Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46

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Education for Chemical Engineers

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Full Length Article

Process safety concerns in process system digitalization

Faisal Khan a,∗ , Paul Amyotte b , Sunday Adedigba a
a
Centre for Risk, Integrity, and Safety Engineering (C-RISE), Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science, Memorial University, St. John’s, NL, A1B 3X5, Canada
b
Department of Process Engineering and Applied Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, B3H 4R2, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: While efforts to use digital solutions in process operations are gaining wider acceptance, there are serious
Received 15 May 2020 safety concerns that need to be addressed when adopting digitalization. Process operations have evolved
Received in revised form 18 October 2020 from batch operation to continuous operation, and from smaller plants to large-scale plants. Automa-
Accepted 10 November 2020
tion and digitalization of processes, especially in process monitoring, instrumentation, and control are
Available online 12 November 2020
becoming the norm. Safety issues have also evolved with these developments, from simple equipment
failure to failure of process systems (equipment with electronic systems), monitoring and control sys-
Keywords:
tems, data encryption systems, and most recently, software systems. How these evolving process safety
Process safety
Safety education
issues should be taught in the classroom to educate and train the next generation of chemical engineers is
Digitalization a challenge with an opportunity. If such issues are not taught in academia, this will create a gap between
Operational safety education and practice, which would have a negative impact on the overall safety of process facilities.
Safety in digital operation Therefore, proactively converting this challenge to an educational opportunity and bringing digital pro-
cess safety issues into the classroom are of paramount importance to help reinforce the concept of making
process safety learning a conscious choice. This will hopefully lessen our reliance on learning from acci-
dents. The current paper presents the need to incorporate digital process safety as part of the chemical
engineering curriculum to adequately address the process industry’s emphasis on digital solutions in
process operations.
© 2020 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction chemical engineering curriculum. It is essential that undergradu-

