1

FAULT TREE
ANALYSIS
MEC 190
PAOLO LEGADA
ELA ZANDRAE LIMOSNERO
JHEROME LLANO
 2
CONTENTS OF
THIS REPORT
• WHAT IS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)
• USAGE
• HISTORY
• METHODOLOGY
• GRAPHIC SYMBOLS
 EVENT SYMBOLS
 GATE SYMBOLS
• TYPES OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
• EXAMPLES IF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
 3
WHAT IS
FAULT TREE
ANALYSIS?
 4
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
01 A top-down, deductive failure analysis.
Undesired state of a system is analyzed using
02 Boolean
events.
logic to combine a series of lower-level

Mainly used in safety engineering and

03 reliability engineering.

04 Also used in fields as diverse as risk factor

identification relating to social service system
failure
 5
BOOLEAN LOGIC
 6

USAGE
 7
USAGE
UNDERSTAND THE

system. The FTA

can be used as
a design tool
that helps to
requirements.
lower level)

designing a
MINIMIZE
LOGIC LEADING TO

(output /

assist in
create
AND
THE TOP EVENT / OPTIMIZE
RESOURCES.
UNDESIRED STATE.

THE TOP EVENT. IT

CORRECT CAUSES OF

CAN HELP WITH THE

DIAGNOSTIC TOOL
TO IDENTIFY AND
PRIORITIZE THE

FUNCTION AS A
system

CREATION OF
DIAGNOSTIC

PROCESSES.
CONTRIBUTORS LEADING

performance of the complex
monitor and control the safety
MANUALS /
TO THE TOP EVENT-
CREATING THE CRITICAL
EQUIPMENT/PARTS/EVENT
S LISTS FOR DIFFERENT
IMPORTANCE MEASURES
 8

HISTORY
HISTORY U.S. Army Materiel
9
FTA received
Command
extensive coverage at
incorporated FTA
a System Safety
into an Engineering
Symposium in Seattle
Design Handbook
sponsored by Boeing
1 3 on Design for 4
and the University of
Reliability.
Washington.

1962 1965 1966 1976 1975

FTA was Boeing began Within the nuclear

originally 2 using FTA for 4 power industry, the
U.S. Nuclear
developed by civil aircraft
Regulatory
H.A. Watsons design. Commission began
at Bell using PRA
Laboratories. (probabilistic risk
assessment)
methods including
FTA.
 10

METHODOLOGY
02
 11
METHODOLOGY

2 IDENTIFY FAILURE CAUSES

UNDERSTAND THE INNER
3
WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM

4 DRAW THE FTA

DIAGRAM

5 IDENTIFY MCS, MPS, OR CCF

DEVELOP RISK MITIGATION

6
STRATEGIES
 12

BUILD A DIVERSE
TEAM
ENGINEERS OF RESPECTIVE FIELDS,
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERS, AND SYSTEM
DESIGN SPECIALISTS ARE REQUIRED FOR
ANY FTA TEAM.
 13

IDENTIFY
FAILURE CAUSES
POTENTIAL FAILURES, THEIR
CHARACTERISTICS, DURATION,
AND DIFFERENT IMPACTS OF
THE FAILURE HAVE TO BE
DEFINED TO START AND
COMPLETE THE PROCESS.
 14
UNDERSTAND THE INNER
WORKINGS OF THE
SYSTEM

THE ENGINEERS WORKING AT

THE SYSTEM LEVEL MUST HAVE
A GOOD IDEA OF HOW
EVERYTHING WORKS AND WHAT
FAILURES YOU WILL WANT TO
AVOID.
 15
DRAW THE FTA DIAGRAM

USING THE FAULT TREE

SYMBOLS AND STRUCTURE
ABOVE, YOUR TEAM CAN DRAW
THE GRAPHICAL
REPRESENTATION OF THE
SYSTEM AND HOW THEY ARE
ALL CONNECTED.
 16
Identify MCS, MPS, or CCF

• MCS or minimal cut sets are identified to

know the most vulnerable parts of the
system.

• MPS or minimal path sets are determined

to identify the core components and
subsystems required to remain
operational.

• CCF identifies the components that cause

the maximum number of failures.
 17
DEVELOP RISK MITIGATION
STRATEGIES

High priority has to be given to protect MPS

(the minimum set of components to keep the
system operational).

Strict maintenance schedules have to be

maintained for CCFs as they can cause a
multitude of issues.

One potential risk mitigation strategy,

especially for CCFs, is preventive
maintenance
 18

GRAPHIC
SYMBOLS
 19

GRAPHIC
SYMBOLS

EVENT SYMBOLS
GATE SYMBOLS
 20
GRAPHIC
INTERMEDIATE
SYMBOLS CONDITIONAL
EVENT
EVENT

EVENT SYMBOLS TOP

EVENT
Event symbols will have only one
input and one output. TRANSFER UNDERDEVELOPED
EVENT EVENT

HOUSE BASIC
EVENT EVENT
 21

EVENT SYMBOLS
THIS IS THE EVENT AT THE TOP OF THE FAULT
TOP EVENT TREE AND IS THE SUBJECT OF THE ANALYSIS.

