Social Goals and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services

Author(s): Robert Costanza

Source: Ecosystems , Jan. - Feb., 2000, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 4-10
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3658660

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ecosystems

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Ecosystems (2000) 3: 4-10
ECOSYSTEMSr
DOI: 10.1007/s100210000002
a 2000 Springer-Verlag

Social Goals and the Valuation

of Ecosystem Services
Robert Costanza

Center for Environmental Science and Department of Biology and Institute for Ecological Economics, University of Maryland, Bo
(1 Williams Street), Solomons, Maryland 20688-0038, USA

Key words: ecosystem services; valuation; social goals; uncertainty; sustainability.

INTRODUCTION VISIONS OF THE ECONOMY AND ITS

RELATIONSHIP TO THE ECOLOGICAL
Ecosystem services are obviously important in sus-
taining human life on earth (Daily 1997; Costanza LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEM
and others 1997a). The big questions include: howJoseph Schumpeter (1954) emphasized the impor-
important? Over what temporal and spatial scales? tance of a "pre-analytic vision" of the world and its
What are the limits of humanity's ability to substi- major problems. He noted that
tute for them? At what levels of stress do they flip to
"vision of this kind not only must precede histori-
some other (less desirable) state? All of these ques-
cally the emergence of analytic effort in any field,
tions require the ability to understand and model
the interconnected, coevolving system of humans but also may reenter the history of every estab-
and nature (Costanza and others 1993, 1997b). In lished science each time somebody teaches us to
see things in a light of which the source is not to be
addition, the answers to these questions are not
found in the facts, methods, and results of the
purely academic. We humans have to make choices
and trade-offs concerning ecosystem services, and
preexisting state of the science" Schumpeter
(1954, p. 41).
this implies and requires "valuation," because any
choice between competing alternatives implies that Our preanalytic vision is changing in many impor-
the one chosen was more highly "valued." That the tant respects. The evolution of the human economy
alternatives are "competing" is important, because if has passed from an era in which human-made
we can find a "win-win" solution then no real capital was the limiting factor in economic develop-
choice is required, and we can avoid valuation. ment
Butto the current era in which remaining natural
most environmental decisions involve the problem capital has become the limiting factor. Basic eco-
of having to weigh and aggregate the myriad differ- nomic logic tells us that we should maximize the
ent kinds of "benefits" of a proposed action against productivity of the scarcest (limiting) factor, as well
its "costs." In most cases, these benefits and costs as try
areto increase its supply. This means that eco-
nomicInpolicy should be designed to increase the
both poorly understood and poorly quantified.
productivity
addition, the future vision and social goals that of natural capital and its total amount,
ratheror
define the degree to which something is a benefit than to increase the productivity of human-
a cost are themselves evolving and changing. In made capital and its accumulation, as was appropri-
ate
doing valuation of ecosystem services, we need to in the past when it was limiting. This implies a
very
consider a broader set of goals that include ecologi- different vision of the economy and its place in
the overall
cal sustainability and social fairness, along with the system.
traditional economic goal of efficiency. Figure la shows the conventional economic pre-
analytic vision. The primary factors of production
(land, labor, and capital) combine in the economic
Received 15 June 1999; accepted 22 July 1999. process to produce goods and services (usually
e-mail: costza@cbl.umces.edu
measured as gross national product or GNP). GNP is

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Social Goals and Valuation 5

(a) "Conventional" Model of the Economy

Individual

Utility/welfare
Property rights
Private Public Consumption
(based on fixed

Building
capital Manufactured .> preferences)
*- Goods
- Economic GNP andnolic
Education,
Research
Training, Labor Prdu
Process

Ir- cve m-nI0 _ _-La

rihsLnd e s
Investment
(decisions about, taxes government spending,
education,

"o /Production Policy tc,

science and
technology
policy, etc., based
on existing property
rights regimes)

(b) Expanded Model of the Ecological Economic System

positive impacts on human capital capacity

being, doing, relating- Well Being

Ecological having, being-r a (Individual and

services/ doing, relating-o Community)

