Human and Organizational Performance [HOP] Approach

in Safety Climate and Safety Culture Assessment

Thursday, May 19, 2022 – Webinar Series #1: UNS IE Doctoral Programme

Presented by:
Dr. Adithya Sudiarno, ST., MT., IPM, ASEAN Eng.
Industrial and System Engineering Department
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember - Surabaya
Working Experiences Brief CV Dr. Adithya Sudiarno, ST., MT., IPM., ASEAN Eng.
▪ Lecturer at Industrial and System Eng.
Dept., Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (ITS) Industrial Partnership Experiences
▪ Expert Staff of Indonesian Young Scientist Association (IYSA)
▪ Organizational development and evaluation Sub-Directorate
Head of ITS
▪ Head of the ITS Industrial Eng. undergraduate study program
Current (on-going) Education
▪ International Diploma for Occupational Safety & Health
Management Professionals, NEBOSH, UK
Certifications
▪ General OHS Expert ▪ BNSP Assessor of Competency
▪ OHSMS Auditor ▪ Senior Professional Engineer
Awards Affiliate Membership
▪ Silver Medal, WWIEA, South Korea, 2018.
▪ Special Award, APIR, Poland, 2019.
▪ Special Award, TIA, Taiwan, 2019.
▪ Gold Medal, WIIPA, Taiwan, 2020.
▪ Mención De Honor, EXPOCYTAR, Argentina, 2020.
▪ Gold Medal, ASIE, Virginia-USA, 2021.
▪ Silver Medal, KIDE, Kaohsiung-Taiwan, 2021
What Will You Get From This Webinar?

The answer is not to build a more complex safety management system.

We aim to refresh your knowledge with a NEW VIEW of Safety.

We will provide you with theories, methods, and tools underpinned

by the latest research/ best practices.

We challenge you to explore OFI (Opportunity ForImprovement) to

improve safety culture/ climate.
 HOP-Based Safety
Culture Assessment
04
Human and Organizational
Performance [HOP]
Safety Climate &
Safety Culture
02 05 Conlussion
01
03 HOP & SC
Connection
Safety Is An Attribute Of Work
 Bad Things Can Happen To The Safe Organization
The Chernobyl disaster was a nuclear accident that
occurred on 26 April 1986 at the No. 4 reactor in the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, near the city of
Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian SSR in the Soviet
Union. The accident occurred during a safety test on
the steam turbine of an RBMK-type nuclear reactor.
Int’l Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) produced
two significant reports INSAG-1 (1986), and a revised
report, INSAG-7 (1992). In summary, according to
INSAG-1, the main cause of the accident was the
operators' actions, but according to INSAG-7, the main
cause was the reactor's design. Both INSAG reports
identified an inadequate "SAFETY CULTURE" (INSAG-1
coined the term) at all managerial and operational
levels as a major underlying factor of different aspects
of the accident.
 Safety Culture In Indonesia
Penerapan Budaya K3 Pada Setiap Kegiatan
2022 Usaha Guna Mendukung Perlindungan Tenaga
Kerja Di Era Digitalisasi
Penguatan Sumberdaya Manusia Yang Unggul
2021 Dan Berbudaya K3 Pada Semua Sektor Usaha
Optimalisasi Kemandirian Masyarakat Berbudaya
2020 Keselamatan dan Kesehatan Kerja (K3) Pada Era
Revolusi Industri 4.0 Berbasis Teknologi Informasi
Wujudkan Kemandirian Masyarakat Indonesia
2019 Berbudaya Keselamatan Dan Kesehatan Kerja (K3)
Untuk Mendukung Stabilitas Ekonomi Nasional
2018 Melalui Budaya Keselamatan Dan Kesehatan Kerja
(K3) Kita Bentuk Bangsa Yang Berkarakter
Dengan Budaya K3 Kita Tingkatkan Kualitas
Hidup Manusia Menuju Masyarakat yang
Selamat, Sehat dan Produktif
2017
Tingkatkan Budaya K3 Untuk Mendorong
Produktivitas Dan Daya Saing di
Pasar Internasional
2016
Melalui Penerapan SMK3 Kita Wujudkan
Indonesia Berbudaya K3 Dalam
Menghadapi Perdagangan Bebas
2015
Mewujudkan Budaya K3 Untuk Menjamin
Stabilitas Usaha Dalam Mendukung
Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Nasional
2014
Budayakan K3 Disetiap Kegiatan Usaha
Menuju Masyarakat Industri Yang 2013
Selamat, Sehat Dan Produktif
Safety Culture In Indonesia

