history, which Toynbee more thoroughly documented
than any scholar, is actually toward more small "c" civilizational centers that flourish as the lessons
of their predecessors radiate through commercial and knowledge networks.
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A world with no center sounds like chaos, yet the most desirable order is one in which
everyone connects but nobody controls.
(Source: Zeit Online)

IF AMERICA REFUSES TO LEAD GLOBALIZATION, CHINA WILL

Peter Morici (Economist and emeritus business professor at the University of Maryland)
Skeptics are criticizing western sanctions on Russia and COVID-19-inspired hardening of
supply chains, as nails in the coffin of globalization, but don’t count on it. The only question is who
leads.
Connecting civilizations through commerce and finance is an ancient and unyielding process.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) haven’t
evolved effectively with big power competition and they will eventually be replaced by an Asian-
centered order.
After World War II, the IMF was established to maintain fixed exchange rates to enable
commerce and short-circuit a repeat of the competitive currency devaluations of the 1930s. Since the
advent of market-determined exchange rates, it has proven useless to resolve the complaints about
governments suppressing currency values to gain competitive advantages.
China’s Belt and Road and European and American responses are weaponizing development
finance, and the World Bank can do little about it.
President Donald Trump’s bilateralism with China was hardly novel. President Bill Clinton
extracted concessions from Japan with 100% tariffs on luxury sedans, and complimentary regional
deals parallel the entire history of the WTO.
Carson Wentz can throw it deep, but Commanders’ supporting cast allows team to do more
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created to reduce tariffs to
encourage market-driven trade and international democratic order. As tariffs came down, it took on
product standards, subsidies, the protection of intellectual property and other issues. Rechristened
the WTO in 1995, it formalized a dispute settlement process that had evolved ad hoc.
In the early 1950s, Germany and Japan were only admitted after democracy and market
economies were reestablished. Western governments had issues with the Japanese industrial policies
until its breakneck growth hit the wall in the 1990s, but it was never perceived as a threat to the
western democratic order.
In contrast, Russia and China were admitted into the WTO after the Cold War under the false
premise that trade would help establish democracy, and these rogue states have exploited the
bounty to attack democracy.
Moscow found vast markets for oil, natural gas, nonferrous metals and agricultural products.
Russian President Vladimir Putin jailed dissenters, enriched oligarchs and invested in a large army
and military technology and cyber tools to undermine western elections, and subverted U.S. efforts
to stabilize the Middle East.
Former iron curtain states of Eastern Europe enjoying political and economic freedom and
prospering within the EU pose a threat by example to Putin’s repressive kleptocracy. His response is
to oppose further expansion of the EU and NATO and invade Georgia, the Crimea and now
Ukraine.
China has exploited the letter and spirit of WTO rules with huge state subsidies, technology
theft and opaque market-access barriers and the deft subversion of the WTO dispute settlement
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mechanism. It aspires to global dominance in semiconductors, 5G wireless, electric vehicles and

artificial intelligence.
Meanwhile, Beijing underinvests in public health and rural development, squanders wealth
with an internal security system and to persecute Muslims in Xinjiang. It is building the world’s
largest Navy to intimidate neighbors in the Western Pacific, project power globally and take Taiwan
by force.
China offers its autocratic market-socialism as an alternative to democracy and has no more
place in the WTO than Russia or North Korea, which thankfully is not a member.
Especially in semiconductors and electric vehicles, the United States and EU are fashioning
counter initiatives to Chinese industrial policy-aggression, but this hardly means the end of
globalization. The economies of scale required in these and other high-tech industries require large
markets and exports for domestic industrial policies to succeed.
President Barack Obama championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to foster trade
among like-minded nations, but Mr. Trump—and now President Joe Biden, want no part in it.
Unfortunately, Mr. Biden’s policies are hostage to progressive intellectuals and organized
labor who see free-markets and free trade as the devil’s workshop. They fashion those as harmful to
the interests of minorities, women and whatever other oppressed groups the executive class of the
progressive left can dupe to secure political leverage and sinecures in academia, non-profits and
government.
Mr. Biden initiated an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which permits countries to
individually op into arrangements on trade, supply chains, the green transition and anti-corruption.
Details are limited and U. S. offers little in the way of additional market access.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen touts friend shoring among likeminded nations to secure
supply chains against disruption but again, offers few carrots to inspire cooperation.
China has created its own Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It has applied to
join the TPP though it would unlikely accomplish membership if the United States rejoined.
With either China or the United States in the TPP, a new Asian centered trade organization
will replace the WTO—the UK is joining and pressure is building for the EU to apply.
America has a choice—it can lead globalization by reembracing free trade through the TPP, or
leave the door open for China and its antidemocratic values.
(Source: The Washington Times)
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Governance
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Zafar U. Ahmed (The author of Pakistan: Principles of Public Policy Redefined — How to fast track
progress and win over citizens)
Before proposing solutions to the economic governance challenge, it is useful to briefly review
the current position. Loans, deferred payments, lowering currency value etc can give temporary
relief but it is not the answer to Pakistan’s economic woes. They have not worked in the past and
cannot work now. First, the problem needs to be properly identified and then possible solutions
found.
Pakistan’s economy can be divided into three sectors:
(1) Fifty-eight per cent of GDP of $380 billion is classified as the services sector — including
wholesale and retail trade, and transport and storage. Pakistan’s annual services exports amount to
$7bn of which ICT services contribute $2.5bn. For context, India’s technology exports alone amount
to $150bn. Services export can earn foreign exchange at a lower cost than commodities. As a small
proportion of a country’s exports, services may reflect inadequate development of human capital.
(2) The industrial/manufacturing sector accounts for some 20pc of GDP. But there are limited
goods that can compete in the international market — despite regulations and subsidies favouring
big businesses and exporters. This is the basic weakness in Pakistan’s economy.
Around 37pc of the country’s population is engaged in agriculture, and a larger percentage
indirectly related to agricultural income. Some of the main industries are based on agriculture,
including textile, fertiliser, farm machinery etc. Exports are still primarily agriculture-based. But
agriculture suffers from inefficiency — livestock milk production is at a quarter of its potential;
sometimes crop spoilage is up to a third of output; in some instances, the fruit/horticulture export
prices received were far lower than what was received by international market leaders.
There is an indefensible gap of $48bn in FY22 between higher imports and lower exports.
Remittances from overseas workers ($31bn) are almost equal to the exports and fill a large part of
the trade gap. Net annual foreign (multilateral and bilateral) inflows were only about $5bn. For
decades, Pakistan has been walking on tightrope over this trade gap, resorting to borrowing from
the IMF and friendly countries. Many commodity exports are contingent upon receiving ‘favoured’
status from importer countries, while Pakistan’s overseas workers are mainly less skilled and
relatively replaceable. It is an unequal/supplicant relationship with buyers.
The majority of citizens are currently facing financial difficulties. Yet, a UN-sponsored report
(National Human Development Report) shows that some Rs2,600bn (2017-18 data) is being given as
privileges to powerful vested interest groups. “It involves special and favoured treatment of the
privileged in laws, rules and regulations, along with preferential treatment by public institutions”
through the taxation system, cheaper inputs, higher output prices and preferential access. “The
corporate sector is the beneficiary of the greatest privileges, including both industry and the banking
sector.” Compare that to the government’s total revenue Rs5,874bn July-March, FY22. And the
government borrowed Rs1,765bn July-May FY22 for budgetary support.
Even a sincere and competent government, which lacks stability and the full authority
mandated by the Constitution cannot undertake the required reforms. No single political party or
even the military can take on the entrenched interest groups. But the objectives of national
development must be achieved. Interest groups cannot be allowed to jeopardise these objectives for
their partisan benefits. Political parties and state institutions must come together to ensure this. The
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reform process can begin with a long-term economic governance framework committed to by
political parties and the establishment, which will facilitate sectoral reforms. The following are some
initial points for the framework:
Parliament: a) Remove all unjustified regulations favouring particular interest groups, for
example, in banking, real estate and businesses linked to state institutions. (b) Remove all unjustified
subsidies and concessions, for instance, for big business and state-owned enterprises. Where
concessions/subsidies are deemed necessary for big business, then citizens/the state must receive a
fair share (as new shareholders) of the businesses subsidised with citizens’ hard-earned incomes. (c)
Appoint competent relevant persons, with no conflict of interest, to regulatory bodies. (d) Impose
agricultural income tax at par with other sectors. The land-revenue department should be
streamlined to remove any hindrance to performance in the agriculture sector. (e) Ensure equal
opportunity for all enterprises; those with the most merit can get ahead and then compete in the
international market without depending upon concessions and subsidies. (f) Minimise indirect
taxation.
Justice system: This includes the laws made by parliament, courts (judges, lawyers and court
officials), police/investigation, official prosecution and defence, and prisons. It also includes
relevant ministries, executive magistrates and other law-enforcement agencies. Since these
components come under different administrative units, it is complicated to implement reforms.
Therefore, a mechanism must be established for effective coordination. Interest groups cannot be
allowed to hinder quick adjudication — this has to be overcome; economic activity is hampered if
quick and just adjudication is not available. In addition, clear criteria need to be agreed upon for the
selection of judges and benches to be formed on the basis of a set formula.
Government servants: Selection/postings should be done on the basis of given criteria,
without reference to the wishes of influential elements. Tenure cannot be unrelated to performance.
Agriculture: The most efficient water conveyance and distribution method, as developed by
technical experts, must be implemented. Agricultural taxation should be imposed at par with the
rest. Recognising the importance of agriculture in the country’s economy, professional management
may be required in agricultural institutions.
Services: This sector should be strongly encouraged to give due importance to exports. The
government must upgrade its export promotion services and put in place professional management.
Unstable governments with circumscribed authority cannot overcome interest groups. How
far such a governance framework can be agreed upon and then implemented will determine the
long-term economic viability of the country. A strong and prosperous country reflects upon its
citizens as well as state institutions.
(Source: Dawn)

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

Dr Shuja Ahmed Mahesar (Professor and Director (Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro)
The menace of sectarianism and religiously inspired extremism has affected the lives of people
across the globe. The most dangerous effect of religious extremism is that it breeds violence and
destabilizes the social, political, and economic structure of society. The religiously motivated
ideology of extremism is used to persuade people to develop hostilities against those who deviate
from the path set by extremist ideology. These inter-creed hostilities not only destroy social relations
but also cause the disintegration of social institutions. Terrorist organizations through acts of
violence and sectarian conflicts challenge the writ of the state to achieve their political interests.
Extremism phenomena are destroying Muslim societies by producing fanaticism, hate, and narrow-
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mindedness. It causes intolerance which insidiously penetrates ethnic, religious, educational, and
political fields. In the religious sphere, there is intolerance towards the beliefs of other sects. People
with an extremist way of thinking don’t accommodate people who disagree with their rigid point of
view and unleash violence against their ideological as well as political opponents. They have a sense
of self-righteousness, and they believe that they have the right to impose their beliefs on a
beleaguered segment of society. This tendency is also seeping into every aspect of the social and
political system of our country. Thus, the elimination of extremism is a formidable challenge faced
by Pakistan.
Pakistan was created on the basis of Islamic ideology. The purpose of its creation was to
safeguard the political, economic, and social rights of Muslims. After the making of Pakistan, the
rights of all citizens of the state were protected. All citizens began to be treated equal and they were
free to profess and practice their faith. The founder of Pakistan Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad Ali
Jinnah envisioned Pakistani society in his historic address on August 11, 1947. He said: “You are
free, you are free to go to temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship
in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with
the business of the state. In the course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims would
cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of every individual,
but in the political sense as citizens of the state” This clearly indicates that religion was not supposed
to be used for political purpose and one community should not be promoted at the expense of the
other communities.
However, in the past, religion has been used to capture, perpetuate, and legitimize power. For
instance, Zia Period (1977-1988) was an example of the religionization of politics. His religious
policies created polarization among various classes in society and widened the gulf between
different sectarian groups. His regime patronized the wave of sectarian divide and nurtured
extremism. In addition, political intolerance was rooted in society by replacing joint electorates with
separate electorates which further sowed the seeds of hatred among minority communities. During
the Zia regime, religious feelings were further exploited in the wake of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The United States was able to convince Muslims that this invasion posed a serious
threat to the existence of Islam. Pakistan and the US made an alliance and developed friendliness
with Islamist groups in Afghanistan by declaring the Soviet Union their common enemy. It resulted
in the mushroom growth of Madressahs and the process of radicalization began to develop its roots
in society. Some Madressahs maintained close ties with radical, sectarian, militant, and political
groups in the country. Some religious parties also played role in the growth of extremism and
disharmony. The spread of hate was converted into sectarian violence. However, the expansion of
the militant landscape posed a serious threat to peace and harmony in society. All religious parties
benefited from the gullible nature of people around them and promoted their ideologies and
accomplished their political tasks. They also promoted perniciously their extremist ideas and made
the Madrassas vehicles of hatred for other creeds, and sects.
The recent history of extremism indicates that the successive governments adopted a policy of
appeasement and remained reluctant to take kinetic action against the extremist groups and put the
lives of innocent citizens at the mercy of extremist hordes. Such dereliction of duties on the part of
authorities allowed extremist forces to multiply in a conducive environment. However, in the recent
past, the state took concrete initiatives to eliminate extremism and stop unprecedented growth in
religious heterogeneity and radicalization. Its narrative was made to counter growing extremism.
The Paigham-I-Pakistan narrative was launched in 2018 through joint efforts of the Council of
Islamic Ideology and Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for stemming extremism and
radicalization among youth through real and virtual platforms. The aim of this narrative is to
promote cultural diversity and interfaith dialogue, national integration social cohesion and youth
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engagement in positive activities. This narrative is to respect religious diversity and value social, and
cultural expressions. It can be argued that this peace narrative in combination with Sufism-related
thoughts and values can contribute to inclusiveness and plurality in society which is so essential for
peace and harmony.
It is expected that government will take tangible action against the extremist elements and
show its resolve against militancy by restricting their movements and weaning them away from
disseminating hate speech after the launch National Security Policy (NSP) earlier this year. The
further new policy of National Counter Violent Extremism (NCVE) has been enforced to create
collaboration among federal and provincial institutions and promote coordination among law
enforcement agencies. It has been made part of a wider counter-terrorism strategy framework. It is
also aimed at the state’s regulation of educational and religious institutions and seeks to bring social
change through curriculum and pedagogy reforms.
In the above activities, a close relationship between state and society will bring synergy and
harmony in their thoughts for building peace and implementing counternarrative against the
complex extremist ideology and promote reconciliation of state laws and social values for achieving
a common goal. Religious scholars can play a vital role in promoting moderation and tolerance as an
essence of Islamic teachings. Islam’s message of peace for mankind is a universal principle that
guides all followers and believers of different religions and creeds about creating a spirit of
coexistence and maintaining peace in the world. This idea of Islam dispels the ideological clash
among various cultures and facilitates interfaith dialogue among various civilizations.
Moreover, the pervasiveness of extremism can be further countered by the development of
community resilience through active citizenship and community engagement. Community resilience
can be strengthened by reformed education, Sufism and cultural festivities, participation of civil
society, speedy social justice, implementation rule of law, youth engagement, effective governance,
the democratization of public opinion and mitigation of economic and social disparities which are
key to curb the anatomy of violent religious extremism in Pakistan.
(Source: Daily Times)

EXPLORING ISSUES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE RULE OF LAW IN PAKISTAN
Dr Shuja Ahmed Mahesar (Director, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro)
It can be argued that the rule of law has become indispensable for maintaining peace and
political stability leading to economic progress in society. Effective performance of government
institutions, maintenance of peace, development of resources and administration of justice, human
security and protection of liberty and equality of all citizens depend on the level of implementation
of rule of law in society. Rule of law reduces administrative corruption, eliminates malpractices, and
protects people from injustices by protecting them from various maladies including red-tapism and
abuse of discretionary powers. It improves hierarchical structure, a delegation of powers and other
principles of administration to execute public policy efficiently, economically, and expeditiously.
Professor Dicey gave a classical explanation of rule of law in his book “Law of Constitution”
published in 1885. It states that law is supreme, and nobody is superior to the laws of the state.
Professor Dicey’s concept is based on three principles. First, the rule of law means that no person can
be punished until and unless he is proved guilty of violating the law. For instance, in the case of
illegal detention, courts are empowered to examine the grounds of detention under writ jurisdiction.
Secondly, rule of law means that nobody is above the law. Everyone, whatsoever his rank or
position is subject to the ordinary law. Both government officials, as well as private individuals, are
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accountable under the law. Thirdly, the rule of law refers to judicial decisions that determine the
rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts. It is the duty of judges to
safeguard the inviolable rights and liberties of people. This notion establishes the equality of all
citizens before the courts of law and ensures the protection of human rights and property rights. It
also rationalises the fair and efficient process of implementation, administration and adjudication of
law adopted for the dispensation of impartial, affordable, and accessible justice without delay.
Further, it encourages the resolution of disputes on the grounds of natural justice, equity, and
fairness, in the cases of recognizable rights.
According to the World Justice Project (WJP), Rule of Law index 2021, Pakistan is ranked at
130, which indicates that Pakistan is one of those few countries where there is the weakest adherence
to rule of law. Despite having constitutional procedures and conventions, rule of law has not yet
been fully implemented and as a result, the country grapples with a governance crisis.
Weak enforcement of rule of law provides space for criminals and elite offenders to enjoy
impunity. Thus, the primary duty of the government is to establish the supremacy of law by
discouraging the legacy of the authoritarian way of powerful elites dealing with public institutions.
Progress regarding the enforcement of rule of law cannot be quantified. However, the level of
institutional loyalty to the state and its constitution, decisions of courts, instant relief to aggrieved
persons, control over cognizable and non-cognizable offences, the performance of urban and rural
policing, level of juvenile delinquency, public order handling and nature of bureaucratic attitudes
indicate the extent of the rule of law in our society. Cooperation among all stakeholders including
political leaders, academic and research scholars, civil and military bureaucracy, print and electronic
media, social media, lawyers, and members of civil society can significantly improve the systematic
execution of laws. Nevertheless, rule of law can only be established by removing lapses in the
criminal justice system and by ensuring across-the-board accountability of all without sparing
sacred cows.
Weak and toothless institutions cannot achieve the tasks including protection of life and
property of people and their belated response provide open ground to the offenders for violating the
law of land. To restore the credibility of institutions, the government should take concrete steps to
strengthen the institutional capacity and empower them to protect the life and liberty of people and
their fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan. Pakistani society has not yet
been liberated from the clutches of slavery of the feudal mindset. Women, children and poor
workers face a lot of violence and unfair treatment in society mainly because of the lack of rule of
law. In the absence of rule of law, the local power elites dominate the society by subjugating the
poor masses. Feudal lords have strong connections with bureaucracy and police, and they use these
state organs for their gains. Thus, feudalism has emerged as one of the biggest obstacles to the way
of enforcement of rule of law. Lack of awareness among people about their constitutional rights also
causes the poor implementation of rule of law. Luckily, our media has become a boisterous
watchdog and thus can educate the masses about the fundamental rights of people and motivate
them to respect rule of law and highlight the need for making of new laws by parliament to deal
with the new problems and emerging situations as an outcome of technological change in society.
There are some disturbing trends in Pakistani society. The middle-class is not strong across
Pakistan and still succumbs to opportunism and greed. It lacks principled and incorruptible
leadership. The lower strata of society in our country are engaged in fighting one another over tribe,
ethnicity, caste and creed, or other such related issues. This is the reason why the upper-class elites
can easily exploit the middle and lower classes. Enforcement of rule of law can protect communities
against various forms of exploitation and intimidation. Thus, the state should develop a long-term
strategy for effective execution of rule of law to regulate the relationship between various classes.
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Rule of Law provides the means to maintain law and order and it helps to create social
control. It strengthens the beliefs of people in the supremacy of law and provides an opportunity
for all people to have access to justice. In this way, it prevents the flagrant violation of laws and
reduces the sense of deprivation among people regarding injustice which tends to destabilise
peace and harmony in society. We are facing a big challenge of terrorism and religiously inspired
acts of violence, militancy, and extremism. Thus, the state needs to establish a rule of law and
demonstrate zero tolerance towards hate narratives which are disseminated through different
platforms of media to trap our youth via cyberspace which has been used as a source of spreading
extremist ideas and religious intolerance. In some cases, incarcerated militants keep continuing to
spread extremist hate messages behind the bars. Government must act against the already banned
organisations by stopping them from disseminating hate speeches. Thus, the communication
network of these extremist outfits and their ‘string-pullers’ must be dismantled by freezing their
financial transactions. Further, the militants must be dealt with according to provisions of the
Anti-Terrorism Act.
Judiciary can play important role in creating supremacy of law and preventing abuse of
executive authority. Article 184 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 provides
that the supreme court has original jurisdiction in any dispute between any two or more
governments. Article 185 gives authority to the court to hear and determine the appeals from
judgements, decrees, final orders, or sentences of a high court. Further, it has advisory jurisdiction
for giving an opinion on any legal matter. Like US supreme court Pakistan’s supreme court has also
the power of judicial review. It can declare the laws null &void in case these laws are repugnant to
the constitution. The Supreme court not only interprets the constitution, but also safeguards it.
Further, it interprets the laws enacted by the legislature and enforced by executive authority. In
Pakistan like most other developing countries higher judiciary in the absence of strong
accountability and check & balance system, exercises the ‘countervailing power’ to check the
bureaucratic abuse of power.
The extent of rule of law is one of the key indicators for evaluating the performance of a
democratic government. Both the civil and military institutions should collaborate to establish rule
of law by working within the constitutional framework. Judiciary can ensure rule of law by
increasing the efficiency of the justice system. It is required to improve the civil and criminal justice
system to restore public confidence in the administration of justice. Moreover, people who believe in
the reign of law rise above their religious, political, ethnic and class affiliations in support of
monocracy.
(Source: Daily Times)
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History
PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL PARALYSIS
Imtiaz Ali (Teaches International Relations at the University of Karachi)
Nadeem Hussain (Economic and education policy researcher and strategist)
Seventy-five years ago, a country was founded to protect the political, economic, and socio-
cultural interests of the Muslims of the sub-continent. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, achieved it through a persistent political and democratic process. He might have wanted to
see Pakistan as a constitutional state where no one would be discriminated on the basis of caste,
creed or religion. One of the reasons behind the creation of Pakistan was the fear of Hindu
domination and persecution of the masses by the elite.
Lawyers, teachers, students, small landowners and peasants sacrificed their lives to fulfil the
dream. The Pakistan movement was a feat of collective consciousness of the working class people
who wanted an independent state that could uphold fundamental rights, provide respectable
livelihoods and guarantee peace and prosperity for future generations. Has this dream been fully
realised?
Pakistan’s political journey faced a severe setback with the death of Jinnah in the early days of
Pakistan.
The nation had not come out of grief and loss of Jinnah’s passing when in October 1951,
another tragedy struck it; the first prime minister of the country was killed in broad daylight at
Rawalpindi. The derailment of democracy started with the death of Liaquat Ali Khan. It continues to
date. Removal of Khawaja Nazimuddin’s ministry through an order of the governor general
reminds us that a stable political government was not a priority. Mohammad Ali Bogra tried hard
but like his predecessor failed against the nexus of civil-military bureaucracy. After Bogra,
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar, and Feroz
Khan Noon proved chessboard pawns.
Martial law was imposed in 1958. It gave the establishment direct control of the country’s
resources. Ayub Khan, and later his successor Yahya Khan, ran Pakistan like their personal fiefs.
Ayub’s licence regime and Yahya’s patronage politics crippled Pakistan’s political institutions.
Serious political conflict erupted between the East and West wings of Pakistan when the elite of
West Pakistan refused to accept the democratic majority of the East. As the political institutions lost
credibility, people took to the streets and tried to resolve the matters in their various ways. This led
to a military operation in East Pakistan and disintegration of the country.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first elected prime minister, picked up the pieces and started efforts to
rebuild Pakistan. He gave the country a democratic constitution. His land reforms were welcomed
by the peasantry. He also laid the foundation of an independent foreign policy and built strong
relations with the Gulf countries.
However, his treatment of nationalist parties in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was
deplorable. His government set a bad precedent in violating fundamental human rights, and curbed
press freedom. The anti-Bhutto movement resulted in another martial law.
Zia ul Haq’s martial law banned all political parties in Pakistan. He abrogated the
constitution, and imprisoned politicians, rights activists, lawyers, journalists, civil society members
and random citizens.
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Zia ruled over Pakistan for about eleven years, exercising near absolute power, showing
contempt for the constitution and disdain for democracy. His legacy has been religious extremism,
polarisation of the society, drugs and the Kalashnikov culture.
Democracy returned in 1988 with the election of first female prime minister of the Muslim
World, Benazir Bhutto. But the prime minister, her cabinet and the parliament were vulnerable as a
powerful president exercised arbitrary powers. Disagreements with the president became the reason
for Miss Bhutto and later, Nawaz Sharif’s departure from the prime minister’s office. For almost a
decade, prime-ministership was rotated between the two leaders. This era ended with another coup
- by Gen Pervez Musharraf.
Musharraf began with a vision of an enlightened and progressive Pakistan but ended up like
other military rulers. He led Pakistan into the War Against Terrorism that cost around $123 billion in
collateral damage and a loss of almost 75,000 lives. His Balochistan operation created a deep divide
in the province.
In his last years, Musharraf lost control over power, announced general elections and allowed
former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to return.
From 2008 to 2013 democratic governments fought deadly terrorism, ethnic violence, and
sectarian conflicts. The first democratic transition occurred in 2013. The new government of Nawaz
Sharif faced constant opposition from the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. Pressure groups like the
Tehreek-i-Labbaik and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) were used to undermine and challenge
the rule and the legitimacy of the PML-N government. In the end, the apex court disqualified the
prime minister on corruption charges. In the 2018 general elections, the PTI won a majority. The
opposition cried foul and blamed the establishment for the results. The establishment finally sent
Khan packing through a vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly.
This sordid saga of Pakistan’s political paralysis is multifaceted. The massive involvement of
the establishment in politics has crippled political institutions. Rigging of the political process and
repression of genuine political voices has created a political vacuum. The political institutions have
become so weak that they are easily manipulated. This causes apathy and distrust in the system.
Those who have power and connections get their way without following due process.
Infighting amongst political parties is another important factor in Pakistan’s political
paralysis. It started with the war between the PPP and the Awami League and its current
manifestation can be seen in the PML-N and the PTI rivalry.
Another thing that renders political parties weak is the absence of democratic processes within
the parties. Regular intra-party elections are not allowed and most parties operate like personal or
family enterprises.
In developed democracies, political parties play a crucial role in safeguarding the constitution
and the democracy. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, political parties could not become genuine
institutions and remained family enterprises. Dynastic politics kill the spirit of democracy and
constitutionalism. This is why when dictators strike against political leaders the masses do not resist.
They feel marginal to the system and are not ready to take to the streets to protect.
Recently, the removal of Imran Khan from office triggered large protest demonstrations in the
urban areas of Pakistan. It is yet to be seen if the PTI can translate this popularity into a sustained
political movement.
The religion-politics mix is another factor causing confusion about the concept of democracy,
constitution and the parliament. Mainstreaming of religiopolitical parties has divided the masses
and hindered the progress of democracy. The recent rise of Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan and their
grassroots support are a wake-up call for mainstream political parties, policymakers and state
institutions.
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This depletion of democratic processes in Pakistan has many impacts. Politics and economy
are intertwined. The former influences the latter and vice versa. Pakistan’s perennial political
turmoil creates uncertainty in the society and abates economic growth.
Pakistan is also facing international isolation. Imran Khan’s presence in the wrong country at
the wrong time has left the wrong impression. Further, his rhetoric of a “foreign hand” in his
removal from office has alienated the US. Unconditional support for the Afghan Taliban might be a
risky policy option for the country.
To address all these issues, the country needs a stable political environment. This can be
achieved by making the political institutions more inclusive and open. Continuity of democracy is
indispensable if Pakistan wants to move forward. The prime minister should be accountable to the
parliament. The judiciary should dispense justice and interpret the constitution rather than repair or
reform it. The responsibility for law making lies with the parliament. Sending elected prime ministers
to gallows or jails will only bring further political paralysis and a bad name to the establishment. The
economy can only be saved by ensuring true representation of the people. Economic stability requires
political harmony, and that has been desperately missing in our 75-year story.
(Source: TNS)

PAKISTAN AND THE SOVIET OCCUPATION

Bruce Riedel (Senior fellow and director of the Brookings Institution)
Note: This article is based on excerpts from the book ‘What We Won: America’s Secret War in
Afghanistan, 1979–89’ by Bruce Riedel.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Zia asked General Akhtar, his ISI Chief, for an
appraisal of the threat posed by the invasion. Akhtar predicted that sooner or later the Russians
would invade Baluchistan, seeking a warm- water port on the Arabian Sea. In his assessment,
Pakistan was caught between the Russians to the west and India to the east and sooner or later they
would join together to destroy Pakistan. To prevent that, he recommended that Pakistan
substantially increase its aid to the mujahedin, thereby bogging Moscow down in a quagmire.
In Zia’s time (1977-1988) the ISI grew under the leadership of General Akhtar Abdul Rahman
– better known simply as General Akhtar – a Pashtun who knew the Afghan world well. His own
subordinates described him as “a cold, reserved personality, almost inscrutable, always secretive.”
Akhtar fought in the 1948, 1965, and 1971 wars with India; consequently, he saw India as Pakistan’s
“implacable enemy.” He taught for several years at the Kakul Military Academy, and he was posted
to England for advanced military training in the late 1960s. Akhtar hated publicity and the press,
avoided being photographed, and was “inscrutable” to even his most senior lieutenants, but he was
a gifted intelligence officer. He developed close working ties to many of the Afghan mujahedin
leaders, especially fellow Pashtuns, and organized them into political parties to give more legitimacy
to their struggle.
Akhtar vastly expanded the size and strength of the service. According to one estimate, the ISI
went from having a staff of 2,000 in 1978 to having 40,000 employees and a billion-dollar budget by
1988. It came to be seen in Pakistan as omnipotent, allegedly having informants in every village, city
block, and public space and tapping every telephone call. Politicians were on its payroll. Much of its
growth was intended to keep Zia in power, but much of it was to wage jihad. One of Akhtar’s
deputies would later say that “the ISI was and still is probably the most powerful and influential
organization in the country”; he also remarked that Akhtar was “regarded with envy or fear,” even
by his fellow officers.
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The ISI war in Afghanistan had to be covert. Although Zia and Akhtar wanted to bog Moscow
down in a guerrilla war, they did not want to give Russia an excuse to march south to the Arabian
Sea or, even worse, to join forces with India in a two-pronged invasion of Pakistan. The pot in
Afghanistan had to simmer but not boil, at least at the start; if it did boil, it was Akhtar’s job to make
it “boil at the right temperature,” as Zia told him.” The ISI managed the operational aspects of the
war. It collected and assessed intelligence from all sources; controlled the supply of arms and
equipment arriving in Pakistan for the insurgency; trained the mujahedin; selected the targets for
attacks; determined which mujahedin commander got aid and how much; and handled liaison with
the CIA, GID, MI6 (the British intelligence service), and the intelligence agencies of other allies.
Since Pakistan was taking all the risks, Zia and Akhtar insisted on full Pakistani control of the
war and demanded what would later be called “Reagan rules” for managing the relationship
between the ISI and the CIA. The ISI would have sole and complete access to the mujahedin. Aside
from photo ops for visiting VIPs such as members of Congress, Vice President Bush, CIA big wigs,
and others, the Americans had no sustained contact with the mujahedin fighters. All training of the
insurgents was done by Pakistani soldiers.
Managing the mujahedin political parties in Pakistan and the commanders of the fighters was
an endless headache for the ISI. They constantly feuded among themselves in Peshawar, where the
leadership lived in exile, and occasionally fought against each other inside Afghanistan. The only
unity of command came from the ISI.
The Pakistani leadership was not only pivotal for the war in Afghanistan, they were also
pivotal in the final stage of the cold war, which had dominated global politics for almost half a
century. Zia and Akhtar were strategists and diplomats of considerable skill. They put together the
coalition of countries that eventually won the war against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. The
Afghan mujahedin could never have done it alone; they were hopelessly divided and remained so
even after their victory over the Soviets. While Washington and Riyadh were critical partners in the
war effort, they were not on the front lines, taking the greatest risks. Only Pakistan could play that
part, and the Pakistani leadership of that time embraced it with passion and enthusiasm. The
decision to fight Moscow was an extraordinarily bold move. The ISI knew, for example, that General
Akhtar was at the top of the KGB’s hit list, with a huge bounty on his head.
From the earliest days of the Afghan war, Zia had already begun planning for the next stage
in the jihad, turning east toward India and Kashmir. Some of the US assistance that was earmarked
for the Afghan jihad was diverted to the Kashmir project and the ISI started helping Kashmiris. A
series of clandestine meetings between the ISI and Kashmiri militants from Indian-controlled
Kashmir were held, many of them in Saudi Arabia. Zia and General Akhtar were directly involved
in the Kashmir project. In 1983 some Kashmiris began training in the ISI’s Afghan camps. Zia,
Akhtar, and the ISI also reached out to other groups in Kashmir, including the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), which had been founded in 1977 in Birmingham, England, by Kashmiris
living in the United Kingdom. The JKLF was much more sympathetic to Kashmiri independence
than to joining Pakistan. It also was reluctant to take ISI help at first, but Akhtar opened talks with
the group in 1984, and by 1987 JKLF militants also were training at the ISI camps.
Meanwhile, in the mid-1980s Sikh nationalists sought to create a Sikh homeland in India, to be
called Khalistan. In 1983 the Sikh independence movement took control of the Sikh holy city of
Amritsar, and the Indian army responded with a major attack on the Sikhs. It ended in a furious
military assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar and hundreds of deaths on both sides. Indira
Gandhi, the iron lady of Indian politics, was assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards a year later.
The largest supply depot for the ISI’s war in Afghanistan was located just outside Rawalpindi
at the Ojhri ammunition storage facility. On April 10, 1988, it was racked by a rippling series of
massive explosions as 10,000 tons of arms and ammunition went up in smoke. More than 100 people
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died in the disaster, including five ISI officers. In 2012 two former Indian intelligence service officers
told me that it was their agency that had sabotaged the facility, to punish Pakistan for helping the
rebels in the Kashmiri and Sikh revolts.
Zia died before the war ended, on August 17, 1988, when the C-130 transport aircraft carrying
him, Akhtar, and the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan crashed into the desert. They had traveled to a
remote training facility to observe a demonstration of a new US tank, which had performed poorly.
After lunch, Zia and his entourage were to return to Islamabad; instead, everyone on board was
killed. Much of the high command of the Pakistani army was dead.
The crash remains a mystery today. An investigation by a joint Pakistani-US air force team
concluded that the crash was the work of criminal acts and sabotage, but it did not identify the
perpetrator. In fact, there seemed to be no interest among either the Pakistanis or the Americans in
identifying the perpetrator of the crash.
It is interesting to speculate on how history might have changed had Zia and Akhtar lived.
Some have argued that unlike Benazir, they would have provided the discipline and cohesion that
the mujahedin needed after the Soviet withdrawal to take Kabul in 1989; they would then have
ended the war early. Zia and Akhtar certainly would have been determined to fight to victory and
not settle for the years of stalemate that in fact followed. Instead, their suspicious death ultimately
left Pakistan without the decisive victory that they craved and a very unstable region.
(Source: The News)

THE 1973 CONSTITUTION

Pakistani democracy’s most-enduring achievement
Ahmer Bilal Soofi (Former Caretaker Federal Law Minister)
As we celebrate 75 years of Independence, we can also breathe a sigh of relief that we are
about to cross almost 50 years of enacting the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.
The present constitution was negotiated in the immediate aftermath of having lost the
territory of East Pakistan in 1971. It has done well to hold together the territories of the Federation
since then. This is no small feat when we consider that the 1973 Constitution stitches together at least
four historically distinct and ethnically diverse territories. Not only were the territories recognised as
separate geographic units but the people living in each region were a nation in their own right.
This is how each unit and its inhabitants, for centuries, have had their own history, norms,
culture, language and ethnicity. Each unit had been larger, and it was through international law
means like the Radcliffe Award, instruments of accessions and referendums that parts of these larger
units and regions were pronounced as territories forming the state of Pakistan. These international
law instruments could not do a clean surgery around 1947 for multiple political reasons, and
therefore some Baloch tribes and territories were left on the Iranian side, the Punjab was divided
between India and Pakistan, the Pathans were split between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Sindhis
on the Pakistani side were separated from those on the Indian side. Therefore, it is perfectly
understandable that there will remain cultural and even political undercurrents to pull away from
the young Federation, and that can only be overcome by allowing greater participation in the affairs
of the new Federation.
In this historic context, the nationalist sentiment as sometimes expressed by regional tribal
leaders, their poets and authors should not be misread or mischaracterised as a betrayal of the
Federation.
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That is where the role of political forces becomes crucial to keep the Federation intact. Both the
small political parties of each federating unit representing their respective ethnic groups and the
national political parties bond together through the constitutional instrument. Only the political
forces can persuade their followers to relinquish the dream of reuniting and instead extend loyalty
towards the Federation. That is why, the very existence and uninterrupted continuation of political
forces per se is a national security compulsion.
Since no federating unit can be compelled for long by force alone, it is the political party or
parties that bring the necessary voluntary compliance and loyalty, on behalf of their people, towards
the constitutional instrument. This ‘voluntary’ following is the major long-term achievement of the
1973 Constitution.
Since it was negotiated with the consent of all the regional parties belonging to all the
federating units, it is absolutely necessary not to upset this finely reached balance. Replacing it with
a presidential form of democracy or forcing any other system will be an irretrievable disaster. An
authoritarian approach will push the federating units to start rethinking disengagement.
Constitutionalists tell us that in the case of a country formed by diverse societies and ethnic groups,
only a consensus-based constitution will work. That is how, a finely balanced instrument like the
1973 Constitution had to be negotiated in order to accommodate the interests of diverse nationalities
and geographical units. At present, one does not notice that kind of consensus for any other form of
government.
Let us be clear, the governance of any diverse group is a challenge. We - the Federation of
Pakistan - are not a composite of only four major national identities but comprise several other
identified sub-nationalities that have emerged over a period of time like the Urdu speaking citizens,
Gilgitis, Baltis, Hazaras, Seraikis and Kashmiris – to name just a few. Such a diverse society cannot
be yoked under an inflexible system like one-party rule or one-man rule. An oversimplification will
strike at the very heart of the federation’s cohesive spirit.
All political, economic, constitutional and foreign policy decisions have to be taken by
consensus. That is why, the parliament, where these decisions are debated and given legislative
shape, assumes such significance. One man can never assume a monopoly over wisdom, neither can
a single party or any institution. It is the supremacy of, what is called the ‘collective will’ in Western
theory and the ‘rule of consultation’ in the Holy Quran, that needs to be ensured and which is
achieved by the Constitution by installing a parliament. The more you take decisions away from the
parliament, the more you weaken the ‘collective will’ or the ‘rule of consultation,’ thereby,
weakening the federation.
It was the collective will of the people of all the federating units that was behind the passing of
the 18th Amendment which brought in the promised devolution and along with it landed several
irritants in governance. The said irritants or obstructions are manageable. The much-ignored
Ministry for Inter-Provincial Coordination holds the key to coordinating amongst all the federating
units to prevent inconsistencies in provincial executive and legislative actions. It should have a
secretariat and staff no less than that of the Prime Minister’s House and can be the conduit for
cooperative federalism.
Political decision-making by various political parties should not be interfered with extensively
by non-representative institutions. For instance, the Supreme Court or High Courts, for that matter,
may be comprising competent legal minds but being unelected they can at best represent their
opinions on legal principles. Whenever a judgment of one or a few judges is seen as replacing the
will of the people, it is met by a serious reaction from the people. This phenomenon has become
much more pronounced lately.
The contemptuous statements or comments on social media, today, are prosecutable offences
but they also serve as an unfortunate alert that the judiciary, for the last decade or so, has ventured
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too far into the domain of governance and political matters by replacing its views with the judgment
of the people. One notices that the judiciary receives most vicious attacks when its judgments have
the effect of belittling a political leader on account of qualification or for justification to hold office or
on another pretext. It is established now that people of the federation have long-term fondness for
their political parties and their respective leaders. We are, in a way, thankful for this and also for
their division on political basis – it would be an unmanageable nightmare if they were divided on
sectarian or ethnic basis.
The same goes for the Armed Forces that are led by a commander whose way of thought and
views are adopted by the entire force given the military culture. So, the military thought process
changes with the change of command which occurs, on an average, every three years (sometimes
six). This means that the time-period in which the commander wants to achieve and correct
everything is on an average three years.
The political parties, on the other hand, have a lifecycle beyond the lives of their founders or
leaders. They plan their political moves, developmental projects, alliances with regional parties and
linkages with foreign states for three to four decades at least. The disconnect in approaches to
resolve crises can lead to the military brass coming into conflict with political forces although they
agree on certain strategic matters. It is submitted that decision making has to be yielded to political
forces as that is the essence of the main covenant that binds the Federation, namely the 1973
Constitution. This realisation is gradually setting in. Army veterans, who have earlier served during
a military rule, have directly seen the adverse repercussions of their decisions. They concede
privately that military rule or one individual’s wisdom is no match to the consensus-based decision
making by political forces.
The media has applied pressure. Further, the major push back has come from political parties
themselves and that too from the leading ones. In recent times, from mere occasional editorials or
voices of a few activists, the narrative about non-intervention by the military in civil matters has
been mainstreamed by Nawaz Sharif who made it loud and clear, and then Imran Khan, who has
shaken everything. The thesis that military solutions have a short shelf life - is being hardwired into
the hearts and minds of followers of both parties. Digital space freedom has, in some cases, crossed
limits to drive the point home.
The Constitution is now a much heavier undertaking than when it was negotiated from an
international law standpoint. The federation, since 1973, has entered into thousands of international
treaties and conventions with states and international organisations. Rule of law now also means
implementing these treaties. The said implementation may cause discomfort to people in some ways
such as compulsory documentation of economy, or counter terrorism operations under the UN law,
or disabling a non-state actor or restricting certain businesses and so forth.
That is again where the support of the political force or a political party is crucial in making
the agreed international obligation acceptable to the people. The good document has protected us
from irresponsible narratives of non-state actors as well.
Going forward, the federation faces an unprecedented financial crises. The political forces
have to talk to one another and separate the state specific agenda of stabilising the economy from the
regime specific quarrels that would continue. If they do not sit and talk then they are to be blamed
for allowing ceding the space to non-elected institutions. They can sit in the parliament or any of its
committees or perhaps convene a full session of the National Economic Council (NEC) that
comprises the PM, chief ministers and economic experts nominated by all the provincial
governments. With PML-N at the Centre, the PTI in territories of two provinces and the PPP in one,
it is a setting where all have interest in the economic development of provinces. The NEC has a
constitutional mandate to review the overall economic condition of the country. It can perhaps meet
on a day-to-day basis – the way parties sat in a row for the 18th Amendment sessions and can come
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out with a list of tangible steps like rupee-dollar parity control mechanism, a list of entities to be
privatised, time bound revival of economic zones, energy and petroleum sector management, steps
for fulfilling CPEC legal commitments, broadening of the tax base, SROs for fast tracking transit
trade, interfacing with American and European businessmen to bring investments in economic
zones and the like.
To facilitate these measures, other immediate steps will need to be taken without delay. For
example, an SRO or appropriate legal instrument can be enacted to protect top 200 taxpayers from
frivolous inquiries and tasking them to bring FDI in their JVs and to incentivise them to conceive
and implement projects that create employment.
Entrepreneurship is a high-level skill that government does not possess. It should not scare
away those who have it. Issuing of directives by Law Ministry under the Civil Servants Act to
protect good faith actions of those civil servants of the federal and provincial governments who
approve public-private partnership agreements, JVs, concession agreements and so forth is also
necessary.
Since there is a given constitutional mandate to have friendly relations with all nations, the
heads of political parties should agree that while they fully support independent foreign policy, they
will honour the treaty commitments with each state. It should be a policy that Pakistan shall base its
relations on agreed and well notified treaty commitments that the state of Pakistan has with inter-
alia United States, China, Russia, Saudi Arab, Iran and so forth.
The well-negotiated 1973 Constitution serves as the treaty uniting at least four territorial units
and local nationalities. It continues to be accepted by all regional and national political parties who
have a clear mandate to function, deliberate, form government, form opposition, disagree, object,
take executive decisions and extend legislative promises to the people they rule. So let it be.
(Source: TNS)
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International Issues
THE ARRIVAL OF THE “FAR EAST” CENTURY
Wang Wen (Executive Dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies)
In the eyes of the Chinese, the “Far East” is a Western-centric concept. The term “Far East” is
rarely used by Chinese except to discuss Soviet or Russian Far East policies and related historical
issues. After the Age of Navigation in the 16th century, when Western European countries began to
expand eastward, they referred Eastern Europe and Northeast Africa as the “Near East”, West Asia
as the “Middle East”, and the easternmost part of Asia as the “Far East”. This actually regarded East
Asia (including Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and even South Asia) as the periphery of the world
with Europe as the center. People at the time must not have imagined that East Asia, which was
regarded as a peripheral zone, is now emerging as the new center of the world in the 21st century.
The most urgent task now is to correct the past stereotype of “Far East = remoteness +
marginalization”. We need to regard it as the hope for future development, and strive to promote
the integration of the Russian Far East into the Greater Far East, that is, the process of East Asian
economic integration.
The rise of the Far East is real
No one mentions “the rise of the Far East”, probably to avoid confusing the concept of “Far
East” in the eyes of the West with the geographical category of Russia’s Far East. In fact, the Russian
Far East is only a part of the Western concept of “Far East”, and if the “Far East” is regarded as the
combination of China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand,
the South Asian subcontinent, and the Russian Far East.
In 2021, half of the world’s population was in the Far East. Half of the top 20 countries by
population are from the Far East: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Japan, the
Philippines, Vietnam. The Far East Economic Circle accounts for 40% of the global GDP and
contributes more than 50% of the global economic growth. Between 2015 and 2030, the consumption
of the world’s middle class is expected to increase by 30 trillion U.S. dollar, with Europe accounting
for only 1 trillion U.S. dollar, and more than a half is from the Far East.
In the past two hundred years, European colonial invasions have forced the Far East to break
up into many fragmented regions, which were economically backward and dependent on the West,
and all partieswere at a standstill. After the Cold War, the countries of the Far East are trying to form
a unified system. In 1999, ASEAN formally integrated 10 countries in Southeast Asia, and
established the “10+1”, “10+3” and “10+8” mechanism around ASEAN with China, South Korea,
Japan, and the United States. Since the beginning of the 21st century, ASEAN has maintained an
average annual growth rate of around 5% and has been the third largest economy in Asia and the
sixth largest economy in the world.
ASEAN is an important part of the rise of the Far East, which fully proves the
misunderstanding from the West, that the Far East is a China-centered region, and even believes that
the only bright spot in the development of the Far East is the rise of China. In fact, China accounts
for less than 40% of the Far East’s population, and the Far East is by no means “China + other
countries”. On the contrary, the Far East represents the collective rise and integration process of
China, ASEAN and many other countries and associations.
In the past 20 years, the Far East hasbecoming the world’s largest industrial belt, with an
international pattern of cross-border labor division among China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN.
The total export volume has exceeded the sum of the EU and North America. The boom in trade
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lifted a large number of people out of poverty in the Far East and produced a large number of rich
population. Over the past 20 years, more than 1 billion people in the Far East have been lifted out of
poverty. Billionaires in the Far East already account for more than 1/5 of the world’s total, and more
than 80% of then are first-generation billionaires. In the next 20 years, there will be the largest wealth
transfer in history, from both sides of the Atlantic to the Far East. Thousands of wealth management
and trust companies are being set up in the Far East.
The Far East is achieving a new height of intelligent revolution. Beijing, Singapore, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, Seoul, and Tokyo are among the world’s high-tech cities. Technologies such as
autonomous driving, urban IoT deployment, sensor networks, cashless payments, energy-saving
technologies, energy storage batteries, urban monitoring, telemedicine and many other technologies
are innovating and spreading far faster in Far Eastern countries than in other countries.
The attractiveness of technological innovation has attracted more and more talents to the Far
East. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the number of people in the U.S. moving overseas for work or
long-term residency has risen sharply, from 4 million in 1999 to 10 million in 2019. The Far East has
become the most popular destination for Americans to go overseas. China, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, etc. all have national talent programs to attract entrepreneurs, scientists and innovators
to the Far East for stable long-term residency.
Westerners are accustomed to measuring the merits of a country by its democratic politics, but
in the Far East, most countries pay more attention to government efficiency and national tolerance,
and major investments in infrastructure, employment, education, and medical care. This has enabled
many countries in the Far East to develop a path that suits their own national conditions. They
transcended the shackles of “the conclusion of the end of history”, avoided the troubles of
American-style veto politics, and developed their own countries based on sustainability.
In fact, if you replace the word “Far East” with “Asia”, you will be surprised to find that as
early as a century ago, Liang Qichao of China, Okakura Tenshin of Japan, and Tagore of India
already proposed the idea of pan-Asianism. Today’s Asia does not expect to establish a “United
States of Asia” like the European Union, but wants to build an inclusive, efficient and practical
union through intellectual synergy, just as Parag Khanna says in his book “The Future of Asia:
Business, Conflict and Culture in the 21st Century”, Asia’s journey to the world represents a great
fusion of civilizations, driving the progress of a new human civilization.
From this perspective, Westerners have long maintained a “Far East” logic of Asia, ignoring
the civilizational leap that is taking place in the Far East. As an important part of the Far East, Russia
needs to avoid the parochialism and self-centeredness of the Western approach.
The rise of the Russian Far East should accelerate
The rise of the Far East is also a reflection of the development of the Russian Far East in the
past decade. Since Putin became president for the third time in 2012, Russia’s new round of Far East
development has accelerated: the Ministry of Far East Development has been established, and more
than 40 laws and regulations have been introduced, including The Law on Advanced Development
Territories,and also the heavy investment in the Eastern Economic Forum to expand international
cooperation between the Far East and the Asia-Pacific region.
These measures brought about four positive economic changes: First, capital inflows have
accelerated. Since 2012, the Russian Far East has attracted more than 40 billion US dollars of
investment, accounting for about 1/3 of Russia’s foreign investment. Second, economic growth has
accelerated. Since 2015, the economic development of the Russian Far East has remained at around
4%, which is about twice the average growth rate in Russia. The third is that the trend of population
decline has been curbed. With the birth rate higher than the death rate, a positive growth
momentum has gradually been formed. Fourth, progress has been made in the construction of free
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ports, especially the Vladivostok Free Port that has been put into operation, and more than 1,400
enterprises have settled in. These achievements are positively appraised by Chinese academia.
But on the other hand, it must be admitted that the Russian Far East is still a relatively
backward region in East Asia. It is more like a latecomer and bystander to the overall rise of the Far
East. It has not fully shared the dividends of the rise of the Far East, nor has it fully integrated into
the economic development of the Far East’s rise, and unable to fully participated in the process of
division of labor and cooperation in the Far East’s economic development.
The reasons can be roughly divided into three points: First, Russia’s economic structure is
relatively simple, with resource export as its pillar industry. Short summers and long
winterssuppress the development of human and industrial environment, restricting transnational
economic cooperation and manufacturing development, coupled with the small economic volume of
the Russian Far East, with a total GDP of about 60 billion US dollars compared to China, a 17 trillion
US dollars economy, Japan, a 5 trillion US dollars economy, and South Korea a $2.5 trillion economy.
It is easy to be isolated from the East Asian regionalized economic and industrial chain system.
Second, the development of the Russian Far East faces the local problem of insufficient
endogenous dynamics. Although President Vladimir Putin has said, “We have never forgotten that
most of Russia’s territory is located in Asia. The time has come for us to move from words to actions
to develop economic, political and other ties together with Asia-Pacific countries”, local
governments in the Far East still lack the sense of ownership,urgency and implementation of the
development of the local economy. As one scholar pointed out, over the years, local governments in
the Russian Far East have been less interested in promoting local economic development and
increasing local budget revenue than in seeking federal budget investment and obtaining more
transfer payments.
The third is the hesitation and wavering of development strategies in Russia’s integration into
the East Asian industrial chain system. In some media reports and documents, it is easy to find that
the Russians are worried that the foreign trade in the Far East will fall into the trap of “exchanging
resources for goods and technology”, and thus become a raw material vassal of East Asian countries.
Rumors of “Sinification” of the Far East, hype of the “China threat theory” and concerns about
China’s “economic and population expansion” have also spread in the media occasionally, all of
which have discouraged Chinese investments.
In fact, regardless of the above three points, the development potential of the Russian Far East
is enormous.
The Russian Far East has the most abundant resources in the entire East Asia. Nearly 80 kinds
of minerals have been discovered. Coal reserves account for 40% of Russia’s total coal reserves,
timber reserves account for 26% of Russia’s total timber reserves. There are also extremely rich in oil,
natural gas, fish and seafood resources. In the future, when resources are scarce, the Russian Far
East will be the most advantageous region in Asia.
At present, Northeast Asian countries are optimistic about Russia’s Far East region. When the
late former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became prime minister again in 2012, he proposed a
“new thinking” towards Russia and became one of the largest investors in Russia’s Far East region.
South Korea has proposed a new northern policy, hoping to participate more in the strategic
development of Russia’s Far East. Although India is a latecomer to participate in the development of
the Far East, Prime Minister Modi has also proposed that he is willing to invest heavily in the
development of energy resources in the Far East.
After the “The Program of Cooperation between Northeast China and Russia’s Far East and
Eastern Siberia (2009–2018)” expired, the “Programme for development of Russian-Chinese
cooperation in trade, economic and investment spheres in the Far East of the Russian Federation
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(2018–2024)” was re-signed, hoping to give full play to Chinese capital, technology, management
and Russia’s Far East resources and geopolitical location advantages.It is hoped that China’s
participation in the development of the Far East will be organically combined with China’s strategy
to revitalize the northeastern region and the economic transformation and upgrading of the eastern
coastal region to jointly create a cross-border economic belt.
It should be said that on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of President Putin’s acceleration
of the development strategy of the Russian Far East, the Russian Far East is becoming the sweet
pastry of the “Far East”, and has become the target of various countries. All countries hope that the
Russian Far East will become more open, more efficient in cooperation, and more pragmatic and
synergistic, so that the Russian Far East can share the common sustainable rise of the Far East.
Some pragmatic suggestions
The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the decoupling of Russia from the
European and American worlds remind Russians that in the foreseeable future, they must clearly
realize that the 21st century belongs to the Asia-Pacific century, and even the century of the Far East.
The Far East is becoming the center of the world economy and trade, and Russia’s “Look East”
should become “Go East” at a faster pace, so that Russia can adapt to the development trend of the
21st century more quickly.
There is a lot that can be done to develop the Far East. In my view, there are at least two
proposals that are most urgent for China’s and Russia’s development initiatives.
First, focus on accelerating the implementation of the original strategic moves to increase the
attractiveness of Russia to develop the Far East. In the eyes of some outsiders, Russia’s sincerity in
developing the Far East is not enough, and many commitments and plans have not been fully
implemented. For example, in April 1996, the then-President Yeltsin signed the presidential decree
“economic and social development of Far East and Transbaikalia for the period of 1996-2005”. The
outline proposed to establish development zones on the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East and
Transbaikal by 2000, and to establish economic cooperation zones, development zones, and storage
zones with the corresponding major cities of Heihe, Suifenhe, Hunchun, and Manzhouli, which
include: (1) establishing a bridge over the Amur River (Heilongjiang) between Blagoveshchensk and
Heihe; (2) opening a railroad link to Northeast Asia between Zarubino and Hunchun; (3)
establishing a storage zone and industrial development zone of world advanced level in
Transbaikalsk and Manzhouli; (4) redrafting the draft economic development of the economic
cooperation zone between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe.
These are fine ideas, but unfortunately, the degree of implementation is still too low. It is
somewhat reassuring that in June 2022, the Heilongjiang Bridge finally opened. Although it is a
belated gift, it makes people look forward to the future with more anticipation.
Second, taking advantage of the strategic relationship between China and Russia, we should
put aside the mutual strangeness and precautions amongthe middle class of the two countries,
complement each other’s advantages, and jointly promote the common development of northeast
China and the Russian Far East.
As a matter of fact, Northeast China is in serious economic decline, facing the problems of
resource depletion, lack of economic growth momentum, overcapacity and population loss.
Revitalizing the northeast is an important development strategy for China, and expanding the level
of opening to the outside world is the primary choice for economic revitalization. For northeast
China, the pace of economic cooperation with South Korea and Japan is accelerating, but the pace of
cooperation with the Russian Far East is relatively slow. From the Russian side, there is no need to
worry about the so-called “population migration from northeast China” or “China’s territorial
claims” rumored by some media. Russian should boldly attract Chinese capital, technology and
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production capacity, and focus on building more than 20 “advanced development zones”. For the
Chinese side, the three northeastern provinces should improve the business environment,
strengthen transportation links to neighboring countries, deepenhumanistic exchanges and
cooperation, and enhance the ability to directly import and export products, so that the Northeast
Asian region can become a new hub of the new economic belt of the Far East.
All in all, amid the new changes in the world after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the continued
rise of the Far East will be an inevitable trend. Time waits for no one, and the prospects for each
other will get better and better by doing what has been planned.
(Source: Valdai Club)