Complex property
-rhaving, haig hv having
rights regimes C-ibeing

Energy
Sl Individual Common I Public (based C
R o Wastes adapting
Restoration, Natural Capital preferences)
Conservation : E

research.
Education, Production GNP and Norms
trainin Human an ICapit
Institutional Process Services olicy
rules, norms, etc. SocialCapital Ivt Omen
a) Investment
Building Manufaptured
i community
! 3 (decisions about, taxes
spending,
Ceducation, science and
technology polic

rights regimes)
.negative impacts on all forms of capital on complex property

Waste heat

Figure 1. Coventional economics model (a) and expanded "ecological economic" model (b).

divided into consumption (which is the sole con-forms of capital are fuzzy. Property rights are usually
tributor to individual utility and welfare) and invest-simplified to either private or public, and their
ment (which goes into maintaining and increasing distribution is usually taken as fixed and given.
the capital stocks). Preferences are fixed. In this Figure lb shows an alternative "ecological eco-
model, the primary factors are perfect substitutes for nomics" view of the process (Ekins 1992; Costanza
each other, so "land" (including ecosystem services) and others 1997b). Notice that the key elements of
can be almost ignored, and the lines between all thethe conventional view are still present, but more has

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
6 R. Costanza

been added and some priorities have changed.

does not make sense to assume tastes and prefer-
There is limited substitutability between
ences are the
fixed. basic
This is a very disturbing prospect for
economists
forms of capital in this model, and their numberbecausehas
it takes away the easy definition
of what
expanded to four. Their names also have is "optimal."
changed to If tastes and preferences are
better reflect their roles: (a) natural
fixedcapital
and given,(for-
then we can adopt a stance of
merly land) includes ecological systems,
"consumermineral
sovereignty" and just give the people
deposits, and other aspects of the natural world;
what they (b)do not have to know or care
want. We
human capital (formerly labor) includes
why they both the they want, we just have to
want what
physical labor of humans and the know-how
satisfy their stored
preferences as efficiently as possible.
in their brains; (c) manufactured capital
But ifincludes
preferencesall
are expected to change over time
the machines and other infrastructure and
of the
underhuman
the influence of education, advertising,
economy; and (d) social (or cultural) capital.
changing Social
cultural assumptions, and so on, we need
capital is a recent concept that includes the web
a different offor what is "optimal" and we
criterion
interpersonal connections, institutional arrange-
have to figure out how preferences change, how
ments, rules, and norms that allow individual
they relate to hu-
this new criterion, and how they can
man interactions to occur (Berkes and Folke
or should 1994). to satisfy the new criterion.
be changed
Property rights regimes in this model Oneare complex
alternative for this new criterion is sustain-
and flexible, spanning the range from individual to completely sustainable scale
ability itself, or more
common to public property. Natural (or
capital captures
size of the economic subsystem), fair distribu-
solar energy and behaves as an autonomous com-
tion, and efficient allocation (Daly 1992). This crite-
plex system, and the model conforms to the basic
rion implies a two-tiered decision process (Page
laws of thermodynamics. Natural capital contrib-
1977; Daly and Cobb 1989; Norton and others
utes to the production of marketed economic 1998) of firstgoods
coming to a social consensus on a
and services, which affect human welfare. It also sustainable scale and fair distribution and, second,
produces ecological services and amenities that using both the market and other institutions like
directly contribute to human welfare without ever education and advertising to implement these social
passing through markets. There is also waste produc- decisions. This might be called "community sover-
tion by the economic process, which contributes eignty" as opposed to "consumer sovereignty." It
negatively to human welfare and has a negative makes most conventional economists very uncom-
impact on capital and ecological services. Prefer- fortable to stray from consumer sovereignty because
ences are adapting and changing, but basic human it eliminates the tidy view of economics as simply
needs are constant. Human welfare is a function of
optimally satisfying a fixed set of preferences and it
much more than the consumption of economic opens a Pandora's box of possibilities for manipulat-
goods and services. ing preferences. If tastes and preferences can change,
These two visions of the world are significantly then who is going to decide how to change them?
different. As Ekins (1992) points out: There is a real danger that a totalitarian government
"It must be stressed that that the complexities and might be employed to manipulate preferences to
feedbacks of model 2 are not simply glosses on conform to the desires of a select elite rather than
model I's simpler portrayal of reality. They funda- the society as a whole.
mentally alter the perceived nature of that reality Two points need to be kept in mind in this regard:
and in ignoring them conventional analysis pro- (a) preferences are already being manipulated every
duces serious errors ..." (p. 151). day; and (b) we can just as easily apply open
democratic principles to the problem as hidden or
VALUATION, CHOICE, AND UNCERTAINTY totalitarian principles in deciding how to manipu-
late preferences. So the question becomes: do we
The conventional vision or paradigm also assumes want preferences to be manipulated unconsciously,
that tastes and preferences are fixed and given and either by a dictatorial government or by big business
that the economic problem consists of optimally acting through advertising? Or do we want to
satisfying those preferences. Tastes and preferences formulate preferences consciously based on social
usually do not change rapidly and, in the short run dialogue and consensus with a higher goal in mind?
(that is, 1-4 years), this assumption makes sense. Ethics is the forging and revising of our existing
But preferences do change over longer time frames, preferences in the light of a higher goal. Taking
and in fact there is an entire industry (advertising) preferences as given would mean that the ethical
devoted to changing them. Sustainability is an problem has been solved once and for all. Either
inherently long-run problem, and in the long-run it way, this is an issue that can no longer be avoided,

