ENRIQUE S. LEGASPI IV ATTY.

MELODY VARGAS

JD III EVIDENCE

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
Respondents.

FACTS:
The primary question in this case revolves around the legitimacy of GMA’s
presidency as ERAP contends that he did not resign and was only on LOA thus, is still
the president. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while
Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was elected VicePresident. The president was accused with
corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson’s accusations that the
president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The Senate and the House of
Representatives began early investigations regarding the accusation, while key
sociopolitical figures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the vice
president, senior advisers and cabinet members called on the president to resign, and
resigned from their cabinet posts themselves. Eventually, even Gen. Angelo Reyes and
other members of the AFP expressed withdrawal of support for ERAP.

The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges

presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled
against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3 billion
bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned and a
mass demonstration at EDSA began. 4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Roco’s motion
to postpone the impeachment trial until the House of Representatives resolved the lack
of public prosecutors.
 With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada
administration, the president attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a
snap election and by allowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures failed,
and the calls for resignation strengthened. On 20 January 2001, the president
negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke out that Chief Justice
Hilario Davide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at EDSA
Shrine.

Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality

of Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his
responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president. The
Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of
government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The
impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor-
Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open
questions regarding Estrada’s qualifications to run for other elected posts.

The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the
corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from
further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be
confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties,
thus making Arroyo an acting president only. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the
parties that they did not declare the Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001,
b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case while in its
pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against
Estrada for 30 days.

ISSUES :

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. - NO

 II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President. – YES

III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition

precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the
negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still president, whether
he is immune from criminal prosecution.- NO

IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the

ground of prejudicial publicity- NO

HELD:

According to Section 8, Article VII of the Constitution: “Sec. 8. In case of death,

permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until President or Vice President
shall have been elected and qualified.”

To be considered as a resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the

intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect. Here, Erap, did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of GMA. Consequently, WON Erap resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. (Using this test, he did resign).

The court looked at “Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” the diary of Exec. Sec.
Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was used as an authoritative window
on the state of mind of the petitioner. 1. The diary detailed that on January 20, the
Erap decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate.-> shows his intent to give up the presidency 2. The diary also stated that
Estrada expressed no objections to the plans for a graceful and dignified exit.-> To the
SC, this was proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. 3. The diary talked about negotiations for a for a peaceful and orderly transfer
of power was limited to 3 points, ( 1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family,
and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner ->which did not include the resignation of petitioner because at this time, this
was not a disputed point. 4. Angara’s diary quotes Estrada saying, “Pagod na pagod na
ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga.”-> To the SC, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko
na” are words of resignation. 5. During this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points
at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period. 6. It was clear in the negotiations that he was to sign a statement
attesting to his resignation after which, GMA will then take her oath. 7. But then all of
the negotiations were thwarted when Erap learned that GMA was going to take her
oath already despite not signing the document yet. (ANO BA MARE ANG LABO MO. All
you had to do was wait) 8. So, ERAP just decided to release the following statement as
per Ronie Puno’s advice:

“At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of
our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave
Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not
shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.xxx”

The resignation of the petitioner was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency.

The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not
resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern and
cites the letter transmitted to the Senate President and House Speaker as support.
However, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner.

Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing

caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation
by the people. - Petitioner also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He
relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which states that no public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the RPC on bribery. The
intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the
investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his
prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a
violation of his constitutional right.

A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative
or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause
the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him.

Also, when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, there were cases filed
against him before the Ombudsman but they were not technically pending as the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. The Ombudsman refrained from
conducting the preliminary investigation for the reason that as the sitting President
then, petitioner was immune from suit. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative

investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. However, the
exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. Even assuming that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner
resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

HEARSAY ISSUES/ HOLDING IN THE APRIL RESOLUTION: In G.R. No.

146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:

1. Whether the angara diary is inadmissible for being violative of the

following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions and
res inter alios acta

2. Whether reliance on newspaper acounts is violative of the hearsay rule-

NO

RATIO:

1. SC: We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of
the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons
subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in
criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases
involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the
Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some
of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that
does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence. The Angara diary is not an out of
court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at
bar .Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor
can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to
by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from
February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of
private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001.

The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12
and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12,
2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum
both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,and the third part,
published on February 6, 2001.It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to
contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo
that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe
hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or
in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it.

There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all
hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence.

Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to
their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. The emergence of these exceptions and
their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and
Berger as follows: Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories
of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra),
and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra).
 Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all,
exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of
hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy
and probative. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.

Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that
these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.

The rules of exclusion don’t cover admissions of a party such as the Angara
Diary. These admissions were admissible even if assuming arguendo, they are hearsay
because:

The diary contained direct statements of Erap which could be categorized as

admissions of a party

It class under the doctrine of adoptive admission, where a party’s reaction to a

statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person

It didn’t violate RIAA since it admitted the exception of admissions by a co-partner or

agent (Angara was the Exec Sec)

Ban on hearsay evidence didn’t cover independently relevant statement which

are relevant independent of WON they are true or not. This has 2 classes: 1)
statements which are the very facts in issue, 2) statements which are circumstantial
evidence of the facts in issue
 2. Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he
assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences
to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test
to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed
events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo as president. (Aka what Chavit said, all the public officials resigning,
impeachment tiral, etc.)

All these events are facts which are wellestablished and cannot be refuted All
these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no
need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers
reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being
hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud
protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.