Impact of access to land on food security and poverty: the case of Philippine agrarian reform - EA Guardian

Impact of access to land on food security and poverty: the

[11]
case of Philippine agrarian reform - EA Guardian
Program Director, GCP / PHI / 047 / AUL and GCP / PHI / 043 / ITA

Agrarian reform in the Philippines seeks to solve the centuries-old problem of landlessness in rural areas.
Through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) initiated in 1987, the government
addressed key national goals: the promotion of equity and social justice, food security and poverty
alleviation in the countryside. After over 14 years of the CARP, however, the program is yet to be completed
and is currently burdened with major issues - from opposition by landlords and lack of support from
legislators, to wide gaps in fund resources.

Various studies, however, have shown that agrarian reform has had a significant impact on farmer
beneficiaries. Increased per capita incomes, reduced poverty incidence, higher investments in
physical capital, and greater household welfare and productivity were reported, aside from social justice
and peace attained in the countryside. Land redistribution alone was not enough to liberate the small
farmer from poverty and ensure the success of the CARP. Support services for the agrarian reform
communities became pivotal in enhancing food security and building infrastructures that promote food
production, enhance community trading and increase rural household income.

Despite the many serious setbacks to the CARP's full implementation, and given the positive results of the
various impact studies, this article shares the view of many observers that the CARP's overall performance
is positive and encouraging. It has clearly benefited a significant portion of the rural population through
its various programs intended to alleviate poverty, ensure food security, and empower people towards
the overall development of the country.
Access to Land, Food Security and Poverty: The Case of Land Reform in the
Philippines

In the Philippines, land reform seeks to address the age-old problem of landlessness in
rural areas. With the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) launched
in 1987, the Government seeks to achieve certain priority objectives, such as the
promotion of equity and social justice, food security and the fight against poverty in
rural areas. Fourteen years later, however, the program is still not complete and
faces serious challenges, ranging from opposition from large landowners and lack
of support from lawmakers to huge loopholes. within the available financial
resources. The agrarian reform had a significant impact on the farmers who
benefited from it: increase in per capita income, reducing the incidence of
poverty, increasing investment in physical capital and improving household
well-being and productivity; social justice and peace now reign in the countryside.
Land redistribution was not enough to free small farmers from poverty and ensure
the success of land reform. Support services to communities benefiting from the
agrarian reform have improved food security and put in place the necessary
infrastructure to facilitate food production, strengthen local trade and improve the
income of rural households. This article shares the opinion of many observers who
consider that this program has obtained positive and encouraging results.

Access to the land, food security and poverty: the case of Philippine land reform

The agrarian reform in the Philippines solved the problem of the landless peasants in
the rural zones, which has come to creep for centuries. Through the Global Agrarian
Reform Program, initiated in 1987, the Government addressed primary objectives: the
promotion of equality and social justice, food security and poverty alleviation in the
countryside. However, after more than 14 years of execution, the Program has
not yet been completed, and it currently faces significant problems: from the
opposition of large landowners and the lack of support from legislators, to large gaps
in financial resources. Agrarian reform has produced higher per capita income,
reduced the incidence of poverty,
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increased investments in physical capital and productivity and well-being of families
and social justice.The redistribution of the land was not enough to free small farmers
from poverty and ensure the success of the Program.Community support services were
vitally important in increasing food security and creating an infrastructure that will
promote the production of food, increase commerce between communities and
increase household income.
In this article, the opinion of many observers that the overall performance of the
Program is positive and favorable: it has clearly benefited a considerable part of the
rural population and can constitute an effective instrument to alleviate poverty, to
guarantee food security and promote the general development of the country

INTRODUCTION

Agrarian reform in the Philippines is a difficult task. In spite of its strategic importance, it is viewed
with great skepticism. It is expected to resolve, in a matter of 20 years, the centuriesold problem of
landlessness that has spawned social unrest and uprisings. It is also expected to address two
important national goals: food security and poverty alleviation. However, it has received far less
public support than expected, and it swims against a sea of odds - opposition from landlords,
criticism by civil society, suspicion by the private sector, cynicism by legislators, a lack of financial
and material resources, and general public apathy.

Every administration has declared agrarian reform a centrepiece program for growth and
development, yet it has received only scanty resources from government. The fund for land
acquisition and distribution (LAD) has always been inadequate, yet LAD is a major component by
which the success of agrarian reform is measured. Most of the funding for the support services
component of the program comes from Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).

Much of the sceptiscm about agrarian reform probably has deep roots in history. During the Spanish
colonial period, the bulk of prime lands went to the friars through means both fair and foul. The
tyranny of the friars was one of the factors that sparked the Philippine Revolution of 1896. When the
United States occupied the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century, they purchased most of
the friar estates for distribution to tenants. However, because of high prices, most of these estates
went to American firms, businesspersons and property owners.