Despite the progress that has been achieved by

Indonesia, the number of occupational accidents are still
relatively high. In 2018 there were reported 153,313
cases of accidents with a death toll of more than 3,500
people. THE INDONESIAN CITIZENS’ SAFETY CULTURE,
especially among workers, IS STILL LOW. Many workers
still do not care about the OSH rules and
implementation of them in their respective work areas,
when without strict supervision.

Jansz, J. et al (2020) Workplace Safety, Enablers and

Barriers
Safety Climate And Safety Culture : recent phenomena

The terms “safety culture” and “safety

climate” are often used in the literature
to refer to the nature of an
organization’s policies and the attitudes
of its employees regarding safety
issues. In certain studies, the words
“safety culture” and “safety climate”
have been used INTERCHANGEABLY
(Arzahan, et al., 2022).
Safety Culture And Safety Climate : recent phenomena

The review identified a total of 108 definitions of

safety culture, safety climate and related construct:
- 51 are original safety culture definitions
- 30 are original safety climate definitions.
- Some authors/organizations offer definitions for
both safety culture and safety climate.
 Safety Climate VS Safety Culture Definition
safety
▪ Dov Zohar : A 40-item measure of
climate organizational climate for safety
was constructed and validated in a
stratified sample of 20 industrial
organizations in Israel. A summary
of molar perceptions that
1980 employees share about their work
environments (Zohar).
▪ Safety climate, is often used to
describe the more ‘tangible’
outputs of an organization’s safety
culture. For example, how people
perceive and describe the
importance given to safety issues
by the organization at a particular
point in time, and how local
arrangements are seen to reflect
this (Health and Safety Executive).
safety
▪ INSAG (International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group) : culture
inadequate "SAFETY CULTURE" at
all managerial and operational
levels as a major underlying
factor of different aspects of the
accident.
▪ The product of individual and
1986
group values, attitudes,
perceptions, competencies, and
patterns of behaviour that
determine the commitment to,
and the style and proficiency of,
an organization’s health and
safety management (Health and
Safety Executive).
 Safety Culture VS Safety Climate Definition
safety safety
▪ Shared perceptions of ▪ Safety culture reflects the
climate employees about the importance attitudes, values, and priorities culture
of safety within their of management and employees
organization (The National and their impact on the
Institute for Occupational Safety development, implementation,
and Health/ NIOSH). performance, oversight, and
1980 ▪ Safety climate is concerned with enforcement of safety and 1986
the shared perceptions and health in the workplace
beliefs that employees hold (NIOSH).
regarding safety in their ▪ safety culture can be viewed as
workplace. These serve to that sub-component of
construct a self-sustaining image organizational culture which
of risk, danger, and safety in an alludes to individual, job, and
organization (Cooper). organizational features
affecting and influencing health
and safety (Cooper).
Safety Climate VS Safety Culture Definition

Taken from RR367, A Review Of Safety Culture And Safety

Climate Literature For The Development Of The Safety Culture
Inspection Toolkit, Prepared by Human Engineering for the
Health and Safety Executive 2005
Safety Climate And Safety Culture : The Difference

Behaviours (symbols)
What safety ‘looks like’

Systems
How safety is ‘meant to be’

Safety Climate
Perceptions of safety’s
importance

Safety Culture
Values and beliefs about safety
 Safety Culture Maturity Level
Based on Hudson ; Filho ; Anglo American Plc, Stemn

No Culture Bureaucratic Owbership

Blame Culture Way of Life
Accept that Culture Culture
Prevent a Way we do
incidents Prevent Improve the
similar incident business
happen incidents before Systems
they occur

BASIC REACTIVE COMPLIANT PROACTIVE RESILIENT

Organization That Have Been Working With HOP
 HOP Backgrounds and Rationale [#1]
How many people
go to work and want Are there people
to come home purposely coming to
safely? work to fail?

