Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

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Applied Energy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apenergy

Reliability of emergency and standby diesel generators: Impact on energy T

resiliency solutions
Jeffrey Marqusee, Donald Jenket (Don) II
⁎

National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO, United States

HIGHLIGHTS

• Finite reliability of emergency diesel generators is vital to energy planning.

• Current metrics do not capture the reliability of generators during a grid outage.
• Datasets were used to estimate generator reliability metrics with varying maintenance levels.
• Poorly maintained generators are 50% likely to fail within 48 h.
• Well maintained generators are 20% likely to fail within two weeks.

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Emergency diesel generators are the most common form of backup power for critical loads when the grid fails
Emergency diesel generators and are most often deployed as stand-alone generators (< 2000 kW) tied to individual buildings for hospitals,
Standby diesel generators emergency services, military bases, ports, airports, industries, and commercial facilities. Understanding the finite
Reliability reliability of emergency diesel generators during continuous operation is crucial for energy planners, managers,
Energy resilience
and end-users. A new analysis of two large non-public emergency diesel generator operational data sets shows
Generator reliability
that commonly used reliability metrics are inadequate to predict the performance during a grid outage.
Additional metrics addressing the likelihood of an emergency diesel generator to be available at the time an
outage starts, successfully start and carry load, and constantly run for the duration of the outage are needed to
predict the continuous run-time reliability of emergency diesel generators during a grid outage. This is the first
analysis of the reliability of modern generators that follow standard maintenance protocols commonly used for
backup power and these new metrics are shown to be dependent on the level of emergency diesel generator
maintenance with values that can vary by more than an order of magnitude. Even using the new metrics for well-
maintained emergency diesel generators, the analysis shows that the single emergency diesel generators con-
figurations are only 80% likely to provide power for the duration of a two-week grid outage.

1. Introduction
Energy resilience is a critical issue facing the nation.1 The Pre-
sident’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) recently is-
sued a report [1] calling for a recognition of this profound risk and a
new national focus. Continuous and reliable electric power is essential
to modern society. We depend on it for health, safety, economic vitality,
and national security. The risks of blackouts and loss of electric power
are not new concepts. Outages of just a few hours are well known, but
longer duration outages are becoming more frequent [2]. Today, the
commercial electric grid faces increasing risks from three threats: [1]
natural disasters and extreme weather; [2] physical attacks; and [3]
cyberattacks. Each of these threats will likely increase in frequency in
the future and utilities are already seeing a statistically significant in-
crease in major event days [2].
Hospitals, emergency services, military bases, ports, airports, in-
dustries, commercial facilities, and others rely on backup power sys-
tems to provide electricity for their critical loads during grid outages. In
2009, 170 GW of backup power was installed in the United States [3],
and this value has likely increased in the past decade. A subset of the