As a specialized discipline aimed at managing the integrity of
process systems, process safety is an emerging area in undergradu-
ate chemical engineering curricula. The primary focus of process
safety is the prevention and mitigation of incidents that arise
from the realization of process hazards. These incidents include
– although are not limited to – fire, explosion, and the release
of toxic materials, often due to human factors, equipment fail-
ure, and external events (Khan et al., 2016). Process safety is
well-established with its own vocabulary to communicate the tech-
niques of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management,
and safety-critical decision making.
Process digitalization, which is currently gaining wider global
acceptance, is defined as the integration of digital technologies in
process operations for greater efficiency, increased product qual-
ity, and improved process safety (the latter, for example, by means
of safety instrumented systems). It has created new challenges for
process safety that need to be understood and addressed in the
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: fikhan@mun.ca (F. Khan).
ate chemical engineering programs capture these emerging process
safety concerns related to process digitalization.
The current opinion article reviews process safety education
in chemical engineering curricula with the goal of identifying
potential inadequacies in terms of digital process safety education.
Emphasis is placed on the significance of digital process safety edu-
cation in the process digitalization era, and a new set of topics is
proposed to remedy the gap identified in the current curricula. The
proposed revised curriculum explicitly considers evolving process
safety issues with respect to process digitalization to develop the
requisite knowledge and skills in the next generation of chemical
engineers via the university route.
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 gives
a historical perspective of process safety as needed background
to the detailed discussion in subsequent sections. Section 3 then
presents various aspects of process digitalization and its associated
process safety concerns comprised of elements of process mon-
itoring, predictive control, and abnormal situation management.
Section 4 suggests chemical engineering curricula improvements in
process safety education with respect to digitalized process oper-
ations; existing and proposed course material discussed includes
abnormal situation management, process automation and control,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ece.2020.11.002
1749-7728/© 2020 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
F. Khan et al.
Fig. 1. Major contributions to the evolution of process safety (Amyotte et al., 2016).
process reliability and asset integrity management. Lastly, Section
5 gives summary remarks in the form of a conclusion to the paper.
2. Process safety: a historical perspective
The term process safety gained international awareness due to
significant process accidents that occurred between 1960–1990
because of progress in technology development and industrial-
ization during this period (Khan et al., 2015). In the early stages
of process safety formalization, contributions by Professor Trevor
Kletz and others emphasized the importance of techniques such as
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies (Gowland, 2012) for iden-
tifying potential hazards in a process system (Kletz, 2012). HAZOP
is defined as the application of a formal, systematic critical examina-
tion of the process and the engineering intentions of new or existing
facilities to assess the potential for malfunctioning of individual pieces
of equipment, and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole
(Dunjó et al., 2010). The HAZOP procedure begins by breaking down
process flow diagrams and relevant piping and instrumentation
diagrams into manageable units called nodes. A process parameter
(e.g., “flow”) is chosen for each node and a guideword (e.g., “no”) is
applied to the chosen process parameter to suggest possible devi-
ation from design intent. If the deviation is applicable, the possible
causes are determined and the associated consequences evaluated
(Crowl and Louvar, 2019).
The concept of inherent safety was also introduced into the
vocabulary of process safety by Professor Kletz while at Imperial
Chemical Industries (ICI). Kletz proposed modifications in basic
safety technology primarily to eliminate hazards from industrial
processes instead of adding safety measures and control devices
to manage the hazards. The four primary building blocks or prin-
ciples of inherent safety are: (1) minimization, which entails the
use of a smaller quantity of a hazardous substance, (2) substitution,
which deals with the replacement of a hazardous substance with
a less hazardous one, (3) moderation, which involves using haz-
ardous materials in less hazardous forms or under less hazardous
conditions, and (4) simplification, which includes the elimination of
unnecessary process complexity through improved process design
(Khan and Amyotte, 2003; Kletz and Amyotte, 2010; Gowland,
2012).
Along with inherently safer design measures, numerous pas-
sive or active engineered and procedural controls are typically
put in place to minimize the risk of process accidents. Never-
theless, the occurrence of many major accidents over the years
34
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
has revealed that such attempts to control process hazards are
not always effective. Intermittent industrial catastrophes have
occurred due to the complex industrial technologies that have
been developed. Examples of major process accidents over the past
50 years include: Flixborough (1974), Bhopal (1984), Piper Alpha
(1988), Philips 66 (1989), Sodegaura (1992), Stockline (2004), BP
Texas City (2005), and Macondo/Deepwater Horizon (2010) (Okoh
and Haugen, 2013). The 1984 Bhopal accident remains the world’s
worst – and hence most cited – major industrial accident (Qi et al.,
2012; Amyotte et al., 2016; Kletz and Amyotte, 2019). A compre-
hensive investigation of these accidents has revealed a variety of
causes largely related to process safety cultural, organizational,
and management issues. Process digitalization has had a positive
impact on these causation factors and thus has the potential to help
minimize the occurrence of major process events.
Fig. 1 presents one view of the various contributions made to
enhance process safety over the years. Process safety improve-
ments were initially focussed on technical aspects – for example,
improved and more reliable safety devices. Later, the importance
of the human dimension in safety performance in the process
industries was acknowledged, leading to significant developments
in the management and behavioural sciences with accompanying
advances in system and cultural approaches. The current authors
have argued that the previous decade has focussed on managing
process safety information and communicating these lessons as
knowledge. A similar case can now be made for the need to focus
on the impact of process system digitalization on process safety –
especially as understood and taught in the curricula of university
engineering programs.
Process operations themselves have also evolved through dif-
ferent stages. Fig. 2 presents a timeline for the changing stages of
industrial process operations from the era of batch operations to
the digitalization era. Digitalization in the present context means
enhancement of autonomous process operation by using advanced
methods of process monitoring, modelling, optimization, and con-
trol. While this may positively impact many aspects of process
safety (e.g., human factors), it may also introduce new process
hazards that act against the inherent safety principles mentioned
earlier.
The smaller circles within the larger circles in Fig. 2 represent
the relative number of process parameters in each of the succes-
sive stages. As indicated by the relative sizes of the larger circles,
the scale and complexity of process operations has progressively
increased, with more process parameters being integrated into pro-
F. Khan et al.
Fig. 2. Timeline of evolving industrial process operations.
cess systems based on sophisticated technological advances over
time. Systemic failure can occur as a result of fragility in a com-
plex, nonlinear system that is coupled with human interaction and
the surrounding environment. This poses significant challenges
in ensuring the control and safety of engineered systems. The
cumulative effect of multiple abnormalities due to dysfunctional
interconnections among components and subsystems can propa-
gate in diverse ways to increase the degree of inherent operational
risk (Venkatasubramanian, 2011).
Process operation stages and their various safety implications
are briefly summarized in the following sections. Major indus-
trial accidents such as Bhopal have occurred at different stages
of the process operation life cycle; these accidents have devel-
oped much-needed global awareness of process safety. Process
system complexity continues to evolve in a manner demanding
more sophisticated methods to assess and manage process safety.
2.1. Batch processing to continuous processing: safety
implications
Industry has in many respects evolved from batch to continuous
processing, although batch processes are still employed, especially
by specialty chemical tolling manufacturers (Seggerman, 2017).
Batch or semi-batch processes – involving discontinuous or semi-
continuous flow of raw materials and/or products – found broad
application in various process industries in the early stages of
industrialization. This method is generally used for plants produc-
ing high-quality and low-volume products (Lu et al., 2018). The
main benefits of batch processing are large equipment size, poten-
tially lower financial investment, flexibility, and adaptability of
flow sheeting configurations. Some of these same features give rise
to several safety implications for batch processes: (i) control diffi-
culties, which can result in thermal runaway due to wide operating
ranges, (ii) energy integration challenges, and (iii) a high inventory
of hazardous materials, which can significantly increase the con-
sequences of process failure. Recalling the Bhopal gas tragedy, the
large amount of MIC released from a ruptured storage tank was an
intermediate product of the batch process used for pesticide pro-
duction. A continuous processing alternative would have consumed
MIC essentially as it was produced, leaving only a few kilograms at
a given time for possible release; this would greatly reduce the
consequence severity component of risk (Etchells, 2004).
35
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
As industrialization progressed and became increasingly cou-
pled with technological development, there was a systematic shift
from batch operation to continuous processing methods. This was
driven in part by the significant weaknesses of batch processes as
described above, which are eased by the continuous flow of both
reactants and products. Continuous processes offer the following
advantages over their batch counterparts: (i) better process con-
trollability, (ii) more opportunities for energy integration, and (iii)
lower inventories of hazardous materials as well as reduced waste
amounts.
Nevertheless, a continuous process can be somewhat deficient
in flexibility. If there is a fault, the entire system is affected, and
the energy efficiency of the continuous process is relatively low.
These disadvantages have serious safety implications for contin-
uous processes. Efforts to improve upon their safety features in
industrial plants led to the revolutionary concept known as process
intensification or PI (Harmsen, 2010).
2.2. Process intensification (PI): safety implications
Process intensification (PI) is defined as any chemical engi-
neering development that leads to a substantially smaller, cleaner,
safer and more energy efficient technology (Harmsen, 2010). PI
combines innovative equipment and process configurations to
overcome prevailing limitations and challenges through improv-
ing heat, mass and momentum transfer, minimizing equipment
volume, increasing efficiency, and at the same time, maintaining
operability, feasibility, controllability and safety (Demirel et al.,
2019). PI facilitates multi-tasking by simultaneously allowing reac-
tion, separation, and various other process phenomena within a
single unit, leading to improved chemical processes with sub-
stantial associated economic and environmental benefits (Demirel
et al., 2017). Process intensification has brought about tremendous
change to process design by providing novel processing tech-
niques and equipment that offer substantial advantages in energy
and material efficiency, reduced environmental impact and – par-
ticularly relevant to the discussion in the current manuscript –
enhanced process safety (Nikačevíc et al., 2011).
Techniques to accomplish process intensification have been
categorized as knowledge based/ heuristic, mathematical opti-
mization, and hybrid. A heuristic technique is based on rules
acquired through experience coupled with process insight at the
F. Khan et al.
operational level of a given unit. The heuristic category is subdi-
vided into three main models: data, data mining, and application;
the method is simple and fast but lacks generalization and requires
extensive expert knowledge (Sitter et al., 2019). Optimization-
based methods require the formation of a superstructure consisting
of every possible flowsheet alternative. The superstructure gen-
erated is transformed into mixed integer nonlinear programming
(MINLP) optimization problems, with the main objective function
being related to process economics. While these methods may yield
more comprehensive results than a heuristic approach, MINLP sim-
plification may preclude new solutions. Hybrid methods integrate
the advantages of both mathematical optimization methods and
heuristic methods. A hybrid approach couples the simple struc-
ture of heuristic methods with thermodynamic insight (Sitter et al.,
2019).
Process intensification has played an important role in the evo-
lution of the process industries by increasing the efficiency of
operations. It has, however, introduced numerous complexities
that have raised significant challenges for process safety. PI efforts
often generate new process hazards that have a higher potential to
cause operator error and equipment failure (Etchells, 2004). Pro-
cess intensification can occasionally adversely affect the process
dynamic scheme, which might result in a more substantial devia-
tion that could cascade into failure (Luyben and Hendershot, 2004).
These safety implications of PI have led to the development of reli-
able and precise instrumentation systems to control and manage
process operations – and hence a greater dependence on engi-