THE DANGEROUS DECADE

A Foreign Policy for a World in Crisis
Richard Haass
“There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.”
Those words are apocryphally attributed to the Bolshevik revolutionary (and Foreign Affairs reader)
Vladimir Lenin, referring to the rapid collapse of tsarist Russia just over 100 years ago. If he had
actually said those words, Lenin might have added that there are also decades when centuries
happen.
The world is in the midst of one such decade. As with other historical hinges, the danger
today stems from a sharp decline in world order. But more than at any other recent moment, that
decline threatens to become especially steep, owing to a confluence of old and new threats that have
begun to intersect at a moment the United States is ill positioned to contend with them.
On the one hand, the world is witnessing the revival of some of the worst aspects of
traditional geopolitics: great-power competition, imperial ambitions, fights over resources. Today,
Russia is headed by a tyrant, President Vladimir Putin, who longs to re-create a Russian sphere of
influence and perhaps even a Russian empire. Putin is willing to do almost anything to achieve that
goal, and he is able to act as he pleases because internal constraints on his regime have mostly
disappeared. Meanwhile, under President Xi Jinping, China has embarked on a quest for regional
and potentially global primacy, putting itself on a trajectory that will lead to increased competition
or even confrontation with the United States.
But that is not all—not by a long shot. These geopolitical risks are colliding with complex new
challenges central to the contemporary era, such as climate change, pandemics, and nuclear
proliferation. And not surprisingly, the diplomatic fallout from growing rivalries has made it nearly
impossible for great powers to work together on regional and international challenges, even when it
is in their interest to do so.
Further complicating the picture is the reality that American democracy and political cohesion
are at risk to a degree not seen since the middle of the nineteenth century. This matters because the
United States is not just one country among many: U.S. leadership has underpinned what order
there has been in the world for the past 75 years and remains no less central today. A United States
riven internally, however, will become ever less willing and able to lead on the international stage.
These conditions have set off a vicious circle: heightened geopolitical competition makes it
even more difficult to produce the cooperation demanded by new global problems, and the
deteriorating international environment further fuels geopolitical tensions—all at a time that the
United States is weakened and distracted. The frightening gap between global challenges and the
world’s responses, the increased prospects for major-power wars in Europe and the Indo-Pacific,
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and the growing potential for Iran to cause instability in the Middle East have come together to
produce the most dangerous moment since World War II. Call it a perfect—or, more accurately, an
imperfect—storm.
To warn of danger is not to predict the future. Ideally, things will turn out for the better. But
good things rarely happen on their own; to the contrary, left to their own devices, systems
deteriorate. The task for U.S. policymakers, then, is to rediscover the principles and practice of
statecraft: to marshal national power and collective action against the tendency toward disorder. The
goal must be to manage the collision of old geopolitics and new challenges, to act with discipline in
what is sought, and to build arrangements or, better yet, institutions where there is sufficient
consensus. To do all that, Washington will have to prioritize establishing order over fostering
democracy abroad—at the same time as it works to shore up democracy at home.
DISORDER ON THE RISE
In August 1990, intent on territorial conquest, Iraq invaded its far smaller neighbor Kuwait.
“This will not stand,” U.S. President George H. W. Bush responded. He was right. Within weeks,
Washington had organized wide-ranging international support for a military intervention around
the limited objective of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The 1990–91 Gulf War was marked by
extensive cooperation, including from China and Russia, fostered by U.S. leadership under the aegis
of the United Nations. In a matter of months, the coordinated response met with considerable
success; Iraqi aggression was reversed and Kuwait’s independence restored at minimal cost. The
major powers upheld the norm that force cannot be used to change borders, a fundamental element
of international order.
Nothing of that sort could take place in today’s world, as the Ukraine crisis has made
abundantly clear, and the fact that Russia is a much more powerful, influential country than Iraq
was in 1990 only partly explains the difference. Although Russia’s invasion has inspired a sense of
solidarity and impressive levels of coordination among Western countries, the war in Ukraine has
yielded nothing resembling the nearly universal embrace of the goals and institutions of the U.S.-led
order that was spurred by the Gulf War. Instead, Beijing has aligned itself with Moscow, and much
of the world has refused to sign on to the sanctions imposed on Russia by Washington and its
partners. And with one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council blatantly violating
international law and the principle that borders may not be changed through force, the UN remains
mostly sidelined.
In a sense, the two wars serve as bookends to the post–Cold War Pax Americana. The United
States’ preponderance of power was bound to diminish, not owing to American decline but because
of what the commentator Fareed Zakaria dubbed “the rise of the rest”—that is, the economic and
military development of other countries and entities and the emergence of a world defined by a
much greater diffusion of power. That said, the United States, by what it did and did not do in the
world and at home, squandered much of its post–Cold War inheritance, failing to translate its
primacy into an enduring order.
This failure is especially noticeable when it comes to Russia. In the years immediately
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the juxtaposition of vast American power and staggering
Russian weakness made it seem unlikely that, three decades later, world affairs would once again be
dominated by hostility between the Kremlin and Western capitals. Debates rage about how this
came to pass, with profound disagreements over how much blame the United States deserves and
how much should be attributed to Putin or to Russian political culture more broadly. But whatever
the cause, it is difficult to deny that six U.S. presidential administrations have little to show for all
their efforts to build a successful post–Cold War relationship with Russia. Today, under Putin,
Russian behavior is fundamentally at odds with the most basic tenets of international order. Putin
shows no interest in integrating Russia into the prevailing order but rather seeks to ignore it when
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he can—and when he cannot, to undermine or defeat it. He has repeatedly demonstrated a

willingness to employ brutal military force against civilian populations in Europe and the Middle
East. Putin’s regime does not respect the borders and sovereignty of other countries, as witnessed
with its ongoing invasion of Ukraine and attempt to annex parts of the country.
Russia’s aggression has upended many assumptions that influenced thinking about
international relations in the post–Cold War era. It has ended the holiday from history in which
wars between countries were rare. It has hollowed out the norm against countries’ acquiring
territory by force. And it has demonstrated that economic interdependence is no bulwark against
threats to world order. Many believed that Russia’s reliance on western European markets for its
energy exports would encourage restraint. In reality, such ties did no better in moderating Russian
behavior than they did in preventing the outbreak of World War I. Worse yet, interdependence
proved to be more of a constraint on countries that had allowed themselves to grow reliant on
Russia (above all, Germany) than on Russia itself.
All that said, Russia will emerge weakened from what promises to be a long war with
Ukraine. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is anything but a superpower. Even before Western
countries imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its assault on Ukraine, the Russian economy
was not among the ten largest in the world in terms of GDP; at least in part because of those
sanctions, it is expected to contract by up to ten percent over the course of 2022. Russia’s economy
remains heavily dependent on energy production; its armed forces have revealed themselves to be
poorly led and organized and no match for NATO. Again, however, it is Russian weakness
juxtaposed against Putin’s willingness and ability to act recklessly with the military and nuclear
strength he does possess that makes Russia such a danger.
Russia presents an acute, near-term problem for the United States. China, in contrast, poses a
far more serious medium- and long-term challenge. The wager that integrating China into the world
economy would make it more open politically, more market oriented, and more moderate in its
foreign policy failed to pay off and has even backfired. Today, China is more repressive at home and
has vested more power in the hands of one individual than at any time since the reign of Mao
Zedong. State-owned enterprises, rather than being rolled up, remain omnipresent, while the
government seeks to constrain private industry. China has regularly stolen and incorporated the
intellectual property of others. Its conventional and nuclear military might has increased markedly.
It has militarized the South China Sea, economically coerced its neighbors, fought a border clash
with India, and crushed democracy in Hong Kong, and it continues to increase pressure on Taiwan.
Yet China also has significant internal weaknesses. After booming for decades, the country’s
economy is now beginning to stall, diluting a principal source of the regime’s legitimacy. It is
unclear how the Chinese Communist Party can restore strong economic growth, given the country’s
political constraints, which hamper innovation, and demographic realities, including a shrinking
labor pool. China’s aggressive foreign policy, meanwhile, has alienated many of its neighbors. And
China is nearly certain to face a difficult leadership transition over the next decade. Like Putin, Xi
has consolidated power in his own hands in ways that will complicate any succession and perhaps
lead to a power struggle. The outcome is difficult to predict: an internal struggle could result in
diminished international activism or the emergence of more benign leaders, but it could also lead to
even more nationalist foreign policies designed to rally support or distract public attention.
What is certain is that Xi and other Chinese leaders seem to assume that China will pay little if
any cost for its aggressive behavior, given that others are too dependent on its exports or on access
to its market. So far, this assumption has been borne out. Yet a conflict between the United States
and China no longer seems like a remote possibility. Meanwhile, as Washington’s relations with
Moscow and Beijing grow tenser, Russia and China are growing closer. They share an animosity to a
U.S.-led international system that they see as inhospitable to their political systems at home and
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their ambitions abroad. Increasingly, they are willing to act on their objections and do so in tandem.
Unlike 40 or 50 years ago, it is the United States that now finds itself the odd man out when it comes
to triangular diplomacy.
MIND THE GAP
As the geopolitical picture among great powers has darkened, a chasm has opened between
global challenges and the machinery meant to contend with them. Take global health. The COVID-
19 pandemic exposed the limitations of the World Health Organization and the unwillingness or
inability of even rich, developed countries to respond to a crisis that they had every reason to
anticipate. Some 15 to 18 million people worldwide have thus far died as a result, millions of them
unnecessarily. And nearly three years after the pandemic began, China’s refusal to cooperate with
an independent investigation means the world still does not know how the virus originated and
initially spread, making it harder to prevent the next outbreak—and providing a prime example of
how old, familiar geopolitical dysfunctions are combining with new problems.
Among other global challenges, climate change has arguably received the most international
attention, and rightly so—yet there is little to show for it. Unless the world makes rapid progress on
reducing greenhouse gas emissions during this decade, it will be much more difficult to preserve
and protect life as we know it on this planet. But diplomatic efforts have come up short and show no
sign of improving. Individual countries determine their own climate goals, and there is no price for
setting them low or not meeting them. Generating post-pandemic economic growth and locking in
energy supplies—a concern heightened by the war in Ukraine and the disruptions it has yielded in
the energy sector—have increased countries’ focus on energy security at the expense of climate
considerations. Once again, a traditional geopolitical concern has collided with a new problem,
making it harder to contend with either one.
When it comes to nuclear proliferation, the reality is more complex. Some scholars predicted
that dozens of states would have developed nuclear weapons by now; in fact, only nine have
developed full-fledged programs. Many advanced industrialized countries that could develop
nuclear weapons have chosen not to. No one has used a nuclear weapon since the United States did
so in the final days of World War II. And no terrorist group has gained access to one.
But appearances can be deceiving: in the absence of proliferation, nuclear weapons have
attained a new value. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gave up the Soviet nuclear
weapons that remained on its territory; since then, it has been invaded twice by Russia, an outcome
that might persuade others that giving up nuclear weapons decreases a country’s security. Regimes
in Iraq and Libya were ousted after abandoning their nuclear weapons programs, which could make
other leaders hesitant to do so or encourage them to consider the advantages of developing or
acquiring nuclear capabilities. North Korea remains secure as it continues to expand its nuclear
arsenal and the means to deliver it. Russia, for its part, appears to be according nuclear weapons a
larger role in its defense posture. And the U.S. decision to rule out direct military involvement in
Ukraine out of a fear that dispatching troops or establishing a no-fly zone could lead to a nuclear
World War III will be seen by China and others as evidence that possessing a substantial nuclear
arsenal can deter Washington—or at least get it to act with greater restraint.
No wonder, then, that Iran is putting in place many of the prerequisites of a nuclear weapons
program amid negotiations meant to revive the 2015 nuclear deal from which the United States
withdrew in 2018. The talks seem to have hit a wall, but even if they succeed, the problem will not
go away, as the accord features a number of sunset clauses. It is thus more a question of when, not if,
Iran makes enough progress to provoke an attack intended to prevent Tehran’s nuclear capability
from reaching fruition. Or one or more of Iran’s neighbors might decide they need nuclear weapons
of their own to counter Iran should it be able to field nuclear weapons with little warning. The
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Middle East, for three decades the least stable region of the world, may well be on the cusp of an
even more dangerous era.
TROUBLE AT HOME
As problems new and old collide and combine to challenge the U.S.-led order, perhaps the
most worrisome changes are taking place inside the United States itself. The country retains many
strengths. But some of its advantages—the rule of law, orderly transitions of power, the ability to
attract and retain talented immigrants on a large scale, socioeconomic mobility—are now less certain
than they once were, and problems such as gun violence, crime in urban areas, drug abuse, and
illegal immigration have become more pronounced. In addition, the country is held back by political
divisions. A widespread refusal among Republicans to accept the results of the 2020 presidential
election, which led to the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, suggests the possible emergence
of an American version of Northern Ireland’s “Troubles.” Localized, politically inspired violence
might well become commonplace in the United States. Recent Supreme Court decisions and the
diverging domestic reactions to them have reinforced the impression of a Disunited States of
America. As a result, the American political model has become less appealing, and democratic
backsliding in the United States has contributed to backsliding elsewhere. Making matters worse,
U.S. economic mismanagement led to the 2008 global financial crisis, and more recent missteps have
allowed inflation to skyrocket, further damaging the country’s reputation. Perhaps most worrisome
is the erosion of faith in Washington’s basic steadiness. Without a consensus among Americans on
their country’s proper role in the world, there have been wild swings in U.S. foreign policy, from the
George W. Bush administration’s catastrophic overreach in Iraq, to the Obama administration’s
debilitating underreach in the Middle East and elsewhere, to the Trump administration’s
incompetence and transactionalism, which led many to doubt whether precedent or standing
commitments mattered anymore in Washington. The Biden administration has done much to
prioritize alliances and partnerships, but it, too, has at times reinforced doubts about American
steadfastness and competence, especially during the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan last year.
The fact that it is impossible to predict who will occupy the Oval Office in the future is
nothing new; what is new is that it is impossible to assume much about how that person will
approach the United States’ relationship with the world. The result is that U.S. allies and partners
increasingly have no choice but to weigh continued reliance on Washington against other
alternatives, such as greater self-sufficiency or deference to powerful neighbors. An additional risk is
that Washington’s ability to deter rivals will diminish as its foes come to see the United States as too
divided or reluctant to act.
ONE BIG IDEA?
In the face of the geopolitical tumult and global challenges that seem certain to define this
decade, no overarching doctrine or construct for American foreign policy will be able to play the role
that containment did during the Cold War, when the concept provided a good deal of clarity and
consensus. Such constructs are useful for guiding policymakers, explaining policies to the public,
reassuring allies, and signaling adversaries. But the contemporary world does not lend itself to such
a simple frame: today, there are simply too many challenges of different sorts that do not sit inside a
single construct. Accounting for this judgment is the reality that it is no longer possible to speak of
world order as a single phenomenon: there is the traditional geopolitical order reflecting balances of
power and the extent to which norms are shared, and there is what one might term the globalization
order reflecting the breadth and depth of common effort to meet challenges such as climate change
and pandemics. World order (or the lack of it) is increasingly the sum of the two.
That does not mean that the United States should simply wing it and approach every foreign
policy issue in isolation. But instead of a single big idea, Washington should use a number of
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principles and practices to guide its foreign policy and reduce the risk that the coming decade will
produce a calamity. This shift would translate into a foreign policy that is based largely on alliances
to deter Russian and Chinese aggression and selective partnerships of the like-minded to address
global challenges that the United States cannot ignore or handle on its own. In addition, democracy
promotion at home rather than abroad should be the focus of U.S. attention, since there is more to
build on and more to lose if the effort fails.
The greatest immediate threat to global order stems from Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Properly managing the war will require a delicate balance, one that blends determination with
realism. The West must provide extensive military and economic support to Ukraine to ensure its
continued viability as a sovereign state and to prevent Russia from controlling more territory than it
already holds, but the West also needs to accept that military force alone cannot end the Russian
occupation. That outcome would require political change in Moscow and the arrival of a leadership
willing to reduce or end Russia’s presence in Ukraine in exchange for sanctions relief. Putin will
never accept such a deal. And to offer a worthwhile compromise to a hypothetical future regime in
Moscow, Washington and its partners would need to levy far more draconian sanctions on all
Russian energy exports—above all, a ban on natural gas exports to Europe.
On China, the United States likewise needs to strengthen the foundations of a regional order.
That means prioritizing its alliance with Japan, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United
States), and the AUKUS grouping (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Applying
the lessons gleaned from watching Europe’s awkward dance with Russia, the United States needs to
reduce its interdependence with China—which, in too many instances, looks an awful lot like
dependence on China. This would mean scaling back economic relations so that imports from China
and exports to it become less essential to the economic health of the United States and that of its
partners—which will make it easier to stand up to China, or even sanction it, if need be. The United
States and other Western countries must bolster the resiliency of supply chains in critical materials
through a mix of diversification and redundancy, stockpiling, pooling arrangements, and, when
necessary, increased domestic production. This is not economic decoupling so much as economic
distancing.
Washington and its partners will also need to respond forcefully if China moves against
Taiwan. Allowing China to capture the island would have massive ramifications: every American
ally and partner would reconsider its security dependence on the United States and opt for either
appeasement of China or some form of strategic autonomy, which would likely involve obtaining
nuclear weapons. A conflict over Taiwan would also lead to a profound global economic shock
owing to Taiwan’s dominant role in manufacturing advanced semiconductors.
Preventing such a scenario—or, if required, defending against a Chinese attack—calls for
Washington to adopt a posture of strategic clarity on Taiwan, leaving no doubt that the United
States would intervene militarily to protect the island and putting in place the security and economic
means to back up that pledge. More international involvement, not less, will be required, which
should entail at a minimum coordinating a strong sanctions package with European and Asian
allies.
Relations with both Russia and China will remain complex, as they will not be one-
dimensional even if they are largely competitive or adversarial. High-level, private strategic
dialogues should become a component of both bilateral relationships. The rationale for such
dialogues has less to do with what they might accomplish than what they might prevent, although
in the case of China, there could be greater scope for exploring rules to guide relations between the
two powers. Diverging and competing U.S., Russian, and Chinese attitudes and ambitions may rule
out more than limited collaboration on world order, but these fault lines arguably make
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communication among the three countries all the more vital to reduce the chance of a grave
miscalculation on geopolitical matters.
Meanwhile, U.S. policy should not seek to transform Russia or China, not because doing so
would be undesirable but because advocating for regime change would likely prove irrelevant or
counter-productive. The United States must deal with Russia and China as they are, not as
Washington would prefer them to be. The principal focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia and
China should not be to reshape their societies but to influence their foreign policy choices.
Over time, it is possible that limiting their external success and avoiding confrontation with
them will build pressures inside their political systems, which could lead to desirable change, much
as four decades of containment did with the Soviet Union. But Washington ought not to pose an
existential threat to either government lest it strengthen the hands of those in Moscow and Beijing
who argue that they have nothing to lose by acting recklessly and that there is nothing to be gained
from working selectively with the United States.
There is another reason for prioritizing the promotion of order over the promotion of
democracy—one that has nothing to do directly with Russia and China. Efforts to build international
order, be it for the purpose of resisting aggression and proliferation or combating climate change
and infectious disease, have broad support among nondemocracies. A world order premised on
respect for borders and common efforts on global challenges is preferable to a liberal world order
premised on neither. That so many countries have not participated in sanctioning Russia is
revealing. Framing the crisis in Ukraine as one of democracy versus authoritarianism has, not
surprisingly, fallen flat among many illiberal leaders. The same logic applies to the U.S. relationship
with Saudi Arabia, which the Biden administration is belatedly working to repair: a preference for
democracy and human rights is one thing, but a foreign policy based on such a preference in a world
defined by geopolitics and global challenges is unwise and unsustainable.
A similarly clear-eyed view should determine how Washington approaches cooperation on
global challenges. Multilateralism is far preferable to unilateralism, but narrow multilateralism is far
more promising than universal or broad forms of collective action that rarely succeed; witness, for
example, the course of climate-change diplomacy and trade. Better to pursue realistic partnerships
of the like-minded, which can bring a degree of order to the world, including specific domains of
limited order, if not quite world order. Here, too, realism must trump idealism.
This observation has direct implications for dealing with climate change. Climate change
poses an existential threat, and although a global response would be best, geopolitics will continue
to make such collaboration difficult. The United States and its partners should emphasize narrower
diplomatic approaches, but progress on mitigation is more likely to stem from technological
breakthroughs than from diplomacy. That owes not to a lack of possible policy tools but rather to a
lack of political support in the United States and other countries for those measures or for trade
pacts that could encourage mitigation by imposing taxes or tariffs on goods derived from fossil fuels
or manufactured through energy-inefficient processes. As a result, the goal of adapting to climate
change should receive more attention and resources, as should exploration of the technological
possibility of reversing it.
FORGING AHEAD
Three last considerations fall most directly on the United States. As it works to untie the knots
that bind old geopolitical dilemmas to newer problems, the United States will face a number of
serious threats, not only from Russia and China but also from Iran and a number of failed states that
could provide oxygen to terrorists in the greater Middle East, and from North Korea, whose
conventional military and nuclear capabilities continue to grow. Security, therefore, will require
Washington to increase defense spending by as much as one percent of GDP: still considerably
below Cold War levels, but a significant step up. U.S. allies will need to take similar steps.
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In dealing with the many threats that will define this decade, the United States will also need
to act with both greater caution and greater boldness in the economic realm. There is as yet no
serious alternative to the dollar as the world’s de facto reserve currency, but that day may come,
especially if Washington continues to weaponize the dollar through the frequent imposition of
sanctions, in particular those targeting central banks. If a competitor currency emerges, the United
States will lose its ability to borrow at low rates and inflate its way out of its massive debt, which
currently stands at more than $30 trillion. Even now this debt threatens to crowd out more
productive government spending, since the cost of servicing it will rise along with interest rates. But
fiscal caution should be combined with a more assertive approach to trade, which would ideally
mean joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and
fleshing out newly announced frameworks in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas so that they lower
barriers to trade in goods and services, set standards for data, and meaningfully address climate
change.
Ultimately, however, the biggest risk to U.S. security in the decade to come is to be found in
the United States itself. A country divided against itself cannot stand; nor can it be effective in the
world, as a fractious United States will not be viewed as a reliable or predictable partner or leader.
Nor will it be able to tackle its domestic challenges. Bridging the country’s divisions will take
sustained effort on the part of politicians, educators, religious leaders, and parents. Most desired
norms and behaviors cannot be mandated, but voters have the power to reward or penalize
politicians according to their behavior. And some changes, including expanding civics education
and opportunities for national service, could be formally introduced.
Navigating a decade that promises to be as demanding and dangerous as this one—a decade
that will present old-fashioned geopolitical risks alongside growing global challenges—calls for a
foreign policy that avoids the extremes of wanting to transform the world or ignoring it, of working
alone or with everyone. It will ask a great deal of U.S. policymakers and diplomats at a time when
the country they work for is deeply divided and easily distracted. What is certain is that the course
of this decade and decades to come will depend on the quality of officials’ political skills at home
and their statecraft abroad.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)

PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Jade Guan
It is under debate whether we are heading towards a fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. This month
alone, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China responded with unprecedented sea
and air combat drills in six exercise zones around the island, and Beijing published a White Paper on
the question of Taiwan’s reunification with China. This was swiftly followed by another US
congressional delegation travelling to Taipei.
Although all the parties declare they want stability and warn the other sides to avoid
provocation, each has been testing where it can go further. The possibility of maintaining stability
across the Taiwan Strait looks less and less likely given the direction in which the key regional
players are heading, namely China, Taiwan and the United States.
Prospect for China’s policy on Taiwan
China’s recent activities targeting Taiwan send out a number of messages.
First, the military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to test and
strengthen its integrated combat ability could become a “new normal” across the Taiwan Strait,
based on Beijing’s perception of further challenges to its “One China Principle” by Taiwan, the
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United States and US allies. Grey zone military operations will continue to be applied to subdue
Taiwan. Additionally and probably more significantly, China will continue to develop its military
capabilities, especially in nuclear weapons. Such a posture seeks to shape a situation where Taiwan’s
independence and a war over the island is unthinkable.
Politically, the White Paper maintains the “One Country, Two Systems” framework is still
applicable to pursue a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but its appeal in Taiwan is in doubt. As
analysts have noted, compared to the versions published in 1993 and 2000, the 2022 White Paper
implicitly suggests that “Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country” and that
Taiwan would enjoy less autonomy after unification. If this interpretation stands, how operational is
the framework when the majority of Taiwanese disapprove of it according to public opinion polls by
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in March 2022?
In terms of lawfare, there is speculation that Beijing might promulgate a “National
Reunification Law” after the 20th Party Congress later this year that could stipulate measures and
steps for China to proceed with national reunification including legal consequences for committing
“serious crimes of secession”. Interestingly, the White Paper singles out Taiwan’s ruling Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) authorities for having “adopted a separatist stance” as distinct from “the 23
million Taiwan compatriots”. If reunification were eventualised, legal consequences would all fall
on “separatists”. Internationally, Beijing will continue its efforts to “institutionalise and normalise”
its “One China Principle” as a universally accepted norm to legitimate its position on Taiwan and
constrain Taiwan’s participation in intergovernmental organisations.
Taiwan’s agency
Taiwan’s politics and emphasis on democratic identity are key drivers of its significant agency
and regional dynamism. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–96) was arguably triggered by the
then President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” and public diplomacy manifested in his visit to
Cornell University in the United States. The referendum campaign on Taiwan independence during
the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian presidency rendered a backdrop for China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law.
Taiwan’s democratic identity has been vigorously promoted by the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen government
to rally domestic and international support. It is predicted that her successor will continue this
strategy after the next presidential election in 2024.
Why does Taiwan matter to the United States?
Although it does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, the United States considers
Taiwan “a key US partner in the Indo-Pacific” – located in the first island chain to block China from
moving further into the Pacific. If the United States failed to support Taiwan under China’s pressure,
US allies might question the country’s role and commitments in the region, particularly at a time
when US power is perceived to be in relative decline.
Ideologically, the United States views Taiwan as a successful model for democracy, making a
strident contrast with China’s internal tightening under President Xi Jinping. The visits made by US
congress delegations are thus a test for Taiwan’s global status under Chinese pressure and send a
strong message to the world that others should not yield to Beijing’s demands.
Economically, Taiwan is the United States’ eighth largest trade partner as of 2021. It provides
critical value in global high-tech manufacturing. As an example, in July this year, the United States
proposed the “Chip 4” alliance, which would include Taiwan, with the intention of competing with
China in the semiconductor industry and supply chain.
Geopolitically, the United States, with key regional ally Japan, will continue to support
Taiwan and would play a major role in any Taiwan contingency. Washington is clear that its
strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific have not been shifted by events such as the war in Ukraine,
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rather its alliance policy has been strengthened and “countering China” remains its strategic
priority.
Chih-yu Shih, a political science professor at National Taiwan University, recently commented
that the United States is seemingly pushing China towards unifying Taiwan by force. Shih argues
that “what China pursues is a peaceful unification”. He suggests that the United States has seen that
should China take military action, it would likely become bogged down, as Russia has in Ukraine.
The United States in such a scenario would support and use Taiwan as a proxy in its great power
rivalry with China, while avoiding direct conflict. In this regard, a proxy war over Taiwan between
the Taiwanese and the PLA would be detrimental to China’s rise but in the strategic interests of the
United States.
The Taiwan issue thus constitutes a key node of the structural rivalry between the United
States and China. Xi’s China is explicit that “Resolving the Taiwan question … is indispensable for
the realisation of China’s rejuvenation” and appears less patient with the United States’ goal of
maintaining its primacy in the region. In this tug-of-war, a democratic Taiwan has considerable
agency and capacity to affect the dynamics of power in East Asia.
(Source: The Interpreter)

GEOPOLITICAL LINKAGE OF ANTI-US POWERS

Seth Cropsey (Founder and president of Yorktown Institute)
US President Joe Biden’s administration appears keen on rejoining the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Barack Obama administration’s so-called “Iran deal” that notionally
guaranteed Iran would not produce nuclear weapons.
A deal remains unlikely. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Biden administration has
doggedly pursued the chimerical agreement for so long, and in the face of such undeniable strategic
evidence of Iranian hostility and coordination with China and Russia, shows that the White House’s
current strategic heuristic is out of touch with Middle Eastern reality.
By pursuing a calamitous Middle East policy, the Biden administration plays directly into
China’s and Russia’s hands.
The administration has shifted foreign-policy goals like the winds since January 2021.
After much hand-wringing and clear resistance from a conflict-averse military leadership, the
US seems to have abandoned its conciliatory approach to China: As punishment for Nancy Pelosi’s
visit to Taiwan, the Communist Party of China (CPC) canceled John Kerry’s climate-cooperation pet
projects.
In Europe, Biden began by seeking another Russia “reset.” But the mounting evidence of
Russia’s planned invasion of Ukraine convinced the US president that a more robust policy would
be necessary. Biden, and once again an element of the American military leadership, has repeatedly
shied away from direct confrontation with Russia.
Nevertheless, the US has progressively expanded the weapons it provides to Ukraine. At this
point, fighter aircraft are virtually the only capability the US has refused to provide. Ukraine now
fields American barrel artillery, precision-guided shells, long-range rocket artillery, and anti-
radiation missiles.
Now that Ukraine has demonstrated its will to fight, the Biden administration seems
committed to staying the course until Russia’s invasion is defeated.
These policy shifts demonstrate modified strategic assumptions about major international
players, their interests, relationships, and politics that guide policymaking.
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The Biden administration’s Russian strategic assumption is now irreversibly transformed. Its
Chinese strategic heuristic is shifting – continued Chinese pressure on Taiwan, along with constant
congressional arm-twisting, is likely to solidify an assertive, rather than an accommodating, China
policy.
However, the Biden administration’s understanding of the Middle East sits rigidly in concrete
poured during the Obama administration. Its intellectual blind spot demonstrates the White House’s
fundamental misunderstanding of the threat the US currently faces and is again poised to generate
from the US a significant concession to Iran.
Obama era redux
The Biden administration’s Iran policy likely originates beyond the president himself. Despite
his supposed foreign-policy credentials, Biden has little tangible foreign-policy experience, and no
successes. His constant impulse has been a reflexive anti-interventionism, broken only when
politically expedient in 2000-2004.
During the Obama administration, as vice-president, he had little role in Iran policy. His
signature foreign-policy achievement, the stabilization of Iraq and subsequent US withdrawal, had
fallen apart in spectacular fashion by 2014. Biden’s nonsensical plan to divide Iraq into three states
became a calling card demonstrating the old senator’s supposed prudence.
Perhaps Biden was removed from the Iran deal’s intimate negotiation processes because of his
limitations. Obama may have recoiled from allowing his unfocused vice-president the chance to
destroy his legacy-defining achievement.
However, the Biden administration is jam-packed with the Iran deal’s architects. Wendy
Sherman, current deputy secretary of state, was the deal’s primary negotiator. National security
adviser Jake Sullivan was one of the three identified delegates who met with their Iranian
interlocutors secretly in 2013. The other two were William Burns, Biden’s CIA director, and Puneet
Talwar, now a Biden ambassadorial nominee.
John Kerry may now be far from Iran policy as climate envoy. But as Obama’s secretary of
state, he was legally the United States’ lead negotiator for the JCPOA.
The Biden team is not only saturated with former Obama staffers, but specifically with those
most responsible for the Iran deal. Biden need not drive the deal forward: The inertia of Foggy
Bottom will push it ahead.
Bizarre strategy
As of this writing, a deal remains tantalizingly close. Iran allegedly scrapped its demands for
less intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accepted that the
US will list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, although it
seems to have reasserted them.
Nevertheless, a final complication remains that may scrap any deal: Iran insists that the US
provide it guarantees that protect its international investments if the US again leaves the JCPOA.
This is impossible.
Biden, like Obama, has no chance of converting the JCPOA into an actual treaty. Nor does the
US president have the authority to treat the JCPOA as an executive agreement, a quasi-treaty the
American executive creates under his constitutional authority – the JCPOA’s content, as a diplomatic
document, does not fall under the president’s actual remit as commander-in-chief.
Hence the JCPOA will never be binding under US law, and the Biden administration can offer
Iran no guarantees that its finances will be protected if a different president withdraws from the
nuclear deal.
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Nevertheless, the very fact that the administration so doggedly pursues the JCPOA is
strategically bizarre. The only benefit a nuclear deal would provide to the West at this point is an
expansion in oil capacity that might reduce soaring Western European energy prices. Theoretically,
this would help the US bolster French and German resolve against Russia.
However, the illiberal entente of Moscow, Beijing and Tehran has solidified their cooperation
since Russia invaded Ukraine.
Naturally there are gaps and hesitations. Xi Jinping, facing a property crisis that could stagger
the Chinese economy immediately before the 20th CPC Congress, fears short-term Western
sanctions, and has therefore been unwilling to provide open military support to Russia.
Nevertheless, there truly appear to be “no limits” to Sino-Russian cooperation.
Chinese and Russian propaganda is increasingly synchronized, especially on Taiwan.
Vladimir Putin has provided forthright support for China’s pressure against Taiwan. China has
joined Vostok 2022, participating for the second consecutive year in that Russian-led military
exercise. Monthly Chinese exports to Russia are now worth US$6.77 billion, nearly 50% higher than
in July 2021, while Russian exports to China reached $10 billion.
Iran, meanwhile, is now providing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, while its
partner-cum-proxy, Syria, has pledged mercenaries and military support to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine.
All three anti-American powers share the same objective. They seek to destroy the US-backed
Eurasian order, replacing it with a system that suits their political interests and distinct but equally
brutal brands of authoritarianism.
Their coordination has intensified over the past year, and will only sharpen over the next, as
China becomes more assertive and Russia more desperate. The signal consequence of an Iran deal
would be to provide a conduit for illegal Russian oil, likely not a Biden administration strategic
priority.
(Source: Syndication Bureau)

ECONOMY FOR THE PEOPLE

Hamilton Nolan (A labor reporting fellow at In These Times)
Consider what typically constitutes ‘good’ economic news: The stock market booming.
Corporate earnings rising. Business growth. In general, any factor that contributes to an
environment in which businesses can get bigger, hire more workers, make more profits, and enrich
investors to a greater degree.
This vision of the economy’s legitimate purpose is so deeply ingrained in the cultural fabric of
America that any economic journalist or analyst who did not accept it would never be hired in the
first place. Yet it is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the economy really is.
The economy’s job is to work for people. It is not the job of people to sacrifice themselves on
the altar of the economy. The subconscious feeling drummed into all of us that we should feel some
sense of collective pride for being ground into dust in service of economic growth is a sick bit of
indoctrination that is stubbornly hard to escape.
The simple step of asking what the economy is doing for us -- rather than what our lives are
contributing to the economy -- can go a long way toward reframing how we all think about this.
They say that behind every fortune is a crime; likewise, behind every mainstream economic
analysis is a set of poisonous assumptions that exist to tranquilize us. Consider the problem of
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inflation. It’s rising around the world. The growing consensus in the financial world is that the era of
low inflation is gone for good, because the era of globalization that enabled it is coming to an end.
Another way to say this is that it is becoming harder for global corporations to leapfrog
around the globe in search of poverty-stricken people to exploit for cheap labor. The generations of
workers in China and Mexico and Bangladesh and elsewhere who served as the human fuel for low
labor costs and cheap, abundant consumer goods would now like to imagine that they may one day
have decent lives.
These workers are getting the strange idea that a lifetime of hard work should lead to higher
living standards for the next generation. This really throws a wrench into the capitalist formula of
ceaseless hopscotching to increasingly poor nations in order to maintain desperately low wages.
Like rapacious Magellans, these companies are finding that you can only offshore jobs so many
times on Planet Earth before you end up back where you started.
If you arrange your economy, as we have, for the purpose of producing corporate profits, a
permanent rise in inflation is bad. But if you look at it as a sign that it is not quite so easy these days
to find millions of desperate people willing to work for pennies an hour, it seems like a historic
reason for celebration.
If human flourishing is our primary goal, the most obvious response to inflation is to ensure
that people have enough money to cope with rising prices -- to ensure that real wages are rising for
low-income workers, that housing and health care and higher education are accessible and
affordable. The human-centric response to inflation, in other words, is public investment in public
goods, a broad push to provide everyone with their basic needs. There is no better way to fight high
prices, after all, than to make things free.
If, however, you view the economy as a machine for pushing up stock prices, your natural
response to inflation is the opposite: austerity. Engineering a recession, creating higher
unemployment, and brutalizing workers so that they will once again grow desperate enough to
accept lower wages is also an effective way to fight high prices -- and one that requires much less
work than, say, building a free public healthcare system.
As long as you personally have enough money to insulate you from the consequences of this
approach, it can be quite appealing. This is, not coincidentally, the consensus policy choice of the
global economic establishment, a group of people who have the luxury of not having to view the
issue from the perspective of a single mother clinging to a tenuous job at a factory in Nuevo Laredo.
So when you see, for example, prominent Democratic economists arguing against the cancellation of
student debt, ask yourself if they might feel differently if they were poor enough to be touched by
the icy hand of ruinous debt themselves.
The idea that the proper function of our economy is to provide humans with decent lives
carries with it the understanding that the distribution of material resources is of primary
importance. Saying “The United States is the richest nation in the history of the world” means
nothing to a person who has no net worth and is sleeping in their car. The grave distribution
problem we have in our society of a few billionaires and many more poor people is treated as a
second-order concern by traditional economic analysis.
The simple intellectual act of accepting that the wellbeing of humanity is the economy's real
function is enough to prove, with little room for argument, that having high inequality means your
economy is broken. Policymakers prefer that the public thinks of economics as an arcane field that
regular people can't understand. But everyone can understand that human rights are more
important than money. All policy ultimately flows from these priorities.
In the old days, the field of economics was called ‘political economy’. This was a more honest
formulation -- it reflected the basic truth that the economy is inseparable from politics, and, by
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extension, from morality. The impoverishment of working people is good news for America’s worst
employers, who can prey on that human need to extract more value for shareholders. That is an
economic fact, but it is not a natural condition of the world. It is, instead, a collective choice we have
made, to structure our system in a way that allows such a thing to be incentivized.
That system does not exist in nature; we built it. We can change it. Money is a fanciful
invention, a utilitarian creation, a method to smooth exchange and facilitate ease of life. It is a tool
that is meant to help us. It is not, under any circumstances, a master to be served.
(Source: Commondreams.org)

REUNIFICATION STANCE LAID OUT IN WHITE PAPER

Zhang Yi
The Communist Party of China is committed to the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan
question and realizing China's complete reunification, said a white paper issued on Wednesday.
"The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized," said the
white paper named "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era", which was
published by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office
of the People's Republic of China.
As China has embarked on a new journey to build a modern socialist country in all respects, it
is necessary to issue a new white paper on national reunification, a spokesperson for the Taiwan
Work Office of the CPC Central Committee said in a statement on Wednesday.
Amid the current complex international and cross-Straits situation, the release of the white
paper is also conducive to exposing "Taiwan independence" separatist forces' collusion with external
forces in making provocations and their attempt to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the spokesman said.
In 1993 and 2000, the Chinese government published white papers on Taiwan. Over more
than the past two decades, especially since the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012, theories
on national reunification and policies toward Taiwan have been developing.
The new white paper offers a systematic elaboration of the principles and policies put forward
by the CPC and the Chinese government in advancing national reunification in the new era. It also
conveys the willingness of the CPC and the Chinese government to continue to achieve peaceful
reunification and win the understanding and support of compatriots on both sides, especially
Taiwan compatriots, and the international community, said the spokesperson.
The white paper said that, under the Party's leadership, people on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits have set out on a path of peaceful development and made many breakthroughs in improving
cross-Straits relations. Increased exchanges, broader cooperation and closer interactions have
brought tangible benefits to people across the Straits, especially in Taiwan, which demonstrates that
cross-Straits friendship and cooperation are mutually beneficial.
"Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of
national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national
reunification," it said.
Peaceful reunification and "one country, two systems" are the basic principles for resolving the
Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national reunification, according to the white
paper.
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"We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification, but we will leave no room for
separatist activities in any form," it said, adding that the use of force would be the last resort taken
under compelling circumstances.
The actions of the Democratic Progressive Party authorities in Taiwan have resulted in tension
in cross-Straits relations, and external forces have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by
separatist forces, according to the white paper.
"Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and using Taiwan to
contain China is doomed to fail," it said.
Wu Yongping, director of Tsinghua University's Institute of Taiwan Studies, said it is the
general will and a historic mission for the Chinese nation to achieve the reunification of the two
sides of the Straits.
Although differences do exist between the two sides, people from the Chinese mainland and
Taiwan are all Chinese, and more exchanges and integrated development can help resolve
differences and find more in common, Wu said, adding that when conditions permit, the two sides
will be reunified.
He emphasized that reunification is a matter between the two sides, so no other country
should interfere, and it is believed that through peaceful consultation, people on the two sides have
the wisdom to discuss a set of solutions to solve their problems.
State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the white paper, which fully
elaborated the historical context of the Taiwan question and China's policy and stance, aims to send
the most authoritative message to the world about the Taiwan question.
As the situation across the Straits is still developing, Wang called for staying vigilant about the
United States, which might not be resigned to its failure on the Taiwan question, and may gang up
with others to add fuel to the flames by expanding military presence in the region to escalate
tensions in an attempt to create new, bigger crises.
He called for keeping a watch on "Taiwan independence" forces, who might miscalculate the
situation and redouble their efforts to collude with external forces to willfully go further on the path
of splitting the nation.
He also underlined the need to be wary of politicians from certain countries who might
attempt to follow suit in performing political stunts based on their political interests. Such acts
would severely damage the political foundation of foreign countries' diplomatic relations with
China as well as having an impact on the United Nations Charter and the international system
established after World War II, he added.
(Source: China Daily)

AMERICA AND THE CHINESE ASCENT

Imtiaz Rafi Butt (Chairman of Jinnah Rafi Foundation)
In the last three decades, countries like China along with Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore and
South Korea have achieved enormous levels of growth in trade, education, development, research
and economic stability. This rise of these countries has far-reaching effects on the regional politics of
Asia and on the politics of global dominance. The centre of power is shifting. There is considerable
resistance from the West and its allies. All parties are pushed to weigh their options. China is
leading the Asian bloc into unchartered territories and there are only a handful of policy
frameworks that will lead to a sustainable tomorrow and an environment of safety and growth for
developed and developing nations in the West and the East.
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The United States is still by far the most powerful country in the world, even though some of
its economic indicators have been overtaken by China. It still possesses the technology, military
might and diplomatic power to overpower any nation in the world. But it is also true that it is in the
phase of “Early Decline”. The reason behind this is, that its politics is highly polarized. Donald
Trump was a manifestation of deep fissures in American society. The American polity has been
divided into an “Us versus them” mindset. Trumpism expanded those cracks and developed them
into a full-fledged internal divide. In the language of many intellectuals, “Trump is gone but
Trumpism is still alive”. According to a survey, 80% of decisions taken by the American congress
benefit only the top 10% of people of the country. This will lead to the ultimate demise of the United
States.
Another cogent reason why China will rise and the United States will lose its position as a
global leader, is its lack of strategic objectives. A clear contrast is seen when we observe the
strategies adopted by the American Government during its conflict with the Soviet Union. The vivid
objective was to disrupt the Soviet economy while overtaking every economic indicator through
better technology, improved trade and highly technical industrial growth. And all these objectives
were met. It resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but this is not happening in the case of
China. America is in a stalemate. There is no policy framework, no plan and no strategic objectives
in place.
In a survey conducted in New York, over 80% people viewed China as a threat and an enemy
of the United States, but none of them was able to give a prudent reason why. And that is the
predicament that prevails in the American Government. They are against China but they refuse to
draft the reasons and the way forward for dealing with China. Before the election, Biden gave a clear
message to the masses that high tariff rates on Chinese exports to the US are damaging businesses
and jobs are being lost, but now he has retracted all those claims and the policies of the United States
government are more or less the same as Trump.
The only option visible to the international eye from the American people and government is
a negative attitude. There is pervading bias against China and Xi Jinping. Trade wars have actually
hurt the United States economy. American Government knows that it cannot afford a direct war and
confrontation with China. So, mostly there is a mere show of power. In the event of a war, both
countries possess a considerable nuclear arsenal and there would be no winners in a military conflict
between China and the United States. The effects would be paralyzing for the world as well as both
of these nations. So, in this context, military options are not feasible by the standard. This narrows
down the policy options that the United States has for China.
Many conspiracy theorists have conceptualized that Americans can resort to covert
approaches to destroying the development and ascendance of China. With the control of the country
in the hands of the Central Communist Party and the deployment of state-of-the-art technology in
monitoring, vigilance, law and order and strict implementation, there is no chance that a regime
change can be instigated by American covert agencies. Besides, China has learned from the
experience of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring where internal agents were bribed into toppling
the regime of the country for the advantage of another nation. All ploys and strategies adopted in
Taiwan and Hong Kong have failed. The military presence is countered at all times by the Chinese
army without fail. All steps taken by the American Government are countered by the Chinese with
ease.
If all of the above are not viable options for China, then what is the right approach that can be
adopted by the United States for its better future and that of Asia? The answer lies in sustainable
engagement. First and foremost, the ASEAN countries can prove to be a bridge between the two
powers. They can help re-align the policy objectives of both nations. Bi-lateral trade can lessen the
chances of war and direct conflict. There is a possibility of a world that is mutually dependent on
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each other for sustainable growth and survival and that can be an engine of coordination between
these two superpowers.
There is a need to transform the American mindset about China. Americans must accept the
progress of China and its inevitable rise. The Americans forget that they are a migration nation, a
country born out of the movement of Europeans looking for new continents, which has happened
only in the last few hundred years, while China is a historical nation with a history of over 5000
years. America has much to learn from China and vice versa.
The Americans always ignore the fact that China’s growth is due to Americans in many ways.
China has adopted the world view of trade and industry as given by the best. It is a fact that China
has beaten the West on its own turf. It is now the market leader in manufacturing, exports and
commodity reserves. The West must honourably accept this fact, instead of penalizing and
demonizing China for raising its population out of poverty. China does not want a war with the
United States or the West. It is focused on uplifting its people, boosting its economic and diplomatic
ties and ensuring its prosperous future, which cannot be denied. The United States must alter its
national narrative toward China. For the very reason to avoid war, for mutual growth and to realise
the dream of a world where economic co-dependence ensures progress, growth and survival of the
poorest to the richest. The lessons must be learned, that adversarial politics is not the only way
forward. Protectionism and engaging in trade wars is contradictory to the Western and American
narrative in the WTO. The ascendance of China is inevitable, it is the need of the hour to engage
with China in a way to maximize mutual gains, especially for the developing world to share in the
profits and raise the living standards of its people. The Chinese model has the potential to teach the
rich as the poor nations to do then what they think is possible.
(Source: 24 News)

THE LONGEST WAR

Dr Samee Lashari (Lecturer at Texas A&M University, USA)
On August 2, President Biden announced that the US had carried out a drone strike in
Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, killing Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor after he was
assassinated about 11 years ago.
Though the United States has not officially announced this, the War on Terror has ended with
the elimination of the top Al Qaeda leadership. Spanning over more than two decades, the longest
war in the history of the United States has transformed the world. Now is a good time to look back
at it and evaluate its causes and consequences.
Arguably, the United States policies in the Middle East, and most significantly its one-sided
support to Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, radicalised the revisionist movements in the
region.
For the United States, supporting tyrannical monarchies and dictatorships was an affordable,
though perilous, strategy. The First Intifada exposed the fault lines in the region.
The 1990s saw the palpable shift in the nature of regional socio-political stability when Iraq
attacked Kuwait, Saudi Arabia hosted American forces to defend itself and the Taliban captured
Kabul in 1996. Other territorial disputes in the Muslim world - Kashmir, Chechnya, Kosovo – also
enflamed the anger. Al Qaeda and Central Asian radical organisations found safe heavens in
Afghanistan to plan a terrorist attack of unorthodox nature and of unprecedented magnitude. They
converted passenger airplanes into strategic weapons to bring down the World Trade Centre and
attack the Pentagon. In later video statements, Al Qaeda leaders assumed responsibility for the
attack and cited US policies in the Middle East as the primary reason for its actions.
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This resulted in the mobilisation of the most expensive force in the history of mankind.
Initially, the objective was to defeat Al Qaeda and prevent another 9/11. However, once the Taliban
were toppled, the US decision makers lost their focus. They quickly started a war in Iraq and
broadened the scope of their presence in Afghanistan to nation building although there was no
consensus on what it actually meant.
According to a book published recently, President Bush did not remember the name of his
war commander in Afghanistan and Secretary Rumsfeld had “no visibility into who the bad guys
are.”
The vague and expansive nation-building project overshadowed the US strategic objectives. It
included building roads, bridges and schools. The US went on to spend its taxpayers’ money on
electrification, hiring, training and arming a whole new Afghan army and police force and so on. It
spent money on projects like raising cashmere goats in Afghanistan.
Over two decades, the US spent more than $100 billion on nation building projects in
Afghanistan. The amount does not include military spending. According to Brown University’s Cost
of War project estimates, the cost of War on Terror in Afghanistan has reached $2.313 trillion. The
US taxpayers will have to keep paying for retired and disabled veterans for decades. The total
money spent of War on Terror around the world is about $8 trillions. The number of causalities has
been estimated to be about 900,000.
Repeatedly, the US political and military leaders boasted about the readiness of the Afghan
army. In August 2021, however, it collapsed like a house of cards and the leadership fled the
country. The Taliban, who took over the country, inherited no debt.
Arguably, the world is far less secure today as compared to September 10, 2001. The War on
Terror ushered in an inexorable mayhem in the Middle East. After the fall of Baghdad, Iraq
witnessed a long and bloody sectarian conflict and the complicated Kurdish question got even more
complicated.
The Arab Spring, initially welcomed as a breath of fresh air, failed miserably with Libya
falling to chaos and Egyptian democratisation reversed in about a year. Syria fell to civil war,
ruining most of the infrastructure around the country, killing about half a million people, and
displacing more than 13 million.
Tunisia, the only country to have ‘successfully’ democratised, has fallen back to the
authoritarian playbook of the Arab world. The war in Yemen has expanded the battlefield in the
region even further, displacing another 3 million people in the region. The wave after wave of
immigrants has reached Europe, complicating the socio-economic issues even further. Though the
ISIS has been shrunken, the danger of terrorism has not abated to a satisfactory level.
For Pakistan, the consequences of the War on Terror have been huge. Till 2018, the country
had lost more than $126 billion in physical infrastructure, foreign investment, and industrial output.
As the war ends, the total losses have been estimated to be about $150 billion. The country also lost
more than 70,000 people including more than 7,700 security force personnel. As Taliban return to
power and consolidate, new threats are emerging from Afghan soil - including the rise of the TTP
and its alliance with the ISIS. The nexus is a new grave threat to the security of Pakistan. The country
faces grave challenges and needs political stability. It’s time to act fast.
(Source: TNS)
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BEGINNING OF CLOSENESS IN CHINA-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Dr. Rajkumar Singh (Head of the Department of Political Science, B.N. Mandal University, Bihar)
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan followed the disintegration of Earlier USSR in early
1990s and on account of its internal dissension, conflict and rivalry China remained in inactive
position for a long time. On the other hand, Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan witnessed large-
scale chaos, anarchy and instability in the country and Taliban, a terror militia group, taking benefit
of the prevailing situation captured the power of the state in the year 1996 which lasted till 2001, but
was overthrown by US forces when they began search for world-famous terrorist Osama bin Laden.
The new interim government was formed under the presidentship of Hamid Karzai which
opened a new chapter in Afghan-China relations and reestablished a strong bond of closeness as
well understanding between them. As a gesture of goodwill, in December 2001 China sent a
working team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which attended the Afghan Interim
Administration’s foundation ceremony and also dispatched a message of congratulations to the
newly appointed president. In the period, with deepening of relations China explored its possibility
of increasing businesses and kept itself aloof from politics aa well as security problems of the
country. In nutshell, Beijing focused only on commercial purposes and refrained from involving in
US-sponsored anti-terror campaign initiated in post-9/11 phase, political reconciliation and
economic reconstruction, as it did not want to perform as a subordinate partner in any way of the
Western coalition.
However, over the years, the considerations in Kabul changed with Taliban becoming more
and more powerful and capturing one territory after another. The Western powers, under the lead
role of the United States also felt the futility of continuing the war against the prevailing terror
groups. As a result, a consensus emerged among the powers concerned to establish peace in
Afghanistan through non-military means and it finally materialised in February 2020 when US
agreed on withdrawing from Afghanistan.
Security motivations of China
Although, Afghanistan remained unstable for last three decades, Beijing began taking interest
in Kabul’s affairs since the emergence and expansion of Taliban, a potential terror militia, at the
close of the century or roughly from 2001 when the first government of Taliban collapsed due to
waging of a decisive war against the terror groups, particularly, Al-Qaeda and its chief Osama bin
Laden.
As China is in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan and share about 76- kilometres of border,
the developments in Kabul directly posed threat to China province Xinjiang where Uighur Muslim-
dominated population reside. China too, for long has been suffering from the terror activities of
Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang province and meanwhile, a good number of Uighur Muslims have
taken shelter in Pakistan’s Federally administered Area (FATA), and the southern and eastern
provinces of Afghanistan.
According to an estimate, about eight thousand Uighur Muslim terrorists are living in
Afghanistan preparing for terror war against the Beijing. In addition, the terror groups having
originated from Xinjiang province and living in Afghanistan have transnational connections with
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Turkestan
Islamic Party TIP). They all want and active enough to establish an Islamic State of East Turkestan in
Xinjiang.
Thus, the entire Chinese activities in Afghanistan revolves around its domestic security
perceptions and therefore, it has ignored the works of political reconciliation and other
reconstruction in the country. In the context, Beijing was ready to train Afghan soldiers on Chinese
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soil to forfeit the purpose of (ISIS), Al-Qaeda and a host of other terror outfits who wish to infiltrate
into Xinjiang province of China through the northeastern border of Afghanistan and get fulfilled
their dreams.
Economic interests of China in Afghanistan
In Chinese considerations national security apart, there are two main economic/commercial
factors that attracted Beijing most to come close to Afghanistan- a. China’s own trade interests, and
b. Afghanistan being a hub of natural resources.
In comparison to the other countries of the region, location of Afghanistan is significant as it
opens the commercial as well as vast trade routes and avenues to South Asia, Central Asia, West
Asia, and China. Beijing, being the largest exporter of the region, which has developed most in
recent decades and years, naturally, requires immense world markets and sales agents for its
economic prosperity and power in the comity of nations.
Its latest trade controversy with the United States of America initiated with assumption of
Donald Trump as the President of US (and continued under the Biden administration) has made it
difficult for China to trade in Western nations in general, particularly with those the US retains good
relations and understanding. The second lucrative cause for Beijing’s temptation in Afghanistan is
its natural resources which include from being rare earth elements to copper deposits, iron ore, gold,
lithium and more.
Keeping in view the said objectives Beijing has also expanded in Afghanistan under its policy
of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a dream of global growth project initiated in 2013 and running in
over hundred countries of the world to help/develop undeveloped and undeveloped countries.
After three years of its launching, China and Afghanistan, in 2016, signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), in which they both expressed their joint commitment to promote co-
operation under the BRI projects, which will also, in future, integrate Kabul in intercontinental
infrastructure and boost its economy. As a result of decades of understanding between the two,
especially since 2001, China emerged as a significant trading partner of Afghanistan and it reached
544 US dollar in 2017 and in the year, they also signed a custom-free trade agreement which opened
a bright chapter in their economic relations.
Forward movement of China in Afghanistan
Keeping in view the larger interest, the People’s Republic of China, moved gradually to take a
bigger role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and started initiating peacekeeping efforts with the
help of Pakistan and Afghanistan through shuttle diplomacy, in addition to joining a regional pool,
Quadrilateral Coordination Group since 2015. It also viewed correctly, weakening position of
Afghan government in the country and establish a good rapport with Taliban in past recent years to
ease its relations with Afghan government and the people as well.
In August 2021 when US withdrew finally and completely, Taliban captured political power
in the country and in following days formed a government to rule over the nation. In return of
Chinese help and assistance, the ruling Taliban has called China a close friend and assured Beijing to
curb militant support given from Afghani soil. At present, it appears a good regional combination of
China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and likely to continue in days to come unless something happens
unexpectedly.
(Source: Eurasia review)

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International Law
GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Lt Col Durward Elton Johnson (Chief of the Criminal Law Division for III Corps and Fort Hood)
The varieties of skulduggery which make up the repertoire of the totalitarian government are
just about as unlimited as human ingenuity itself, and just about as unpleasant. For, as you know, no
holds are barred. There are no rules of the game. They can do anything that they think is in their
interests. —George F. Kennan
These words were delivered by U.S. diplomat George Kennan during lectures at the National
War College to describe the Soviet Union in 1946. It was the beginning of the Cold War and the U.S.
policy of containment. The case is being made that these words still apply today. Consider the
National Security Strategy,1 National Defense Strategy,2 and operational concepts in joint military
doctrine3 painting a bleak picture of global threats and persistent competition. In fact, these
documents portray the United States as being at another inflection point in modern conflict with a
return to Great Power competition. For the Department of Defense (DOD), a renewed focus on state-
on-state strategic competition is premised on revisionist powers, such as Russia and China, and
rogue regimes, such as Iran and North Korea, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities by taking deliberately
malicious actions carefully crafted to avoid armed conflict and a powerful military response.4 This is
a problem.
U.S. military operational concepts describe the notion of a competition continuum—“a world
of enduring competition”5—acknowledging the need for the U.S. military to reframe how it
competes in the space between peacetime and armed conflict, commonly known as the gray zone.6
To do so, DOD calls for a more nuanced approach, characterizing the traditional peace/war binary
model as an artificial distinction in today’s global environment. Military doctrine portrays strategic,
operational, and legal uncertainty in the gray zone, making it difficult to respond, fight, and win. In
this space, a critical first step is identifying whether a legal framework can enable strategic and
operational solutions within the boundaries of the law. This is especially true for nations such as the
United States that promote the rule of law and advocate compliance with international law.
Indeed, if the United States failed to advocate the rule of international law, Kennan’s
observations that “[t]here are no rules of the game” and that states will “do anything that they think
is in their interests” would become the reality of Great Power competition, dissolving the
international rules-based order. While there are scores of international law rules, three loom large
within the gray zone. Within this space, international law can be reframed as a triad—composed of
sovereignty, nonintervention, and the proscription on the use of force—offering the United States a
better foundation for developing new national security strategies to compete outside traditional
armed conflict while upholding its position as a standard-bearer for the rule of law. The triad
framework also provides the basis for measures of self-help, arming the United States with a menu
of response options to counter malign behavior.
Removing the veil of legal uncertainty gives U.S. competitors less opportunity to exploit
perceived gaps in international law. While specific application of international law to specific
activities requires careful legal analysis, understanding the basis for lawful action enables the
development of new national security strategies to counter malign behavior. This article does not
address domestic law or policy. Instead, it explores international legal obligations to provide a prism
through which domestic law and policy can be fashioned to meet U.S. national security objectives.
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Freedom to Act
The modern state system derives from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which recognized that
states are sovereign and generally not subject to the jurisdiction of others.7 Absent international
obligations generally formed through treaties or customary international law, states generally have
the right to engage in any national security activity subject only to internal domestic law and policy.
This concept, also known as the Lotus principle, is reflected in the 1927 S.S. Lotuscase in which the
Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that
[i]nternational law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations
between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common
aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.8
Thus, unless the United States chooses to ratify a treaty or accept a certain activity as
prohibited under customary international law, almost nothing in international law forbids that
activity. This is true even when other states claim an activity is customary, so long as the United
States has consistently objected to that emerging norm—in other words, a persistent objector.9
Consider treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, and the Geneva Conventions I through IV. The United States ratified
these treaties, creating international obligations. In contrast, the United States has not ratified other
multilateral treaties such as the two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Since those treaties were not ratified, the United States is not
bound by them, except where the United States treats certain aspects as customary international
law.10 Where certain aspects are considered customary by other states, the United States only needs
to persistently object to ensure that it is not bound by the rule.
Customary international law is described as “a general practice accepted as law.” This
description is derived from Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a treaty the
United States ratified along with all other UN member states—193 to be exact.11 Essentially, states
make binding customary international law through consistent practice combined with a sense of
legal obligation—that is, opinio juris.12 State practice, by itself, is not enough. Colloquially, states
must practice what they preach. If enough states replicate the same behavior, it becomes custom
subject to the exceptions of persistent objectors. Requiring these two aspects is generally accepted by
most prominent legal scholars and illuminated in seminal works such as Oppenheim’s International
Law and Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law. A review of the Department of Defense
Law of War Manual affirms the United States shares this view. Well-known sources of customary
international law are found in official opinions of government legal advisers, rules of engagement,
domestic court opinions, military manuals, and certain treaties and other international
instruments.13 The bottom line is that states, and no one else, make international law. The United
States subjects itself to certain international obligations of its own choosing. The only exceptions to
this essential aspect of creating international law are peremptory norms, also called jus cogens,
which are fundamental principles, such as the prohibition against slavery, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.14
Across the Competition Continuum
U.S. military operational concepts rightly argue that competition across the continuum
requires more nuance, especially in the space between peacetime and armed conflict. International
law is the foundation to enable new strategic and operational solutions. Arguably, gaps exist in
current national strategy, policy, and domestic legal authorities to address hostile activities outside
of armed conflict. However, international law is generally more permissive in allowing states to
engage in national security activities as well as respond to other states’ hostile behavior outside of
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armed conflict. There is no gap and certainly no gray zone in international law—just the need to
understand, apply, and interpret the correct body of international law.
State-on-state behavior, whether during an armed conflict or outside of one, is regulated by
primary rules of international law. These rules establish international obligations between states.15
This article does not address international human rights law and its application to state behavior
toward individuals. The law of armed conflict (LOAC), also known as international humanitarian
law or the law of war, regulates the activities of states that are part of an armed conflict. LOAC is
primarily found in customary international law and treaties such as the Geneva Conventions I
through IV. Outside of armed conflict, the use of interstate force is primarily regulated by the UN
Charter and customary international law. Outside of armed conflict and the use of interstate force,
customary international law applies to state-on-state behavior.
However, secondary rules of international law, commonly known as Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, begin when international obligations are violated and measures
of self-help available to an affected state are limited.16 In 2002, the UN General Assembly adopted a
report of the International Law Commission that contained draft articles on state responsibility
never ratified by any state.17 The consensus among scholars and states is the draft articles on state
responsibility generally codify customary international law principles describing what are termed
internationally wrongful acts.18 The draft articles also provide states injured by internationally
wrongful acts attributable to other states with response options to counter and stop the unlawful
activity. Call it measures of self-help. When considering the customary state responsibility rules,
along with treaty and customary international law obligations that apply to state-on-state behavior,
an international legal framework can be applied across the competition continuum. Think of it as a
triad framework in the space between peacetime and armed conflict. Understanding and applying
the triad framework provide a legal basis for the United States to engage in national security
activities outside of armed conflict and to counter activities that harm U.S. national security
regardless of whether the malign behavior falls in the gray zone.
The Triad Framework
This framework involves three distinct and overlapping concepts that create international
obligations and regulate state-on-state activity: the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention
and the proscription on the use of armed force. Generally, if a state’s activities comply with these
three concepts, those activities are unregulated under international law, providing freedom to
engage in those activities. If a state violates an aspect of the triad, however, it commits an
internationally wrongful act, triggering the right for an injured state to respond. While there are
exceptions to these guidelines and differing interpretations on the peripheries of the rules, the triad
framework provides a baseline for U.S. national security strategy to counter malign behavior.
The principle of sovereignty is perhaps the most fundamental international law principle in
the triad framework and undergirds the other two. Sovereignty connotes a state’s independence
over its territory and freedom to choose how to conduct its affairs inside and outside its own
borders. Territorial sovereignty applies to a state’s control over the people, objects, resources, and
state activities within its own borders. Classic violations of territorial sovereignty include a state
sending “its troops, its warships, or its police forces into or through foreign territory, or its aircraft
over it.”19 Returning to the Lotus principle, the Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed a
state “may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”20 The rule, however,
is not absolute, as not all activities a state conducts inside another state violate sovereignty.
Consider the concept of innocent passage.21 As an exception to violating territorial
sovereignty, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea allows for a ship to transit through another
state’s territorial sea without that state’s consent. Disagreements between leading international cyber
law scholars on whether a state violates another state’s sovereignty if engaged in unknown or
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nonconsensual cyber activities on its territory are a more contemporary example.22 Does emplacing
not-yet-activated malware into another state’s cyber infrastructure, in and of itself, violate
sovereignty?
Consider also espionage. Most leading scholars have long asserted espionage either does not
violate sovereignty or has become a carved-out exception based on overwhelming state practice. In
fact, DOD in its “Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations” expressly
stated the lack of international legal sanctions for espionage may be due to the international law
doctrine of “‘tu quoque’ (roughly, a nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it
itself engages).”23 Moreover, when a state receives the consent of another state to conduct a myriad
of activities on its territory, there can be no violation of sovereignty.24
Somewhat interdependent with sovereignty is the overlapping primary rule of
nonintervention. There is general agreement supported by leading scholars and further confirmed in
opinions of the International Court of Justice that nonintervention is a rule of customary
international law.25 In its 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice
confirmed “the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference.”26
This right prohibits states from intervening “directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of
other States.”27 This is commonly known as a state’s domaine réservé. While the use of interstate
armed force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the most obvious example, activities that do not
rise to the level of armed force may be wrongful intervention in another state’s internal affairs. The
critical requirement to violate this rule is coercion affecting a state’s domaine réservé.28While there
are differing interpretations on the fringes of the meaning of coercion, the prevailing view among
scholars is that coercion simply means the affected state has no “control over the matter in
question.”29 It is more than just interference with state affairs; it must be “dictatorial,” depriving the
affected state of its free will.30
The third component of the triad framework is the proscription on the use of armed
aggression against another state. Pursuant to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.” This fundamental treaty rule is also customary international law. However, the
charter does not define the term force. In fact, there is no authoritative definition of or criteria for a
prohibited use of force. Some scholars view that such force is limited to armed—or military—
action.31 Others argue that Article 2(4) also covers physical force of a nonmilitary nature.32 For
example, former Department of State legal advisor Abraham Sofaer defines force as any manner of
physical violence.33 At a minimum, there is broad consensus that actions that injure or kill people,
or physically damage or destroy objects beyond a de minimis level, amount to a use of force. Other
forms of coercion, such as economic, political, or psychological campaigns, are not prohibited under
Article 2(4), although they still might violate the principle of sovereignty.34 These coercive measures
also have the potential to violate other international obligations formed through other treaties or
customary international law such as the nonintervention rule, but they fall outside the scope of
Article 2(4).
Understanding the triad framework serves as the international legal foundation for the United
States to engage in national security activities around the globe outside of armed conflict. If U.S.
national security activities do not violate another state’s sovereignty, coercively intervene in another
state’s affairs, or are not a prohibited use of force outside its own borders, then the activity may be
used lawfully under international law to achieve national strategic objectives absent any specific
treaties the United States may have with the target state. Yet international law provides exceptions
to compliance with the triad framework, absent any other relevant international agreements,
instruments, or customary international law.
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Countering Malign Behavior

Where another state, such as Russia or China, engages in internationally wrongful acts that
injure the United States, a menu of response options is available to counter the behavior. In fact,
many of these measures would be considered violations of the triad. However, they are lawfully
justified when used to counter an internationally wrongful act. Think of these options as lawful
measures of self-help. There are four major response options relevant to counter hostile and
malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict. The four response options are retorsion,
countermeasures, self-defense, and the legal doctrine of necessity.
First, the United States always has the right to retorsion. Examples of retorsion include
expulsion of diplomats, economic sanctions, embargoes, and the withdrawal of aid.35 These are
perhaps the most common unilateral measures taken by states. Retorsion options are normally done
in response to an internationally wrongful act of another state, yet they need not be.36 Retorsion
may be used in response to any undesired conduct of another state. But it must be in response. They
are lawful measures used to compel other states to cease certain activities because the activities, in
and of themselves, do not breach an international obligation as defined in the triad framework. They
also cannot violate any treaties or international agreements the United States may have with another
state, such as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement37 or the U.S. and China Phase One
Trade Agreement.38 Indeed, because they are lawful measures, albeit unfriendly or unwelcome
conduct, states are free to engage in retorsion.
Consider the removal of 60 Russian officials from the United States in 2018 after the poisoning
of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom. Senior U.S. officials
stated the measure was taken due to Russia’s use of a military-grade chemical weapon in the
territory of another state—the United Kingdom.39 Or consider a series of additional economic
sanctions by the United States against Iran in response to Iran and its proxy attacks against U.S.
forces and interests in Iraq. According to the State Department, the United States initiated new
sanctions against senior Iranian leaders and numerous sectors of the Iranian economy including
construction, manufacturing, textiles, and mining.40 While the United States took measures of
retorsion against Russia and Iran, the events in question also arguably provided other avenues of
self-help, such as countermeasures and self-defense.
Countermeasures are a broad and flexible concept. This legal doctrine allows the United States
to counter internationally wrongful acts committed by another state with a response, except armed
force, that under other circumstances would be considered unlawful. They can be employed solely
to stop hostile or malicious activity, not for purposes of retribution. Countermeasures may be used
to compel and convince adversaries to cease their activity. The doctrine justifies or excuses violating
portions of the triad framework, including the offending state’s sovereignty or coercively
intervening to counter the malign behavior. It also allows a state to violate any other international
obligation formed through treaties or other international instruments, except the use of force under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, certain conditions apply. Normally, states are required to
provide advanced notice to the offending state to give it an opportunity to cease the activity. Yet this
may be impractical when “urgent countermeasures” are necessary to avoid further injury or may
give the offending state an opportunity to defeat the countermeasure.41 The countermeasure must
also be proportionate. In this sense, the response must be “commensurate with the injury suffered.”
If the response is comparable in size and degree considering the gravity of the internationally
wrongful act, it does not matter the means or methods of the response. The response is not limited to
the same type of activity the offending state engaged in. The response can also be one measure or
multiple measures if it is proportionate.42
Consider the events during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. According to the Washington
Post and multiple other news outlets, the United States blocked Internet access of the Russian
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Internet Research Agency (IRA). The IRA was offline during the day of the midterm elections and a
few days after until tallying of the votes was complete to ensure the IRA did not interfere.43 Let us
assume the cyber operation, without justification, would be an internationally wrongful act, either
by violating Russia’s sovereignty or the rule of intervention. U.S. officials assessed the IRA works on
behalf of the Russian government and concluded it was partly responsible for Russian interference
in the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. Assuming Russia, through the IRA, was engaged in a
disinformation campaign to disrupt the 2018 midterm elections and it was deemed an
internationally wrongful act, taking the IRA offline is likely a valid countermeasure. Making these
assumptions, the United States is not limited to an in-kind response. If the Russians committed an
internationally wrongful act by interfering in U.S. elections, the United States could resort to any
measures short of armed force to stop the malicious activity subject to the requirements for
countermeasures. In this case, blocking Internet access was enough.
The most powerful response option is self-defense. Unlike countermeasures, the principle of
self-defense allows the United States to respond with interstate armed force only subject to certain
requirements. Based on treaty law under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international
law, the United States has the “inherent right” to defend itself against an armed attack. The term
armed attack, however, is subject to some debate. There is a prevailing view recognized by the
International Court of Justice in the aforementioned 1986 Nicaragua case that the notion of an armed
attack is always a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4), but not all uses of force falling within
the Article 2(4) prohibition qualify as an armed attack.44 Accepting this view creates a gap where
malicious state actors could engage in forceful actions in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
without triggering the right of an injured state to forcefully respond; those hostile forceful actions
are not considered severe enough to constitute an armed attack. This is significant because U.S.
competitors would rather engage in hostile and malicious activities without generating a powerful
military response. Instead, the United States would be relegated to only nonforceful
countermeasures to stop forceful actions of a malicious state actor.
As expressed in the DOD Law of War Manual, however, the United States “has long taken the
position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force.”45
Thus, the U.S. view most aptly reflects the notion that no gap exists between a “use of force” and an
“armed attack”—a position not expressly shared by other states. Most notably, Japan appears to be
inching closer to the U.S. view.46 Other U.S. allies and partners, nevertheless, do not openly share
this view, which may create a dilemma. Where there is disagreement about whether hostile actions
qualify as an armed attack during combined operations or other activities that involve other states,
the availability of forceful response options may be limited.
Yet assuming a malicious state actor illegally uses force, the United States reserves its right to
respond with armed force only subject to the requirements of necessity and proportionality.47
Necessity essentially means that no reasonable alternative means other than armed force are
available to deter or defeat the armed attack.48 Proportionality in the self-defense context is different
from required in countermeasures or during armed conflict. Proportionality for purposes of self-
defense allows the use of armed force “to the extent that it is required to repel the armed attack and
to restore the security of the party attacked.”49 While proportionality in the context of
countermeasures must be commensurate in scale and intensity, a defensive forceful measure may be
disproportionately larger or smaller depending on what is needed to defeat the armed attack. There
can be multiple measures or one large-scale response, so long as it satisfies the requirements of
necessity and proportionality.
To illustrate, the United States targeted and killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, a senior
Iranian military commander in charge of the Quds Force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. The United States justified this use of armed force as a self-defense measure against a
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persistent and continuing threat. The initial statement by DOD confirms that Soleimani “was
actively developing plans to attack” U.S. personnel, was “responsible for the deaths of hundreds” of
troops, and “orchestrated attacks” against U.S. interests in Iraq over the preceding months.50 While
there is significant disagreement in blog posts and academic circles regarding the legality of the
strike, these analyses are based on incomplete information and a lack of access to the intelligence
that likely informed the U.S. decision to forcefully respond. Employment of forceful defensive
measures must be analyzed case by case on all available information known at the time of the
decision, not ex post facto.
The final and seldom-used response option is based on the plea of necessity. The response
may be of any nature, means, or methods, subject only to the requirements to invoke the doctrine.
Necessity may be justified in situations that create a “grave and imminent peril” to an “essential
interest” of the state. Threats to the existence of the state are the most obvious case but may apply in
the absence of an existential threat. Simply, it depends on all the circumstances. The response must
also be the only means available to defend the essential interest and cannot “seriously impair” an
essential interest of another state. Given these high standards, the doctrine of necessity is rarely
used. In situations that may apply, necessity likely overlaps with other lawful response options,
such as countermeasures or self-defense. However, the doctrine of necessity provides some
flexibility as there is no requirement that the triggering situation be deemed an internationally
wrongful act or attributable to another state.51
The Starting Point
With a renewed focus on Great Power competition, how the United States reframes
competition across the continuum is vital, most notably, in the space between peacetime and armed
conflict. This gray zone is being leveraged to diminish U.S. global reach and power while creating
discord among the United States, its allies, and partners. For the United States to effectively engage
in this space to counter malign behavior, understanding and applying international law is the
starting point. Viewing international law through the lens of the triad framework offers a better
foundation for developing new national security strategies to compete outside of traditional armed
conflict. The framework also provides the basis for measures of self-help arming the United States
with the ability to counter malicious state activities.
While this article provides guidelines for understanding and applying international law,
context matters. Specific activities in specific situations require careful legal analysis. Regardless, the
crux is the United States is not bound by international rules that constrain its ability to compete,
fight, and win in the current global operational environment. Certainly, international law need not
be thought of as a binary model only applying to peacetime or wartime. Once reframed, U.S.
domestic legal authorities, strategy, and policy can be reshaped to meet the needs of persistent
engagement and undermine U.S. competitor objectives.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION LAWFARE AGAINST INDIA’S WAR