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Jeffrey.Marqusee@nrel.gov (J. Marqusee), donald.jenket@nrel.gov (D. Jenket).
1
Resilience is defined as the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstandand recover rapidly from disruptions. In the context of energy
disruptions, it applies to our ability to respond to long duration outages.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114918
Received 18 December 2019; Received in revised form 3 March 2020; Accepted 28 March 2020
0306-2619/ Published by Elsevier Ltd.
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket
electrical power backup is captured through the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Program
(ECIP) Initiative [4]. The Initiative reports that 85% of backup power
for the critical infrastructure is provided by emergency or standby
diesel generators.2 Going forward, we will refer to these generators
collectively as emergency diesel generators (EDGs).
Emergency power systems based on diesel generator sets are installed
at facilities where a loss of utility power would result in an unacceptable
impact to operational capability or present a risk to life, safety, or property.
These generator sets are typically configured to start automatically upon
electrical utility failure and assume essential facility loads until utility
power is restored. They are commonly deployed as stand-alone generators
tied to a single critical-load building. For outages of a few hours at most,
these generators have proved effective and easy to deploy. But for longer
outages, their reliability and configuration become critical issues. The
failure of an EDG during a grid outage can cause severe economic con-
sequences to a company, increased community risk due to loss of emer-
gency services, fatalities in medical facilities, and can endanger national
security if it occurs at a military installation [5]. Increasing redundancy
(N + 1, N + 2, and so on), or networking EDGs in a microgrid, can im-
prove the system’s reliability, but the need for redundancy or networking,
and its costs and benefits, depends on the reliability of the individual
generators, the length of the outage, and the value of the lost load.
Standards, regulations, and guidance provide direction on the use,
design, and maintenance of EDGs for providing backup power for cri-
tical loads [6–10]. These documents require or recommend the de-
ployment of EDGs for critical facilities. Some hospital functions require
backup power for four days [11], while military base requirements vary
from one to two weeks of backup power. The reliability of any backup
power system based on EDGs is dependent on the reliability of each
powered EDG in the configuration; however, the standards and gui-
dance documents do not provide information (or appropriate reference)
about typical reliability metrics for modern, well-maintained EDGs. We
show, for the first time, that the reliability metrics commonly used
today by both government and commercial sectors are both inadequate
and inappropriate for assessing the performance of EDGs for providing
backup power during a grid outage.
Despite how common EDGs are as a source of backup power, the
literature on their reliability is very limited and primarily focused on
generators that provide backup power to nuclear power plants [12–14]
which are typically much larger than EDGs that are used by hospitals,
emergency services, military bases, ports, airports, industries, and
commercial facilities. In this paper we compare our results with the
most recent data on EDGs at U.S nuclear power plants. There is pub-
lished research on older EDGs [15,16] in service during the 1970s,
1980s and early 1990s but emissions and environmental restrictions in
the 1990s led to significant design changes in the diesel engines that
make these results no longer relevant for EDGs fielded today. Attempts
have been made to calculate reliability from first principles [17] but the
complexity of EDGs and the large number of failures mechanisms make
such attempts uncertain. One might assume that with the large litera-
ture on backup power systems using microgrids that the reliability of
the most common distributed energy resource, EDGs, would have been
carefully examined. But a recent review [18] of microgrid design and
optimization approaches shows that the published work ignores the
reliability of the EDGs or treat it as a parameter that is unknown. Even
recent optimization work [19] that is designed to assess power ava-
ibility makes assumptions on the reliability of EDGs that are nor sup-
ported by data and lead to different results than we present here. Thus,
in the absence of data driven analysis on EDG reliability, energy
2
The terms “emergency” and “standby” have different meanings in various
building codes but these backup power systems use the same commercial power
generation systems. Both types of backup power systems are governed by the
National Fire Protection Association 110 Standard (6).
2
Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918
resilience studies most often assume 100% reliability.
This paper, based on a new analysis of two large non-public data
sets, provides the first known reporting of the reliability of modern
commercial EDGs that follow standard maintenance protocols com-
monly used for backup power at typical critical facilities. This paper
also addresses the impact of the finite EDG reliability on energy resi-
lience for facilities during a multiday grid outage. In Section 2, we
discuss currently used reliability guidance, define the reliability metrics
needed to assess performance, and review four existing data sets re-
levant to estimating EDG reliability. In Section 3, we calculate the
critical reliability metrics based on two data sets that have not pre-
viously been fully analyzed and compare them to the existing literature.
In Section 4, we illustrate the impact of these metrics on a few common
energy backup configurations. We conclude with a brief discussion of
the importance of considering finite reliability when assessing energy
backup power systems and discuss future directions.
2. Emergency diesel generator reliability data
Reliability is defined as “a characteristic of an item, expressed by the
probability that the item will perform its required function under given
conditions for a stated time interval” [12]. In this paper, we assume that
the EDG has passed acceptance testing, was properly engineered and
manufactured, and is not near the end of its life. In terms of the reliability
literature’s3 “Bathtub Model” (Fig. 1), the EDG is in its useful life period
and has a constant failure rate. Most reliability assessments are con-
cerned with systems or components intended to operate continuously. As
discussed below, EDGs run very infrequently and sit in a cold state for
most of their lifetimes. Because of this, it is important to precisely define
the required function and time intervals we are considering when spe-
cifying reliability metrics. The reliability metrics discussed below are the
standard terms used in the industry. What differentiates our definitions
from common usage is the explicit recognition of the time intervals
which should be considered when treating EDGs.
We assume that the EDG is operating within the useful life period
and that failure rates are constant. An assumption of constant failure
rates has been shown to be accurate for many systems4 and is the
method recommended by the IEEE Standard 3006.8 for analyzing re-
liability of commercial power systems. If one assumes a constant failure
rate, the cumulative failure rate is exponentially distributed.
Reliability is the probability that the component will perform its
function for time t and is designated R(t). Equivalently it is the prob-
ability that the component will have no failures between the time at
which it is required to operate (t = 0) and time t. The failure prob-
ability is the cumulative distribution function for failures from t = 0 to
time t and is given by:
F (t ) = 1 R (t )
If we take the first derivative of a cumulative failure distribution
function, we obtain the failure probability density function:
f (t ) = dF (t )/ dt
Typically, the mean time between failure (MTBF) is used to define
the reliability of repairable components:
lifetime
MTBF =
number of failures
The MTBF is simply the inverse of the failure rate per year or hour
(λa):
1
MTBF =
a
3
See Ref. [12] and sources cited.
4
See Ref. [12] and sources cited
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket
Fig. 1. A reliability bathtub model showing a low constant failure rate during
the useful life period.
This metric is dependent on the number of attempts to maintain,
repair, or utilize the EDG which creates a dependency on the main-
tenance schedule and number of grid outages. Since EDGs sit idle most
of their lifetimes, the MTBF cannot be used to estimate the probability
of an EDG’s runtime failure however this is the commonly reported
reliability metric.
A metric used to describe non-reparable components is the mean
time to failure (MTTF):
MTTF = t × f (t ) dt = R (t ) dt
0 0
Although EDGs are repairable, we will use MTTF to define the
failure rate as a function of run time. Upon repair, an EDG may again be
started, but that constitutes a new run time interval. Empirically the
MTTF can be calculated as:
total runtime
MTTF =
number of failures while running
This reliability metric is independent of the grid’s reliability or the
EDG’s testing frequency and is a function of the EDG run time. The
impact of more frequent grid failures requiring more frequent EDG
demands are factored out. We separately consider the probability that
the EDG fails to start and carry the load5:
number of failures to start
Failure to Start Probability (FTS ) =
number of attempts to start
These two metrics, MTTF and FTS, define the inherent reliability of
an EDG. Since EDGs are repairable, we differentiate these from the
reported MTBF which does not capture whether the failure occurred
upon start or while running and is dependent on the frequency of de-
mands on the EDG due to testing and grid outages.
One additional metric we require is the operational availability (OA)
of the EDG. This is defined as the probability that the EDG is in service
(or available to attempt to provide power) at the start of a grid outage
and accounts for the EDG being down due to repairs or maintenance:
Lifetime Time offline due to repairs and maintenance
OA =
Lifetime
An EDG could be offline or unavailable due to ongoing repairs in-
itiated due to a failure or due to scheduled maintenance. These out-of-
service times are characterized by the mean time to repair (MTTR),
which is the mean time associated with unscheduled repairs due to
failures, and the mean time to maintain (MTTM), which is the mean
time associated with scheduled maintenance activities that require the
system to be taken offline. OA is sensitive to maintenance and repair
times, as well as the failure rates and maintenance schedules.
The standard source for reliability data for equipment used in in-
dustrial and commercial power systems is the Institute of Electrical and
5
FTS is not usually considered for generators that provide prime power and
are on almost all the time. But for an EDG often run for short time periods, the
FTS can be an important reliability driver.
3
Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918
Electronics Engineers (IEEE’s) Gold Book [13], recently updated in IEEE’s
3006.8 Recommended Practice for Analyzing Reliability Data for
Equipment Used in Industrial and Commercial Power Systems [14]. IEEE
provides summary data on key reliability metrics for hundreds of com-
ponents. The summary data is based on data from two major collection
efforts conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Power Reliability
Enhancement Program (PREP). As the IEEE standard states [14], the
PREP’s “efforts created the most comprehensive facility equipment re-
liability database in existence.” IEEE’s earlier reports [13] are identical to
the reliability data reported in the U.S. Army standard [15], which also is
derived from the PREP database. The Army has not updated their pub-
lished guidance since 2006 and now relies on the IEEE documentation of
its data collection. Both government and commercial assessments of re-
liability are dependent on the recent IEEE reported results.
Older EDG reliability data [16] is of historical interest but not re-
presentative of currently deployed EDGs. Increased scrutiny of air
emissions from diesel generators in the early 1990s led to changes in
diesel generator design. Although the focus was not on emergency
generators, the 1990 Clean Air Act impacted the manufacturing of all
diesel generators. Therefore, this analysis does not consider reliability
data from generators manufactured before the 1990s to be re-
presentative of today’s generator performance.
IEEE summary data provides results for standby diesel
generators < 250 kW and standby diesel generators from 250 kW to
1500 kW. These sizes are typical of EDGs used at hospitals, military
bases, and commercial facilities. IEEE and PREP report the following
information [17]:
• Failure rate per year or hour: λ a
• Mean time between failure: MTBF = 1/ λ
a
• Mean time to repair (excluding logistics): MTTR
e
• Mean time to maintain: MTTM.
For EDGs, this analysis considers the IEEE- and PREP-reported re-
liability data to be inadequate and inappropriate for assessing the
performance of EDGs for providing backup power during a grid outage
for the following three reasons.
First, EDGs only run during a grid outage or for testing, which ac-
counts for a very small fraction of the year. The inherent reliability of
an EDG is dependent on the unit’s design, manufacturing, age, and
maintenance, which are independent of the testing schedule and the
reliability of the local grid. Using MTBF, which is based on a failure rate
per year, yields the results reported by IEEE of greater than 35,000 h for
250-kW to 1500-kW standby generators. This is more than twice the
MTBF reported for continuous-use generators of the same size [14].
Annual failure rates are not relevant for assessing the run time failure
rate of an EDG and MTTF as defined previously (as a function of run
time) is required. IEEE and PREP’s MTBF provides a reliability metric,
dependent on the EDG’s testing schedule and the reliability of the grid
(more grid outages lead to greater run times per year of an EDG) and is
inappropriate for predicting run time failures during a grid outrage.
Second, emergency generators are turned on and off much more
frequently than prime generators. EDGs are not kept on hot standby and
the FTS is an important characteristic usually not considered in asses-
sing continuous power systems. An EDG is run only for required testing
and during a grid outage. The probability of an emergency generator
failing to start is a well-recognized failure event, but IEEE and the
underlying PREP data do not provide this key reliability statistic.
Third, the MTTRe reported by IEEE does not include the logistics
associated with a repair [17]. It reports only the time required to make
the repair once the needed parts and labor are on-site (i.e. the MTTRe).
The time required to obtain parts and have the appropriate technicians
on-site is significant and can be larger than the time needed to make the
repair, as we will show in Section 3. In terms of assessing the OA of a
standby generator, it is the full MTTR that includes the logistics time
that is critical.
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