INTERMEDIATE THESE ARE THE EVENTS CAUSED BY ONE OR

MORE OTHER EVENTS.
EVENT

TRANSFER CAN REPLACE ONE BIG PART OF THE FAULT TREE

WITH A SINGLE SYMBOL AND ELABORATE ON WHAT
EVENT COMES NEXT ON A SEPARATE DIAGRAM.
 22

EVENT SYMBOLS
REPRESENTS ROOT CAUSE EVENTS THAT
BASIC EVENT SPREAD UP THE CHAIN OF THE SYSTEM TO
CAUSE THE TOP EVENT.

CONDITIONAL ACT AS A CONDITION FOR AN INHIBIT GATE

WHICH IS MENTIONED LATER.
EVENT

UNDERDEVELOPED DEVELOP A SUBTREE.

EVENT

HOUSE EVENT THESE EVENTS CAN EITHER HAPPEN OR NOT

HAPPEN
 23
GRAPHIC
SYMBOLS AND INHIBIT
GATE GATE

GATE SYMBOLS XOR

gate

OR
Gates, sometimes called logic gates,
represent how failures spread through the PRIORITY
system.
AND
GATE
GATE
k/N
OR
VOTING
GATE
 24

EVENT SYMBOLS
ONLY OCCUR IF ALL THE INPUT EVENTS
AND GATE HAPPEN

PRIORITY AND ONLY OCCUR IF ALL INPUT EVENTS HAPPEN IN

A SPECIFIC SEQUENCE
GATE

OR GATE OCCUR IF ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE INPUT

EVENTS OCCUR

XOR EVENT OCCUR ONLY IF EXACTLY ONE INPUT

ELEMENT OCCURS.
 25

EVENT SYMBOLS
k/N OR VOTING
THERE WILL BE AN ‘N’ NUMBER OF INPUT
GATE EVENTS AND ONE OUTPUT EVENT.
THE OUTPUT EVENT WILL OCCUR IF ‘K’
NUMBER OF INPUT EVENTS OCCURS

INHIBIT GATE OCCUR WHEN INPUT EVENTS OCCUR, AND A

CONDITIONAL EVENT ALSO OCCURS.
 26

TYPES OF

FTA
 27
TYPES OF TAKES MULTI-
STATE
COMPONENT
S AND
RANDOM Fuzzy
FTA

FTA
PROBABILITIE
S INTO TAKES UNRELIABLE
FACTORS THAT ARE
CONSIDERATI DIFFICULT TO
ON. Extended PREDICT (LIKE THE
WIND OR WEATHER)
FTA INTO ACCOUNT WITH
A COMPLEX
MATHEMATICAL
CONCEPT CALLED
FUZZY SET THEORY.

Repairable
FTA SEFT IS USED
TO ANALYZE
DYNAMIC
Dynamic BEHAVIOR
THAT

FTA
EXTEND ORDINARY
ENHANCE THE
STANDARD FTA MODEL BY FAULT TREES
State-
FAULT TREES INTRODUCING CANNOT
BY MODELING THE POSSIBILITY MODEL.
COMPLEX
SYSTEM
TO DESCRIBE
COMPLEX event
COMPONENTS’
BEHAVIORS
DEPENDENT
REPAIRS OF FTA
SYSTEM
AND COMPONENTS.
INTERACTIONS.
 28

EXAMPLES OF
FAULT TREE
ANALYSIS
 29
THE CAR WON’T STOP
 30
B is a non-redundant system bus.

PS is the power supply to the server.

C1 and C2 are two redundant central processing units

(CPUs) for the server, meaning one of the two CPUs
can fail without causing total system failure.

M1, M2, and M3 are memory components that can be

shared between both CPUs.

SERVER EXPERIENCES
A CATASTROPHIC
FAILURE
 31

HE BOOLEAN EXPRESSIONS FOR THE SYSTEM

G1 = U ∩ G2
G2 = B ∩ G3
Combining the two gets us:
G1 = U ∩ (B ∩ G3)
G1 = (U ∩ B) ∪ (U ∩ G3)
 32
REFERENCES
Center for Chemical Process Safety (April 2008). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (3rd ed.).
Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-97815-2.

Goldberg, B. E.; Everhart, K.; Stevens, R.; Babbitt, N.; Clemens, P.; Stout, L. (1994). "3". System engineering
toolbox for design-oriented engineers. Marshall Space Flight Center. pp. 3–35 to 3–48.

Center for Chemical Process Safety (October 1999). Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk
Analysis (2nd ed.). American Institute of Chemical Engineers. ISBN 978-0-8169-0720-5.

U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1994). Process Safety
Management Guidelines for Compliance (PDF). U.S. Government Printing Office. OSHA 3133.

https://limblecmms.com/blog/fault-tree-analysis/#the-process
 33

THE END