100% No one
“Mistakes arise directly from
the way the mind handles
information, NOT through
stupidity or carelessness.”
- Dr. Edward de Bono
Humans are fallible but they also
contribute a lot to safety, they
are capable of adapting to
unexpected situations, and they
are aware when the risk
increases
(Charles Major ; Wes Harvard ; ICSI)
 HOP Backgrounds and Rationale [#2]
How Work Really Happens : Drift And Accumulation
Expectations: Work As Planned (Imagined)
“Continuous improvement/
innovation”

Complex
Adaptive SUCCESS!
Behavior Task end
Task start
Worker become :
“violation” “master of the blue line”
Conklin / Fisher
Reality: Work As Performed (Done)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdLfDLjIqXE&ab_channel=SecuriteIndustrielle
 Human & Organizational Performance [HOP] Leaders & Evolution
HOP is a systems-based approach that originated with safety thought leaders
like Todd Conklin, Sidney Dekker, Erik Hollnagel, and James Reason.

James Reason Erik Hollnagel Sidney Dekker Todd

Todd Conklin
Conklin
“Human Error” “Human Reliability Analysis” “Drift Into Failure” “Pre-Accident Investigations”
“Managing the Risks “Safety I and Safety II” “The Safety Anarchist” “5 Principles of Human
of Organizational Accidents” Performance”
“Swiss Cheese Model”
 Human & Organizational Performance [HOP] Definition
Another Way [New View] to Think About Safety
HOP is a science-based approach to looking at HOP is a contemporary perspective on how we can
mistakes so we can address them more effectively. It improve work. It focuses on understanding the
builds an understanding of how humans perform and context and conditions of work, recognizing the
how we can build systems that are more error- complex interactions between people and systems.
tolerant (SAIF’s leadership project). HOP helps us to understand how humans perform
and gives us a framework for building more
HOP is a science-based approach to understanding RESILIENT organizations. HOP is a tool that helps
how and why people make these mistakes or errors safety practitioners answer the question: how can
and what you can do about them either as an we do safety differently? (HOP LAB, Southpac
organization or as an individual (Rob Fisher, 2019). Int’l Group ; Andrea Baker).

HOP is a risk-based operating philosophy recognizing

that error is part of the human condition and that an
organization's processes and systems greatly influence
employee actions and choices, and consequently, their
likelihood of success (Brooks, 2021).
 The Big Ticket Idea Within HOP [#1]
Common Cause of Human Error
Workplace Injury
Machine & Individual
Equipment Mistakes
20% Failure 30% Organizational
Weaknesses

Human 80% 70%

Error

unlike a risk management program that works hard to eliminate, mitigate,

or substitute risk, HOP assumes that mistakes will happen. In essence,
humans try hard, but they’re not perfect. No amount of planning or
equipment can make them perfect, so perhaps through better process
systems management and analysis, organizations might lessen the effect
of human error through the promotion of defenses that reduce risk.
 The Big Ticket Idea Within HOP [#2]
Shift thinking from “why” . . . . . . to “how”! (Conklin ; Brooks)

HP = W (B+R) HOP = H (B+S+R)