To quantitatively characterize an EDG’s6 reliability during a grid
outage, we need to know four metrics:
• OA: The probability an EDG is operationally available (i.e., not out
of service due to repair or maintenance activities) to attempt to
generate power when a grid outage occurs;
• FTS Probability: The probability the EDG fails to start and carry load
at the beginning of an outage;
• MTTF: The run time failure rate during an outage. MTTF or run time
failure rate requires data on the EDG run times to calculate; and
• MTTR: The likelihood that the failed EDG can be repaired during the
outage including the logistics time to receive parts and/or have
skilled labor on-site.
The limited amount of data available for modern EDGs7 creates a
challenge for providing information on any of these key criteria. Given
the complexity of an EDG and the large variety of failure mechanisms,8
empirical data is needed to assess their reliability. To our knowledge,
only four data sets9 are both large enough and relevant enough to EDGs
to be considered. While none of these data sets provide information for
all four metrics, they can be used together to provide insight on the
performance of an EDG during a long-term grid outage. We briefly re-
view these four data sets [17–20] below and summarize their char-
acteristics. We quantitively compare the reliability metrics that can be
calculated based on these four data sets in Section 3.
The data collected by the PREP that forms the basis for all reported
IEEE reliability results was collected from over 200 sites in the United
States and Canada. The sites include military facilities, hospitals, and
universities. PREP collects data by surveys from facilities and follows up
with site visits when possible. The PREP data for EDGs is divided into
two size classes: < 250 kW and 250 kW–1500 kW. The PREP data does
not include information on the number of attempted starts or run time
of the EDGs. Thus, estimates for FTS and MTTF based on run time
cannot be constructed. PREP data includes the number of failures as a
function of the observation time or, equivalently, a failure rate per year
or MTBF. PREP data also includes detailed data on the time required for
maintenance activities and the time to repair in case of failures which
can be used to estimate availability. While this data set does not provide
complete spare parts kit on hand. 57% of PREP sites employ average
maintenance practices.
• Below average maintenance either has no formal maintenance policy
and schedule or fails to follow one. 17% of PREP sites employ below
average maintenance.
For the purpose of this study, we partition maintenance practices
into two classes: well-maintained EDGs, which include both average
and above average maintenance practices; and poorly maintained
EDGs, which are equivalent to below average maintenance.
A study [18] conducted in Hong Kong reported data on 147 EDGs
monitored for an average of five years. The data was collected via a
generator reliability survey followed up by site visits when feasible. The
EDGs were used in commercial, residential, industrial, and institutional
settings to provide backup power during a grid failure. They ranged in
size from 80 kW to 1500 kW, which is typical of EDGs for the purposes
of this study. They were reported to have poor maintenance practices,
which resulted in a high reported FTS of 1.65% and an MTTF based on a
run time of only 61 h. This data set provides a benchmark for EDGs in
the below average or poorly maintained category.
In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) re-
quires that the performance data on EDGS that support nuclear power
plants be reported routinely. Like all EDGs, those at nuclear power plants
do not operate all the time. They are required to operate when the grid
power is down and during shutdown periods. The demands and run
hours are reported on a quarterly or semi-annual basis, and existing
regulations established the requirements for testing of these on-site
power sources. Therefore, an extensive database on these EDGs exists
[21]. Recent analysis of this database [19] has calculated the EDGs’ re-
liability metrics. All demand types on the EDGS are considered, including
both testing, as well as operational. These EDGs range in size from 50 kW
to 499,999 kW, and most are considerably larger than those used in
hospitals, emergency facilities, military bases, and commercial facilities.
The sizes of the EDGs in this database are summarized in Fig. 2.
180
160
140
Number of EDGs