CRIMES IN KASHMIR
Hassan Aslam Shad (Expert in International Law)
India has been rampantly abusing and violating the international law in IIOJK. Pakistan,
through universal jurisdiction – a part of customary international law – can counter India’s war
crimes in Kashmir using its legal prowess.
Ask a common man and he will tell you this: international law lacks teeth. Reasons cited
include the following: international law is hardly ever seen in action; it is hostage to geopolitics; and,
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its enforcement is selective. Other criticisms include the sovereign equality claim under international
law, namely that all countries of the world are equal. The criticism goes: how can international law
be termed as a law between “equals” when some countries – presumably “more equal” than others –
can weaponize international rules against weaker states with little to no accountability?
There is indeed truth in this criticism. The record of international law, in particular
international criminal justice, is patchy. Success stories are few and far in between. It is common to
see countries violate international law and get away with it. Violators of human rights can be seen
roaming around with impunity. The selective application of international law makes one wonder if
searching for answers in the international legal order is equivalent to flogging a dead horse.
But, like any other law, international law isn’t without its failures and, importantly, inbuilt
complexities. International law, which has evolved over the years, is an ocean of specialized
knowledge. It consists of many moving parts, some of which are pliable due to changing state
practice. The true challenge for any country is knowing how to put together those parts and to set
the wheel of international law in motion. This requires some tact and out-of-the box thinking.
Take the case of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK). Despite that
Pakistan’s legal case in respect of IIOJK is firmly anchored in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) resolutions, due to India’s unilateral declaration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
which prevents the world court from adjudicating the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan has its hands tied.
Moreover, Indian war crimes in IIOJK cannot be tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC)
because neither India nor Pakistan are a party to the ICC’s founding treaty, i.e., the Rome Statute. In
addition, due to India’s strong geopolitical muscle, countries of the world haven’t come forward in
support of the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination. On the face of it, therefore, it looks like
Pakistan, or Kashmiris for that matter, aren’t left with any viable legal option against Indian state
aggression.
In a 40-page report titled “India’s War Crimes in Kashmir”, Stoke White seeks the
commencement of legal proceedings against India’s Army Chief and Home Affairs Minister on the
basis of the principle of “universal jurisdiction”.
But this is only partly true. There is more to it than meets the eye. Hidden underneath the
rubble of international law’s failures are some potent rules that merit consideration. Knowing how
those rules work and how they fit within the overall framework of international law is both
revealing and promising. If used properly, these rules can be a shot in the arm for the Kashmiris’
struggle against Indian state oppression and set in motion the slowly but surely moving wheel of
international criminal justice.
Take the case of universal jurisdiction, an international law concept that has recently come in
the global limelight.
On January 20, a London-based law firm, Stoke White, filed an application with the UK
Metropolitan Police for the investigation and arrest of India’s Army Chief, Manoj Naravane, and
Home Affairs Minister, Amit Shah, for the torture, kidnapping, and killing of activists and civilians
in IIOJK.
In a 40-page report titled “India’s War Crimes in Kashmir”, Stoke White seeks the
commencement of legal proceedings against India’s Army Chief and Home Affairs Minister on the
basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Stoke White has asked the Metropolitan Police to investigate the death of a minor who was
illegally detained by the Indian authorities and the systematic torture of a human rights defender.
The firm claims to have collected more than 2,000 testimonies on a range of abuses and violations of
international and domestic laws.
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Universal jurisdiction is an established principle of international law that obliges all countries
of the world to prosecute and punish perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
and torture on the basis that these crimes strike at the very heart of global conscience.
Universal jurisdiction is now also part of customary international law, which means that it is
binding on all countries of the world regardless of whether they are parties to any treaties that
incorporate any international crimes covered under universal jurisdiction.
While it is too early in the day to know how far these legal proceedings against the Indian
Army Chief and Home Minister will go, the first legal salvo has been fired against India.
Universal jurisdiction is an established principle of international law that obliges all countries
of the world to prosecute and punish perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
and torture on the basis that these crimes strike at the very heart of global conscience. Universal
jurisdiction, which looks to end impunity for grave international crimes, requires all countries of the
world to prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes regardless of lacunas of
jurisdiction, territoriality, and citizenship, etc.
Universal jurisdiction has evolved over the years and has been invoked by the courts of
various countries. Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, was arrested in the UK in 1998 for
crimes against humanity, on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by a court in Spain. Following a
legal battle, the British courts rejected Pinochet’s claim for immunity as a former head of state and
ordered his extradition to Spain to stand trial. Although the trial never took place due to Pinochet’s
ill health, his one-and-a-half-year detention marked a turning point in the development of the
concept of universal jurisdiction.
The Pinochet proceedings have offered a new window of hope to victims and lawyers to
pursue international criminal accountability. Since then, several Latin American countries have
opened investigations into international crimes. The extradition of former Peruvian President,
Alberto Fujimori, from Chile to Peru in 2007 serves as an example of successful universal jurisdiction
proceedings.
Universal jurisdiction is now also part of customary international law, which means that it is
binding on all countries of the world regardless of whether they are parties to any treaties that
incorporate any international crimes covered under universal jurisdiction. Notably, when a country
exercises universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture,
that country, in effect, acts as an agent of the international community in the fulfilment of its
commitment to end impunity for international crimes.
In 2012, Amnesty International (AI) conducted a detailed study of preliminary legislation
around the world to incorporate universal jurisdiction over international crimes. Whilst the study
notes that domestic legislation of many countries does not incorporate all international crimes under
their domestic laws, and that in many cases the definitions of those crimes are not consistent with
the strict requirements of international law, this study makes some important findings on the
universal jurisdiction ecosystem. It notes that 147 out of the 190 United Nations (UN) member
countries have provided universal jurisdiction over one or more crimes under international law. The
study also notes that 142 UN member countries have included at least one war crime as a crime
under their national law while 136 have provided universal jurisdiction over such crimes. In respect
of the crime of genocide, this study notes that 118 UN member countries have included it as a crime
under national law while at least 94 have provided for universal jurisdiction over this crime.
Pakistan must pursue strategies that resonate with the international audience and coincide
with existing trends and practices. As such, by leveraging the full scope of universal jurisdiction,
Pakistan can launch a preemptive legal strike on India. The time to act is now.
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This AI study offers a glimpse into the true reach of universal jurisdiction in today’s world.
Every legal system, to the extent that it incorporates universal jurisdiction, is a constituent part of the
broader international system. As such, the world is a potential playground for lawfare against
Indian war crimes and other grave violations of human rights in Kashmir.
This also brings me to the recent charges filed against the Indian Army Chief in the UK. This
development has coincided with a few notable developments. The first is Genocide Watch’s
observation that India sits at the precipice of an impending genocide. That Genocide Watch – a
neutral and impartial third party – has issued its damning findings against India (including
Kashmir) is to be contrasted with Pakistan’s own efforts to highlight the plight of Kashmiris –
something that is not given much weight internationally because Pakistan is “seen” as an interested
party with an axe to grind against India. As I have stated elsewhere in my writings, Pakistan should
change the lens through which the world sees Kashmir, all the while extending further moral and
legal support to the Kashmiris to help them in bringing to bear the full power of the law on India.
The momentum is shifting in Pakistan and Kashmiris’ way. Hindutva’s religious bigotry,
which has engulfed all of India, is now a threat to international peace and security. The systematic
oppression of the Kashmiris is no longer going under the radar. Global media has been reporting
about the dangerous trajectory India is on under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Every day is
bringing some dark side of India in the global limelight.
Universal jurisdiction can offer a cascade of favourable outcomes to the Kashmiris including
their right of self-determination.
But, before embarking on a universal jurisdiction lawfare, Pakistan’s policy circles must not
get too bogged down by the glass half-full (optimism) versus half-empty (pessimism) debate. The
risk of a delayed decision is that by the time a move is made, someone else has drunk the water from
the glass.
I suggest that Pakistan should consider adopting the following approaches.
First, Pakistan should hold a conference titled, “Holding India Accountable Under Universal
Jurisdiction”. This will throw a fresh light on Indian human rights and international criminal law
violations in IIOJK. Invitations should be extended to all countries, leading academics, international
jurists, NGOs, foreign media organisations, and influencers. The extent of participation in this
conference shouldn’t be Pakistan’s concern. Pakistan can always conduct mock court proceedings
like the recently convened Russell Tribunal on Kashmir in Sarajevo. In this Pakistan initiated
conference on universal jurisdiction, victims of Indian crimes must be invited to present their
testimonies. Pakistan must then build on the deliberations at the conference and, eventually, take it
to the UN. Again, fear of failure should not stop Pakistan from using today’s relative advantage over
India to impose out-of-proportion costs on it.
Secondly, Pakistan, with the help of the Kashmiris, should identify state-affiliated or
sponsored individuals who have been involved in committing international crimes in Kashmir at
India’s request. Again, this isn’t too difficult a task. A trove of evidence exists within the public
domain, NGOs, and human rights organisations. This evidence can form the basis for filing
universal jurisdiction claims against Indian officials.
Thirdly, Pakistan must enlist international law specialists for “forum shopping”, i.e., to
identify suitable jurisdictions for filing cases with an eye on the ease of registering criminal
complaints, issuing arrest warrants and arresting perpetrators, as well as the duration of legal
proceedings, and likely criminal penalties. Pakistan would require specialist advice on the full
ecosystem of universal jurisdiction with a particular reference to the chosen jurisdictions. Needless
to say, the filing of legal proceedings under universal jurisdiction will also require meticulous
crafting of legal cases that are well grounded in international jurisprudence.
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Pakistan must pursue strategies that resonate with the international audience and coincide
with existing trends and practices. As such, by leveraging the full scope of universal jurisdiction,
Pakistan can launch a preemptive legal strike on India. The time to act is now.
(Source: Daily Times)

MYANMAR MUST END ITS EGREGIOUS BREACH OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW
Dr Arpita Hazarika (India-based researcher at Gauhati University, Assam)
At least two moral shells fired by Myanmar into Bangladeshi territory on September 3 in the
morning were illegal under international law. The event occurred five days after Bangladeshi
officials summoned Myanmar’s ambassador in Dhaka and sent him a note verbale in protest over
Myanmar’s use of two deadly shells at the same location on August 28. This raises greater concerns.
According to the police investigative center at Ghumdum in the hill area of Bandarban, at least two
fighter jets flew over the Bangladesh border while firing eight rounds, while two military helicopters
hovered while firing more than 30 shells.
Bangladesh has reiterated its “deep concern” over Myanmar’s violation of the air border
agreement, with mortar shelling inside Bangladesh and indiscriminate firing from aircraft in border
areas.
In addition to suppressing internal rebels (Arakan Army), the presence of the Myanmar army
on the border is again raising fears of Rohingya infiltration into Bangladesh. There have been
allegations of inaction to deport the remaining Rohingyas staying in the country through
maneuvering. In this situation, the local residents have announced new intrusion prevention.
Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) is also active
For the past few days, there has been an ongoing conflict in Rakhine State, an area bordering
Bangladesh and India in Myanmar, which is affecting the neighboring countries as well. Especially
the residents of Ghumdhum and Tambru border areas of Bandarban are in a panic. On the other
hand, many people of these states fled and took refuge in India.
On the one hand, as the Myanmar army is fighting with the Arakan Army in Rakhine, on the
other hand, since last May, the Myanmar army has started a major military operation against the
rebel groups in Kayah, Kain and Chin states. The military forces of that country are also using
helicopters and warplanes in this war.
The military junta wants to hold general elections in Myanmar in August 2023. Before that,
they want to establish their complete control in Rakhine and other states. Rakhine State is
particularly important to them, as the state shares the border with Bangladesh and India, Myanmar’s
Rakhine State is an area bordering Bangladesh. Where the conflict is going on, too is just across the
border in Bangladesh.
As a result, the Bangladeshi residents of the border area are terrified of the conflict there. Four
and a half thousand Rohingyas have been living on the Tambru border line in Naikshatchari for the
past few years, where this violence is going on. Due to the violence, there is a fear that they will
move to Bangladesh.
It has been alleged that there is a plot to move the remaining Rohingyas in Myanmar to
Bangladesh. As of August 2017, the Myanmar Army has been flying warplanes and helicopters
along the border of Bangladesh, firing and bombimg mortar shells. Among them, four mortar shells
and numerous bullets have landed in the territory of Bangladesh. Locals complain that this strategy
of Myanmar will cause Rohingya infiltration like before.
The two shells fired on August 28 landed half a kilometer inside the Tambru border but did
not do any damage, in contrast to the two shells fired on September 3 at Tambru of the Ghumdum
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border, which burst about 120 meters into Bangladeshi territory. We express our outrage at
Myanmar’s flagrant disregard for international law, demonstrated by its twice-weekly firing of
deadly shells into Bangladesh despite previous complaints following the initial breach on August 28.
Usually, when an operation is carried out near the border, a warning is given if there is a
relationship between the two states in this operation. “But no such information was given to
Bangladesh. It is a violation of international norms not to inform Bangladesh before conducting
operations against Arakan.”
This is not Myanmar’s first offense against international law
In September 2017, shortly after launching a genocide against the Rohingyas and driving a
sizable number of them out of its Rakhine state and into Bangladesh, Myanmar repeatedly violated
Bangladesh’s airspace for a week. Additionally, it continued to instill fear in Rakhine State so that
none of the 1.2 million Rohingyas who are currently seeking refuge in Bangladesh would agree to go
back to their home country.
Such activities pose a serious threat to the safety of peaceful people, a sustainable process of
Rohingya repatriation, a violation of the border agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and
to the good neighborly relations between the two parties.
It appears that Bangladesh, which has about 165 million people, or about three times as many
as Myanmar, is the target of such violations of international law by a nation like the military-run
Myanmar, which has a poor reputation among other states worldwide. This could be because
Bangladesh has an international reputation in terms of politics and strategy as a peaceful country.
But Myanmar must understand and realize that Bangladesh is also a militarily capable country. If
Myanmar continues to pursue an offensive strategy, Bangladesh can take a defensive approach
along the border. This can cause the destabilization of the whole region.
Regional stability might get affected
Although Bangladeshi officials claim to be closely monitoring events, the incident—more so in
light of previous events—is sufficient to raise questions about Bangladesh’s security and territorial
integrity.
On Sunday, Bangladesh reaffirmed its “grave concern” on recent incidents including mortar
shelling from Myanmar, indiscriminate aerial firing in the border regions, and violations of the
airspace.
The Bangladeshi foreign ministry strongly protested the recent incidents along the
Bangladesh-Myanmar border and summoned Myanmar Ambassador to Bangladesh Aung Kyaw
Moe. The ministry had called the envoy three times in a little over a week to express their worry.
The circumstances call for Bangladeshi authorities to make stern diplomatic objections to
Myanmar’s behavior and to take the necessary steps to prevent similar sad incidents from
happening in the future.
While Bangladeshi authorities have little choice but to vigorously protest Myanmar for its
egregious breach of international law in shelling Bangladeshi land, Dhaka must do so in order to
prevent future occurrences of this kind.
Given the circumstances, Bangladeshi authorities should strongly denounce Myanmar’s
actions through the diplomatic process and take appropriate action to prevent a repeat of such
regrettable incidents.
While there is no room for Bangladeshi authorities to accept lightly Myanmar’s egregious
breach of international law by shelling Bangladeshi territory, Dhaka must make a strong complaint
to Naypyidaw to put an end to future episodes.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
 178

International Relations
NEW WORLD ORDER OR THE SYSTEMATIC PLUNDERING OF
NATIONS
Sarah Neumann
For several decades, the process of modern international banditry has been going on in the
direction that it is the USA that determines the place of friend and enemy and the rules of the game.
These rules are written using sanctions, endless wars, or threats of war. The strategic questions here
are: Are peace and democracy possible in such a world? Is it not the right time for making
fundamental international rights stated in the United Nations Charter global? Shall not we try to
change America’s global dictatorship that prevailed under the guise of the new international order
and replace it with a multipolar order?
In the legal section of the United Nations Charter, it is clearly emphasized that every country
can freely choose its own path, both politically and economically. In other words, there is no
condition on how a government should implement its governance system. Violent security and
political behavior of the USA, palpable in Asia and especially Vietnam, in addition to the process of
nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, has led to endless wars and destruction.
The United States has insinuated as if the West, under the leadership of the United States, has the
right to intervene and arbitrate on the governance system of countries or the standards of democracy
and can decide which country is a “good” democracy.
Despite the very clear position of international law in the UN Charter, the United States has so
far given itself the right to decide what is a democratic political system and what values should be
applied everywhere in the world. However, in the United Nations Charter, it is emphasized that no
government or country can interfere in the internal affairs of another country and force it to adopt or
follow certain “values”.
However, in the logic of Washington, it seems that the logic of power has overcome the power
of logic. When the United States wants to launch the new world order by the dint of war, the story is
totally different and the United Nations Charter and the provisions of international law become
futile and America becomes able to loot other countries, wage a war to punish countries such as
Afghanistan or Iraq or encourage a country, like Saudi Arabia, to proceed its brutal war against
Yemen.
The problem is that in the structure of the American world order, what has always remained
is the basic principle that only one actor has the right to determine the rights of others. It is obvious
that in this world order, there is no such thing as common rights or the right to enjoy international
rights and everything is exported unilaterally from America.
A simple example shows how deceptive this one-sided designation is: the United States has
appointed a special representative for women’s rights in Afghanistan while handing over it to a
group that has been one of the most dangerous and misogynist terrorist groups for years. The story
becomes even more ridiculous when even Biden talks about the violation of women’s rights in
Afghanistan, and the United States condemns the non-respect of women’s basic rights in
Afghanistan- the denial of the right to education by the Taliban. It is while Taliban is a group that
the United States was exactly aware of its ideological thoughts and political and cultural policies.
Even if appointing a special representative for women’s rights is a positive action for Afghanistan,
then why is not a special representative for women in Middle East countries, where women’s rights
are equally in doubt, appointed?
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However, the bigger problem is that a country gives itself the right to use double standards to
apply any right that is beneficial to itself and within the utilitarian framework of relations with its
allies. These American values have a diverse range including occupying a country or handing over
the occupied country to Salafi Jihadi groups.
Will the United States accept that a task force is appointed by China or by the United Nations
to deal with the massive genocide of the Indians in the 19th century in the United States? Is America
willing to compensate them for the genocide and occupation of their lands? Will America allow
China, or any other country, to be responsible for tracking the status of blacks in America? Is there
any country that can force America to become a member of the Hague International War Crimes
Tribunal? While 300 billion dollars of gold reserves and foreign exchange of Russia and the foreign
assets of Russian institutions and individuals have been blocked by the United States, can we expect
that in the event of a war by the United States, the same amount of assets of American individuals,
companies, and officials be seized by a third country?
Another issue that is raised in America’s dealings with other countries is the creation of a
system of looting in the global political economy whose most benefits go to the pockets of the
Americans. In order to maintain its position as the treasurer of other countries’ capital, America has
forced or encouraged most of its neighboring governments to accumulate their foreign exchange
reserves in the United States. Whenever the United States sees the conditions proper, it has no
abstinence from looting the property of other countries.
For example, Afghanistan, as one of the poorest countries in the world, is facing a severe
financial crisis; after the Taliban came to power following the agreement with the White House,
Afghanistan faced the looting of its property; 7 billion dollars from the accumulation of territorial-
national wealth of the Afghan people were confiscated by the United States. The irony is that the
United States will never return half of this $7 billion to Afghanistan, which it has reserved for the
victims of 9/11. This is while about 24 million people in Afghanistan are living in acute hunger.
What makes the matter worse is that according to the American intelligence agencies’ own
estimates, not the Taliban but Al-Qaeda was involved in the September 11 attacks; in addition, most
of the perpetrators were Saudi nationals but the case of Saudi involvement or role was never
seriously investigated.
The most fundamental question is “From whom should the families who have lost their
members in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya as a result of brutal wars of the United States, get their
compensation?” More than 200,000 Iraqi citizens were killed in the American attack on Iraq, and
many more have perished due to the indirect results of the war, such as the destruction of the
food, sanitation, and drinking water security system, malnutrition and disease. According to the
Civilian Harm Monitoring Group Airwars, between 22,000 and 48,000 individuals have been
killed in direct American airstrikes after September 11. Can the killed civilians claim
compensation from the US in an international court? There is no answer, and this is the banditry
going on in the American world order.
(Source: Eurasia Review)

THE BATTLE BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

Jan Krikke (The author of Leibniz, Einstein, and China)
“If Russia fails, all bets are off for the 21st century. And if Russia succeeds as a nation-state in
the family of nations, it will owe much of that success to one man, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.” –
Time magazine, “Putin Man of the Year” in 2007
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Admire him or despise him, Russia’s president has put his stamp on 2022. By invading
Ukraine and challenging the West, Vladimir Putin changed the world’s political and economic
landscape. He set the table for a post-American, multipolar world. Future historians will speak of
the pre- and post-2022 worlds.
Putin, whose grandfather cooked for Josef Stalin, succeeded the tragicomical Boris Yeltsin as
president in 1999. He is said to have prevented the disintegration of the Russian Federation. This
year he dealt a fatal blow to NATO expansion into the heart of the Eurasian continent. Whether by
design or coincidentally, he also put a bomb under the global dollar system.
Western governments frame this epic proxy war with Russia as a battle between democracy
and authoritarianism. From a limited Western perspective, this is an obvious and marketable
narrative, but much of the non-Western world doesn’t buy it. Most countries in the East and the
Gobal South see the conflict in Ukraine as a battle between globalism and sovereignty.
Globalization under Western rules is said to have caused a decline in the power of national
governments to direct and influence their economies, especially in terms of macroeconomic
management. It also led to a decline in the ability of countries to determine their own political
structures. The Ukraine war made countries in the European Union belatedly realize that the
European Commission sets the EU’s foreign policy.
The non-Western world has reasons to be skeptical about the motives behind proclaimed
Western ideals of freedom and democracy.
After the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rather than
following suit, was transformed into what is in effect the enforcement arm of globalism and its
backbone: the (petro) dollar system, SWIFT, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Wall
Street, and the City of London.
NATO’s operational theater has now expanded far from its Atlantic roots. It is now active in
Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
No Plan B
After Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, the West confiscated billions of dollars in Russian
reserves and unilaterally expelled the country from the global dollar payment system, the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). No court was involved. The West also
confiscated private property and yachts from anyone who carried a Russian passport.
The plan of the US and its EU Atlanticist allies was simple enough: Let Ukraine fight a proxy
war against Russia until the Russian economy collapses or Putin is replaced in a Kremlin putsch.
The plan was apparently not gamed out with a rigorous “what if” test, which may explain why there
was no Plan B.
What if the resilience of the Russian economy and its war machine was underestimated? What
if Russia cut off all or part of its energy exports? Russia is one of the world’s leading exporters of
commodities. Where would the EU get its energy? What if China, India and Saudi Arabia didn’t sign
on to the plan?
The miscalculation had catastrophic consequences. At the start of the war, Ukraine’s army was
the second-largest in Europe. Ukraine has spent the past eight years heavily fortifying the Donbas
region using NATO standards. Military commentators compared it to a modern version of the
World War I Maginot Line.
Six months into the war, Ukraine is on course to lose a third of its territory. It has suffered well
over 100,000 dead or wounded, a number that exceeds the total manpower of the British Army.
Russia is said to have suffered 15,000 casualties. This alone will assure the Russians will extract a
heavy price from Ukraine – and the West.
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Realism catches up with idealism

Russia has also prevailed on the economic front. It raked in billions of dollars in additional income
from rising fuel prices. Oil banned by the EU found eager buyers in Asia and elsewhere. The ruble nearly
doubled in value, while the euro tanked. In March of this year, a euro was worth 145 rubles. In August, it
had dropped to 58 rubles. The ruble has been the best-performing currency in 2022.
The damage from the self-harming sanctions against Russia is growing by the day. Germany’s
captains of industry have warned that their country, without cheap Russian energy, may see the
disintegration of its business model. In August, British gross national product saw its biggest decline
in 300 years. Economists predict an inflation rate of 18% for the UK later this year.
In the early days of the war, EU leaders projected the resolve of wartime leaders, defiantly
proclaiming they were defending democratic values and freedom. If sanctions cause economic
hardship, so be it. The media, on the left and the right as well as state-owned, displayed a rare
unanimity in depicting Putin as the new Rasputin.
When economic reality sunk in, the EU leadership acted like deer caught in the headlights.
One day Brussels sanctioned Russian oil, the next day it accused Russia of “blackmail” for reducing
gas deliveries. While it was sending weapons to Ukraine to kill Russian soldiers, it protested that
Russia was “weaponizing” its oil.
For Europe’s young and inexperienced political elite, needling Russia and letting new states
into NATO was all part of the (political) game. But getting into a full-blown fight with Russia was
not. EU leaders, many of whom were toddlers during the Cold War, found themselves dealing with
the biggest economic, financial, and geopolitical realignment since World War II.
Back to gold
As it becomes apparent that the war on Russia has had many unintended consequences, the
first cracks are appearing in the united Western front. “No matter who wins Ukraine, America has
already lost,” headlined the influential American magazine The National Interest last weekend. It
pointed at the new alliance between Russia and China, respectively the world’s largest commodities
exporter and the world’s largest industrial producer.
Rather than isolating Russia, the West has isolated itself from the majority of countries that
make up 80% of the global population. Russia has taken the lead in developing an Asia-centric
currency as an alternative to the global dollar system.
A shake-up of the dollar system was inevitable in the long run (global dollar-denominated
debt is about $300 trillion and impossible to unwind without a major financial reset), but the
expulsion of Russia from the dollar system has forced the issue.
The rival to the dollar will likely be digital only and backed by gold and commodities.
Countries likely to participate are the resource-rich BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa), the eight members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Nigeria.
If the rise of the ruble is any indication, the new currency will lead to a steep increase in the
prices of oil, gold, and other commodities in both euro and dollar terms.
The EU and even the US will come to regret the day that a handful of Western ideologically
driven politicians took it upon themselves to torpedo the Minsk Accords. A neutral Ukraine could
have led to the further development of a contiguous Eurasian economic zone.
Given its geography and abundant resources, Ukraine would have been a natural hub in
China’s Belt and Road Initiative. When the dust settles over Kiev, the BRI will gradually get back on
track and will include what is left of Ukraine.
And rather than being neutral, Ukraine’s security will depend on Russia rather than NATO.
(Source: Asia Times)
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IS DEPENDENCY THEORY RELEVANT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY?
Olusola Samuel Oyetunde
In the last decade, the debate over the relevance of the dependency theory in explaining
contemporary international political economy has re-emerged in academic discourse. The
dependency theory emerged in the 1960s as a reaction to the modernisation theory and trickle-down
economic theory. While the modernisation theory assumes a unilinear and progressive development
of societies by holding industrialisation as a prerequisite for development (Regmi, 2018), the trickle-
down theory contends that rapid economic growth automatically reduces inequality as wealth
trickles down from the rich to the poor (Arndt, 1983). As a critique of both theories, the dependency
theory argues that development is neither unidirectional nor economic growth in developed
countries automatically translates to the development of less developed ones. Instead,
underdevelopment results from obstacles created by ‘centre nations’ through the integration of
‘peripheries’ into the world capitalist system, leading to the economic reliance of the periphery on
centre nations. Although the dependency theory was a dominant explanatory framework between
the 1960s and 1980s, it declined in the mid-1980s due to the rise of neoclassical economics and its
inability to explain some changes in the international political economy structure, particularly the
economic success of the Newly Industrializing Asian countries (Kvangraven, 2021). However, the
persistence of uneven development and increasing poverty trends has led to the re-emergence of
academic discourse regarding the relevance of dependency theory in explaining today’s world
inequalities.
This essay argues that despite the changes in the international economic order, which led to a
decline in the popularity of the dependency theory, the theory remains relevant in explaining
economic and power relations between states in the twenty-first century globalised economy. The
manifestation of the unequal and exploitative relationships between the Global North and Global
South countries can be seen in many spheres, including economic, political, military, and ideology
(Galtung, 1971). However, this essay will focus on the role of foreign aid by the International
Monetary Fund in perpetuating the dependence of Global South countries. Besides increasing the
debt profile of Global South countries, the conditions attached to international aid by western
financial institutions are detrimental to the economy of the peripheries as it limits the decision-
making capability of aid recipient countries. Consequently, this has led to the inability of the global
south countries to take ownership of their national development schemes. The resultant effect is
economic and political dependencies, which has further widened the developmental gap between
the developed industrialised countries and the third world countries.
Nigeria, the world’s eighth-largest recipient of foreign aid and second in Africa, is used as a
case study because over forty per cent of the country’s population are living below the poverty line,
according to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (Aderounmu et al., 2021). Furthermore, the
figure is estimated to increase to forty-five per cent in the year 2022 by the World Bank (Irwin et al.,
2021). The essay is structured into four parts. After the introduction, the underlying assumptions of
the dependency theory were discussed. The third part explains the contemporary relevance of the
theory using IMF-Nigeria relations as a case study. The final part gives the conclusion.
Theoretical Background
Dependency theory was developed as a framework for understanding the reasons for the
divergence in the development level between wealthier and poorer nations. Historically, the theory
was first used to explain the underdevelopment of Latin America and is associated with scholars
such as Paul Prebisch and Hans Singer. Prebisch, in 1949 had argued that Latin America is
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underdeveloped because it relied on the exportation of primary commodities, which resulted in

unequal trade terms between Latin American countries and developed western countries. However,
several variants of the dependency theory have been used to explain underdevelopment in other
world regions, such as Africa (Rodney, 1972; Amin, 1974) and Asia (Ohno, 1998). Dos Santos
(1970:231) defines dependency as ‘a situation in which the economy of certain countries is
conditioned by’ the development processes of other countries. The main argument of the
dependency theory is that the incorporation of the ‘satellites’ into the world capitalist system
dominated and controlled by the ‘metropolis’ has resulted in an unbalanced relationship that keeps
the satellite countries dependent on the economies of the metropolis. The central assumptions of the
theory include: (a) Underdevelopment, which is different from un-development, deals with the
active extraction of resources from periphery countries for the benefit of the core countries (b) the
world is polarised into two: the highly industrialised wealthy core nations and less industrialised
poor peripheries (c) The periphery countries are poor because they are forcefully integrated into the
international division of labour where they functioned as producers and suppliers of raw materials
or repositories of cheap labour (d) Resource diversion is maintained through active collaborations of
local elites and dominant states who share common interests (Namkoong, 1999).
The dependency theory has been subjected to several criticisms. Kvangraven (2021) argues
that most of the criticisms of dependency theory are based on a superficial, incorrect, and incomplete
understanding of the theory’s core assumptions. Nevertheless, the critiques centre on its emphasis
on external factors as causes of underdevelopment (Sanchez, 2003), economic reductionism
(Grosfoguel, 2000), tautology and lack of precision (Lall, 1975). Kvangraven (2021) states that while
some criticism, such as tautology, is valid in some cases, others represent minority perspectives
within the dependency tradition. Furthermore, Amsden (2003) criticised the dependency theory for
suggesting the impossibility of achieving development within the international capitalist framework
and failing to account for the development of some traditional periphery countries. Critics posit that
the rise of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore’s economies indicates the possibility of
attaining economic progress under the integrated world economy (Sanchez, 2003). However,
Kvangraven (2021) maintains that the economic transformation of these countries does not
contradict the basic assumption of the dependency theory. As shall be argued in this essay, the
dependency theory still offers a crucial explanatory power in explaining today’s world inequalities
despite its relegation in the field of development studies.
The International Monetary Fund and Dependency Theory in the 21st Century
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in
1944 to manage the international monetary system after the Great Depression of the 1930s and the
Second World War (Igwe, 2018). The initial function of the IMF was to maintain exchange rate
stability by providing loans to countries experiencing temporary balance of payment crises (Ahmed,
2018). However, the role of the IMF has evolved to include structural reforms, domestic financial
system stability, debt crisis management and pandemic response (Yoon, 2005). The financial aid of
the IMF is tied to the implementation of certain economic policy conditions, which includes trade
and financial liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, currency devaluation and other market-
liberalising reforms. These neo-liberal reforms, known as the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP), aim to facilitate the expansion of capitalism and the integration of developing countries into
the world capitalist economy. While the imposition of SAP as a precondition for obtaining financial
assistance by the IMF has long been a subject of criticism, the logic behind these conditions and their
contemporary effects conforms with the basic assumptions of the dependency theory. Whereas
Nigeria adopted SAP in 1986, the IMF loan conditionalities have evolved in the 21st century to
reflect the growing involvement of the IMF in low-income countries experiencing structural
problems. The relationship between Nigeria and the IMF as a lender of last resort is exploitative,
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favouring the latter at the expense of the former. This has brought untold hardship to the Nigerian
populace and has further widened the inequality gap between Nigeria and developed countries of
the West.
The dependency theory can be used to explain Nigeria’s reliance on foreign aid from the IMF.
The motive behind aid issuance aligns with the dependency theory assumption of a polarised world
between the ‘Centre’ and ‘Periphery’. Although the IMF comprises 190 member states, the
institution is controlled by industrialised western powers, as observed in its governing structure. For
instance, the members of the IMF are hierarchically positioned according to the quota assigned to
them based on their relative economic position in the world’s economy. The IMF quota formula
considers each country’s Gross Domestic Product, openness, economic variability, and international
reserves (Jha and Saggar, 2000). Similarly, the institution’s decision-making procedure is by
weighted voting, and the weight of each country’s voting right reflects its quota (Mayer and Napel,
2020). This implies that decisions of the board primarily reflect the interests of economically
developed countries that dominate world trade. Nigeria is a regular recipient of IMF financing and
is currently among the heavily indebted countries in sub-Sahara Africa. A recent statistic by the Debt
Management Office in Nigeria shows that the country owes the IMF $3.45 billion as of September
2020 (Ugbodaga, 2021). Nigeria’s extreme dependence on loans from the IMF has worsened its debt
crisis as it has resulted in a debt burden that has distorted the country’s development. Due to the
resources directed toward debt servicing, the debt crisis has restricted the country’s capacity to
invest in critical growth-sustaining infrastructure (Yusuf and Mohd, 2021). Consequently, Nigeria
has found itself in a very “tightrope debt trap” with unsustainable external debt. From the
dependency theory’s perspective, the IMF’s loans can be seen as a mechanism used by highly
industrialised nations to maintain the dependence of the Periphery on their economies under the
pretense of assisting in achieving economic development.
The IMF loan conditionalities and their effects have further made the dependency theory
relevant in the Twenty-First Century. Besides reducing economic growth in Nigeria, the loan
conditionalities infringe on the country’s national sovereignty and have restricted the Nigerian
government’s capacity to manage the country’s internal economic affairs. This is because the
predetermined economic policies under the IMF packages have led to the failure of the Nigerian
authority to govern its economy. Whereas the IMF often claims that the policies aim to facilitate
economic development, these policies are imposed with little or no consultation with the Nigerian
government and without regard for the country’s economic circumstances (Eberlein, 2006).
Moreover, the IMF fails to consider the unique causes of Nigeria’s economic challenges by imposing
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which is seen as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. As an
aid recipient, Nigeria lacks the power to independently decide what to do with the loans received
from the IMF without input from the international financial institution, as the donor’s interest
remains paramount. Ikejiaku (2008) argues that while developing countries demand loans to
improve their economic situation, the conditions attached to the loans often worsen the situation.
For instance, the continual adoption of the SAP and other economic liberalisation policies in Nigeria
as preconditions for assessing IMF loans has worsened its debt crisis and has resulted in socio-
economic and political crises in Nigeria. As a result, the country’s debt repayments can be seen as an
instrument of neo-imperialism as it erodes the Nigerian government’s power to meet its citizens’
needs and make economic decisions that improve the welfare of its citizens (Dantani, 2019). Nigeria
continues to adopt the IMF-imposed liberalisation packages despite limiting its ability to make
crucial economic decisions that suit its local peculiarities.
Through its loan conditionalities and high-interest rates, the IMF has kept Nigeria in a vicious
cycle of unending debt dependency. Whenever a country attempts to break away from this
exploitative relationship, the IMF withdraws or delays loan disbursements until the conditions are
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entirely accepted. An example is the disbursement delay of the Second largest IMF COVID-19
emergency fund for Nigeria due to the disagreement between Nigeria and the IMF over the
conditions attached (Amuno, 2020). The saying “he who pays the piper dictates the tunes” explains
why the IMF have an enormous influence on the Nigerian economy. Nigeria is left with little or no
choice but to accept the stringent loan conditions since the country is politically and economically
weak in a world characterised by power. The adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme has
had adverse effects on Nigeria’s development. The trade liberalisation policy, for instance, has
encouraged the growth of foreign corporations in Nigeria and has opened the Nigerian economy to
superior over-priced foreign products (Adenikinju and Chete, 2002). The prices of locally produced
Nigerian goods are deliberately kept low and subjected to the forces of demand and supply. This has
led to the inability of local industries to compete with their foreign counterparts leading to the
eventual closure of most local industries. The situation has left Nigeria’s economy at the mercy of
transnational corporations who act as agents of Western countries to exploit human and natural
resources. Specifically, multinational corporations such as Shell Petroleum Development Company
(SPDC) in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria have been a clog in the wheel of Nigeria’s development.
The activities of SPDC in the Niger Delta region have led to developmental challenges such as
poverty, political instability, unemployment, civil unrest, and environmental degradation
(Oluwaniyi, 2019). Furthermore, the participation of Nigeria in the Global Value Chains, ‘where the
different stages of the production process are located across different countries’, has further given
more room to multinational corporations, thereby reinforcing the core vs periphery pattern
(Trienekens, 2012).
Another offshoot of the IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria is the
privatisation policy, with economic liberalisation as its primary focus. Privatisation entails the
partial or outright sales of public enterprises to private individuals to make them more efficient and
effective (Asaolu et al., 2005). The policy aims to reduce government spending to make money
available for debt servicing and put Nigeria in a better position for more loan procurement (Ojo and
Fajemisin, 2010). Privatisation has led to the sale of giant utilities in Nigeria, such as the National
Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the Nigerian Telecommunication (NITEL), and the Nigerian Port
Authority. While the privatisation policy has not resolved the problems facing public enterprises in
Nigeria, the policy has worsened development challenges in Nigeria with adverse social effects such
as inflation, unemployment, and corruption (Orji et al., 2014). The policy has contributed to the
current inflation rate in Nigeria, which is about 15.63 per cent and its unemployment rate of about
33.3 per cent (Nwokoma, 2021; Izuaka, 2022). Besides, Eke et al. (2017) argue that the privatisation
policy has led to the return of foreign expatriates, who had initially relinquished the companies to
the Nigerian government after colonialism, as executive directors of the privatised companies.
Consequently, this has compromised Nigeria’s economic sovereignty and reasserted the dominance
of the country’s economy by foreigners due to the predominance of foreign investors in the
privatised companies (Excellence-Oluye et al., 2019). This has perpetuated Nigeria’s dependency on
western-controlled foreign transnational corporations due to the inability of the Nigerian
government to regulate and control the activities of foreign industries, such as the Shell Petroleum
Development Company (Nwozor, 2020). As a result, adopting the privatisation policy in Nigeria has
promoted foreign capitalist interests and provided opportunities for human and material resources
exploitation (Odukoya, 2007).
This exploitation is sometimes made possible through the collaboration of Nigerian elites and
the transnational corporations representing western interests in Nigeria. The Nigerian governing
elites use state power to advance the interests of foreign capital since these interests coincide with
their own. An example is an allegation by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
of SPDC using its relationship with the Nigerian government to exploit the oil-rich Niger Delta
(Ryerson, 2018). Despite the evidence of exploitation and illegal activities against SPDC leading to
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the underdevelopment of the Niger-Delta area, the Nigerian government continues to deploy state
power to protect SPDC’s economic interests. The resultant effect is the decreasing independence of
the Nigerian economy and the increasing autonomy of transnational corporations in Nigeria. This
further aligns with the dependency theory’s assumption of the reciprocal relationship between
political and economic elites in periphery and centre nations.
Conclusion
This essay has examined the relevance of the dependency theory in explaining today’s global
imbalances. Despite the decline in the popularity of the dependency theory, it can be used to explain
the contemporary relationship between Nigeria and the IMF, which has reinforced the Nigerian
economy’s dependence on western countries. Through its loan conditionalities, the IMF has kept
Nigeria in a debt cycle leading to the inability of Nigeria to govern its economy. This has kept
Nigeria’s economy underdeveloped and widened the inequality gap between Nigeria and Western
Countries. To break away from this exploitative relationship, Nigeria must embrace industrialisation
without external dependence.
(Source: E-IR)
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Interviews
INDIA AND PAKISTAN AT 75
Prospects for the Future
Interview with Ambassador Jalil Abbas Jilani; Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi; Ambassador
Nirupama Rao; Ambassador Arun Singh
India and Pakistan, the two nuclear-armed giants of South Asia, each mark the 75th
anniversary of their independence this week. Disputes over their shared border and the territory of
Kashmir have been a recurrent source of conflict between the two countries over the course of their
histories, and new geopolitical alignments, changes in conventional and nuclear military
capabilities, and deep mistrust continue to forestall any normalization of ties. China’s rise and the
attendant great power competition have complicated both Islamabad’s and New Delhi’s strategic
calculus as they both look to balance relations with Washington and Beijing.
In this article, USIP interviews Jalil Abbas Jilani and Maleeha Lodhi, former ambassadors of
Pakistan to the United States, and Nirupama Rao and Arun Singh, former ambassadors of India to
the United States, to get their perspectives on the main foreign policy and security challenges facing
their respective countries, options for rapprochement, and the role of the United States and other
global powers in supporting peace and stability in the region.
At the 75th anniversary of independence, what do you see as the primary foreign policy and
security challenges facing your country in the coming five to 10 years?
Rao: This is a time of heavy turbulence in global politics. Power equations are not stable, the
world where globalization seemed to assure a better future for billions of aspiring youth is an image
receding from our rear windows, and negotiated multilateral or regional solutions for lingering
geopolitical problems, and questions of war and peace, are no longer assured. South Asia is a
different place today with China’s assertive military and financial clout generating challenges for
India’s neighborhood policy. Our relationship with Pakistan will continue to remain fraught and
weighted down by cross-border “gray zone” confrontation and militancy targeted against us. Of
even more consequence is the hostile and adversarial state of India’s relations with China, where the
lack of resolution of problems on the high Himalayan borders we share has created a potent cocktail
of mistrust and dangerously close military confrontation.
Lodhi: Pakistan’s greatest security challenges will continue to emanate from its neighborhood
— from the unsettled situation on its border with an unstable Afghanistan and from troubled
relations with India. An imposing foreign policy challenge will be to navigate the growing
confrontation between the United States and China, two global powers with which Pakistan has its
most important bilateral relationships.
Ties with China will remain an overriding priority for Islamabad. The strategic direction
relations have taken in recent years has given this long-standing partnership added significance at a
time of a fundamental change in the international balance of power brought about by China’s rise as
a global power; the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is emblematic of this.
Pakistan seeks a reset of ties with the United States, but relations will inevitably be affected by
Washington’s standoff with Beijing. Islamabad wants to avoid being sucked into this big power
rivalry. But this is easier said than done. So long as U.S.-China relations remain unsteady it will have
a bearing on Pakistan’s effort to reconfigure ties with the Washington. Redefining Pakistan-U.S.
relations will be a daunting task in the changed context of America’s military withdrawal from
Afghanistan and its choice of India as its strategic partner in the region in its strategy to contain
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China. Aspects of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy also have security implications for Pakistan, not
least because it injects Cold War dynamics into the Indian Ocean, which Islamabad has long sought
to prevent becoming India’s Ocean.
Singh: The world is now moving decisively from its unipolar moment to a multipolar phase.
India will have to carefully navigate its relations with the three major powers: United States, Russia
and China. There is growing convergence in Indian and U.S. interests, particularly in the Indo-
Pacific, and growing strength in various aspects of the bilateral relationship: trade, investment, value
chain, technology, defense and diaspora. There will be difference on Russia, with which India has a
legacy, a strong defense supply dependence, a productive energy partnership, and need to prevent
Russia from taking anti-India positions on India-China issues. India also has to manage its relations
with China, complicated by differences and confrontation on the boundary between them; China’s
growing concerning presence in South Asia, the Indian Ocean and space; and growing Chinese
defense and cyber capabilities. Threading the needle of these three relationships, in an era of intense
geopolitical competition, will pose the primary foreign policy and security challenge to India in the
coming five to 10 years. Many of the other challenges that India may face, including terrorism, will
be a subset of this primary challenge.
India and Pakistan have experienced repeated hostilities over their post-independence history,
but for the past year and a half, a tenuous cease-fire agreement along the Line of Control has been
upheld. How could the neighbors build on this toward a greater stability in bilateral ties?
Jilani: The history of Pakistan-India relations can be characterized as one of lost opportunities.
Mistrust, hostility and conflict has undermined efforts toward peace and stability. Since
independence, Pakistan and India have had numerous wars, border skirmishes and military stand-
offs. They also continue to have unresolved disputes, lingering irritants and a history of broken
promises.
Attempts made by the two countries in the past seven decades to address disputes have not
been successful due to various domestic, regional and global factors. India’s position on almost
every issue regarding Pakistan has hardened ever since the emergence of India as a “strategic
partner” of the United States and other Western powers. Developments since 2018, including New
Delhi’s unilateral decision to repeal Articles 370 and 35A and alter Kashmir’s constitutional status,
which Pakistan considers to be a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and the Simla
Agreement, have further strained ties between the two countries.
Although issues between Pakistan and India are long-standing, progress is possible. Leaders
on both sides of the border need to develop a national consensus in support of the peace process and
bring all stakeholders including the core constituencies, media and opposition parties on board. As
in the past, the United States and United Kingdom can also play an important role in defusing
tensions.
This may appear to be a tall order but there are historical precedents and lessons the two
countries can draw from. In the face of high-level tensions between 1999-2003, former Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India initiated a unprecedented peace process from 2003-2008,
leading to a nearly decade-long cease-fire, increases in bilateral trade and the establishment of
Kashmir-related confidence-building measures. The two countries also addressed their respective
concerns on terrorism through a discreet and candid dialogue, and came close to a resolution on
several disputed boundary points. Unfortunately, the process was disrupted due to political
developments in the two countries and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Several important lessons can be drawn from the substantive and result-oriented peace
process followed by the two countries from 2003-2008. First, visionary leadership on both sides of
the border can change the course of history and break the logjam. Second, it is imperative to show
flexibility and adopt a problem-solving approach. Third, dialogue is essential. Only through regular
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dialogue do new ideas emerge. Negotiations should not thrust anything unacceptable on any party.
Fourth, building trust is of paramount importance. The only way it can develop is through
engagement at all levels including between the political leadership, public officials, businesses,
media and civil society.
If we want the next 75 years to look any different from the past, adhering to the above
principles could allow both Pakistan and India to live a more peaceful and prosperous future.
Prudence demands that we pick up the threads from where we left off in 2008 and find common
ground to work together. Only then can lasting peace become a viable alternative to endless
conflicts.
Singh: The cease-fire has held despite an absence of a public working relationship or
exchanges between the two governments at the moment. There was also an effective cease-fire
earlier from 2003 to 2008. However, at that time there was a dialogue process, aimed at advancing
cooperation, and a reportedly productive back channel for discussing some of the contentious issues.
This had been disrupted by the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack linked to official elements in Pakistan.
One way to build on the present cease-fire would be to explore ways to advance cooperation
on trade and economic issues, especially since globally, including in South Asia, there has been a
significant negative impact of COVID and then the present crisis in Europe, leading to rise in energy
and food process. Several South Asian countries are seeking support from the IMF. A South Asian
initiative to respond to the current crisis could reinforce in popular perception of the advantages
from cooperation rather than confrontation.
Lodhi: Managing difficult relations with India will continue to preoccupy Pakistan. Dialogue
has been suspended for years. Trade was halted and diplomatic representation downgraded in 2019
after India’s illegal action of incorporating and bifurcating the disputed state of Jammu and
Kashmir. The hope that back-channel communication between the two countries in 2021 would
yield a thaw turned to disappointment when no headway was made on any front, beyond the re-
commitment by both neighbors in February 2021 to observe a cease-fire on the Line of Control. This
was an important development, however, as only two years earlier the two states were locked in a
dangerous confrontation epitomized by the Balakot crisis, when Indian planes carried out bombing
inside Pakistani territory. In view of the persisting deadlock, the future outlook for Pakistan-India
relations is uncertain. Given the impasse on Kashmir, an uneasy and fragile state of “no war, no
peace” is likely to continue.
Rao: It is important that the cease-fire agreement along the Line of Control between India and
Pakistan should hold and that attempts by the latter to provoke pro-Pakistani secessionist elements
in Kashmir should cease. It is difficult — indeed, impossible — to nurture any illusions of a better
tomorrow in India-Pakistan relations, if such activities continue. There is little patience among the
Indian public for talk of peace with Pakistan when we confront the turbulent history of the past few
decades of relations, despite attempts made by successive Indian governments to build bridges with
Pakistan and promote a functioning relationship with our western neighbor. The domestic
consensus is for a firmness of approach in dealing with Pakistan in a non-conciliatory manner given
this troubled history.
How do you assess regional stability and relations with your neighbors and other powers such as
the United States, China or Russia? What is needed from outside partners to help ensure peace
and stability in South Asia over the next 25 years?
Rao: I believe that the global consensus should be to support regional integration among the
eight countries of South Asia, and to advocate this as a way forward for the secure and prosperous
future of every country in the region. One neighbor, China, which is also a global power, and is not a
South Asian country, has pursued a disruptive policy agenda in the region that has sought to
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challenge India (which is the crucial connector country in South Asia for any scheme of regional
integration) rather than work with it as far as the pursuit of such integration is concerned.
China’s regional ambitions do not support the realization of the potential of an integrated
South Asia, especially since it has actively helped the advancement of Pakistan’s military and
strategic ambitions against India. The United States and India have worked hard to cement their
close and comprehensive global strategic partnership over recent years, and one factor in this
equation has been the deep disquiet and concern about the aggressive assertiveness of China in the
Indo-Pacific and the challenge this poses to a rules-based international order. Our relationship with
Russia passed its heyday long ago, yet Russia remains a Eurasian power whose capacity to influence
the regional trajectory cannot be denied. Russia policy therefore cannot be an area of neglect.
Singh: While outside partners have, at times, played a role in defusing acute tensions, or
ongoing conflict, their involvement in South Asian affairs has not necessarily contributed to
cooperation and stability. From the Indian perspective, Pakistan had earlier leveraged its
relationship with United States, and now with China, to sustain an adversarial and negative
approach to India. External powers could play a helpful role in current context if they stepped
back and declared willingness to support South Asian initiatives to deepen economic linkages.
However, I am not sanguine that this is likely in the current phase of intense competition between
the major powers.
Lodhi: Outside powers can play a constructive diplomatic role in helping India and Pakistan
reinitiate a broad-based peace process, which proceeded with some promise in the past, especially
between 2004 and 2008. The frequent acknowledgement by both countries that they have much to
gain from trade and connectivity in economic areas has taken a back seat to revival of tensions, the
shadow of unresolved disputes and geopolitical considerations by both sides. If India and Pakistan
were to settle their outstanding disputes, practical issues relating to trade and connectivity should
not be difficult to resolve. The peace dividend from economic engagement would be substantial, but
outside intervention may be needed to nudge them in this direction.
(Source: USIP)

DANIEL MARKEY & AMBASSADOR HESHAM YOUSSEF

What You Need to Know About the I2U2
USIP’s Ambassador Hesham Youssef and Daniel Markey look at the vision animating I2U2,
what each country aims to achieve and the potential areas of cooperation.
Is there any sort of normative or principled vision behind the I2U2?
Markey: Each of I2U2’s leaders stressed the group’s desire to mobilize private sector capital
and technologies to solve practical, shared challenges. Trade and transit infrastructure, clean energy,
waste treatment and critical and emerging technologies were all identified as priorities. Largely
missing, however, was any overarching, principled vision of what unites these four states in
partnership. The omission is noteworthy in part because the I2U2 often draws comparisons with the
Indo-Pacific’s “Quad,” whose members — Japan, the United States, Australia and India — often
stress the unifying force of their democratic practices.
Practical cooperation may prove sufficient to sustain I2U2. That said, an aspirational vision for
the group’s core identity would not be all that difficult to find, given the striking religious diversity
of its members. By highlighting their shared commitment to pluralism and cooperation across faiths,
I2U2 could become a venue for cooperation on a variety of other initiatives. It could pair pragmatic,
development-oriented problem-solving with peacebuilding across religious and communal divides.
In addition, the shift would offer the Biden administration a means to broaden its vision of world
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order from one that is primarily defined by “democracy versus authoritarianism” to one that
considers other important features of national identity and helps to build different sorts of bridges
with strategic but undemocratic partners like the UAE. Third, an I2U2 that advances pluralism
across its member states could also encourage the practice of related values — including protections
for minority, religious and human rights — within them as well.
What do these countries aim to achieve with the I2U2?
Markey: India sees clear and tangible benefits from the I2U2, starting with the group’s first
two announcements: a $2 billion investment and technological assistance for agricultural initiatives
in two Indian states, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh; and support for a hybrid renewable energy
project in Gujarat. I2U2 thus offers a model and platform for sustained mobilization of capital from
the UAE that is supported by Israeli and American technologies and championed by Washington.
In addition, given India’s close ties with both Israel and the UAE, New Delhi has much to like
about the I2U2 as a diplomatic device to accelerate, deepen and guarantee the ongoing
normalization of relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. Israel supplies critical military
technologies to India, but prior generations of Indian leaders tended to downplay those defense ties,
in part for domestic political reasons and in part to placate their Arab neighbors. Nowadays, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi has the luxury of being unapologetic in his outreach to his Israeli
counterparts. To be sure, the Abraham Accords and I2U2 don’t entirely solve India’s balancing act in
West Asia, given New Delhi’s continued wish to retain good ties with Tehran, but they do help.
Finally, I2U2 offers India an opportunity to cooperate with the United States on its own terms:
not as a junior associate or a formal ally, but as a self-confident and “strategically autonomous”
partner. I2U2’s emphasis on voluntary economic initiatives rather than binding multilateral trade
deals (like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) that India has repeatedly rejected is
also attractive. In that narrow respect, I2U2 resembles Washington’s new Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework, which India has also joined.
Youssef: The UAE is working to become one of the most globally connected players in the
region. One of the pillars of this strategy is to pivot to Asia. But in contrast to the U.S. pivot to Asia
aiming at confronting China, the UAE considers China one of its main partners in achieving this
objective. I2U2 is also one of the ways the UAE is balancing its relations with its two main Asian
partners: China and India.
The rapid advancement in UAE-India relations started around 2015. The UAE is India’s third-
largest trading partner, and earlier this month they signed a free-trade agreement that is expected to
increase their bilateral trade from $59 billion to over $100 billion in five years. The UAE also recently
signed a free-trade agreement with Israel, and they are planning to increase annual bilateral trade to
over $10 billion in the next five years. One year after establishing relations, trade reached $885
million, according to Israel’s economy minister. It remains to be seen whether this target would be
exceeded because of I2U2 engagement and projects.
Since its establishment, the UAE has had strong relations with the United States. The I2U2
summit and a bilateral meeting on the margin of the summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries and Egypt, Jordan and Iraq helped to overcome some tensions with the Biden
administration and table others.
The UAE and India are focused on pursuing economic cooperation through I2U2, and it seems
that the United States and Israel are willing to go along with this approach. However, it is not clear
whether any of them will introduce geopolitical objectives to I2U2 in the future. This would be
problematic as the countries in the group have conflicting positions on how to deal with China,
Russia and Iran that may affect the future of the group and its prospects of success. The UAE in
particular will strive to avoid this risk. Israel's ambassador to India stressed that the group is "not
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against anyone,” adding that “it's for our people and for making the world a better place," an
important message that was not echoed widely enough.
The Jerusalem Declaration signed during the Biden reflects the strength of Israeli relations
with the United States. I2U2 is also a demonstration of the extent to which the United States is
committed to advancing Israel’s integration in the region particularly since the Abraham Accords
laid the ground for establishing this group and the Biden administration vowed to support this
process.
Israel’s newly established relations with the UAE have been quite warm and are advancing at
a rapid, perhaps even surprising, pace. Other than the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the more
recent Negev Forum, I2U2 is the most visible platform that Israel shares with an Arab country.
Israel has significantly advanced its relations with India since the 1990s. Negotiations
surrounding a free trade agreement have made substantial progress, amid a backdrop of
intensifying Israel-India economic cooperation. First, Israel-India bilateral trade increased from $200
million in 1992 — when India formally established its embassy in Tel Aviv — to $6.35 billion in 2021.
Second, the Haifa Port project that was initially awarded to China and which the Pentagon
repeatedly warned Israel to cancel, was reportedly awarded to a joint Indian-Israeli bid that will
operate the port until 2054. Third, Israel is India’s major defense supplier: India makes up 42% of
Israeli arms exports at an estimated annual value of $1 billion. Between 2015-2019, Indian arms
imports from Israel increased by 175%. I2U2 and the projects agreed in the summit are likely to
substantially increase India-Israel bilateral trade.
What are the current and future areas of cooperation and potential risks for the group?
Youssef: Cooperation among I2U2 members represents key areas in the 21st century global
economy. The group should avoid entering into geopolitical issues that could derail its principal
objective. For example, a number of experts fear that the UAE’s current foreign labor force may be
replaced with Indian workers. Another danger is that I2U2 falls victim to mission creep. Although
the group should not spread itself too thin, I2U2 can expand by advancing cooperation in new areas
in the future or by pursuing cooperation with other partners in both the Middle East and South Asia.
I2U2 has huge potential, and its composition provides ample opportunities for win-win
cooperation. The United States has vast capabilities in every conceivable area; India has massive
human resources and talents; Israel has advanced technology in a number of important fields; and
the UAE is advancing innovative policies, attracting start-ups and willing to invest substantial
resources. However, the burden of its sustainability will mainly lie with the UAE and Israel — the
main beneficiaries — to maintain the interest of the United States and India and justify its
continuation.
(Source: USIP)
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Kashmir
IS KASHMIR A TERRITORIAL DISPUTE OR REGIONAL?
Kainat Saleem
Kashmir is part of the never-ending story of injustice in which the oppressed Kashmiris are
laying down their precious lives and the echoes of their lives and sobs have captivated the entire
world. Kashmiri Muslims raise their voice for their freedom, which India oppresses the oppressed
Kashmiri Muslims to suppress and tries its best to reach every tactic. Pakistan is the voice of
Kashmiri Muslims who are bringing India’s oppression to the whole world. India is oppressing the
Kashmiri Muslims because of its ego it is taking precious lives of old, elderly, children, women and
youth and this face of India is being seen by the whole world today.
India claims that Kashmir is part of them and they will not give it to Pakistan at any cost and
on the other hand Pakistan claims that Kashmir is geographically connected with Pakistan and their
religion, culture and race are related to Kashmiris has happened before partition, the communication
system was also connected to Punjab of Pakistan.
From geographical point of view, Kashmir is vital as well and it serves as a bridge between
South Asia and central Asia. For India it is the only direct route to central Asia and central Asia to
Europe and it plays a Belt and Road Initiative and not only route but also provides a opportunity
with significant location to India for spying China and Pakistan, Siachen Glaciers is the main
boundary between India and China. Kashmir is very rich in water resources, natural beauty and this
region always attracted people from all over the world and it is also very important for India
because it is economically strong.
For the Pakistan, Kashmir is important because the water resources as the five rivers Jhelum,
Ravi, Chenab, Beas, Sutlej all originate in Kashmir and flow into Punjab region of both India and
Pakistan. As India has Kashmir and thereby the upper side control of the river origins. So, India cam
build damn and control the flow of river. It means that the lifeline of Pakistan is in the hand of India
and this worries Pakistan and they want Kashmir. Pakistan also claims that Kashmir is connected
with Pakistan because of same religion, culture and ethnicity and it is the integral part of Pakistan to
the large Muslim population in Kashmir. The Pakistan and India was founded on the two-nation
theory which essentially states that Muslims and Hindu are so different and that they cannot co-
exist. The unrest and the frequent clashes between the Kashmiris youth and Indian army is a proof
that India is treating the Kashmiri Muslims as second class.
Recently the BJP government established governor Raj and illegally started work. Firstly, they
revoked the article 370, 35A on August 2019. Because under this article the state of Jammu and
Kashmir was allowed to have its constitution, flag and special status.
They started tortured to Kashmiris to changed their religion. Because if Kashmiri Muslims
change their religion than majority of people will be Hindus and they will vote to India and India
automatically gain votes in majority. They also started human rights violation, disappearances of
young Kashmiri, right of self- determination has been suppressed, genocide and ethnic cleansing of
Kashmir Muslims. Burhan Wani is the best example because he was killed by Indian army in 2016.
Kashmir issue should be resolve by diplomatically and if Pakistan wants Kashmir, then
Pakistan should be economically strong. Both India and Pakistan will have to make compromises
and will come to win- win situation not at the zero- sum game.
Because we can never imagine the solution to Kashmir with big ego and thick brains.
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The assessment of the regional and international situation is that the two countries, Pakistan
and India should make a decision as soon as possible for the betterment of the Kashmiris, and
keeping in mind the generous and human rights and also establish better relations with each other
to form a block in Asia that can prevent the United States and his disciples from looking upon the
whole Asia.
And now I want to conclude it that it is the territorial dispute not religious but Religion is use
as the tool to achieve Kashmir. Because Kashmir is very beautiful and economically strong for India
and if India releases it then they loss geographical edge and cannot spy their neighbors.
(Source: Daily Times)

