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Does the Shallow Pond Analogy Justify an Individual Obligation

to Donate to Global Famine Relief?

CCGL9014 Thinking About Global Ethics

Word Count: 1491

Sunny Yeung
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Does the Shallow Pond Analogy Justify an Individual Obligation

to Donate to Global Famine Relief?

In remote regions of the world, such as Yemen and South Sudan, 10 million people

are afflicted with famine.1 Peter Singer asserts that we, as citizens of affluent countries, have

a duty to provide aid via donations to aid agencies under the Shallow Pond Analogy

(“SPA”).2

Singer argues that if we can prevent something bad, e.g. famine, from happening

without sacrificing anything of “comparable moral significance”, which means causing any

comparable negative consequences to ourselves, we should do it. He illustrates the claim with

the SPA: if we can rescue a drowning child and thereby soil our clothes, we ought to do it as

soiling our clothes is nowhere as bad as letting the child drown.

I accept that a duty of aid exists in the SPA, but question its applicability to global

famine. In this essay, I will defend the SPA against the disanalogy of geographical distance,

but argue that the disanalogies of the number of victims and the presence of other potential

rescuers render the SPA inapplicable in global famine.

Disanalogy 1: Proximity

The proximity disanalogy argues that while the drowning child is physically close to

us, a starving person in Yemen is far away, thus the duty of aid does not arise.

Singer argued that if we accept any principle of impartiality, we cannot discriminate

against a victim due to distance. He argued against the rebuttal that we should help those

closer to us because we are more capable of doing so, asserting that advancements in

technology have made it equally possible for us to help the distant famine victims.

1
Hungry in a world of plenty: millions on the brink of famine. Oxfam International. (2017, June 27).
https://www.oxfam.org/en/hungry-world-plenty-millions-brink-famine.
2
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–243.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.
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His argument is even more plausible now than when it was made 49 years ago,

advancements such as instantaneous communication and improved transportation have made

it easier for aid to be delivered from affluent countries to the victims, notwithstanding the

ineffectiveness of the aid when delivered. Thus, distance likely makes neither a practical nor

moral difference.

However, Miller argues that proximity creates a morally relevant feature in the

rescuer-victim relationship, providing three factors.3

Firstly, physical distance makes the victim uniquely vulnerable to the rescuer. Often

when the two are physically close, the rescuer is the only person who can provide rescue with

sufficient haste. This argument has two components, firstly, being the only rescuer creates a

duty, secondly, proximity creates the “only rescuer” condition. I accept the first component

but doubt the second due to instantaneous communication. If an Oxfam advertisement for

helping a starving child is shown exclusively to an affluent person, the beneficiary would still

be uniquely vulnerable notwithstanding distance, this seems to suggest that the uniquely

vulnerable argument relates to the number of potential rescuers rather than distance per se.

Secondly, a personal encounter is created between the rescuer, recognising the victim

as in need, and the victim, recognising the rescuer as able to help. Proximity normally implies

a personal encounter, which creates a duty of aid. I argue that personal encounters do not play

a role in whether a duty of rescue is formed. A duty to aid does not vanish merely due to the

victim’s ignorance of the rescuer’s presence, as in cases of unconscious victims. In the SPA

itself, there is no indication that the child knew of the rescuer’s presence, yet it would be

absurd to suggest that whether there is a duty to rescue depends on the child’s knowledge.

Thirdly, he argues that we claim moral sovereignty over the personal space around our

bodies and accept responsibility for whatever enters that area, but allows that our personal

3
Miller, D. (2020). The Nature and Limits of the Duty of Rescue. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 17(3),
320–341. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01703003
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space may vary according to circumstances, for instance, I have to save a drowning child

yards away and can legitimately demand a stalker a street away to stop following me.

Considering the two examples he gave, I argue that his idea of “personal space” is based on

the agent's knowledge of the circumstances and ability to act, not physical space. Thus, I can

demand an online stalker stop stalking me for invading my personal space. A starving person

would fall into our personal space if we have knowledge of his plight and know we are able

to save him. This is refutable by the absence of our ability to rescue, but not by distance.

Thus, Millers’ factors are either unnecessary for the creation of a duty, or are not

absent merely due to physical distance. Proximity does not make a morally significant

difference in the duty of rescue.

Disanalogy 2: Number of Victims

Global famine is analogous to a scenario where millions of drowning people are in the

pond. There are two interpretations of the duty of rescue, the first is to pull each one out until

the agent has to sacrifice something of comparable moral significance, the second is that the

agent’s aid would be spread to all. I argue that, while a duty exists in the first, global famine

is more akin to the second, where the obligation to aid cannot be discharged without

sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.