neered and procedural safety measures. For example, Baldissone
et al. (2014) describe the requirement for additional layers of pro-
tection when process intensification was applied to a catalytic
combustion treatment plant designed for the removal of volatile
organic compounds. This may be contrasted with the often-quoted
inherent safety PI benefit of minimization of hazardous inventories.
Nevertheless, process intensification rightfully commands strong
research interest globally due to its potential for efficient and eco-
nomic process operations (Tian et al., 2018).
2.3. Process control and advanced control: safety implications
To control industrial process operations efficiently and pro-
duce products with consistent quality, process control systems
are adopted. Process control has been traditionally implemented
through tight control of the main process variables at predeter-
mined setpoints (Moshgbar and Hammond, 2010). Process control
automatically regulates an output variable by identifying the
amplitude of an output parameter from the process, subsequently
comparing it with the setpoint, and finally propagating or feed-
ing the error signal generated back to an input variable (Dunn,
2005). The central principle behind this approach is the established
or assumed relationship between process inputs and process out-
puts. However, this control strategy does not adequately account
for common-cause variations in the actual process operation. An
early perspective paper by Christofides at al. (2007) helped shape
many of the developments that have subsequently occurred in
smart manufacturing to address this and other concerns with tradi-
tional process control (as discussed later in the current paper) – e.g.,
model predictive control, plant-wide optimization and supervisory
control, process monitoring, and fault-tolerant process control.
Advanced process control uses a mathematical control algo-
rithm that adopts different kinds of techniques such as adaption,
prediction, and optimization to control or regulate multi-input pro-
cess variables and multi-output process operations. Such a control
strategy is designed to produce a product with consistent attributes
(Moshgbar and Hammond, 2010). Some process control practi-
tioners view process safety as a control problem, such that an
accident occurs when external disturbances, hardware failures or
36
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
a dysfunctional interrelationship among system components, are
not effectively restrained by existing control mechanisms, cas-
cading into violation of underlying safety measures (Leveson and
Stephanopoulos, 2014). Accordingly, some process safety practi-
tioners have substituted “loss of control” for “loss of containment”
as the primary reason for the occurrence of process safety events.
Drawing on the discussion in Leveson (2004), further insight
can be gained by examining Leveson’s accident causation model,
which uses the concept of process control and system theory as an
analogy to explain how systems can be viewed. The sociotechni-
cal structure of a process system is considered in term of levels of
controls. Each of these levels exercises control of process threats
arising from various factors such as component failure, dysfunc-
tional interaction, and environmental disturbances. Process safety
management in Leveson’s model mandates a thorough identifica-
tion of constraints on process behaviors required to ensure safety;
these groupings of constraints are enforced through either process
operation or design. Leveson’s model thus clearly focuses attention
on the role of constraints in process safety management (Leveson,
2004).
The advantages of advanced control in an industrial process
include handling complex multivariable interaction, control over a
wide operating range, and the ability to satisfy a variety of oper-
ating constraints related to safety limits, input saturation, and
product quality. Extreme process complexity that results in uncer-
tainty leading to control failure is the primary safety implication of
advanced process control (Tade et al., 2008). The Richmond Refin-
ery fire that occurred on August 6, 2012, is a classic example of
a process accident resulting from system safety deficiencies (CSB,
2015a; Adedigba et al., 2018).
3. Process digitalization: process safety concerns
Process digitalization is defined as the integration of digital tech-
nologies in process operations for the purposes of greater efficiency
and increased product quality. It also provides a means of capturing
and converting an analog signal to a digital form that can be elec-
tronically processed or stored. Digitalization of industrial processes
is the ultimate need of today’s industry (Kayikci 2018; Vaidya et al.,
2018). Process digitalization is therefore gaining wider acceptance
in industrial operations; it offers promising benefits in term of pro-
ductivity, flexibility, and quality for the chemical process industries.
Process digitalization, by virtue of its fundamental and insep-
arable adoption of digital technologies, can cause major changes
at both the process and organization levels. The benefits of digi-
talization are found in the generation of digitized operational data
and the replacement of manual process operations with software,
which permit automatic data collection for effective process mon-
itoring (Parviainen et al., 2017).
In digitalized processes, operations are thus monitored and
maintained for greater efficiency and better control. However, this
may cause overreliance on instrumentation and data utilization,
which can have adverse implications for process safety. It is well-
established that such a dependence on engineered devices and
administrative safety measures has been a leading cause of pro-
cess accidents. An important example in this regard is the disaster
that occurred on December 11, 2005 at the Buncefield oil storage
depot in the UK. The primary cause of overfilling of a petrol (gaso-
line) storage tank was failure of the automatic tank gauging system
(Paltrinieri et al., 2012). A similar accident occurred on October
23, 2009 during offloading of gasoline from a tanker ship at the
Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO) facility in Bayamon,
Puerto Rico. (CSB, 2015b). Although process digitalization is a clear
step in the right direction for enhancing the efficiency of process
systems, its potentially adverse impacts on process safety need
F. Khan et al.
to be studied and taught as part of the university undergraduate
chemical engineering curriculum. Important elements of process
digitalization and their process safety implications are now briefly
discussed.
3.1. Process monitoring
Modern industrial systems are intricate in both their basic struc-
ture and the level of automation. Reliability and safety concerns
regarding such complex systems are increasingly viewed as being
among the most critical factors for process system design (Yin et al.,
2014). Process monitoring techniques are therefore adopted in pro-
cess operations as tools for assurance of both process safety and
product quality.
Process monitoring with the ultimate aim of fault detection
and diagnosis are inseparable components of modern industrial
process operations (Ge et al., 2013). A comprehensive treatment
of research on process fault detection and fault-tolerant control
is given in the book by Mhaskar et al. (2013). In a recent study,
Alauddin et al. (2018) have provided a bibliometric analysis of fault
detection methods applicable to process systems. Their analysis
demonstrates the strong linkages among process monitoring, fault
detection, and subsequent safety interventions.
Fault diagnosis methods are generally classified according to
the type of model on which they are based: quantitative, qualita-
tive, or process history (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a, 2003b,
2003c). Qualitative model-based methods express a relationship
concerning the qualitative function of the various units in each pro-
cess. Usually, the qualitative model is developed using abstraction
hierarchies (structural and functional) or qualitative causal models
(fault trees, digraphs, and qualitative physics). Qualitative model-
based methods are typically not very robust (Venkatasubramanian
et al., 2003b).
Process history-based methods make use of the availability of
large amounts of historical process data. In these methods, the
data is transformed to extract salient features that are fed as
prior information or knowledge to a diagnostic system. The fea-
ture extraction process can be undertaken either qualitatively or
quantitatively (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003c). Widely used
qualitative extraction methods include expert systems and qual-
itative trend analysis (QTA). An expert system has the advantages
of clear reasoning, rapid development, and a robust capability to
reason under uncertainty. However, knowledge-based systems are
usually generated from expert rules, are system specific, have lim-
ited representation power, and can be challenging to update. QTA is
advantageous because it offers detailed explanations for different
categories of events taking place in the process due to malfunction-
ing diagnosis; it can also predict the future state. However, filtering
is needed to obtain a signal trend that will not be susceptible to
variation because of noise. Widely used quantitative extraction
methods include neural networks and statistical techniques such as
PCA (principal component analysis) and statistical classifier. Quan-
titative extraction methods are prone to shortcomings related to
classification error and adaptability (Venkatasubramanian et al.,
2003c).
Quantitative model-based methods generally rely on input-
output models and state space models. First-principle models and
frequency-response models have also been developed. The princi-
pal advantage of quantitative-based model techniques is that they
offer control of the characteristic of the residuals. Nevertheless,
many process system attributes, such as process nonlinearity, lack
of data and high dimensionality, limit their application in industrial
processes (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a). The general limita-
tion of quantitative model techniques is multiplying uncertainties
due to parameter drifts in this model type.
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Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
No single process monitoring technique possesses all the desir-
able characteristics for an ideal diagnostic system. As reviewed
in the current section, detailed information about process moni-
toring techniques can be found in the suite of papers written by
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2003c).
3.2. Predictive control
Model predictive control (MPC) is a type of control technique
that obtains the current action by solving a finite horizon open-loop
optimal control problem at every interval of the sampling period,
using the current information or state of the process plant as the
input or initial state (Mayne et al., 2000). This optimization process
gives an optimal control sequence, the foremost of which is used
by the process plant (Mayne et al., 2000). MPC shows an excellent
capability to handle complex constrained optimization control dif-
ficulties in various aspects of advanced manufacturing, aerospace
applications, and the energy industry. This capability comes from
the ability of MPC to predict future features or characteristics of
dynamic systems.
There have been several recent studies relating various aspects
of process control with process operational safety. These efforts
emphasize taking a system perspective of process safety, which
facilitates analysis of process incidents as events that occur because
of changes in process state over a period of time. (This is similar to
the previously mentioned incident causation view of loss of con-
trol leading to loss of containment.) Detailed examination of the
dynamic interaction between feedback control and chemical pro-
cess safety systems in the context of both classical and model-based
control was conducted by Zhang et al. (2018). An approach that
coordinates safety and control systems through an indexing (com-
mon metric) procedure has also been undertaken (Albalawi et al.,
2017a).
Albalawi et al. (2017b) proposed incorporation of a distributed
architecture with Lyapunov-based economic model predictive con-
trol (LEMPC) for process systems (a theme further pursued by Wu
et al., 2019). Chen et al. (2020) have presented a framework for iden-
tifying various forms of cyber-attack on process systems. In their
work, a neural network-based detector is combined with a two-tier
control architecture that reconfigures the control system to enable
a return to the original steady state whenever the process system
is threatened by cyber-attack. Additionally, a real-time machine
learning approach was used by Wu et al. (2020) to optimize process
operational safety for nonlinear systems undergoing time-varying
disturbances. Other recent developments in the peer-reviewed lit-
erature concerning process operational safety via model predictive
control and control design are described by Albalawi et al. (2018).
Although MPC has successfully gained wide acceptance in
industrial process operations as an active control technique for
overcoming constrained optimization challenges, it exhibits sev-
eral limitations that affect the safety of industrial process systems
(Xi et al., 2013). These limitations are related to the following fea-
tures of current industrial MPC algorithms that are (Xi et al., 2013):
• primarily appropriate for slow dynamic processes with extensive
sampling opportunities,
• principally limited to linear or quasi-linear processes and there-
fore unable to handle nonlinear control problems, and
• limited in effectiveness due to their inherent heavy computa-
tional burden.
The effects of these weaknesses of predictive control on the
reliability and safety of complex industrial processes concern-
ing process digitalization need to be adequately understood and
emphasized in undergraduate chemical engineering curricula.
F. Khan et al.
3.3. Abnormal situation management
Abnormal situations usually occur due to disturbances that
cause a process to deviate from its tolerable operating range. The
management of such process deviations is termed abnormal situa-
tion management or ASM (Dai et al., 2016; Eljack and Kazi, 2016).
Abnormal situation management provides early warning of atyp-
ical situations coupled with timely diagnosis of abnormality root
causation, and offers decision-making support to process operators
to facilitate reasonable actions to restore the process to normalcy
(Shu et al., 2016). In other words, ASM identifies deviations from
normal operation, which may lead to failure conditions. This infor-
mation is used in assessing risk, a further step that helps to provide