KASHMIR DISPUTE
Role of Diaspora
Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai (Secretary General, World Kashmir Awareness Forum)
First of all, let me express deep appreciation to the Pakistan Business Forum, Azad Kashmir
for inviting the leadership of the Kashmiri Diaspora of the Washington metropolitan area to speak
on the subject, “Kashmir Dispute & the Role of Diaspora.” Lot has happened in the corridors of
power in Washington, DC and it would not have been possible without the deep involvement,
selfless efforts, and constant struggle of your guests: Sardar Zulfiqar Khan, Sardar Zarif Khan,
Sardar Zubair Khan and Irfan Tasaduq Sahib. These brothers may belong to different political
parties of Azad Kashmir but in Washington, they represent no one except the oppressed people of
Jammu & Kashmir. The nation of Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir remains thankful for the
sincerity and understanding of the diaspora of Azad Kashmir origin, be they in America, Europe,
the Middle East, or elsewhere.
It is a fact that the situation in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir has dramatically changed,
particularly since August 5, 2019, and it will not be an exaggeration to say that the people of
occupied land are facing an existential threat. Indian colonialist rulers have put their machinery in
motion which is fast moving to accelerate the process of genocide they have systematically put in
place through their proxies since October 27, 1947.
It will be grossly unfair to forget that, over the years, the All Parties Hurriyet Conference has
shown formidable leadership in representing the people of Kashmir. Now, Syed Ali Geelani, the
most towering personality is no more. Yasin Malik is facing a situation of life and death. Shabir
Ahmed Shah has been incarcerated for more than half of his life. Masarat Alam has been booked 37
times under Public Safety Act. Aasia Andrabi has been charged under UAPA. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
has been under house arrest for the last three years. They all, however, remain undeterred and clear
in their thought processes that the people of occupied Jammu and Kashmir have only one option
which is total freedom from the colonial clutches of India.
And the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir, despite all the odds, have never lost hope in the
right to self-determination. The Kashmiri diaspora does not need to remind them that. The Kashmiri
diaspora needs to simply take the reins, open the doors, pave the road, and take advantage of those
opportunities that become available to express that will. The role of our global Kashmiri diaspora
becomes much more pertinent and important after the developments since August 5, 2019, and
because of the changes occurring at a global level. Kashmiri diaspora knows it well that a coordinated
effort on every level to counter India’s disinformation campaign should be the top priority.
Kashmiri diaspora understands that multiplicity of Kashmiri organizations in any important
world capital is not only unnecessary but counterproductive to Kashmir’s right to self-
determination. It’s time, for all the flowers to be a bouquet of flowers. It’s time that the diaspora
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gives all that flows from its heart because it is only then that the people will respond with theirs and
demonstrate the power of their love for their country, Kashmir – that was once the paradise on
earth.
It’s imperative at this stage in our history for the Kashmiri diaspora to recognize that real
change is needed and cannot happen without a change in the way that we do business. Foremost,
what is needed is a united front that will inspire the people as well. A united front will demonstrate
that we are Kashmiris first and foremost, and not simply members of some political party or social
group. Only a united people can bring about the change that will help us achieve our ultimate
objective – the right to self-determination.
The leadership of all political parties in Azad Kashmir have exhibited strong sensitivity to the
issue of IOK (Indian-occupied Kashmir) and have paid strong tributes to the sacrifices made by the
leaders like the late Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Yasin Malik. However, the abominable plan of
Indian government to change the demographic character of Kashmir needs very serious strategic
planning by Azad Kashmir leadership to counter these evil designs.
Finally, let us also briefly present to you some of the activities that the Kashmiri diaspora have
initiated since August 5, 2019, when India abrogated Article 370 and 35 A. Kashmiri diaspora is
conscious of the strength and extent of the Indian lobby in the US. Despite significant odds, we were
able to do the following activities since August 5, 2019.
World Kashmir Awareness Forum (WKAF) has been doing all its activities in collaboration
with Kashmir America Welfare Association (KAWA). The guest speakers today are the members of
the board of KAWA.
Kashmiri diaspora is fully engaged in Washington as well as in New York to advocate for the
political and human rights of the people of Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
On social media front, we use the digital trucks, billboards, both in Washington as well as in
New York.
Since August 5, 2019, we organized 5 rallies in front of the White House; 4 at Indian Embassy,
Washington, DC; 6 at the United Nations; 4 at Indian Mission in New York; 6 Indian Consulate in
New York.
Narendra Modi will be speaking at the United Nations on September 24, 2022. A plan of
action has been prepared for a peaceful rally in front of the United Nations during his speech. It is
important because Narendra Modi will not tell the United Nations that Kashmir is on the brink of
genocide as mentioned by Genocide Watch; and that Kashmir is the World’s Most Beautiful Prison
as suggested by John Cushnahan, former MEP; and that Kashmir is the most militarized place on the
earth as cited by Arundhati Roy
Recommendations:
We aspire for Pakistan to immediately create a Kashmir Cell comprising retired and sitting
diplomats, with expertise on India. This cell should also include members from all the political
parties of Pakistan, as well as representatives from the civil society and Kashmiri diaspora.
We also aspire for Pakistan to work on sustaining the momentum on engaging major powers
to pressurize India not only to lift the on-going repressive measures, including crippling restrictions
and communication blockade, but more importantly to eventually engage with the Kashmiri
leadership and Pakistan, and workout a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan’s current domestic politics is very worrisome for a common Kashmiri. They see their
success only in a strong and viable Pakistan. The Pakistan government should create a constructive
atmosphere where the top leadership of various political parties can be seen visibly and manifestly
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on the same page with regards to Kashmir issue. Any weakness in this area plays into the hands of
India’s rabidly nationalist Media.
Lastly, there is also a serious discussion going on in many important Capitols to pursue the
Musharraf formula to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Except for one point, viz the withdrawal of
troops (the demilitarization of Kashmir leading to a settlement of the dispute), all other points are
either pure fake or protective cover for the Indian position. Kashmiri diaspora wants to make it clear
that Musharraf formula is an absolute fallacy.
(Source: Sabah News)

CRIMINALIZING DISSENT IN KASHMIR

Ershad Mahmud (Freelance journalist)
Since the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution three years ago on August 5,
2019, Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir has become a land where the silence of graveyards, not of
peace, reigns supreme.
Indian authorities are content that daily demonstrations and political activities have come to
an end. But the efforts to ensure peace in the region involved many heinous acts of violence and
terrorism. Almost all major pro-Azadi political leaders were either jailed or put under house arrest.
Fifty-six-year-old freedom leader Yasin Malik was sentenced to life imprisonment a few weeks ago.
He went on a fast-unto-death in Tihar Jail for ten days, demanding a fair trial.
The last three years mark the most horrible phase in the contemporary history of Kashmir,
even worse than Maharaja Hari Singh’s time when political and economic empowerment was at its
lowest ebb. Ali Gilani’s dead body was snatched from his family and unceremoniously buried in the
dark, even against his will. Another resistance leader, Ashraf Sehrai, passed away mysteriously. His
family believes that he was poisoned in prison. Instead of conducting investigations to prove his
family wrong, his sons and relatives were detained.
Shabbir Ahmad Shah, Asiya Andrabi, Naeem Khan and several other popular leaders have
been persecuted in politically motivated and largely fabricated cases. The list is endless. These
people are not criminals by any standard and deserve fair and humane treatment.
Representatives of India’s civil society and human rights watchdogs used to criticize the
Indian state’s repression and heavy-handedness. Most of them are now facing extraordinary
restrictions. Recently, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval publically declared Indian civil
society actors ‘the enemies of the country’. He said that civil society could hurt national interests.
This resulted in a heavy crackdown on human rights defenders and independent media
persons. Dissent has been made a crime by state authorities in the Kashmir Valley. Internationally
acclaimed human rights defender Khurram Parvez became a prime victim in November 2021 and
still remains detained at the Tihar Jail. Indian authorities alleged that he had links with militant
outfits.
Interestingly, Khurram Parvez has been added by ‘Time’, an American news magazine, in its
list of ‘100 Most Influential People of 2022’. The magazine says, “He (Khurram Parvez) had to be
silenced, for his was a voice that resounded around the globe for his fierce fight against human-
rights violations and injustices in the Kashmir region.”
Kashmiri media outlets were told to either fall in line or face the occupying state’s wrath. Most
of them opted to toe the official line and committed themselves to observe exceptional self-
censorship. The Srinagar press club was locked and handed over to state loyalists. Promising
journalist Fahad Shah was implicated in a fabricated case and sent to jail. Independent journalists’
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homes and offices were frequently raided. Their gadgets such as laptops and mobile phones were
confiscated. Some of them were summoned to police stations as well.
Kashmiri journalists are also being stopped from traveling outside India. Recently, Aakash
Hassan, who writes on human rights and digital technologies, was prevented by the immigration
authorities at the Delhi airport from leaving for Sri Lanka for work. Previously, Sanna Irshad Mattoo
was denied permission to travel abroad without any reason. She was travelling to Paris as one of the
10 award winners of the Serendipity Arles Grant 2020 to attend a photography exhibition.
Save a few exceptions, the vernacular Kashmiri media has successfully been tamed. Former
Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Mehbooba Mufti has aptly described the state of the media in
Kashmir, “freedom of expression virtually guillotined.” The Press Council of India’s fact-finding
team recently revealed (March 2022) that the Indian government is releasing advertisements to
newspapers selectively; this selection is based on the ‘line’ and nature of the coverage.
Pro-Azadi digital activism has also been proscribed. Social media platforms are being strictly
scrutinized. Several Kashmir sympathizers claim that their Facebook and Twitter accounts have
been suspended at the behest of Indian authorities. Despite this, young people find ways to raise
their voices and circumvent oversight to some extent. To avoid de-platforming, they create
innovative IDs and put across information about events taking place in the Kashmir Valley.
Social-political suffocation and growing frustration among the people have reached their
climax. No space for political or social activities has generated a wide void. Consequently, the
violence by the occupying forces has taken an ugly turn. Despite massive witch-hunt operations and
killings of hundreds of militants, reaction by Kashmiris has not significantly receded.
Indian authorities have acknowledged that, due to the LoC ceasefire, barbed-wires and
multilayered defence mechanism on the ground, cross-border movement is gone. Nevertheless,
indigenous armed pro-freedom groups have gained significant strength; they are now operating
anonymously. The highly militarized capital city of Indian-held Kashmir, Srinagar, bore the major
brunt of violence last year despite having an unprecedented intelligence network.
Three years have passed, but relations between Pakistan and India are still on a rocky path; no
hope for the resumption of full diplomatic relations is in sight, let alone the resumption of a bilateral
dialogue. Upping the ante, Doval told ‘ANI’ last month. “We can’t have peace and war at the choice
of our adversary (Pakistan). If we have to protect our interests, then we will decide when, with
whom and on what terms we will have peace.”
Following this playbook, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath reassured the people of India that
his country would never forget to gain control of Pakistani areas – Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-
Baltistan.
The above two statements show that India is adamant to continue its disengagement approach
towards Pakistan and Kashmiri pro-freedom parties, and also wants to develop its capacity to gain
control over Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
(Source: The News)
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Law
US SUPREME COURT’S CONTROVERSIAL DECISION
Overturning Roe v Wade
Abdullah Jobair (Law Student at University of Dhaka)
In a 6-3 Conservative majority decision, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
overturned almost the 50-year-old landmark abortion decision Roe v Wade (1973). Earlier to the
recent decision, women's right to abortion was a constitutionally protected right; but now it is no
longer a constitutional right, and hence, the authority to outlaw or allow the right to abortion
returns to the individual state legislature. To understand the decision and its reasoning, we have to
first understand the politics of constitutional interpretation in the US.
There are two contrasting leading theories of constitutional interpretation relevant to the case:
one is 'originalism' and the other one is 'living constitutionalism'. Originalism is the antithesis to
living constitution. Originalists believe that the constitutional provision means what the original
understanding of the text at the time it was drafted and ratified, meant. According to this theory,
constitutional provisions do not change its meaning over time. If the constitution needs any change
to meet the needs of the time, it can only be so done by the amendment.
On the other hand, living constitution is the idea that the constitution is a document that
evolves, changes over time from decade to decade and adapts to new circumstances without being
formally amended. This theory is of the view that the amendment procedures of the constitution is
so rigid that it would be unrealistic to expect cumbersome amendment process to keep up with the
changed circumstances which were unforeseeable when the constitution was in fact adopted.
Prior to the Roe v Wade decision, it was up to the states to allow, restrict or ban women's right
to abortion. Back then abortion was prohibited in almost 30 states of the US. Thus, the effect of the
decision significantly affected the individual states' prerogatives to regulate abortion in the manner
as their citizens wanted it to be.
Since then, Roe v Wade has always been one of the controversial decisions of American
constitutional law history. The conservative justices regarded Roe as a bad decision which illegally
usurped to the field of parliament. According to them, abortion is a policy question and the
democratically elected representatives should be allowed to do their job on the subject-matter. All
issues not addressed by the constitution should be decided by the people, by the state legislatures.
On the contrary, under the living constitutionalism theory, the 14th amendment protection of
liberty, as liberals opine, includes a fundamental right to privacy that protects an implicit right to
abortion and abortion is covered under constitutional right to privacy.
Now the Supreme Court of super majority conservative judges returns to the position from
the pre-Roe v Wade (1973) context. Conservative Justice Samuel Alito writing for the majority
expressly reflected jurisprudence of originalism saying 'the constitution makes no reference to
abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision'.
He went on adamantly holding 'abortion couldn't be constitutionally protected. Until the latter
part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law. It is time to heed the
constitution and return the issue to the people's elected representatives.'
Living constitution theory, generally speaking, from which judgements like Roe v Wade flows
from is enormously attractive to judges and its supporters (vast number of American citizens)
because it empowers both of them. Judges are empowered to re-write their philosophy into the
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constitution in the guise of interpretation and similarly thereby their supporters' views become
binding even upon the large number of people who do not support the theory. On the other hand,
originalism leaves the questions like abortion right, death penalty, same sex marriage to be decided
by the people through legislature whereas living constitution theory imposes the rule not explicitly
in the constitution even upon the persons who are against such exercise.
(Source: Daily Star)

FIXING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

Feisal Naqvi (Lawyer of the Supreme Court)
The last meeting of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan on July 28, 2022 ended badly. None of
the five nominees proposed by the chief justice of Pakistan for appointment to the Supreme Court
was confirmed.
Matters got worse when a post-meeting debate started over whether the five nominees had
been rejected or whether their consideration had been deferred. The CJP tried to resolve this dispute
by releasing the audio recording of the JCP meeting. That step only attracted further criticism (in
part because the recording revealed that some members of the JCP had grave doubts regarding the
integrity of certain nominees). All in all, an unfortunate and depressing spectacle.
What then is the way forward? Should the CJP give up his position that seniority is not the
appropriate standard? Or should the ‘rebels’ temporarily relent for the sake of the system while a
consensus formula is evolved?
In my view, both arguments are flawed because it is not necessary for the JCP to have a
‘formula’ for appointments. Instead, I propose to let every member of the JCP vote as they will. Let
those who believe in seniority vote on the basis of seniority. Let those who believe in merit trumping
seniority argue the merits of their chosen candidate. Let a thousand formulas bloom.
The actual problem with the current JCP setup is not the formula used to decide who becomes
a Supreme Court judge (or the lack of one). Instead, the problem with the current setup is that only
nominees proposed by the CJP get to be considered. As a consequence, if the CJP does not approve
of any one candidate, that individual has no chance of being appointed. It is this formula (or more
accurately, rule) which needs to change.
Defenders of the status quo argue that this system has worked for the past twelve years and
that an alternate system which allows all members of the JCP to submit nominations would be
unmanageable. Both points are invalid.
*Chief Justice Umar Ata Bandial is a good man and a good judge. I have known him for
decades and I have no doubts as to his competence or integrity. At the same time, it is time to retire
the sentiment that the chief justice of Pakistan is the ‘pater familias’ of the judiciary*. The chief
justice of Pakistan will always be the first among equals. But there is no need to burden him with
exclusive responsibility for certain decisions, particularly when there are better (and more
democratic) options available. More importantly, this particular exclusive power has now become
controversial to the extent that it affects the legitimacy of the entire judiciary.
So, how would an alternate system work?
Before I elaborate, let me first note a preliminary point. The seats on the Supreme Court have
been normally understood as loosely corresponding to geographical quotas. Thus, when a judge
from Balochistan retires, the assumption is that their seat will be filled by another judge from
Balochistan. This convention needs to be updated to include judges from Islamabad (particularly
given the inexcusable refusal to consider Chief Justice Athar Minallah). However, subject to that
amendment, it provides a good working basis for nominations.
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Here’s the proposal: if each of the JCP members has the right to nominate one person for each
vacancy, there will be a maximum of nine candidates (though most likely less). Now ask all
members of the JCP to vote yea or nay on each of the candidates, starting with the candidate who
has the most nominations. The first candidate to get a majority of the JCP goes through to the next
stage of the appointment process (review by the Parliamentary Committee). If no candidate gets a
majority in the first round of votes, reduce the pool to those with the maximum number of votes and
have a runoff. Now repeat the process for all available vacancies.
The benefit of this approach is that it avoids the insoluble question of what makes a good
judge. As already argued by me in an earlier column, there is no formula which allows one to
predict who deserves to be a judge. Sometimes great lawyers make bad judges. Sometimes judges
bloom when they reach the Supreme Court. The one thing I can say with certainty is that seniority is
a terrible basis to determine who gets elevated to the Supreme Court. Yes, seniority is a somewhat
‘objective’ standard. But it makes no more sense to appoint Supreme Court judges on the basis of
their seniority than it does to appoint them on the basis of their height or weight (which are also
objective but irrelevant standards).
By comparison, it needs to be recalled that six of the nine members of the JCP are either
serving or former Supreme Court judges. The remaining three constitute the law minister, the
attorney general and a senior advocate representing the Pakistan Bar Council. They are all
individuals chosen for their integrity and fidelity to the law. If JCP members can be entrusted with
the responsibility of (effectively) appointing judges, it makes no sense to say that they cannot be
trusted with the power to nominate candidates.
In the words of Attorney General Ashtar Ausaf Ali, each of the JCP members is there as a
fiduciary holding powers granted to them by the constitution as a “sacred trust”. Each of the
members brings years of experience in the law to the table. Stop trying to straitjacket their decisions.
Just let them vote.
*The main difference between my proposed solution and the current JCP setup is that the CJP
will no longer have effective veto power. That is no loss. Yes, the CJP is wise and venerable. But so
too are the other members of the JCP*.
I had argued that the intractable debate between those advocating unrestrained discretion and
those demanding ‘objective’ standards (such as seniority) was unnecessary. Instead, I had proposed
that every member of the Judicial Commission be empowered to nominate candidates and that
every JCP member be allowed to vote as they please.
Justice (r) Faisal Arab has responded to this idea through a recent column. Justice Arab
disagrees with the concept and makes the following arguments:
One, that the CJP only has 11 per cent of the voting power of the JCP. Two, that allowing other
judicial members of the JCP to nominate judges will result in the development of groups within the
JCP. Members of the JCP will then be inclined to prefer individuals nominated by their own group
which would not be good for the “disciplined functioning” of the JCP.
Three, that in the US, only the president nominates judges. Similarly, in the UK the
nomination also comes only from the chairperson of the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC).
Four, that giving the power to nominate only to one person is in accordance with the principle
of “unity of direction.”
And, finally, that if all members of the JCP can nominate candidates, you may wind up with
judges who were not even nominated by the CJP.
My response to Justice Arab is as follows: one, yes, the CJP only has 11 per cent of the voting
power in the JCP. But then why does he have 100 per cent of the nominating power?
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Two, you already have groups within the JCP. In fact, not just the JCP but the entire Supreme
Court is bitterly factionalized. That is why we have the unedifying spectacle of competing press
releases. More pertinently, that is why none of the five candidates proposed by the CJP in the last
meeting of the Judicial Commission were approved.
My problem here is not with the diversity of opinion. Instead, quite the opposite. My point
here is that diversity of opinion is here to stay and should be embraced. Appointments to the
Supreme Court are a matter of supreme concern not only to members of the judiciary but to
everybody involved in the profession of law and even every citizen of Pakistan. We, as a nation,
have moved beyond the point where such grave decisions can be discreetly made behind a facade of
collegiality. Yes, I think that open debate of such questions is better. But even if you disagree with
me, the legal community is now simply too fractured, too politicized and too polarized to now
believe in the benevolent judgment of an all-wise ‘paterfamilias’. To misquote Faiz, “jo toot gaya so
toot gaya, tum kyun aas lagaye baithe ho?”
Three, the US has an expressly and exclusively political system of appointments in which the
president alone nominates judges to the Supreme Court but suitability and competence are
independently assessed by the Senate. It is therefore not comparable to Pakistan in which the
judiciary insists that: (a) judges should be appointed on merit; and (b) politicians are unqualified to
opine on judicial merit. To elaborate, political leaders (like the US president) have the legitimacy to
make ostensibly arbitrary decisions because they are elected and represent the majority consensus.
Judges have no such electoral legitimacy and hence cannot justify arbitrary decisions.
The reference to the UK is equally inapt. To begin with, the chairperson of the JAC is not even
a lawyer, but a politician. Furthermore, the judicial members of the Commission are a minority of
the JAC and include a cross-selection of judges from across the UK, rather than only the five senior-
most judges of the Supreme Court.
Most importantly, the selection process for judges in the UK is open and competitive.
Vacancies are normally advertised, and written applications are invited. In the case of appointments
to the UK Supreme Court, the JAC consults a wide range of senior politicians and judges across the
UK. After interviewing the candidates, a report recommending one candidate is sent by the JAC to
the lord chancellor (again a political appointee, approximately equal to our law minister) who is
then again required to formally consult senior politicians and judges. Unless the lord chancellor
rejects the final report on the basis of written reasons, the appointment goes ahead.
How is this very detailed, very public, and very open process comparable in any way to our
system?
Four, there is no principle of ‘unity of direction’ in the judiciary. In fact, there is no such
principle at all. To the extent I have ever heard of any such commandment, the closest analogue is
General Musharraf’s ‘unity of command’. However, ‘unity of command’ does not apply to the
judiciary. My understanding is that judges are selected not for their ability to obey orders but for
their ability to use their independent minds.
Five, I concede that if all members of the JCP are given the power to nominate, we may wind
up with judges whom the CJP has not nominated (and by extension, may not want to be appointed).
But this is not a terrible outcome. Legal history is replete with judgments in which chief justices have
found themselves part of a dissenting minority. Nobody thinks any less of those judgments just
because the CJP was in a minority. This is because the institution of the Supreme Court is larger than
the person of the CJP. Similarly, if the CJP’s reservations regarding a particular nominee are
overruled by a majority of the JCP, the heavens will not fall.
All nine members of the JCP have devoted their life to the law, in one form or another. All of
them need to be given the respect they deserve. To take the most obvious example, the current JCP
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includes three judges who are scheduled to become the chief justice of Pakistan. It makes little sense
to say that, as of today, those three judges cannot be entrusted with the power to nominate
candidates but that as and when they become CJP, they may exercise that power to the exclusion of
everyone else.
Laws are a means to social ends. The purpose of inserting Article 175A in the constitution was
to ensure the transparent appointment of judges on merit so as to enhance the legitimacy of the
judiciary; in other words, to ensure not only that justice was done (in terms of judicial
appointments), but that justice was seen to be done.
The legitimacy of the judicial appointment process is now under grave threat. One main
reason for the threat is the stalemate caused by the infighting amongst the JCP members (and its
spillover into the media). However, the solution here is not a return to the days when the CJP’s word
was law. We are beyond the point where suppression of dissent was either feasible or desirable.
Those days are over. To quote Faiz again: “sheeshon ka maseeha koi nahi, tum kyun aas lagaye
baithe ho?”
(Source: The News)

DISSOLVING A POLITICAL PARTY

Salman Akram Raja (An advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan)
The dissolution of the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1975 followed months of degradation
of the party and its leadership in the mass media. This was a party in power, in coalition with
Maulana Mufti Mehmud’s Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), in two of the provinces of the country and
had participated with zeal in the passage of the constitution in 1973.
The public in the Punjabi heartland, an area traditionally planted thick with the weeds of
conspiracy, was made to believe that following the fall of the eastern wing foreign-aided nationalists
among the Baloch and Pakhtuns were set to make a move. The judge, who as law secretary had
prepared the reference against NAP, then proceeded to adorn the bench of the Supreme Court that
was to hear the reference. Wali Khan, the leader of NAP, objected. His request for a reconstituted
bench was refused. He walked out of the courtroom. Dissolution of his party followed. While a
rump of the defunct NAP was to re-emerge as the Awami National Party (ANP) the damage done
was permanent. The gash created in the body politic let in the religio-fanaticism that was nurtured
through the latter half of the 1970s and the 80s. The insurgent disquiet that raised its head in
Balochistan was met with a cycle of violence that continues.
History is not set to repeat itself. The PTI is not NAP. It is a party cut from the same genetic
material as the PML-N. The two parties occupy much of the same geographical and psychological
territory. Both carry the colours of Pakistani nationalism. JUI and ANP joining the dissolution
chorus is historic amnesia brought on by that most irresistible of passions: opportunism.
The constitutional order of the Islamic Republic today stands on foundations covered by the
stains of the past. Moral hubris in the service of power has scripted much that provides grist to the
opportunistic. Some legalese is unavoidable, and essential, if sense is to be made of where we are
headed. Consider.
Article 17(1) of the constitution declares the formation of a political party to be a fundamental
right of the citizens of Pakistan. Article 17(2) of the constitution provides a solitary ground for the
dissolution of a political party. A party established for the purpose of damaging, or actually working
against, the integrity or sovereignty of the country may be declared by the federal government to be
such a party. This declaration is to be placed before the Supreme Court within fifteen days of being
made. If the Supreme Court upholds the declaration, the political party concerned stands dissolved.
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Members of parliament, including the provincial assemblies, belonging to such party stand de-
seated.
General Musharraf issued the Political Parties Order in 2002 when the constitutional order
stood suspended following the coup of 1999. Political parties were seen as irritants to be subdued
into obedience. The general’s order purported to add a ground for the dissolution of a political
party, beyond what the constitution stipulates. A political party obtaining any aid, financial or
otherwise, from any foreign government or foreign political party or any portion of its funds from
foreign nationals is to be considered a foreign-aided political party. Section 15 of the Order of 2002
states that such a party is to be dissolved following a declaration by the federal government to this
effect and an order of the supreme court upholding the declaration. No threshold for the receipt of
funds for dissolving a political party is provided.
Another provision of the general’s order of 2002 describes funds that a political party is
prohibited from receiving. The category of prohibited funds covers contributions made, directly or
indirectly, by any foreign government, multi-national or domestically incorporated public or private
company, firm, trade or professional association. Only the funds expressly described as prohibited
funds, if received by a political party, are liable to be confiscated.
Section 6(3) states that a party may accept contributions and donations only from individuals.
This section appears to make no distinction between funds contributed by individuals who are
nationals and those who are not. Funds from both categories of individuals appear to fall outside the
ambit of prohibited funds. This creates an apparent inconsistency. While funds from individuals
who are not nationals are not prohibited funds in terms of Section 6(3), the receipt of such funds
would make a political party a ‘foreign aided political party’ liable to dissolution in terms of Section
15 of the order of 2002. The cause of the apparent inconsistency can safely be put down as poor
drafting, a malaise that afflicts most legislative drafting in Pakistan.
The lawyer’s essential craft is to identify inconsistencies in the law and provide interpretations
that make the best sense of disparate provisions when read together. The status of the constitution as
the supreme law must be upheld and all interpretations of laws subordinate to the constitution must
be made so as to make these laws conform to the intent of the constitution. Where such conforming
interpretations are not possible, the subordinate law must be declared unconstitutional and void.
The Election Commission of Pakistan was called upon to interpret the provisions of the
Political Parties Order of 2002 that deal with prohibited funds and a foreign aided political party in
the light of Article 17 of the constitution. In particular, the language of Section 15 of the Order of
2002 that appears to make the mere receipt of funds from non-nationals to be a wrong that must be
visited with dissolution had to be harmonized with the fact that Article 17(2) only allows dissolution
of a political party if it is found to be working against the sovereignty or integrity of the country. As
it turns out, the ECP made no attempt to take Article 17(2) of the constitution into account. This is
abdication of duty.
An obvious harmonious reading of Section 15 of the Order of 2002 with Article 17(2) of the
constitution would be to hold that for a party to be dissolved on account of having received funds
from foreign nationals there must be evidence that on account of such receipts the party concerned
had acted in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of the country. The mere receipt of
foreign funds is not a constitutional wrong. The consequence of not harmonizing Section 15 of the
Order of 2002 would be to render it void, being in excess of the limit imposed by the constitution.
Section 15 of the Order of 2002 provides for dissolution of a political party only when funds
are shown to have been received from foreign governments, political parties or foreign individuals.
Section 6(3) requires that funds received from multinational or domestic companies be treated as
prohibited funds and confiscated. The ECP has taken the word ‘multinationals’ to include all foreign
companies. While the Order of 2002 makes a clear distinction between foreign nationals and
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multinationals, with only funds from the latter liable to confiscation, the ECP has effaced the
distinction. The PTI is said to have received funds from foreign individuals as well as foreign
companies but not from foreign governments or foreign political parties. All such funds have been
held liable to confiscation.
A large part of the overseas funds, totaling about 80 crore rupees, received by the PTI through
bank transfers during the years 2008 to 2013 came through fund-raising vehicles set up by the PTI
itself, such as the two PTI LLCs established in the United States, PTI Canada Corporation and PTI
UK. The ECP has considered funds raised by these entities, regardless of the identity of the ultimate
donors, to be funds provided by foreign companies that are to be confiscated. Over the period 2008
to 2013 more than half of the foreign funds received by the PTI have come through these vehicles.
Are these funds liable to confiscation? Are the PTI funding vehicles to be treated as foreign
multinationals or alter egos of the PTI itself? Lawyers relish these questions.
There are other flows, including from the now disgraced but then valorized Arif Naqvi’s
Wootton Cricket Club totaling over two million dollars, that might have been collected for charitable
and not political purposes in the UK. Some of the accounts through which funds have come to the
PTI are claimed by the ECP to have been concealed by the party while issuing certificates of
complete disclosure signed by the PTI head Mr Imran Khan. These are serious enough matters even
if they do not provide a basis for dissolving the PTI.
Mr Khan must hope that the standard applied to declare Mian Nawaz Sharif not sadiq, in a
petition brought to the Supreme Court by Mr Khan himself, and hence ineligible for life for seeking
membership of parliament is not applied to him. Mian Nawaz was declared ineligible not because at
the time of the declaration he stood convicted of some corrupt practice. He was not declared
ineligible on account of holding an iqama or a residence visa of the United Arab Emirates. He was
told that a nominal salary not received as chairman of the board of a single member company set up
by his son in the UAE constituted a receivable. Since receivables are accounting assets and since he
had not declared this ‘asset’ in his electoral wealth declaration he was not sadiq.
(Source: The News)
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Middle East
CHINA, SAUDI ARABIA ON WAY TO EXPANDING TIES
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
China and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have a history of mutually beneficial friendship.
Friendship is based on the principles of mutual respect, non-interference, and regard for the
sovereignty. Both countries also tried to support each on their core interest. For example, Saudi
Arabia clearly supported the stance of China on Taiwan and Xinjiang, and never fell for the
propaganda. China reciprocated by respecting the KSA’s interest and never gave any head to false
propaganda. The relationship was summarized by Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman by saying,
“We (Arab) have history thousands of years of relationship with China, but we never faced
challenges or interference from China.”
The strong foundation of relationship helped both countries to enhance cooperation in
multiple fields including economy and trade. Foreign Minister of KSA highlighted the importance of
economic linkages by saying, “China is largest trade partner of Saudi Arabia and biggest export
market for Saudi oil.”
According to statistics, total trade between China-KSA was US$ 87 billion in 2021. KSA is
enjoying positive trade balance with US$ 56.96 billion export. Further, KSA was top exporter of oil to
China with 17% share in total import of China. Now both countries are considering using Yuan for
bilateral trade. It is big news, if it is materialized then KSA will be first major oil exporter to replace
dollar with Chinese Yuan. Western media and think thanks are discussing it as a beginning of new
ear for China and KSA’s relationship. Some experts believe, this news also contributed to push
President Biden to visit Saudi Arabia.
Besides, in 2019, during the visit of Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman to China, both
countries signed 35 agreements of US$ 28 billion. Aramco and Sinopec signed a deal of US$ 10
billion to cooperate in refining and petrochemical sector. In August 2022, Aramco and Sinopec
signed another MoU to further strengthen the cooperation.
Apart from economic and investment cooperation, both countries are also enhancing security
cooperation. It was reported by the foreign media that arm sale between two countries witnessed an
increase of 386% during the period of 2016-2020. China also sold sophisticated arms like ballistic
missiles and now is assisting Saudi Arabia to build local production line.
Building on the past success, China and Saudi Arabia are now working to further strengthen
their friendship. In pursuance of this objective President Xi Jinping is planning to visit KSA during
this week. It is expected that President Xi will be discussing a broad range of opportunities for
strengthening friendship. The anticipated visit is dubbed as one of the most important visits of
President XI due to multiple reasons.
First, it is first time that President Xi Jinping is leaving for international visit since the
outbreak of the Covid pandemic. It shows that China gives immense importance to relationship with
Saudi Arabia. Second, it is happening just after one month of visit of President Biden.
Therefore, some experts believe that the visit will consolidate position of KSA as regional
leader. Third, right now world is going through economic crisis and Russia-Ukraine conflict has
further aggravated the situation. World is struggling to find a way out. For that purpose, countries
are trying to strengthen existing relationship and find new allies and avenues to combat economic
crisis. The visit of President Xi can be quoted as practical example.
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Fourth, energy market is going through transition, and it is quite volatile now. China and KSA
being major consumer and producer, respectively, have high stakes and power to define the future
of energy market. Therefore, any deal or agreement on energy will have direct relevance for global
energy market. Thus, world is waiting for the outcome of the visit.
Apart from these factors, visit is also important in the context of future endeavors of China-KSA.
As we know China-KSA are transforming, and they are looking for reliable partners. Saudi Arabia
through the Vision 2030 has accelerated the process of transformation. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin
Salman is trying to diversify economy and move away from dependence on oil export.
He is looking for new drivers of economic growth and industrialization. He is also pushing
country to venture in technologies and services sectors. For that purpose, Saudi Arabia needs a
reliable partner, who do not lecture on governance and so-called human rights.
On other hand, China is transforming into great power. By realizing the responsibilities of
great power, China has launched multiple economic and technological programs including Belt and
Route Initiative (BRI). China is welcoming all interested countries to join these initiatives and benefit
from the emerging market of China. China also needs reliable partners, who can withstand western
pressure. Thus, both countries are natural allies. That’s why, Vice Prime Minister of China, said that
both countries need to work to create synergies between BRI and Vision 2030.
In this context, President Xi Jinping’s visit will be extremely important to define the future
relationship and pave a way for win-win cooperation.
Therefore, leading global players, media and think tanks are keeping a close on the visit, even
before the start of visit.
Lastly, the visit will be successful because President Xi and Crown Prince Muhammad attach
high priority to bilateral relationship. Crown Prince Muhammad regards President Xi as true and
trusted friend of KSA, as President Xi came forward to help KSA in 2017, when KSA was going
through difficult times. Let’s hope for the best.
(Source: The News)

THE PALESTINIAN MARCH FOR FREEDOM IS RELENTLESS

Ramzy Baroud (An internationally syndicated columnist)
Former Palestinian prisoner Jalal Lutfi Saqr once told me: “As soon as I left prison, I went to
(my brother) Nael’s grave. It is adorned with the colors of the Palestinian flag and verses from the
Holy Qur’an. I told my little brother how much I loved and appreciated him and that, one day, we
would meet again in paradise.” This testimony was published two years ago in my book “These
Chains Will Be Broken.”
As a Palestinian, born and raised in a refugee camp in Gaza, I was always familiar with the
discourse surrounding political prisoners. My neighborhood, like every neighborhood in Gaza, was
populated with a large number of former prisoners and families whose members have experienced
imprisonment in the past or present.
However, starting in 2016, my relationship with the subject took on, for the lack of a better
term, a more “academic” approach. Since then, I have interviewed scores of former prisoners and
members of their families. Some were imprisoned by Israel, others by the Palestinian Authority. I
even spoke to prisoners who have experienced the brutality of prisons elsewhere in the Middle East,
from Iraq to Syria and Egypt to Lebanon. A few particularly unlucky ones endured multiple prison
experiences and were tortured by men speaking different languages.
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Some prisoners, now quite old, were imprisoned by the British Army, which colonized
Palestine between 1920 and 1948. They were held according to the 1945 Defense (Emergency)
Regulations, an arbitrary legal code that allowed the British to hold rebelling Palestinian Arabs
without having to provide a reason or engage in due process.
This system remains in effect to this day, as it was adopted by Israel following the end of the
British Mandate. Following minor amendments in 1979 and the renaming of the law as the Israeli
Law on Authority in States of Emergency, it essentially became today’s so-called administrative
detention. It allows Israel to incarcerate Palestinians, practically indefinitely, based on evidence that
is kept secret, even from the defense attorney.
This “emergency” law remains in place simply because Palestinians have never ceased
resisting. Thousands of Palestinians were held without evidence or trial during the First Intifada, the
uprising of 1987. Most of them were kept in horrific living conditions in tent cities in the Naqab
desert.
According to the Palestinian Commission on Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, about 1
million Palestinians were imprisoned between 1967 and 2021. There are currently hundreds of
Palestinian administrative detainees in Israeli prisons, which violates international law on various
counts, such as holding prisoners without trial or due process and transferring prisoners out of
occupied territories, the latter being a stark violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
Of course, respecting international law has never been Israel’s strongest suit. In fact, Israel
continues to deliberately ignore international law in numerous aspects of its illegal military
occupation of Palestine, rationalizing such actions on the grounds of “security.”
Palestinians are also doing what they do best: Resisting, even under the harshest of
circumstances and by every means available to them. Tellingly, the strongest resistance takes place
inside prison walls, by gaunt-looking and often dying hunger strikers.
Khalil Awawdeh, a 40-year-old Palestinian from a village near Al-Khalil (Hebron), is the latest
prison hunger striker to make history, as he refrained from eating for 180 days. His weight dropped
to 38 kg, having lost more than 40 kg while on hunger strike. The images of his half-naked, skeletal
body were deemed “graphic” and “offensive” by some social media users and were removed as
soon as they were shared. By the end of his protest, he could only whisper a few words. Though
barely audible, they were filled with courage.
On Aug. 31, Awawdeh ended his hunger strike after reaching a deal with the Israeli prison
administration to release him on Oct. 2. His first words after that agreement were not those of a
dying man, but of a triumphant leader: “This resounding victory extends the series of great victories
achieved by the mighty and honorable people of this nation.”
These words, however, were not unique. They carried the same sentiment communicated to
me by every single freed prisoner I have interviewed in recent years. None have any regrets, even
those who spent most of their lives in dark cells and in shackles; even those who lost loved ones;
even those who left prison with chronic diseases, destined to die soon after their release. Their
message is always one of defiance, courage and hope.
Awawdeh is not the first prisoner, nor will he be the last, to undergo a life-threatening hunger
strike. The strategy may be explained, and understandably so, as a last resort or an act of
desperation by individuals who are left without alternatives. But for Palestinians, these are acts of
resistance that demonstrate the power of the Palestinian people: Even in prison, handcuffed to a
hospital bed and denied every basic human right, a Palestinian can fight, and win. Awawdeh did.
When Saqr learned that his brother Nael was killed by the Israeli army in Gaza, he was a
prisoner in Israel. He told me that the first thing he did when he learned of his brother’s death was
to kneel down and pray. The following day, he spoke to the mourners in his Gaza refugee camp
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using a smuggled cellphone, telling them: “Ours is a long and painful march for freedom. Some of
us are in prison; others are underground, but we will never cease our fight for our people. We must
remain committed to the legacy of our forefathers and our martyrs. We are all brothers, in blood, in
the struggle and in faith, so let’s remain united as one people, as brothers and sisters, and carry on,
despite the heavy losses and tremendous sacrifices.”
Saqr’s call was made 20 years ago. It remains as relevant today as it was then.
(Source: Arab News)

THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL ORDER

Paul Salem (Founding director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut)
During the second half of the 20th century, there was at least order in the Arab World, even if
precarious. Represented by the League of Arab States, the practice of Arab summitry provided some
semblance of regional order. However, this precarious order broke down in stages, firstly as a result
of Egypt’s separate peace with Israel in 1979 and later due to Iraq’s invasion of a fellow Arab state,
Kuwait, in 1990. Meanwhile, the positions of non-Arab players shifted. After 1979, Iran turned away
from the West to focus on building influence in the Arab-Muslim world. Two decades later, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan has also recalibrated Turkey’s foreign policy, balancing a continued interest in
Europe with rebuilding influence in the former Ottoman Arab World.
To this day, the region continues to undergo dynamic changes as new regional alignments
and divisions ebb and flow, but all without yet arriving at an overarching political, economic or
security architecture that could build on common interests, manage areas of difference, and work to
avoid direct or proxy conflict.
There is an increasing need for such an effective regional order. Already beset by high levels
of conflict, inequality, and unemployment, the region is facing a future further challenged by climate
change, water scarcity, and other unpredictable systemic challenges, as vividly illustrated by the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. There is a budding awareness of the need to turn away from decades
of geopolitical contestation and focus on the common systemic issues faced by the societies of this
region in a challenging century.
But a history of division and tension runs deep, and the goal of regional order still seems
dangerously beyond the horizon.
The Arab Regional Order Leading Up To 2020
In 1987, Egypt had been readmitted into the Arab League after its membership was suspended
for signing the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia provided
a partnered leadership between the most populous and wealthiest Arab states. Saddam Hussein’s
regime, which had challenged the Arab order in 1990 by invading Kuwait, was removed by the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq—an invasion which would generate its own set of major regional threats and
challenges. Arab summits resumed with a sense of complacency and assurance that an old familiar
order had been restored. But that order was facing serious challenges from within and without.
From without, external players began intruding into the Arab region in new and
unprecedented ways. During the Cold War, global powers—namely the United States and the Soviet
Union—built enormous influence in the Middle East by choosing and aligning client states along the
East-West axis. But it is noteworthy that the global powers competed largely by proxy, avoiding
large-scale direct military interventions of their own for fear of escalating direct conflict with the
rival superpower. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed that constraint. When Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990, the United States went ahead with a full-scale military deployment in the Middle
East without any concern for a backlash from Russia. And when Al-Qaeda attacked the United
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States on September 11, 2001, the United States, again, felt no restraint in sending forces to topple the
Taliban regime in Kabul and the Saddam regime in Baghdad. The United States was not the only
global power to take up direct military intervention. Russia would recover from the collapse of the
Soviet Union and follow suit in 2015 with a military intervention in support of the Bashar Al-Assad
regime in Syria, although it was not the only actor in this multi-party-led external intervention. From
without, regional powers were increasing their presence as well.
Iran
Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran signaled its interest in becoming a
direct and powerful player in the Arab World. Throughout the 1980s, Iran had remained fairly
contained by Saddam’s power and by an Arab state system that held firm. Iran’s main
breakthrough, however, was in Lebanon. State collapse from the 1975 civil war created conditions
that allowed Iran to build up Hezbollah as a powerful Iranian proxy throughout the 1980s and
beyond.
Iran’s second chance came in 2003, when the United States toppled an Iraqi regime that had
kept it largely in check, enabling Iran to emerge as the dominant power in Iraq. Iran’s third
breakthrough came as Al-Assad’s regime in Syria risked collapse at the hands of a popular uprising
that started in 2011. Iran rushed to the aid of its ally, sending in Iranian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and other
militia and military forces under the leadership of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, solidifying its
influence in Syria. Its most recent breakthrough came in 2014 in Yemen, where an alliance between
the Houthis and former president Ali Abdallah Saleh toppled the transitional government in Sanaa
and unleashed a civil war that continues to this day. The Houthis welcomed Iranian support, and
Iran has now added another Arab capital to the list of capitals in which it has a strong and
seemingly long-lasting presence and influence, including Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad.
Turkey
After almost a century of shunning the Arab-Islamic world and looking westward, Turkey has
also sought to reclaim its influence in the Arab World under Erdoğan’s leadership. In 2010, this
appeared to be a fairly benign and constructive interest: Turkey was presenting a convincing model
of political democratization and economic development; a balance of traditional values and vigorous
modernization projects; and the potential for integration with the West via the European Union.
Erdoğan promoted a “no problems with neighbors” foreign policy, focused on improving regional
cooperation and integration based on common economic interests and win-win solutions, and
exported an increasing number of consumer goods and TV soap operas to the Arab World. This
changed dramatically after the Arab uprisings of 2011.
Erdoğan saw an opportunity to regain a powerful role for Ankara in the Arab World by
backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, who seemed on track to become the ruling party
in several Arab countries including Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, and potentially major players
in Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait. However, his gamble did not pay off, as the Muslim Brotherhood
was removed from power in Egypt and failed to make the promised gains in other Arab countries. A
chastened but frustrated Erdoğan scaled back his ambitions but compensated with a direct military
intervention in Syria and Iraq and a strong proxy presence in Libya.
States of the Arab uprisings
However, the main challenge to the Arab order came from within, in the form of the 2011
Arab uprisings. These uprisings shook the Arab state system to its core, as people finally expressed
decades of pent-up frustration over unequal socioeconomic conditions and repressive political
institutions. The effect of these events at the regional level was significant. First, they led to full or
partial state failure in a number of key Arab states, including Libya, Yemen, and Syria. These
collapses created vacuums that would be filled by a number of state actors such as Iran, Turkey,
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Russia, and the United States, as well as non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Houthi forces, the
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and affiliated jihadist groups. At the regional
level, the uprisings and the potential rise of the Muslim Brotherhood—as well as the rift with Qatar
which appeared to be encouraging both—also cemented the Arab Quartet, a regional alliance
between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain.
All of these events, especially those following the 2011 Arab Spring, helped form the current
relationships and alignments within the Middle East. The Arab Quartet acted as the new center of
the Arab World, commanding the bulk of its economic resources. But Iran has successfully become
the dominant power in the “center” of the Arab World with its dominance in Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon. It has also gained a long-term foothold on the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. Turkey’s
influence has ended up well below its ambitions, with only pockets of influence, mainly in Syria
and Libya.
Israel
The breakthrough country, since 2020, has been Israel. In that year, the Abraham Accords,
signed between Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE, catapulted Israel into key partnerships with wealthy
and influential Arab monarchies. It has also begun normalizing relations with Morocco, the major
player on the western reaches of the Arab World. This Israeli breakthrough, particularly in the Gulf,
is likely to have important impacts on economic development, technology, trade, and investment,
but is also transforming the security relationship between Israel and the Arab Gulf states, as both
share an existential fear of Iran. The accords also mark a definitive shift away from years of Arab
policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which, since the Arab peace initiative of 2002, has offered
normalization only in exchange for a two-state solution for the Palestinians. After decades of being a
player excluded from the region, Israel—like the non-Arab Middle Eastern states of Iran and Turkey,
but in very different ways—is now also a player inside the Arab World.
The 2022 Regional Order
There is no overarching Middle East order today. We can speak perhaps of two (or rather,
two-and-a-half) sub-orders. The first is the centrist Arab order led by the aforementioned Arab
Quartet. It promotes stability and economic development, believes in top-down governance, and is,
therefore, antithetical to democracy. It is hostile to Iran and radical Islamist groups and is aligned
generally with the United States, although it enjoys growing economic relations with China and is
open to relations with Russia.
The second sub-order is one that is dominated by Iran and includes the Levantine countries
and a big part of Yemen. It is debatable whether this can be considered a sub-order of states, as most
of the states in this Iranian sphere of influence are either fully or partially failed, or are in extremely
precarious situations. Iran’s agenda in these states is partly aggressive defense against the perceived
threats from the United States, Israel, and radical jihadist groups like ISIS. Iran has enjoyed a fair
measure of backing from both Russia and China, who share part of its ambition to limit U.S.
influence. But it is also a forward-leaning ideological agenda representing both the Islamic
Republic’s own revolutionary ambitions to transform and lead the wider Muslim world, and also a
revived Iranian appetite to reclaim its prominence in the heart of the Middle East—a role that it has
enjoyed on and off in past centuries and millennia. The remaining “half order” is the small Turkish
sphere of influence scattered between Syria, Libya, and other parts of the Middle East, although this
hardly rivals the other two.
Internationally, the great powers cast long shadows across this Middle East. The United States
is still the most present and influential, although its presence and role are diminished compared to
the watershed years of George W. Bush. The United States pulled out of Iraq in 2011 (although it had
to return in 2015) and Afghanistan in 2021. Successive U.S. administrations from Obama to Trump to
Biden have recognized that while the Middle East remains significant, America’s main contest and
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challenge is further east with a rising China, and that America’s resources must be recalibrated
accordingly. The United States is, in a sense, moving back to its pre-1990 level of involvement in the
Middle East, which amounts to maintaining sizable diplomatic and economic relations, as well as
significant naval, counterterrorism, and other military assets in the region.
An assertive Russia has certainly reemerged in the Middle East, but its return is limited. It has
projected military power into Syria, and engaged via proxies in Libya, but its ambitions and
capacities are restricted. The Russian economy is only around 7 percent of the U.S. economy and 10
percent of that of China, rendering it unable to compete on par with those two powers.
China, on the other hand, is still playing the long game in the Middle East, focusing on
maintaining access to energy resources, finding markets for its products, and investing in its One
Belt One Road infrastructure. While it is geopolitically challenging the United States in the South
China Sea and over Taiwan, and in the realms of cyberspace, artificial intelligence, cell phone
technology, and satellite security, it has chosen not to directly challenge America’s geopolitical role
in the Middle East, at least for now. Although China disagrees with U.S. oil sanctions on Iran,
American naval presence and policy in the Middle East generally serves Chinese interests as it
ensures the free flow of much of the region’s oil to China and ensures the protection of trade routes
through which much of China’s global exports flow. How China’s posture and strategy will evolve
in 2030 or 2040 is harder to predict.
Navigating the Road to 2030
In the long run, a regional order would need to include all the main Arab and non-Arab states
of the region, but given the current differences and divergences, one could suggest a three-track way
forward. First, the Arab League should be strengthened and leveraged as a mechanism for
rebuilding and enhancing intra-Arab cooperation in order to better face the myriad socioeconomic,
security, and environmental challenges of the near future. But the Arab League—in effect, its main
leaders—must also better articulate what future it is promising to the region’s youth. We have seen
how the gap between youth ambitions and conditions led to wide-scale uprisings in the past decade,
and such frustrations might boil up again. For example, what message are the Arab states that
dominate the Arab League sending to the region’s youth if they are contemplating readmitting the
Syrian regime, after all the ways it has decimated its own population, into the League? Intra-Arab
state cooperation is necessary, but the Arab League and its main leaders going forward need to
make clear what future they are proposing for the Arab World, if this cooperation is to build
stability in the long run. Second, until one can imagine Iran and Israel participating in the same
regional forum, the two tracks might need to be kept separate. This could include one regional
forum that includes the Arab states, Turkey, and Israel. This platform could be used to address
differences, work toward solutions to intractable problems—most notably, the rights of Palestinians
to self-determination—and potentially build on common interests. A separate regional forum,
including the Arab states, Turkey, and Iran, could also work to reduce conflict, enhance trust and
cooperation, and build on common interests. Over time, whether enough progress could be made to
merge these two into one overarching regional order is hard to predict, but at least it will be
building the pathways and habits of intra-regional cooperation across a wide cross section of states.
Regional cooperation is essential to creating lasting stability, and the same can be said for the
international relations of the Middle East. The region must integrate more fully into the global
economy, must be a leader in energy transition, and must build fruitful relations with the major
economies of the world. But Middle Eastern leaders should also be aware of the need to prevent
global competition from sparking division and conflict within the region. This certainly was the case
during the Cold War, and as the United States and China face off over the next few decades, history
could very well repeat itself. As they navigate the next decade to 2030, regional leaders must figure
out how to build and balance their global relations so as to reap the fruits of global economic and
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technological integration without getting dragged into global rivalries that could take the region
down the path of more division and internal conflict.
The challenges of the coming decades will not be easy for the Middle East, nor for any region,
to confront. But they will be nearly impossible to overcome if the region’s states remain mired in
division and conflict or if global powers choose, once again, the Middle East as a battleground.
Building a regional order and enhancing regional cooperation and integration, while dissuading
global powers from exporting their differences to the region, is an urgent necessity if we are to stop
our region from sliding into chaos. Also, giving our younger generations the means to confront and
overcome the challenges lying ahead is a step in the right direction. If done correctly, it is possible to
build a future of security, prosperity, and self-actualization together.
(Source: Cairo Review of Global Affairs)

IRAQ HEADING FOR CIVIL WAR

US must not take advantage
Hussain Abdul-Hussain (Research Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in
Washington, DC)
Ten months after Iraq’s pro-Iran bloc was soundly defeated in parliamentary elections, and
less than a week after Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr announced his retirement from political life, a
stalemate between Shiites who oppose Tehran and those who support it seems to be leading the
country toward civil war. Yet this is only half the story.
There’s a pattern that connects US policy on Iran and civil wars in the Middle East. Whenever
Washington offers Arab countries up as prizes to Iran for the freezing of uranium enrichment, those
same Arab countries – usually with significant Shiite populations – plunge into conflict. This
happened in Lebanon in 2008, in Iraq and Yemen in 2014, and is happening again in Iraq.
Previous civil wars in the Middle East were preceded by allegations in Washington that
respecting Iranian interests in the region was key to peace. Today, those same arguments are being
made by the same American leaders, only this time they occupy the White House.
In 2012, US forces had just withdrawn from Iraq. At the time, current Secretary of State
Antony Blinken was serving as the national security adviser to then-vice-president Joe Biden.
Blinken oversaw the Barack Obama administration’s Iraq portfolio, making him the top White
House official on Iraq.
In a March 2012 speech, Blinken argued that “Iraq and Iran will inevitably be more
intertwined than we, and many of its neighbors, would like.” While he acknowledged that the
majority of Iraq’s leaders were resistant to outside influence, including from Iran, crucially, he did
not say the US would help them resist.
Tehran interpreted that statement as Washington green-lighting its dominance of Iraq.
Coming amid a campaign by then-Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to purge Sunnis from power,
it also coincided with the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) and eventual takeover of the northwest in 2014.
An intra-Iraqi war ensued, with the US leading a global coalition against ISIS.
In both Iraq and Iran, the majority is Shiite, which has prompted Tehran to try to use Shiism to
override the national divide, subdue Iraqis, and make them pledge allegiance to Iran’s Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But not so fast. Most Iraqi Shiites have proved to be patriotic, regardless of their religious
affiliation, and as such have opposed Tehran’s dominance at home. These Iraqis expressed their
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sentiment when they roundly defeated Iranian incumbent lawmakers in parliamentary elections last
October, leading the pro-Tehran parliamentary bloc to shrink to 15 members from 75.
Losing its majority, the pro-Iran coalition tried to torpedo election results but failed. It then
hoped to kill a parliamentary quorum, but an anti-Iran majority formed, and in January, anti-Tehran
Speaker Mohammad al-Halbousi was re-elected.
Then, just when the anti-Iran majority was about to elect a president and designate a prime
minister, the Iran bloc persuaded the Iraqi Supreme Court to ignore democratic rules and declare
that a supermajority of two-thirds was required for a quorum to elect a president and form a cabinet.
In parliamentary systems, such as in Britain and Israel, only a simple majority is required to
govern. Supermajorities are for big decisions, such as constitutional amendments.
As Iraq’s stalemate persisted, the Iranian bloc caught another break with the clumsiness and
inexperience of its opponents. Hoping to make a splash and force the hand of the Iran bloc, Sadr
instructed his bloc of 73 lawmakers, the biggest in parliament, to resign.
But instead of things shaking out Sadr’s way, the pro-Iran coalition anointed its losing
candidates as replacements, obtaining a majority. Tehran’s allies then changed position – from
insisting that anything short of a national-unity cabinet would lead to civil war, to speeding up the
process of electing a president and forming a cabinet regardless of minority blocs.
To stop Iran’s march toward absolute power in Iraq, Sadr was left with one tool: taking to the
streets. On Monday, he announced his “final withdrawal” from politics, which prompted deadly
protests by supporters. But by using this card, Sadr inadvertently played Tehran’s game of having
non-state actors rule using brute force, as in Lebanon and Yemen.
Unlike in Lebanon and Yemen, however, Iran’s partisans have no monopoly over the Shiites.
A civil war in Iraq might not go Iran’s way and could even drag on, threatening Iraq and possibly
shutting down its export of 4 million barrels of oil a day, thus shaking the global economy that is
already starved of energy because of the Russian war in Ukraine.
But then, as a reward for Iran agreeing to the revival of a skewed nuclear deal, Washington
might again offer Iraq as a prize to sweeten the pot for Tehran. One way the US could do this is by
starving Sadr’s militias and Iraq’s government forces of arms, while allowing Tehran’s militias to
receive all the support they need to win the war.
Iraq is about to plunge into a civil war that could spill beyond its borders. Such a war would
shake the region and the world economy. Washington is well advised to think of an unfolding Iraqi
civil war as a threat to its national interests and global peace – not as a reward that can entice Iran
into signing a nuclear deal.
(Source: Asia Times)

THE DESTINY OF THE JCPOA

Amer Ababakr (Holds PhD degree, Cyprus International University)
The silence of Ali Khamenei, the rotations of Kayhan and Noor News, the cautious hope of the
West and Arab states, and the threats of Israel; What will be the fate of the JCPOA?
In recent days, there have been a lot of analyzes and speculations about the prospect of the
EU’s nuclear proposal and Iran’s and the US’s response to it. Some consider the agreement to be
close and have entered the stage of evaluating the economic benefits of the JCPOA. A group also
believes that there is still a long way to reach an agreement.
But focusing on predicting the future of negotiations based on speculations from the EU’s
proposal and Tehran’s and Washington’s responses diverts minds from the most important issues in
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the nuclear case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This brings the questions that their answers can
provide a clearer vision of the fate of the current consultations with the Islamic Republic or any
future negotiations.
Are Tehran authorities looking for a permanent solution to the nuclear crisis? Is a stable
agreement possible without the normalization of Iran-US relations and with the continued threat of
Israel’s destruction? Why did the JCPOA collapse and does Tehran stop its ideological regional
activities? Can the Islamic Republic act independently of Russia and in the later stages of China in
making decisions about the JCPOA or any other deal with the West?
Iran’s nuclear crisis, which recently passed its 20th anniversary, is a leaked case that forced
Tehran’s authorities to interact and negotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Until
the disclosure of Iran’s nuclear activities in 2002, these programs were being implemented secretly
and with a specific purpose. The archive related to the activities of those years, which is now in
Israel’s possession and has become one of the main issues of dispute between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, shows that the Islamic Republic was pursuing nuclear
activities of a military nature, at least until the disclosure of these programs.
In all these years, Iran developed its nuclear activities, when the sanctions resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council were approved one after the other, or during the JCPOA period,
and now that the Biden administration has passed the maximum pressure policy of the Donald
Trump era. This process became slower or faster at times, but it never stopped.
In more than two decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has spent hundreds of billions of
dollars directly and indirectly on the nuclear crisis with the goal of deterrence, and an agreement
that would release 100 billion dollars of blocked assets is only an opportunity for Tehran’s
authorities, not an incentive to neglecting a strategic goal.
On the other hand, the ruling regime in Iran has declared the US and Israel as enemies since
the beginning. Today, not only there is no sign of changing this approach or giving up the threat of
Israel’s destruction, Tehran is threatening the United States authorities on this country’s soil. At the
same time, the US is the main party in nuclear negotiations with Iran, and Israel is its most
important strategic partner in the region.
The experience of maximum pressure in the Republican Administrations and the interaction
with Tehran in the Democratic Administrations of the United States in the last 20 years also show
that the durability of an agreement, along with other factors, depends on the normalization of
relations with the United States and Israel or at least putting aside hostility with them.
One of the most important reasons for the collapse of the JCPOA was the security concerns of
Israel, the states of the region, and of course the Republicans concerns about security in the
region, and these factors have remained constant in the case of a purely nuclear agreement with the
Islamic Republic. The JCPOA, did not have any guidelines for missile or regional activities of the
Islamic Republic and postponed it to the next stages of JCPOA’s implementation and another round
of negotiations. Today, with the weakening of the arms embargoes against Iran, the security
concerns of the states in the region are more than when the JCPOA was implemented.
In the meantime, the role of Russia and then China in the decisions made by the authorities of
Iran cannot be ignored. This makes Tehran’s decisions dependent on Moscow’s considerations for
regulating relations with the US and the EU.
It is difficult to predict politics and it is even more difficult to predict the behavior of a state
that only thinks about survival. But the history of the nuclear program is a clear illustration of the
fragility of any agreement. Thus, history is more important than prediction.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
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National
FOOD INSECURITY AND WAR
Tabinda Ashraf Shahid (Editor of Scientific Investigation and Global Network of Scientists)
The cost of war is visible not only in gun smoke, bloodshed and tears; it is also evident in the
sweeping away of the living rights of people affected by conflict, irrespective of gender and age.
According to the Global Network’s 2022 Global Report on Food Crisis, clashes and wars remain
significant drivers of food insecurity worldwide. Wars make weapons even out of food, a basic
necessity and the right of every human being.
Meanwhile, climate challenges, pandemic blows and economic instability have resulted in a
global hike in fuel and food prices, along with the war in Ukraine having a devastating impact on
worldwide food security. Worldwide, around 47 million people are facing a shortage of wheat and
other supplies. The UN sanctions on Russia have further disrupted import transit to West and
Central Africa, pushing away further the major target of the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 to
end hunger.
Food insecurity compels ‘hunger’, which is mainly associated with inadequate dietary energy
intake. The Global Hunger Index 2021 stated that Central Africa faced “alarming” and South Asia
“serious” hunger with scores of 43 and 24.7 GHI respectively. Central Africa was ranked 114, while
Pakistan, India and Afghanistan were ranked 92, 101 and 103, respectively, out of 116 countries. The
report also highlighted the precarious food insecurity situation in Balochistan, Sindh and KP due to
severe drought and inadequate rainfall in the country.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine is also having an indirect impact on food availability in the
country. Around 60 per cent of the wheat consumed in the country was imported from Ukraine in
FY20-21, making us the third largest importer of wheat (the fourth largest being Russia). The
presently lower export rate of Ukraine’s grain has affected global energy and food prices, and has
also strained Pakistan’s international trade. The country would have to find new sources of wheat or
wait for a bumper crop to fulfil domestic needs. The International Food Security Assessment, 2021-
31, has warned that food insecurity in Pakistan is expected to reach 38pc in the next decade.
Within the region, Sri Lanka has also felt the squeeze of war (Russia is the second-largest
buyer of Sri Lankan tea) and has experienced an economic meltdown that has resulted in a shortage
of food, fuel and other essential items.
Around the world, insufficient food and the latter’s inadequate quality are major contributors
to nutritional deficiencies, impacting the overall health conditions of the population concerned. In
Pakistan, not everyone is blessed with enough means to consume three meals daily, let alone three
healthy meals, to meet their dietary requirements. Besides food insecurity, nutritional insecurity is
also a matter of concern. Our children and women are nutritionally deficient, which contributes to
the overall burden of disease.
The huge economic and human damage inflicted due to the pandemic, poverty and conflict
needs to be reversed. There is a dire need for effective measures and sustainable nutritional goals to
restore food security in the current global situation. In Pakistan, not only poverty but political and
economic instability, natural disasters, low agricultural attainments, and Covid-19, too, have
shattered many sectors of human development in the region, aggravating the crises in health,
education, etc. In this regard, subsidising healthy food items and providing an uninterrupted food
supply to the population will help mitigate the acute food insecurity while also reducing nutritional
inadequacies.
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There is no one-size-fits-all methodology to handle food and nutritional insecurity. A

consistent multisectoral app-roach is needed — for instance, by encouraging the agriculture sector
and subsidising tax on the latest types of machinery and technologies to increase sustainable
production and get bumper yields to avoid the import of grains.
To combat micronutrient deficiencies, there should be incentives for growing bio-fortified
staple crops. Nutrition education is all about a balanced diet and can play a vital role in improving
the utilisation of important nutrients and encourage wise food choices at different socioeconomic
levels.
However, to promote innovation in the midst of multidimensional global challenges, the
priorities and needs of small stakeholders should also be factored into national policies in order to
keep a check on resources and prices of staple crops. It is important to bridge social and economic
inequalities, revive the economy and compensate for the losses incurred during the current wheat
supply and price crises.
(Source: Dawn)