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Social Goals and Valuation 7

and one that can best be handled using open
democratic principles and innovative thinking.
VALUATION OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
AND PREFERENCES
ences change (in response to education, advertising,
peer pressure, etc.) then value cannot completely
originate with preferences. Value ultimately origi-
nates in the set of individual and social goals to
which a society aspires.

The issue of valuation is inseparable from the VALUATION AND SOCIAL GOALS
choices and decisions we have to make about
ecological systems. Some argue that valuation of ultimately refers to the contribution of an
Valuation
ecosystems is either impossible or unwise. For item
ex-to meeting a specific goal or objective. A
ample, some argue that we cannot place a value baseball
on player is valuable to the extent he contrib-
such "intangibles" as human life, environmental utes to the goal of the team's winning. In ecology, a
aesthetics, or long-term ecological benefits. But, geneinis valuable to the extent it contributes to the
fact, we do so every day. When we set construction survival of the individuals possessing it and their
standards for highways, bridges, and the like, we
progeny. In conventional economics, a commodity
value human life-acknowledged or not-because is valuable to the extent it contributes to the goal of
spending more money on construction wouldindividual save welfare as assessed by willingness to pay.
lives. Another often-made argument is that Thewepoint is that one cannot state a value without
should protect ecosystems for purely moral or stating
aes- the goal being served. Conventional eco-
thetic reasons, and we do not need valuations of nomic value is based on the goal of individual utility
ecosystems for this purpose. But there are equally maximization. But other goals, and thus other
compelling moral arguments that may be in direct values, are possible. For example, if the goal is
conflict with the moral argument to protect ecosys- sustainability, one should assess value based on the
tems, such as the moral argument that no one contribution to achieving that goal-in addition to
should go hungry. All we have done is to translate value based on the goals of individual utility maximi-
the valuation and decision problem into a new set of zation, social equity, or other goals that may be
dimensions and a new language of discourse, one deemed important. This broadening is particularly
that in some senses makes the valuation and choice important if the goals are potentially in conflict.
problem more difficult and less explicit. As briefly mentioned above, there are at least
So, whereas ecosystem valuation is certainly diffi- three broad goals that have been identified as
cult, one choice we do not have is whether or not to important to managing economic systems within
do it. Rather, the decisions we make, as a society, the context of the planet's ecological life support
about ecosystems imply valuations. We can choose system (Daly 1992):
to make these valuations explicit or not; we can 1. assessing and insuring that the scale or magni-
undertake them by using the best available ecologi- tude of human activities within the biosphere are
cal science and understanding or not; we can do ecologically sustainable;
them with an explicit acknowledgment of the huge
uncertainties involved or not, but as long as we are 2. distributing resources and property rights fairly,
both within the current generation of humans and
forced to make choices we are doing valuation. The
between this and future generations, and also be-
valuations are simply the relative weights we give to
tween humans and other species; and
the various aspects of the decision problem.
Society can make better choices about ecosystems 3. efficiently allocating resources as constrained
if the valuation issue is made as explicit as possible. and defined by 1 and 2 above, and including both
This means taking advantage of the best informa- marketed and nonmarketed resources, especially
tion we can muster and making uncertainties about ecosystem services.
valuations explicit too. It also means developing Several authors have discussed valuation of ecosys-
new and better ways to make good decisions in the tem services with respect to goal 3 above-allocative
face of these uncertainties. Ultimately, it means efficiency based on individual utility maximization
(for example, Farber and Costanza 1987; Costanza
being, explicit about our goals as a society, both in
the short term and in the long term, and understand- and others 1989; Mitchell and Carson 1989; Dixon
ing the complex relationships between current ac- and Hufschmidt 1990; Pearce 1993; Goulder and
tivities and policies and their ability to achieve these Kennedy 1997). We need to explore more fully the
goals. implications of extending these concepts to include
This leads back to the role of individual prefer- valuation with respect to the other two goals of (a)
ences in determining value. If individual prefer- ecological sustainability, and (b) distributional fair-