information to prevent faults from ultimately becoming failure con-
ditions.
In digitalized processes, fault detection/diagnosis and ASM can
all occur in a closed loop. Fault detection approaches determine
the actual fault conditions and attempt to identify the possible
hazards. Accident modelling evaluates the probabilities and con-
sequences of identified hazards when ASM fails to contain the
relevant faults. ASM is not, however, limited to exposing process
deviations and appropriately diagnosing corresponding causes; it
also focuses on decision-making to bring a process back to normal
operation. Abnormal situation management is therefore an integral
part of process safety. ASM plays a key role in dynamic risk manage-
ment by serving as a link between fault detection/diagnosis and risk
management decision-making. Dai et al. (2016) have commented
that risk assessment is the first essential step of ASM to obtain
an initial and clear outline of the risk scenario to manage, while
fault detection/diagnosis identifies the process deviations and root
causes of a given risk scenario.
As previously discussed, modern process control has introduced
a high degree of automation to chemical processing and has con-
tributed significantly to production efficiency, product quality, and
process safety. Automation of abnormal situation management has
not, however, been fully realized. Economic loss of about 20 billion
USD (2016) has been estimated to result from abnormal situations
in the chemical and petroleum industries in the United States (Shu
et al., 2016).
In essence, the primary cause of process incidents is ultimately
traceable to the occurrence of an abnormal event or events. Major
accidents are typically the result of seemingly insignificant inci-
dents, near misses, or unsafe behaviours – all of which suggest
abnormal situations. The primary causes of an abnormal situa-
tion in process systems are usually human error (brought about
by inadequate human factor considerations), process excursions
outside the design envelope (recall the previous discussion on
HAZOP), equipment failure, or any combination thereof. Inability
to recognize abnormal situations, poor appreciation of their effects,
and improper techniques for handling abnormal conditions, are
responsible for the often devastating failures of abnormal situation
management (Eljack and Kazi, 2016).
The inherent characteristics of industrial system data create
numerous challenges for effective process fault diagnosis. Such data
are often nonlinear, highly time-variant, and non-Gaussian in dis-
tribution. Descriptions of satisfactory application of fault diagnosis
techniques in real industrial processes are rare (Shu et al., 2016).
Although process safety in conjunction with abnormal situation
management has undergone significant improvements globally
over the past couple of decades, this has not translated into a sig-
nificant reduction in major process accidents. Further advances in
real-time process fault detection and diagnosis (abnormal situation
management) will play a large role in preventing major industrial
accidents (Shu et al., 2016).
For safe and efficient operation of modern process systems in
the digitalization era, the urgent need for a protocol that detects
38
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
abnormal situations in real time cannot be understated. The timely
detection of abnormal situations is of paramount importance to
prevent devastating accidents that negatively impact humans,
equipment and other assets, business operations, and the natural
environment (Khan et al., 2014).
In summary, digitalization has provided numerous advantages
to process operation including improvements in product quality,
system reliability, process monitoring, fault detection and diagno-
sis, and process control. One of the distinct advantages of process
digitalization is the possibility of remote and integrated operations.
In addition to these advantages, process digitalization offers seri-
ous challenges. These include – although are not limited to – the
relationship between digitalization and the previously described
inherent safety principles, the most notable of which is simpli-
fication. Digitalized processes are, by nature, complex and thus
introduce new pathways for hazard realization. Other potential
challenges include the replacement of experienced personnel with
digital logic solvers, susceptibility to external events, alarm flood-
ing, and cyber security. In addition to the examples subsequently
described, the recent cyber security incident at the Saudi Aramco
refinery in Saudi Arabia has drawn further drawn attention to some
of the potential challenges of process digitalization (Rashad, 2020).
4. Process safety education in digitalized process operation
Chemical engineering (ChE) is a discipline of applied science
that focuses primarily on the design and optimization of chemi-
cal and biological processes. Chemical engineering education has
made steady progress over the centuries, beginning with the first
ChE course offered by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
1888 and the creation of the first ChE department at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania in 1892 (Van Antwerpen, 1980). While various
paradigm shifts have brought the discipline to its current state as
presented in this paper, chemical engineering has not strayed from
its founding principles based on methods of processing. What has
evolved and expanded is the nature of the entities being processed
– be they commodity chemicals, petrochemical feedstock, crude oil,
biological organisms, nano-size materials, and so on – even now to
the inclusion of knowledge vectors such as process data.
Emphasizing educational needs, Mkpat et al. (2018) refer to pro-
cess safety as the learning of operating disciplines and safety through
a systematic approach, with a view to preventing major accidents in
the process industry. They further remark that process safety educa-
tion can be acquired through three distinct avenues, namely: (i) a
university-based route involving the spectrum of curricula from the
Bachelor’s degree to the Doctoral degree, (ii) a professional route
involving industry internships, on-the-job training, and continuous
professional development (CPD), and (iii) training by government
regulatory agencies (Mkpat et al., 2018).
An additional avenue for formally enhancing process safety
knowledge is the establishment by technical colleges of train-
ing programs for personnel working in the chemical, oil, and gas
industries as operators. All of these approaches are, of course,
not mutually exclusive; they clearly emphasize the desirability
of a continuum view of learning that incorporates contributions
from academia, industry, and government. Process safety educa-
tion should not be limited to only chemical engineers, but should
be provided to all who work in the process and related industries.
The current paper is focussed primarily on suggested revisions
to the ChE undergraduate curriculum in light of the rise of process
system digitalization and the commensurate concerns for process
safety assurance. Here, and in subsequent sections, we also com-
ment briefly on the need for process safety education in general
and in what form this might occur. There appears to be an ongoing
discussion – a healthy debate of sorts – among chemical engineer-
F. Khan et al.
ing educators on whether process safety should be taught at the
undergraduate level by means of a dedicated, stand-alone course
(e.g., the course described by Amyotte, 2013 and Amyotte et al.,
2019), or by integration into core ChE courses (i.e., throughout
the entire chemical engineering curriculum; Venkatasubramanian,
2011). As with the general approaches identified by Mkpat et al.
(2018), these two possibilities for process safety undergraduate
teaching are not mutually exclusive. Both are desirable and fea-
sible. Effectively addressing the common refrain – “Who will teach
this material? and How can we accommodate this material in an
already full curriculum?” – requires collegial dialogue and collab-
orative endeavours (see, for example, Amyotte, 2004 and Amyotte
and McCahill, 2004).
4.1. Core chemical engineering curriculum and process safety
Table 1 lists the chemical engineering undergraduate courses
taught at six different universities. Memorial is the home institution
for two of the current authors, while U of T, Yale, UCL, USM, and Wits
represent a cross-section of well-established programs located in
various parts of the world. Table 1 is not intended as a global gen-
eralization of chemical engineering/process safety education. Its
purpose is to provide an entry point to subsequent discussion of
pedagogical strategies and regulatory regimes.
Apart from an attempt to ensure some geographical coverage
while also limiting the sample size, no other specific criteria were
used in choosing the programs shown in Table 1. None, other than
of course Memorial (and to a lesser extent U of T), are particu-
larly well-known to the current authors. In that regard, we did
consciously avoid programs with active process safety researchers
and educators with whom we have collaborated (e.g., Texas A&M
University and Delft University of Technology, among others).
Before analyzing the curricula given in Table 1, it is important
to note the following points:
• Course titles and groupings by year were taken directly from the
university web sites (last accessed on September 28, 2020).
• The course order in a given year does not necessarily correspond
to the term or semester of delivery.
• As per the previous point, words such as “course”, “term”,
“semester”, “year”, “credit hour”, etc. are not employed con-
sistently throughout global academia. Therefore, whether a
program is delivered in 3 or 4 years is a moot point; it is the
curriculum content and delivery that are paramount. Addition-
ally, many chemical engineering programs worldwide extend
to 5 years with the introduction of co-operative education and
industry internships, along with combined Bachelor’s/Master’s
programs.
• There may be other required courses for a particular program
beyond those shown in Table 1. For example, Memorial also
requires a number of courses termed “complementary studies”;
these typically have content from the humanities and social sci-
ences. Such courses are shown explicitly in Table 1 for U of T.
• The courses in Table 1 are believed, for the most part, to be core
and therefore required of all graduates from a given program.
Through our Canadian lens of “counting courses”, it seems there
may be elective courses in the mix for USM Year 3. The university
web site does refer to third- and fourth-year specialization in: (i)
Separation Process Engineering & Catalysis, (ii) Process Control
Engineering, and (iii) Bio-Process Engineering & Environment.
This point is mentioned for the sake of completeness; it is not
critical to our analysis here.
• The final item of note is the fact that all programs identified in
Table 1 are accredited by the relevant authority: (i) Memorial
and U of T – CEAB (Canadian Engineering Accreditation Board), (ii)
Yale – ABET (Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology,
39
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
Inc.), (iii) UCL – IChemE (Institution of Chemical Engineers), (iv)
USM – BEM (Board of Engineers Malaysia) via EAC (Engineering
Accreditation Council), and (v) Wits – ECSA (Engineering Council
of South Africa). The USM and Wits web sites also reference the
Washington Accord, which is an international agreement con-
cerning the substantial equivalency of engineering accreditation
systems. Accreditation is an important factor to which we return
in later discussion.
We first make a few general observations on the curricula in
Table 1. One sees clear evidence of progression from an early
emphasis on the natural sciences (primarily chemistry and physics)
and mathematics, to drawing in engineering science concepts
from chemical engineering and other engineering disciplines (e.g.,
mechanical and electrical) – with the extent of the latter depending
on the particular approach to breadth of scope. As time-in-program
continues, undergraduate students gain exposure to, and experi-
ence with, discipline-specific engineering science content such as
ChE thermodynamics as well as components of engineering design,
culminating in a significant capstone design project. Along the way,
the various ChE programs all cover what might be called the “heart
of chemical engineering” in terms of engineering science and engi-
neering design content: mass and energy balances, heat, mass and
momentum transfer, reaction kinetics (to account for molecular
changes by chemical means), separation processes (to account for
molecular changes by physical means), and process control. The
route is not linear; elements of engineering design, for example,
are sometimes introduced at early stages in the curriculum.
Four of the programs have a stand-alone pro-
cess safety course or courses (identified in Table 1 in
bold-faced italics with underlining): Memorial – Safety & Risk
Engineering; U of T – Risk Based Safety Management (Technical
Elective); UCL – Advanced Safety & Loss Prevention; USM – Plant
Safety, and Advanced Process Safety Engineering. Those programs
that do not appear to have a separate process safety course (Yale
and Wits), incorporate the teaching of relevant material in the
capstone design project and related courses (identified in Table 1
in bold-faced italics) – as do the other four programs (Memorial, U
of T, UCL and USM). The formal teaching of process safety by what-
ever arrangement generally occurs toward the latter part of each
program’s curriculum. This is not to say that integration of process
safety principles does not occur in other courses throughout these
programs; such a determination is, however, beyond the scope of
the current analysis.
Descriptions of the process safety courses identified in Table 1
reveal the following fundamentals being taught:
• Hazard identification, including hazard and operability study
(HAZOP),
• Risk assessment, including quantitative risk assessment (QRA),
• Risk management,
• Root cause analysis (RCA),
• Safety management systems,
• Human factors, and
• Inherently safer design (ISD).
It should also be noted that a somewhat different route for
teaching process safety has emerged in some countries, in par-
ticular the United States. Here, recent initiatives have been aimed
at bringing into the classroom process safety professionals with
years of experience working in industry. With this “practitioner’s
approach”, case study resources such as Kletz and Amyotte (2019)
are the primary vehicle used to impart lessons learned from process
incidents.
No matter the approach, gone are the days when teaching safety
in a ChE program meant reminding students about wearing PPE
 F. Khan et al.
Table 1
Undergraduate chemical engineering curricula at six selected universities.