When peasant uprisings broke out in the 1930s, during the period of the Commonwealth, President
Quezon introduced a massive resettlement program. This program was pursued by President
Magsaysay after the Pacific War to break the backbone of the Huk Rebellion. The government
opened up vast uncultivated and unpopulated areas for homesteading, especially on Mindanao
Island. This created another problem: it marginalized the indigenous population, as some of the
resettlement areas intruded into ancestral domains. This is one of the roots of the current conflict in
Mindanao.

There have been attempts since the Commonwealth to reform tenancy relations by arranging a
more equitable sharing of crops between landowners and tenants. However, they have not really
addressed the problem of landlessness. In 1963, President Macapagal enacted the Land Reform
Code. This officially abolished share tenancy and instituted a leasehold system whereby tenants
would eventually own the land through amortization. However, the program did not gain momentum.

President Marcos was the first to implement a major redistributive type of land reform. Soon after
imposing martial law in 1972, he issued Presidential Decree No. 27, declaring the whole country a
land reform area. His program covered rice and maize lands. Thus, only direct tillers were entitled to
land transfer. Marcos' land reform failed because of a number of flaws, including: the "severely
limited" coverage; the high retention limit of 7 ha, which applied even to absentee property owners;
the burdensome process of obtaining land; and the lack of support services (Reyes, 2001).

After the fall of Marcos, the succeeding government of President Aquino enacted Republic Act No.
6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The enactment of the CARL was in itself
controversial. It came in the wake of a protest rally of some 10 000 militant farmers in January 1987
that ended in a massacre. The farmers had been demanding immediate land distribution, through
confiscation and expropriation if necessary. Government troops fired on them, killing 17 and
wounding about 100 others. This prompted the immediate filing in Congress of the agrarian reform
bill. The bill was debated intensely inside and outside the halls of Congress. There were almost daily
mass demonstrations by civil society groups.

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In the end, a compromised version of the CARL emerged. Much of the compromise was in favor of
the landowners, especially on their rights to retention and just compensation. However, the
landowners complained that the law was harsh and confiscatory, while the militant groups
denounced it as pro-landowner and bogus. Nevertheless, the CARL was the best that could be had
under those difficult times and circumstances. This is perhaps the reason why the agrarian reform
program has been viewed with skepticism until today.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

The CARL set in motion the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
[12]
(CARP) in June 1988 with an initial allocation of p50 000 million for the Agrarian Reform Fund
(ARF). The CARP covered all public and private agricultural lands regardless of the crops planted. It
also included public domain lands that were suitable for agriculture. It sought to redistribute land not
only to farmers and farm workers but also to other landless poor. Guided by the principle of social
justice, it recognized the right of landowners to just compensation and provided a retention limit of 5
ha. It also recognized the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral land.

The CARP extended the amortization period from 20 years (as under President Marcos' Decree No.
27) to 30 years. On lands not covered by land distribution (those within the retention limit), the
CARP sought to improve tenure arrangements through leasehold. The law mandated the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to lead the implementation of the CARP.

The CARP also provided a comprehensive package of support services. These included: land
surveys and titling; credit; basic rural infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, communal irrigation
systems, and post-harvest facilities); basic social services (potable water supply, education and
health care); extension (including marketing and management assistance); and capability building
(training and organizational development of farmers).

The CARP was given ten years to distribute a total target of some 8 million ha. However, by June
1998 it had distributed only 4.6 million ha (58 percent of target) to some 2.8 million agrarian reform
beneficiaries (ARBs), leaving a backlog of some 3.4 million ha. President Ramos signed Republic
Act No. 8532 on 11 February 1998, extending the CARP until 2008, with an additional allocation of
[13]
p50 000 million for the ARF.

Table 1
CARP accomplishments, to December 2002

Scope Accomplishment Accomplishment

(hectares) (%)
DENR
Public A&D lands 2,502,000 1,235,922 49
ISF areas 1,269,411 1 335 999 105
Subtotal 3,771,411 2,571,921 68
DAR
Subtotal 4,290,453 3,249,260 76
Total 8 061 864 5,821,181 72

According to figures from the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, the CARP had distributed more
than 5.82 million ha to some 3 million ARBs by the end of 2002, or an accomplishment rate of
almost 72 percent from the revised total scope of 8.1 million ha. Of this accomplishment, the DAR
distributed 3.25 million ha of mostly agricultural lands, or 75.6 percent of its scope of 4.3 million ha,
while the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) distributed 2.57 million ha of
public lands and integrated social forestry areas, or 68.2 percent of its scope of 3.8 million ha (Table
1).