In the first interpretation, our duty is discharged by saving as many lives as we can

until we reach the point where we would have to sacrifice something of comparable moral

worth. The people we cannot save have no right to rescue against me as, by saving others, my

obligation to save them became impossible.4 The SPA’s applicability is unscathed here.

While there are sponsorship schemes, which are prevention schemes, similar to the

first interpretation, most famine relief schemes are more akin to the second, assuming a

4
Anscombe, G. E. (1967). Who is Wronged? Oxford Review, 5.
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difference between the two. Under the second interpretation, Cullity argues that as my

contribution is spread to all the victims, the donation to each person would be imperceptible.

Whether I donate would not matter.5

This argument can be explained with a modified SPA: multiple children are drowning

in the pond, I cannot swim but can throw my violin case into the water as a floatation device.

However, I know that all the children would cling to the case, causing all to sink. In such a

case, I would not have a duty to make a sacrifice as it would be futile and wasteful.

In global famine, subject to the exception of billionaires, even if ordinary affluent

people donate until they reach the point of starvation, their contribution would still not make

a difference to any one victim if it is spread across all. Any individual donation would be

futile in preventing the loss of lives. Thus, for most individuals, Singer’s precondition to the

duty of aid, that we “are able to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing

anything of comparable moral significance”, is impossible.

Disanalogy 3: Number of Potential Rescuers

In global famine, I am not the only agent as there are millions of idle potential

rescuers. Singer argues that a scenario with idle bystanders is no different from one where I

am alone, our obligation to aid the child is unaffected.

However, assuming that the imperceptibility argument stands, I argue that the

presence of idle bystanders matters, as while the duty of aid is impossible for an individual, it

is possible for a collective of affluent people.

Global famine relief can be explained by Cullity’s winch analogy: the drowning child

can only be saved with a winch mechanism operated by two.6 Cullity argues that we have a

5
Cullity, G. (2004). The Life-Saving Analogy. The Moral Demands of Affluence, 7–15.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.003.0002
6
Cullity, G. (2004). Saving Lives. The Moral Demands of Affluence, 54–69.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.003.0005
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collective duty to aid the child, and individuals owe a duty of fairness to each other to

contribute. Steinhoff reinterprets this as a duty to cooperate with each other to rescue, which I

agree is more akin to Singer’s intended obligation to the victim.7

Proceeding upon the assumptions that all contributions would be spread and there is a

collective duty to rescue, I formulate the individual duty to cooperate as follows: an

individual is obligated to cooperate with a group of enough citizens, which can collectively

raise an adequate sum that would be perceptible when spread to all victims, without any

individual having to sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance. The individual’s

duty to donate does not arise until this duty to cooperate is fulfilled, nor does it arise if some

members renege, as any individual donation would be rendered imperceptible.

The presence of idle bystanders, or the absence of enough active rescuers, thus

matters. In global famine, at least thousands of affluent ordinary citizens would be required to

cooperate before any individual duty to donate arises. However, in the absence of an adequate

number of people cooperating, or the individual’s certain knowledge of such cooperation

existing, any donation would not have any perceptible effect on the victims, thus the duty to

donate would not arise.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while proximity is insufficient to render the SPA inapplicable in global

famine, the number of victims and potential rescuers are morally significant disanalogies.

Due to imperceptibility, the individual duty to rescue does not automatically arise, with the

small exception of the ultra-rich, it only does if an adequate number of people cooperate, a

precondition unmet in real life.

7
Steinhoff, U. (2010). Drowning the Shallow Pond Analogy: A Critique of Garrett Cullity's Attempt to
Rescue it. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2474979
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References

Anscombe, G. E. (1967). Who is Wronged? . Oxford Review, 5.

Cullity, G. (2004). Saving Lives. The Moral Demands of Affluence, 54–69.

https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.003.0005

Cullity, G. (2004). The Life-Saving Analogy. The Moral Demands of Affluence, 7–15.

https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.003.0002

Hungry in a world of plenty: millions on the brink of famine. Oxfam International.

(2017, June 27). https://www.oxfam.org/en/hungry-world-plenty-millions-brink-famine.

Miller, D. (2020). The Nature and Limits of the Duty of Rescue. Journal of Moral

Philosophy, 17(3), 320–341. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01703003

Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3),

229–243. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.

Steinhoff, U. (2010). Drowning the Shallow Pond Analogy: A Critique of Garrett

Cullity's Attempt to Rescue it. SSRN Electronic Journal.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2474979