LIFE IN FREEDOM
A Moment of Reckoning
M Alam Brohi (Former member of Foreign Service of Pakistan)
As a conscious citizen of this country, I have traversed a stream of jolting events and violent
turns of history in my country that, over years, have caused me disillusionment and reinvigorated
too my hopes in the resilience of this land. Many countries have survived more tumultuous and
tragic histories than that of Pakistan and achieved stability and prosperity. Their successive leaders
toiled in sweat and blood to steer those countries to safe shores. We didn’t have that stock of leaders,
unfortunately.
I dimly remember the imposition of the infamous scheme of One-Unit and later the Martial
Law of October 1958 and the relatively stable period that followed. However, the veneer of stability
and development that was trumpeted without any letup began disappearing with the advent of the
presidential elections of 1964 in which the autocratic rule of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan
was challenged by Muhtarma Fatima rallying the political forces of the country around her lean and
fragile figure for the restoration of plural democracy.
The democratic movement was overtaken by the mindless adventure of 1965 and the Tashkent
Treaty. The Field Marshal emerged as a weak leader from the Tashkent parleys gradually losing his
grip on the levers of power. The agitational politics that ensued forced him to hand over power to
his drunkard Commander in Chief, General Yahya Khan in March 1969. However, his authoritative
rule and myopic policies from October 1958 to March 1969 coalescing with the political blunders of
the past leadership had already alienated the Bengali population of Pakistan and heightened the
sense of deprivation in the smaller provinces of West Pakistan.
The so-called fair and transparent general elections held on the basis of adult franchise in the
country in December 1970 brought a bigger tragedy in their wake culminating in the violent
secession of the eastern wing of the country leaving the western part in a thick fog of chaos and
uncertainty. The death of the Jinnah’s Pakistan left the nation in a sombre and despairing mood. No
one was confident of the survival of the remainder of Pakistan as a country. This was the first time,
many Pakistanis cried like helpless children over the defeat and breakage of the country. Later, we
realized that the cumulative consequences of the senseless political and economic policies pursued
by the ruling clique combined with the condescension and hauteur with which the Bengalis were
treated since the inception of the country had contributed more to the secession of the eastern wing
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and the defeat of Pakistan than the military intervention of our enemy. Our elite did not learn a
lesson from this disgrace and continued to persevere in their political and economic shenanigans
strengthening their grip on the state resources to the peril of the common man.
We started with a renewed energy to rebuild our new Pakistan. Sooner than later, we came
across the political incorrigibility of our political class. The democratic governments of the National
Awami Party in Balochistan and KPK were dismissed in July 1973. Again, a military operation was
ordered to subdue the ensuing violent Baloch protests. This is recorded in our short history as the
third security operation against the Baloch. The earlier two operations (1948 and 1954) in which
Baloch leaders were imprisoned and executed were still fresh in the Baloch mind. Later, the National
Awami Party was banned and its veteran Baloch and Pashtun leaders were charged with sedition
and imprisoned in Hyderabad to be tried by a Special Tribunal. The most saddening thing was that
all this happened under a democratic government.
Lo and behold, we were well back on our beaten track of political machinations, palace
intrigues and strained civil-military relationships with our able and wise politicians undermining
each other. Nobody thought of the Constitution, democracy, political tolerance, human rights and
the abject poverty engulfing the masses. This provided a God-send opportunity to a meek, cunning
and scheming General to outfox the fractious political clan. The tyranny unleashed by the new
Martial Law Administrator shamed all the contemporary dictators in the world. Religion was
ruthlessly exploited and abused to serve his political ends. The Judiciary was reduced to a shamble;
the media gagged; the political workers were jailed, lashed and executed. The architect of the new
democratic Pakistan was executed through a dubious judicial decision.
The military intervention of the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan brought into play a
new Great Game which would be fulfilling the dream of the British Imperialist Prime Minister,
Benjamin Disraeli to push the Muscovites into the Caspian Sea. The US ganged with its western and
Middle Eastern allies to inflict a harder blow this time that brought down the moth-eaten structure
of the Soviet Union.
We consented to be the springboard for the US-led Western war against the Soviets in
Afghanistan presenting our land as the launching pad for the ragtag forces of the Mujahideen in
exchange for sacks of US dollars. The sword and the pulpit coalesced to legitimize our blind plunge
into this war. Our cities were teeming with Afghans, their leaders and fighters. There was the
unprecedented dispersal of dollars passing through the hands of our able intelligence officers.
Nobody looked beyond this momentous adventure. What would be the result of this reckless push
to destroy the Godless Soviets was the business of none. Our eyes were blinkered by the shine of the
US dollars and weapons. We were basking in our momentary strategic success.
The massive US aid did not bring about any change in the life of the common man though it
filled the coffers of a few religious political and military leaders. The economy continued to be
strained by the millions of Afghan refugees; the society was weaponized; the so-called Mujahideen
had the laissez passé to roam about in the northern hilly tracks of our land. We would soon reap
what we were sowing.
Pakistan was achieved through a democratic movement and given its territorial making or
geographical composition. It could have been kept together by functional democratic institutions as
a federal and parliamentary state with adequate autonomy to its constituent states. The third Martial
Law in the country by General Zia was a fatal blow to democracy in the new Pakistan. However, it
failed to stunt the nation’s aspiration for representative governance.
The struggle for the restoration of democracy in the mid-1980s incurred the wrath of the Junta.
The rural regions of Sindh remained ablaze for months witnessing the bloodiest clashes with the
security forces. Karachi and Punjab remained indifferent to this heroic struggle. The Junta had
already sowed the seeds of ethnic division in Sindh encouraging and patronizing the Urdu-speaking
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segment of its population to gather into a mafia-like political organization. The new sons of Karachi
amassed heaps of weapons and shamelessly engaged in bloodletting. Ironically enough, the first
victim of their militancy was the peace, tranquillity and tolerance of Karachi.
Their violent struggle for political clout and the ensuing turf war witnessed the brutal murder
of eminent persons including Hakeem Muhammad Saeed. The post-1988 governments failed to
bring any respite to Karachi or any improvement in the living conditions of the poor and were rather
engaged in their desperate struggle for survival. The civilian presidents were breathing over their
necks with draconian powers under the Eighth Amendment. They exercised these powers ruthlessly
to send packing home the civilian governments on charges of corruption and incompetence.
The overthrow of the government of Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif by General Pervaiz
Musharraf in 1999 heralded new political chicanery with mock democracy and powerless Prime
Ministers. After the elections of 2002, the Metropolis of Karachi, as a matter of political expediency,
was handed over to the MQM to prop up the Federal and Provincial Governments in Islamabad and
Sindh. The party, weakened by the earlier security operations, rapidly regained its organizational
strength, street power and militant prowess to the peril of peace and tranquillity of the Metropolis.
They remained the uncrowned king of the city, reining it in a fascist fashion. They continued to have
this privilege and power during the successive PPP governments in the centre and the province
holding this vibrant city hostage to their whims. On frivolous pretexts, their young motorcyclists
could shut it down within minutes harming the country with billions in economic loss. No one at the
helm of state affairs would bother about this harm to the country and harassment to the population
of the Metropolis.
The General ruled the country for a decade playing havoc with the constitution and judiciary.
Under pressure from his Western allies, the General struck a deal with the PPP leader Muhtarma
Benazir Bhutto closing her corruption cases abroad in exchange for political partnership. Muhtarma
Benazir did not see the dawn of democracy. Her life was shortened by enemies. We have had a
hybrid democracy since 2008 ebbing and flowing in choppy waters. The stock of leadership we have
is unable to strengthen democratic institutions, and strike a balance in the chronically strained
relations between civil governments and military commanders.
The people of Pakistan had harboured aspirations for the development of the country into a
modern, moderate and progressive state aspiring to have a political system in which the rule of law,
merit, equality before the law, freedom of profession and faith and the liberty of expression and
assemblage would reign supreme, with representative governments committed to political and
democratic norms, honesty, social justice and economic equity. Their dream is yet to be realised.
Who would not acutely feel the pain and sorrow if the human rights violations are rampant
and the forced disappearances continue unabated in his land? Who would be happy at the sight of
religious intolerance acquiring xenophobic proportions; corruption and violence becoming endemic
and education in public schools, colleges and universities almost collapsing? The population growth
is galloping unbridled. The urban and rural regions are devoid of the basic human needs while the
economic gap between haves and haves-not is widening. Over 65 per cent of the arable land is held
by a small number of landlords, leaving 50 million peasants to live on crumbs sharing the remaining
35 per cent of the land among themselves. What aspect from the above can soothe crying eyes and
bleeding hearts?
We have many positive achievements to contrast with the catalogue of our failures. We have
progressed well in infrastructural communication, technological and industrial development,
defence technology and prosperity in the upper echelons of society. All these achievements over 75
years pale into insignificance when compared to our monumental national failures. We have
developed a habit of highlighting our minor successes and finding scapegoats for big failures. We
have yet to decide whether we are going to have a theocratic, garrison or a democratic state in
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Pakistan. The capture of power and state resources by the elite has rendered the life of over 70 per
cent of 220 million people miserable. We are caught once again in an intractable political logjam
shaking the very foundations of the country. It is no less dangerous than the eventful occurrences of
1970, 1977 and 1999. The strained civil-military relationship seems to be at the heart of this turmoil.
The whole nation is gripped by fear and uncertainty. The foreign-aided economy is sinking. The
gravity of the situation has forced the military chief to set aside all the pretensions and use his clout
with friendly states for financial rescue.
In such a political impasse, the democratic dispensations or wise nations take recourse to the
electorate. But we have neither a democratic dispensation in the true sense nor wise leaders. The
ruling coalition fears heavy electoral loss and is engaged in efforts to discredit its political
challenger. We all know from our experience that disqualifying popular leaders and banning
political parties on flimsy grounds have all backfired. Our leaders don’t give two hoots about past
experiences.
The nation celebrates the 75th year of Independence in awe and fear.
(Source: Daily Times)

A TALE OF 75 YEARS
Tahir Kamran (Professor in the faculty of Liberal Arts at BNU, Lahore)
Azadi can be described in English in several ways, such as independence, freedom and
liberation etc. These English renderings of azadi have subtly different connotations. Independence is
defined as “condition of a person, nation, country or state in which residents and population, or
some portion thereof, exercise self-government and usually sovereignty, over its territory. The
opposite of independence is the status of a dependent territory.” Although a person features in this
definition of independence, the phenomenon is generally concerned with a nation, a state or a
country.
During the second half of the 20th Century there was a decolonisation wave. Several colonies
gained the right to independence through certain documents, such as the 1960 Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. How far these rights apply to all
people has been a moot point.
Pakistanis celebrate their independence on August 14 with an extra-ordinary zeal, but are
Pakistanis independent in the real sense of the phrase? Independence is bliss because those who
have it are not subject to control by others. It is self-governing. Independent entities are not affiliated
to larger, controlling units. Are we not subject to control by others? Many will answer this query in
the negative. At best we can say that we are no longer colonised. However, the assertion that
nobody exercises control over us would be hard to prove.
For 75 years, Pakistanis have been celebrating their Independence Day, not realising that there
is a difference between being independent and not colonised. The first and the foremost condition
for independence is for a state to direct all its energies to evolving administrative and legal
structures that are subservient to the collective will and interests of its people alone.
In the early years of Pakistan, the elite seemed eager to receive an assurance of American
protection. Chaudhry Zafarullah, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhary Muhammad Ali and
Iskander Mirza couldn’t see Pakistan surviving and sustaining itself unless America took it under its
wing.
At first the US didn’t heed Pakistan’s requests. However, the ruling elite kept on trying
assiduously to woo America and eventually succeeded. Pakistan’s entry into the SEATO and the
CENTO was an outcome of this sense of insecurity, harboured mainly by the elite. There should be a
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comprehensive investigation into how we benefitted from these pacts and treaties and in what ways
we suffered on their account. I am sure, the findings will be an eye-opener for many.
The little dividends to accrue for playing the second fiddle to the US were limited to the elite.
The same can be said about the proxy wars that Pakistan fought for it. The bottom line is that
Pakistan has been dependent on foreign resources, the biggest chuck of which is controlled by
America.
In terms of the definition of independence that is in wide circulation, we are a dependent, neo-
colonial polity, held hostage by its tiny elite. Such a polity can’t formulate and pursue independent
policies and is unable to guarantee freedom for its people.
We now turn our gaze to ‘freedom.’ It is an inalienable right of a citizen in a free state.
Freedom is the most fundamental attribute of a citizen. The freedom to speak, act, assemble and
hold opinions are what make a person - adami according to critic Hasan Askari, an insan. In going
through that transition, one embarks on a journey where one’s true (latent) potential can be realised.
A simple description of freedom is “the quality or state of being free: such as a) the absence of
necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action. b) liberation from slavery or restraint or from
the power of another. c) the quality or state of being exempt or released - usually from something
onerous.
Freedom gives humans their basic right to express their opinions and to speak freely about
any matter without government restraint. It’s important because it allows for change in a society and
the exchange of ideas. We should take care not to exercise the rights and freedoms granted to us by
our constitution, in an unrestrained manner so as to infringe on the rights of other people.
In a socially hierarchical polity freedom becomes a hollow expression. To guard freedoms, the
state has to have a robust system of justice that is sadly compromised in Pakistan. Governance has
thus gone down the drain. In such a situation, freedom is reduced to a quixotic aspiration.
The eagle is a personification of freedom. More than any other symbol, it is the sight of this
bird that represents total freedom. But eagles are not to be found in our landscape. I wonder why
Iqbal kept on exhorting Muslims to be like a shaheen. The bird is conspicuously absent from both
our lives and our consciousness.
In philosophy and religion, freedom is sometimes associated with having a free will and being
without undue or unjust constraints, such as enslavement. It is an idea closely tied with the concept
of negative liberty. Charles Taylor resolves one of the issues that separate the positive and negative
theories of freedom first distinguished in Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay, Two Concepts of Liberty.
He uses the words freedom and liberty interchangeably. Taylor says it as undeniable that
there are two such families of conceptions of political freedom. Negative liberty is a concept that is
often used in political philosophy. It is the idea that freedom means being able to do what you want,
without any external obstacles. This concept has been criticised for being too simplistic and not
considering the importance of individual self-realisation. Positive liberty is the ability to fulfill one’s
purposes.
“Freedom is not worth having if it does not include the freedom to make mistakes.”
(Source: TNS)

HAPHAZARD URBANISATION
Iftekhar A Khan
The large-scale movement of population from rural and backward areas to main cities to seek
jobs needs urgent attention. Instead of ringing alarm bells in the high offices of politicians and
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bureaucrats, they remain unperturbed. The political tug of war that went on during PTI rule has
continued unabated. The most depressing situation is that the wellbeing of the downtrodden doesn’t
surface in the priority list of feuding politicians.
For instance, people moving from the far-flung districts in the Seraiki belt, such as, Dera Ghazi
Khan, Muzaffargarh, Layyah Rajanpur and so on, to big cities is a compulsion for them to keep the
requirement of body and soul together. On reaching the cities, people settle on all kinds of menial
jobs in return for small salaries. Many of them serve in the houses of the rich as household servants,
which also includes women. Some of these hapless women falling prey to the lust of the
homeowners is nothing new. In many cases the poor woman is killed before she squeaks and the
rich homeowner gets away from the clutches of law, for being rich.
No government in the past considered creating opportunities of livelihood in the rural areas to
prevent people from shifting to big cities. For example, the barren lands in district D G Khan and its
tehsil Taunsa to which former CM Usman Buzdar belonged, large industrial zones could have been
set up. The entrepreneurs could have been induced to set up industries based on local agriculture
produce on the assurance of getting cheap power supply and latitude in various taxes. The locals
jobless would have earned their living near their own homes. In Australia, when the government
wishes to develop new residential areas, it first provides the road infrastructure, schools, a
university and a railway line. People automatically move in there since the residential plots are
cheaper than in the main cities. The main cities are saved from extra burden on the civic amenities.
Our case is different. Instead of setting up new cities in unpopulated areas, more residential
societies are added to big cities. Lahore, the provincial capital is already bursting with population.
Now a huge concrete jungle in the shape of River Ravi Front has been planned. The ill-conceived
project is located on river Ravi, which is one of the most polluted rivers according to the
environmentalists. River Ravi is turned into a drain of black slimy water where human waste and
chemicals are dumped. How tragic that 44,000 acres of arable land has been acquired for the project.
Many owners of the land having gone to the courts is another matter. Ravi Urban Development
Authority has already been constituted and filled with bureaucrats.
Now why couldn’t Hill Torrents Development Authority be set up in Taunsa? The authority
should be deputed to build dams on hill torrents, store water, and set up filtration plants to make
local brackish water potable. It will discourage movement of local people from leaving their homes
in Koh Suleman Ranges to the planes. Besides, during the rainy season more than hundred thousand
cusecs of water that gushes down from the mountains and devastates crops in the neighbouring
districts will be controlled and put to useful purpose. These projects will open new vistas of job
opportunities for the locals.
Were people in the backward areas provided with basic facilities to earn their livelihood,
educate their children, and get medical care near their homes, they wouldn’t have to leave their soil
where they were born and brought up. During Eid holidays, Lahore city roads turn almost empty.
It’s just that the huge number of working hands return to their villages to celebrate Eid with their
families. Recently, I asked Najam, who works in a laboratory and belongs to Tibi Qaisrani in Tehsil
Taunsa, why couldn’t find a job near his home. He said, if he could find one there why would he
travel more than three hundred miles away from home, pay rent for living, support himself and
send money back home to the family.
Former CM Buzdar could have done a lot by establishing industrial ventures in the backward
areas of D G Khan but he wasn’t cut out for it. Even his appointment as CM of the province of over
hundred million was a shock for many. From where he materialised, everyone seemed to question.
By appointing him as CM, Imran Khan the great man with the rosary who often talks about the state
of Medina wanted to prove that when God gives, He gives through the roof. (Source: Daily Times)
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POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

Zeba Sathar (Country Director, Population Council)
Pakistan’s booming population is at odds with its natural endowments. Environmental stress
caused by an imbalance between rapid population growth and limited natural resources is one of
the most frightening, but least discussed realities we face. Our already teetering economy — one
which can barely generate the three million additional jobs it requires annually for new entrants into
the labour force — faces the added threat of water and land shortages. It is a perfect storm waiting to
happen — or have the clouds already burst?
Rises in temperatures associated with climate change, and a decline in rainfall, grab public
attention and tend to overshadow the underlying and growing threat of the erosion of the projected
size of the natural resource base, which informs Pakistan’s National Conservation Strategy,
approved in 1992. Even though tackling a rapidly growing population was part of the strategy,
policymakers did not foresee that population growth rates would continue at their high levels and
that we would add another 120 million to the population between 1981 and 2017. We are expected to
add at least another 120m by 2050.
The first alarm bell is the shrinking water base. One direct manifestation of the nature-
population imbalance can be seen in the stark decline in per capita water availability from 2,150
cubic metres, or CM, to 860CM between 1980 and 2017. A few simple calculations confirm this trend
will continue: the total availability of water resources in Pakistan is currently estimated at 178 billion
cubic metres (BCM). At the current growth rate, our population will expand to 242m by 2025 and
290m by 2035. Unless we improve our ability to store and conserve water, per capita water
availability will fall to further scarcity levels of 730CM in 2025 and 600CM in 2035.
The second glaring imbalance is in the shrinking land base for agriculture and increasing need
for food production. Rural areas have been hit hardest by water shortages and there has been a
decline in cultivated land per capita from 0.5 acres in 1980 to 0.2 in 2017. Another striking trend is
that while 62 per cent of those working in agriculture owned land in 2005, the equivalent proportion
was down to 49pc in 2020. These changes alone directly impact livelihoods, evidenced by the
shrinking size of agriculture as a source of income.
Rural to urban migration is an immediate outcome of rural stress caused by dwindling natural
resources, shrinking economic opportunities and a sharp increase in the numbers seeking work.
Migration induced by decreasing agricultural opportunities and the attraction of selling rural land in
response to population pressures is an adaptation strategy. However, carefully deliberated policy is
required to reduce the stress on cities and towns that were not originally planned for this level of
population increase. Improved public service delivery in smaller cities to reduce migratory stress on
large urban centres is most definitely required.
There has been greater urban population growth than rural, which is increasing
environmental challenges and causing shortages in urban areas. Rapid urban growth was a result of
high urban fertility rates and rapid rural-to-urban migration until the late 1980s, when urban fertility
rates finally began to decline. As a result, the rates of urban growth in 1951–1972 were close to 5pc
per annum at their peak, compared to rural rates of 3.5pc. Urban growth rates have fallen since 1981,
but continue to be more than 1pc to 2pc higher than rural areas due to internal migration. The urban
population has already risen from 24m to 76m between 1980 and 2017 and will surpass the rural
population by 2045.
Population growth is leading to massive overcrowding, high population densities and
shortage of land to build upon because of the pressures of additional demand for housing. The
number of housing units in urban areas has gone up from 3.6m to 12m units between 1980 and 2017.
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The quadrupling of housing demand is leading to steep rises in real estate costs and conversion of
rural and zoned areas to housing projects.
Projecting forward to 2050, we expect 100m more Pakistanis to be living in urban areas even if
there is a moderate decline in family size in the cities. But high population densities and pressures
on already overstretched city municipal limits will continue to overload limited facilities, especially
water for domestic use and sanitation.
Across Pakistan, climate and population pressures will eventually lead to shortages in food
due to the negative impact on our ecology and biodiversity, and possibly also livelihoods, thereby
exacerbating inequalities. Already better off regions like the irrigated plains of Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa will build resilience against climate vagaries, while poorer desert and rain-fed regions
in rural Sindh and Balochistan will succumb to pressures. Rising inequalities can lead to huge
regional frictions based on the ever-increasing competition for largely limited resources and
livelihood opportunities. The prospect of escalating water disputes is inevitable.
Can Pakistan break this cycle, following the example of several other countries in this region
where breakthroughs of science, adaptation in agriculture, energy usage and governance, and
economic adaptation took over? Importantly, most, if not all of them, did not also have to contend
with the pernicious effect of high population growth rates. The lowering of population growth rates,
which is a glaringly neglected national priority, would greatly relieve these pressures and mitigate
economic and political threats.
The issue requires immediate policy attention and financing for the implementation of the
2018 Council of Common Interests-endorsed Plan of Action to tackle rapid population growth. The
new national narrative on population, which has been approved by religious, political, and civil
society leaders, supports maintaining a balance between resources and population numbers. What
can be more critical than the need to emphasise the deleterious effects of a large, uncontrollably
growing population, which is completely at odds with the natural resources we have?
(Source: Dawn)
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Nuclear Issues
AT THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR
(Mis)Perceptions & The Kargil Crisis
Zin Mar Khing
The role of misperception has been considerably emphasized in the process leading to crisis
and war. Robert Jervis, a leading scholar with many landmarks works in the study of war and
misperceptions, has long argued that a crisis is most likely to escalate to war when states
overestimate others’ hostility but underestimates the extent to which their capabilities or actions can
be seen as threats by their adversaries. However, these misperceptions can be avoided by
safeguarding common perceptual errors. Although a crisis or conflict may take place without
misperception(s), it is rarely completely out of question. The Kargil crisis in 1999 between India and
Pakistan is a critical case in point. It marked the first military confrontation between the two new
nuclear states and is said to be the first crisis that came closest to a nuclear war since the Cuban
Missile Crisis. However, despite being the longest and the most intense among other Indo-Pakistani
conflicts with nuclear threats looming over the horizon, it did not escalate to a nuclear war. Today,
the Kargil crisis remains highly debated in the international strategic community due to its
significant occurrence in the post-nuclear era. Given that, this paper will seek to address how
(Jervis’s model of) misperceptions of the conflict parties leads to the crisis escalating to war, and
why despite huge hostility, a full-scale nuclear war is avoided.
Kargil Crisis From the Beginning
The Kargil crisis arose out of failed attempts to resolve the long-standing Kashmir disputes
between India and Pakistan. Upon their independence from the British colonial government in 1947,
although Kashmir aligns more with Pakistan due to its Muslim-majority population, India acceded
Kashmir to its union through military force against the will of the princely state. When Pakistan
challenged the legitimacy of this accession, the first Indo-Pakistani war occurred. The war ended
with the establishment of a Cease-Fire Line (CFL) between the two states under the United Nations
inspection. After the war, most of the Kargil region remained under Indian control, and later, the
remaining parts of Kargil also fell under its control after defeating Pakistan in 1971. In the following
year, the Simla Agreement was signed, and both sides promised to refrain from using military force
while remaining in their territory within the area of LoC (the CFL was renamed as Line of Control
(LoC)).
In 1984, India launched an attack to capture the disputed Siachen Glacier in Northern
Kashmir, due to its perception that it is pre-empting Pakistan’s plan to capture the key strategic
passes in the region, directly violating the Simla Agreement. By the time Pakistan responded to the
attack, India has already captured major passes on the Saltaro Range. Pakistan suffered great
humiliation, and this translates into its perception that Pakistan could also trespass the Simla
Agreement to deter any future attacks even on the Indian side of the LoC. From the mid-1990s
onwards, the two sides have constantly engaged in artillery shelling along their side of the LoC and,
at times, involved in low-intensity conflicts to reclaim their lost territory.
Against these backdrops and the subsequent military buildup along the LoC, the Kashmir
disputes entered a dangerous phase in 1998 when India, and later Pakistan, conducted nuclear tests
triggering international sanctions against them. The Kargil crisis began in 1999 when the Pakistan
military covertly crossed over the Indian side of the LoC. Due to their nuclear arsenals and the
resulting international repercussions, they believe that neither side is willing to risk military
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confrontation and escalation. Pakistani army disguised itself with the Kashmiri freedom fighters and
advanced into Indian-controlled Kargil heights believing that India would not retaliate heavily and
will eventually withdraw from Siachen Glacier and re-negotiate the broader Kashmir disputes.
Meanwhile, believing that an attack from Pakistan is impossible, India left the critical heights vacant
during winter and this facilitated Pakistani acquisition of the Kargil heights. The crisis eventually
escalated to war in mid-May 1999 when India realized Pakistani intrusion and retaliated heavily,
involving air forces and artillery, capturing strategic positions, and pushing the Pakistani military
back to their LoC. The conflict ended without nuclear escalation as U.S. intervention forced Pakistan
to withdraw from the Indian side of the LoC followed by the latter ending hostility on all fronts.
Crisis Management: Misperceptions and the Kargil Conflict
The underlying question is this: Why did the Kargil crisis escalate to conflict despite the lack
of Indian and Pakistani anticipation of the possibility of any military confrontations between them?
Although war without misperception is possible, the Kargil crisis escalated to war due to a series of
misperceptions associated with the military, political and strategic constraints on either or both
conflict parties.
Robert Jervis identifies many different forms of misperceptions and explains how they
increase the likelihood of war. He argues that misperceptions originate from inaccurate inferences
about states’ capabilities. They are often optimistic about their military assets and pessimistic about
the long-term diplomatic solutions, and this thereby escalates to war as states come to believe the
former bears more chance of success than the latter. In a broad sense, most Pakistanis believed that
the forced accession of Muslim-majority Kashmir was neither just nor fair and that the Hindu
leadership has only enabled oppressive Indian control of the region and its populations. Multiple
failed Pakistani attempts to ‘liberate’ the Kashmiri population and the brutal crackdown by Indian
forces, especially with the invasion of Siachen Glacier, have only convinced Pakistan that Indian
military superiority greatly overwhelmed any diplomatic/political solutions for the Kashmiris. It is
the decades of Indian aggression and Pakistan’s humiliating defeat that the latter came to believe
that the Kargil operation was the only option to return the favour. On the Indian side, it largely
viewed the Pakistani advance to its side of the LoC as a revisionist challenge to its political and
territorial status quo, and therefore, it retaliated militarily. In short, the Kargil conflict broke out
because both sides believe that there is no other solution than the military to resolve their long-
standing rivalry in the region.
More remarkably, Jervis argues that states are more prone to misperception (and war) when
there is a lack of alternative information that contradicts their pre-existing assumptions about their
opponents. This has been apparent in Pakistan’s military supremacy facilitated by the absence of
political consolidation, a stable political system and the input from foreign offices, and the presence
of international security challenges. As important decision-making associated with national and
foreign affairs centred around the military, its attitude during a crisis is largely fixated on the idea of
reducing crisis stress through aggressive military means. In India, the major and the only reliable
source of information for crisis decision-making has been the intelligence agencies. As decision-
makers become mostly dependent on the information provided by these agencies, the failure of
which results in misperception. As a result, they assume a larger extent of the legitimacy of their
positions or the hostile intents of their adversaries, which, as illustrated shortly, is proven to be the
underlying reason for the Kargil conflict.
On the one hand, war occurs when aggressors underestimate the resolve of status quo powers
and how their actions can be seen as a threat by their adversaries. In essence, a war between India
and Pakistan was almost unavoidable as both sides underestimated each other’s intentions and
capabilities. Due to asymmetric military capability and the Indian forces’ partial retreat from the
LoC due to harsh winter conditions and dangerous terrain, Pakistani planners believed that a
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“denial and deception campaign” that involved sending troops, disguised as Kashmiri freedom
fighters, across the Indian side of the LoC to capture the Kargil heights will be a success. They
believed that this will not only enable them to reach the superior terrain before being discovered by
the Indian intelligence after the winter retreat, but will also allow them to maintain a quid pro quo
for their broader ambition to re-negotiate the Kashmir dispute, and to a lesser extent, the Siachen
issue. Furthermore, as India was also increasingly restrained by international sanctions and
preoccupied with the Kashmir insurgency, Pakistani officials anticipate neither India’s counterattack
nor the military escalation along the international border. For the same reason, Pakistan’s military
leadership was confident that even if India retaliated militarily, Pakistan troops can successfully
neutralize the potential war with India.
At the same time, India’s underestimation of Pakistani intrusion has enhanced the latter’s
initial success in disguising as Kashmiri insurgents and acquiring the Kargil heights. Pakistan’s
preoccupied support for the Kashmiri revolt, the division between its political and military
leadership, the deteriorating economic conditions, and India’s military superiority – which has
historically been able to outmaneuver Pakistan’s military capability – has all tapped into the
perception of Indian defense and intelligence analysts that Pakistan cannot afford to execute a
conventional military operation on India, let alone surprise and deception. Consequently, they did
not see the risk of leaving the forward post temporarily vacant during winter. Even when
unidentified militants were first discovered in the Kargil sector, the intelligence field units were slow
to report believing that they are not Pakistani forces, and thus, can be handled locally. This is later
cited as an intelligence failure for India – a great humiliation in its failure to detect Pakistan’s
military buildup and prevent it from losing the strategically important terrain.
In the summer of 1999, when the Kargil crisis escalated to war with India’s massive
counterattack against Pakistani militants, the above perceptions of both conflict parties are proven to
have been misplaced. On the Pakistan side, it has underestimated India’s responses to their
transgression and the strategic importance of Kargil to India. While an element of surprise in
Pakistan’s crisis management strategy was successful against India, whose intelligence has
miserably failed to detect massive intrusion, neither the nuclear threshold nor international
repercussions on its nuclear tests have prevented India from military retaliation. Pakistan’s invasion
of the Kargil sector, which is an important supply line for its troop stationed beyond Kargil to
ensure its control over Kashmir, has only provided more incentive for the Indian military to reverse
the advance and recapture what it has lost. On the Indian side, the scope of Pakistan’s operation
took it by surprise as it underestimated the rationale of Pakistan’s historical grievances and its
intention to reverse the territorial status quo. Although the early period of conflict was marked by
massive causalities due to India’s vulnerability to Pakistan’s attack from high grounds, it was able to
effectively overcome the stress and “slowly brought their superior military capability to bear
against” Pakistan. Once Pakistan’s surprise strategy was broken and India escalated the conflict to
defend its status quo by authorizing its air forces and heavy artillery, Pakistan constantly found its
initial mandate overstretched and was gradually forced out of Kargil back to its side of the LoC.
On the other hand, crises are more likely to escalate to war when states overestimate others’
hostility and infer threatening motives from actions that can be seen as at least partly cooperative
leading to war. Although overestimation seems to be absent in India’s crisis decision-making due to
presumptions of its military superiority, it has no doubt played a role in Pakistan’s misperception.
First, while Pakistan perceives India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as a strategy that tilts the military
balance in favor of India and pressures it to stop challenging Kashmir accession, the latter acquire
these weapons merely to discourage Pakistan from supporting the Kashmir insurgency that poses an
existential threat to India’s territorial integrity. Second, Pakistani military commanders justify
Pakistan’s action as a preemption to anticipated Indian military operation. This is based on their
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belief that India has planned a military operation to undermine any potential Pakistani inception in
the Kashmir dispute. However, as illustrated above, the Indian army’s lack of intelligence
preparedness, policing on Kargil heights, and incoordination during the initial contact with
Pakistani forces have all proved this perceived Indian offensive to be a myth.
Crisis Management: Nuclear War Prevented
With the threat of nuclear use looming over the horizon, the Kargil conflict was still
characterized as a limited conflict fought under the nuclear threshold. What explains how India and
Pakistan manage to prevent a full-fledged nuclear war despite high hostility? The answer lies in the
ability of states to signal to their adversaries about their “assumptions, beliefs, and the predictions
that follow from them.” In the case of the Kargil conflict, nuclear war was prevented because
communication happens at two-level: state and international levels.
At the state level, this communication happens between India and Pakistan. It is argued that
states prefer peace to war as long as they assume uncontrollable consequences of all-out war and
maintain rational control over their behaviors. The nuclear war was prevented because the nuclear
capability and the danger associated with escalation have restrained both sides from expanding the
scope of conflict on another (nuclear) front. The nuclear war has been avoided because crisis
controllability remains high despite the comparable incentives for nuclear first use. Due to its
military inferiority, Pakistan has maintained its first-strike policy where nuclear readiness is
guaranteed through the integration of nuclear into its conventional military assets and delegation of
these capabilities to lower-level military commanders. By contrast, India maintains “a no-first-strike
policy” unless it believes Pakistan to have readied itself for the first nuclear attack. It is maintained
in a way to limit accidental or unauthorized use. In any case, the red lines for both sides are made
clear: while Pakistan will strike first only when a large-scale attack has occurred that undermines its
existence, India will preempt when it suspects Pakistan to have planned its nuclear first use. High
controllability on both sides means that neither will intentionally breach these thresholds and risk
the cost of a nuclear war.
However, states do not only signal each other, they also communicate with the international
community. In essence, states may rationally be willing to bear the cost of war to foster an
international reputation on the legitimacy of their actions and strengthen their bargaining power
against their opponents. The role of international actors has been an important dimension of the
resolve of the Kargil conflict and in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Pakistan believed that
with the mounting international concern for nuclear escalation, since both states acquire nuclear
weapons in 1998, internationalizing the Kargil conflict as a geographical struggle that risks nuclear
escalation will catalyze international intervention in its favor. On the other hand, India only sought
limited objectives – force Pakistan’s army out of the side of the LoC and reclaim the Kargil heights –
and signal itself as a responsible nuclear state acting in self-defense. While Pakistan’s leadership
emphasizes the element of secrecy in its Kargil policy by restricting the involvement of foreign
offices and prohibiting media coverage of the issue, India’s leadership favors a transparent policy by
freely sharing its information with foreign diplomats and the media. This transparency on India’s
side means that India’s intention to restrict its superior conventional military – capable of achieving
swift and decisive victory against Pakistan – and prohibit spillover of its attacks to Pakistan’s side of
the LoC and maintain its image as a rational, responsible nuclear state is clearly communicated. As
India appeared as a victim of aggression acting in its self-defense, Pakistan is constantly portrayed
as a violator of the norms of international conduct. All this ensures that while Pakistan’s signaling
efforts were greatly undermined, India’s crisis management through international signaling has
worked in its favor. In the end, the nuclear war was avoided as the international community came to
India’s rescue holding Pakistan accountable for provoking the Kargil conflict and forcing it to retreat
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to its side of the LoC. While India emerged as a responsible nuclear stakeholder with closer ties to
the United States, Pakistan emerged as a nuclear aggressor and a terrorist state.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the underlying cause of the Kargil crisis escalation is an outcome of circles of
mutual misperceptions, particularly simultaneous underestimation and/or overestimation by India
and Pakistan about each other’s intentions. While Pakistan underestimated India’s responses to its
transgression and how its acquisition of Kargil heights is seen as a threat to India, India
underestimated the possibility and capability of Pakistan’s advance. Although overestimation
appeared to be absent in India’s crisis decision-making, Pakistan’s overestimation of India’s
intention to develop nuclear capability and initiate invasion has only made conflict unavoidable.
Yet, despite huge hostility under the nuclear shadow, the conflict did not escalate into nuclear war
due to the effective Indian and/or Pakistani signaling at both state and international levels.

IS NUCLEAR WAR INEVITABLE?

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (Professor at Harvard University)
Russian aggression and nuclear saber rattling have reminded us that the likelihood of nuclear
war is a matter of both independent and interdependent probabilities. Paradoxically, reducing the
probability of an all-out catastrophe requires that we learn to accept a certain degree of risk and
uncertainty.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and nuclear saber rattling against the West have revived a debate
about nuclear weapons. Last year, when a United Nations treaty to ban such weapons outright
entered into force, none of the world’s nine nuclear-weapons states was among the 86 signatories.
How can these states justify possessing weapons that put all of humanity at risk? That is a pertinent
question, but it must be considered alongside another one: If the United States were to sign the
treaty and destroy its own arsenal, would it still be able to deter further Russian aggression in
Europe? If the answer is no, one also must consider whether nuclear war is inevitable.
It’s not a new question. In 1960, the British scientist and novelist C.P. Snow concluded that
nuclear war within a decade was “a mathematical certainty.” That may have been an exaggeration,
but many believed Snow’s prediction would be justified if a war occurred within a century. In the
1980s, Nuclear Freeze campaigners like Helen Caldicott echoed Snow in warning that the buildup of
nuclear weapons “will make nuclear war a mathematical certainty.”
Those advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons often note that if you flip a coin once, the
chance of getting heads is 50%; but if you flip it ten times, the chance of getting heads at least once
rises to 99.9%. A 1% chance of nuclear war in the next 40 years becomes 99% after 8,000 years.
Sooner or later, the odds will turn against us. Even if we cut the risks by half every year, we can
never get to zero.
But the coin-flip metaphor is misleading where nuclear weapons are concerned, because it
assumes independent probabilities, whereas human interactions are more like loaded dice. What
happens on one flip can change the odds on the next flip. There was a lower probability of nuclear
war in 1963, just after the Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because there had been a higher probability
in 1962. The simple form of the law of averages does not necessarily apply to complex human
interactions. In principle, the right human choices can reduce probabilities.
The likelihood of nuclear war rests on both independent and interdependent probabilities. A
purely accidental war might fit the model of the coin flip, but such wars are rare, and any accidents
might turn out to be limited. Moreover, if an accidental conflict remains limited, it may trigger
future actions that would further limit the probability of a larger war. And the longer the period, the
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greater the chance that things may have changed. In 8,000 years, humans may have much more
pressing concerns than nuclear war.
We simply do not know what the interdependent probabilities are. But if we base our analysis
on post-World War II history, we can assume that the annual probability is not in the higher range
of the distribution.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, US President John F. Kennedy reportedly estimated the
probability of nuclear war to be between 33% and 50%. But this did not necessarily mean unlimited
nuclear war. In interviews with participants in that episode on its 25th anniversary, we learned that,
despite the massive superiority of the US nuclear arsenal, Kennedy was deterred by even the
slightest prospect of nuclear war. And the outcome was hardly an unalloyed American victory; it
involved a compromise that included the quiet removal of US missiles from Turkey.
Some people have used the mathematical-inevitability argument to push for unilateral nuclear
disarmament. Inverting the Cold War slogan, future generations would be better off red than dead.
But nuclear knowledge cannot be abolished, and coordinating abolition among nine or more
ideologically diverse nuclear-weapon states would be extremely difficult, to say the least.
Unreciprocated unilateral steps could embolden aggressors, increasing the odds of an unhappy
endgame.
We have no idea what utility and risk acceptance will mean to distant future generations, or
what people will value in 8,000 years. While our moral obligation to them compels us to treat
survival very carefully, that task does not require the complete absence of risk. We owe future
generations roughly equal access to important values, and that includes equal chances of survival.
That is different from trying to aggregate the interests of centuries of unknown people into some
unknowable sum in the present. Risk will always be an unavoidable component of human life.
Nuclear deterrence is based on a usability paradox. If the weapons are totally unusable, they
do not deter. But if they are too usable, nuclear war with all its devastation might occur. Given the
usability paradox and the interdependent probabilities related to human interactions, we cannot
seek an absolute answer to what constitutes “just deterrence.” Nuclear deterrence is not all right or
all wrong. Our acceptance of deterrence must be conditional.
The just war tradition that we have inherited over the centuries suggests three relevant
conditions that must be met: a just and proportionate cause, limits on means, and prudent
consideration of all consequences. I derive five nuclear maxims from these conditions. In terms of
motives, we must understand that self-defense is a just but limited cause. As for means, we must
never treat nuclear weapons as normal weapons, and we must minimize harm to innocent people.
And regarding consequences, we should reduce the risks of nuclear war in the near term and try to
reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons over time. A bomb in the basement involves some risk, but
not as much risk as bombs on the front lines.
The war in Ukraine has reminded us that there is no way to avoid uncertainty and risk. The
goal of reducing (not abolishing) the role of nuclear weapons over time remains as important as
ever. Richard Garwin, the designer of the first hydrogen bomb, calculated that, “If the probability of
nuclear war this year is 1%, and if each year we manage to reduce it to only 80% of what it was the
previous year, then the cumulative probability of nuclear war for all time will be 5%.” We can live
moral lives with that probability.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
 230

Organizations
UN’S RELEVANCE
Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry (Former foreign secretary)
The present world order was conceived in the wake of the unprecedented destruction caused
by the Second World War. The principles underpinning the world order were encapsulated in the
Charter of the United Nations that was established in 1945. The UN member states made a solemn
commitment to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, not to interfere in each
other’s internal affairs, and to resolve their disputes through peaceful means. These principles
served the world well for over 50 years. The UN emerged as the universal, most representative, and
most respected international organisation.
Things began to change, however, with the advent of the 21st century. Major powers started
violating the Charter principles with impunity. When the US decided to invade Iraq on suspicions of
weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security Council did not agree as there was not enough
evidence justifying the violation of the territorial integrity of a fellow UN member state. The US
formed a ‘coalition of the willing’ and went ahead with the invasion. That was the start of
unilateralism trumping multilateralism. Ever since, there have been numerous instances of major
powers opting for unilateral approaches to secure their perceived national interests.
With unilateralism on the ascendent and multilateralism on the retreat, is the UN becoming
redundant to international peace and security? It may not be redundant, but has certainly been
marginalised in many of the conflict situations. The US-led Nato presence in Afghanistan had only a
limited role for the UN. Russia invaded Ukraine to occupy Crimea in 2014 without a care for UN
principles. Several powers waged a nasty proxy war in Syria. Long-standing conflicts on the UN’s
books, such as Palestine and Kashmir, remain unresolved. For decades, the UN has operated
peacekeeping missions in several parts of Africa, obtaining at best limited results.
If the UN is so marginalised and major powers do whatever they wish, without much regard
for international law, is the UN then on course to becoming irrelevant to interstate conduct?
Certainly not. The UN is, and will, remain relevant as long as it is viewed as a platform where all
nations come together to discuss and resolve their issues. It is not a world government nor is it a
world police. It is a useful venue to forge a consensus on how to keep, and then build, peace,
address issues of common interest such as environmental degradation and pandemics, and to
provide advocacy and expertise to pursue development goals like the MDGs and SDGs.
So, is it then just a forum for talking shop? Well, on human rights and development issues, the
UN has much to show, like putting together a global socioeconomic normative framework.
However, in matters of peace and security, it is, sadly, turning out to be a talking shop. The UN
Security Council, the principal UN organ responsible for international peace and security, is
dominated by five permanent members — the US, UK, France, China and Russia — who possess
veto power to block any decision of the Security Council. Efforts have been made to reform the
Council to make it more representative. However, a stalemate persists because four major powers,
namely Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, are more interested in getting into the Council as
permanent members than in the larger objective of making the Council more effective and relevant
to today’s world.
With rapid global changes, the US firmly locked in rivalry with China and Russia, and the
Russia-Ukraine war germinating energy, commodities and other crises, the world today is deeply
polarised and chaotic. The world order underpinned by the UN Charter principles is in disarray.
The US-China competition could morph into a second Cold War. Do we need a new balance of
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power to accommodate an emerging multipolar world and provide a more stable world order? Will
the rules of the UN be rewritten to accommodate new ground realities? Answers to these questions
are fuzzy because the world is still in transition and flux. The major powers need to realise that in
this age of unprecedented weaponisation and nuclear arsenals, any kinetic confrontation will exact
such a heavy toll on humanity that the destruction caused by the two world wars would pale into
insignificance.
It is to the credit of Pakistan that it has always conducted its foreign policy based on respect
for UN Charter principles. Pakistan has neither interfered nor aggressed against any state. A few
like-minded nations (like Pakistan), which bear faith in the UN Charter, should work together to
protect the world from the deadly future that it could face if major power rivalry goes unchecked.
(Source: Dawn)

A SHIFT IN NATO
Dr Imran Khalid
For the obvious reason of a smoldering war on the eastern fringe of Europe, the just-
concluded Nato summit in Madrid, which took place within a few days after the EU and G7
summits, had assumed extraordinary importance.
However, contrary to general expectations, the main highlight of the summit was the personal
involvement of US President Joe Biden, who, unlike his predecessor Donald Trump’s excessively
loud-mouthed diplomacy style, likes to maintain a low profile even at international forums. At the
Madrid summit, President Biden displayed his diplomatic skills to avert a massive embarrassment
to Nato by using his personal influence to facilitate the smooth induction of Finland and Sweden in
the alliance – perhaps the biggest diplomatic win for President Biden in recent times.
Three key decisions were expected to be taken: enhanced support package for Ukraine,
inclusion of Finland and Sweden in the alliance and the endorsement of the new policy document
‘Strategic Concept’. All these strategic decisions were approved rather smoothly. The Ukraine war
was indubitably the nucleus of the Madrid summit and most of the deliberations and proceedings
revolved around this subject. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was also especially invited
to attend the summit and given the status of ‘guest of honour’ there.
But the fact is that, ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the last week of February, the
trans-Atlantic alliance has been fast losing its credibility as a guarantor of peace and stability in the
region. The prima facie justification for the creation and existence of this alliance is to ensure security
and peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. But the speed with which the Russian forces captured 20 per
cent of Ukrainian territory, despite Nato’s massive financial and material package to Kyiv, has
actually raised many questions about Nato’s much-hyped image as a highly reliable deterrence
against any ambitious plan of Moscow in this region. So, Nato itself is passing through a credibility
crisis due to the Ukraine war.
It was, therefore, expected that the Nato leadership would do everything possible to bolster its
image and show muscle power at the Madrid gathering. The leadership did everything possible to
give a strong message that the alliance was completely united against the Russian intervention, and
would strictly adhere to their ‘open-door policy’ to embrace new members. Against the backdrop of
fierce opposition from Turkey which had serious reservations about Finland and Sweden due to
their open support for Kurdish militant groups, even Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was
unsure about the fate of the two applicants till the last day before the summit.
The situation was quite tense and it was expected that Turkey would use its veto to block their
membership. But US President Biden played the lead role in resolving this snag through his
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personal involvement. President Biden directly spoke to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A
lot was at stake at the summit; in case of Turkey’s veto to Finland and Sweden, it would have
inversely motivated Vladimir Putin who has launched the Ukraine war with the main objective of
discouraging the expansion of Nato.
President Biden convinced Erdogan to have trilateral discussions with Swedish and Finnish
leaders on the sidelines of the summit. This was followed by Erdogan’s lengthy negotiations with
the Finnish president and Swedish prime minister as well as Nato Chief Stoltenberg – leading to
eventual signing of the trilateral memorandum. In a way, it was one of the most prominent
diplomatic victories of President Biden in recent times. Turkey’s turnaround after a month of
inflexible opposition to Finland and Sweden drew more limelight at the summit, which was
expected to focus on the Ukraine war. Though it is still unclear what kind of details were agreed
upon in these discussions, President Biden has emerged as a more assertive leader after this episode.
On the Ukraine matter, as per expectations, the Madrid summit took two major steps. One,
they have generously enhanced the support package to fulfil Kyiv’s urgent need for more advanced
weapons and hardware. And two, in an indirect way to threaten Moscow, Stoltenberg announced a
massive increase in the number of high-readiness alliance forces to more than 300,000 troops from
40,000. The expansion is part of what he called the “biggest overhaul of our collective defence and
deterrence since the cold war.” At the same time, there is a plan to enhance many of its forward-
deployed battlegroups currently stationed in the eastern part of Europe up to a brigade level.
One of the key features of this year’s summit was the endorsement of the new Strategic
Concept, a key policy document that lays down the alliance’s defence and security vision. This
document is revised every ten years to keep it at par with the changing global security needs.
The new Strategic Concept embodies a paradigm shift in Nato’s deterrence and defence
policy, with a special focus on the evolving new threats and challenges, particularly terrorism,
cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare. However, there is a totally new element in this Strategic Concept
– related to China, which is being mentioned in the official documents of Nato as a “challenge” to
the alliance’s interest, security and values. This is heralding a new chapter of q new kind of cold war
between the West and Beijing in the coming days.
This one paragraph about China in the final declaration of the Madrid summit is going to
have a drastic impact on the geo-political and geo-economic fabric of the globe. Obviously, the Nato
leadership has drafted and approved this policy document with a clear intention to tell the Xi regime
in clear terms that the West is now officially keeping China on the ‘watch list’. At this time, when
Nato’s credibility as the custodian of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is at stake due to the
Ukraine war, the China chapter will definitely put more stress on the financial and military
inventory of the alliance. Things are going to be very complicated in the global arena.
(Source: The News)

GEOECONOMICS, NOT GEOPOLITICS, WILL

DRIVE I2U2 ALLIANCE
Afshin Molavi (Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies)
When US President Joe Biden sat down next to Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid in front of a
large screen in a Jerusalem hotel last month, it appeared as if the usual post-pandemic video
conference was about to unfold. But on the other end of the video call were two more world leaders,
President Mohamed bin Zayed from the United Arab Emirates and Indian Prime Minister Narendra
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Modi. Together they launched a new multilateral alliance that crossed traditional, regional and
geopolitical boundaries.
Named the I2U2 – Israel and India as the two I’s, the US and the UAE as the two U’s – the
grouping reflects a new trend toward transregional alliances. Focused on goals from security to
economics, these alliances bypass the post-World War II institutional architecture. The most
prominent are the security alliances like the Quad – the US, Australia, India, and Japan with shared
interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Or, the more recent AUKUS – Australia, the UK, and the US –
pledging broad security and defense cooperation with an eye toward China.
A few of these groupings already involve Middle East states. The East Mediterranean Gas
Forum, for example, links Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine. The
Negev Forum joins together Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the UAE, and the US. Then, there is, of
course, the 2020 Abraham Accords that normalized ties between Israel and Arab states comprising
the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. Since then, UAE-Israel commercial ties have exploded with
two-way trade hitting $1 billion in the first quarter of 2022.
Stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, the I2U2
alliance was born amid the winds of change swirling with the Abraham Accords, the US-China
rivalry, and the global realization brought about by the pandemic that the most intractable
problems, from food insecurity to stunted economic growth, require global solutions.
It would be tempting to see the I2U2 grouping solely part of the larger US-China tensions, but
that would miss the mark. In fact, the I2U2 group – much like other groupings recently announced –
reflects the institutionalization of a mostly economic alliance that was already forming.
Consider the trade ties among the member states. By my calculations, based on 2021 IMF
figures, trade among the four nations clocks in at nearly $400 billion. Thriving trade corridors
already exist between the UAE and India, as well as between the US and Israel. India tops the list as
the biggest trader with the other three countries, at $188 billion, heavily weighted to the US and the
UAE. The United States comes in second with some $167 billion in trade with the other states, a
figure with much room to grow given the US’s roughly $5 trillion trade profile. As for the UAE, its
trade relations with India are deep and historic, and its trade ties with Israel are growing fast. Israel
still has significant room to boost trade with both the UAE and India.
The UAE-India economic partnership can serve as the bedrock of this new group. The UAE, a
small country of some 10 million people, is India’s number two export destination, with some $25
billion of goods flowing from the South Asian giant to the Gulf Arab state. On the UAE side, India is
the Emirates’ number one export destination, with some $43 billion of exports.
UAE airports have also become India’s gateway to the world – a key primary destination and
also connecting hub for travelers. Before COVID-19, one-third of all international flights that landed
in India emanated from the UAE.
The UAE has also been a magnet for Indian professionals and workers. All told, some $15
billion of remittances flowed from the UAE to India in the 2020-21 financial year. The UAE and India
recently signed an ambitious free trade agreement that seeks to double down on their growing
commercial ties.
So, when the first I2U2 meeting announced an ambitious food security initiative in which the
UAE would invest $2 billion to develop a series of food parks across India with American and Israeli
assistance to tackle global food insecurity, what may have seemed like a breakthrough project was
actually repackaged from earlier agreements between India and the UAE.
The Israel-India relationship has also been growing over the past decade. Israel is a major
arms supplier to India, and Israeli companies have been widely engaged in water management
issues to boost India’s agriculture sector. According to IMF figures, India clocks in as Israel’s third
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largest export destination. More recently, an Indian firm was awarded the contract to manage a key
terminal at Israel’s Haifa Port.
For US policy-makers, the I2U2 presents a unique opportunity. The other three states have
demonstrated either historic trade, technology, and investment ties (India and the UAE) or fast-
growing ties (Israel and India, Israel and the UAE). Clearly, all three are motivated to accelerate
those ties. But all four states have different risk profiles on how they see the world, whether it relates
to China or Iran or Russia’s war in Ukraine. The enthusiasm and unanimity of the I2U2 today would
likely grind to a halt if Washington sought to use the group toward geopolitical ends. There are
other venues for that.
On the other hand, if Washington and other member state policy-makers see the grouping as a
way to contribute, bolster and accelerate already existing commercial cooperation among the
member states while adding government heft to the process, the I2U2 would have a positive future.
It may even have other countries knocking on its doors for membership.
(Source: Syndication Bureau)

WHY THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION MATTERS?