NOTE : NOTE :
HP = Human Performance HOP = Human & Organizational Performance
W = Why H = How
B = Behaviors B = Behaviors
R = Results S = System
R = Results
 The Task-Based System
Human and Organizational Performance SYSTEM MODEL
▪ The Task-Based System shows that on any
task at any time, the individual performing
the task is within a system. The individual is
surrounded by other People, Programs,
equipment people
Processes, Work Environments,
organizations, and Equipment.
▪ The systemic drivers are dynamic, not static
and as they shift throughout the task, they
organization programs all impact each other, they all impact the
individual, and the individual must respond
to these shifts in systemic drivers. The
individual is an expert at adapting to
changes and optimizing our systems.
work enviro. processes ▪ A bad system will beat a good person every
time (Edwards Deming)
 Todd Conklin’s 5 HOP Principles

https://www.southpacinternational.com/hop/the-five-principles-of-hop/
 HOP Principle No. #1
Belief
People make mistakes
Emerging Behavior

▪ People are fallible, and even ▪ Designing to fail safely

the best make mistakes.
▪ Errors and poor judgment are
part of the human condition.
▪ As work gets more complex,
the number and complexity
of errors increase.
▪ Designing systems that can
withstand errors prevents
injuries.
▪ Defense testing
▪ Designing to fail safely
Tools Embraced
▪ Defense testing
▪ Essential controls
▪ Defense testing audits
 HOP Principle No. #2
Belief
Blame fixes nothing
▪ Thought leaders have long
known about the corrosive
nature of blame, yet it is still a
common first reaction to
workplace incidents.
▪ Blame is common because it is
easier to blame than improve.
▪ Blaming an individual will not
change the probability of a
similar event.
Emerging Behavior
▪ Discussion on reactive
accountability decreases
▪ Discussion on system
improvements and forward
accountability discussion
increases
▪ Designing to fail safely
Toolstesting
▪ Defense Embraced
▪ Removal of zero-tolerance policies
▪ Rewriting HR policies
▪ Bias training
 HOP Principle No. #3
Belief
Context drives behaviour
▪ People are not all that unique - if one
person breaks a rule there is high
probability others will do the same.
▪ The environment in which work occurs
mainly determines workers' behavior and
actions.
▪ Those closest to the work understand
context the best.
▪ Context is the circumstances that form the
setting for an event, such as fatigue,
production demands, or broken
equipment.
Emerging Behavior
▪ Seeking to understand local
rationale
▪ Deviation prone rules and
normalized deviations
▪ A focus on improving systems
and processes, not individuals
Tools Embraced
▪ Learning Teams
▪ EEFA Charting
▪ Blackline/blueline meetings
▪ New employee listening sessions
 HOP Principle No. #4
Belief
Learning is vital
▪ A complex system cannot be
designed perfectly from the
beginning.
▪ Resilience is not an end state of
design, it is a state of continuous
learning and improvement.
▪ The whole point of analyzing
workplace injuries is to prevent
them from happening again, but
many organizations see the same
types of injuries over and over.
Emerging Behavior
▪ Operational Learning
rhythms adopted at all
levels of the organization
▪ Designing to fail safely
Tools Embraced
▪ Defense testing
▪ Learning teams
▪ Post-job/pre-job
▪ Live procedures
▪ The index card process
▪ Operational learning walks
▪ Seeking operator struggle
 HOP Principle No. #5
Belief
Response matters
▪ The leaders’ reaction to failure builds
or breaks learning and improving
culture.
▪ Managers shapes how the organization
learns by their reaction to failure.
▪ You can blame and punish or you can
learn and improve, but you can't do
both.
▪ Every aspect of improvement is
contingent upon leadership's
deliberate decision to get better.
Emerging Behavior
▪ Solutions sets not
overridden by managers
▪ Try-storming embraced
▪ Policy changes built with
those closest to the work
▪ Empathetic communication
▪ Designing to fail safely
Tools Embraced
▪ Defense testing
▪ Advisory boards
▪ Communication reviews
▪ Soft skills training
 Human & Organizational Performance [HOP] Highlight

HOP is NOT a program….It is an OPERATING PHILOSOPHY.