Year Memorial University University of Toronto Yale University University College London University of Science Malaysia University of the
(Memorial) [Canada] (U of T) (Yale) (UCL) (USM) Witwatersrand (Wits)
[Canada] [United States of [United Kingdom] [Malaysia] [Republic of South
America] Africa]

1 • Chemistry I • Orientation to Engineering
• English • Engineering Chemistry &
• Engineering Statics Materials Science
• Introduction to • Engineering Strategies &
Programming Practice I (includes human
• Engineering factors)
Graphics & Design • Engineering Strategies &
• Mechanisms & Practice II
Electric Circuits • Mechanics
• Calculus I • Calculus I
• Calculus II • Calculus II
• Linear Algebra I • Linear Algebra
• Physics I • Fundamentals of Computer
• Physics II Programming
• Physical Chemistry
• Concepts in Chemical
Engineering
• Introduction to Chemical
Engineering & Applied
40
• General Chemistry & • Computational Modelling & • Engineering Mechanics • Introduction to
Lab I Analysis • Engineering Practice Process & Materials
• General Chemistry & • Design & Professional Skills I • Engineering Calculus Engineering
Lab II • Engineering Challenges • Engineering Materials • Chemistry I
• Differential Calculus • Introduction to Chemical • Organic Chemistry • Physics
• Integral Calculus Engineering • Chemical Engineering • Mathematics I
• Engineering Improv • Mathematical Modeling & Drawing • Critical Thinking*
(Introduction to Analysis I • Electrical Technology • A Social History of
Engineering • Physical Chemistry • Advanced Engineering Technology
Analysis) • Thermodynamics Calculus
• Introduction to • Transport Phenomena • Physical & Analytical
Computing for Chemistry
Engineers & • Introduction to Project
Scientists Management
• Mass Balance