metrics for FTS or MTTF, it will be used later in this study to estimate 120
maintenance and repair time to calculate OA. 100
Maintenance frequency and practices affect an EDG’s availability 80
and reliability. PREP rates each site according to the quality of main- 60
tenance employed and categorizes the sites into three tiers: 40
20
• Above average maintenance is reserved for facilities that followed a 0
scheduled preventative maintenance policy equivalent to the man- 50 kW - 249 250 kW - 5,000 kW - 100,000 kW -
ufacturer’s suggested policy; meets National Fire Protection kW 4,999 kW 99,999 kW 499,999 kW
Association [6] or DoD’s Unified Facility Criteria [10] recommended Size of EDGs
maintenance practices; uses specialized equipment tests (thermo-
graph, vibration analysis, oil analysis); and has complete spare parts Fig. 2. EDG size distribution in NRC database.
kits for the equipment. 25% of the PREP sites employ above average
maintenance.
•
160
Average maintenance also rigorously follows recommended main-
140
Number of EDG in Database

tenance schedules but does not use specialized equipment or have

120
100
6
An EDG is considered a system and includes all components required to
80
output electrical power, including the transfer switch.
7
By modern, we mean typical of EDGs deployed today. 60
8
Starting failures include battery failures, motor starting failures, starting 40
solenoid/relay failures, fuel pump failures, fuel solenoid and starting control
failures, and others. Running failures include voltage regulator failures, speed 20
governor failures, cooling system failures, fuel supply system failures, and 0
others. <250kW 250 to <500kW 500 to <1000kW 1000 to 2000 kW
9
Given the low probability of failure, a data set must be large enough to yield EDG Size
a result in which the confidence intervals for the key metrics are not mean-
ingless. Fig. 3. EDG size distribution in the Fehr database.