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 8 R. Costanza

Table 1. Valuation of Ecosystem Services Based on the Three Primary Goals

Sustainabilitya

Level of Level of
Goal or Preference Discussion Scientific Specific
Value Basis Who Votes Basis Required Input Required Methods

Efficiency Homo economius Current individual Low Low Willingness to pay

preferences
Fairness Homo communicus Community High Medium Veil of ignorance
preferences
Sustainability Homo naturalis Whole system Medium High Modeling with
preferences precaution

aCostanza and Folke 1997.

ness (Costanza and Folke 1997). Basing valuation mius"-that humans act independently, rationally,
on current individual preferences and utility maxi- and in their own self-interest. Value in this context
mization alone, as is done in conventional analysis, (E-value) is based on current individual prefer-
does not necessarily lead to ecological sustainability ences, which are assumed to be fixed or given
or social fairness (Bishop 1993). (Norton and others 1998). No additional discussion
A Kantian or intrinsic rights approach to valua- or scientific input is required to form these prefer-
tion (compare Goulder and Kennedy 1997) is one ences (since they are assumed to already exist), and
approach to goal 2, but it is important to recognize value is simply people's revealed willingness to pay
that the three goals are not "either-or" alternatives. for the good or service in question. The best estimate
Whereas they are in some senses independent of what people are willing to pay is thought to be
multiple criteria (Arrow and Raynaud 1986), they what they would actually pay in a well-functioning
must all be satisfied in an integrated fashion to allow market. For resources or services for which there is
human life to continue in a desirable way. Similarly, no market (like many ecosystem services) a pseudo-
the valuations that flow from these goals are not market can sometimes be simulated with question-
"either-or" alternatives. Rather than an "utilitarian naires that elicit individual's contingent valuation.
or intrinsic rights" dichotomy, we must integrate the Fairness based value (F-value) would require that
three goals listed above and their consequent valua- individuals vote their preferences as a member of
tions. the community, not as individuals. This different
A two-tiered approach that combines public dis- species (Homo communicus) would engage in much
cussion and consensus building on sustainability discussion with other members of the community
and equity goals at the community level with and come to consensus on the values that would be
methods for modifying both prices and preferences fair to all members of the current and future
at the individual level to better reflect these commu- community (including nonhuman species), incorpo-
nity goals may be necessary (Rawls 1971; Norton rating scientific information about possible future
1995; Norton and others 1998). Estimation of eco- consequences as necessary. One method to imple-
system values based on sustainability and fairness ment this might be Rawls' (1971) "veil of igno-
goals requires treating preferences as endogenous rance," where everyone votes as if they were operat-
and coevolving with other ecological, economic, ing with no knowledge of their own individual
and social variables. status in current or future society.
Sustainability based value (S-value) would re-
VALUATION WITH SUSTAINABILITY, quire an assessment of the contribution to ecological
FAIRNESS, AND EFFICIENCY AS GOALS sustainability of the item in question. The S-value of
ecosystem services is connected to their physical,
Thus, we can distinguish at least three types of value chemical, and biological role in the long-term func-
that are relevant to the problem of valuing ecosys- tioning of the global system. Scientific information
tem services. These are laid out in Table 1, according about the functioning of the global system thus is
to their corresponding goal or value basis. Efficiency- critical in assessing S-value, and some discussion
based value (E-value) is based on a model of human and consensus building is also necessary. If it is
behavior sometimes referred to as "Homo econo- accepted that all species, no matter how seemingly