Ishtiaq Ahmad (Former vice chancellor of Sargodha University)
Established in 2001 as a successor to the Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization is the largest regional grouping in Eurasia, covering around 40 percent of the world’s
population and 30 percent of global economic output. Owing to its impressive profile of security and
economic cooperation, the SCO has gained enormous traction across Asia. No surprise that a
number of countries from the Middle East and Southeast Asia are lining up to join as dialogue
partners, observers and members.
The SCO currently comprises eight member states (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), four observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and
Mongolia) and six dialogue partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and
Turkey). In the annual summit of the SCO’s heads of state in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on Sept. 15-16,
Iran will gain full membership of the organization, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt will
become dialogue partners.
Moreover, Belarus will begin the process of acquiring membership; Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Cambodia and Nepal will become observers; and Bahrain and the Maldives will start the process of
joining as dialogue partners. The UAE reportedly wants to join the SCO as a member, bypassing
other accession conditions. Syria, Iraq, Israel, Bangladesh and Vietnam also hope to join as dialogue
partners or observers.
Since its inception, the SCO has forged close ties with several international institutions and
regional organizations, including the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
the Asian Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. A memorandum of understanding between the SCO Secretariat and
the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States was also concluded during last year’s SCO
summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
The SCO was initially branded by the US as a hostile bloc, led by China and Russia to
challenge its post-cold war global supremacy. Quite the contrary, its evolution conforms to the
familiar pattern of “new regionalism” in the developing world, which has produced viable regional
organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and ASEAN. All are intergovernmental
organizations with similar structures, defying the supranational mode of integration in the EU.
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The SCO also shares significant similarities with the GCC and ASEAN in terms of its origin
and evolution. It was created to combat the three evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism. The
GCC and ASEAN also came into being to address the security threat from Iran and communism,
respectively. While regional security remains a common concern for both organizations, their real
success lies in economic integration: GCC’s common market versus ASEAN’s economic community.
However, the SCO’s comparative distinction arises from its rapid progress in forging close
security and economic collaboration. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is its key institution to
counter the three evils. Security cooperation is reinforced by military exercises, dubbed as peace
missions, and counterterrorism drills held periodically in the member states. It has produced
tangible outcomes in combating terrorism, in particular.
The SCO’s economic value arises from the fact that it is led by China, the global economic
powerhouse, and includes Russia and India as major international players, as well as the states of
Central Asia and the Caucuses, which have largely untapped resources of oil and natural gas.
Although the SCO has yet to establish a free trade zone, it has made significant gains in expanding
intraregional trade and investment, and regional share in global trade.
China dominates SCO’s trade and investment activities. Recent reports estimate that its trade
with other member states expanded 20 times from 2001 to 2020, reaching $245 billion in 2020, up
from $12 billion in 2001. Until last year, China had invested $85 billion and contracted additional
development projects worth $280 billion in other member states. The total trade volume of SCO
member states also increased from $668.09 billion in 2001 to $6.06 trillion in 2020; and the share in
global trade rose from 5.4 percent in 2001 to 17.5 percent in 2020.
China and Russia do have competitive interests in the SCO, including trade and development
versus energy and security, respectively. But their overarching goal is to create the Greater Eurasian
Partnership by synergizing SCO’s developmental activities with multilateral integration projects in
Eurasia, including China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.
This strategic mission of the SCO makes it the best option for the GCC as it seeks to diversify
geo-economic linkages in Asia without jeopardizing geopolitical partnership with the US. These two
paths are not at cross-purposes, as one ensures economic prosperity and the other provides security
guarantee. There are other reasons, too.
So far, the Gulf nations have sought bilateral free trade agreements with China, India and
Pakistan, but with limited success. Their relations with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus,
despite the commonality of hydrocarbon riches, are still minimal. With ASEAN as well, successive
rounds of ministerial meetings have failed to deepen trade and economic relations.
That Saudi Arabia and Qatar are set to become dialogue partners of the SCO is, therefore, an
encouraging development. Bahrain will enter the club in over a year. It would be great if the UAE
also joined the accession process. Together with Egypt, Turkey and other Middle Eastern aspirants
of SCO partnership, the oil-rich Gulf nations have the wherewithal to act as a catalyst in Eurasian
regionalism, along with China, Russia and resourceful Central Asian and Caucuses members.
That is why they do not need to worry about Iran, as it gets ready to join such a large regional
organization as a full member for the first time since 1979. After all, arch-rivals India and Pakistan
have been members of the SCO since 2017, without causing any trouble in its institutional efficacy.
The GCC members are, no doubt, late entrants in this pivotal regional body. But better late than
never.
In fact, as China’s largest trading partner and recipient of the bulk of Chinese investments
under the Belt and Road Initiative, Saudi Arabia can use its formidable economic clout to shape
SCO’s progressive agenda in its own way. In this regard, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
who has been invited to participate in the Samarkand summit, can play a pivotal part by sharing the
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Kingdom’s exceptional expertise in renewable energy with the SCO. This is one arena it has
achieved the least.
(Source: Arab News)

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AT 20

Irwin Cotler (Former minister of justice of Canada)
Allan Rock (Canada’s former ambassador to the United Nations)
Brandon Silver (Director of Policy and Projects at the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights)
As the permanent venue for pursuing accountability for those who commit mass atrocities, the
International Criminal Court is the crown jewel of the international justice system. But with its
credibility having been eroded in recent years, stronger complementary policies are needed to help
it fulfill its mission.
This month marks the 20th anniversary of the first session of the International Criminal Court
under the Rome Statute, a major milestone in the effort to end impunity for mass atrocities. The
ICC’s first generation of operation shows how much it is needed – and what more needs to be done
to maximize its impact.
The concept of international justice rose like a phoenix from the ashes of the Holocaust, and
was first put into practice at the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders in 1945. A newfound focus on the
individual – on the civilian who deserves protection, and on the perpetrator who deserves
punishment – marked a decisive shift away from a system in which heads of state had a license to
kill or torture anyone within their borders. The idea of individual criminal responsibility for mass
atrocities challenged the old notion of unfettered state sovereignty and its animating ethos that
“might makes right.”
Efforts to achieve accountability for mass atrocities have continued in various forms, including
through ad hoc special tribunals established by the United Nations Security Council. But as a
permanent venue for securing justice for victims and accountability for violators, the ICC is the
crown jewel of the current system. It continues to represent the greatest hope for international
justice.
Complementary to the ICC is the international sanctions regime, which includes global legal
norms (so-called Magnitsky laws) that allow for punitive measures – travel bans, asset seizures,
financial prohibitions, and, in Canada, asset repurposing – against specific individuals responsible
for human-rights abuses.
The ICC and targeted sanctions are each significant in themselves; but to achieve their full
potential, they should be mutually reinforcing. For example, the sanctions regime should be
deployed against anyone who is evading an ICC arrest warrant, or against foreign officials from
Rome Statute states who fail to cooperate with the ICC in the fulfillment of its mission.
One of the ICC’s greatest challenges has been ensuring that arrest warrants are enforced.
Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir traveled freely for years – taking more than 100 foreign
trips to various countries – while subject to an ICC arrest warrant. The failure to arrest Bashir eroded
the ICC’s credibility and significantly undermined its deterrent effect. But if the image of a free-
flying Bashir were to be replaced with one of a president in handcuffs at the airport, the story of
international justice would start to look quite different.
We know that targeted measures can persuade state officials to change course, because we
have seen “carrots” and “sticks” – incentives and coercive measures – work together to secure
arrests in the past. For example, the promise of eventual EU membership convinced the Serbian
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government to hand over Ratko Mladić to face trial in The Hague for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide in the 1992-95 Bosnian War. Similarly, the US government’s offer of a $5
million reward for the apprehension of ICC fugitives has resulted in militia leader Bosco Ntaganda’s
surrendering himself to the court in 2013, and in the arrest and capture of various other fugitives
from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
“Sticks” – such as threats of economic pressure – have also proven effective. For instance, a US
threat to withhold aid led then-Yugoslav President Vojislav Koštunica to have a “change of heart” in
2001, resulting in Slobodan Milošević’s extradition to The Hague for trial before an international
tribunal.
To bring such leverage more consistently to bear, states with existing sanctions legislation
should amend their laws or regulations to include ICC prosecutor requests as one of the triggers for
considering new sanctions designations. If all ICC member states were to adopt such a policy, 123
countries would become off limits to suspects on the run.
Coordinated implementation of targeted sanctions in these circumstances would help advance
human rights and the rules-based order that safeguards them. By interweaving two of the most
transformative trends in international justice – trials and sanctions – we can ensure that the effort to
combat impunity grows stronger, rather than weaker, over time. The victims of the world’s worst
crimes deserve nothing less.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
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Pakistan@75
SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EDUCATION
Dr Naazir Mahmood (PhD from the University of Birmingham, UK)
As Pakistan celebrates its platinum jubilee at 75, it is time to take stock of the country’s
achievements and losses in various fields. A country can measure its progress in terms of several
indicators such as education, electricity provision, employment opportunities, financial stability,
fundamental rights, gender equity, health facilities, internal security and stability, international
relations, and many others.
Ideally, the government should have conducted an extensive exercise to assess our
achievements and losses in each area, but it is either unable or unwilling to do so lest it shows a
mirror to our rulers – both de facto and de jure.
As an educationist, I can briefly discuss what we have done to our education in the last 75
years. The dismal state Pakistan finds itself in – culturally, economically, politically, and socially –
has a lot to do with our failures in the education system, and I can cite multiple reasons for that.
All indicators of development are interconnected and influence each other. Political decisions
and will, or lack thereof, have their direct bearing on how a society develops or degenerates.
Perhaps the most devastating impact that our society had in its early years was the Objectives
Resolution that put the country on a path of ever-increasing religiosity.
Apparently, it had nothing to do with how education evolved in Pakistan but a careful look at
our recent history shows that the country’s fixation with theocracy has had far-reaching
ramifications across nearly all areas and sectors, including education.
Attitude formation and behavioural change depend, to a great extent, on how a state and its
functionaries form their attitudes and display their behaviour. If a state itself becomes biased, its bias
is invariably reflected in its curriculum and the entire education system.
Unfortunately, right from its inception, the leadership of this country selected a trajectory that
was bound to make its education infertile, intolerant, and incapable of nurturing new generations
able to fit in the world as capable, decent, and responsible citizens. Instead, we have been grooming
hatred, incompetence, jealousy and lawlessness.
After the passage of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949, the priorities of the state became
quite different from what the father of the nation had enunciated in his speech on August 11, 1947.
But irrespective of what he had or had not said or wanted, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that the UN ratified had outlined a basic structure of what should have become a pillar of our
education and political system just three months before the Objectives Resolution in Pakistan. The
country’s leadership had least interest in education development and was more involved in palatial
intrigues and using religion for its short-term political benefits.
Various events of the early 1950s showed that religious minorities would remain on the
receiving end of injustice; and the dream of an intolerant and harmonious society would remain just
a dream. The musical chairs of the 1950s did not allow any political leadership to pay much
attention to education. In comparison, India’s first Union education minister Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad held that office from 1947 till his death in 1958. He put India on a sound footing of liberal and
secular education that lasted for at least 60 years, before the BJP started dismantling it from 2014
onwards.
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The dissolution of provinces and the formation of one province called West Pakistan in 1955 –
with its capital in Lahore – was a major blow to education in the country. All provincial education
ministries ceased to exist and bureaucracy in Lahore took all administrative and curriculum
decisions for West Pakistan.
Local cultural diversity required localized decisions, but even primary and secondary
education became highly centralized in Lahore where all educational hiring, postings and transfers
took place. Nearly all languages from Balochi and Punjabi to Pashto and Sindhi suffered as ‘one-
unit’ education did not take into account the aspiration of people who loved and spoke these
languages.
From 1960 onwards there was a clear focus on changing the curriculum with more religious
orientation. Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, who remained the vice-chancellor of the University of
Karachi for a record ten years, played a significant role in this change to more religiosity. He was an
historian with an agenda, just like bureaucrats like Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Qudratullah Shahab,
and many others.
Textbooks eulogized religious leaders and warriors more than they did academics, explorers
and scientists. There was a clear denunciation of ‘Hindu mentality’ and ‘Hindu conspiracies’ against
Muslims. This tendency portrayed all Hindus as enemies of Islam and Pakistan. Gradually, this
narrative targeting the ‘kufaar’ (infidels) became so pervasive that nearly all religious minorities
became villains in the eyes of students right from primary education.
The curriculum that should have been promoting harmony and tolerance became increasingly
tinged with religiosity and self-righteousness in which our past was glorious and all others were
enemies and conspirators against Islam and Pakistan. This nurtured a generation that fed on hatred
and had blinkers on their eyes that the system had foisted on them.
The next turning point for education in Pakistan was the selection of Nawab Amir
Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh as the governor of West Pakistan by the self-appointed president and
field marshal General Ayub Khan. Nawab Kalabagh was a feudal lord known for his brutal and
ruthless handling of political matters. He hardly had any interest in educating the people and
crushed all dissent with an iron hand.
Students were playing a considerable role in the fight against the military dictatorship;
Kalabagh was bent upon destroying that democratic spirit from all students. Colleges and
universities remained closed for months, but the Nawab was not bothered.
The war of 1965 between India and Pakistan took its toll on education too. There were at least
three adverse impacts of that war on education. One, the country now had to spend much more on
defence and education was lowered on the priority list of all future governments to come – both
civilian and military.
Two, education in the social sciences became even more replete with references to heroic
warriors as role models, at the cost of others. Three, the falsification of history became even more
intense as there was no room for students to read or think about an alternative version other than
the official one which glorified its ostensible success.
By the end of the 1960s, Pakistan had little to show on its educational record as in the previous
20 years the curriculum had declined in quality, and most of the people were still illiterate. When the
country was about to celebrate its silver jubilee in 1972, the nation had gone through a brutal
military action in former East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto apparently
had good intentions when he introduced his policy of state control – dubbed as nationalization – of
major sectors including education, but his government failed to make it a success for various
reasons.
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Ultimately it turned into the bureaucratization of education rather than nationalization. The
idea was good as essentially it is a prime responsibility of any state to provide accessible and free
quality education to all from primary to higher education. But the Bhutto government failed to
improve the quality of education as it declined even in those institutions that had been performing
well previously.
There was a ban on any new private venture in education, and though the government
established new state-run schools and universities, their performance was below par.
The first half of the 1970s brought both good and bad news for education in Pakistan. The
good news was that the Bhutto government had a plan to offer free education to all under the
nationalization programme rather than relying on the private sector.
The idea was to improve and strengthen the government sector in education so that a more
egalitarian approach towards learning and teaching prevailed in the country. Bhutto claimed to be a
socialist and in that outlook the private sector had little role to play. By the 1970s, there were some
big and good educational institutions that prominent philanthropists and foundations had
established. They were not large in number, and catered to the needs of their limited catchment
areas. Bhutto considered that private education promoted class differences and the government had
the right to run them under its umbrella.
So initially it was good news for common people who thought their children would receive
the same quality of education that some private institutions offered. The PPP government in Sindh
also took a correct and timely step to introduce Sindhi language as a compulsory subject right from
school education. One wonders why the PPP government in Punjab did not do the same by
introducing Punjabi language as a compulsory subject.
However, there was an instantaneous reaction against the introduction of Sindhi. There were
student protests and riots in and out of educational institutions; ethnic tensions mounted and Bhutto
negotiated with the leaders of those opposing the language compulsion.
Bhutto also launched a massive plan of establishing new government colleges and universities
across the country. Higher education was now relatively more accessible and those who could get
admission completed their education almost free. Even engineering and medical colleges and
universities charged next to nothing; engineers and doctors graduated at public expense. Faculty
members had job security with pensionable employment and promotion opportunities.
Within five years, the dream had gone sour. We need to understand education in its broader
perspective. It is not simply the quantity of educational institutions that matters – what you teach
and how you teach it makes the difference. Bhutto had a golden opportunity to revamp the
curriculum that could change the course of education in the country with more analytical skills and
critical thinking. More than education in science, it is the social sciences that alter the cultural,
economic, political, and social outlook of students.
Education in civics, ethics, geography, history, and other social sciences can make or break a
young generation. Bhutto could give a new direction to social science education by having a critical
look at the first 25 years of Pakistan. Most of all, the recent events in East Pakistan that had resulted
in massive atrocities and killing of hundreds of thousands of people needed a fair analysis and
discussion. Germany and Italy after the Second World War made sure that their children and young
generation knew about atrocities that their own people had committed.
Rather than accepting one’s past errors and missteps, Bhutto kept promoting an obsolete
narrative of national grandeur and hero worship. Bhutto’s policies of ‘fighting for a thousand years’
and ‘eating grass to make the atomic bomb’ reflected in education too. History books overall
remained the same with no room for critical analysis of the past and no discussion on multiple
perspectives. Bhutto lost that opportunity and strengthened the old and one-sided state narrative
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that bordered on chauvinism and contained jingoistic elements. Bhutto’s policies towards minorities
were also anachronistic and his constitutional amendments set the course for more persecution.
His nationalization of education could have produced better results but it had some major
flaws. Recruitment in the schools and colleges should have been on merit but that didn’t happen.
The hiring process was skewed in favour of political appointments, of course with some joining on
merit. Education became one of the largest employment providers by the government, with a
majority of new teachers without the knowledge and skills that their profession demanded. Like
other sectors that had gone through the nationalization process, the education sector also became a
behemoth with hundreds of thousands of incompetent administrators and educators who were
mostly unskilled.
This does not mean that during the military dictatorships of Generals Ayub and Yahya
education was any better. Perhaps it was worse, but at least there were some educational institutions
under private management that were offering slightly better education. Bhutto’s assumption that all
private educational institutions were exploitative and needed government control was also
incorrect. There were many foundations and trusts that did not run on profit motives. The
government should have allowed them to continue working independently without direct
government control. State control badly affected their performance and most of them declined
sharply.
Another adverse impact of Bhutto’s policies was an abrupt end to any new investment in
education by non-government sources that included both for-profit and nonprofit. From 1972
onwards for at least a decade only the government of Pakistan could open and run educational
institutions. This imposed restriction was uncalled for and unwise. From 1870 to 1970, the country
had seen the establishment of some fine institutions such as FC College, NED University, DJ Science
College, Dawood Engineering College, St Joseph’s and St Patrick’s Colleges, and many other
schools, colleges, and universities.
Now suddenly the government was in charge of all education and no private investment came
up. This had far-reaching implications for education in Pakistan. The Bhutto government did try to
fill the gap but the broader policy of giving precedence to security did not leave much in financial
resources to spend on education. Bhutto’s obsession with the security establishment in the hope of
deriving strength from there, was misplaced and the stronger he made that establishment the
weaker he emerged on other fronts. This was a major cause of his undoing and the failure of his
most policies.
But at least student associations and unions were functioning well during the entire tenure of
the Bhutto government. There were heated debates on campuses, both conservative and progressive
outfits had candidates contesting elections for student unions. Apart from sporadic crackdowns on
protesting students, there was a thriving culture of political awareness that trained students for civic
and political responsibilities. Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam, Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, National Student
Federation, People’s Student Federation, and numerous other conservative, liberal, nationalist, and
progressive students’ association held conferences and conventions on and off campus. There was
always a threat of government crackdown but overall it was not as suffocating as it became later on.
The last months of the Bhutto government in 1977 were perhaps a turning point for education
as the conservative onslaught on Bhutto intensified. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) made its
inroads into educational institutions too, with a highly toxic agenda of eliminating all liberal and
progressive thought from campuses and from society. All student associations with a religious
orientation allied with the PNA against Bhutto and when he won the elections with some election
irregularities the campuses also became a battleground. I was in eighth class and was happy that
schools were closed for months due to the PNA agitation.
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In April 1977, the government announced that students would be promoted to their next class
without any exams. We were delighted, not having a clue that the next few months would see the
beginning of an even darker era for education in Pakistan under General Ziaul Haq.
(Source: The News)

SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY

Ishrat Husain (The author of 'Governing the ungovernable')
A large majority of Pakistan’s population was born after the country got its independence. The
median age today is 23 years and the youth have only experienced economic difficulties and
hardships in their lifetime. They are hardly aware of the glory days of Pakistan. Despite the many
articles that have appeared on this subject, it is essential to make them aware of the historical context
in which they are today leading their lives.
At the time of independence, the prospects of the economic survival of a ramped Pakistan
appeared quite dim as it inherited an extremely weak and fragile economy. More than 80 per cent
were small farmers, and the rest were shopkeepers and artisans. From India, Pakistan got another
eight million impoverished Muslim peasants and hardly any skilled technicians or businessmen. The
country had no big industry worth the name except a few cotton mills, a cement factory, railway
repair shops.
The financial resources allocated to it at the time of Partition were never released by the
Reserve Bank of India and the salaries of the civil servants were paid by a few rich Muslim
businessmen. Only a few hundred civil servants opted to serve the country and they formed the
nucleus of the new government machinery sitting in dilapidated and makeshift offices. LIFE
Magazine had predicted in its issue of January 1948 that Pakistan would collapse within six months
as it would not be able to sustain itself economically.
From such a shaky start, Pakistan today is the 24th largest economy in the world with a GDP
of approximately 1500 billion (PPP dollars) and per capita income of PPP $6672. In terms of official
exchange rate, per capita income is $1700 compared to $100 in 1947. Pakistan's overall growth record
has been quite impressive; on average, the economy grew at an annual rate of slightly above 5 per
cent during the last six decades. In per-capita terms, the growth rate was 2.5 per cent annually.
Consequently, the incidence of poverty has halved from 40 per cent to around 20 per cent. The
manufacturing sector has been the most dynamic sector of the economy.
For the first four decades – 1950-1990 – Pakistan was among the fastest growing economies in
the developing world. This achievement was remarkable because Pakistan without any industrial
base had to rehabilitate and absorb eight million refugees – almost one fourth of the total
population; had to fight a war with a much bigger and stronger neighbour in 1965; lost its eastern
wing and suffered a trauma in 1971. In the 1970s all major industries, banks, and educational
institutions were nationalized. In the 1980s, the country participated in the Afghan war against the
Soviet Union which created some harsh social and geopolitical consequences. India in this same
period was growing at 3 per cent per annum – almost half of Pakistan’s growth rate. But there are
other remarkable achievements that the country can proudly boast of.
A country with 30 million people (present-day Pakistan) in 1947 couldn’t feed itself and had to
import all its food from abroad. By 2016, the farmers of Pakistan were not only able to fulfill the
domestic needs of wheat, rice, sugar, milk for 200 million people at a much higher per capita
consumption level but also export wheat and rice to the rest of the world. Pakistan has emerged as
the world’s fourth largest exporter of rice.
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Agriculture production has risen more than five times with cotton attaining a peak level of
more than 14 million bales compared to one million bales in 1947. Pakistan has emerged as one of
the leading world exporters of textiles. Steel, cement, automobiles, sugar, fertiliser, cloth and
vegetable ghee, industrial chemicals, refined petroleum and a variety of other products that did not
exist at the time are now manufactured for the domestic market and, in many cases, for the world
markets too.
Per capita electricity generation is 10,160 kwh compared to 100 in 1947. Pakistan’s vast
irrigation network of large storage reservoirs and dams, barrages, link canals constructed during the
last six decades has enabled the country to double the area under cultivation to 22 million hectares.
Tubewell irrigation provides almost one-third of additional water to supplement canal irrigation.
The road and highway network in Pakistan spans 260,000 kms – more than five times the
length inherited in 1947. Modern motorways and superhighways and four-lane national highways
link the entire country along with secondary and tertiary roads.
Natural gas was discovered in the country in the 1950s and supply has been augmented over
time. At its peak, almost four billion cubic feet/day of natural gas was generated, transmitted and
distributed for industrial, commercial and domestic consumption and until recently accounted for
40-50 per cent of the country’s energy needs.
Private consumption standards have kept pace with the rise in income. There are 30 road
vehicles for 1,000 persons compared with only one vehicle for the same number of people in 1947.
Mobile phone penetration is 88 per cent compared to almost less than one per cent having phone
connection in the 1950s. TV sets, which were nonexistent then, adorn 122 out of every 1,000 houses.
These achievements in income, consumption, agriculture and industrial production are
extremely impressive and have lifted millions of people out of poverty. But these do pale into
insignificance when missed opportunities are looked at. Since 1990, the tables have turned. India has
surpassed Pakistan not only in per capita income, GDP growth, human development indicators but
has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Bangladesh which was way behind
us in all economic and social indicators in 1990 has forged ahead of us and is recording 6-7 per cent
growth rate with impressive gains in social and human development.
Pakistan has become a laggard in South Asia, facing episodes of boom and bursts. The country
had to approach the IMF for meeting its balance of payments crisis 22 times in the last thirty years.
What explains this reversal from a dynamic and vibrant to an externally dependent economy? There
are many factors, but I would confine them to only a few.
The largest setback to the country has been the neglect of human development. Had adult
literacy rate been close to 100 per cent, it is estimated that per capita income would have reached at
least $ 3000. Pakistan ranks low in human development indicators with an adult literacy rate of 60
per cent, average schooling of five years, high infant and maternal mortality rates. Science and
technology, which are the drivers of productivity and efficiency, have been neglected and
innovation is missing from the production structure. Modi is personally leading the move to
transform India into an advanced technological power; 16 unicorns were added only in one year.
The respective roles of state and markets have been distorted. Markets which allocate
resources efficiently have been rigged by a small class of elites to their benefits while the state that
ensures benefits of growth are widely distributed among the population has also been hijacked by
the same elite class. We end up with the worst of both worlds – inefficiency and inequity – that
slows down our economic progress and creates a sense of deprivation.
Pakistanis consume more than they save – both the government as well as households. They
import more than export, have low investment rates in private and public sectors but aspire to grow
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beyond their means. Unless these recurrent imbalances of fiscal, trade, financial, savings investment
gap are bridged the situation would remain unchanged.
Finally, Pakistan’s institutions of governance – parliament, judiciary, media and civil services
– which brought about spectacular results in the first 40 years have decayed. Patronage-based
politics and polarization have weakened these institutions. Loyalty rather than competence has
become the hallmark of appointments in the executive branch resulting in waste, corruption and
nepotism. The private sector has also become used to rent seeking with the help of the tax and
regulatory authorities – and, with a few exceptions, lost its vibrancy and dynamism.
The above agenda for structural reforms has to be pursued vigorously if Pakistan is to resume
its journey that it had traversed in the first 40 years of its existence and has since deviated from it in
the last 35 years.
(Source: Dawn)

AGRI’S 75 YEARS OF SUCCESS AND STAGNATION

Ahmad Fraz Khan
Agriculture, by far, is the biggest human activity in Pakistan, providing a way of life to two-
thirds of the population, contributing 22.7 per cent to GDP, providing 37.4pc of national
employment and anchoring over 70pc of exports.
Despite this phenomenal importance, the last 75 years present a patchy picture of the sector:
progressing here and regressing there enviable during a certain period and disappointing in others.
Painting this decade-wise picture tells us that it witnessed record growth in the 1960s before
slumping during the early 1970s. Recovering in the second half of the 70s, it sustained around 5pc
growth in the 80s and 90s.
Since then, a growth rate between less than 1pc to 4pc has merely covered population growth
and demand for food and fibre for the last two decades.
Historically speaking, the stage for early growth was set by a commission in the late fifties,
which led to multiple development strategies through the sixties. Commonly known as the Green
Revolution, it was an era of high, rather record, growth with the introduction of high-yielding crop
varieties. Modern inputs like fertiliser and pesticides were introduced and progressive irrigation
ways revolutionised the sector.
During that decade (1963-73), Pakistan`s per capita incomegrew by a healthy 27pc. As added
an advantage, this growth mainly occurred in rural areas, where poverty resided. This high growth
period led to the setting up of the embryonic fertiliser, tractor and seed industry, which later grew to
expand to their current levels. The early seventies also saw the beginning of the poultry industry,
which now boasts of over Rs400 billion investment and is a proud global competitor when it comes
to technology and stocks.
The next foundational policy document was produced three decades down the line by
Pakistan`s most prolific technocrat Sartaj Aziz in the late eighties, which not only diagnosed the then
emerging ills but also prescribed its treatment and set parameters for the way forward. For most
writers and experts in the sector, it is still considered the most relevant, but ignored, document.For
the next 34 years ago, no one bothered to seek guidelines from it or refresh it through another
attempt at the same level, thus creating a policy vacuum at the national level.
However, beyond these works, which should have created a policy and development
discipline, the sector has grown at its own pace and direction dictated by potential and profits,
regardless of sustainability and cost of the experiment.
In the last seven decades, crop concentration has hit 167pc against the 67pc of irrigation
planning producing three crops instead of the historical one crop from the same soil.
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Imported hybrid seeds multiplied the number and yields of crops beyond most calculations
and sustainability.
For example, maize, which at merely 705,000 tonnes in the 70s, has gone beyond eight million
tonnes. Rice numbers grow both in variety and yield and hit production of 7.5m tonnes with over
4m tonnes being exported making Pakistan the tenth largest producer globally.
Cotton production rose from 188,000 bales in the 1950s to over 14m bales at one point, before
dipping down to half of it right now. Sugarcane stood at 81m tonnes in 2020 rising from 23m tonnes
in 1971. The potato crop has gone beyond 6m tonnes.
All these figures look impressive when taken out of context because they have put Pakistan on
the world food map in a respectable position: cotton, rice and mango (4th), milk, sugarcane and date
palm (5th), citrus (6th), wheat and onion(7th), chickpea (3rd) and apricot (6th).
However, when taken in the backdrop of the cost of this unplanned growth on soil health and
underground water, the achievements are disastrous. According to global standards, the soil must
have 1.29pc organic matter to qualify as healthy.
In Pakistan, most of it has fallen below 1pc, with massive tracks having only half of 1pc.
As far as subsoil water is concerned, Pakistan`s potential is 68bn square meters, out of which
60bn square meters are being exploited. It is not being exploited only in those areas where pumping
the water out is not feasible for technical or economic reasons. It means that this resource is almost
exhausted. In most of Punjab, as some recent studies indicate, the level is dropping by one to three
feet every year.
Even among those crops, which have seen a phenomenal rise in the last few decades, the two
most crucial ones wheat and cotton have hit stubborn stagnation. Wheat has been stuck at 25m
tonnes for the last eight years, with little variation every year turning Pakistan into a net importer
over the last four years.
Similarly, cotton production is actually receding, leaving the industry largely dependent on
imports as other crops hog itsarea and economic sheen. Since policy planning and direction are
missing, Pakistan is importing both at great foreign exchange pain.
These seven decades also present two more phenomenal failures: mechanisation and research.
Since independence, mechanisation meant tractorisation and some harvesting and thrashing units.
The tractor industry, which was the harbinger of the farm mechanisation process, has hogged all
subsidies and other benefits for itself, leaving others out and ignoring the fact that the tractor does
not perform at its optimum utility when running on its wheels alone it needs implements alongside
to hit optimum utility and most of them are simply not there.
Soil generally needs three kinds of inputs primary (soil preparation), secondary (agronomic
practices) and tertiary (harvesting). All of them need a complete range of implements which are
missing in Pakistan`s scheme of things.
Successive governments have announced subsidies on tractors and ignored the rest and
compromised farm mechanisation in the process.
Research has also been a sore point in Pakistan`s context.
It has spent far less than 1pc of agriculture GDP on research, against 6-7pc by others like India.
This only increased dependence on imported seeds, which defied local ecological realities and soon
lost utility. Climate change has added urgency to research requirements and makes this investment
absolutely necessary.
(Source: Business & Finance Weekly)
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THE PATHS NOT TAKEN

Of the three countries that were once a single entity, Pakistan seems to have fallen way
behind. With all its posturing, waving of the green flag, shouts of `Pakistan Zindabad`, it cannot
fudge the historic numbers that blatantly tell the story of economic and political turmoil that led to
neither growth nor human development. Without an excuse for its inept management, Pakistan lags
behind India and Bangladesh in most indicators.
Inflation
In our time, we got a few anna for pocket money,` muse old grandparents while tch tching at
prices. Though this is a refrain multiple generations have heard growing up, the prevailing over
20pc inflation rate will put the elderly horror of current prices to shame. Further adjustments are
expected as electricity rates continue to march up, though the real inflation is hardly reflected in the
`official` rate quoted by World Bank data that was used to make the graph.
India and Bangladesh are no strangers to volatility of inflation rates though both countries
have fared better than Pakistan in recent years. The recent 50pc hike in fuel prices in Bangladesh to
trim its subsidy burden will further aggravate its 7.5pc inflation rate. At 95 to a dollar, Bangladesh’s
taka is more than twice as strong as Pakistan`s rupee but the global crisis created by the Russia-
Ukraine war has pushed it to approach the IMF for a bailout as well.
While the Indian rupee has received a drubbing as well, it is nowhere close to running to the
IMF for a bailout. At around INR 80 for $1, its depreciation has been roughly 7pc in 2022 with the
slight expectation that the worst is over. For both regional countries, a stronger local currency has
helped hedge against inflation compared to Pakistan`s rupee`s free fall.

Rupee’s journey
After independence, remnants of Pakistan`s colonial heritage lingered for the rupee that
remained linked to pound sterling till September 1971, according to the State Bank.
Given the bungee dive that the rupee has taken of late, a time when the PKR remained
constant for years seems like the golden period. It wasn`t.
In 1949, the Bank of England devalued the pound sterling relative to the rupee, leading India
to follow suit. By keeping the exchange rate constant, Pakistan`s exports were expensive relative to
its competitors in its main market at the time of independence: India. An archivedNew York Times
article of August 1, 1955, states that the Pakistan Government reduced the value of the rupee by one-
third in a day, bringing it down to the same rate as India in hopes of boosting exports. An effort that
was too little too late.
Pakistan maintained a fixed exchange rate till 1982, converting to a managed floating system
that remained in place till the International Monetary Fund put its foot down in 2018. Previously,
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Pakistan used to keep the dollar artificially stable by selling its reserves, hardly feasible during
current times when the country floated perilously close to a default.
Averaged out, the Pakistani rupee has steadily weakened since it came into existence with the
recent appreciation being an anomaly following weeks of speculation that artificially pushed up the
value of the dollar.
GDP growth rate
Pakistan’s story of GDP growth rate > has always been of boom-and-bust cycles that have
gotten steadily shorter.
The economy overheats as soon as growth rates perk up, leading the government to reign it in
and enter a `stabilisation` phase while knocking at IMF`s door with the proverbial dollar bowl.
India and Bangladesh have not escaped thevolatility that makes their GDP growth rate graph
look like a death-defying roller coaster ride.
Despite that, India`s GDP growth averaged 4.4pc during the 1970s and 1980s, accelerating to
5.5pc during the 1990s-early 2000s, and further to 7.1pc in the decade before the pandemic,
according to a World Bank blog. Its progress has been broadly diversified, accelerating the fastest in
services,followed by industry but less so in agriculture.
`Much of Bangladesh`s growth is owed to its exports which zoomed from zero in 1971 to
$35.8bn in 2018 (Pakistan`s is $24.8bn).
Bangladesh produces no cotton but, to the chagrin of Pakistan`s pampered textile industry, it
has eaten savagely into its market share,` explains Mr Pervez Hoodbhoy in an article.

Population growth rate

My husband refuses to use birth control measures, laments Saima, a maid and mother of six
children, not all of whom she has given birth to. `He already has four sons, one from me and three
from his previous wife, yet he wants more while refusing to provide for any of them,` she laments.
Her tale is similar to many others that belong to the lowest income classes and are solidly driving
population growth in Pakistan. Without measures, the population may double in the next 33 years.
In the last six decades, India`s population has more than tripled. Despite bringing its
population growth rate down, it gains about a million inhabitants a month and is on course to
surpass China as the world`s most populous country by next year. In contrast, Bangladesh has been
more successful in bringing down its population rate. From government efforts to convince ulema to
educate the masses to higher literacy rates for females, a combination of factors has led the country
that was once part of Pakistan to bring down its fertility rate from 6.1 in 1980 to 2.3 in 2010.
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FDI inflows as a % of GDP

AFTER an all-time high in > 2007 at 3.67pc, Pakistan`s FDI as a percentage of GDP has
drooped down. In 2007 and 2008, Pakistan attracted reasonable inflows of $5.6bn and 5.4bn
respectively but the momentum could not be sustained owing to militant violence, global financial
meltdown, political upheaval, and usual inconsistent economic policies, lack of rule of law and so
on.
With over 44m cases and half a million deaths, india suffered a lot more than Pakistan during
the pandemic. Despite that india continued to attract foreign direct investment at record levels while
Covid-19 wreaked havoc in the country, amounting to $81bn in 2021-21, 10pc higher than the
previous year.
The historical impetus of foreign cash has allowed India to improve its infrastructure and
increased productivity and employment. It has led Pakistan`s neighbour to acquire sophisticated
technology and mobilise foreign exchange reserves that can be used to stabilise its exchange rate.
Despite steady economic growth in the country over the past decade, foreign direct
investment has been comparatively low in Bangladesh compared to India and Pakistan. At around
1pc, it is one of the lowest rates in Asia.
In absolute terms though, Bangladesh has fared better. The FDI stock in Pakistan fell from
$41.9bn to $35.6bn in five years to 2020. Bangladesh on the other hand built its stocks from $14.5bn
to $19.6bn and India from $318.3bn to $480.3bn in the same period.
According to the IMF, an increase of a dollar in capital inflows is associated with an increase
in domestic investment of about 50 cents. As in the case of india during the peak pandemic period,
FDI has also proved to be resilient during financial crises.
Another instance is the East Asian countries where investment was remarkably stable during
the global financial crises of 1997-98. The resilience of FDI during financial crises was also evident
during the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.
Given its importance, is Pakistan an attractive destination for foreign investment in the
region? To put it bluntly, the answer is, no, according to the Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics. The reason why is simple: Pakistan has had volatile and episodic growth since the 1950s
with low rates of local investment, lags in innovation and low productivity.
The policymakers need to make strong efforts to come out of this vicious circle of low
investment, low innovation and low productivity which is hardly possible when each government
spends its tenure fire-fighting to keep the economy afloat while battling it out for the throne of
power.
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GDP per capita

IN 2021, before the rupee`s devaluation eroded what little strength the local currency had,
India`s per capita income was over $1,000 more than Pakistan and Bangladesh`s was $740 more.
Meaning: an average Indian or Bangladeshi was better off than a Pakistani.
At over $3tr, India is the sixth largest economy in the world with the second largest
population. IMF`s projected real GDP growth rate for 2022 is 7.4pc. In the last fiscal year, it a record
high of $418bn in exports.
Bangladesh`s exports were $52.08bn and its GDP last year was $416bn. It`s national income
has multiplied 50 times, per capita income 25 times(higher than India`s and Pakistan`s), and food
production four times, according to an article by Ishrat Hussain. To put their progress in
perspective, Pakistan`s per capita income in 1990 was twice as much as Bangladesh’s but has fallen
today to only seventeenth, he says.
At a GDP of $346bn in 2021 and annual exports of $31bn, Pakistan`s numbers pale in
comparison, explaining why an average Pakistani is worst off.

Military spending as a % of GDP

DEFENCE is one indicator > where Pakistan outshines both countries. With perpetual enmity
against one neighbour, suffering from persistent low-key (and frequently high-key) terrorism from
another neighbour, and various insurgencies within the country, the military chunk of the budget is
17.5pc. So for every Rs6 spent by the government, more than Rs1 is spent on the armed forces.
Though Pakistan spends a higher proportion of its income on defence, it is dwarfed by India
whose military expenditure is $70.6bn compared to Pakistan`s $10.3bn. With fewer hassles on its
border, Bangladesh`s expenditure is $4.4bn.
(Source: Business & Finance Weekly)

BALANCING STATE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN PAKISTAN

Asim Zaman (Graduate from the School of Politics and International Relations, QAU, Islamabad)
The idea of security is fundamental to human life, and its history is as old as human existence.
Its genesis has been associated with the individual, meaning man had to secure himself against
natural threats. Later, when men socialised into group, it was attached with survival of the tribe and,
subsequently, with the modern state. Gradually, the centre of security became state rather than clan
and individual.
The classical realist scholars of International Politics consistently argued the case for state-
security. They maintained that state-security comes prior to the individual security because the state
is the magnified image of the individual and the interests of the individual can best be served in the
interests of the state.
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The ideas of realist thinkers were challenged in the 1990s with the emergence of the
Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Barry Buzan, the central figure of this school, introduced the
Theory of Securitization in his book “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in
International Relations”, which was later made more sophisticated in his collective work with Ole
Waver and Jaap de Wilde: “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” These works challenged the
dominant notions of security by clarifying that security is a process through which an issue can be
securitised.
Securitisation means that the speech-acts on the part of state elites determine the salience of a
particular issue as a threat to be contended with. This implies that security is not objectively given
but is subjectively constructed through discourses. Hence, security can be made individual-centric,
and its canvas can be broadened to other dimensions including social, political, economic and
environmental sectors. The Copenhagen School, therefore, brought back human security to the field
of Security Studies. They engendered a new discourse, which asserted that security is primarily the
prerogative of the individual and it is inseparably linked with human rights and dignity, as
enshrined in the term “Human Security.”
Pakistan’s security has predominantly been state-centric. Pakistan ranks 154th among 189
countries on the Human Development Index. Added to this is the issue of enforced disappearances
in Pakistan. According to the Norwegian Human Rights Fund, more than 7000 complaints of
enforced disappearances have been reported in Pakistan since 2011; however, the real number might
be much higher.
Applying the traditional security framework, analysts argue that it is the geography, history
and design of the international system that makes Pakistan’s security landscape state-centric.
Geographically, it exists in a volatile region surrounded by hostile states. It is a thin strip, thus its
width remains a security challenge, and its borders do not correspond to natural geographic
boundaries, which makes it state-security prone. The genesis of the state took place in a crisis added
by huge migration, separation and subsequently the loss of its East Wing and later on the Wars in
Afghanistan. All this made Pakistan highly state-security conscious. Pakistan’s state exists in an
anarchic world structure in which power, statism, and self-help remains the best options for
ensuring state-security.
The non-traditional security analysts disagree with these explanations. They argue for
‘security as a practice’, referencing the phrase from Lene Hanson’s book title. They maintain that
social and cultural processes, rather than natural factors, are responsible for securitization of the
state. These processes include generating a broad social agreement about security through discourse
production. These discourses include broader official policy statements and marginal political and
cultural debates about security. The state uses different discursive strategies to produce an image of
a unified whole that is under threat from a different and dangerous other. In Pakistan’s context, the
state uses the apparatus of speech-acts through curriculum, media, sports as well as other fora to
generate a state-centric discourse about security.
Both theories converge on the idea that in Pakistan security is state-centric, but the traditional
school, by giving its reasons as state geography, history and a deterministic international system,
justifies and naturalises it. In contrast, the non-traditional school, by explicating the mechanism
through which state has become the centre of security, scrutinises and denaturalises it and opens the
way for alternative possibilities. It suggests shifting the focus from state to the individual vertically
and from military to non-military aspects of security horizontally on the security graph.
In Pakistan, such a paradigmatic shift towards non-traditional security is visible in certain
areas. A good example is Pakistan’s first National Security Policy (NSP) (2022-2026). Its section-VIII
is specifically devoted to human-security. Moreover, there is securitization of the environment,
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apparent predominantly in the environmental discourse of Pakistan Tahreek-i-Insaaf, and relatively

in other political parties.
This brings us to our second and last question, which is why Pakistan should balance state-
security with human-security. Firstly, it is a promise of the NSP (2022-2026), so along with a moral
responsibility it is now a legal compulsion for the state. Secondly, it is only possible to solve the
myriad problems mentioned above in a state with a human-centered approach towards security.
Thirdly, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. “Human Security complements state security,
furthers human development, and enhances human rights”, as advocated by the Commission on
Human Security, 2003. Fourthly, traditional threats, for instance India, may or may not destroy
Pakistan, but climate change or pandemics surely will if the state attitude remains the same. Fifth,
the consistent neglect of human development of the marginalised sections of the country is
perceived as an active denial of it, and that results in their alienation. Sixth, the current deep
economic turmoil is an alarm on the harsh consequences of not investing in human-security.
Seventh, pursuing traditional state-security may produce security dilemmas, but human-security is
non-rival and non-excludable, therefore, accessible to everyone. Lastly, it is the most cost-effective
way of countering extremism, sectarianism, separatism and violence - the long list of protracted
ailments in Pakistan.
In brief, security analysis of Pakistan shows that security in Pakistan is predominantly state-
centric with few glimpses of human-security in terms of the development of discourses on
economics and environment. However, there are many good and urgent reasons for bringing
human-security at par with state-security.
(Source: The News Independence Day Supplement)

PAKISTAN’S UNIVERSITIES AT 75
Pervez Hoodbhoy (Islamabad-based physicist and author)
At birth, Pakistan inherited Punjab University in Lahore, the only among the Raj’s 16
universities. Seventy-five years later, there are 120-plus officially recognised universities. Roughly
an equal number of non-recognised institutions are self-declared teaching universities. College
numbers have skyrocketed from 30-35 to 1,500 or more. Higher education has taken off — or so it
seems.
Commonly touted signs of success: most universities boast lists with a PhD against every
teacher’s name and award a fantastically large number of doctoral degrees. Research is thriving. A
half joke is that professors are publishing so many research papers and books these days they have
no time to even read what they write. But in fact it’s no joke at all!
One superstar professor with the highest Pakistani national award is credited with 1,000
mathematics research papers over three years — almost one per day. Another publishes an average
of 25 thick books in chemistry research (about one per two weeks) every year and dozens of papers
annually. In 2020, Stanford University reportedly chose 81 Pakistani scientists from 159,683 scientists
across the world. The myth lives although Stanford flatly denied the report.
For all these ‘successes’, within campuses the stench of intellectual rot is overpowering. Ask a
prolific author to present his research work before an informed audience and hackles rise. Rare is the
professor, dean, or vice chancellor who reads books for pleasure or can sensibly debate some current
academic topic. Most cannot name the last serious book they read, fiction or otherwise.
Rare also is the professor who delivers an academic lecture in syntactically correct Urdu or
English. A bastardised admixture is normal for this linguistically troubled country. Writing skills?
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Even with correcting smartphones and computers, deciphering what a professor or student really
wants to say isn’t always easy. Brilliant exceptions exist but, of course, exceptions are exceptions.
Academic poverty becomes more visible upon traversing softer fields like business
administration and digital marketing towards harder ones like mathematics and physics. In those
20-30 university departments that teach harder subjects only a few dozen professors can solve 12th-
grade A-level math-physics problems or compete with a good pre-university Vietnamese student.
Social sciences and liberal arts are relatively better off. But professors and students must
worry about red lines. Appealing to abstract canons of academic freedom won’t help since
‘imported’ Western concepts are scorned. A case in point is the discipline of philosophy. This
requires unfettered freedom to explore. Nine philosophy departments notwithstanding, can anyone
name a single Pakistani philosopher accepted as such by the international community of
philosophers?
A still seamier, uglier side: some universities brazenly sell degrees under the counter,
professors demand money from students in exchange for grades, administrators boost personal
incomes through fixing appointments, and sexual harassment is okay until it becomes too visible.
Although the student body is hyper religious, regular in prayer and eager to lynch blasphemers, yet
most are comfortable with cheating in examinations.
Surveying the landscape of this broken system one asks: what created such appalling
intellectual deserts punctuated by just an occasional oasis? History gives the answer.
Living in the dream world of past glories, two centuries ago the Muslims of north India were
dead set against modern secular education and the influx of new European ideas. The heroic efforts
of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to fight for science, English language, and modern learning met some
success but not enough. His Aligarh Muslim University, the so-called “arsenal of Muslim India”,
eventually became the forward base for the Pakistan Movement. However, contrary to his hopes,
AMU failed to become an Oxford or Cambridge.
Acceptance of non-madressah education was slow and grudging. It came too late. At partition,
most professors were Hindus who fled to India once rioting began. Abandoned senior posts were
promptly seized by junior Muslim professors and lecturers. Bypassing due process, political
appointments allowed academic mediocrities to become department heads, deans and vice
chancellors. The new gatekeepers were perennially suspicious of potential challenges to their
authority. Thus each new generation slipped behind the previous one. A degenerative cycle explains
the present.
To fix, two different directions were taken. First, after Gen Musharraf joined the war on terror,
American dollars rained from the skies. All earlier objections to niggardly government spending
evaporated. New universities and new buildings sprouted together with new salary scales for
professors, cash for publishing papers, stipends for PhDs, overseas scholarships, and sparkling new
equipment.
Second, and more recently, in the name of discipline and organisation, the leadership of some
large universities was handed to retired military officers. Universities in Islamabad have many such
heads now. These retirees have created souped-up versions of cadet colleges they attended in
Hasanabdal and Kohat. Dress and hairstyles are tightly controlled. So are thoughts.
What’s the way ahead? If the smoking genie from Aladdin’s lamp was to somehow appear
and ask me for three wishes, here would be my list:
First, I wish that Pakistani professors turn into an ethical community. This means don’t
reward or punish a student for any reason except academic performance; don’t pretend you know
the answer to a question which you don’t actually know; don’t publish a research paper unless it has
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something new and important to say; don’t defend your friends once they have been caught; and
don’t think you are entitled to your salary unless you actually work for it.
Second, I wish we could all be excited by the vast amounts of knowledge generated by the
day. Every one of us would then struggle to constantly self-learn and self-educate. In a world of
incredibly rapid change, the university degree you earned yesterday means little today. Unless
professors run with their changing field they cannot inspire their students.
Third, I wish all teachers and administrators acknowledge their ethical responsibility to
produce young adults who can think for themselves. This means the still-dominant authoritarian
traditions of teaching must go. Instead of being automatically entitled to respect by students, every
teacher must earn this by demonstrating a high level of maturity and knowledge.
Hopefully the genie will grant my wishes. But I can’t seem to find that magic lamp.
(Source: Dawn)

PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS @ 75
Rizwan Zeb (A Karachi-based security analyst)
Today marks Pakistan’s 75th independence anniversary. Despite all the financial, political and
social problems that it continues to face, one should be cognizant of the fact that a country that did
not even have paper pins and other necessary stationary items for its government offices back in
1947, at present is an important player in the regional and global order. Since 1947, Pakistan and
India are engaged in what late Stephen Cohen called a ‘paired minority conflict.’ It is a relationship
based on open hostility, rivalry and deep mistrust.
Since the end of the cold war, the Indian nuclear test in 1998, the rise of China and its
emergence as a serious challenger to the American dominance, the significance of India in the eyes
of the Western power centres particularly Washington has increased immensely.
That India is an emerging power is not a recent claim. However, the jury is still out on
whether it has happened. Historically, no country ever managed to rise to the status of global power
without being a regional hegemon or having good relations with states in its immediate
neighbourhood. In the case of India, this yet has to happen. At present, India has problematic
relations with all its neighbours. For New Delhi, Pakistan’s continuous rejection of its greater power
and hegemony in the region stems from the support China provides it to play the role of a spoiler in
India’s rise to the status of a global actor.
Historically, New Delhi has followed different policies to deal with Pakistan at different times.
For instance, it played a major and proactive role in the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, pursued a
policy of peace and engaged in bilateral dialogue as per the Gujral doctrine (a set of five principles to
guide the conduct of foreign relations with India’s immediate neighbours, as spelt out by Indian
diplomat Indar Kumar Gujral). In between these, it also actively pursued the objective of getting
Pakistan declared a rogue or a terror-sponsoring state and sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. Since the
nuclearisation of India and Pakistan, another trend has emerged in India’s dealing with Islamabad:
every action or decision taken by India intends to be a signal to Washington to put pressure on
Islamabad otherwise, New Delhi would be compelled to take action against Islamabad that might
jeopardise American interests in the region.
Since the rise of Narendra Modi, India is undergoing Moditva (the term is used for Modi’s
cultural nationalism anchored in the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) political doctrine of
Hindutva, but extending beyond it). Modi’s politics revolves around anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan
rhetoric. He has openly boasted about playing a role in breaking up Pakistan into two in 1971,
supporting the Baloch insurgency and has used false flag operations to achieve political objectives.
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The draconian steps that he has taken in the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK)
and against Indian Muslims in India are cases in point. He is using water as a weapon against
Pakistan and declared that blood and water cannot flow together. New Delhi has adopted an
uncompromising approach towards negotiations with Pakistan. Since Modi took over as the Prime
Minister of India, New Delhi also wants Islamabad to acknowledge India’s supremacy in the region.
As per Indian-British activist Satish Kumar, “Pakistan poses a long-term security threat to India
which is inherent in the nature of the Pakistani state, its ideology, its power structure,” and that
“India has to cope with this kind of adversary and its strategic capabilities and thinking, its national
will and character must respond the situation accordingly.”
Indian and most of the western academic discourse on the subject, therefore, put the blame on
Pakistan for this. Does this mean, India is clear on how to deal with Pakistan? If yes, what is India’s
Pakistan policy? If not, how does India intend to address its Pakistan problem? When India engages
in a military confrontation with Pakistan, what does it want to achieve? Or what is its end game?
When it engages Pakistan in a peace process, what is India’s desired outcome? Does it want to
manage the conflict or resolve it? When India argues for trade liberalisation, easy movement of
people across the borders; most favoured nation (MFN) status and gas pipeline projects, does it
mean, it is willing to accept Pakistan as a partner? What is India willing to offer Pakistan in return
for that? Would India be willing to view Pakistan other than an enemy state? Does the Indian
strategic and diplomatic community have any vision of Pakistan other than as an enemy state? The
major obstacle in the way of establishing peace between India and Pakistan is a lack of a clearly
defined strategic and foreign policy for Pakistan and an incoherent vision of the political and
military establishment of India for how to deal with Pakistan.
A huge set of literature exists on enduring rivalries and how to establish peace between
adversaries. One thing that is common in this literature is the element of reciprocity. Who must take
the first step towards peace? We should evaluate whether Indian preconditions for starting peace
talks with Pakistan are rational or not. Charles Kupchan, an American politician, in his magnum
opus: How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, asserts that stable peace can only
be achieved when the bigger and stronger parties in the conflict move toward peace and
reconciliation. He argues: “the stronger party undertakes the ‘opening gambit’ and makes the initial
concession to its adversary since its relative strength ‘puts it in a better position to offer concessions,
since it is more confident than the weaker party that it will not suffer unacceptable costs should the
target state fail to reciprocate. In other words, deft diplomacy, and not trade or investment makes
peace.”
If peace is ever to be established between India and Pakistan and for the South Asian region to
emerge as a regional block, India needs to rethink its Pakistan policy or what it believes to be its
Pakistan policy. If this does not happen, in 2047, when Pakistan and India would be 100 years old,
South Asia would still be amongst the most down-trodden and least developed regions of the world.
(Source: The News Independence Day Supplement)
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Reports
NARROWING THE DISASTER RISK PROTECTION GAP IN CENTRAL ASIA
Executive Summary and Part on Pakistan
This report discusses and estimates the “protection gap” for flood and earthquake disaster risk
in the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC ) region. The intention of the study is
to better understand the current approach to disaster risk finance in each member country, to
identify opportunities to strengthen financing arrangements. The report also inputs into the design
of the regional disaster risk transfer facility to be developed under this technical assistance.
When flood and earthquake disaster events happen, finance is required by those experiencing
the consequences of that risk—the “risk holder.” This finance is needed first to support immediate
response and recovery efforts before longer term reconstruction. Quick and reliable access to such
finance, for both sovereign and subsovereign governments, as well as households and businesses, is
critical in minimizing the human losses that disaster events cause.
Some of this financing can be arranged in advance of a disaster. These so-called ex ante
mechanisms have the advantage that many of the decisions regarding their structure and use—such
as how much will be provided, to which parties, and for which activities—are already determined.
This typically means that ex ante mechanisms can provide finance more quickly, and the amount of
finance they provide is more predictable, than if financing arrangements are only made after the
disaster strikes (ex post). Ex ante mechanisms can be further distinguished
between risk retention mechanisms, where the financial resources are provided by the risk
holder (e.g., reserve funds, savings, contingent disaster financing), and risk-transfer mechanisms
where the responsibility for providing financial resources in the event of a disaster is transferred to a
third party (e.g., insurance).
The quantification of the protection gap in this report is based on the difference between the
losses from disaster events and the extent of available ex ante finance. This focus on ex ante
mechanisms reflects the predictability and timeliness that these financing sources provide, which
evidence shows is critical in reducing the impact of disasters. In undertaking these calculations, the
report considers different types of losses that might need to be covered by ex ante mechanisms
including emergency response costs, the losses associated with the reconstruction of property, as
well as the indirect losses that disaster events might pose in terms of, for example, business
interruption. It also considers the finance that might be required on average each year, as well as the
finance that might be required when events of different frequency and severity strike.
While ex ante mechanisms are crucial, governments, households, and businesses may also
access finance through ex post mechanisms, most notably through assuming additional debt.
However, the feasibility and desirability of using ex post mechanisms varies substantially. In
countries with robust macroeconomic fundamentals, easy access to credit and where business and
households benefit from high levels of financial inclusion, ex post borrowing may relatively be easy.
Generous social protection measures will also reduce the borrowing households require and/or
make it easier for them to access such funds. By contrast, where the opposite is true, ex post
borrowing is unlikely to be feasible or desirable. In these cases, both governments and individuals
may end up relying, instead, on humanitarian support. While such support plays a vital role, its
amount, speed, and predictability rarely match the needs of the beneficiaries. As such, to
complement the quantitative assessment of the protection gap, the report also provides a qualitative
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discussion on the feasibility of both governments and households relying on ex post borrowing or
other non-humanitarian response measures to cope with disasters.
This analysis allows some broad categories of CAREC member countries to be distinguished.
The first group are those countries with the largest protection gap consisting of Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan. In these countries, ex ante risk finance measures are limited, such that more
than 85% of the average annual losses (AAL) are not covered. The paucity of financing means even
frequent events are likely to exhaust any risk retention mechanisms. The challenges in these
countries are compounded by low sovereign credit ratings, which will make it difficult and more
expensive to access debt from private capital markets, and low rates of financial inclusion of
households, which affects the financial resilience of citizens. Moreover, in all three countries, the
provinces where risk and vulnerability coincide most strongly are characterized by a heavy reliance
on agriculture and basic agro-processing, largely undertaken by smallholder farmers and small and
medium-sized enterprises.
In Tajikistan and Pakistan, the greatest financing needs relate to flood events. In Afghanistan,
earthquakes are a greater challenge. There is an urgent need to enhance all aspects of disaster risk
financing: at the sovereign and the household levels; for common events (where risk retention is
often more appropriate) and rarer events (where risk transfer is often more appropriate). The ability
to pay for additional disaster risk finance will, however, be a critical challenge, although this should
be seen in the context of the even higher costs that can be expected from disaster events if there is no
ex ante financing in place.
A second group consists of the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. These countries
all benefit from some risk retention mechanisms and have somewhat greater financial resilience to
the most common disaster events than countries in the first group. Both the sovereign governments
and households are also somewhat more likely to access borrowing than countries in the first group.
The context across these three countries also differs in important ways. The Kyrgyz Republic is
expected to see the largest losses of any country in the CAREC region as a percentage of gross
national income, due to both extensive flood and earthquake risk. It is estimated that just over 50%
of its AAL are not covered by risk retention or risk transfer mechanisms. Recent economic
development in Uzbekistan provides stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, though risk varies
spatially, revealing large areas of acute vulnerability. It is estimated that just under 85% of its AAL
are not covered by risk transfer or risk reduction mechanisms. In Mongolia, the overall level of risk
is lower than other CAREC countries, reducing the relative size of the financing need. Indeed, in
contrast to the other two countries in this category, the central case results suggest that there could
be sufficient ex ante risk finance in place to cover the AAL associated with floods and earthquakes
(although in previous disaster events not all the budgeted funding has been made available).
In addition, welltargeted social protection measures and moderate financial inclusion and
insurance penetration mean there is a broader base of resilience across the country than in other
countries in the region. However, the strained fiscal position of the government means that it is
unlikely to quickly and easily rely on ex post borrowing to meet the funding needs associated with
disasters. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, risk and vulnerability overlap most acutely in
areas where agricultural and manufacturing activities are both important. In Mongolia, livestock
herding is the most important economic activity in the locations of greatest concern.
A third group of countries consists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. All these
countries have reasonably good access to finance to help respond to disaster events. Existing risk
retention mechanisms are sufficient to cover AAL from flood and earthquake events and/or cover
the emergency response costs of more severe events (typically up to 1 in 200-year events). A further
common feature of these countries is that the provinces where risk and vulnerability coincide rely
less heavily on agriculture than similar regions in the other groupings with, instead, activities such
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as light manufacturing, and, in the case of Kazakhstan, fossil fuel extraction and refining,
dominating the economic structures of the relevant regions. However, at present, the direct losses of
1 in 10-year flood event in Kazakhstan or a 1 in 5-year flood event in Georgia would exhaust current
risk retention mechanisms, rising, respectively, to a 1 in 100-year and 1 in 25-year earthquake event.
As such, in these countries, the greatest need may be for risk transfer instruments that would
support reconstruction for events of these thresholds of severity or greater.
A final group consists of Turkmenistan and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region in the People’s Republic of China. It is more difficult to draw definitive
conclusions regarding the protection gap for these CAREC member countries and provinces. Data
availability is an issue for Turkmenistan. In the case of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, government support for disaster events is centralized. This
means that an understanding of the extent to which current funding mechanisms are adequate for
these provinces would require an assessment of the risks throughout the country as only then would
it be possible to understand whether the amount of funding available to each province would be
sufficient. This has not been conducted.
All CAREC member countries have a deficit of robust risk financing for flood and earthquake
disaster risk. The varying levels of financing are testament to the progress made by some
governments over several years. Others, meanwhile, face a high level of disaster risk without
sufficient financial protection. Even where governments have arranged financing, the modest
quantum means these are likely to be exhausted rapidly. Rates of economic development are
increasing the value-at-risk over time. An intensification of rainfall patterns consistent with climate
change predictions increases the potency of the hazard. Without a committed response, the
protection gap is likely to widen further.
A regional approach to disaster risk management and financing could benefit many countries
simultaneously.
With common risks faced from floods and earthquakes, regional cooperation solutions can
materially narrow the protection gap. A regional facility, as targeted under this technical assistance,
can provide an optimally and sustainably priced insurance capacity for countries and so increase the
amount of ex ante financing for disasters.
For example, with current emergency response financing requirements exhausted for many
CAREC countries between 1 in 5-year and 1 in 20-year events, a regional solution could provide
insurance cover at these levels for the respective member countries. This would quickly offer a
financing solution for CAREC member countries, and materially narrow the protection gap for
disaster risk.
Part on Pakistan
Flood and Earthquake Risk
Both flood and earthquake risk are significant in Pakistan, shown in Figure 27. Floods are
associated with an AAL of around $1.5 billion dollars and earthquakes with an AAL of around $614
million. This rises to $1.6 billion and $644 million with the inclusion of indirect losses. This is the
highest absolute amount of loss of any country in the CAREC region and across the two perils direct
losses amount to 0.20% of GNI, the fourth-highest losses as a percentage of national income of any
country in the region. As Figure 27 shows, floods are expected to cause greater losses than
earthquakes for events of the same return for return periods of up to (at least) 1 in 200 years.
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Reflecting the large absolute population of the country, the loss of life associated with these
risks is also substantial.
Earthquakes are expected to be associated with an average annual loss of life of 863 deaths,
around seven times higher than the country with the next highest expected loss of life from this
peril. The number of people expected to be severely affected by earthquakes is just under 165,000,
also the highest figure in the region. Floods are expected to cause a further 234 deaths each year with
more than 678,000 people expected to be severely affected by flooding. Respectively, these are the
second highest and highest numbers for this peril in the CAREC region.
It is striking that the proportion of the population living in multidimensional poverty is much
higher in Pakistan than in many other countries in the CAREC region, with more than 50% of the
population in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh meeting this classification. While there
is a general negative correlation between the direct losses caused by floods and earthquakes and the
proportion of people living in multidimensional poverty, Sindh is noteworthy for ranking relatively
highly on both metrics (Figure 28). The same broad pattern emerges from considering the
relationship between multidimensional poverty and expected loss of life, although when
considering this correlation, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stands out more as a “hot spot.”
There is a strong agricultural focus to economic activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, accounting
for around 40% of the province’s labor force, with key crops including wheat, maize, and sugar beet.
Industrial activity is dominated by SMEs and focuses heavily on textiles and apparel as well as food,
beverages, and tobacco flour mills; though leather, gems, and marble mining can be found in specific
parts of the province. In Sindh, most of the poverty is found
in rural and semi-urban areas (i.e., outside of Karachi) with farming and agribusinesses as
particularly important sectors for SMEs.
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Risk Retention and Insurance Penetration

The National Disaster Management Act of 2010 established a National Disaster Management
Fund and separate disaster management funds to be administered by each provincial government.
These are intended to cover spending on items such as shelter, food, drinking water, medical cover,
etc. However, ADB reports that “significant work remains to be accomplished in operationalization
of the funds, adequate provision of financing mechanisms,
nd standardization of procedures across provinces.” It reports that the federal government
typically only has limited contingency funding of around $15 million–$20 million to respond to
national emergencies while a 2019 World Bank paper reports that the federal fund has $10.6 million.
It is not clear how much more might be available to provincial governments.
With support from ADB, a disaster risk financing unit has been established under the National
Disaster Risk Management Fund (note it is different from the National Disaster Management Fund
discussed above). This unit is responsible for the improved management of natural hazard risks and
has set itself three targets:
(i) To analyze disaster risks based on identification of hazards and risks. This includes the
quantification of expected disaster costs and the preparation of disaster risk management strategies
based on the analysis. To support this, a NatCat model is being developed to cover earthquake,
fluvial floods, droughts, and tropical cyclones. This is being developed by the Pakistan Space and
Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).
(ii) To develop a strategy for disaster risk financing and the transfer of risk. It is expected that
the strategy will “identify appropriate tools for each layer of risk, based on multi-hazard loss curves
and taking into account the scale of funding required for each layer of risk, the speed with which
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disbursement of funding is required, and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative instruments

for specific layers of loss.”
(iii) To develop and pilot disaster risk finance instruments. The website identifies that two
disaster risk finance solutions (instruments) will be developed, and one will be piloted. The status of
the work of this unit, or the instruments that will be developed or piloted, is not clear. The last
reported activity related to disaster risk finance is that a national consultative workshop was held in
July 2019 in Dubai.
Penetration of retail insurance is low, both by comparison to other CAREC countries and more
generally. In 2015, reports suggest only 1.9% of the population held any form of insurance policy.
The nonlife insurance penetration rate is estimated to be 0.3% as of 2019, and insurance density
estimated at $4/person (footnote 30). These low rates reflect security challenges, widespread
poverty, and constrained access to capital for lower income households.
Forty-four percent of the nonlife market is composed of property insurance premiums. Of
these policies, it is estimated that around 70% of property policies include cover for earthquakes and
other atmospheric disturbances, such as cyclones (footnote 47). There is little information available
on the extent to which property insurances policies include cover for floods, but ADB reports that
insured losses from the 2010 floods amounted to just 1% of total losses from this event (footnote 89).
World Bank reports suggest that only around 1%–2% of residential properties in the country are
insured against disasters (footnote 90). Further, despite insurance of public assets being mandatory,
ADB reports that only 30% of public assets are insured according to the State Life Insurance
Corporation, and that these are only insured during the construction phase (footnote 89).
However, recent government-supported housing schemes are encouraging the take up of
property insurance. The Naya Pakistan Housing Programme aims to construct 5 million affordable
housing units for Pakistanis, with eligible citizens benefiting from subsidies to ensure affordability.
Reports suggest that 135,000 units are being developed in the first part of the scheme. Under the
scheme, developers are required to take out insurance up to the full value of the property in the case
of apartments and up to the construction cost value in the case of houses. However, it is unclear
whether this is just required for the period of construction or also while the house is occupied.
There have also been some attempts to support agricultural insurance. Under the national
Crop Loan Insurance Scheme those who use agricultural production loans from banks or microfinance
institutions are required to purchase the insurance. The policy insures against disasters but only pays
out if crop losses are greater than 50% of total yield. The Pakistani government provides a 100%
subsidy for small farmers and 50% of premiums for farmers with landholdings 5 to 25 acres. In 2018, a
pilot project in Punjab region introduced an index-based subsidized agricultural insurance product
which has rapidly spread in popularity, issuing 227,000 insurance contracts in 2019.
By 2023, it is expected that 3.5 million farmers could be covered under the scheme (footnote
96).
Quantifying the Protection Gap The analysis uses the results from the modeling undertaken as
part of this project as presented in Figure 27. The AAL (direct losses only) from flood events is
estimated at $1.5 billion and from earthquakes at $614 million. In terms of the extent to which
insurance might cover these losses, the analysis assumes that 1% of the losses from flood events may
be covered by insurance, in line with the ADB analysis. It is assumed that a higher proportion of the
losses from earthquakes might be covered by insurance based on market reports that 70% of
property insurance policies cover earthquakes. The base-case analysis assumes that 4% o losses from
earthquakes might be covered.
Given the relative losses associated with flood and earthquakes, these assumptions imply that
around 2% of the total losses from the two perils are covered by insurance.
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The analysis also takes account of the funding available in the risk retention mechanisms. It is
assumed that $20 million might be available toward the top end of the reported funding to allow for
an unknown amount of resources that may be available in provincial disaster risk funds.
Nonetheless, the analysis shows that current disaster risk finance resources are woefully inadequate
to meet the costs and losses that are expected to be caused by disaster events each year (Figure 29).
Indeed, the assumptions regarding risk retention and risk transfer imply sufficient funding to only
cover 3% of the AAL, leaving a residual “unfunded” AAL of around $2.1 billion (97%). Consistent
with this, current disaster risk finance resources are insufficient to cover the total losses, the direct
losses or even the emergency response costs associated with events of all frequencies (Table 10).

Ability to Rely on Ex Post Borrowing

Even before the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, Pakistan was in a challenging fiscal position
with limited fiscal space. It suffers from both high levels of public debt and a large fiscal deficit with
the government already borrowing heavily to finance day to day expenditure. Its credit rating is
among the lowest of any country in the CAREC region.
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As well as the expected impact of COVID-19 on the size of the economy—estimated to have
contracted by 1.5% in the 2020 financial year—the pandemic has interrupted the government’s fiscal
consolidation efforts as part of the IMF-Extended Fund Facility. This interruption has exacerbated
fiscal imbalances and further damages the government’s finances. On recent occasions, Pakistan has
had to reach bilateral arrangements with creditors to extend repayment of maturing debt. The IMF
has assessed the overall risk of debt distress in the country as high and its debt carrying capacity as
weak. Figure 30 summarizes.