4
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

Table 1
Summary of EDG data set characteristics.
Source (Ref) # EDGs EDG Years of Observation Available Metrics Comments

PREP [17] 304 2298 • MTBF • Representative size EDG (≤1500 kW)
• Repair time • Mixed maintenance
• Maintenance time
Hong Kong [18] 147 790 • MTBF • Representative size EDGS (80 kW–1500 kW)
• MTTF • Poorly maintained
• FTS
NRC [19] 232 1790 • MTTF • Large EDGS (most ≫ 1 MW)
• MTBF • Well-maintained
• FTS
Fehr [20] 239 1281 • MTTF • Representative size EDGS (10 kW–2000 kW)
• MTBF • Well-maintained
• FTS
Since this data set represents all EDGs used at U.S. nuclear power Table 2
plants, it provides insight into an industry that requires high con- MTTF data including mean and 90% confidence intervals for the three data sets.
sistency, and the EDGs are assumed to be well-maintained. They re-
Data Source MTTF Low Value MTTF Mean Value MTTF High Value
ported an FTS of 0.66% and a MTTF base on run times of 636 h, con-
siderably better than the results for the smaller EDGs in the Hong Kong Fehr [20] 1180 h 1662 h 2410 h
study. Due to the EDG size distribution of this data set, direct com- NRC1 [19] 568 h 636 h 714 h
parison of their reliability performance for our applications cannot be Hong Kong [18] 53 h 61 h 71 h
achieved. 1
The published study on EDGs at U.S nuclear power plants reports only
The final data set we consider was collected in support of a Ph.D.
failures to run for run times greater than one hour. The underlying data is not
thesis [20] supported by the U.S. Navy. The research was intended to
available for analysis outside the nuclear industry. This constraint is unlikely to
provide facility managers with the qualitative data to optimize the affect the calculated MTTF significantly and would decrease the reported MTTF
staffing level and generator maintenance. The scope of the study was value.
limited to modern, high-efficiency, low-emission generator sets. The
mean age of EDGs in this database is 11.2 years. Maintenance logs that work [20], this data contains no statistically significant evidence that
followed current government regulations were collected and entered the generator’s make, model, or size (10 kW–2000 kW) has any sig-
into a structured database. The sample population included EDGs be- nificant impact on reliability. Using a simple frequentist analysis [21],
tween 10 kW and 2000 kW with a 324-kW mean generator set rating. the MTTF and its 90% confidence intervals are provided in Table 2. This
Fig. 3 shows the EDG size distribution for this database. information is compared to results from the NRC and Hong Kong data
The database contains information on run times, as well as at- sets described above that provide information on failures as a function
tempted starts and failures. Detailed information on the maintenance of run time (the PREP data does not contain information on run times).
practices were recorded but do not include data on downtime due to The 90% confidence intervals do not overlap. The Fehr and Hong
maintenance time or repair time due to failures. The FTS and the MTTF Kong data sets involve similar size and types of EDGs and are used to
are reported in Section 3. This data set will be used to provide a represent EDGs with significantly different levels of maintenance. The
benchmark for EDGs that are well-maintained. well-maintained EDGs in the Fehr data set have MTTFs over 20 times
The NRC data set includes mostly EDGs larger than typically used in longer than seen in the poorly maintained Hong Kong data set. The NRC
hospitals, emergency facilities, military bases, and commercial facil- data set includes much larger EDGs. Whether their relative MTTF (be-
ities, while the other three data sets report on EDGs of a size typically tween the other two data sets) is due to the size of the generators or the
used in these facilities. We report the NRC results only to qualitatively maintenance practices in the nuclear industry cannot be determined.
compare them to EDGs of concern at typical critical facilities. The other
three databases represent two different levels of maintenance: well-
maintained and poorly maintained. The characteristics for these four 3.2. FTS probability
data sets are summarized in Table 1.
Although these data sets are the largest available, their size is lim- As stated above, EDGs are not kept on hot standby and must start
ited. Failures are relatively rare events and it is important to understand and transfer power to the load when called upon during a grid outage.
the uncertainty in estimates for the reliability metrics due to sample Failures to start is a rare phenomenon but significant enough to warrant
size. In the next section we address this issue by providing 90% con- its inclusion in reliability assessments. The NRC and Hong Kong data
fidence intervals for the two key reliability metrics, MTTF and FTS and sets report number of attempted starts and FTS. The NRC divides its FTS
the impact on a single EDG’s reliability is provided. In Section 4 the into two classes: immediate FTS and FTS and carry load.10 For the Fehr
impact on system level reliability is discussed. data set, 44 FTS were observed for the 239 EDGs monitored. The
number of attempted starts was only recorded only for 35 of the 239
EDGs in the data set. Three of these EDGs were installed for less than
3. Emergency diesel generator reliability two months and were still undergoing initial testing. For the 35 EDGs,
the average number of starts per year was 26.7, consistent with
3.1. MTTF common practices. We can use this rate to estimate the total number of
attempted starts for all 239 EDGs. Applying this simple estimate yields
The MTTF based on run time is the most important EDG reliability 34,134 attempted starts over the observation period for the 239 EDGs
parameter when looking at EDG performance periods from days to resulting in an estimated FTS of 0.13%.
weeks. Over long duration outages, failures while running dominate the Statistics on the FTS with 90% confidence intervals are shown in
overall reliability.
We have analyzed the recently collected Fehr dataset [20] to de-
termine the MTTF for well-maintained EDGs. As shown in previous 10
Failure to carry load includes any failure that occurs within 1 h of starting.