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Social Goals and Valuation 9

uninteresting or lacking in immediate utility,more

haveintegrated,
a preanalytic vision and new, yet to
role to play in natural ecosystems (Naeem and be developed, analyses that flow from it. This will be
an enormously important challenge for the next
others 1994; Tilman and Downing 1994; Holling
generation of ecosystem scientists.
and others 1995), estimates of ecosystem services
may be derived from scientific studies of the role of
REFERENCES
ecosystems and their biota in the overall system,
without direct reference to current human prefer-
Arrow KJ, Raynaud H. 1986. Social choice and mu
ences. Humans operate as Homo naturalis indecision-making.
this Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
context, expressing preferences as if they were
Berkes F, Folke C. 1994. Investing in cultural c
representatives of the whole system. Instead of
sustainable use of natural capital. In: Jansson AM,
being merely an expression of current individual
Folke C, and Costanza R, editors. Investing in nat
the ecological economics approach to sustainabilit
preferences, S-value becomes a system characteris-
ton DC: Island Press. p 128-49.
tic related to the item's evolutionary contribution to
Bishop RC. 1993. Economic efficiency, sustainability
the survival of the linked ecological economic sys-
versity. Ambio 22:69-73.
tem. Using this perspective, we may be able to better
Bockstael N, Costanza R, Strand I, Boynton W, Bell K,
estimate the values contributed by, say, mainte-
1995. Ecological economic modeling and valuation
nance of water and atmospheric quality to tems.
long-
Ecol Econ 14:143-59.

term human well-being, including protecting the JM. 1954. Social choice, democracy, and free market
Buchanan
opportunities of choice for future generationsJ (Gol-
Polit Econ 62:114-23

ley 1994; Perrings 1994). One way to get atCostanza

theseR, Folke C. 1997. Valuing ecosystem services with
efficiency,
values would be to use systems simulation models fairness and sustainability as goals. In: Daily G,
editor. Nature's services: societal dependence on natural ecosys-
that incorporated the major linkages in the system
tems. Washington, DC: Island Press. 392 pp; p 49-70.
at the appropriate time and space scales (Costanza
Costanza R, Perrings C. 1990. A flexible assurance bonding
and others 1993; Bockstael and others 1995; Voinov
system for improved environmental management. Ecol Econ
and others 1999). To account for the large uncertain-
2:57-76.

ties involved, these models would have to be used in R,

Costanza Farber SC, Maxwell J. 1989. The valuation and

a precautionary way, looking for the range management

of of wetland ecosystems. Ecol Econ 1:335-62.