Financing challenges are also strongly evident for individuals and households, with Pakistan
suffering from some of the lowest rates of financial inclusion in the world. Less than a quarter of the
population has a bank account, and only 7% of the female population do so, implying some of the
greatest gender inequality in the region (footnote 24). There have been, however, a number of recent
efforts to improve financial inclusion with, for example, the creation of the Pakistan Microfinance
Investment Company in 2018 and the Digitization of its Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)
in 2010, which helped as many as 6 million women move to a digital savings platform.
Meanwhile, the Aga Khan Foundation has previously led a series of initiatives in the north of
the country, providing female-targeted literacy and community training, along with “Women Only”
markets and organizations.
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Neither are social protection programs likely to be particularly effective in protecting the most
vulnerable populations following a disaster. According to the latest data, only 26% of the bottom
income quintile are covered by social protection or labor programs (footnote 64). Pakistan’s main
system of support is an unconditional cash transfer for 5 million people through the BISP, which is
primarily focused on the poor, rural, female population. Recent research has revealed challenges
with the scheme resulting from disruptions in payment frequency and insufficient funding. In recent
years, the government has introduced the Ehsaas Strategy, an initiative that combines BISP cash
transfers with skills training, financial inclusion, and other measures to address poverty, while the
Kamyab Jawan program also provides support for young entrepreneurs. Conditional cash transfers
to encourage school-age children to return to school were rolled out on a national level in late 2020.
The effectiveness of these additional initiatives is not yet clear.
However, there are innovative approaches to make social protection measures more shock-
responsive, which may enhance households’ financial resilience. The current extent of shock-
responsiveness in social protection varies by province, with Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
leading the way through policies that acknowledge the relationship between social protection and
covariate disaster management. The provincial government of Punjab has introduced a cash-based
flood response program, while in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the provincial government provides cash
transfers to internally displaced people to mitigate the impact of displacement under conflict.
The ongoing process of adopting a national social protection policy framework—which
intends to streamline different initiatives—is expected to facilitate more shock-responsive social
protection programming, with the BISP having been identified by some stakeholders for offering
potential for comprehensive SRSP operationalization in Pakistan Ehsaas Tahafuz, which forms part
of the Ehsaas Strategy, is Pakistan’s first “shock-oriented” initiative that assist the vulnerable
population in covering “catastrophic” health expenditures.
Summary
There is an urgent need to enhance the current disaster risk finance approach in Pakistan. Risk
retention mechanisms are insufficient to cover the losses associated with even the most frequent of
flood and earthquake events, while private insurance solutions for these risks have achieved only
minimal market penetration. These challenges are compounded by a challenging external financing
context at the sovereign level, making it difficult to access debt quickly and cheaply after a disaster,
and low levels of financial inclusion that exacerbate the vulnerability to disaster events of many in
Pakistan. Previous disaster events illustrate the challenges that Pakistan faces: for example, floods in
2010 and 2015 caused an estimated PRs32.6 billion ($326 million) losses to farmers in Punjab. To
support the affected farmers, the Government of Pakistan provided PRs6.7 billion ($67 million)—
amounting to only 18.5% of the required amount.
There would appear to be a need to increase the coverage and depth of the existing risk
retention instruments for high frequency events, through enhanced functioning of the national and
provincial disaster management funds.
This could be complemented with the use of risk transfer instruments that might support either
the emergency response cost and/or the support the reconstruction of assets damaged or destroyed by
lower frequency, higher intensity events. These actions are consistent with the identified work plan of
the Disaster Risk Financing Unit of the National Disaster Risk Management Fund.
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THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND CHINA'S

REUNIFICATION IN THE NEW ERA
Preamble
Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a shared
aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. It is indispensable for the realization
of China's rejuvenation. It is also a historic mission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The
CPC, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have striven for decades to achieve this goal.
The 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 heralded a new era in building socialism with
Chinese characteristics. Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping
at the core, the CPC and the Chinese government have adopted new and innovative measures in
relation to Taiwan. They have continued to chart the course of cross-Straits relations, safeguard
peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and promote progress towards national reunification.
However, in recent years the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
have redoubled their efforts to divide the country, and some external forces have tried to exploit
Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and
halt the process of national rejuvenation.
The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in fulfilling the First Centenary Goal of
building a moderately prosperous society in all respects as scheduled, and in embarking on a new
journey towards the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a modern socialist country.
The Chinese nation has achieved a historic transformation from standing upright to becoming
prosperous and growing in strength, and national rejuvenation is driven by an unstoppable force.
This marks a new starting point for reunification.
The Chinese government has published two previous white papers on Taiwan. One was The
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China in August 1993, and the other was The One-China
Principle and the Taiwan Issue in February 2000. These two white papers provided a comprehensive
and systematic elaboration of the basic principles and policies regarding the resolution of the
Taiwan question. This new white paper is being released to reiterate the fact that Taiwan is part of
China, to demonstrate the resolve of the CPC and the Chinese people and their commitment to
national reunification, and to emphasize the position and policies of the CPC and the Chinese
government in the new era.
I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact
Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history
and jurisprudence. New archeological discoveries and research findings regularly attest to the
profound historical and cultural ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. A large number of
historical records and annals document the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier
periods.
The earliest references to this effect are to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic
Gazetteer compiled in the year 230 by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the Three Kingdoms
Period. The royal court of the Sui Dynasty had on three occasions sent troops to Taiwan, called
Liuqiu at that time. Starting from the Song and Yuan dynasties, the imperial central governments of
China all set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Penghu and Taiwan.
In 1624, Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. In 1662,
General Zheng Chenggong, hailed as a national hero, led an expedition and expelled them from the
island. Subsequently, the Qing court gradually set up more administrative bodies in Taiwan. In
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1684, a Taiwan prefecture administration was set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. In
1885, Taiwan's status was upgraded and it became the 20th province of China.
In July 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In April 1895, the defeated
Qing government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. During the Chinese
People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945), China's Communists called for
the recovery of Taiwan. Talking with American journalist Nym Wales on May 15, 1937, Mao Zedong
said that China's goal was to achieve a final victory in the war - a victory that would recover the
occupied Chinese territories in Northeast China and to the south of the Shanhai Pass, and secure the
liberation of Taiwan.
On December 9, 1941, the Chinese government issued a declaration of war against Japan, and
proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between
China and Japan had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan and the Penghu
Islands.
The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on
December 1, 1943 stated that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had
stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to
China.
The Potsdam Proclamation was signed by China, the United States and the United Kingdom
on July 26, 1945, and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union. It reiterated: "The terms of the
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In September of the same year, Japan signed the instrument
of surrender, in which it promised that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the
Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25 the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the
exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in Taiwan
Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei (Taipei). From that point
forward, China had recovered Taiwan de jure and de facto through a host of documents with
international legal effect.
On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, becoming the
successor to the Republic of China (1912-1949), and the Central People's Government became the
only legitimate government of the whole of China. The new government replaced the previous KMT
regime in a situation where China, as a subject under international law, did not change and China's
sovereignty and inherent territory did not change. As a natural result, the government of the PRC
should enjoy and exercise China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan.
As a result of the civil war in China in the late 1940s and the interference of external forces, the
two sides of the Taiwan Straits have fallen into a state of protracted political confrontation. But the
sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and will never be divided, and Taiwan's
status as part of China's territory has never changed and will never be allowed to change.
At its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
2758, which undertook "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United
Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they
unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it". This resolution
settled once and for all the political, legal and procedural issues of China's representation in the UN,
and it covered the whole country, including Taiwan. It also spelled out that China has one single
seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan".
The specialized agencies of the UN later adopted further resolutions restoring to the PRC its
lawful seat and expelling the representatives of the Taiwan authorities. One of these is Resolution
25.1 adopted at the 25th World Health Assembly in May 1972. It was clearly stated in the official
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legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat that "the United Nations considers
'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status", and the "'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not
considered to... enjoy any form of government status". At the UN the island is referred to as
"Taiwan, Province of China".
Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal
authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide. Taiwan does not have
any ground, reason, or right to join the UN, or any other international organization whose
membership is confined to sovereign states.
In recent years some elements in a small number of countries, the US foremost among them,
have colluded with forces in Taiwan, to falsely claim that the resolution did not conclusively resolve
the issue of Taiwan's representation. Puffing up the illegal and invalid Treaty of San Francisco and
disregarding the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international legal
documents, they profess that the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined, and declare their
support for "Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system". What they are actually
attempting to do is to alter Taiwan's status as part of China and create "two Chinas" or "one China,
one Taiwan" as part of a political ploy - using Taiwan to contain China. These actions in violation of
Resolution 2758 and international law are a serious breach of political commitments made by these
countries. They damage China's sovereignty and dignity, and treat the basic principles of
international law with contempt. The Chinese government has condemned and expressed its
resolute opposition to them.
The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community; it
is consistent with the basic norms of international relations. To date, 181 countries including the
United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the one-China
principle. The China-US Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, published
in December 1978, states: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." It also states: "The United
States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal
Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress (NPC) in December 1982, stipulates: "Taiwan is part of the sacred
territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including
our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."
The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the 10th NPC in March 2005,
stipulates: "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one
China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan
compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the 'Taiwan
independence' secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any
means."
The National Security Law, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the
12th NPC in July 2015, stipulates: "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China brook no
violation or separation. Safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity is the
common duty of all Chinese citizens, including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots."
We are one China, and Taiwan is part of China. This is an indisputable fact supported by
history and the law. Taiwan has never been a state; its status as part of China is unalterable. Any
attempt to distort these facts and dispute or deny the one-China principle will end in failure.
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II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification

The CPC has always been dedicated to working for the wellbeing of the Chinese people and
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Soon after its founding in 1921, the CPC set itself the goal of
freeing Taiwan from colonial rule, reuniting it with the rest of the country and liberating the whole
nation, including compatriots in Taiwan. It has made a tremendous effort to achieve this goal.
The CPC is committed to the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing
China's complete reunification. Under its resolute leadership, people on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits have worked together to de-escalate tension across the Straits. They have set out on a path of
peaceful development and made many breakthroughs in improving cross-Straits relations.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China's Communists, under the leadership of Mao
Zedong, proposed the essential guideline, underlying principle, and basic policy for peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC prepared and worked for the liberation of Taiwan,
thwarted the Taiwan authorities' plans to attack the mainland, and foiled attempts to create "two
Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". Through their efforts, the lawful seat and rights of the PRC in
the United Nations were restored and the one-China principle was subscribed to by the majority of
countries, laying important groundwork for peaceful reunification. The CPC central leadership
established high-level contact with the Taiwan authorities through proper channels in pursuit of a
peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, with the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, China's Communists,
led by Deng Xiaoping, defined the fundamental guideline for peaceful reunification in the vital
interests of the country and the people and on the basis of the consensus for peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question. The CPC introduced the creative and well-conceived concept of One Country,
Two Systems, and applied it first in resolving the questions of Hong Kong and Macao. It took action
to ease military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, restore contact, and open up people-to-
people exchanges and cooperation, opening a new chapter in cross-Straits relations.
After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1989, China's
Communists, led by Jiang Zemin, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits
relations and the peaceful reunification of China. The CPC facilitated agreement across the Straits on
the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. It initiated cross-Straits consultations
and negotiations, resulting in the first talks between heads of the non-governmental organizations
authorized by the two sides of the Straits, and expanded cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in
various fields. The CPC took firm action against separatist activities led by Lee Teng-hui, and struck
hard at the separatist forces seeking "Taiwan independence". It ensured the smooth return of Hong
Kong and Macao to China, and applied the policy of One Country, Two Systems, which had a
constructive impact on the settlement of the Taiwan question.
After the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, China's Communists, led by Hu Jintao,
highlighted the importance of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. The CPC pushed for
the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law to curb separatist activities in Taiwan, hosted the first talks
between the leaders of the CPC and the Kuomintang in six decades since 1945, and defeated
attempts by Chen Shui-bian to fabricate a legal basis for "independence". The CPC effected profound
changes in moving the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations forward by promoting
institutionalized consultations and negotiations that produced fruitful results, establishing overall
direct two-way links in mail, business and transport, and facilitating the signing and
implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
After the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, China's Communists, under the leadership of
Xi Jinping, took a holistic approach to cross-Straits relations in keeping with changing
circumstances, added substance to the theory on national reunification and the principles and
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policies concerning Taiwan, and worked to keep cross-Straits relations on the right track. The CPC
developed its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and set out the
overarching guideline and a program of action.
At its 19th National Congress in October 2017, the CPC affirmed the basic policy of upholding
One Country, Two Systems and promoting national reunification, and emphasized its resolve never
to allow any person, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate
any part of Chinese territory from China.
In January 2019, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of
China, addressed a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the release of the Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan. In his speech, Xi Jinping proposed major policies to advance the peaceful
development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China in the new era. These
are: first, working together to promote China's rejuvenation and its peaceful reunification; second,
seeking a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and making innovative efforts towards
peaceful reunification; third, abiding by the one-China principle and safeguarding the prospects for
peaceful reunification; fourth, further integrating development across the Straits and consolidating
the foundations for peaceful reunification; fifth, forging closer bonds of heart and mind between
people on both sides of the Straits and strengthening joint commitment to peaceful reunification.
The CPC and the Chinese government have thereby adopted a series of major measures for
charting the course of cross-Straits relations and realizing China's peaceful reunification:
- The CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated the first meeting and direct dialogue
between leaders of the two sides since 1949, raising exchanges and interactions to new heights,
opening up a new chapter, and creating new space for cross-Straits relations. This is a new
milestone. The departments in charge of cross-Straits affairs on both sides have established regular
contact and communication mechanisms on a common political foundation, and the heads of the
two departments have exchanged visits and set up hotlines.
- Upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, the CPC and the Chinese
government have facilitated exchanges between political parties across the Straits, and conducted
dialogues, consultations, and in-depth exchanges of views on cross-Straits relations and the future of
the Chinese nation with relevant political parties, organizations, and individuals in Taiwan. These
efforts have resulted in consensus on multiple issues, and promoted a number of joint initiatives
exploring the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question with all sectors of Taiwan society.
- Guided by the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same
family, the CPC and the Chinese government have promoted peaceful development of cross-Straits
relations and integrated development of the two sides for the benefit of both the mainland and
Taiwan. We have also refined the institutional arrangements, policies and measures to promote
cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation, designed to advance the wellbeing of the people of Taiwan.
These include the delivery of water from the coastal province of Fujian to Kinmen Island, electronic
travel passes for Taiwan residents to enter or leave the mainland, residence permits for Taiwan
residents, progressively ensuring that Taiwan compatriots have equal access to public services so as
to facilitate their studying, starting businesses, working and living on the mainland, and an ongoing
effort to pave the way for Taiwan to benefit first from the mainland's development opportunities.
- While countering interference and obstruction from separatist forces, the CPC and the
Chinese government have called on the people of Taiwan to promote effective and in-depth
cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in various fields across the Straits. Having overcome
the impact of COVID-19, we have held a number of exchange events such as the Straits Forum, and
maintained the momentum of cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation.
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- Resolute in defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity and opposing separatist
activities and external interference, the CPC and the Chinese government have safeguarded peace
and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. We have
taken lawful action against and effectively deterred separatist forces. We have handled Taiwan's
external exchanges in a sound manner, and consolidated the international community's commitment
to the one-China principle.
Under the guidance of the CPC, great progress has been made in cross-Straits relations over
the past seven decades, especially since the estrangement between the two sides was ended.
Increased exchanges, broader cooperation and closer interactions have brought tangible benefits to
people across the Straits, especially of Taiwan. This fully demonstrates that cross-Straits amity and
cooperation are mutually beneficial.
The volume of cross-Straits trade was only US$46 million in 1978. It rose to US$328.34 billion
in 2021, up by a factor of more than 7,000. The mainland has been Taiwan's largest export market for
the last 21 years, generating a large annual surplus for the island. The mainland is also the largest
destination for Taiwan's off-island investment. By the end of 2021 Taiwan businesses had invested in
almost 124,000 projects on the mainland, to a total value of US$71.34 billion.
In 1987 less than 50,000 visits were made between the two sides; by 2019 this number had
soared to about 9 million. In the past three years, affected by COVID-19, online communication has
become the main form of people-to-people interactions across the Straits, and the numbers of people
participating in and covered by online communication are reaching new highs.
The CPC has always been the spine of the Chinese nation, exercising strong leadership in
realizing national rejuvenation and reunification. Its consistent efforts over the decades to resolve
the Taiwan question and achieve complete national reunification are based on the following:
First, the one-China principle must be upheld, and no individual or force should be allowed to
separate Taiwan from China.
Second, it is imperative to strive for the wellbeing of all Chinese people, including those in
Taiwan, and to realize the aspirations of all Chinese people for a better life.
Third, we must follow the principles of freeing the mind, seeking truth from facts,
maintaining the right political orientation, and breaking new ground, and defend the fundamental
interests of the nation and the core interests of the state in formulating principles and policies on
work related to Taiwan.
Fourth, it is necessary to have the courage and skill to fight against any force that attempts to
undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity or stands in the way of its reunification.
Fifth, extensive unity and solidarity must be upheld to mobilize all factors to fight against any
force that would divide the country, and pool strengths to advance national reunification.
III. China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted
Against a backdrop of profound and complex changes in the domestic and international
situation, our cause of complete national reunification is facing new challenges. The CPC and the
Chinese government have the strength and the confidence to deal with complexities and overcome
risks and threats, and the ability to take great strides forward on the path to national reunification.
1. Complete Reunification Is Critical to National Rejuvenation
Throughout China's 5,000-year history, national reunification and opposition to division have
remained a common ideal and a shared tradition of the whole nation. In the modern era from the
mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China
was gradually reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, and went through a period of
suffering worse than anything it had previously known. The country endured intense humiliation,
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the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness.
Japan's 50-year occupation of Taiwan epitomized this humiliation and inflicted agony on both sides
of the Taiwan Straits. Our two sides face each other just across a strip of water, yet we are still far
apart. The fact that we have not yet been reunified is a scar left by history on the Chinese nation. We
Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound.
National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese
nation since the modern era began. Only by realizing complete national reunification can the
Chinese people on both sides of the Straits cast aside the shadow of civil war and create and enjoy
lasting peace. National reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and
occupied again by foreign countries, to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China, and to
safeguard the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country. It is the most effective
remedy to secessionist attempts to divide our country, and the best means to consolidate Taiwan's
status as part of China and advance national rejuvenation. It will enable us to pool the strengths of
the people on both sides, build our common home, safeguard our interests and wellbeing, and create
a brighter future for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. As Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great
pioneer of China's revolution, once said, "Unification is the hope of all Chinese nationals. If China
can be unified, all Chinese will enjoy a happy life; if it cannot, all will suffer."
In exploring the path to rejuvenation and prosperity, China has endured vicissitudes and
hardships. "Unification brings strength while division leads to chaos." This is a law of history. The
realization of complete national reunification is driven by the history and culture of the Chinese
nation and determined by the momentum towards and circumstances surrounding our national
rejuvenation. Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal
of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national
reunification. The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will
be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. When all the Chinese people stick together
and work together, we will surely succeed in realizing national reunification on our way to national
rejuvenation.
2. National Development and Progress Set the Direction of Cross-Straits Relations
China's development and progress are a key factor determining the course of cross-Straits
relations and the realization of complete national reunification. In particular, the great achievements
over four decades of reform, opening up and modernization have had a profound impact on the
historical process of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing complete national reunification. No
matter which political party or group is in power in Taiwan, it cannot alter the course of progress in
cross-Straits relations or the trend towards national reunification.
International Monetary Fund statistics show that in 1980 the GDP of the mainland was about
US$303 billion, just over 7 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$42.3 billion; in 2021, the GDP
of the mainland was about US$17.46 trillion, more than 22 times that of Taiwan, which was about
US$790 billion.
China's development and progress, and in particular the steady increases in its economic
power, technological strength, and national defense capabilities, are an effective curb against
separatist activities and interference from external forces. They also provide broad space and great
opportunities for cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation. As more and more compatriots from
Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the
mainland, cross-Straits exchanges, interaction and integration are intensified in all sectors, the
economic ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper, and our common
cultural and national identities grow stronger, leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.
The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in embarking on the new journey of
building China into a modern socialist country in all respects. Following the path of socialism with
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Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its governance and maintained long-term
economic growth; it enjoys a solid material foundation, a wealth of human resources, a huge market,
strong resilience in development, and social stability. It therefore has many strengths and favorable
conditions for further development, and these have become the driving force for reunification.
Grounding its effort in the new development stage, the mainland is committed to applying the
new development philosophy, creating a new development dynamic, and promoting high-quality
development. As a result, the overall strength and international influence of the mainland will
continue to increase, and its influence over and appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing. We will
have a more solid foundation for resolving the Taiwan question and greater ability to do so. This
will give a significant boost to national reunification.
3. Any Attempt by Separatist Forces to Prevent Reunification Is Bound to Fail
Taiwan has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times. Moves to separate
Taiwan from China represent the serious crime of secession, and undermine the common interests of
compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.
They will lead nowhere.
The DPP authorities have adopted a separatist stance, and colluded with external forces in
successive provocative actions designed to divide the country. They refuse to recognize the one-
China principle, and distort and deny the 1992 Consensus. They assert that Taiwan and the
mainland should not be subordinate to each other, and proclaim a new "two states" theory. On the
island, they constantly press for "de-sinicization" and promote "incremental independence". They
incite radical separatists in and outside the DPP to lobby for amendments to their "constitution" and
"laws". They deceive the people of Taiwan, incite hostility against the mainland, and obstruct and
undermine cross-Straits exchanges, cooperation and integrated development. They have steadily
built up their military forces with the intention of pursuing "independence" and preventing
reunification by force. They join with external forces in trying to sow the seeds of "two Chinas" or
"one China, one Taiwan". The actions of the DPP authorities have resulted in tension in cross-Straits
relations, endangering peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and undermining the prospects and
restricting the space for peaceful reunification. These are obstacles that must be removed in
advancing the process of peaceful reunification.
Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots. The
Chinese people are firm in their resolve and have a deep commitment to safeguarding China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and this
resolve and commitment will frustrate any attempt to divide the country. When Taiwan was
invaded by a foreign power more than 100 years ago, China was a poor and weak country. More
than 70 years ago, China defeated the invaders and recovered Taiwan. Today, China has grown into
the world's second largest economy. With significant growth in its political, economic, cultural,
technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be
separated again. Attempts to reject reunification and split the country are doomed, because they will
founder against the history and culture of the Chinese nation as well as the resolve and commitment
of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.
4. External Forces Obstructing China's Complete Reunification Will Surely Be Defeated
External interference is a prominent obstacle to China's reunification. Still lost in delusions of
hegemony and trapped in a Cold War mindset, some forces in the US insist on perceiving and
portraying China as a major strategic adversary and a serious long-term threat. They do their utmost
to undermine and pressurize China, exploiting Taiwan as a convenient tool. The US authorities have
stated that they remain committed to the one-China policy and that they do not support "Taiwan
independence". But their actions contradict their words. They are clouding the one-China principle
in uncertainty and compromising its integrity. They are contriving "official" exchanges with Taiwan,
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increasing arms sales, and colluding in military provocation. To help Taiwan expand its
"international space", they are inducing other countries to interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting
Taiwan-related bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China. They are creating confusion around
what is black and white, right and wrong. On the one hand, they incite separatist forces to create
tension and turmoil in cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, they accuse the mainland of
coercion, pressurizing Taiwan, and unilaterally changing the status quo, in order to embolden these
forces and create obstacles to China's peaceful reunification.
The important principles of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations are the cornerstones of modern international law and basic
norms of international relations. It is the sacred right of every sovereign state to safeguard national
unity and territorial integrity. It goes without saying that the Chinese government is entitled to take
all measures necessary to settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification, free of
external interference.
Behind the smokescreens of "freedom, democracy, and human rights" and "upholding the
rules-based international order", some anti-China forces in the US deliberately distort the nature of
the Taiwan question - which is purely an internal matter for China - and try to deny the legitimacy
and justification of the Chinese government in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial
integrity. This clearly reveals their intention of using Taiwan to contain China and obstruct China's
reunification, which should be thoroughly exposed and condemned.
These external forces are using Taiwan as a pawn to undermine China's development and
progress, and obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. They are doing so at the cost of the
interests, wellbeing and future of the people of Taiwan rather than for their benefit. They have
encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-
Straits tension and confrontation, and undermined peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
This runs counter to the underlying global trends of peace, development and win-win cooperation,
and goes against the wishes of the international community and the aspiration of all peoples.
Shortly after the PRC was founded, even though the country itself had to be rebuilt on the
ruins of decades of war, China and its people won a resounding victory in the War to Resist US
Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953). We defeated a powerful and well-armed enemy through
gallantry and tenacity. In doing so, we safeguarded the security of the newly founded People's
Republic, reestablished the status of China as a major country in the world, and demonstrated our
heroic spirit, our lack of fear, and our will to stand up against the abuse of the powerful.
China is firmly committed to peaceful development. At the same time, it will not flinch under
any external interference, nor will it tolerate any infringement upon its sovereignty, security and
development interests. Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and
using Taiwan to contain China is doomed to fail.
Tranquility, development and a decent life are the expectations of our Taiwan compatriots,
and the common aspiration of those on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Under the strong leadership
of the CPC, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation have stood upright, won prosperity, and
grown in strength. A moderately prosperous society in all respects has been built on the mainland,
where a large population once lived in dire poverty. We now have better conditions, more
confidence, and greater capabilities. We can complete the historic mission of national reunification,
so that both sides of the Straits can enjoy a better life. The wheel of history rolls on towards national
reunification, and it will not be stopped by any individual or any force.
IV. National Reunification in the New Era
Taking into consideration the overall goal of national rejuvenation in the context of global
change on a scale unseen in a century, the CPC and the Chinese government have continued to
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follow the CPC's fundamental guidelines on the Taiwan question and implement its principles and
policies towards Taiwan, and have made concrete efforts to promote peaceful cross-Straits relations,
integrate the development of the two sides, and work towards national reunification.
1. Upholding the Basic Principles of Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems
National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC and the Chinese
government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as
a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and
development of China. We have worked hard to overcome hardships and obstacles to peaceful
reunification over the past decades, showing that we cherish and safeguard the greater good of the
nation, the wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan, and peace on both sides.
The One Country, Two Systems principle is an important institutional instrument created by
the CPC and the Chinese government to enable peaceful reunification. It represents a great
achievement of Chinese socialism. Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our
basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national
reunification. Embodying the Chinese wisdom - we thrive by embracing each other - they take full
account of Taiwan's realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.
We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system
and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law. The two social systems will
develop side by side for a long time to come. One Country is the precondition and foundation of
Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country; and the two are
integrated under the one-China principle.
We will continue working with our compatriots in Taiwan to explore a Two Systems solution
to the Taiwan question and increase our efforts towards peaceful reunification. In designing the
specifics for implementing One Country, Two Systems, we will give full consideration to the
realities in Taiwan and the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides, and fully
accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan.
Ever since the One Country, Two Systems principle was proposed, certain political forces
have been misrepresenting and distorting its objectives. The DPP and the authorities under its
leadership have done everything possible to target the principle with baseless criticisms, and this
has led to misunderstandings about its aims in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a fact that since Hong
Kong and Macao returned to the motherland and were reincorporated into national governance,
they have embarked on a broad path of shared development together with the mainland, and each
complements the others' strengths. The practice of One Country, Two Systems has been a
resounding success.
For a time, Hong Kong faced a period of damaging social unrest caused by anti-China
agitators both inside and outside the region. Based on a clear understanding of the situation there,
the CPC and the Chinese government upheld the One Country, Two Systems principle, made some
appropriate improvements, and took a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and
root causes of the unrest. Order was restored and prosperity returned to Hong Kong. This has laid a
solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong and Macao and the long-term
continuation of One Country, Two Systems.
To realize peaceful reunification, we must acknowledge that the mainland and Taiwan have
their own distinct social systems and ideologies. The One Country, Two Systems principle is the
most inclusive solution to this problem. It is an approach that is grounded in democratic principles,
demonstrates good will, seeks peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and delivers mutual
benefit. The differences in social system are neither an obstacle to reunification nor a justification for
secessionism. We firmly believe that our compatriots in Taiwan will develop a better understanding
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of the principle, and that the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question will play its full role
while compatriots on both sides work together towards peaceful reunification.
Peaceful reunification can only be achieved through consultation and discussion as equals.
The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the fundamental obstacles to the
steady improvement of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed
down from one generation to the next. We can phase in flexible forms of consultation and
discussion. We are ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad
exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the
one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Representatives will be recommended by all political
parties and all sectors of society on both sides, and they will engage in democratic consultations on
peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, integrated development of the two sides, and the
peaceful reunification of our country.
2. Promoting Peaceful Cross-Straits Relations and Integrated Development
Peaceful cross-Straits relations and integrated development pave the way for reunification and
serve to benefit our people on both sides. Thus, both sides should work together towards this goal.
We will extend integrated development, increase exchanges and cooperation, strengthen bonds, and
expand common interests in the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. In this way, we will
all identify more closely with the Chinese culture and Chinese nation, and heighten the sense of our
shared future. This lays solid foundations for peaceful reunification.
We will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in
setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Straits development in Fujian Province, advancing
integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust
and understanding. Both sides should continue to promote connectivity in any area where it is
beneficial, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure, energy and resources, and
industrial standards. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and health care, and the
sharing of social security and public resources. We should support neighboring areas or areas with
similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible public services. We
should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common
market for the two sides to strengthen the Chinese economy.
We will improve the systems and policies to guarantee the wellbeing of Taiwan compatriots
and ensure that they are treated as equals on the mainland, and we will protect their legitimate
rights and interests here in accordance with the law. We will support our fellow Chinese and
enterprises from Taiwan in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, major regional development
strategies, and the strategy for coordinated regional development. We will help them integrate into
the new development dynamic, participate in high-quality development, share in more
development opportunities, and benefit from national socio-economic development.
We will expand cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields and overcome any
obstacles and obstruction. We will encourage our people on both sides to pass on the best of
traditional Chinese culture and ensure that it grows in new and creative ways. We will strengthen
communication among the general public and the younger generations on both sides, and encourage
more fellow Chinese in Taiwan - young people in particular - to pursue studies, start businesses,
seek jobs, or live on the mainland. This will help people on both sides to expand mutual
understanding, strengthen mutual trust, consolidate a shared sense of identity, and forge closer
bonds of heart and mind.
3. Defeating Separatism and External Interference
Separatism will plunge Taiwan into the abyss and bring nothing but disaster to the island. To
protect the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must
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resolutely oppose it and work for peaceful reunification. We are ready to create vast space for
peaceful reunification; but we will leave no room for separatist activities in any form.
We Chinese will decide our own affairs. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves
China's core interests and the Chinese people's national sentiments, and no external interference will
be tolerated. Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China's internal
affairs or obstruct China's reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people,
including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate our resolve, will and ability to
defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful
reunification. But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all
necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities. In no
way does it target our fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Use of force would be the last resort taken under
compelling circumstances. We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the
provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines.
We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to
interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements. Our ultimate goal is to ensure
the prospects of China's peaceful reunification and advance this process.
Some forces in the US are making every effort to incite groups inside Taiwan to stir up trouble
and use Taiwan as a pawn against China. This has jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan
Straits, obstructed the Chinese government's efforts towards peaceful reunification, and undermined
the healthy and steady development of China-US relations. Left unchecked, it will continue to
escalate tension across the Straits, further disrupt China-US relations, and severely damage the
interests of the US itself. The US should abide by the one-China principle, deal with Taiwan-related
issues in a prudent and proper manner, stand by its previous commitments, and stop supporting
Taiwan separatists.
4. Working with Our Fellow Chinese in Taiwan Towards National Reunification and
Rejuvenation
National reunification is an essential step towards national rejuvenation. The future of Taiwan
lies in China's reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation, an endeavor that bears on the future and destiny of the people on both sides. A
united and prosperous China will be a blessing for all Chinese, while a weak and divided China will
be a disaster. Only China's rejuvenation and prosperity can bring lives of plenty and happiness to
both sides. But it requires the joint efforts of both sides, as does the complete reunification of the
country.
Separatist propaganda and the unresolved political dispute between the two sides have
created misconceptions over cross-Straits relations, problems with national identity, and misgivings
over national reunification among some fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Blood is thicker than water, and
people on both sides of the Straits share the bond of kinship. We have great patience and tolerance
and we will create conditions for closer exchanges and communication between the two sides, and
to increase our compatriots' knowledge of the mainland and reduce these misconceptions and
misgivings, in order to help them resist the manipulation of separatists.
We will join hands with our fellow Chinese in Taiwan to strive for national reunification and
rejuvenation. We hope they will stand on the right side of history, be proud of their Chinese
identity, and fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in China's rejuvenation. We hope they
will pursue the greater good of the nation, resolutely oppose separatism and any form of external
interference, and make a positive contribution to the just cause of China's peaceful reunification.
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V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification

Once peaceful reunification is achieved under One Country, Two Systems, it will lay new
foundations for China to make further progress and achieve national rejuvenation. At the same time,
it will create huge opportunities for social and economic development in Taiwan and bring tangible
benefits to the people of Taiwan.
1. Taiwan Will Have a Vast Space for Development
Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and
robust foreign trade. Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland. After
reunification, the systems and mechanisms for cross-Straits economic cooperation will be further
improved. Backed up by the vast mainland market, Taiwan's economy will enjoy broader prospects,
become more competitive, develop steadier and smoother industrial and supply chains, and display
greater vitality in innovation-driven growth. Many problems that have long afflicted Taiwan's
economy and its people can be resolved through integrated cross-Straits development with all
possible connectivity between the two sides. Taiwan's fiscal revenues can be better employed to
improve living standards, bringing real benefits to the people and resolving their difficulties.
Taiwan's cultural creativity will also enjoy a great boost. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits share
the culture and ethos of the Chinese nation. Nourished by the Chinese civilization, Taiwan's regional
culture will flourish and prosper.
2. The Rights and Interests of the People in Taiwan Will Be Fully Protected
Provided that China's sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after
reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.
Taiwan's social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious
beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. All Taiwan
compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the
masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China's development. With a powerful
motherland in support, the people of Taiwan will enjoy greater security and dignity and stand
upright and rock-solid in the international community.
3. Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits Will Share the Triumph of National Rejuvenation
The people of Taiwan are brave, diligent and patriotic, and have made unremitting efforts to
improve themselves. They revere their ancestry and love their homeland. Working together and
applying their talents, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits will create a promising future.
After reunification, we Chinese will bridge gaps and differences caused by long-term separation,
share a stronger sense of national identity, and stand together as one. After reunification, we can
leverage complementary strengths in pursuit of mutual benefit and common development. After
reunification, we can join hands to make the Chinese nation stronger and more prosperous, and
stand taller among all the nations of the world.
The people separated by the Taiwan Straits share the same blood and a common destiny.
After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and a stronger ability
to shape international public opinion, and the Chinese people will enjoy greater self-esteem, self-
confidence and national pride. In Taiwan and on the mainland the people will share the dignity and
triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. We will work together to refine and
implement the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question, to improve the institutional
arrangements for implementing the One Country, Two Systems policy, and to ensure lasting peace
and stability in Taiwan.
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4. Peaceful Reunification of China Is Conducive to Peace and Development in the Asia-Pacific

and the Wider World
Peaceful cross-Straits reunification is of benefit not only to the Chinese nation, but to all
peoples and the international community as a whole. The reunification of China will not harm the
legitimate interests of any other country, including any economic interests they might have in
Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring more development opportunities to all countries; it will create
more positive momentum for prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world; it
will contribute more to building a global community of shared future, promoting world peace and
development, and propelling human progress.
After reunification, foreign countries can continue to develop economic and cultural relations
with Taiwan. With the approval of the central government of China, they may set up consulates or
other official and quasi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and agencies may
establish offices, relevant international conventions can be applied, and relevant international
conferences can be held there.
Conclusion
Over its 5,000-year history, China has created a splendid culture that has shone throughout
the world from past times to present, and has made an enormous contribution to human society.
After a century of suffering and hardship, the nation has overcome humiliation, emerged from
backwardness, and embraced boundless development opportunities. Now, it is striding towards the
goal of national rejuvenation.
Embarking on a new journey in a new era, the CPC and the Chinese government will continue
to rally compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and lead the efforts to answer the call of the
times, shoulder historic responsibilities, grasp our fate and our future in our own hands, and work
hard to achieve national reunification and rejuvenation.
The journey ahead cannot be all smooth sailing. However, as long as we Chinese on both sides
of the Taiwan Straits devote our ingenuity and energy to the same goal, let there be no doubt - we
will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country,
and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation. The historic goal
of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.
(Source: The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office)
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Sustainable Development Goals

TRACKING LOOPHOLES IN SDGS ATTAINMENT
Salman Danish (research associate at the Resilient Development Programme, SDPI)
Pakistan has recently seen one of the worst monsoons in its history exacerbated by the impacts
of climate change, causing flash floods across provinces.
The impacts of climate change are visible in the historic heat waves sweeping through Europe
and Great Britain which have never had to deal with such high temperatures and are ill equipped to
deal with them both in terms of infrastructure and cultural practices.
The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) 2022 Report on the status of SDG
progress and a possible future roadmap indicates that the SDG index world average is stagnant at
66, making this the second consecutive year that the world has not made progress on the SDGs.
In fact, the average SDG Index score slightly declined in 2021, which can be explained in part
in terms of problematically slow and even downright non-existent recovery in the particularly
marginalised and vulnerable parts of the world, i.e., the low- and middle-income countries, and
countries disproportionately vulnerable to climate change. Pakistan happens to fall in both
categories. It ranks 125 out of 163 on the SDGs index with a score of 59.3 against the regional average
of 65.9.
Food security seems impacted amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict which has impacted global
commodity prices. For Pakistan, this has burdened an already struggling economy with rising fuel
and commodity prices combined with the rising political uncertainty.
It is easy to see that these crises and pressures have diverted the much-needed policy attention
and priorities away from medium- and long-term goals, such as the realisation of the SDGs and the
Paris Climate Agreement 2015 and of course, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
towards reducing carbon emissions.
Pakistan submitted its revised NDCs on the eve of the COP26 held in Glasgow in November
2021 with some ambitious targets for carbon reduction by 50 percent until 2030 – 15 percent from the
country’s resources and 35 percent depending upon international climate finance support.
However, Pakistan is not alone in this regard. Much of the world’s attention is similarly
diverted and the SDSN report calls for a global return to focus on these issues as the SDGs are not
mere paper commitments but real time humanitarian and development goals that focus on social
inclusion, clean energy, responsible consumption and production and universal access to public
services; all of which are needed more than ever to respond to the major challenges of our times,
including security crises, pandemics and the ever-present spectre of climate change.
Pakistan adopted the SDGs as its official development agenda through a joint resolution of the
parliament in 2016 and set up SDGs Units both at federal and provincial levels. The country has
selected 193 out of 247 indicators for national reporting leaving 54 due to either non-availability of
data or non-relevance to Pakistan.
Currently, the country is reporting 133 priority indicators. In 2018, the government developed
the National SDG Framework which prioritises and localises the 17 SDGs. Government ministries
and line departments, as well as NGOs were asked to prioritise the SDGs in their programming and
to report their achievements in the SDGs format.
Pakistan prioritises the 17 SDGs into three categories; Category 1 goals require immediate
attention to achieve rapid results and help expedite achieving goals in categories 2 and 3. The
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Category 1 includes: SDG 2 (No Hunger), SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being), SDG 4 (Quality
Education), SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 8
(Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).
Category 2 includes SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 9 (Industry,
Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and
Communities) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). Category 3 includes SDG 12 (Responsible
Consumption and Production), SDG 13 (Climate Action), SDG 14 (Life below Sea) and SDG 15 (Life
on Land).
In a recent discussion, the climate change director agreed that while the SDGs are a great
guideline for achieving sustainable development, we need to act and prepare beyond 2030. This can
only be accomplished by realigning our policy priorities towards achieving the current SDG targets
and planning beyond 2030.
He appears to be right in terms of futuristic thinking but the policy makers should keep in
mind that Pakistan lags behind much of the SDG targets and indicators due to resource constraints,
targetted policy deficit and implementation on the SDGs as the country’s own targets. Further, there
is a need to align development work with the SDGs targets and indicators.
A major gap in Pakistan’s SDG progress is data collection and monitoring. As much as 3
percent data seems missing for being unreported or non-existent. The Covid-19 pandemic and the
deadly monsoons have shown that we can no longer rely on traditional methods of data collection
and monitoring alone.
We must use technology, data systems and innovative methods to ensure availability of
timely and high quality data to monitor the impacts of any situation or crisis in real time and inform
policy intervention at international and national levels. A significant investment in data sciences,
research and development and capacity building of the current and future workforce for data
collection and analysis is needed.
Not everything is doom and gloom. Pakistan’s overall progress on the SDGs index score
increased from 52.95 in 2015 to 63.10 in 2020, i.e., 19.2 percent from the baseline of 2015. The country
made significant progress, 28.2 percent from the baseline in short-run goals which include Goal-2:
zero hunger, Goal- 3: good health & wellbeing, Goal-4: quality education and Goal-16: peace, justice,
and strong institutions. Even so, progress on two short-run goals, i.e., Goal-7: affordable and clean
energy and Goal-8: decent work and economic growth remains unsatisfactory.
Apart from policy prioritisation at the upper echelons, another avenue of progress that
Pakistan can utilise is its often-underutilised youth. Mobilisation and capacity development of youth
on climate action and sustainable consumption and production and achieving sustainability can be a
viable strategic intervention.
Well-informed youth can lead debate on climate action and sustainability in line with relevant
SDGs among communities and stakeholders and on social media platforms. They can promote
sustainable consumption and production in all spheres of life. This is a leading issue on the debate
on realising SDGs for climate action and sustainability.
As peer mobilisers, the youth can motivate fellow youth to play their role in local actions for
conservation in the interest of reducing impacts of climate change, especially from floods. The
achievement of the SDGs can be a great starting point towards resilient and sustainable
development
(Source: TNS)
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CAN TECHNOLOGY PLAY A MORE MEANINGFUL

ROLE IN MEETING THE SDGS?
Chaesub Lee (Director, ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau)
Standards are a hidden part of the information and communication technology (ICT)
networks and devices we all use every day. They are rarely perceived by users but are vital in
enabling the interconnection and interoperability of ICT equipment and devices manufactured by
hundreds of thousands of different companies around the world.
For example, 95% of internet traffic is on fibre, built on standards from the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN specialized agency for ICT and we also played a leading
role in managing the radio spectrum and developing globally applicable standards for 5G.
Technical standards necessary to improve SDGs
But while it is clear that technical standards are indispensable for business and society to work
in our industrialized world, it is becoming clear that technical standards will also play a key role in
addressing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Indeed, the focus of the recent ITU Global Standards Symposium which brought more than
700 industry leaders and policy-makers together, was how standards can play a role in addressing
some of the most pressing needs of the planet, like eradicating poverty or hunger and mitigating
climate change.
How ITU can help end poverty and hunger
An ITU Focus Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things (IoT) for Digital
Agriculture is working towards new standards to support global improvements in the precision and
sustainability of farming techniques.
Within an ITU WHO Focus Group on AI for Health, an open-code concept highlights the type
of metrics that could help developers and health regulators certify future AI solutions, in the same
way as is done for medical equipment. In addition, standards for medical-grade digital health
devices – such as connected blood pressure cuffs, glucose monitors, weight scales and a wide range
of activity – are helping prevent and manage chronic conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, and
heart disease.
Standards are helping bring broadband to rural communities with lightweight optical cable
that can be deployed on the ground’s surface with minimal expense and environmental impact. The
installation of ultra-high-speed optical networks typically comes with a great deal of cost and
complexity. Standards are helping to change that equation by providing a solution able to be
deployed at low cost with everyday tools.
Making cities and communities smarter
Addressing SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities, more than 150 cities around the
world have started evaluating their progress towards smart-city objectives and alignment with the
SDGs using Key Performance Indicators for Smart Sustainable Cities based on tech standards. These
cities are supported by United for Smart Sustainable Cities (U4SSC), an initiative backed by ITU and
another 16 UN partners
Addressing SDGs on climate action and green energy, ITU standards for green ICT include
sustainable power-feeding solutions for 5G networks, as well as smart energy solutions for telecom
sites and data centres that prioritize the intake of power from renewable energy sources. They also
cover the use of AI and big data to optimize data centre energy efficiency and innovative techniques
to reduce energy needs for data centre cooling.
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Financial inclusion is another key area of action to achieve SDG 1 on ending poverty. Digital
channels are bringing life-changing financial services to millions of people for the very first time.
Enormous advances have been made within the Financial Inclusion Global Initiative (FIGI) and
associated development of technical standards in support of secure financial applications and
services, reliable digital infrastructure, and the resulting consumer trust that our money and digital
identities are safe.
Taking a multi-stakeholder approach
However, the complexity of global problems requires numerous organizations with different
objectives and profiles to work towards common goals. The world’s leading developers of
international ICT standards need to work together to address the SDGs, using frameworks such as
the World Standards Cooperation, with the support of mechanisms such as the Standardization
Programme Coordination Group, reviewing activities, identifying standards gaps and opportunities,
and working to ensure comprehensive standardization solutions to global challenges.
Including a greater variety of voices in standards discussions is crucial. It is particularly
important that developing countries are heard, and that a multistakeholder approach is made a
priority to have a successful and inclusive digital transformation. Uncoordinated and non-inclusive
standardization can spell lasting harm for countries that already struggle to afford long-term socio-
economic investments. Without global and regional coordination, today’s digital revolution could
produce uneven results, making it imperative that all standards bodies work cohesively.
Political will is crucial for change
Sustainable digital transformation requires political will. It was notable that last year in Italy
for the first time, the G20 leaders in their final communiqué acknowledged the importance of
international consensus-based standards to digital transformation and sustainable development.
This very important step could not have been made by one standards body alone.
Cities, governments, and companies are on a steep learning curve as they adopt new tech as
part of low-carbon, sustainable, citizen-centric development strategies as they seek to meet the
challenge of addressing the SDGs. International standards, recognized around the world, are
essential to making technologies in fields like fintech, digital health and 5G, combined with bigger
and better data use, accessible and useful to everyone, everywhere.
(Source: World Economic Forum)

GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS

Abdulla Shahid (76th President of the United Nations General Assembly)
Gabriel Ferrero De Loma-osorio (the Chairperson of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS))
As parents and global citizens, we are very worried about the cost-of-living crisis that the
world is facing – the worst in over a generation. The interlinked shocks of the Covid-19 pandemic,
climate change and conflicts have thrown the global food, agricultural, financial and energy systems
and markets into turmoil.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has added fuel to the already precarious poverty, hunger and
malnutrition situation. Besides its tragic humanitarian toll, the war is extending human suffering to
all corners of the world through widespread disruptions to the planting, harvesting, transport, and
export of major agricultural commodities from the Black Sea region.
The war has also disrupted prices of and access to inputs like fuels and fertilisers. And in this
context, we welcome the grain trade deal which offers a lifeline to millions, and strongly urge all
parties to honour the agreement.
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Even before the war, hunger and malnutrition were on the rise globally, with an unacceptable
823 million people going hungry in 2021 according to the recent edition of the State of Food Security
and Nutrition in the World report by five United Nations agencies, including FAO, IFAD, UNICEF,
WFP and WHO. That said, the war has pushed an additional 50 million people into severe hunger in
2022 across the world. With food prices continuing to rise, another 19 million more people are
expected to face chronic undernourishment globally in 2023.
These are not mere statistics but real people around the world, from Cairo to Caracas, Dhaka
to Donetsk, who are going to bed hungry.
While everyone is squeezed by food price inflation, the poor are the hardest hit, especially in
developing countries, where food accounts for half of a typical family’s budget. They are finding it
more and more difficult to afford the food needed to nourish their families, and are being forced to
reduce food intake, sell their productive assets, or take their children out of school.
As a result, we are seeing years of progress in reducing hunger and poverty reversed,
undermining efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 while
exacerbating inequalities. The World Bank warns that the war in Ukraine is likely to plunge up to 95
million people into extreme poverty, making 2022 the second-worst year ever for poverty
alleviation, behind only 2020.
The growing number of export bans and trade restrictions on wheat and other commodities
are making the crisis worse. These actions are counterproductive and they must be reversed.
We are glad to note that representatives from more than 100 World Trade Organization
member countries have recently taken action to step up their efforts to facilitate trade in food and
agricultural products and reaffirmed the importance of refraining from export restrictions.
In addition, the Group of Seven, which includes major food exporters like Canada, the
European Union, and the United States, has already pledged to avoid export bans and other trade-
restrictive measures.
Food insecurity and malnutrition will remain a key challenge given the intensification of its
drivers, including conflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns, combined
with the high cost of nutritious foods and growing inequalities.
In challenging circumstances like this, we are all called to come together, united in common
responsibility, to address and solve the problem. As the UN secretary-general says: “It takes a world
to fix the world.” For us, inaction is not an option.
We call on the international community to urgently support affected people, communities and
countries through coordinated action. We welcome and laud several initiatives that have been
launched over the past months by governments, institutions and political fora. These are mobilising
leadership, finances, political will and a wide range of policy responses to the global food crisis.
To succeed, all of us must work together to ensure our actions to address the crisis converge.
Millions of lives are at stake and the world’s most vulnerable do not have the luxury of time for
duplication or wastage of efforts.
Thankfully, we know what we need to do, together, to raise our ambition and deliver concrete
actions.
First, stepping up humanitarian response for those already in need. However, addressing this
crisis and the vicious cycles it creates calls for an approach that looks at the emergency today with
our focus firmly fixed on strengthening livelihoods against future shocks.
Second, urgent stabilisation of markets, debt and commodity prices to immediately restore the
availability, accessibility and affordability of food to enable all people everywhere to realise their
right to food. We urge countries to continue releasing strategic food stockpiles and inputs into
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markets, minimise hoarding and other speculative behaviour, and avoid unnecessary trade
restrictions.
Third, encourage increased local production by family farmers, small-scale food producers,
small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and cooperatives, as well as increased consumption of
diverse food varieties; diversify sources of imported foods; and reduce food loss and food waste.
Fourth, restore fertiliser availability ensuring sustained and affordable access by smallholders
and family farmers. This should go hand-in-hand with transformation to sustainable and inclusive
production as promoted by the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit, including a commitment to
increased efficiency in the use of energy and fertilisers, unleashing the potential of agroecology and
other innovative approaches to sustainable agriculture.
Fifth, reinforce social protection systems needed to prevent vulnerable communities from
sliding into poverty and furthering malnutrition. Examples of such measures include the time-
proven school meals programme to address the impact of this crisis on children’s malnutrition, or
cash transfer programmes to boost the purchasing power of poor households.
Sixth and last, countries need financial resources and the fiscal space to support strong
national responses to the crisis. We need to fund existing international financing mechanisms; with
the IMF and the international financial institutions (IFIs) playing an essential role. We urge countries
that were proposing cuts to Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments to reconsider
their decisions and instead respect the target to direct 0.7 percent of their national incomes to ODA.
Lessons from the 2007-08 food crisis, as well as from the COVID-19 pandemic more recently,
show that meaningful and principled policy response should support country-led coping strategies
that involve all of society: from farmers to consumers, civil society, and businesses, especially those
most affected by the food crisis.
Gladly, we have seen many countries around the world, including those that are affected
most, put in place a raft of solutions to cushion their people against the crisis. These solutions should
be encouraged and supported. The UN secretary-general’s Global Crisis Response Group is
providing joint analysis and policy recommendations from the whole of the UN System.
We must ensure that our responses are consistent with and guided by the SDGs, which are the
comprehensive blueprint for sustainable development.
This article was originally published as: ‘It’s time we all come together to address the global
food crisis’.
(Source: Al Jazeera)
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South Asia
BLUE ECONOMY MAY BE THE KEY TO SOUTH ASIA’S UPSWING
Samriddhi Roy (Research Assistant at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation)
For decades, traditional and non-traditional threats in South Asia have found their footing in
shifting geopolitical patterns. The Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the recent Sri Lankan geo-economic
crisis and US–China flare-up over Taiwan have elicited a thicker South Asian solidarity through
avant-garde developmental policies. In this milieu, introducing blue economic partnerships in South
Asia may prove for lucrative and sustainable collaboration between nations.
The United Nations first used the term “Blue Economy” in 2012 during the Rio+20 summit on
sustainable development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The objective was to create a “sustainable ocean-
based economy”. Alongside economic liberation, the Blue Economy Theory stresses social
integration, the defence of humanity, the pursuit of gender equality and the preservation of the
ocean.
Given the rise of land and border-based issues globally, South Asian nations must chart new
courses under the remit of the Blue Economy strategy so that they can take full advantage of their
prospering oceanic capabilities with joint regional partners. Consider Bangladesh – a littoral country
that has skilfully harnessed the Bay of Bengal for economic development and utilisation of the seas,
oceans and marine assets. Similarly, India's Sagar Mala project aims to connect the oceans with the
Indian interior by unlocking the potential of its waterways, including 111 inland rivers. In Sri Lanka,
the country’s proximity to major sea lanes has led to the recreation of industries and the building of
port capacities.
However, while South Asia enjoys coastal advantages due to its geography, it is also faced
with multiple challenges. Besides geopolitical difficulties, the region’s countries also face serious
impediments due to pollution, habitat loss, biodiversity degradation, piracy, international crime and
climate change.
The Bay of Bengal, however, offers multiple blue benefits to the South Asian region. Being the
largest bay in the world, it shares a coastline with Bangladesh to the north, India to the north and
east, Myanmar to the east, Indonesia to the southeast and Sri Lanka to the southwest. As a result,
most South Asian countries have invested in several municipal and diplomatic instruments that
acknowledge the interrelationship between their environments. Yet analyses have proven that South
Asia seems unable to conjointly mobilise the potential of a blue economy. The lack of financial
backing, dearth of regional research and scientific inquiry, inadequacy in policy-building,
uncoordinated institutional frameworks and limited capacity building are serious barriers to South
Asia's blue economic growth. Hence, the region should look towards an ambitious but pragmatic
ocean strategy that involves bilateral and multilateral funding sources, incentives and regulations
and a commerce-based approach that aligns with cohesive proliferative schemes. An all-inclusive
South Asian directive should be instituted, where regional stakeholders – from heads of nations to
grassroots organisations, NGOs and the private sector – participate in addressing these challenges.
In this regard, three recommendations can be proposed. First, South Asian nations should
undertake to unify all industrial and environmental concerns relating to marine ecology under a
single regulating authority. This will reduce governance and coordination challenges. A joined
South Asia committee/forum should be formulated that recognises both economic and ecological
regional aspirations by the sharing of respective national databases subdivided by aquatic sectors.
This will immensely assist countries in deliberating over joint operational possibilities in the blue
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sector, such as in deep-sea mining, maritime transportation, sea-borne trade and sharing of
advanced technologies and skill development.
Second, introducing blue bonds at the national and regional levels could be a game-changer in
producing flourishing blue governance systems. Bonds of such a nature demand ocean-related
economic activity, which needs to be transparently regulated to prevent perverse incentives, such as
the sprawl of the fishing industry. Globally, at least six blue bonds have been issued to assist ocean
conservation initiatives, with the Seychelles government giving the first in 2018. There is an urgent
need to develop such markets for a positive environmental influence.

Third, bring women’s participation in the blue economy to the mainstream is not a need but a
necessity. In India, more than 5.4 million people actively fish, of which 1.6 million are fisherwomen.
In Indonesia, the number is even higher, with at least 56 million people working in the fishing
industry, more than 39 million of whom are women. However, the work of women in coastal
activities is not reflected in equitable remittances compared to their male counterparts. The UN
Women report (2020) addresses this gender-wage gap and suggests increasing women’s economic
empowerment by removing unwarranted gender imbalances in the marine sector.
Recent developments in South Asia’s power-based realpolitik will only intensify in the future.
Thus, integrative blue economic policies are required to bolster regional growth by unblocking trade
barriers and facilitating more comprehensive connectivity. The initiative of intra-Asia blocs such as
the I2U2 (aka West Asia Quad) also serve as examples of South Asia’s comprehensive energy and
knowledge-sharing outreach.
Through the implementation of these recommendations, blue economic systems can achieve
appreciable flexibility to respond to new possibilities and problems. Governing vast expanses of
ocean space towards a blue economy is a joint regional task. If South Asia manages the oceans
effectively, it possesses the ability to both augment existing industries and foster the development of
new ones.
(Source: The Interpreter)

REALPOLITIK DRIVES ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN

INDIA AND THE TALIBAN
Dnyanesh Kamat (Development sector professional)
When the death of Ayman Al Zawahiri was announced last week, the government of India, a
country singled out as a target by the Al Qaeda leader, remained quiet. Many analysts read the fact
that he was able to base himself in the Afghan capital as the Taliban’s failure to keep its promise that
the group had cut ties with extremist groups threatening other countries. Theories swirled that
Pakistan had given up his location to the Americans in a great betrayal. Either way, Al Zawahiri’s
death on a Kabul balcony from a US drone strike was an awkward moment for India because it
highlighted what was once considered unthinkable – New Delhi’s attempts to build ties with the
Taliban.
In June, India announced the re-opening of its embassy in Kabul after shutting it down when
the Taliban swept to power a year ago. Historically, India and the Taliban have been enemies. The
Indian national security establishment viewed the group as a Pakistani proxy; the Taliban in its
previous incarnation as a government between 1996 and 2001, ensured Afghanistan gave Pakistan
and anti-India terror groups strategic depth. From the Taliban’s perspective, India supported
Afghanistan’s previous republican government, as well as anti-Taliban forces in the 1990s. Given
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this, it is surprising that both sides now seem to want to engage with each other. Yet, it seems as if
realpolitik has brought both sides to this moment.
The Taliban is desperate for developmental and humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan’s
economy has collapsed, a situation worsened by one of the worst droughts to hit the country in
living memory. In June, a devastating earthquake killed 1,000 people. India sent 30,000 metric tons
of wheat and 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Afghanistan in February. Pakistan, long viewed
as the Taliban’s benefactor, will in the long term be unable to match Indian assistance given that its
economy is a shambles and the level of political instability.
Moreover, Pakistan-Taliban relations have become increasingly tense in recent months. Just
like previous Afghan governments, the Taliban refuses to recognize the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, viewing it as a colonial imposition. Taliban border guards have repeatedly blocked
Pakistani attempts at fencing the border. Islamabad is also unhappy with the Taliban’s
unwillingness or inability to rein in the anti-Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) militant group, which
maintains bases in Afghanistan. In April, Pakistan launched air raids against what it believed were
TTP bases in eastern Afghanistan, which killed dozens of Afghan civilians. A Taliban spokesman
said the airstrikes would pave the “way for enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” A souring
Taliban-Pakistan relationship may have created an opportunity for New Delhi.
Cooperation could begin with India providing developmental and humanitarian assistance in
return for the Taliban’s assurances that it will not allow Afghanistan to be used by anti-India terror
groups. New Delhi has still not officially commented on the Al Zawahiri killing. He had threatened
India as recently as May, yet despite this, and perhaps to avoid embarrassing the Taliban further,
New Delhi has chosen to stay silent. Instead, TV channels seen as friendly to the government have
speculated feverishly on Pakistan stabbing the Taliban in the back by disclosing to the US Al
Zawahiri’s location in a villa linked to the Haqqani faction of the Taliban, long considered close to
Pakistan.
Both New Delhi and the Taliban, despite their history, have given signs over the last few
months that they need not view each other as enemies. Even in 2019, when India enraged Pakistan
by stripping Kashmir of its autonomy, the Taliban refused to comment on the issue, saying it was
India’s internal affairs. New Delhi for its part has avoided antagonizing the Taliban. In November
last year when India hosted the Afghanistan Conference with regional states, it made it clear that its
aim in Afghanistan was not to support an anti-Taliban military alliance, but to prevent Afghan
territory from being used by transnational terror groups. In May, India’s national security advisor
went a step further by calling for enhancing Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities. What was
left unsaid was how this could be done when the Taliban has not been recognized by any
government thus far.
Clues as to the direction of the current limited detente may be gleaned from the red-carpet
welcome given by the Taliban to 25 India-trained Afghan soldiers affiliated with the previous
regime who returned to Kabul this month. After assurances from the Afghan interior ministry that
no harm would come to them, it was further announced they would be used for the country’s
national defense. The Taliban’s defense minister, Mullah Yaqoob, has also called for Taliban soldiers
to receive training in India. This has to be seen in the context of the Taliban’s inability to defeat the
ISIS in Khorasan Province militant group. This may be a bridge too far for New Delhi for now, but it
is significant given that Afghanistan’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani belongs to the Haqqani
faction, which was blamed for the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul.
Due to its strategic location and considerable mineral deposits, a Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan will become the site of great power competition yet again. Soon after coming to power,
the Taliban asked a state-backed Chinese company to return to a mining project to extract copper.
Neither the US nor India would like to see a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan fall under Beijing’s sway. As
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odious as the Taliban regime is, particularly in its treatment of women and minorities, it seems
realpolitik will increasingly determine not just India’s but the world’s engagement with the new
regime in Kabul.
(Source: E-IR)

THE FACADE OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY

Asif Iqbal (Researcher, and counterterrorism and geopolitical analyst with a focus on South Asia)
Seventy-five years ago, India gained freedom and declared itself a secular state. The
constitution of the world’s largest democracy provides for “freedom of conscience and the right of
all individuals to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion”.
The multi-ethnic and multi-religious population of the country apparently lived in ‘relative
peace’ till 2014, despite being marred by intermittent episodes of massacres like Nellie and Gujarat,
assault on mosques, killings of Adivasis (Indian aborigines), discrimination against Dalits, not to
forget the sporadic separatist cum independent movements in Illegally Indian Occupied Jammu and
Kashmir (IIOJK), Punjab, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pardesh, Meghalaya,
Tripura and the Naxalite movement affecting ten or so states.
In 2014, the ultra-rightwing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power and
the political landscape of India morphed into saffron terrorism. It was evident that the secular ideals
professed by Nehru were under threat from Hindutva fanaticism, when the ‘butcher of Gujrat’,
Narendra Modi, declared at an election rally in Bangalore, “I can see saffron waves rising from
across the region. What a delightful sight!”
The Sangh Parivar provides a ‘canopy’ to all ultra-Hindu nationalist organizations – over 60 of
them – epitomized and infused by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS); the BJP is the political
power facet of the RSS. With over 3000 branches in more than 120 countries, the RSS and its
affiliates, like the VHP, HSS etc, accrue considerable funding from expatriates. As per a Human
Rights Watch (HRW) report, it has “considerable influence over [the] country’s educational, social
and defense policies”.
The Liberhan Commission report, constituted after the destruction of Babri Masjid, laid the
“primary responsibility” for its destruction “on the top leadership of the RSS, VHP, Shiv Sena,
Bajrang Dal and the BJP, as inner core of Sangh Parivar”. The Commission also highlighted that the
“Ayodhya campaign demonstrated that the ‘Sangh Parivar’ is a highly successful and corporatised
model of a political party, with a highly efficient organizational structure”. The Sangh Parivar took
long years to plan and accomplish its designs for Hindutva ideology – India for Hindus; Hindu
Rashtra – using the media to stimulate, influence and create its aura amongst the people. The
demolition of Babri Masjid was just the tip of what was to follow when the BJP would come into
power.
The RSS, inspired by the Hindutva vision of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, over the years
managed to create a myth that Hindu religion is endangered because of the presence and practice of
other religions and Hindus would only be safe, if India were converted into a Hindu state. The myth
held sway, and it was no surprise when the BJP won the elections in 2014 and Narendra Modi took
the helm to ‘save’ Hindus from the perils of secularism.
Muslims, being 14 per cent of the population in India, are one of the largest minorities but still
seen as ‘outsiders’ by the dons of Hindutva. The anti-Islam and anti-Muslim stance has gained
traction and hate-crimes against Muslims have considerably increased since the BJP came to power.
Secular India is now being led by a fascist regime which is hell-bent in persecuting minorities to its
objective of Hindutva. Dr Lal Dena, former vice-chancellor of Sangai International University,
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Manipur has interesting statistics for the year 2021, which witnessed the highest number of
persecution of Christians in India, with reported cases reaching 486; the worst affected states were
Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh. No doubt, RSS leaders like Madhav
Sadashivrao Golwalkar and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar were impressed with Hitler’s policies and
so-called ‘cultural nationalism’.
The policies implemented and pursued by the Modi government have the blessings of the RSS
and are shaped by the think tanks of Sangh Parivar, like Hindu Vivek Kendra, Vivekananda
International Foundation (VIF) and Akhil Bharatiya Itihas Sankalan Yojana (ABISY). Interestingly,
the VIF’s founder is none other than Ajit Doval, the current and longest running national security
adviser of India; this public policy think tank has ‘intellectuals’ like Lt-Gen Gautam Banerjee and
Tilak Devasher on its payroll.
New citizenship laws were passed prior to the 2019 elections, quelling all opposition voices,
and paving the way for Modi’s second term. Approximately 120 million voters, which included an
estimated 70 million Muslims and Dalits, were removed from the electoral rolls to achieve victory.
To top it all, citizenship of approximately two million Muslim émigrés, settled in Assam since the
1950s and 60s, was revoked; they are now declared as “illegal infiltrators”.
The anti-Muslim campaign took a new turn when Modi revoked the special status of IIOJK to
realize the delusion of Akhand Bharat. The demography of IIOJK is being transformed through
Hindu immigration, granting property rights to non-Kashmiris and raising new settlements for
Hindus. Nehru believed that “facts are facts and will not disappear on account of your likes” — yet
to legitimize the illegitimate, history books are being re-written under the auspices of the BJP
government and under RSS guidance, to downplay the role of Muslims in Indian culture and
history.
Under Modi’s fascist regime, there are abundant human rights violations which are contrary
to Nehru’s democratic ideals — persecution of minorities, discrimination against Dalits, forced
conversions of Muslims, banning of beef and of cow slaughter, illegal detention, extra-judicial
killings, use of rape as weapon specifically against Muslims and Maoists, random and well-planned
attacks on minorities, exclusion of job opportunities for Muslims and Dalits, forced migrations and
evictions, passing of laws which affect certain communities and their religious sensibilities (as was
the case of Triple Talaq Bill).
Communal violence against minorities gets a blind-eye from the government, thus endorsing
a silent nod. Awakening the so-called ‘Hindu chauvinism’ vis-a-vis Hindu extremism has resulted
into a fractured and fissured India, signifying fascism at its peak, where minorities, specifically
Muslims are being persecuted. Barbara F Walter, the leading US political scientist, counts India
amongst the top 25 democratic countries which are ‘severely affected by a wave of international
autocratization’. Modi’s policies are more autocratic than democratic and can be judged when the
prime minister of the largest democracy, as reported by HRW, called people participating in various
peaceful protests as “parasites”.
Y Venu Gopal Reddy reports that according to Prakash Karat, the former general secretary of
Communist Party of India, “there are two components among the major source of authoritarianism
at work in India, ie, Hindutva communalism and right-wing neo-liberal drive”. Democracy in India,
with the BJP at the steering, is a facade and a sham, which is evidently accentuated by the degrading
polity score.
Dr Lawrence Britt highlights fourteen aspects of fascist regimes: powerful and continuing
nationalism; disdain for the recognition of human rights; identification of enemies/ scapegoats as a
unifying cause; supremacy of military; rampant sexism; controlled mass media; obsession with
national security; religion and government are intertwined; corporate power is protected; labour
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power is suppressed; disdain for intellectuals and [the] arts; obsession with crime and punishment;
rampant cronyism and corruption; and fraudulent elections. The BJP checks all and fits the bill.
The way the RSS has entrenched Hindutva ideology amongst the Hindu masses, compounded
with Modi’s policies of investing more powers in his office and dissuading any opposition to his
nefarious and divisive policies, it is plausibly assessed that India is likely to remain under a
democratic-autocratic rule for the times to come.
(Source: The News)