The Agrarian Reform Community

One innovative approach in the implementation of the CARP was the adoption of the so-called
Agrarian Reform Community (ARC) strategy. An ARC is a cluster of rural communities or barangays
(villages) where land transfer has been more or less completed and where there is a critical mass of
ARBs, that is, 50 - 60 percent of the community residents are ARBs. Conceived in 1993, the ARC
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strategy arose from a need to optimize the use of the limited financial and material resources of the
government. At that time, donor countries were hesitant to deal with the DAR because of the 1989
scandal involving the sale of the overvalued Garchitorena Estate (1 888 ha) in the Bicol Region.

Table 2
Official development assistance portfolio, end 2002

Status No. of projects 1

(p million) Project cost
(US $ million)
Completed projects 21 5,320 266
Ongoing projects 17 33 920 1,696
Proposal approved 1 1 120 56
Total 39 40 360 2,018

Note:
1 Inclusive of loans, grants and the Government of the Philippines counterpart. The
dollar costs indicated in the table were computed into peso equivalents based on the
exchange rates current at the time these projects were approved. The projects were
approved during the period from 1992 to 2002. Hence, peso equivalents in this table
use various peso - dollar exchange rates.

Although the sale was aborted, donors remained hesitant to support the CARP, especially its LAD
component.

The Aquino administration hoped to raise US $ 2,580 million for the CARP between 1988 and 1992,
but as of 1990 it had only received US $ 95.8 million in foreign commitments, mainly from the United
States of America (52 percent), the Netherlands (33 percent ), Japan (7.05 percent) and Italy (6.04
percent).

The ARC strategy focused on support services in selected areas to raise the household income of at
least 70 percent of ARBs in the ARC to above poverty level. This strategy fitted into the framework
of foreign donors to support specific geographic areas or sectors rather than the whole CARP itself.
Thus, it attracted foreign donor support. From 1993 to 1997, at the end of President Ramos' term,
[14]
the DAR had mobilized some p22 500 million in foreign development assistance. As of
[15]
December 2002, the DAR had mobilized some p40 400 million for 39 foreign-assisted projects
for 779 agrarian reform communities (Table 2).

The poverty situation

Based on official government estimates, the incidence of poor families in the Philippines increased
from 34 percent in 1991 to 40 percent in 2000. In order to compare poverty incidence in rural and
urban areas, a noted poverty expert in the country analyzed these national figures and produced the
figures shown in Table 3. In 2000, the poverty incidence in rural areas was about 41 percent,
compared with 13 percent in urban areas.

Table 3
Poverty situation, the Philippines

Poverty incidence
(%)
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Rural 53.1 45.7 48.6 45.4 36.9 41.3
Urban 21.7 16.0 20.1 18.6 11.9 13.2

Source: "Policy issues affecting the agrarian reform program in the Philippines" a
PowerPoint presentation by Arsenio D. Basilican at the FAO - TSARRD workshop,
Davao City, Philippines, in October 2002.

Poverty in the Philippines is still a rural phenomenon. Three-quarters of the poor live in the rural
areas, and the majority depend on agriculture and agriculturerelated industries for employment and
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income. Even urban poverty is partly an indirect effect of rural poverty.

THE IMPACT OF THE CARP

In assessing the impact of the CARP, the focus is always on the ARC because it is the show-window
of the program. Most funds for support services have been invested in ARCs, of which 1,543 have
been established nationwide.

The ARC remains the main strategy of the CARP in enhancing food security through higher
agricultural production and in lifting rural families out of poverty through higher income. It is in the
ARCs that the DAR has built, and continues to build, infrastructures that promote food production,
enhance community trading, and increase rural household income.

The ARC strategy is a testimony to the fact that land redistribution alone is not enough to liberate
the small farmer from poverty and to ensure the success of the CARP. Support services are
essential to the CARP. Without them, the CARP would destabilize and lose momentum.

The following box illustrates how support services affect the goals of improving food security and
alleviating poverty.

In a barangay in Talavera, Central Luzon, rural development had stagnated for many
years simply because of the lack of a good road. Transport vehicles seldom entered the
barangay, so the farmers had to carry the sacks of palay to the roadside where tricycles
(ie motorbikes with sidecars) would take them to the buyer. They could only load about
five sacks of palay in a tricycle, and they paid p50 1 per transport.
As they had no solar drying facility in the barangay, the quality of the palay was poor,
and the farmers hurried to dispose of their palay before it deteriorated. They received
p6 / kg, sometimes p5 / kg when the buyer thought the palay had too much moisture and
would need further drying.

When the ARC was established in the area, the DAR Agrarian Reform Communities
Project (ARCP), funded by the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), built a farm-to-market
road, a solar drying facility, and a warehouse in the barangay. Vehicles soon began to
travel the road. Palay buyers came and the farmers did not have to transport their sacks
of palay. The savings on transport costs easily translated into income. As they could now
dry their palay, they earned a higher price, averaging p10 / kg. They could also store
their palay in the warehouse to wait for a time when prices were good.