5
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

Table 3 4. Impact of EDG reliability on resiliency

Mean FTS Probabilities and the 90% Confidence Intervals.
Data Source Low Value FTS Mean Value FTS High Value FTS The resiliency of a backup power system during a long duration
outage depends on the repairability of a failed EDG during the outage.
Fehr [20] 0.10% 0.13% 0.17% The MTTR of 37 h is already relatively long and reflects repairs during
NRC1 [19] 0.26% 0.66% 1.20%
short outages, which is the dominant type of outage generators ex-
Hong Kong [18] 1.44% 1.65% 1.88%
perience. During a multiday outage, it is unlikely that staff and
1
These are the FTS values that include both the immediate FTS and the equipment will be available to make the needed repairs. Thus, we treat
failures to carry load. the EDGs in our analysis below as unrepairable for the duration of an
outage.11
Table 3 for all three data sets (the PREP data contains no information on The reliability [12] of a single EDG at time t is given by:
attempted starts). Similar to the MTTF metrics, well-maintained EDGs
R (t ) = OA × (1 FTS ) × e t / MTTF
are much more reliable with the FTS probability an order of magnitude
lower than the poorly maintained EDGs. The larger EDGs used in the
We use the estimates listed above from the Fehr and Hong Kong
nuclear industry have FTS and carry load roughly midway between the
data sets to model modestly sized EDGs (< 2000 kW) that are well-
other two data sets. Again, the cause for this difference may be due to
maintained or poorly maintained and compare these to the results for
the size of the EDGs or maintenance practices.
larger EDGs used in the nuclear industry. Fig. 5 shows the expected
reliability for a single EDG for outages that range from one hour to two
weeks (336 h). Also included is the predicted reliability if one uses the
3.3. Operational availability
MTBF provided by IEEE [14] instead of the MTTF. As discussed above
this is incorrect but a common mistake that results in major over-
The OA of an EDG is dependent on the annual failure rates, the time
estimate in EDG reliability.
it takes to repair a failure, and the time the EDG is out of service due to
In Fig. 6, the same reliability results using the MTTF values for
scheduled maintenance activities. The PREP database contains in-
outages up to 12 h are shown to clearly illustrate the impact of different
formation on the repair and maintenance times. The published [14]
probabilities for FTS.
mean time to repair does not include the logistics time (MTTRe) and is
Fig. 7 shows the reliability range expected for a well-maintained
not relevant for calculating an OA; however, the underlying database
EDG with its 90% confidence intervals.
does include the needed information, and Fig. 4 shows the distribution
The impact of our sample size can be seen in Fig. 7. Uncertainty in
of repair times, including logistics (MTTR) for all packaged EDGs in the
the reliability metrics has a minor impact on the performance of well-
PREP database. Due to PREP reporting from earlier data collection ef-
maintained EDGs for outages of only few hours but it grows as the
forts, PREP characterized a subset of observations by the subset’s mean,
outage duration grows. Well-maintained EDGs have a reliability be-
which falls in the 16–24-hour interval. Thus, the data artificially ap-
tween 92% and 96% for providing backup power for four days (96 h)
pears as a bimodal distribution.
into an outage (current requirements for critical loads at hospitals),
The MTTR is 37 h if we eliminate a single outlier, which was nearly
between 90% and 95% at one week, and between 75% and 87% at two
2000 h and more than twice the next-longest repair time. The MTTR is
weeks (requirements for critical loads at military facilities). These un-
over 12 h longer than the reported MTTRe [14]. The MTTM is the
certainties should be considered when evaluating performance for long
average time an EDG is offline due to scheduled maintenance and has
duration outages. Not surprisingly, a below average maintenance EDG
been previously reported by PREP [15] and IEEE [14]. The MTTM is
is unlikely to provide power for durations longer than a day and have
narrowly distributed, with a mean value of 1.7 h; however, most
reliabilities of only 80% at 12 h. These figures reinforce the importance
outages are due to extreme weather events, and scheduled maintenance
of following the current guidance on EDG maintenance. Using the IEEE
is often delayed when severe weather is expected. For assessing the
MTBF value yields incorrect predictions. Thus, single EDGs tied to in-
performance of an EDG to provide power during extended outages, we
dividual loads do not provide a robust source of emergency power for
will ignore this short duration of an EDG being unavailable due to
critical loads over multi-day outages.
scheduled maintenance. Providing power for very short outages (typi-
One can substantially increase the reliability as seen in Fig. 7 by
cally < 15 min) is accomplished by an Uninterruptable Power Supply
using two EDGS for a single critical load (a backup to the backup or
(UPS) rather than an EDG, which is not the subject of this study.
N + 1). This model represents a best-case reliability because it ignores
Under these assumptions, the OA of an EDG or the probability an
failures due to shared components, such as switch gear, that could still
EDG can attempt to provide backup power can be calculated from an-
represent a potential single point failure. The failures of two EDGs are
nual failure rates and repair times (ignoring scheduling maintenance
independent; one achieves higher reliability but at double the cost.
downtime) from:
As shown in Fig. 8, two poorly maintained EDGs still yield very
Total time Time offline due to repairs limited reliability beyond 24 h (< 90%), but two well-maintained EDGs
OA = achieve relatively high reliabilities over 96% out to two weeks. This is
Total time
still considerably less than the multiple nines often quoted as the de-
If we divide both the numerator and denominator by the number of sired or required reliability.
failures, we estimate: The situation is complicated if one considers a campus-like en-
vironment (hospital complexes, universities, military installations)
MTBF MTTR where critical loads occur in multiple buildings. The most common
OA =
MTBF architecture for providing backup power is to place a single EDG at each
building with a critical load. Fig. 9 illustrates the probability that all
Table 4 shows estimates for availability for modest size EDGs
critical loads across 1, 8, and 80 buildings can be met even with well-
(< 2000 kW) that are well- or poorly maintained. The MTTR is taken
maintained EDGs.
from the PREP data and applied to the Fehr and Hong Kong data sets.
The differences in OA are due to the failure rates or, equivalently, the
number of required repairs. 11
In estimating availability, we treated the EDGs as repairable. Most failures
These high availabilities reflect the limited number of runs per year during an EDG’s lifetime that lead to the unavailability of an EDG occur during
of an EDG, and, thus, the small number of potential failures per year. testing or short duration outages.