To adopt the PHILOSOPHY, HOP principles need to become commonly
values ….
held values
value near misses as significant learning opportunities:
We value
▪ Look for what went well in our system’s responses and what
did not respond well
▪ Determine if we are good or if we are lucky.

(Baker ; Ferguson)
HOP and Safety Culture : The Connection
12 core attributes of a world-class safety culture
Engaged management Safety recognition programs

Active safety committee Continuous improvement

Employee who are comfortable

Apply Behavior-Based Safety
speaking up
Human & Organizational
Dedicated resources
Performance
Consider contractors, customer,
Safety Training
and competition

Leading indicator Open communication

HOP and Safety Culture : The Connection

HOP principle : New value

Safety Culture
Values and beliefs about safety
HOP and Safety Culture : The Connection
Key Phases to Incorporate HOP in Safety Culture

1. Garnering Interest & Commitment

2. Developing Foundational of Understanding HOP

3. Beginning Operational Learning

4. Organizational Alignment

5. Prevention of Catastrophic Outcomes

HOP is a cultural change, a movement that needs to be

planned and fostered.
(Baker)
SOME IDEA TO TAKE HOME : HOP-BASED SC ASSESSMENT
Safety Model Canvassing
Learning is vital Context drives behaviour

Response matters Blame fixes nothing

People make mistake

 SOME IDEA TO TAKE HOME : HOP-BASED SC ASSESSMENT
People make mistake Risk

▪ Is an employee's error an avoidable risk? (adapted from NOSACQ)

▪ When performing parallel OM on multiple units do you identify more and more errors? (adapted
from Dahl Kongsvik)
▪ Etc.
Blame fixes nothing Engage. & Involvement

▪ Do you able to speak freely and openly about unsafe conditions without getting negative judgments
from those around you? (adapted from Lingard)
▪ Did your manager respond well to your explanation of the mistakes that occurred? (adapted from
Dahl Kongsvik)
▪ Etc.
 SOME IDEA TO TAKE HOME : HOP-BASED SC ASSESSMENT
Context drives behaviour Info. & Communication

▪ Does management always share information regarding the updated-working environment

conditions for the employee? (adapted from Zaira and Hadikusumo)
▪ Does management provide an opportunity at regular meetings to discuss actual conditions that
affect the level of risk? (adapted from NOSACQ)
▪ Etc.

Learning is vital Organizational learning

▪ Does the management open and responsive in providing follow-up on reports of unsafe conditions
or unsafe behavior? (adapted from Lingard)
▪ How often does management analyze the causes of near-miss incidents? (adapted from Filho, et al)
▪ Etc.
SOME IDEA TO TAKE HOME : HOP-BASED SC ASSESSMENT

Response matters Leadership

▪ Does your manager immediately follow up on problems found in the field directly? (adapted
from Dahl & Kongsvik)
▪ Has your manager given examples of efforts to improve safety at work to all his subordinates/
staff? (adapted from Fleishman)
▪ Etc.
HOP-BASED SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT

We want to measure culture

culture change
(artifacts), so we can learn where there
is HOP progress…….

….. NOT FORCE change through

measurement.
 CONCLUSSION
▪ Safety climate related with perception, safety culture related with value
and beliefs.
▪ HOP is another Way [New View] to Think About Safety which assumes
that mistakes will happen [error tolerant].
▪ HOP is NOT a program. It is an Operating Philosophy which principles
need to become commonly held values as part of safety culture
campaign.
▪ HOP-based safety culture assessment very dependent on the success of
the interest & commitment garner of all parties and organizational
alignment. Avoid forcing the change through measurement.
SOME RESOURCES
Great performance is not the absence of errors
or failures…..
….. It is the presence of EXPANDING CAPACITY
….. It is the presence of DEFENCES.
(Conklin)

#thank you

Dr. Adithya Sudiarno, ST., MT., IPM, ASEAN Eng.

Industrial and System Engineering Department
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember – Surabaya
adithya.Sudiarno@gmail.com