Later the road was paved, again through funding from the DAR-AsDB-ARCP. Farmers
who lived a little distance from the solar dryer did not need to go there, they simply
spread their palay on the paved roadside to dry. The solar drying facility also had other
uses, such as a basketball court and place for social gatherings.

In another example, the town of San Mateo in northern Luzon had long been isolated by
an impassable river. Just across the river is a community with great commercial
potential. To reach that community, residents of San Mateo had to go a roundabout way
of several kilometers. They not only spent more on transport, they could only carry a
limited load. With very little income opportunity, many ARBs secretly mortgaged the land
awarded to them.

In 1999, the DAR Agrarian Reform Communities Development Project (ARCDP),

supported by the World Bank, agreed to build a bridge in the town on condition that the
ARBs recovered their land from mortgage. Farmers' relative who were working abroad
sent money to pay the mortgage. When the condition was met, the bridge was built. The
bridge transformed the life of the residents of San Mateo. It ended their isolation,
enhanced their social interaction with other communities, and improved trading activities.
With the market now nearer, they were encouraged to increase agricultural production.

1
The reference year in this story is 2002. However, only the nominal
exchange rate for 2001 (p50.99 = US $ 1) is available on NEDA's (the
country's national planning and development office) Web site.

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The examples in the box are only two examples of support services provided by the DAR to ARCs.
Across ARCs nationwide, the DAR has delivered hundreds of such projects. In addition to roads and
bridges, the projects have included communal irrigation systems, water-impounding structures, post-
harvest facilities, potable water systems, demonstration and model farms, modern farm technologies
for sustainable agriculture, and manyothers.

The impact of the CARP after 12 years

Seven research studies were undertaken in the first round of the CARP impact assessment studies.
These studies had funding support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), AsDB,
FAO and the European Union (EU), with counterpart funds from the Philippine Government. Among
the key findings were:

significant increase in ownercultivatorship;

significant decline in share tenancy leaseholding;

lower incidence of owner non-cultivators;

ARBs invest more in on-farm assets compared with non-ARBs;

ARBs have better perceptions of their economic and social conditions and are more optimistic
about their future;

ARBs are in a more favorable position than non-ARBs in terms of:

- average farm income,

- educational attainment,

- access to potable water and sanitary toilets,

- ownership of household assets;

between 1990 and 2000, poverty incidence among ARBs declined from 47.6 to 45.2 percent,
while it increased among non-ARBs from 55.1 to 56.4 percent;

agrarian reform contributed to the reduction of social conflicts and promoted peace and order
in the areas studied.

Several other studies cite improvements in the living conditions of rural households in ARCs as a
result of the CARP.

In her study of 12 years of CARP implementation, Reyes (2001) says: "The results show that
agrarian reform has had a positive impact on farmer-beneficiaries. It has led to increased real per
capita incomes and reduced poverty incidence between 1990 and 2000 . ARBs tend to have higher
income and lower poverty incidence compared to non-ARBs. Real per capita income of ARBs
increased by 12.2 percent between 1990 and 2000. Moreover, poverty incidence among ARBs
declined from 47.6 percent in 1990 to 45.2 percent in 2000. [In contrast, poverty incidence among
non-ARBs was 55.1 percent in 1990 and 56.4 percent in 2000.] "

Deininger et al. (2000), in a Swiss-funded study, observe that the CARP has resulted in "higher
investments in physical capital, greater increase in inter-generational transmission of human capital,
and greater household welfare and productivity".

The World Bank - Agrarian Reform Communities Development Project (WB - ARCDP) Impact
Assessment Report (2000) shows an average increase in the income of beneficiaries of 74.4
percent, using 1994 as base year.

Riedinger and Kang (2000) also observe that the change in the tenure status of the farmer - from
tenant to leaseholder, and from amortizing ARB to ownercultivator - has resulted in increases in the
production of rice. The observation was based on panel data from a 1989 - 1990 nationwide survey
of 8,935 respondents and on data from a follow-up 1996 survey with 1,469 respondents.

In September 2002, the Institute of Agrarian and Rurban Development Studies of the University of
the Philippines Los Baños produced an evaluation of the Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support

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Project Phase I (ARISP-I), a foreign-assisted project of the DAR funded by the Japan Bank for
International Cooperation (JBIC).

The evaluation, conducted in partnership with Dr Nozawa of the University of Asia in Japan,
consisted of a survey of three ARCs covered by the ARISP-I and three ARCs not covered by the
project. Findings of the evaluation showed that the ARISP-I generally resulted in increased crop
yield which "produced favorable changes in the level of non-farm and farm income combined". The
evaluation noted greater improvements in cropping intensity for rice, rice productivity, average
farmgate price, and household income in ARCs covered by ARISP-I compared with non-ARISP
ARCs.

For example, cropping intensity in ARISPcovered ARCs was higher at two to three rice croppings
per year compared with only one in non-ARISP ARCs. In terms of rice productivity, the average
harvest per hectare was about 4 tonnes in ARISPcovered ARCs compared with only a little more
than 2 tonnes in non-ARISP ARCs. The improvements in productivity and income were attributed to
the communal irrigation facilities that have been provided, which have resulted in sufficient water
supply, and to the adoption of high-yielding varieties and increased fertilizer inputs.

Another main accomplishment of the CARP was the virtual elimination of share tenancy, which was
reduced from 67 percent before 1972 to 3 percent in 1995. Conversely, owner-cultivation increased
from 2 to 23 percent during the same period (Bravo and Pantoja, 1998) .

Some points to ponder

The improvements mentioned were true only in representative ARCs, not in all ARCs. As of 2002,
based on the ARC level of development assessment (ALDA) ratings developed by the DAR, a
greater number of ARCs still produce below the national mean, and an equally significant number of
ARB households have incomes below the poverty threshold.

Moreover, ARC development is also anchored on the performance of ARB organizations, mainly
cooperatives. The 2002 assessment based on ALDA ratings shows that only 19 percent of ARB
organizations have businesses run by fulltime management and staff.

Some studies on the impact of the CARP - expressed in terms of increased productivity and income,
greater opportunities, and better welfare of ARB households - are fragmentary and unconsolidated.
They represent the condition of selected ARCs, and do not necessarily reflect the general situation
among ARCs. A more comprehensive assessment and quantification of the impact is needed,
especially at the household level. There is an ongoing four-year CARP impact assessment being
undertaken at the microlevel, mesolevel and macrolevel but complete results are not expected until
2004.

Some studies that indicate major increases in the income of ARB households need to be verified.
For example, the JBICsponsored survey of three ARISP-assisted ARCs mentions a dramatic
[16]
increase in the income of ARB households, averaging more than p120 000 per year per
household. This is substantial considering that the national average annual income of rural
[17]
households is p40,000 - 60,000. However, the major portion of the increase (about 70 percent)
was attributed to remittances from family members working abroad. It is not clear how much of the
increase was due to or induced by the CARP, or whether the opportunity to work abroad was
brought about by the CARP. Therefore, some findings about the positive impact of the CARP remain
attempt in the absence of a definitive study that puts all the observed and perceived improvements
into context.

However, despite the tentativeness of findings, there is no doubt that some improvements have
occurred. It is just a matter of building and sustaining the momentum to achieve a high impact,
though this in itself is a formidable task.

Still left out and somehow missing from the picture are the ARBs in non-ARC areas and ARBs in
ARCs not covered by foreignassisted projects. Of the 1,543 ARCs nationwide, only 779, or 50.48
percent, are covered by the various foreign-assisted projects of the DAR.

As most of these ARBs have received far less in terms of support services, they are not expected to
have attained the same level of achievement as those in ARCs covered by foreign-assisted projects.
It is interesting to know how access to land through the CARP has improved their income and living
conditions, if at all. Considering that ARBs in non-ARC areas are greater in number (of the

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estimated 3 million ARBs, only about 800,000 are in ARCs), the impact of the CARP on food
security and poverty alleviation would logically be more tangible among these ARBs.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Despite the many serious constraints on its full implementation, and given the positive results of the
various impact studies, this paper shares the view of many observers that the overall performance of
the CARP is positive and encouraging. It has clearly benefited a significant portion of the rural
population through its various programs intended to alleviate poverty, ensure food security, and
empower people towards the overall development of the country.

CHALLENGES FOR THE CARP

Completing land acquisition and distribution

Upon the inception of the CARP in 1988, the ARF was established with a budget of p50 000 million.
The first ten years of the CARP had a LAD accomplishment of only 58 percent, but almost 90
percent (p44 700 million) of the ARF had been spent (p17 000 million by the Aquino government
between 1988 and 1992, and p27 700 million by the Ramos government). Of the used fund, 37
percent was spent on LAD, 30 percent on program beneficiaries development, and the rest on
operational support, infrastructure, and special projects.

When President Estrada assumed office in 1998, the CARP had a backlog of 3 million ha, of which
the DAR was to acquire and distribute about 1 million ha, mainly private agricultural lands.
The DENR was to distribute some 2 million ha of public lands. The DAR estimated that about p111
800 million [18] would be needed to complete the remaining 42 percent of the CARP, of which 47
percent would be for LAD. At the end of 2002, the CARP's backlog was about 2.28 million ha.

However, the DAR's requests for an adequate LAD budget have been blocked consistently. In 1998,
the Senate committee on appropriations transferred some p1 200 million [19] for LAD to
support services. In 1999, only a little more than p1 000 million was allotted for LAD.

In 2002, the budget provided was only enough to acquire 50,000 ha of private agricultural
lands, when the target was at least 100,000 ha. There was then, and there is now, a dire lack of
support for the CARP from legislators, as many of them are property owners themselves.

The challenge for the CARP is to find alternative sources of funds and to explore new modes of land
tenure improvement that will not strain the financial resources of the government

Filling up the support services gap

The budget problem also affects the government's capability to mobilize ODA funds. For the
medium term 2002 - 2004, implementation of some 32 foreign-assisted projects that require p26 500
[21]
million in counterpart funds has been deferred owing to budget constraints.

Table 4
Physical infrastructure support and services in ARCs

Farm-to-market roads
Required by ARCs 30 832.11 km
Completed / provided 13,976.78 km
Ratio 45.33%
Bridges
Required by ARCs 115 706.56 lm
Completed / provided 47 295.26 lm
Ratio 40.88%
Pre-and post-harvest facilities 64% of ARBs have access
Irrigation systems
Required systems / projects 22 076.00
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Provided / completed 12 832.00

Ratio 58.13%
Service area
Requiring irrigation 490 986.28 ha
Irrigated 253 967.71 ha
Ratio 51.73%
ARBs with service area
Requiring irrigation 246 774.00 ARBs
With access to irrigation 140 018.00 ARBs
Ratio 56.74%

There remain huge gaps in the support services provided to ARBs in terms of physical infrastructure
support, economic support, and organization building and strengthening (Table 4).

In terms of physical infrastructure support required by ARCs, the gaps are:

Of the required 30,832 km of farm to-market roads, only 13,977 km (or 45.33 percent) have
been completed.

Of the required 115,707 linear meters (lm) of bridges, only 47,295 lm (40.9 percent) have
been completed.

About 36 percent of ARBs still do not have access to pre- and postharvest facilities.

Of the required 22 076 irrigation systems or facilities, 12 832 (or more than 58 percent) have
been completed.

In terms of economic support, some 54 percent of ARCs do not have definite marketing outlets, and
only 8 percent have organizations that have forged marketing contracts or agreements with the
private sector (Table 5). Credit access of ARBs remains low. Only 38 percent have access to
production loans, 59 percent to livelihood loans, and 5 percent to multipurpose loans (Table 5).

Table 5
Economic support services in ARCs

Marketing services Credit access

54% of ARCs do not have definite 38% of ARBs requiring production loans
marketing outlets have access
Only 8% have organizations that 59% of ARBs requiring
have forged marketing contracts or livelihood loans have access
agreements
5% of ARBs requiring multipurpose loans
have access

In terms of maturity and strength of ARB organizations (cooperatives), the ARB membership ratio is
65 percent, while membership reach is a very low 29 percent. Based on the 2001 ALDA rating, only
22 percent of ARB organizations have a high level of maturity, 31 percent have a medium level of
maturity, and 47 percent have a low level of maturity (Table 6).

It must be made clear that gaps in support services are in ARCs covered by foreign-assisted
projects, which are only about half of the total number of ARCs nationwide. Moreover, all the ARCs
contain only about one-third of the total number of ARBs.

In view of meagre resources, the possibility of convergence of resources with other CARP-
implementing agencies and partners should be explored in order to sustain the provision of support
services to ARBs.

Opposition by landowners

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Generally, only large landowners, especially those belonging to the elite, oppose the CARP strongly.
They are confined to specific areas, mainly the Visayan islands of Leyte, Negros and Panay.
However, many of them have softened their attitudes and cooperated with the DAR after a sustained
campaign of consultations and dialogues.

The main objection of landowners to the CARP arises from what they perceive as undervaluation of
their property. This problem was addressed by DAR Secretary Morales when he issued guidelines
for a revised method of land valuation. A landowners' assistance desk has also been created within
the DAR to assist them with preparing their claim folders and other problems.

Table 6
Organizational maturity levels, ALDA rating, 2001

Level of maturity Level No. org. %

Low I 910 33
Low medium II 404 14
Medium III 447 16
High medium IV 420 15
High V 605 22
100
ARB membership ratio 65%
ARB membership reach 29%
Financial resources p701.38 million
Capital buildup p544.69 million
Savings mobilized p156.69 million

Where landowners have used armed personnel to harass farmer claimants, and even eject ARBs
from the land that has been awarded to them, the government has called in the police and the
military for help. The DAR has recently signed a memorandum of agreement with the national police
to help enforce the CARP mandate. This has been successful. In a number of instances where
farmer-beneficiaries had to be installed in the lands awarded to them, the presence of police and
military authorities prevented violent confrontation.

The main challenge here is to continue to pursue consultations and dialogues to encourage and
convince the resisting landowners to support the CARP.

Convergence of resources

The DAR has tried to promote a convergence strategy with the DENR and the Department of
Agriculture (DA) as the two agencies are also involved in the CARP - the DENR through distribution
of public lands and the DA through improving the productivity of farmers. In some cases, the
functions of the three departments overlap.

The three agencies signed a joint memorandum circular in January 1999 agreeing to implement a
convergence strategy in nine pilot areas (Cagayan Valley, Central Luzon, Quezon, Bicol, Bohol,
Panay, Caraga, Davao and Zamboanga). They drafted an Area Strategic and Investment Program
[22]
for each area, and each department committed an initial amount of p1.5 million. The strategy did
not follow through because the Estrada government collapsed.

The challenge for the CARP is to institutionalize a convergence strategy that would involve not only
the DENR and the DA but also other CARP partners, including the private sector and civil society.
This is important in pooling resources that could be used to undertake common activities that would
promote the specific goals of each cooperator. In the process, convergence could stimulate synergy
while easing the burden on the meagre resources of the government.

Partnership with local government units

Following the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1995, the functions of most government
agencies have been devolved to local government units (LGUs). Thus, at the LGU municipal level,

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there are now municipal agricultural offices (devolved from the DA), rural health units (devolved from
the Department of Health), etc.

The DAR is one of the few remaining national agencies whose functions have not been devolved.
Thus, while its constituencies are the grassroots, it has not mobilized the full cooperation of LGUs in
CARP implementation. The CARP is seldom included in the development plans or agenda of LGUs.

Many LGUs are unaware of the various programs and projects of the DAR. The few who are aware
are not keen on cooperating unless they are direct beneficiaries of the program or project. Even
then, their participation would be driven mainly by the institutional requirement for LGU counterpart
funding for foreign-assisted projects.

Under the law, there are supposed to be barangay agrarian reform committees or councils (BARCs),
but these are either non-existent or non-functional. As DAR functions are not devolved to the LGUs,
the BARCs are not within the LGUs' jurisdiction.

The DAR has been encouraging LGUs to adopt the CARP in their development agendas. A few
have expressed interest, but have not gone beyond that. The challenge for the DAR is how to
embed the CARP agenda and operational structures within the organizational setup of LGUs so that
implementation of the CARP will have a strong local base.

Private sector participation

Generally, the private sector has always been wary of entering into partnership with farmers or their
organizations. Stories of farmers not honoring contracts, short deliveries or non-deliveries, failure to
meet deadlines or product qualities, etc. are legion. Private entrepreneurs would rather deal with
intermediaries than deal directly with farmers, who are considered very risky partners.

Through CARP support services, the government has been painstakingly trying to transform the
ARBs into highly productive and competitive agriculturebased entrepreneurs. However, without
involvement of the private sector, ARB development would be very slow, and the burden on
government would be heavy.

The government has been promoting a wider matchup in agricultural production between ARBs and
the private sector through market matching and agribusiness assistance to ARBs. It has arranged
marketmatching consultations and dialogues, where links are forged between private entrepreneur-
buyers and ARB producers.

As a result, assured markets have been opened up to the ARBs and their organizations. Hundreds
of contracts have been signed and business tie-ups arranged between agribusiness enterprises and
ARB organizations.

Not all contracts have gone smoothly, but many have been sustained. The challenge is to build
momentum for this effort and strengthen the buyer - producer relationship.

In the process, the private sector could take over the role of providing capital and technical expertise
to the ARBs. Aside from easing the burden on government resources, this would hasten the
transformation of ARBs into agriculturebased entrepreneurs.

Other modalities / schemes on agrarian reform

The remaining few years of CARP implementation find the government moving into the most
problematic phase of the program. The government now has to go into sectors where landowner
resistance is expected to be strong. The major sectors include private agricultural lands between 5
and 25 ha, large sugar and coconut farms, and the highly profitable commercial farms. The DAR is
considering a scheme that would speed up the process of effecting land transfer, blend well with
existing arrangements, and capitalize on the benefits gained and lessons learned from the CARP. In
order to defuse landowner resistance, improve farmers' ability to pay, and increase the incentive for
private sector participation, one evolving strategy for promoting agrarian reform is based on farmer -
landowner negotiation in the land acquisition phase and community - state partnership in the
planning, provision and management of productive investments and critical support services. This
broad approach is consistent with the government's policy, thrusts and strategies of using market-
based or demand-driven mechanisms and participatory processes to attain the objective of rural
development.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CARP

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Among the many lessons that can be learned from the CARP, some of the most important are:

Agrarian reform is not simply land distribution. Poor farmers, used to the paternalistic ways of
the old system, cannot afford to take the full risk of owning land. They have to be provided
with a comprehensive (as in total) package of support services before access to land can be
translated into productivity and growth, and into food security and freedom from poverty.