possible values and erring on the side of caution

Costanza R, Wainger L, Folke C, Miler K-G. 1993. Modeling
complex ecological economic systems: toward an evolutionary,
(Costanza and Perrings 1990).
dynamic understanding of people and nature. BioScience
To fully integrate the three goals of ecological
43:545-55.
sustainability, social fairness, and economic Costanza
effi- R, d'Arge R, de Groot R, Farber S, Grasso M, Hann
ciency, we also need a further step, which Naeem
Sen S, Limburg K, Paruelo J, O'Neill RV, and others.
(1995) has described as "value formation through
The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural ca
Nature 387:253-60.
public discussion." This can be seen as the essence of
real democracy. As Buchanan (1954, p120) Costanza
put it: R, Cumberland JC, Daly HE, Goodland R, Norgaar
1997b. An introduction to ecological economics. Boca Rato
"The definition of democracy as 'government by
FL: St. Lucie Press. 275 p.
discussion' implies that individual values can and do
Daily G, editor. 1997. Nature's services: societal dependenc
change in the process of decision-making." Limiting
natural ecosystems. Washington, DC: Island Press. 392 p.
our valuations and social decision making Daly
to the
HE. 1992. Allocation, distribution, and scale: toward
goal of economic efficiency based on fixed prefer-
economics that is efficient, just, and sustainable. Ecol E
6:185-93.
ences prevents the needed democratic discussion of
values and options and leaves us with only Dalythe
HE, Cobb JB. 1989. For the common good: redirecting
economy toward community, the environment and a susta
"illusion of choice" (Schmookler 1993). So, rather
able future. Boston: Beacon Press.
than trying to avoid the difficult questions raised by
Dixon JA, Hufschmidt MM. 1990. Economic valuation tech-
the valuation of ecological systems and services, we
niques for the environment: a case study workbook. Balti-
need to acknowledge the broad range of goals being
more: Johns Hopkins University Press:
served as well as the technical difficulties involved. Ekins P. 1992. A four-capital model of wealth creation. In: Ekins
We must get on with the process of value formation P, Max-Neef M. Real-life economics: understanding wealth
and analysis in as participatory and democratic a creation. London: Routledge. 460 pp; p 147-55.
way as possible, but one that also takes advantage of Farber S, Costanza R. 1987. The economic value of wetlands
systems. J Environ Manage 24:41-51.
the full range and depth of scientific information we
have accumulated on ecosystem functioning. This is Golley FB. 1994. Rebuilding a humane and ethical decision
system for investing in natural capital. In: Jansson AM,
not simply the application of the conventional Hammer M, Folke C, Costanza R, editors. Investing in natural
preanalytic vision and analyses to a new problem, capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability.
but it will require a new, more comprehensive, Washington DC: Island Press. p 169-78.

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
10 R. Costanza

Pearce D. 1993.
Goulder LH, Kennedy F. 1997. Valuing ecosystem Economic values
services. In: and the natural world. London:
Earthscan. and value.
Daily G, editor. Ecosystem services: their nature
Washington DC: Island Press. p 23-48. Perrings CA. 1994. Biotic diversity, sustainable development, and
natural capital.J.
Holling CS, Schindler DW, Walker BW, Roughgarden In: 1995.
Jansson AM, Hammer M, Folke C, Costanza
R, editors.
Biodiversity in the functioning of ecosystems: an Investing
ecologicalin natural capital: the ecological econom-
icsC,
synthesis. In: Perrings C, Miler K-G, Folke approach to sustainability.
Holling CS, Washington, DC: Island Press. p
92-112. and ecologi-
Jansson B-O, editors. Biodiversity loss: economic
cal issues. New York: Cambridge University Rawls
Press. J. p 44-83.
1971. A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford Univ
Mitchell RC, Carson RT. 1989. Using surveysPress.
to value public
goods: the contingent valuation method. Schmookler
Washington,AB. 1993. The
DC: illusion of choice: how the market
Resources for the Future. economy shapes our destiny. Albany, NY: State University of
Naeem S, Thompson LJ, Lawler SP, Lawton JH, Woodfin RM. New York Press.
1994. Declining biodiversity can alter the performance of Schumpeter J. 1954. History of economic analysis. London: Allen
ecosystems. Nature 368:734-7. and Unwin. 1260 p.
Norton BG. 1995. Ecological integrity and social values: at what Sen A. 1995. Rationality and social choice. Am Econ Rev 85:1-24.
scale? Ecosystem Health 1:228-41. Tilman D, Downing JA. 1994. Biodiversity and stability in
Norton B, Costanza R, Bishop R. 1998. The evolution of prefer- grasslands. Nature 367:363-5.
ences: why "sovereign" preferences may not lead to sustain- Voinov A, Costanza R, Wainger L, Boumans R, Villa F, Maxwell T,
able policies and what to do about it. Ecol Econ 24:193-211. Voinov H. 1999. The Patuxent landscape model: integrated
Page T. 1977. Conservation and economic efficiency. Baltimore: ecological economic modeling of a watershed. Environ Model
Johns Hopkins University Press. Software 14:473-91.

This content downloaded from

177.159.245.16 on Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms