C© MP AR AT^ E ‫ ه‬C ON TI NENT AL P H I L O S O P H Y , ٧٠١ . 5 N©.

٦, May, 2013, 99-106

REVIEW ESSAT

The Ambiguity ٠٢Facticity ¡٨

^ei^egge^s Ea^y Work
^EShlE M a c A v OY
East Tennessee State University

The Early Heidegger's Philosophy ofLife: Facticity, Being and Language offers an
interpretat‫©؛‬n ٠٢ Heidegger’s c©ncept ٠٢ facticity· as it is articulated in
c©nnecti©n with the ideas ٠٢ life and language in the lecture c©urses ٢٢٠٢٨
1919—25. The b©©k argues that ‫؛‬acticity is both the s©urce ٠٢ vitality ٢٠٢
theory and a source ٠٢ decept‫©؛‬n and falsehood and therefore cann©t be
viewed in either p©s‫؛‬t‫؛‬ve ٠٢ negative terms exclusively, but must instead be
viewed as amb‫؛‬gu©us. This essay argues that this basic thesis is c©rrect and
is supp©rted by drawing a d‫؛‬st‫؛‬nct‫©؛‬n between everydayness and inauthen-
ticity. It is als© argued that the analysis of language the b©©k ©ffers can be
usefal in clearing up misunderstandings ٠٢Heidegger’s c©ncept ofdiscourse
in Being and Time.

KEYW ORDS Heidegger, facticity, life, language

Scott M. Campbell, The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy o fL ife : Facticity, Being, and
Language‫ و‬Fordham University Press, 2012, 2 4 ‫ و‬pp, $28 (pbk), ISBN-13: 978-0‫־‬
8232-4220-7.
The volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe dedicated to the lecture courses that
he delivered in the years prior to the publication of the 1927 w ork Being and Time
have received a great deal of attention in the last couple of decades and with good
reason, for they shed an enormous am ount of light on the development of
Heidegger’s ^ ilo so p h ic al thinking. Scholars examine these volumes for a variety
of reasons/ Some are interested in the clues they provide regarding the
development of the position articulated in Being and Time. Others study these
texts to unravel the influence of im portant figures from the history of philosophy

1 ‫ آل‬would be impossible to eite all ‫ ﺀه‬tbe literatee that foeuses ou Heidegger’s early lecture courses. Some notable
book leugth studies include Bowler 2008; Crowe ‫ ﻫﻬﺖ‬6 ‫ ﻫﻬﺖ ث‬8 ‫ ت‬Kisiel ‫ل‬993 ‫ أ‬Shirley ‫ت‬01 ‫ أه‬van Buren 1 4 ‫ وو‬. A
particularly good anthology is Kisiel and van Buren 1994.

© ١٧ . s . Maney & Son Ltd 2 0 1 3 OI□‫ﻫﺂ‬.^‫ و‬/ ‫ أ‬7‫ ص‬6‫ق‬81‫و‬2 .‫ ﻫﻤﻬﻬﻬﻬﻤﻬﻪ‬4

٦٠٠ LE$LIE

٠٨ Heidegger’s t a u g h t , while still others are particularly keen ^٠ explore

Heidegger’s critical engagement with his philosophical contemporaries in
phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. Campbell’s book, The Early Heidegger's
Philosophy o f Life: Facticity, Being, and Language, should be understood as
contributing to this growing body of literature. The philosophical study aims to
explore Heidegger’s thinking about facticity through an a m i n a t i o n of those
lectures and portions of lectures dealing with the topic during the period
1 5 ‫ و‬1‫ت— و‬. c ^ p b e l l ’s objective is to interpret these early lecture courses on their
own terms and to critically engage a few scholarly claims that have been made
about Heidegger’s position during these years. It is not, therefore, his goal to
discuss these lectures with the aim of shedding light on Being and Time.
Nevertheless, his analysis deals with themes that relate to topics addressed in that
text and does seem to presuppose that the reader will have some basic familiarity
with core positions and concepts from it. Therefore, Campbell’s work will be of
particular interest not only to scholars who work on the early lecture courses, but
to readers of Being and Time as well.
In engaging with the topic of facticity, Campbell focuses on two dimensions—
the facticity of life and of language. In addressing this topic, he wants to draw out
those dimensions of hum an experience by which hum an beings are able to
understand themselves as living and speaking beings (‫ رث‬. This suggests that
facticity is of concern in tw o senses. First, the term facticity refers to the historical
situation of the particular, concrete individual. Thus, to focus on facticity is to
focus on the existence of hum an beings as living and speaking entities. But,
secondly, it is also suggested that from out of this existence or facticity, it is
possible for hum an beings to understand themselves as factical, existentially
constituted beings. This indicates that facticity contains within it the possibility of
understanding existence and of understanding Being. Put another way, an
understanding of Being belongs to hum an facticity. Philosophy and science, then,
are ^ ssib ilities that unfold from hum an facticity, and the particular philosophies,
concepts, and so on that emerge will be conditioned by the factical situations from
which they develop. This is the insight that informs the view that facticity is a kind
of vital source for theory. But it is also the case, as Heidegger argues and Campbell
emphasizes, that these theoretical concepts and understandings can become
sedimented and ossified, cut off from their factical source, and then they can no
longer serve to express factical understanding but rather obscure it. Thus, in the
early courses, Heidegger repeatedly contrasts the way things are conceptualized or
disclosed within theoretical discourses, whether those be discourses of science or
religious dogma, and how they are disclosed within factical life. This will become
an im portant thesis of Being and Time as well.
The problem is not only that theoretical discourse can become cut off from its
factical sources, but that it can provide the fram ework through which we
habitually understand ourselves and our world, and consequently the possibilities
of genuine self-understanding that emerge from our own factical situation become
occluded. In this way, we are brought to the position that while facticity can be
conceived in positive terms as a source of vitality for inquiry, it is also the source of
deception and falseness. Campbell refers to this duality as the ambiguity of factical
 AMBIGUIT¥ ٠۴ FACTICITY IH HEIDEGGER'S EARLY WORK ]٠٦

life, and he argues for it throughout the book. The basie thesis is that facticity
contains within it the dual possibility of uncovering, disclosing, or revealing on the
one hand, and covering over on the other. Campbell begins the argument for this
point in his treatm ent of factical living, as just discussed, and then extends it
through his analysis of Heidegger’s discussion of language and speaking. This
analysis aims to show that speech can be used both to disclose things as w hat they
are, or as w hat they are not. In this way factical speech illustrates the interplay
between disclosing and covering over that also typifies factical living, and
therefore, Campbell argues, the facticity of living and speaking function both to
uncover and cover over Being. On the basis ©fthis argument Campbell disputes the
claim that Heidegger is not concerned with the question of Being in his early work
(xii). Against this, he argues that Heidegger focuses on facticity in this period
precisely because factical life generates an openness to Being and thus is the site
from which any questioning about Being or understanding of Being is possible.
Campbell maintains, then, that the analysis of Dasein with which readers of Being
and Time are familiar evolves out of the analysis of factical life that Heidegger
undertakes in the early work.
The Early Heidegger's Philosophy o f Life consists of nine chapters divided into
four parts: I. Philosophical Vitality (1‫ و‬1‫ و‬- ‫ ;) ﻣﻖ‬II. Factical Life (1921-22)‫ ؛‬III. The
Hermeneutics of Facticity (1‫ و‬222-‫ث( و‬IV. The Language of Life (1923-25). Part I
focuses on Heidegger’s analysis of science and religion in the lecture courses from
1919-21: Toward the Definition o f Philosophy (GA 56/57)‫ ؛‬Basic Problems o f
Phenomenology (GA 58); Phenomenology o f Intuition and Expression: Theory o f
Philosophical Concept Formation (GA 59)‫ ؛‬and The Phenomenology o f Religious
Life (GA 6‫ م(ه‬The aim of this section is to highlight the position that facticity is the
existential or living source for theories, regardless of whether these theories are
scientific or religious. As such, facticity is the source of any sort of foilosophical
vitality, which is subsequently lost when these expressions of life are ‘objectified’ in
theory. Part II looks more broadly at the concept of life itself and how questioning
emerges from out of factical life. It also argues for the ambiguity of focticity based
on Heidegger’s claims that facticity is a source of ‘ruinance.’ The source material
for the analysis in the two chapters of this section is “Phenomenological
Interpretations of Aristotle: An Initiation into Phenomenological Research” (GA
61). Part 111 focuses on the text “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to
Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” the so-called “lost manu-
script” from 1922, and O ntology: The Hermeneutics o f Facticity (GA 6‫ م(و‬This
section is organized around the claim that Heidegger intends to reinterpret
philosophical and theological concepts in terms of the facticity of life by retrieving
the factical meanings from which they developed and which have subsequently
been covered over. Thus, it focuses on illustrating how Heidegger begins to analyze
facticity or existence with an eye tow ard linking it to ontology. Part IV shifts to a
consideration of the topic of language and focuses on Introduction to
Phenomenological Research (GA 17), Basic Concepts o f Aristotelian Philosophy
(GA 18), and Plato's Sophist (GA 19). The goals here are to show that language
involves both a revealing and a concealing, and that language can serve as foe
‫ص‬ LESLIE MACAVOY

ground of ontology. To achieve these goals Campbell also gives considerable

attention to Heidegger’s im erpretation of logos as speaking.
The book is organized chronologically and then thematically, where the
thematic ordering consists mainly in the fact that the first three parts focus on
factical life and the last part focuses on language. Although Campbell doesn’t
discuss every lecture course during the period 1 5 ‫ و‬1‫ و‬1-‫ ﻗﻮ‬, he discusses most of
them, which indicates a desire to be fairly comprehensive from a historical or
chronological point of view. This, however, raises the question of why the
investigation ends where it does: with the lecture course on the Sophist in the
winter semester of 1‫ﻗﻮ‬ 41‫־‬-
‫ ﻗﻮ‬5 ‫ م‬Of course, one cannot and should not expect that a
book will cover everything, but in view of the ambiguity of life thesis that
Campbell is defending, it might have been informative to give further
consideration to Heidegger’s thesis regarding truth as disclosedness and uncover-
ing. Campbell points to this thesis mainly in the conclusion, but given the interplay
between covering and uncovering that Heidegger focuses on when discussing
truth, it seems that more attention to it would have supported his overall position,
and to this end some discussion of Logic: The Question o f Truth (GA 2.1) from the
winter semester of 192.5 —26 might have been useful. Nevertheless, the analyses of
the texts that are offered here are careful and detailed, and there is much to be
gained by studying them. The chapters on language in Part IV are particularly
interesting. For some reason these lectures seem to receive less attention than the
lecture courses dealing with factical life and religion, yet in some respects they are
an im portant missing link in the chain between the Heidegger of the early Freiburg
years and the Heidegger of Being and Tim e, and I believe Campbell’s analysis helps
us to see this more clearly.
For example, Campbell’s informative discussion of logos as speaking, in the
Aristotle lectures especially, should shed new light on the concept of discourse
(Rede) that Heidegger begins to use after this period. During this time, Heidegger
begins to identify discourse as an im portant mode of disclosedness along with
understanding and state-of‫־‬mind or attunem ent, but he doesn’t devote a great deal
of attention to elaborating the concept, and some of the things he says have
generated a good deal of confusion. So, for instance, in Being and Time he
distinguishes between discourse and language (1Sprache), stating that discourse is
the “e ^ rtem ia l^ n to lo g ica l foundation of language” (SZ 161/BT 203) and that
language is “the way in which discourse gets expressed” (SZ 161/BT ‫ ﻣﺚ‬4 ‫ر‬. This
distinction suggests that discourse, whatever it is, is distinct from language. This
has led a num ber of com m entators to interpret it as a non-linguistic phenomenon,*
in opposition to others who think of discourse as language or as something like
language.‫و‬
But a look at Heidegger’s lecture course on Aristotle shows, as Campbell points
out, that Heidegger is interested in logos, discourse, as factical speech, and this
implies that the distinction between discourse and language cannot be understood

2^See especially Dreyfus 1991, 7‫— ﻟﻖ‬5‫ ﻟﺖ‬and Haugeland 1‫ و‬9 ‫ت‬.
3For a discussion of this debate between a so-called “pragmatic” model of discourse and a “linguistic” model of
discourse, see Carman2‫ت״‬0 0 ‫ و‬,‫ ﻗﺖ‬0 —‫وت‬
 AMBIGUITY OF FACTICITY IN HEIDEGGER'S EARLY ^ORK ]‫وه‬

as a distinction between a no^linguistic phenomenon and a linguistic one, but

must instead be understood as a distinction between two linguistic phenomena.
And, indeed, when we bring this insight back to Heidegger’s text in Being and
Tim e, we can find corroboration for this view when he writes that “language is a
totality of w ords” (SZ 161/BT ‫ ﻫﻖ‬4 (‫ م‬W hat this suggests is that the distinction
between discourse and language is similar in some respects to the distinction
between a diachronic and synchronic view of language, i.e., between spoken
language or speech and language as a closed, static system of signs. Thus, more
attention to Heidegger’s discussion of logos in the lectures Campbell highlights
w ould help to clear up some of this confusion in the scholarship connected to
Being and Tim e.
Although Campbell claims that Heidegger’s focus on language is an extension of
his interest in factical life, the book seems to inadvertently set up a dichotomy
between life and language, partly due to the thematic organization of the book and
partly due to repeated references to the idea that for Heidegger facticity focuses on
living and speaking, as though living were one activity and speaking another.^ But
this is misleading. In GA 18 Heidegger devotes considerable attention to Aristotle’s
notion of the hum an being as zöon logon echon. The upshot of fois definition for
Aristotle, as Heidegger points out and Campbell emphasizes, is that the human
being is foe entity who speaks. This means that speaking is essential to the human
form of life, to hum an living. In light of this, foe dichotomy that the book suggests
between living and speaking is problematic because it suggests that Heidegger
simply turns from a consideration of factical living to factical speaking, as though
he were moving from one topic to another, when in fact it seems more likely that
he comes to realize that any consideration of facticity as a source for thought
' theological, or otherwise) must necessarily turn to language
because there is no hum an living w ithout speaking. Thus, while it does seem right
to Haim that Heidegger’s interest in language is motivated by his interest in
facticity, w hat we should see here is that his whole conception of fa c tic ity -o f
factical life -m u st evolve and become more sophisticated in light of the
recognition of the place that speaking and language play in forming the contexts
of meaning th at enable factical understanding. As such, Heidegger doesn’t just
shift his attention from one area of facticity to another. His thinking regarding
facticity in fact develops.
Though I have focused on language here, the main thesis of Campbell’s book
really concerns foe ambiguity of facticity, and so a consideration of this is in order.
This thesis is developed partly in response to a disagreement in foe literature
regarding whether factical life is to be viewed in positive terms, as a source of
m eaning and vitality, or in negative terms as a source of deception. M uch of
Campbell’s book aims to show that this ،either/or’ approach to factical life is
wrong and that instead it (factical life) is foe source of both vitality and corruption.
The tendency to focus on the positive or the negative aspect of facticity without
realizing that it is necessarily both leads, he believes, to a tendency to set up a
dichotomy between authenticity and in ^ th en ticity (18, 211f). He associates this

4 Im passim throughout the totroduction. I —0‫ ت‬.

4‫ﻫﺂ‬ LESLIE MACAVOY

confusion with those interpretations of the early Heidegger that focus on

destruction.* On this reading, inauthenticity am ounts to a kind of conformity to
tradition, while authenticity involves a “destruction” or “d ^ o n stru ctio n ” of the
tradition which extracts value from factical life. Campbell understands this to
mean that the goal of authenticity is to eliminate the ambiguity of factical lifo,
which he thinks in turn implies the view that “Dasein might be able to remain
authentic” (‫م(ﻟﻠﺖ‬
Campbell is right about the ambiguity of factical life, and I agree with the basic
idea that the simultaneity of covering and uncovering that occurs in foe dynamic
of factical disclosure is im portant support for this thesis. But I am puzzled about
the worry expressed here regarding the dichotomy between authenticity and
inauthenticity. Campbell says that if one posits such a dichotomy, then it is
implied that there is no way to pass from inauthenticity to authenticity (214).
This may be why he thinks the position suggests that Dasein can remain
authentic, and I can agree that this claim is problem atic as is the implication, if it
is one, that there would be no way to move from inauthenticity to authenticity.
But why does presenting the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity as
a dichotomy imply that? ?erhaps Campbell is trying to say that if authenticity
am ounts to eliminating the ambiguity of factical lifo, then inauthenticity amounts
to persisting within that ambiguity, and it is the ambiguity, the simultaneity of
covering over and uncovering, that makes it possible to pass from inauthenticity
to authenticity and vice versa. So, if authenticity meant eliminating this
ambiguity, then authenticity would be a state that has been purged of the (quality
in virtue of which change, in this case degradation back to inauthenticity, would
be possible.
But perhaps fois focus on the dichotomy between in ^ h e n tic ity and authenticity
misses the target. The problem may have more to do with the association of
in ^ th en ticity with the ambiguity of factical hfo. Indeed, the worry Campbell
expresses is reminiscent of the debate about foe relationship between inauthen-
ticity and everydayness in Being and Time. For a long time, many readers of that
text simply equated foe two notions, and Campbell appears to be largely
supportive of that interpretation (223). But the scholarly consensus now is that
inauthenticity and everydayness should be distinguished, and that inauthenticity
and authenticity are both possibilities grounded in Dasein’s Being-in‫־‬the-world.
The basic idea here is that the contexts of meaning that make up the world and in
virtue of which it is intelligible are necessarily shared, and that engagement in the
w orld is impossible w ithout participation in practices that are constituted through
the existential structure represented by the “they.” Consequently, authenticity
could not possibly involve escaping foe structure of foe “they” because that would
mean that Dasein would somehow have to cease being Being-in-the-world, which
w ould mean th at it would have to cease being Dasein, which is absurd. As such,
authenticity must involve some way of ^ p ro p ria tin g or disclosing one’s own
Being and one’s possibilities within the structures of the world and the “they.” This
position is supported by passages that indicate that authenticity does not entail a

*Crowe 2.006 and ¿008 and van Buren 1992 and 1994 are the particular targets £٠٢ this critique.
 AMBIGUITY OF FACTICITY INHEIDEGGER'S EAREY WDRK 105

detachment from the ‘they’ but rather a modification of one’s involvement with it.6
It furtherm ore implies that everyday Being-in-the-world is neutral with respect to
authenticity and inauthenticity and is the ground from which each of these
possibilities develops/
In this way, one can argue for a distinction between everydayness and
inauthenticity, and it seems that such a distinction would be useful to
Campbell’s argument. The ambiguity that Campbell seeks to highlight in factical
life is the ambiguity that belongs to everydayness, and it appears as though
Campbell wants to retrieve a positive meaning for in u th en tic ity mainly because
he wants to point to the multi-valence of everydayness. For this reason, it may be
more effective to distinguish everydayness and inauthenticity, rather than to argue
against a dichotomy between authenticity and inauthenticity.
These points of disagreement are, however, fairly minor in that they concern the
argument as it is framed in the introductory and concluding sections of the book.
The chapters in between are full of careful textual analysis and interpretation that
will be of considerable interest to serious readers of Heidegger across a broad
spectrum. Campbell’s exegetical approach to these lectures shows a path of
thinking that Heidegger sustains over the six-year period investigated and beyond,
and in this regard, it makes a valuable contribution to the body of scholarship on
H eidegger’s early philosophy.

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6 “Authentic Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon ٠. . a condition that has been detached from the ‘they’; it is rather an
existentiell modification o f the They'— o f the ‘they' as an essential existentiale" (SZ 130/BT 168).
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Notes on contributor
Correspondence to: Leslie MacAvoy, macavoyl@etsu.edu.
 ‫آلﻣﺂورلم؛‬

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