6
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

100

90

80

70
Frequency of Repair Times

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
<1hr 1 to <2 2 to < 4 4 to < 8 8 to < 16 16 to <24 24 to <48 48 to < 72 72 to < 120 120 < 240 240 +
Hours to Repair
Fig. 4. Distribution of repair times including logistics for EDGs after a failure(The most common frequency for 16–24 h is an artifact of the inclusion of large numbers
of repairs from an early PREP data collection for which only the average value for that set was recorded.)

Table 4 1
Availability estimates for different levels of main- 0.98
tenance. 0.96
0.94
Reliability

Maintenance OA 0.92
0.9
Well-Maintained 99.98% 0.88
Poorly Maintained 99.84% 0.86
0.84
0.82
1 0.8
0.9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.8
0.7 Outage Duration (hours)
Reliability

0.6 Well-Maintained NRC Poorly Maintained

0.5
0.4 Fig. 6. The reliability of a single EDG for outages less than half a day.
0.3
0.2
0.1 1
0
0.95
15
30
45
60
75
90
105
120
135
150
165
180
195
210
225
240
255
270
285
300
315
330
0

Reliability

Outage Duration (hours) 0.9

Well-Maintained NRC Poorly Maintained IEEE MTBF
0.85
Fig. 5. The reliability of a single EDG over two weeks.
0.8

Clearly the likelihood of meeting the load across many buildings 0.75
becomes very small in a few days. This is simply due to the greater
12
24
36
48
60
72
84
96
108
120
132
144
156
168
180
192
204
216
228
240
252
264
276
288
300
312
324
336
0

opportunity for failures when multiple independent generators are in- Outage Duration (hours)
volved. Results for EDGs that have poor maintenance are worse.
Mean 90% CI 90% CI
An alternative way to view these results is to calculate the number
of buildings that will lose power during an outage. Assume we have N Fig. 7. Mean and 90% confidence interval reliabilities for a well-maintained
buildings with critical loads on a campus, each with an EDG with a EDG for outages up to two weeks.
reliability R(t) and a cumulative failure probability given by F(t) = 1-R
(t). The probability that k buildings, each with one EDG, have power The mean number of buildings at time t that still have power can be
during an outage at time t is given by the binomial distribution: determined by calculating the mean value of k at time t:

N k N k Mean (k ) = N × R (t )
P (k , N ) = RF
k
The number of buildings without power is simply the number of

7
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket Applied Energy 268 (2020) 114918

1 40.0%

Buildings Without Power

0.9 35.0%
0.8
30.0%
0.7
Reliability

0.6 25.0%
0.5 20.0%
0.4 15.0%
0.3
10.0%
0.2
0.1 5.0%
0 0.0%

12
24
36
48
60
72
84
96
108
120
132
144
156
168
180
192
204
216
228
240
252
264
276
288
300
312
324
336
0
12
24
36
48
60
72
84
96
108
120
132
144
156
168
180
192
204
216
228
240
252
264
276
288
300
312
324
336
0

Outage Duration (hours) Outage Duration (hours)

Well-Maintained Poorly Maintained Mean N=4 N=8 N=40

Fig. 8. Reliability of two EDGs (backup to a backup) as a function of main- Fig. 10. Mean fraction of buildings that lose power plus potential positive de-
tenance. viations when one EDG supports each building.