Chemistry

2 • Chemistry II
• Engineering
Professionalism I
• Engineering
Mathematics
• Introduction to
Process Engineering
• Thermodynamics I
• Chemistry & Physics
of Engineering
Materials I
• Chemical Engineering &
Applied Chemistry –
Laboratory I
• Chemical Engineering &
Applied Chemistry –
Laboratory II
• Process Engineering
• Fluid Mechanics
• Applied Chemistry I –
Inorganic Chemistry
• Applied Chemistry II –
• Organic Chemistry & • Chemical Reaction • Fluid Flow for Chemical • Computing for
Lab I Engineering I Engineering Process Engineers
• Organic Chemistry & • Design & Professional Skills II • Energy Balance • Process Engineering
Lab II • Engineering • Mass Transfer Fundamentals
• Physics I Experimentation • Computer Programming & • Energy Balances &
• Physics II • Modelling & Analysis II Applications Applications
• Multivariable • Separation Processes I • Biotechnology for Engineers • Chemistry II
Calculus • Particulate Systems & • Process Heat Transfer (Metallurgy)
• Ordinary & Partial Separation Processes II • Chemical Engineering • Electrical
Differential • Process Design Principles Thermodynamics Engineering
Equations • Process Heat Transfer • Engineers in Society • Economic Concept

Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46

• Advanced Calculus Organic Chemistry • Minor I • Mathematical Methods for • Mathematics II
• Process Engineering • Calculus III Chemical Engineering
Thermodynamics • Engineering Economic • Chemical Engineering
• Process Analysis Laboratory I
Mathematical • Communication
Models • Heat & Mass Transfer
• Process Engineering • Process Dynamics:
Calculations Modeling, Analysis &
• Process Fluid Simulation
Dynamics I • Statistics
• Environmental Chemistry
 F. Khan et al.
Table 1 (Continued)

Year Memorial University University of Toronto Yale University University College London University of Science Malaysia University of the
(Memorial) [Canada] (U of T) (Yale) (UCL) (USM) Witwatersrand (Wits)
[Canada] [United States of [United Kingdom] [Malaysia] [Republic of South
America] Africa]

3 • Probability & • Chemical Engineering & • Physical Chemistry I • Advanced Safety & Loss Prevention • Plant Safety • Transport
Statistics Applied Chemistry – • Physical Chemistry II • Process Plant Design Project • Separation Processes Phenomena
• Mass Transfer Laboratory III • Thermodynamics (includes safety issues) • Chemical Reaction • Chemical
• Process Heat • Chemical Engineering & • Fluid Mechanics • Chemical Reaction Engineering Engineering
Transfer Applied Chemistry – • Kinetics & Reactors Engineering II • Process Dynamics & Control Thermodynamics
• Process Equipment Laboratory IV • Transport Processes • Process Dynamics & Control • Environmental Engineering • Chemical
Design I • Engineering • Engineering Elective • Transport Phenomena II & Management Engineering
• Process Equipment Thermodynamics • Minor II • Transport Phenomena Laboratory
Design II • Process Design (includes • Minor III • Reactor Design & Analysis • Mass Transfer
• Chemistry & Physics HAZOP) • Chemical Engineering • Numerical Methods
of Engineering • Reaction Kinetics Laboratory II • Chemical Reaction
Materials II • Professional Engineering • Downstream Processing of Engineering
• Process Modelling & Consultancy Biochemical & • Chemical Design
Analysis • Separation Processes Pharmaceutical Products Principles
• Chemical Reaction • Process Control • Renewable & Alternative • Environmental
Engineering • Chemical Reaction Energies Process Engineering
• Process Fluid Engineering • Biochemical Engineering
Dynamics II • Team Strategies for • Process Intensification in
• Technical Stream Engineering Design Chemical Processes
Course (includes process safety • Nanomaterials in Chemical
management, occupational Engineering
health & safety) • Oleochemical Processing
• Technical Electives
41

