Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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7/27/2011
The Typical drilling contract will allocate certain risks on a reciprocal basis
(including personal injury, damage to property, certain pollution risks and
consequential damages), regardless of fault.
Other risks, such as well control, downhole pollution, loss or damage to
the hole or downhole tools and reservoir damage, are often assumed by
the operator, at least to some degree.
The drilling contract is one of the most important contracts an operator
will enter into. Other related contracts, such as vessel charters, service
agreements, etc. will often be based upon the risk allocation scheme in
the primary drilling contract.
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Companies initially negotiated and drafted their own set of contracts with
each other. This took up significant time and resources.
Over the last several decades, the industry has worked to some extent on
a cooperative basis to develop and use various types of petroleum model
contracts to gain the benefits of standardization and efficiency.
Two recognized Model contracts today for onshore drilling contracts are
those by the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) and
American Petroleum Institute (API).
Not surprisingly, the IADC form favors the drilling contractor, while the
API form favors the operator.
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Day Work Contract. A day work contract is "a contract for the drilling of an
oil and gas well under which 'the drilling contractor furnishes the drilling
crew and drilling equipment; he is paid an agreed sum of money for each
day spent in drilling regardless of the number of days involved or the
depth drilled.
The contractor waits for direction by the operator, and most importantly
the contractor retains only the specified risks detailed in the contract.
All other risks, whether detailed in the contract or unaddressed by the
written agreement, are shifted to the operator.
This is the most common type for onshore drilling contracts.
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Here all work of drilling and completing a well for production is borne by
the contractor. The operator simply waits for the contractor to complete
working before becoming the owner of the well.
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Conversely, the operator normally accepts liability for its own personnel
and property and, in daywork contracts, generally assumes responsibility
for well related risks (including pollution, wild well control, well damage or
loss) and reservoir damage.
The principle that each party assumes liability for its own property and
personnel, often referred to as “knock for knock”.
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The “knock for knock“ concept frequently is adopted to allocate risk for injury
or death of the respective employees of the contractor and operator.
What about responsibility for claims of third party personnel, both in respect
of the various subcontractor and service company personnel which may be
dispatched to the rig site by either of the parties and as respects “true” third
parties (i.e., the general public and others who have no contractual
relationship with either party)?
As respects the employees of subcontractor or service companies, such as
cementing, logging and casing crews, the operator and contractor often
indemnify each other for injury or death of employees of their respective
subcontractors and other contractors. This is based on the understanding that
the party that hires such services will negotiate the terms of engagement and
should require the service company or subcontractor to contractually extend
an indemnity for injury or death of its own personnel.
Liability for loss or damage to true “third parties” is generally based “At Law”
or “upon percentage of negligence”.
ENERGY SYMPOSIUM 2011
The “knock for knock” approach also generally applies to equipment and
property of each party. Here again, the respective parties are expected to
insure (or self-insure) their own assets against damage or loss and thus
should be prepared to accept the associated risk in the context of a
drilling contract.
The contracts generally allocate damage or loss of equipment and
property provided by their respective subcontractors and other
contractors. The operator and contractor should then be able to allocate
the property risks to the asset owners in the subcontract agreements.
Among traditional exceptions to the “knock for knock” principle is the
compensation customarily afforded contractors for inhole and subsea
equipment damaged or lost while working on a daywork basis.
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Risks related to the well being drilled pursuant to the contract generally
are allocated to the operator in daywork offshore drilling contracts since
such risks traditionally are insured (or retained on a self-insured basis) by
operators through placement of “Owner’s Extra Expense” insurance
coverage.
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The third well related risk customarily covered by Owner’s Extra Expense
insurance relates to wild well control. In daywork contracts, the operator
normally assumes liability and extends an indemnity for the costs of
controlling a wild well, including relief well(s).
As noted earlier, the risk allocation for “people and property” are
generally performed on a “ knock for knock” basis, wherein each party
assumes responsibility for loss or damage to its own people and property.