1 5. Conclusions
0.9
0.8
There is an absence of realistic estimates for the reliability of the
0.7
primary technology used for backup power, an emergency diesel gen-
Probability

0.6
0.5 erator, despite the amount of literature for modeling energy resilience
0.4 during outages. Using IEEE reported mean time between failure results
0.3 in incorrect predictions. We have presented estimates for the reliability
0.2
of modern commercial emergency diesel generators that are commonly
0.1
0 used based on empirical data sets. The uncertainty of these estimates is
determined by the size of the available data sets, which results in 90%
12
24
36
48
60
72
84
96
108
120
132
144
156
168
180
192
204
216
228
240
252
264
276
288
300
312
324
336
0

confidence interval roughly equal to 50% of the mean values. Reliance

Outage Duration (hours)
1 Building 8 Buildings 40 Buildings 80 Buildings
Fig. 9. Probability critical load can be met using one well-maintained EDG at
each critical building across a campus with 1, 8, 40, or 80 buildings.
buildings, N, minus these numbers. Or, equivalently, the mean fraction
of buildings on a campus without power during a grid outage is 1-R(t),
which is independent of the number of buildings.
In assessing the risks associated with the loss of power to buildings,
one should consider not only the expected average performance but the
range of failures likely to occur. Deviation from the mean performance
is expected due to two causes. First the uncertainty in the key reliability
metrics (OA, FTS, and MTTF) due to the limitations in the empirical
data sets, which is captured by the reported 90% confidence intervals
illustrated in Fig. 6. Second, the inherent probabilistic nature of outages
as expressed by the binomial distribution. This is measured by the
standard deviation of the binomial distribution.
Standard Deviation (k )=SQRT (N × R (t ) × (1 R (t )))
The magnitude of these deviations from the mean is dependent on
the number of buildings. The relative magnitude of the standard de-
viation of the binomial distribution decays as one over the square root
of the number of buildings. For a small number of buildings, the
probabilistic effect is significant, but for campuses with many buildings
(> 40), the uncertainty in the reliability metrics dominates.
Fig. 10 shows the mean fraction of buildings that do not have power
plus one standard deviation from both the uncertainty in the underlying
reliability metrics and the probabilistic nature of failures as a function
on the number of buildings with one well-maintained generator tied to
each building. This estimates the 90% worst-likely scenario as a func-
tion of number of buildings.
For long outages, this can be a significant number of buildings. For
all campuses, the mean fraction of buildings expected to be without
power is roughly one-fifth of facilities during a two-week outage. For
large campuses with greater than 40 critical-load buildings, one quarter
of the buildings can be without power and over a third of buildings for
small campuses.
on poorly maintained emergency diesel generators leads to a very sig-
nificant risk of power loss at a facility during a grid outage. Even for
well-maintained emergency diesel generators, less than perfect relia-
bility is important to consider when estimating a backup power sys-
tem’s performance. For multiday outages, the reliance on single emer-
gency diesel generators for supporting backup loads is unwarranted and
leaves the end user with a significant risk not usually recognized.
For campus-like environments, where multiple buildings house
loads supported by independent individual emergency diesel gen-
erators, the number of buildings without power can be significantly
higher than often recognized. Increasing the redundancy of EDGs pro-
vides much higher reliabilities but at a significant cost.
The analysis presented here does not take into account the impact of
hybrid backup power systems that combine emergency diesel gen-
erators with other distributed energy resources or variable load on
backup systems which allow networked distributed energy resources. In
future papers we will show that networked or microgrid-based solutions
utilizing a set of emergency diesel generators can provide much higher
levels of reliability. We will also report on the reliability contribution
provided by intermittent renewable energy coupled to battery storage.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Jeffrey Marqusee: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal ana-
lysis, Investigation, Data curation, Writing - original draft,
Visualization, Supervision, Funding acquisition. Don Jenket:
Conceptualization, Validation, Writing - review & editing,
Visualization, Project administration.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare the following financial interests/personal re-
lationships which may be considered as potential competing interests:
[Jeff Marqusee previously served as the Director of ESTCP, the funding
source for this work.].

8
J. Marqusee and D. Jenket
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Peyton Hale and Chris Thompson of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers for providing the PREP data as of December 2018
and generously answering our questions, and Dr. Fehr for generously
providing NREL with a copy of his database and answering all our
questions.
This work was authored by the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, operated by Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC, for the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under Contract No. DE-AC36-
08GO28308. Support for the work was also provided by the Department
of Defense’s Environmental Security Technology Certification Program
(ESTCP) under [Agreement IAG-18-02080]. The views expressed in the
article do not necessarily represent the views of the DOE or the U.S.
Government. The U.S. Government retains and the publisher, by ac-
cepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the U.S.
Government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide
license to publish or reproduce the published form of this work, or
allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes.
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