• Complementary Studies
Electives

4 • Technical Stream
Courses: must
include
Safety & Risk Engineering
for Process Technical
Stream
• Process Engineering
Project I (includes
safety issues)
• Process Engineering
• Chemical Plant Design • Chemical Not Applicable • Advanced Process Safety Engineering• Chemical
• Professional Practice Engineering Process • Plant Design & Economics Engineering Design
• Thesis Design (includes (includes plant safety, (includes HAZOP,
• Technical Electives (include safety & hazard reliability and operability, layout, safety
Risk Based Safety Management) analysis) plant layout, plant startup, impacts)
• Complimentary Studies • Separation/Purification commissioning, and • Hydrometallurgy
Electives Processes shutdown) • Management for
• Free Elective • Process Control • Process Design & Analysis Process Engineers
• Chemical • Chemical Engineering • Solid Fluid Systems
Engineering Lab Laboratory III • Process Control

Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46

Project II (includes • Engineering • Wastewater Treatment • Advanced Chemical
safety issues) Electives Engineering Engineering B
• Process Dynamics & • Petroleum & Gas Processing • Advanced Chemical
Control Engineering Engineering C
• Process Plant Design • Final Year Project • Advanced Chemical
& Economics • Advanced Control System for Engineering D
• Engineering Industrial Processes • Chemical
Professionalism II • Membrane Science & Engineering
• Elective Course Technology Research Project
• Biorefinery Engineering • Biochemical
Engineering

*
It is interesting to note the inclusion of a course on Critical Thinking in the first year of the chemical engineering program at University of the Witwatersrand. As an essential skill for process safety practitioners, a strong case
can be made for its incorporation (like process safety itself) throughout the undergraduate curriculum of all chemical engineering programs.
F. Khan et al.
(personal protective equipment) in the laboratory and posting a
copy of the applicable OH&S (Occupational Health & Safety) regu-
lations. These are important matters to be sure; but they are not
the sole safety knowledge chemical engineering undergraduates
should be taking with them into industry, government, or further
academic study. The university educational environment cannot
neglect its responsibility toward teaching chemical process safety
(Louvar and Hendershot, 2003).
Two factors are central to the evolution of process safety peda-
gogy. First, we now have excellent resource material on which to
base our teaching efforts – whether these be in a dedicated pro-
cess safety course or a program-wide initiative to integrate process
safety concepts. There are several textbooks now available for this
purpose; as illustrative examples, we cite CCPS (2016); Benintendi
(2018), and Crowl and Louvar (2019). Benintendi (2018) and Crowl
and Louvar (2019), in particular, demonstrate to undergraduate
students that process safety is a highly quantitative subject as well
as being also qualitative. What to teach with respect to process
safety is not a mystery.
Second, as indicated earlier, engineering accreditation systems
worldwide are driving the imperative for process safety education.
Accreditation is one of the educational determinants for a process
safety course that was identified by Amyotte (2013). In Canada, the
professional accreditation expectation concerning safety is that the
instruction is commensurate with the hazards and risks brought
about by the nature of the specific engineering discipline. The need
for chemical engineering students to study process safety is thus
evident from their potential exposure to flammable, explosible and
toxic substances over the course of their careers. Simply put, no ChE
graduate should enter the world of professional engineering with-
out knowing the meaning of HAZOP and without even rudimentary
proficiency in its application.
4.2. Core chemical engineering curriculum and process
digitalization
The discussion in the previous section is intended to convey a
sense of guarded optimism about the current state of process safety
education. However, it should not be viewed as a broad endorse-
ment of the extent of coverage of process digitilization concepts. In
absolute terms, there remains much to be accomplished; in relative
terms, the role of process safety in chemical engineering education
has advanced significantly from even a decade ago.
A key part of what remains to be accomplished is full integration
of process safety concepts throughout the undergraduate chemical
engineering curriculum, much like the integral role of mass and
energy balances in a chemical engineer’s skillset. As engineering
educators, we advise our students not to compartmentalize – i.e.,
not to tuck away bits of knowledge once a course has been com-
pleted, never to retrieve those thoughts again for future use. Having
learned how to do a mole balance in a first- or second-year course,
the material returns time and again in later parts of the curriculum.
Ideally, process safety will eventually reach the same state.
In a similar manner, digitalization cannot be comprehensively
taught only in a single standalone course. It should also be woven
throughout the curriculum by embedding relevant digitilization
concepts in courses such as thermodynamics, reaction engineer-
ing, process modelling and simulation, and process dynamics and
control. Further, process safety should be considered an essen-
tial element of the digitalization topics embodied in the various
courses. For example, a process simulation course typically exposes
students to the use of best-practice, commercial software tools used
for design purposes. Such educational efforts could also demon-
strate how noise and inaccuracies in process data can threaten
process simulation results and introduce new hazards into the pro-
cessing system.
42
Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46
A major driver for further process safety and general chemical
engineering curriculum reform is the advent of the fourth indus-
trial revolution based on smart technology. Industry 4.0 is primarily
based on the industrial internet of things (IIoT), Internet of Services
(IoS), Internet of manufacturing services (IoMS), and artificial intel-
ligence and cyber-physical systems (CPS). The basic features of the
fourth industrial revolution are: (1) digitization and integration of
vertical value chains, (2) digitization and integration of horizontal
value chains, (3) end-to-end integration across the entire product
life cycle, and (4) acceleration through smart technology (Moktadir
et al., 2018; Vaidya et al., 2018; Carvalho et al., 2018). Digitization
and integration of vertical value chains implies full integration of
process manufacturing plants with cyber-physical systems (CPS) to
create a dynamic production entity. The positive impact of smart
technology is referred to as acceleration (Moktadir et al., 2018).
Just as overall chemical engineering curriculum reform is needed
to ensure graduates are familiar with changes in process opera-
tions as a result of process digitalization, process safety curriculum
reform must keep pace. Lee et al. (2019) recently concluded that:
Industry 4.0 offers the opportunity to integrate and leverage current
technologies and modelling approaches to improve process safety.
Table 2 presents some thoughts in this direction by illustrat-
ing relevant topics grouped under four subject areas: (i) abnormal
situation management, (ii) process automation and control, (iii)
process reliability, and (iv) process safety and asset integrity.
Table 2 is based on the experience of the current authors and
their colleagues in delivering core and elective undergraduate
courses and graduate courses in these areas. While abnormal situ-
ation management and aspects of process automation and control
have appeared in earlier sections of the current paper, the newly
introduced topics of process reliability and asset integrity are
becoming increasingly important as physical assets undergo aging
and degradation. Additionally, the aforementioned increased com-
plexity brought about by digitalization means that the reliability of
software and associated information technology accessories plays a
critical role in overall safety and security of modern process plants.
Although “making safety an elective” is inherently subject
to misconceptions about a program’s culture and commitment
toward safety, it can be an effective means to introduce new mate-
rial into the curriculum. This was precisely the approach taken by
one of the authors in establishing the now mandatory fourth-year
process safety course (Industrial Safety & Loss Management) at
Dalhousie University. The course began about 20 years ago as a
graduate level offering that was open to undergraduate ChE stu-
dents as a technical elective. The subject matter resonated with
undergrad students to the extent that there was a groundswell of
support for introducing the course into the undergraduate curricu-
lum. Thus, while many of the topics listed in Table 2 might seem
more suitable for graduate than undergraduate level courses, this
alternate approach could provide an effective interim measure for
curriculum modification.
Of course, one does not have to view the four columns in Table 2
as representative of four distinct courses. As described previously
in this section, they can also be thought of as potential topics for
integration into existing ChE courses while the usual content of
these courses is modified to address process digitalization technol-
ogy. New digitalization topics such as big data analytics, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning applications could become part
of foundational mathematical methods courses that typically focus
on traditional numerical modelling and analysis.
A decade ago, Venkatasubramanian (2009, 2011) advocated for
changes to ChE modelling and control courses to address situa-
tions for which new tools beyond DAEs (differential and algebraic
equations) were becoming available. Part of his motivation was to
accommodate changing process safety issues with changes in tech-
nology. In this vein, the topics given in Table 2 – alarm management,
 F. Khan et al.
Table 2
Subject areas and suggested topics to address process safety concerns with respect to process system digitalization.