SOUTH ASIA DEBT WOES EVOKE FEARS OF

ANOTHER 1997-STYLE CRISIS
Pakistan is scrambling for a bailout to avert a debt default as its currency plummets.
Bangladesh has sought a preemptive loan from the International Monetary Fund. Sri Lanka has
defaulted on its sovereign debt and its government has collapsed. Even India has seen the rupee
plunge to all-time lows as its trade deficit balloons.
Economic and political turbulence is rattling South Asia this summer, drawing chilling
comparisons to the turmoil that engulfed neighbors to the east a quarter century ago in what became
known as the Asian Financial Crisis.
Back then, what seemed like an isolated event—Thailand’s July 1997 baht devaluation to cope
with currency speculation—spread like a virus to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. Panic-
stricken lenders demanded early repayments, and investors pulled out of stocks and bonds in
emerging markets, including in Latin America and Russia, which defaulted on some of its debt in
August 1998. A month later hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, which had made highly
leveraged bets on Russian and Asian securities, buckled.
Can it happen again? Ammar Habib Khan, chief risk officer at Karandaaz Pakistan, an
Islamabad-based nonprofit that focuses on financial inclusion, thinks so. South Asian nations “had a
big party on low-cost dollar debt, funding consumption and vanity projects during the last 10
years,” he says. “South Asia has the same vibes as Southeast Asia in 1997.”
The fault lines started to show this spring, when the US Federal Reserve accelerated interest-
rate increases to combat inflation. That set dominoes falling in South Asia, where inflation has also
been roaring. Easy money dried up, currencies depreciated, and foreign exchange reserves
dissipated.
A prolonged crisis would sap dynamism in a region that’s home to a quarter of the world’s
population and its fastest-growing major economy, India, threatening expansion plans for
companies betting big on the area, such as Amazon.com Inc. and Walmart Inc.
So far, contagion seems contained. One reason is that in 1997, Asian countries’ so-called
economic miracle masked vulnerabilities that are less prevalent today: too much public and private
debt, weak banks, highly speculative foreign investment. South Asian countries also owe less to
foreigners, having borrowed more in local currencies than in dollars to finance growth than
neighboring countries did in the 1990s.
The IMF, in various stages of negotiation with the most battered economies for potential loans,
also seems more forbearing. The multilateral lender imposed harsh austerity measures on flailing
governments in the last crisis. This time, experts say, it’s unlikely to follow the same playbook. “I do
not think there is a standard answer such as belt-tightening,” says Raghuram Rajan, a professor at
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and former governor of the Reserve Bank of
India. “Indeed, poorer households may benefit from some targeted government help if we are to
maintain social harmony.”
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Still, there are plenty of danger signs. The region has been slammed by fuel and food
shortages and the inflationary spike caused in part by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Political unrest has
broken out in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
Government rationing has led to unpredictable power outages that have stretched to 12 hours
a day in Pakistan and five hours in Bangladesh. “Sometimes lights go out in the evening, sometimes
in the middle of the night,” says Shawon Mondol, 18, a college student from Madhukhali in
southern Bangladesh, about 90 miles from Dhaka. “That’s in addition to the power cuts in the
daytime. I can’t concentrate on my studies.”
Capital is fleeing. Even countries that export commodities and benefited from a strong dollar
earlier this year are suffering from broad-based outflows, according to the Washington-based
Institute of International Finance.
Pakistan’s currency, the rupee, has crashed to a record low and fared the worst among the
countries the IIF tracks. Its sovereign debt rating is deep in junk territory. A new administration has
increased diesel prices nearly 100% and electricity prices almost 50 percent over a few months in a
bid to win an IMF bailout. Pakistan also imposed a tax on retailers to boost revenue, setting off
countrywide protests. When the pandemic took hold, multilateral institutions and other countries
“had a greater sense of concern for the global economy,” says Finance Minister Miftah Ismail.
“That’s missing now.” He insists Pakistan is weathering the storm with the help of self-imposed
budget cuts and by depressing demand for imports.
In Bangladesh, which has a steady credit rating and is considered a rising star among so-called
frontier economies by many economists, fuel shortages are fomenting widespread angst and
bloating import bills. The usually robust garment industry, accounting for more than 80% of exports,
faces an energy crunch at home and a slowdown in orders from abroad. Bangladesh has sought IMF
assistance, which officials in Dhaka say is preemptive and not to be equated with the bailout funds
sought by Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
Sri Lanka’s problems are the most complicated. Its government toppled amid widespread
protests over fuel shortages and government mismanagement. And it’s yet to meet conditions for
fresh IMF aid, such as creditor agreements to whittle down existing debt. “Everybody is in queues,”
says Ravith Silva, head of Motor Link Holdings, an auto engineering company in Colombo. A barrel
of engine oil that two years ago cost 150,000 to 200,000 Sri Lankan rupees ($414 to $552) now fetches
one million, he says. Paint prices have risen almost 900%. “Prices are changing so fast that we cannot
give a quote that is valid for more than three days.”
Sri Lanka is negotiating with China for as much as $4 billion in aid, including a restructuring
of a $1 billion Chinese loan due this year, Palitha Kohona, Colombo’s ambassador to China, told
Bloomberg Television on July 15. Some 10% of Sri Lanka’s external debt is owed to China, he says.
The hope is that India can provide an anchor of stability, as China did for East Asia a quarter
century ago. India’s foreign currency reserves have increased twentyfold since the previous crisis,
which largely spared the nation. Its stock markets have zoomed as investors placed bets on its vast
consumer market. But the rupee’s fall against the dollar alongside Fed tightening has put fresh
pressure on India’s ability to finance imports that have grown more costly with a weaker currency.
The central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, has been forced to use part of its war chest of
about $600 billion after investors pulled out almost $29 billion from domestic equities this year,
though it still has enough to cover imports for about nine months. The RBI has raised interest rates
and is expected to tighten more to bring inflation down, with Governor Shaktikanta Das promising a
soft landing. A neighborhood of more than 1.5 billion people can only hope for the same.
(Source: The News Time of Asia)
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HOW CAN SRI LANKA ESCAPE CRISIS

The IMF last week announced a provisional $ 2.9 billion loan to Sri Lanka for recovery from
an economic crisis which has caused extreme inflation, shortages and protests. But once the loan is
approved, the country has decisions to make on how best to spend the funds. Recent evidence
shows that universal social protection could be critical to getting the country back on track.
Lessons from the COVID response
Sri Lanka’s current crisis requires a large-scale emergency response. The COVID-19 pandemic
caused significant damage to family wellbeing as well as the economy. The response put in place
was nowhere near large enough to offer families adequate income support and trigger economic
recovery.
Back in 2020, UNICEF recommended a large-scale, six-month expansion of social protection,
which would have cost a total of 1.5% of GDP and generated significant demand within the
economy, while reaching 86% of the population with essential income support. Unfortunately, the
absence of an adequate fiscal response to the COVID-19 emergency meant that the economy has
been unable to return to a strong footing, which has contributed to the current crisis. Subsequent
policy decisions by the Government made an already bad situation much worse.
It is essential that the Sri Lankan Government and the international community learn the
lessons from the limited response to the COVID-19 crisis. This means implementing, as soon as
possible, an ambitious program of emergency income support to families. If families do not receive
this support, social unrest is likely to worsen, which could lead to a collapse of the political system,
with far-reaching consequences. Further, the economic situation could continue to deteriorate,
exacerbating a volatile situation, while families across the country struggle to feed themselves and
access public services.
This short note proposes an ambitious emergency package which, if implemented, should
help stabilise the political situation, reduce the level of social unrest, offer vulnerable families – who
now comprise most of the population – immediate financial support, and stimulate economic
recovery.
Emergency support for children, persons with disabilities and older people
Across the country, the majority of families are suffering. Even among those who were
previously secure, many have fallen into deep poverty and the crisis has left almost no one
untouched. The greatest challenges are felt by households that include children, persons with
disabilities and older people. Therefore, given that not everyone can be reached, support should be
focused on these vulnerable categories of the population, which will also help those who live with
them in the same households.
As the crisis is universal, it makes little sense to target the poorest members of society. Even
before COVID, it was impossible to identify the poorest households in Sri Lanka. For that reason,
back in 2016, more than half (58%) of people who were meant to receive the Samurdhi cash transfer
– directed at ‘the poor’ – did not receive it. Further, targeting the poorest could exacerbate the
current political crisis, given that most of the population would feel that the Government is
abandoning them, while the targeting errors would create widespread resentment and generate
further social unrest. Indeed, one of the causes of the civil war in Syria was the introduction of a
poverty-targeted cash transfer to compensate for the removal of a universal fuel subsidy.
An emergency program of income support should, therefore, offer transfers to children,
persons with disabilities and older people for a period of six months. While this program could be
designed in various ways, one option is to provide transfers to every child aged 0-17 years (with the
cash being given to the female caregiver, or a male if a female is not present), all persons with
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disabilities aged 0-59 years and everyone aged 60 years and above. 1The transfer values and costs
are set out in Table 1.1.
The total package would require $ 1.06 billion. While this may appear to be a high cost over a
short period of time, it is an investment that will have rapid impact and pave the way for long-term
recovery – at the cost of little more than a third of the IMF’s loan (36.6%).
If the emergency package is not put in place, the real cost to Sri Lanka, through further
hardship, losses in child development, social unrest, and reduced economic growth will be much
higher and, in some cases – especially the losses in human capital among children – unrecoverable.
Since the transfers would be given to everyone in the categories, registration should be
relatively easy, at least for older people and children. They would only have to provide evidence of
their age and the additional complexity associated with poverty targeting would be removed.
Identifying persons with disabilities will be more challenging: it would be necessary to design a
reliable but easy-to-use disability assessment mechanism before registration commences (off-the-
shelf options are available, such as a mechanism that has recently been introduced into Cambodia).
Prior to the roll-out of the support, it will be necessary to design the operational processes and
set up an electronic management information system (MIS). Again, with the right level of
commitment, this could be achieved relatively quickly, especially if it is built using an open-source
MIS used in other countries. A payment mechanism(s) would have to be designed, using established
financial service providers. Given the high rate of inflation, it is likely that frequent payments to
recipients would be helpful (for example, every two weeks) and payment values should be adjusted
each time, in line with the dollar exchange rate.
Likely impacts of the emergency transfers
The emergency transfer package will have a significant impact on the wellbeing of households
across Sri Lanka. In total, 88% of households will be reached. On average, a household would
receive $ 32 per month, with higher amounts accessed by households with disabled members ($ 60
per month) and over-60s ($ 58 per month). The largest households – those with more than six
people, which tend to be poorer – would receive, on average, $ 61 per month. The average increase
in household consumption among recipient households, compared to pre-COVID consumption,
would be 14%.
2As Figure 1 indicates, the highest increases would be among those who were in the poorest
decile of the population prior to COVID, at almost 32%. This would make a significant difference to
the wellbeing of households. However, given the scale of the current crisis, for many households the
transfers are likely to be their only source of income and means of feeding themselves.
Emergency transfers would have further important impacts. They are likely to lessen the risk
of social unrest and conflict and, as such, build trust in a new government, which will enable it to
have the space to make further important policy decisions. In addition, the transfers will play a key
role in promoting economic recovery.
After six months, the Government should consider continuing with the transfers, as it seeks to
build a modern, lifecycle social protection system. Such a system would build the resilience of the
population to future shocks, while offering income support to the most vulnerable members of
society. The reformed social protection system could scale back from the level of emergency
spending, potentially by reducing the age of eligibility for the child benefit – in line with a UNICEF
proposal from 2020 – and by increasing the age of eligibility for the old age benefit.
Recurrent annual spending of 2% of GDP would be sufficient to give Sri Lanka a strong,
modern social protection system that offers meaningful protection to all citizens across the lifecycle,
building trust in a new government, while continuing to stimulate economic growth.
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WHY SRI LANKA’S COLLAPSE LOOMS LARGE OVER BANGLADESH

Shafquat Rabbee (Geopolitical columnist)
Dubbed by pundits as a development “miracle”, Bangladesh is slated for graduation from the
status of “Least Developed Country” to “Developing Country” by 2026.
Yet, suddenly, the nation finds itself battling comparisons with Sri Lanka, which has just
experienced an economic free-fall. Bangladeshi mainstream media and social media are flooded with
speculations about the country’s impending collapse like its fellow South Asian nation.
Everyone from the prime minister’s office and groups of eminent economists to the American
ambassador in Dhaka has chimed in to argue why they believe Bangladesh is still far removed from
a Sri Lanka-like cataclysmic implosion.
They may be only partly right.
Bangladesh’s GDP is about the size of the Pakistani and Sri Lankan economies combined.
Bangladesh’s foreign currency reserves are $39bn, more than twice the $18bn of those two
neighbours together. According to the finance ministry, Bangladesh’s total debt-to-GDP ratio stands
at just over 31 percent, compared with 119 percent for Sri Lanka. Bangladesh has a higher per capita
GDP than India and is outperforming other major South Asian nations in key socioeconomic
metrics.
Given the above backdrop, why are Bangladeshis concerned about their country sliding, like
Sri Lanka, into an economic collapse?
The answer lies not so much in economic statistics but in three key similarities between the
countries that may have evaded the eyes of some external experts. These are: authoritarianism under
dynastic rule; corruption and cronyism; and debt-fuelled vanity projects.
Like the Rajapaksa family, the Sri Lankan political dynasty that steered the country into its
recent wilderness of despair, Bangladesh has been ruled for the past 14 years by the Awami League
party, led by the family of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. While the Rajapaksas were at least
democratically elected several times – including as recently as in 2019 – Hasina returned to power in
2018 via an election where the country’s security apparatus allegedly stuffed ballot boxes the night
prior to the vote. The ruling Awami League won 96 percent of the seats, a result as lopsided as is
usually the case for the rulers of North Korea, Syria, and Cambodia.
Over the years, both the Rajapaksas and the Sheikh family have drawn their political
legitimacy from their much-fabled wartime leadership. In 2009, then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa
and his brother, defence minister Gotabaya Rajapaksa, were in charge when the Sri Lankan
government decisively vanquished the Tamil Tiger guerilla fighters in Sri Lanka’s decades-old civil
war. Likewise, Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, led Bangladesh’s war of independence
against Pakistan half a century ago.
Selling their family’s wartime bravado to their impoverished and nationalistic audience, both
the Sheikhs and Rajapaksas established de-facto fiefdoms, where almost every living member of
their respective clans got positions of power.
The Rajapaksas ran Sri Lanka like a “family firm”. Before the brothers’ rule crumbled last
month, Gotabaya was president, Mahinda prime minister and their third brother Basil was a cabinet
minister. Their children also held ministerial positions – all simultaneously.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s family in Bangladesh has followed a similar template, though
less formally. Her daughter Saima Wazed, seen by many as her heir-apparent, attends state
functions and meetings with her mother. Sajeeb Wazed, the expatriate son of the prime minister,
enjoys the title of ICT adviser, with de-facto oversight of the country’s lucrative digital technology
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transformation. The prime minister’s sister Rehana, nephews, nieces, cousins and their children are
entrusted with key responsibilities ranging from managing propaganda organisations, diplomatic
and donor relationships, military affairs, parliamentary memberships and running business
conglomerates.
Such control over the state machinery and private businesses invariably breeds autocracy and
disrespect towards public opinion and political opponents. That, in turn, spawns rampant
corruption and cronyism. That’s what happened with the Rajapaksas in Sri Lanka, where protesters
found opulence in the presidential palace at variance with the dire conditions of the country. That is
also the reality in Bangladesh under the Sheikh family.
What about vanity projects?
The Rajapaksas built a $1bn port that rarely saw any ships, a $210m airport where hardly any
planes landed and a 35,000-seat cricket stadium bearing Mahinda Rajapaksa’s name that seldom
hosted any games. These are the poster children of Sri Lanka’s debt-funded excesses that sank the
nation.
Bangladeshis are now busy comparing their own white elephants with Sri Lanka’s. While the
government has introduced austerity measures, including power rationing, and police have fired
upon – and even killed – those protesting against price hikes, Bangladesh is going ahead with the
construction of a $140m cricket stadium bearing the prime minister’s name.
The Hasina government is busy constructing several multibillion-dollar mega projects,
including a $12bn nuclear power plant in Rooppur, which is significantly more expensive than
similar projects in other countries. When the World Bank declined to fund Bangladesh’s recently
completed Padma Bridge, citing corruption, Bangladesh self-funded and completed the 6km (3.7-
mile) long bridge after spending three times the initial budget ($3.8bn vs $1.2bn).
Within about a month of opening the Padma Bridge amid much jubilation, the country
frantically wrote letters to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development
Bank for loans to keep the economy afloat amid a balance of payment crisis due to rising oil prices.
It is possible the government acted prudently by pre-emptively talking to the lenders of last
resorts. After all, the Bangladesh government must have seen in Sri Lanka what economic stress can
do when an autocrat’s grand bargain of “less democracy, more development” fails.
Yet it is hardly surprising that the people of Bangladesh see eerie parallels with Sri Lanka, as
the contrast between their dwindling personal finances and the corruption-prone vanity projects
becomes sharper. Seeing the collapse of Sri Lanka’s debt-driven, dynastic authoritarianism, the
Bangladeshis are not irrational in their worry: “Are we next?”
(Source: Al-Jazeera)

UNDERSTANDING THE PROPOSED BANGLADESH-INDIA

COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (CEPA)
Bangladesh and India enjoy cooperation and warm relations in almost every area. Throughout
history, both countries have cultivated an economic dependency through export relations. At
present, both the countries are experiencing high growth and stable rise. To consolidate their growth
and dependency, they have embarked on signing a comprehensive economic partnership
agreement, titled Bangladesh-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).
Currently, both countries are diplomatically engaged on this issue. As Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina is visiting India after three years on a four-day visit (beginning on September 5, 2022), the
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visit is likely to address CEPA for further development. So, what are the prospects and potentials of
CEPA?
Notably, the talks on a CEPA began informally in 2018, against the backdrop of increasing
Chinese investments in Bangladesh. It was also discussed due to the fact that regional free trade
arrangements, like the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), have become dysfunctional. Till now,
both India and Bangladesh have run a joint study and agreed on the terms of reference.
Understanding CEPA
The proposed CEPA between Bangladesh and India has three dimensions: Trade in goods,
trade in services, and investment.The main target of the proposed CEPA is to reduce the huge trade
gap between Bangladesh and India, and open up new economic opportunities including
connectivity, new markets, and cooperation and partnership. Moreover, the CEPA is planned to
resolve the issues and challenges of anti-dumping duties and rules of origin through the perspective
of multi-modal connectivity and deepening of cooperation in the context of sub-regional
cooperation. The CEPA recognises the significant benefits of bilateral economic and commercial ties.
According to an official statement released by India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the
CEPA will incorporate a variety of issues of mutual interest, including the development of railway
infrastructure, port infrastructure, border haat, regional connectivity through multi-modal
transportation, harmonisation of standards, and mutual recognition agreements.
Further, the agreement could help step up cooperation in new areas such as green
technologies, renewables, and IT and digital platforms.
A CEPA will also strengthen the scope of investment as it includes new areas and ways of
cooperation. It will give a significant boost to two-way trade. In addition, the agreement is focusing
on four areas for strengthening the India-Bangladesh partnership including connectivity and
maintaining uninterrupted supply chain, joint production of defence equipment, exploring potential
areas of investments, and joint manufacturing of vaccines and other medicines.
Benefits of CEPA
There are specific benefits that CEPA can provide in the future. Firstly, against the backdrop
of growing bilateral trade, the trading regime between the two countries, including imports, exports,
related rules and regulations, will get new momentum as the agreement has instruments for them to
work jointly on trade, supply chain, and production. If the CEPA is operationalised, bilateral trade
potential would be USD 40 billion. After the withdrawal from RCEP, India is looking forward to
making several bilateral FTAs with its neighbouring countries.
Secondly, the CEPA will boost bilateral and sub-regional connectivity that Bangladesh is
championing in its policy initiatives. It will produce a cluster of connectivity which will shape future
trade through the Asian Highway Network routes (AH-1 and 2), BBIN, BCIM and BIMSTEC
connecting India and Bangladesh at the Petrapole-Benapole, Phulbari-Banglabandha and Dawki-
Tamabil points, and a new rail link between Akhaura (Bangladesh) and Agartala (India), among
others.
The agreement will ease personal, passenger, and cargo vehicle travel across the borders once
fully implemented. This will be most visible in bordering areas of Bangladesh where the price of
goods could decrease by more than 4.5 percent. More trade and transit will inspire new economic
activity that will raise income and lower costs for businesses and consumers.
Connectivity facilities will have some trickle-down effects on other connectivity projects in the
region. For instance, the BIMSTEC Conclave of Ports agreement linking Thailand's Ranong Port with
ports in Chennai, Visakhapatnam, and Kolkata, a BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement and a
BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement will bring more than two billion people – 22 percent of world's
population – together into an economic region.
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Thirdly, the agreement will create a new avenue for cooperation and partnership and open up
opportunities for a joint production hub and create an uninterrupted supply chain. When the
production hub and supply chain are materialised, they will create new markets for both the
countries and the investments will get a new boost in coming days. Bangladesh has already set up
three Special Economic Zones for Indian investors and Indian companies are investing in various
sectors including telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, FMCG and automobiles sectors in
Bangladesh.
Fourthly, as Bangladesh prepares for its dual graduation journey (middle-income graduation
and LDC graduation), the agreement will be important to harness the potential opportunities by
addressing the attendant concerns and leveraging the initiatives.
And fifthly, CEPA will generate revenues for both Bangladesh and India as the connectivity
and trade along territorial and maritime borders will increase.
What is to be done?
To reap the benefits of any economic partnership agreement, infrastructural conditions are
crucial as these yield the outcomes. Both countries should take calculative and accommodative
stances to agree on the conditions. Informal trade between the two countries should be reduced to
formalise economic relations between the two countries. To increase trade, tariff and non-tariff
barriers and rules of origin should be removed. The dumping and antidumping disputes, lack of
formalisation of customs, time consuming approach of loading and unloading at no man's land
should be addressed.
Challenges for CEPA
However, existing legal barriers may also pose challenges. As per the WTO regulations, all
border duties and restrictive restrictions must be eliminated covering at least 90 percent of trade in
goods with partner countries and service must cover substantially all sectors (under Article XXIV of
GATT 1994 and Article V of GATS) to conclude an FTA. Hence, it may impact Bangladesh's import
duties. Reciprocity should be maintained while striking the deal.
Again, to fully harness the benefits of an FTA, a country should have a diversified export
basket to balance the trade volume. Notably, apparel constitutes more than 80 percent of
Bangladesh's total export and it is mainly exported to developed countries. And, there is very little
demand for apparels in the Indian market. Therefore, diversification of export products is a
prerequisite of achieving success in the proposed CEPA.
The CEPA has the potential to be a game-changing agreement given the economic and
geographical potentials between India and Bangladesh. From trade to connectivity and socio-
economic to infrastructural arena, the agreement may bring forth a profound sense of cooperation
and partnership. However, the challenges must be addressed.
Both countries should run a cost-benefit analysis to yield the desired outcome. Constructive
steps must be undertaken towards triangulation of trade, transport, and investment connectivity to
develop the production networks and establish the backward and forward value chains that serve
the interests of trade, and commerce – both bilateral and beyond. Moreover, a time-bound road map
is needed to take advantage of the emergent window of opportunity.
(Source: Daily Star)
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Ukraine Crisis
STRANGE EVENTS AND THE FUTURE OF
THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR
George Friedman (An internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international
affairs)
Russia and Ukraine have signed an agreement to permit the shipping of grain through the
Black Sea to world markets. A few hours after the agreement was signed in Turkey, Russia attacked
the Black Sea port in Odesa. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also fired his security chief to
investigate allegations of treason and dismissed his chief prosecutor and other officials – all while a
U.S. congresswoman asks President Joe Biden to investigate Zelenskyy’s chief of staff for his alleged
ties to Russia. The war is becoming complex.
The decision to permit shipments of wheat makes sense for the rest of the world. Ukraine is
the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, accounting for a little under 10 percent of global supply, and the
Russian blockade drove the price of grain up dramatically. Whatever sense the agreement makes,
though, it is unheard of for two nations engaged in war to reach formal agreements on the side.
Stranger still is that though Russia benefits from the agreement too, it is far more beneficial for
Ukraine, which not only receives more revenue but also gains a sense of security for its Black Sea
ports. The attack on Odesa was no doubt meant to remind Ukraine that such agreements can be
abandoned quickly, but the fact that it was reached to begin with is odd nonetheless.
Also startling is the firing of senior officials. Zelenskyy claimed that they were guilty of
treason. General corruption is one thing, especially in the former Soviet Union. The invocation of
treason is quite another. In some quarters of Kyiv, support for Russia is nothing new; Ukraine has
more than its fair share of pro-Russia sympathizers. But if, say, the FSB had penetrated Ukrainian
security – which is likely – then the weeks of speculation about their job security makes little sense.
If senior officials are found to be compromised, their removal would be instant. Instead, Zelenskyy
destabilized his government and unnerved his allies. (Of course, it could have been a foreign
intelligence service that detected the breach, and Zelenskyy may have been reluctant until forced to
act. As in all such matters, those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know. What is clear
is that this sort of matter in the course of war is not normal.)
Russians and Ukrainians sitting side by side can’t help but bring to mind the possibilities of a
peace treaty. The firings in Kyiv seem to indicate a degree of instability and discord in Ukraine,
creating the possibility, however remote, that new considerations are being made that could lead to
some kind of larger deal.
The war has been raging for five months – six months if we count the noisy leadup. It has not
gone as Russia hoped. Moscow’s initial offensive, a three-pronged attack on Kyiv, Odesa and
Donetsk, failed for a variety of reasons: the limits of Russian logistics, the difficulty of coordinating
an armored system at distance, and above all Ukrainian tactics and American weapons. The
Ukrainians fought an infantry battle with a decentralized command structure and tactical mobility,
and they did so with weapons such as Javelin missiles that were ideally suited for combatting the
Russian army.
The Russians were forced to retreat to the east as they fought for the Donetsk region, a
relatively small area along the Russian border in which Moscow already had a large presence.
Moscow has been engaged there for five months, with mercifully short supply lines to Russia
proper, and is now almost in control of the area. Even this highly vulnerable region predisposed to
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Russian victory took months to subdue. The experience there signals a long war in which Russia will
struggle to project force over increasingly large areas of a country it does not really occupy.
Ukraine, meanwhile, may have had the luxury of resting and training its infantry to the west
and north, but it cannot be sure of how it’ll fare against new Russian tactics. Kyiv has the advantage
of American weaponry and intelligence, and in theory it has the capability to at least resist a Russian
offensive even if it cannot launch a larger one of its own. This is why instability at the top of the
Ukrainian command is a problem. It’s possible that Zelenskyy is simply cleaning house in
preparation for a Russian offensive, but that doesn’t explain why he dragged his feet on the
dismissals. Russia might strike sooner rather than later, but the unrest at the top is likely going to
trickle down to lower levels. Officers linked to offenders may lose focus, or troops might lose
confidence in the chain of command. It is one thing to fight a war based on unity of purpose. It is
another thing to fight the war with the chain of command uncertain.
Though it’s unclear what exactly is happening in Kyiv, the Americans and the Russians are
likely well informed. Assuming they didn’t force the firings for reasons unknown, the Americans
will be pressing to contain the purge until a later date. The Russians, who certainly have assets in the
Ukrainian government and military, will seek to destabilize.
Of course, there’s a chance that the firings were a minor event amounting to little more than
domestic political machination. But that doesn’t seem likely. More likely is that the war has created
tension and risk at the highest levels of authority. The immediate challenge for Ukraine is to contain
the issue before it affects the army.
Both sides, then, would seem to have an interest in a negotiated settlement. The problem is
that neither side can afford one. Russia’s objective was to make Russia, and Moscow in particular,
secure against NATO (read: American) actions. So far, the distance to Moscow is where it was when
the war started. Russia cannot accept a peace that does not move Russian control far to the west.
Ukraine, and by extension the United States, might be interested in a stand-still. Russia can’t accept
that without risking confidence in the government.
And it’s not a given that Ukraine would settle for it either. There is clearly dysfunction at the
top. If Kyiv were to cede major portions of territory to Russia, things would get only more
dysfunctional. For the West, moving the Russian border closer to Eastern Europe would not end the
war; it would only create the pretext for the next. The closer Russia is to the western Ukrainian
border, the more it must be assumed that Russia would choose to move farther still. True or not, it
must be assumed.
As the risks mount for both sides, a settlement seems likely. The agreement on grain was
obviously signed with some notion of what it could mean. The concept of a peace agreement is
sound, but the geography of such an agreement, and the imperatives on both sides, seems to make
this impossible. What is needed here is fear.
(Source: Geopolitical Futures)

SIX MONTHS OF WAR IN UKRAINE

Europe’s life and fate
Marcus Colla
For the political analyst, it is often difficult to identify whether the decisions made by
powerful actors are borne of a sense of strength or out of weakness. In this respect, the sinister game
that Vladimir Putin is playing with Europe’s gas supplies is a case study par excellence. Should it be
interpreted as a raw assertion of the Russian President’s power, reminding Europe of its own
fundamental weaknesses by exploiting the social and political fissures that lie just beneath the
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continent’s surface? Or is it an act of desperation, designed to effect a change of fortunes in a war

that has plainly not gone according to plan?
It is a question of some consequence for Europe’s leaders as a difficult winter looms. As the
historian Lawrence Freedman – one of the very best commentators on the war in Ukraine – observes,
Europe’s energy crisis could very well dispose its decision-makers to overtures from Putin for a
“peace” compromise. Given that it would mean territorial concessions from Ukraine, any such
scenario would of course be seen in Kyiv as a betrayal. But it nevertheless says much about the
Russian President’s fear of appearing “weak” that this seemingly obvious manoeuvre has not, so far,
been attempted.
More likely, Putin is banking on time.
Six months after the invasion of Ukraine, much has been written about the onset of war
fatigue in Europe. Energy prices and inflation are biting. Inevitable cracks are appearing on
domestic political fronts. And the war shows no sign of ending any time soon.
Yet, by its own logic, Europe cannot afford to surrender to the strains, for it has given itself a
moral stake in Ukraine’s success. For the European Union in particular, maintaining solidarity –
both internally and with Ukraine – is a collective mission of almost existential importance. In his
speech to the EU Parliament on 1 March, one week into the war, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr
Zelensky made it clear that this is a fight Europe cannot afford to lose: “We are fighting to be equal
members of Europe.”
Some 80 per cent of Ukrainians wish to join the European Union, of which the country is now
a candidate member. Since July, an EU flag has hung in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament.
Within Europe, the invasion served to suffuse the “European project” with renewed emotional force
and a sharpened sense of moral purpose. Amid the din of tanks and missiles could be heard the
hymns of European idealists, long muddied by the arcane policy disputes and loathsome
bureaucratism that today typifies the EU in many European minds. European leaders were quick to
reciprocate the Ukrainian President, producing an unequivocal statement that “Ukraine belongs to
our European family”.
Inevitably, emotions have since subsided a little. But outward support for the Ukrainian cause
remains resolute. To visit the Baltics or Visegrád states, one is still endlessly confronted with public
signs of sympathy for the Ukrainians and revulsion for the Russian President. It is rare to wander
down an inner-city street without encountering a blue and yellow flag draped from an apartment
window or a violent piece of anti-Putin graffiti. But will it last? As Catherine Belton – author of the
excellent Putin’s People – notes:
A big inflection point is coming in the autumn. This is when the sanctions will begin to bite
hardest on the Russian economy, but it will also be when the energy prices hit the West the worst.
Within Europe, the energy crisis has had the effect of domesticating the politics of the war. It
has demanded tough decisions from national governments, and sacrifices from their citizens.
Ominously, the domestic economic pressures created by the war have supplied a political lifeline for
Europe’s Putin-loving populists. After a period of embarrassed silence following February’s
invasion, they have rediscovered their voices by criticising Western sanctions for their consequences
at home, rather than for nakedly pro-Russian reasons.
In Germany, for instance, far-right groups paint an apocalyptic image of a Wutwinter, a
“Winter of Fury”, with homes plunged into darkness by endless power cuts, cities paralysed by
mass street protests. It’s an unlikely scenario, of course. But it nevertheless reveals the latent danger
of Europe’s political extremes (of both Left and Right) exploiting the economic fallout of the war for
their own purposes.
Should the situation deteriorate, European leaders will find it difficult to quell domestic
instability by reminding citizens of their moral duty toward their Ukrainian neighbours.
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So much for Europe. Even less clear is the future of Russia itself. It is a cliché that Russian
history resembles an unusually powerful tide that slowly recedes before violently coming in every
couple of generations or so. 2022 surely marks one such tidal moment. Devotees of Moscow and St
Petersburg now speak of a vanished world: the small but extraordinarily dynamic pools of creative,
liberal culture that once marked those cities have dried up.
Already tight since the protests of 2011–13, Putin’s clamps of repression have more or less
closed completely. And perhaps even more damaging in the long-term, countless enterprising
young Russians (in May, experts already put the figure at around 150,000) have departed their
homeland – some, no doubt, forever.
Putin’s reckless invasion of Ukraine in February may have been impelled by an inability to
grasp just how much that country has changed since 1991 – and indeed, since 2014. But the effect of
his action has only been to accelerate Ukraine’s drift from Moscow’s orbit.
In the long-term, perhaps the greatest consequence of the war for Europe will be that the
continent’s fifth biggest country in terms of population, and its largest in area, will have become
more “European”. For now, though, the medium-term horizon is littered with variables – few of
them providing great reason for optimism. One can only hope that, in the future, we will not have to
speak of this period only as the “first” six months of the war.
(Source: The Interpreter)

A NEW WORLD ORDER ENSUES UKRAINE WAR

Timothy Hopper (International Relations graduate of American University)
During the last few months since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the perception of
most of the countries of the world about the war in Ukraine has been formed not according to the
western framework; and now they see the continuation of the conflict as a geopolitical game in
which the west, instead of solving the Ukraine crisis, is trying to weaken Russia and does not intend
to back down from aiming to discredit it.
The west was aware that the expansion of NATO in Russia’s security environment is a red line
for Moscow. On the other hand, having the vital energy artery of Europe, Russia thought it can
maintain this security red line and adjust its relations with Europe and America based on its own
geopolitical goals and achievement. However, not only did Russia not remove the threat, but
Moscow’s actions up to this point have backfired and created a front against it that has even placed
the eastern and northern countries of Europe against it.
Currently, Ukraine is the victim of a proxy war between Russia and America, and the
important issue for Washington and Moscow is neither the independence of Ukraine nor the
complete destruction of this country, but the desire and will of both sides of the war to defend an
order based on the rules of the logic of military force. Therefore, the war in Ukraine, as a historical
turning point for which there is no imminent end, has a painful end for the Ukrainians and even
global security. These conditions have created a situation that has complicated the probability of
reaching a political agreement.
The global hatred of proxy wars, which is the result of the complications of the open
competition between Russia and the United States in Ukraine, has led to a deep international dislike
of the United States and Europe, as well as Russia, whose military interventions to protect their
interests in Africa, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen over the last half century
have left nothing but death and destruction.
Beijing, Moscow, Delhi, and Tehran consider Russia’s economic blockade and its destructive
economic and security consequences as a national and global threat, and even in the United Nations
General Assembly, in which Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was condemned by an
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overwhelming majority of 141 votes, abstained in order to stay away from the West’s confrontation
with Russia as much as possible.
As the leader of the African continent, South Africa also blamed the United States for its past
military follies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya during the discussion about the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in the Ukraine war at the United Nations. South Africa also listed the United
States and its Western allies as violators of the UN Charter, who seek to gain their geopolitical
interests against Russia by supporting the UN resolution condemning Moscow.
The actions of these countries against the United States first of all reflect the challenges that
Washington is facing to show a united front in support of Ukraine and condemn Russia as an
aggressor. Except for America’s close friends and military allies in Europe and East Asia, most
countries in the world are not interested in joining the US campaign to isolate Russia. It is natural
that in the process of the war in Ukraine, proceeding between the two major military powers, we
will face a world in the future in which either a new era of multi-polarity or absolute unilateralism
will prevail; a new era in which, without a doubt, either the United States or Russia is no longer
considered a military superpower.
In fact, at the end of the war in Ukraine, we are certainly not going to return to the same world
we were in before the war. In the future, a new world order based on the final outcome of the war
will be formed and will define and outline the final form of the peace treaty between Russia and
America in the future order. Therefore, the non-aligned countries of the world should have realistic
prospects in mind and think about how peace will be achieved, or how to prevent the third world
war. Therefore, the countries of the world should not be inclined to adopt a completely anti-Russian
or anti-American position. The United Nations, which has always been under relentless attack by
veto power, will lose its international and mediating advantages even more by exercising the power
of the victorious side of the war-unless it is revived.
It can be said with certainty that there is a decisive issue in the future of the Ukrainian war:
that the war can only have one winner under the name of America or Russia. If Russia wins the war,
with the military power it will gain in cooperation with its partners such as China, India, and Iran, it
will dominate a large part of the rich natural sources and human resources of the world and can
easily create a “uni-multipolar world”.
Undoubtedly, India, the main rival of China in the region, will become the most important
supporter of the United States by creating a delicate balance in maintaining constructive relations
with the West, and a traditional neutral global actor will act against China. This condition can
restore the lost trust of the United States to it, and even countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates, who had lost their trust in Washington and turned to China and Russia, will
have no choice. To protect what they have developed in the framework of strategic diversity, they
will return to cooperation with the United States, because there will no longer be a path to continue
cooperation with Moscow and Beijing.
Even countries that have gradually, especially since the Trump era, come to the conclusion
that the era of the United States is over must return to the world of American unilateralism with a
rapid transformation. Even India and China cannot use dissatisfaction with America as a balancing
factor in foreign policy if America wins over Russia in this war and appear hesitant in regulating
relations with the United States.
Trying to be optimistic, it can be said that perhaps from the day after the end of the war in
Ukraine due to the victory of the US or Russia, the observer or supporting countries will not
participate in the global competition between the Kremlin and the White House for at least a few
decades; saving themselves from falling into the abyss of conflict between the great powers, because
the common mutual threats of the Cold War between the West and Russia, which plagued many
countries of the world, will end forever.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
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Water
WATER SECTOR SUFFERS FROM BAD GOVERNANCE
Shakeel Ahmad Ramay
Water is most precious natural resource. It is a major driver of ecosystem and life. It is cradle
of civilisations and helped them flourish. It gives life to barren lands and creates food system for the
survival of humanity and living creatures. It is a source of one of cleanest and widely available
renewable sources of energy.
However, mismanagement of water can turn it into source of destruction, and Pakistan is
perfect example on this front. Nature has bestowed Pakistan with precious resource of water, but the
country does not have any parallel to bad governance of water sector.
On top of that, political parties have politicised the water sector. It is unfortunate that
Pakistani politicians are master in making everything political. They do not have political wisdom to
solve the issues.
Owning to brainless politics, Pakistan is stuck between too much water and no water which
has turned Pakistan into home of water-related disasters for some time. Pakistan started the 21st
Century with severe and prolonged drought from 1999 to 2003. The drought played havoc with the
life of people and their livelihoods. Balochistan, parts of southern Punjab and Sindh were among the
areas worst impacted. It was estimated millions of animals died. It exposed the common and poor
people to unbearable losses.
They lost their livelihoods and poverty increased sharply in these areas. Many of them had no
option but to migrate to survive the impacts of droughts. Then in 2010 country was ravaged by
unprecedented flood. It was followed by a series of floods from 2010 onwards. Floods shattered
livelihoods at a massive scale and displaced people on a large scale.
Floods and droughts were tagged to climate change, while the government shed off its
responsibilities. The successive government used climate change as slogan and miserably failed to
deliver.
They remained busy in pleasing the international players and ignored the local dynamics. The
analysis of ground realities identified adaptation as most urgent required action. Climate Change
Policy 2012 and Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy also highlighted the
urgency to go for adaptation.
National Economic and Environment Development Study (NEEDs) of Pakistan produced the
same conclusion and provided a comprehensive guideline for actions. Further, vulnerability index
also supports the national studies and policies findings and gives highest priority to adaptation.
Regrettably, the actions are not reflecting the importance of adaptation urged in the
government policies and frameworks. Pakistan is focusing more on mitigation activities like
plantation, electric vehicles etc.
These are good initiatives. It will help Pakistan in long run to meet the emission targets.
However, adaptation is direly needed in the context of Pakistan which is not getting required
attention leave alone prioritisation. There is no major drive to push for adaptation, and even
National Action Plan for Adaptation is not ready yet.
Now, we are facing consequences of ignorance. We ignored climate change, water governance
and now nature is punishing us. Water is back with its full might and power of destruction.
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According to the National Disaster Management Authority, about 218,000 houses were completely
destroyed and 452,000 damaged.
Further, two million acres of crops and orchids were impacted and 793,900 livestock died. In
addition to that, 3,000km of roads and 145 bridges were damaged. It will not end here. Pakistan
needs to be ready to face the aftermaths of floods. Once the water goes down, a new cycle of
disasters and challenges will emerge.
First, there is fear of spread of waterborne diseases and dengue. Children will be more prone
to these diseases. Besides, trauma would be another challenge. Women health will be a major
concern as they have specific health requirements. It has been observed that during the floods,
women’s needs are ignored which create health problems.
Second, hundreds of thousands of people have lost their livelihoods. Economic status of
millions of people has been jeopardized by the floods. They will be looking for livelihoods for their
revival. Third, there is a serious threat to food security of nation. Floods damaged crops and food
reserves all over the country.
It is feared food insecurity will increase by 10-12 percent. The assumption is based on the data
of 2010 floods. According to independent data, Pakistan in 2010 witnessed an increase of 10 percent
in food insecurity (48 percent to 58 percent). It is a scary picture as food insecurity is already
exceedingly high in Pakistan (58.8 percent).
However, the impacts will not be equally distributed and poor sections of the society will
have to bear worst impacts. Poor people will be facing dual-edge problem. They have lost their
sources of income, assets and economic opportunities. On the other hand, they will have no food.
Farming community, especially small farmers, will be the worst-hit segment.
Besides, food insecurity will not only increase in flood-affected areas but also in the cities.
Owning to lower availability and higher prices, it will be difficult for the middle class and the poor
to maintain their food basket. For example, onion, which was Rs70/kg last week, is now being sold
at Rs300/kg. This is only one example.
Experts are warning about a potential human crisis. Therefore, it is suggested all the
governments, political parties and stakeholders join hands to combat the situation. Otherwise,
everyone will be a loser and the country will face worst human tragedy of its history.
(Source: The News)

EMERGING SOLUTIONS TO A GLOBAL WATER CRISIS

Italy has declared a state of emergency as its longest river dries up, California is in the grip of
its worst drought for 1,200 years, and Germany’s Rhine river is so low that barges can no longer
transport key supplies across it. At the same time, the neon-clad cities of Las Vegas in the US and
Seoul in South Korea, as well as areas across Pakistan, have experienced unprecedented flooding
from record rainfall. And what about the rain that is falling? It contains “forever chemicals” found in
plastic and other manmade materials and is now unsafe to drink…everywhere on Earth.
There is no question—weather cycles are out of whack, and the connections between the twin
water and climate crises can no longer be ignored. Fortunately, water scarcity and security are
suddenly at the top of the agenda for politicians and the media. But how long will the level of
interest last?
Rising temperature + rising population = rising water insecurity
Water scarcity and insecurity is the lack of access to safe, reliable water sources for everyday
necessities like drinking, cooking, cleaning, sanitation and more. They are long-term challenges that
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will only worsen as the impacts of climate change continue to spiral and populations rise. A 2020
study estimated that 4 billion people already experience water scarcity for at least one month a year.
This number could double by 2050 if the world fails to meet the Paris agreement’s target of
limiting warming to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and if future population
growth is high, according to the same study. Even if the target is met, and population growth is low,
water stress could still rise by 50% by 2050 compared with 2010 levels, the research says. Yet
progress on water-scarcity targets under the UN Sustainable Development Goals is off track.
When it comes to the Paris agreement on climate change, the topic of water scarcity and
insecurity does not get much attention, says Claire O’Neill, senior adviser at international
investment firm Hambro Perks and former UK minister for energy and clean growth. “Three [or
more] billion people in water stress is a huge compelling issue, but there is no conversation,” she
says.
Professor Edeltraud Guenther, director of the UN University’s Institute for Integrated
Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources, agrees that water scarcity has largely been
invisible to policymakers. “When we have these extreme events like drought, we talk about water
scarcity, but it’s not visible most of the time,” she says.
“Water resilience has been an orphan child, and issues like the current drought force us to
fundamentally play catch-up,” Ms O’Neill adds. But the issue is rising up the political agenda and
she says it is likely to be a key theme of the 2023 COP28 UN climate talks, which are being hosted by
the United Arab Emirates.
Emerging technologies for water security
In addition to low political and public awareness, the water sector has typically suffered from
a lack of innovation, says Stephen Brooke, partner at Hambro Perks. However, many technological
developments to make better use of water resources are coming to the fore.
These include technologies to improve the efficiency of typically energy-intensive desalination
plants; improved biological treatment processes that effectively double the capacity of wastewater
treatment plants to increase the water available for industrial and agricultural use; and smart
sensors for alerting utilities to leaks in pipes.
UK company i2O has developed an advanced pressure-management system that saves water
through the use of sensors that learn the pressure requirements at different times of the day and
adjust it automatically to match need. This technology was deployed during Cape Town’s extreme
drought in 2018, delivering 70% of the demand reduction target needed to stop the city’s water
supply running dry, known as “day zero”.
Investment has not always been available for water resource solutions, according to Jann
Breitenmoser, who manages a sustainable-investment strategy focused on water and the circular
economy at Man GLG. “The solutions are there, it’s more a lack of investment, and a lack of
awareness that this should be a priority,” he says.
But companies providing solutions to water scarcity are experiencing structural growth of 5-
10% a year due to demand. “It’s not like other sectors where growth goes in cycles,” he says.
The water sector is a US$500bn marketplace, representing a huge opportunity for investors,
according to Mr Brooke. But investing in this area requires a willingness to wait for returns in the
longer term.
“If you want to prove a water technology in the market at scale, it’s probably going to be
running for a couple of years before people know that it is working properly and not creating other
problems in the water network that hadn’t been thought about. A lot of investors want instant
growth,” he says.
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Putting money where the (political) mouth is

Lack of investment in water resilience is beginning to change, Mr Breitenmoser believes. For
example, the EU Green Deal contains €38bn (US$38.7bn) for resource management, and €77bn
(US$78.4bn) for environmental protection, while the US Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
contains US$64bn geared towards better management of water, wastewater and stormwater, he
notes.
Furthermore, Mr Breitenmoser explains that the EU’s taxonomy, which will guide all
investment under the €1trn (US$1trn) EU Green Deal, comprises six environmental objectives. One
of these covers the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, while another is
about transitioning to a circular economy, which could help reduce both demand for and wastage of
water.
But investment in new technologies is not the only answer, according to Ms Guenther. She is
co-editor of Unconventional Water Resources, a book published by the UN earlier this year to urge
the tapping of diverse and abundant resources that until now have not received much attention.
These range from the millions of cubic kilometres of water in deep land-based and seabed
aquifers, and in fog and icebergs, to reusing water from the ballast holds of thousands of ships for
agriculture.
The problem will only be solved when multiple actors—including engineers, politicians and
private companies—collaborate, she believes. There also needs to be more focus on reducing
demand, for example by installing dry toilets, or by growing different crops that do not need as
much water, she says.
“It is a human approach to think that sufficient technology will tackle the problem. But if
there’s no rain, if the groundwater level gets lower and lower, if we cannot drill deeper, and there is
no option for desalination, this is when we start thinking,” says Ms Guenther. “But by then it’s very
often too late.”
(Source: The Economic Impact)
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Women
THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
Dr Rafi Amir-Ud-Din (Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS University)
The World Economic Forum recently published Global Gender Gap Index for 2022, which
benchmarks the current state of gender parity in 146 countries across four key dimensions (economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political
empowerment). Not surprisingly, Pakistan stands at an unenviable 145th place.
Afghanistan narrowly beat Pakistan in this race to the bottom. Iceland, Finland, and Norway
took the first, second and third places, respectively. Bangladesh ranked 71st on the index.
Why is Pakistan one of the worst countries in the world in terms of the gender gap? Some
valuable insights may be gained by zooming in on the individual components that make up the
index.
The Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) is a simple average of four sub-indices: economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political
empowerment. Each subindex is a weighted average of underlying indicators converted as female-
to-male ratios. For example, if the share of women in the labour force is 20 percent in some country,
the ratio is 0.25.
Let’s consider two illustrative cases. If the female share in the labour force is 50 percent, the
ratio is one – implying complete parity. If the female share is 0 percent, the ratio is zero implying
complete disparity. It is important to mention the methodological caveat here. What if women
perform better than men in some countries? If the female share in the labour force is 80 percent? The
resulting ratio would be four but the GGGI assigns it a value of one. This is called data truncation.
This is because it is considered better to err on the side of favouring women.
The following paragraphs list the indicators associated with each of the four dimensions and
give Pakistan’s relative rank in the parentheses.
The first sub-index, namely, the economic participation and opportunity, consists of five
indicators, including labour force participation rate (145th), wages equality for similar work (141st),
estimated earned income (86th ), legislators, senior officials and managers (143rd) and professional
and technical workers (130th).
The second subindex of educational attainment consists of four indicators, including literacy
rate (133rd), enrolment in primary education (missing data), enrolment in secondary education
(124th) and enrolment in tertiary education (102nd).
The third sub-index, namely, health and survival, consists of two indicators, including sex
ratio at birth (141st) and healthy life expectancy (140th).
The last sub-index of political empowerment consists of three indicators, including women in
parliament (97th), women in ministerial positions (114th), and years with a female/ male head of
state in the last 50 years (31st).
As is apparent, Pakistan‘s ranking in individual dimensions is not uniform. Pakistan ranks
145th, 135th, 143rd, and 95th regarding economic participation and opportunity, educational
attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment, respectively. Pakistan did relatively
better in the political empowerment dimension.
Pakistan ranked 31st in the years with female/ male head of state indicator because Benazir
Bhutto was the prime minister for roughly five years. If the effect of this episode 26 years ago were
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partialled out, Pakistan would be at the lowest place in the world with regard to the gender gap.
Pakistan also lags behind the world in the dimensions of health and survival as well as economic
participation and opportunity.
One might argue that every society has a unique worldview regarding the attributes of a
desirable life. Some goals considered desirable in one society may be considered undesirable in
another. Consequently, if we include other indicators in the GGGI index, Pakistan’s relative position
may be dramatically different.
Such reasoning may have merit partly because all indices are subjective by default. However,
the desirability of most of the indicators and the four dimensions of the GGGI enjoys a broad
consensus.
It may be instructive to note that Pakistan’s performance is equally dismal on other indices of
well-being, such as the Rule of Law Index (130 out of 139 countries) and the Human Development
Index (154 out of 189 countries). So, the strong correlation between different human development
indices seems to converge towards a system of core social values.
It may also be instructive to make further inquiry into what explains the economic and health
outcomes for women in Pakistan, which are one of the worst in the world. Two interrelated factors
figure out conspicuously. The first relates to an abject failure of the state to ensure a minimum living
standard for the vulnerable population groups.
In Pakistan, the system of social security and old age benefits is available only to the public
sector employees and a fraction of private sector employees. (As an aside, recruitment, even in the
public sector has increasingly been done on a contractual basis in recent years.) For the rest of the
employees (which makes up a majority of the workforce), the social security and old age benefits are
unheard of. It is rational to look for alternative sources of security for old age, and a critical source of
economic security during old age is children. The gender gap may be rooted in this mundane
preference for children as a hedge against economic insecurity.
Son-preference is widespread in Pakistan. This may well be the first trigger behind a massive
gender gap. Social customs and patriarchal structure of Pakistani society reinforce son-preference.
The society views women as vulnerable and in need of protection by male family members. Isn’t this
a costly proposition? It is because it requires a significant investment of time. Sons can go to school
alone but daughters need to be accompanied.
The very idea that a female family member is being harassed on the way to school or college is
one of the worst nightmares for parents and families. This is not an ordinary denial of the right to
freedom of movement. Harassment of women has far more significant implications. The society has
a queer way of looking at a victim of harassment with attendant social consequences for the rest of
her life.
The judicial arm of the state is not famous for serving an effective deterrent. The combined
effect of lack of social security, inept judicial system, and warped moral values creates and
accentuates gender gaps.
Several simultaneous interventions are called for to reduce the gender gap. The first
intervention relates to the responsibility of the state to provide economic security to all citizens.
Providing economic security for a population of 230 million is easier said than done. When people
are insured against pauperisation, there will be less dependence on children in general and male
children in particular, resulting in less gender discrimination at the household level and a narrowing
of the gender gap.
This is the type of demographic pattern observable in most of the developed world. The desire
for economic security through male children is the biggest driver of large family size. The oft-quoted
reason for large family size, namely, the unmet contraceptive demand, comes way behind.
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For economic security of a massive population the government needs massive investment in
the human capital for increased productivity to improve the living standards. Shifting focus away
from security to public welfare is imperative. Among other things this requires a radical shift in
foreign policy.
Making the judicial arm of the state an effective deterrent is another precondition for changing
gender-related social norms. The current conviction rate in cases of harassment and gener-related
violence is hardly reassuring for a general sense of security.
When people are convinced that the state can and will punish those transgressing the limits,
women will no longer be considered a liability. When people are confident that the state can take
care of their needs and guarantee a desirable standard of living, the son-preference will fade away.
Herein lies the key to reducing the gender gap in Pakistan.
(Source: The News)

MAPPING THE CONDITIONS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PAKISTAN

Mahnaz Rahman
In 2020, the UN Secretary-General Ant—nio Guterres’ delivered remarks on “Women and
Power” at The New School in New York:
“The women’s rights movement came of age in the twentieth century. Women Heads of State
dispelled any doubts about women’s ability to lead. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
asserted the equal rights of men and women, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women outlined a vision of gender equality.
Today, young women like Malala Yousafzai and Nadia Murad are breaking barriers and
creating new models of leadership.
However, despite these advances, the state of women’s rights remains dire. Inequality and
discrimination are the norms, everywhere. Progress has slowed to a standstill - and in some cases,
been reversed.”
It is a good moment to go through our history for a reasoned analysis of how we got here and
what might be done to improve the situation. In doing so, we may focus on three chief areas:
Literacy and education
Most importantly, there has been underinvestment in female education and health during the
last 75 years and it has had deleterious effects not only on women themselves but on children and
future generations as well. The problem is more pronounced in rural areas of Pakistan where low
level of education and lack of awareness and access to medical facilities pose a major threat to the
development of a healthy and productive society. The dominant cultural notions regarding women
are also instrumental in hampering women’s access to education, information and other structures
of power.
The parts that now constitute Pakistan were among the least developed regions of India and
the rest of the world prior to 1947, and the last to be conquered by the British, according to the
eminent economist Dr Kaiser Bengali. The British rule in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP lasted a
century and these regions were considered the periphery of the British Raj in India. At the time of
the first census in 1950, the overall literacy rate was 20 per cent in India and 14 per cent in Pakistan,
according to UNESCO. As of 2012, India has achieved a 75 per cent literacy rate while Pakistan is at
58 per cent (Pakistan Standards of Living Measurements (PSLM) survey, 2011-12). Pakistan Youth
(15-24 years) literacy rate is 79.1% for males and 61.5% for females. As of 2010, there are 380 out of
every 1000 Pakistanis aged 15 and above who have never had any formal schooling. Of the
remaining 620 who got enrolled in schools, 22 dropped out before finishing primary school, and the
remaining 598 completed it. Out of every 1000, only 401 Pakistanis made it to secondary school; 290
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completed secondary school while 111 dropped out. Only 55 made it to college out of which 39
graduated with a degree.
There are two systems of education prevalent in Pakistan: the traditional religion-based
education system and the modern formal education system that began under British colonial rule
and continued after the country’s independence. Both systems are financed by the Ministry of
Education, although the scrutiny by the government of standards of the modern education sector is
far stricter than for the madrassahs. Since the late 1970s, with the increasing Islamisation of
Pakistan’s polity and society, the management of the traditional institutions has been under the
control of mullahs both at the provincial and the federal levels. This was partly supported by the fact
that the madrassahs were financed out of the zakat, the Islamic tithe collected by the government.
With the upheaval in Afghanistan during the early 2000s, the Taliban and many of its fighters
sought refuge in Pakistan. They enforced strict codes of conduct in the areas they controlled and
restricted the freedom of women and put a ban on girls from attending schools. This action
worsened the already deteriorating education system in Pakistan, with over 5.5 million primary
school-aged children out of school of which 63 per cent are girls. According to a UNESCO’s 2014
report, Pakistan has the second highest number of out-of-school children in the world. While the
government of Pakistan has legislated education for all, Gender Concerns International (GCI) and
other NGOs have noted that education remains drastically under-funded at only 2.5 per cent of the
country’s GDP in 2013, despite a government commitment of 4 per cent. In recent years, the plight of
girls’ education has been highlighted by various NGOs, action groups and notably by Malala
Yousafzai, who was shot by the Taliban in 2012 for attempting to attend school.
Health and population status of women and children
In Pakistan, during the 1940s, population growth rates began to accelerate because of some
improvement in the health system which increased the life expectancy, however, birth rates still
remained high. In 1947, at the time of independence, Pakistan’s population was 31 million. By 1995 it
escalated to 140 million. Family planning programmes were started in the 1950s and 1960s by
private and government institutions. International donors such as the World Bank along with the
government of Pakistan funded the programmes for family planning (FP). For years these
institutions focused only on women as it was thought that FP was only women’s responsibility.
Nothing improved in the following years and now with a population of 221 million people, it
is currently the world’s seventh largest country and will become the third biggest contributor to
world population growth. According to the United Nations projections, the Pakistan’s population
will grow to over 380 million by the year 2050, surpassing the United States, Indonesia, Brazil and
Russia and becoming the world’s third largest country after India and China. With its highest
population growth rate, Pakistan will certainly experience dramatic declines in the per capita
availability of arable land, water, and forest resources. Already rapid population growth at three per
cent per year is eroding economic gain.
The water availability in Pakistan has plummeted from about 5,000 cubic meters per capita
in the early 1950s to less than 1,100 m3 per capita in 2011. According to the World Bank Water
and Sanitation Specialist, the absence of a safe water supply at or near their homes-and the
resulting need to walk up to 4 kilometres or more to get water each day-has aggravated the
burden of women’s duties in many ways, making them vulnerable in terms of both their health
and personal safety.
Political rights of women
The political history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1970 reveals that the first constituent assembly of
Pakistan was constituted from within the Indian legislature elected in the 1946 elections. After its
dissolution the second assembly came into being as a result of an indirect election; nevertheless, at
the provincial level, election based on the adult franchise were held in East Bengal (subsequently
East Pakistan and now Bangladesh) in 1954, in 1953 in Sindh, in 1951 in Punjab and NWFP (now
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) respectively. It was only in 1970 when after the imposition of martial law in
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1969, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan for the first time, held country-wide general elections
based on the adult franchise which was contested by nine women as independent candidates but all
of them lost. However, it was the first time that women actively participated in politics.
The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was composed of 69 members, with two women
Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah and Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz who served from 1947 to
1954. There was no representation of women in the second constituent assembly which had 72
members who served from 1955 to 1958.
While women’s representation remained low in the first and second constituent assemblies,
the amendments in the Constitution of Pakistan paved the way for their increased participation in
the parliament. Moreover, the progressive laws helped improve their participation in legislative and
executive positions over the years. Since 2002, women politicians have had notable representation in
the federal as well as provincial assemblies. The successive governments and the parliamentarians
have contributed to ensuring women’s representation in the legislative bodies. The Constitution of
Pakistan of 1956 reserved ten seats for women in the unicameral parliament with five seats each
from East and West Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan of 1962 reserved six seats for women in
the national assembly with three seats each from East and West Pakistan. The Constitution of the
Pakistan of 1973 reserved ten seats for women for ten years from the commencing day of the
Constitution to the holding of the third general elections to the national assembly, whichever
occurred later. In 1985, ten seats were increased to twenty whereas, the reserved seats for women
were increased to sixty in 2002 during the era of General Pervez Musharraf. Various provisions of
the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan affirm the state’s resolve to minimise gender disparity by
eliminating discrimination based on gender and encouraging the participation of women in all
walks of life. Article 17 (2) of the constitution provides every citizen with the right to form or be a
member of a political party. Article 34 of the Constitution emphasizes the full participation of
women in national life and states that “steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in
all spheres of national life”. To implement the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution,
substantive amendments in the constitution, as well as election laws, are made to ensure increased
participation of women in the political process. For instance, 60 seats for women are reserved in the
national assembly under Article 51 and 17 seats are reserved in the Senate of Pakistan under Article
59, while there are 168 seats for the provincial assemblies ie Balochistan (11), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(26), Punjab (66) and Sindh (29) under Article 106 of the constitution. Similarly, the Elections Act of
2017 directed the political parties to ensure at least five per cent representation of women candidates
when fielding candidates for general seats, which is a progressive development to encourage
representation of women in legislative bodies.
The preamble of the constitution of Pakistan supports democratic principles and guarantees
the fundamental rights of all citizens. Under the interim constitution, women were granted suffrage
in 1947 and this right has been reaffirmed in the national elections of 1956. One of the most well-
known examples of female political leadership in Pakistan is the two-time female Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto. In 1988, Bhutto won the elections and became the first woman to be elected as the
head of an Islamic state government. However, many women in Pakistan still face social, religious,
economic and political obstacles. An example is a parliament, which since 2013 has only 20.6 per
cent (70 out of 340) of women in the lower house, whilst in the upper house, this percentage is even
lower at 18.3 per cent (19out of 104).
During these 75 years, economic crisis and structural adjustment adversely affected women in
their roles as producers, household managers, and mothers. Women’s participation in the workforce
has almost doubled in 22 years (1992-2014) but the increase isn’t happening fast enough.
Some recent developments
ADB 2016: Policy Brief on Female Labour Force in Pakistan
Despite increase in recent years, female labour force participation in Pakistan, at 25 per cent, is
well below rates for countries with similar income levels. Even among women with high levels of
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education, labor force participation lags: only around 25 per cent of women with a university degree
in Pakistan are working. This low female labor force participation represents a major loss of
potential productivity.
Rural Women in Pakistan Status Report 2018 UN Women Pakistan
The returns to labour for women in agriculture are low; the large majority work as unpaid
contributing family workers while those who do paid work are given a pittance for what is
considered strenuous work such as cotton picking, stripping leaves of sugarcane stalks,
transplanting rice etc.
IMF Report 2020
According to the IMF staff report, women in most countries do not have same opportunities as
men have to participate in economic activities.
In 21 countries, including India, Pakistan, and Egypt, female labour force participation was
below 30 per cent. The global rise in female labour force participation has been driven mostly by
changes in advanced economies and emerging markets. In 2018, advanced economies as a group
had the highest female labour force participation rate, at 70 per cent, which reflects an increase of 12
percentage points over the past two decades.
Globally, about one-quarter of countries have experienced declining female labour force
participation. Countries such as India and Sri Lanka faced an average annual decrease of 1 per cent
between 1990 and 2018, whereas Pakistan, Peru, and Spain experienced average annual increases of
2 per cent.
Global Gender Gap Report - WEF 2022
Pakistan is the second worst country in the world in terms of gender parity, ranking 145 out of
146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index Report released by the World Economic Forum in July
2022.
Pakistan is the country where women have the smallest share of senior, managerial and
legislative roles (4.5 per cent), compared to Jamaica, where women represent 56.6 per cent of workers
in that category, or Togo, which has the highest share of women in senior roles, at 70.1 per cent
According to the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLSM) district level
survey 2019-20, “the literacy rate of population (10 years and above) is stagnant at 60 per cent in
2019-20 since 2014-15.”
The cumulative education expenditures by the federal and provincial governments in FY2020
stood at 1.5per cent of the GDP compared to 2.3 per cent in FY2019-20. Expenditures on education
had been rising gradually till 2018-19 but in 2019-20 it witnessed a decrease of 29.6 per cent - from
Rs868 billion to Rs 611 billion.”
The Global Education Monitoring Report, 2022, released by UNESCO on Wednesday
estimates that globally 771 million adults lacked basic literacy skills in 2020, among which 98 million
were aged 15 to 24.
The annual gender report of the UN’s specialised agency says females accounted for 63 per
cent of all adult illiterates and 55 per cent of young illiterates. Among adults, 83 per cent of women
and 90 per cent of men were literate, a gap of 7 percentage points, whereas the gender gap was only
two percentage points among youth.
In Pakistan, only one girl achieves the top proficiency level for every three boys but the
absolute gap between them is only 0.1 percentage points because overall performance levels are low.
(Source: The News Independence Day Supplement)