A potential deviation from the “knock for knock” principle relates to war
and political risk exposures to the contractor’s MODU in international
contracts.
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7/27/2011
After the parties have agreed upon a risk allocation matrix for a drilling
contract, careful consideration should be given to selection of the governing
law and inclusion of provisions which will assure that the agreed indemnity,
risk allocation and insurance provisions are enforceable.
The Texas and Louisiana anti-indemnity statutes render certain liability and
indemnity provisions of a drilling contract unenforceable in the absence of
mutual indemnities and insurance or, in certain circumstances, in the event of
negligence by indemnitee.
Be careful, however, because in certain circumstances, such as in performance
of inland waterway drilling in a state with an anti-indemnity statute, it
generally is accepted that the parties are free to designate an appropriate
governing law for most international offshore drilling contracts and for
domestic contracts involving MODU operations in the Ocean Continental
Shelf (where “general maritime law of the United States” is an appropriate
governing law designation)
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The Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (the TOAIA applies to both property
damage claims and claims for bodily injury or death.
The TOAIA recognizes two exceptions: a limited unilateral indemnity and a
mutual indemnity. The unilateral indemnity is valid if the parties agree, in
writing, that the indemnity will be supported by insurance (up to $500,000).
The “mutual” indemnity exception is limited “to the extent of the coverage
and dollar limits of insurance or qualified self-insurance each party as
indemnitor has agreed to obtain for the benefit of the other party as
indemnitee.”
Significantly, the TOAIA does not apply to insurance that does not directly
support the indemnity, and this means that insurance provisions can provide
more protection than indemnity agreements in certain instances.
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7/27/2011
Maritime law also has certain potentially applicable restrictions on indemnity. The
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA) prohibits an indemnity claim
by a “Vessel” (including a jack-up rig) against the employer of an injured longshoreman.
However, there are exceptions. First, a reciprocal indemnity under 33 U.S.C. 905(c) is allowed
when the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) is applicable, and insurance protection
is enforceable even if the indemnity is invalid under 33 U.S.C. 905(b).
Second, section 905(b) only prohibits indemnity from an LHWCA employer to a “Vessel.”
Indemnity from a non-employer is not affected by section 905(b). Similarly, a non-Vessel is
not prohibited from obtaining indemnity from an LHWCA employer.
When an operator acts in more than one capacity, such as charterer of a crewboat and
operator of a fixed platform, section 905(b) may only preclude indemnity for “Vessel”
negligence, i.e., negligence in the capacity of vessel owner or charterer.
If you are dealing with an offshore drilling contract- one significant issue will be to
determine if the rig is considered a vessel and if it is operating on the Outer Continental
Shelf. This is a very fact specific exercise.
It is generally permissible for a contract to require that one party (the indemnitor) indemnify
another party (the indemnitee) for the indemnitee's own negligence. But that intent must
be clearly expressed.
Under maritime law and Louisiana law, for example, no talismanic (i.e. “required”) language
is required to make an indemnity agreement enforceable, but the intent to indemnify
against the indemnitee's negligence must be expressed in “clear” and “unequivocal terms.”
Texas courts follow a two-part test for enforceable indemnities, which requires that (1) the
intent to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence must be stated in “specific”
terms, and (2) the provision must be “conspicuous.” The first part of that rule is the “express
negligence” doctrine, which is a stricter standard than that required under Louisiana and
maritime law.
It is advisable under all three tests, maritime, Louisiana, and Texas, for the contract to cover
not merely indemnification for the “negligence” of the indemnitee, but to specifically
include the “sole or concurrent” fault or negligence of the indemnitee. Otherwise, the
indemnitor may argue that the provision is not sufficiently clear.
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We will discuss the specific types of policies in more details later in the
presentation.
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Otherwise, the court may compare the “other insurance” clauses in the
contractor's policies and require the company's policies to share a loss.
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Maritime Policies
Hull and Machinery
Charterer’s Legal Liability
Protection and Indemnity
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