Abnormal Situation Management Process Automation and Control Process Reliability Process Safety and Asset Integrity

Introduction State Space Theory Failure Distribution Accident Modelling

•Different layers of control and •Modelling in space •Reliability function •Accident process concept
monitoring •Relationship between transfer function and •Mean time to failure •Domino theory
•Abnormal event management state space model •Conditional reliability •STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model
(AEM); fault detection diagnosis •Analysis of state space model, controllability, and Processes) model
(FDD) observability •Layers of protection
•Other models in literature
Model-Based Monitoring Estimation of States Time-Dependent Failure Models Consequence Modelling
Techniques •Kalman filter (KF) •Weibull distribution •Fire and explosion modelling
•Modelling of faults •Extended Kalman filter (EKF) •Normal distribution •CFD-based release and dispersion
•Fault detectability, insolubility, •Unscented Kalman filter (UKF) •Lognormal distribution •CFD-based fire modelling (pool fire, fireball,
identifiability •Gamma distribution jet fire, flash fire)
•Parameter estimation, parity •CFD-based explosion and BLEVE modelling
relations, residual generation,
detection properties of residuals,
isolation properties of residuals,
residual evaluation, thresholding
Data-Based Monitoring Introduction to Process Modelling and System Reliability Human Factors in Engineering
Techniques Parameter Estimation •Serial configuration •Definitions: human error, human factors
•Univariate statistical methods: •What is identification or estimation? •Parallel configuration •Human reliability assessment model
43

data sets, sampling interval, •Main issues in model building •Combined series-parallel systems •Various approaches for human error
sample size, data pre-processing, •Model structures •Minimal cuts and minimal path prediction: e.g., SLIM (Success Likelihood Index
lag, order selection •Common mode failures Methodology), HEART (Human Error
•T2 statistics and thresholds Assessment and Reduction Technique)
•Multivariate statistical methods:
principal component analysis
(PCA), reduction order, fault
detection, fault identification, fault
diagnosis, dynamic PCA, other
PCA-based methods; partial least
squares (PLS), PLS algorithms, fault
detection, fault identification, fault
diagnosis; Comparison of PCA and

Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46

PLS
Steps in Model Building State-Dependent Systems Risk Assessment
Alarm Management
•Design of experiments •Markov analysis •Process hazard analysis (PHA)
•Alarm philosophy codes and standards
•A priori analysis of data •Load-sharing systems •Elements of risk analysis
•Alarm data analysis
•Model structure determination Standby systems Quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
•Alarm rationalization
•Concepts of system identifiability, bias and •Degraded systems •Risk representation and •ALARP (as low as
•Alarm flooding and impacts on process safety
consistency •Three-state devices reasonably practicable)
•Binomial, Poisson and hypergeometric
processes
•Risk simulation techniques
 F. Khan et al.
Table 2 (Continued)

Abnormal Situation Management Process Automation and Control Process Reliability Process Safety and Asset Integrity

Parameter Estimation Methods Design for Reliability Probabilistic Risk Assessment

• Guiding principles behind parameter
estimation methods
• Minimizing prediction errors and the
prediction error approach
• Asymptotic distribution of parameter
estimates
• Reliability specification and system • Data modelling for risk assessment
measurements • Advanced techniques: Bowtie analysis,
• Reliability allocation Bayesian network analysis
• Design methods • Specialized software packages
• Failure analysis • Risk management
• System safety and fault tree analysis

Computing the Estimate Maintainability Uncertainty Analysis

• Linear regression and least squares
• Subspace methods for estimating state space
models
• Analysis of downtime
• Repair time distribution
• Stochastic point process
• System repair time
• Reliability under preventive maintenance
• State-dependent system with repair
• Fundamentals of uncertainty
• Uncertainty types
• Analysis techniques
• Representation of uncertainty

Model Validation Methods Availability Asset Integrity

• Strategies for end-use of model (prediction • Inherent availability • Concept of asset
and control) • Operational integrity
• Validation – time domain availability • Reliability centred
44

• Validation – frequency domain • Exponential maintenance (RCM)

availability model • Risk based
Analysis of Multivariable Systems • System availability maintenance (RBM)
• Transfer functions for multiple input, model • Risk based
multiple output (MIMO) systems • Inspection and inspection of static
• Multivariable frequency response repair availability equipment
• Directions in multivariable systems, model
right-half plane (RHP) zeros
• Analysis using eigenvalues
• Analysis using singular value decomposition
(SVD)
• Analysis using relative gain array (RGA)
• Control structure design

Education for Chemical Engineers 34 (2021) 33–46

Controller Design
• Trade-offs in controller design
• Pre- and post-compensator, decoupling, SVD
controller
• State feedback control
• Model predictive control (MPC)
F. Khan et al.
model predictive control, Markov analysis, Bayesian networks, and
the like – must be viewed in light of their process safety implica-
tions in addition to their technical definitions and uses. As a final
comment, we note that Table 2 and similar listings are dynamic
compilations. With an eye on the technical literature, we should
also keep in mind changing industry needs related to process secu-
rity (physical and cyber security (e.g., Chen et al., 2020), both
internal and external to a company or facility) and how these con-
siderations might find their way into our classrooms. (Moreno et al.,
2018).
5. Concluding remarks
The chemical process industries (CPI) have gone through dra-
matic changes in the past several years due to technological
developments. Process digitalization has rapidly gained ground in
the CPI and has brought with it associated safety concerns. As cor-
responding chemical engineering educational reform takes place,
concurrent changes in process safety pedagogy must also occur.
The discipline of chemical engineering has about a hundred year
head-start on process safety in terms of being formally taught in
universities. A reasonable goal for process safety educators would
be to explore avenues within their chemical or process engineer-
ing department for both concept integration and development of
stand-alone process safety courses. Multiple resources – books,
journals, technical organizations, and colleagues – are available to
assist in these endeavours. Collaborative revision should be the
aim; adherence to accreditation criteria can provide motivation
when needed.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support pro-
vided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada (NSERC) through the Discovery Grant Program and the
Canada Research Chair (Tier I) Program in Offshore Safety and Risk
Engineering. We also wish to thank the anonymous peer reviewers
for their suggestions to improve the original manuscript.
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