Agrarian reform must involve the cooperation and participation of all sectors. Without
involvement by other government line agencies, the civil society, the private sector, LGUs, the
landowners, and the ARBs themselves through their organizations, agrarian reform cannot
gain momentum; it will drag too slowly, and have little significant impact.

Access to land opens growth opportunities for farmer-beneficiaries, but does not necessarily
translate into actual productivity. Beneficiaries must have access to other resources, such as
credit, capital, technology, farm management skills, and marketing information.

Access to land must translate into tangible improvements within a reasonably short period of
time, or else there will be a great risk of so-called "beneficiary defection", in which farmer-
beneficiaries abandon their stake in the land and mortgage or sell it. This could lead to the
reconcentration of lands in the hands of new landowners and eventually in the conversion of
these lands to other uses.

Public support is important in strengthening the case for agrarian reform. Legislators are able
to block funding for the CARP because the public is not keen on the issue and does not
complain. It would probably make a lot of difference if the public, perhaps through civil society
groups and other influential social sectors, made itself heard whenever legislators tried to
slash the budget for the CARP.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balisacan, A. & Hill, H. 2003. The Philippine economy: development, policies and challenges.
Quezon City, Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Bautista, G. & dela Cruz, LR 2002. Institutional and organizational assessment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program . Quezon City, Philippines, Institute of Philippine Culture,
Ateneo de Manila University.

Bravo, M. & Pantoja, B. 1998. Beyond 2000: assessment of the economy and policy
recommendations - social sector dealing with agrarian reform . Laguna, Philippines, Institute of
Agrarian Reform and Rurban Development Studies, College of Public Affairs, University of the
Philippines Los Baños.

Deininger, K., Lara Jr., F., Olinto, P. & Maertens, M. 2000. Redistribution, investment, and human
capital accumulation: the case of agrarian reform in the Philippines . Unpublished study funded by
the Swiss Special Studies Trust Fund.

Gordoncillo, PU, Escueta, EF, Peñalba, LM & Javier, FA 2002a. Assessment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and its impact on rural communities: household (micro)
perspective . Laguna, Philippines, Institute of Agrarian Reform and Rurban Development Studies,
College of Public Affairs, University of the Philippines Los Baños.

Gordoncillo, PU, Escueta, EF, Peñalba, LM & Javier, FA 2002b. Assessment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and its impact on rural communities: community (meso)
perspective . Laguna, Philippines, Institute of Agrarian Reform and Rurban Development Studies,
College of Public Affairs, University of the Philippines Los Baños.

Habito, C., Briones, R. & Paterno, EM 2001. Investment, productivity and land market impacts of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program . Report submitted to the Department of Agrarian
Reform.

Manasan, RG & Mercado, RG 2001. An evaluation of the fiscal aspect of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) . Makati, Philippines, Philippine Institute for Development
Studies.

Paunlagui, M. & Rola, A. 2001. The evolution of social capital and civic entrepreneurship under
CARP . Laguna, the Philippines, Institute of Strategic Planning and Policy Studies, College of Public
Affairs, University of the Philippines Los Baños.
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Reyes, CM 2001. Impact of agrarian reform on poverty . (Unpublished paper)

Riedinger, J. & Kang, S. 2000. Back to land: revisiting the rationale for agrarian reform. In: The
impact of agrarian reform and changing markets in rural households . MODE Research Papers.
Flight. I, No. 4.

WB - ARCDP (World Bank - Agrarian Reform Communities Development Project). 2000. WB -

ARCDP impact assessment report . Project publication. Quezon City, Philippines.

FAO / 18232 / J. Villamora

[11]
This paper was prepared under contract with FAO and presented at the 29th Session of the
Committee on World Food Security, Rome, 12 - 16 May 2003, Informal panel on the impact of
access to land on improving food security and alleviating poverty. The positions and opinions
presented are those of the author alone and are not intended to represent the views of FAO.
[12]
In 1988, the peso / US $ (nominal) exchange rate was p21.09 = US $ 1 (source: Philippine
[National] Economic Indicators Online, Money and Banking, External Indicators [Annual: 1987 -
2001]), available Has www.neda.gov.ph .
[13]
In 1998, the peso / US $ (nominal) exchange rate was p40.54 = US $ 1.
[14]
The exact US dollar equivalent of this figure could not be given because this development
assistance was cumulative for the period 1993 - 97. The peso / dollar exchange rates during these
years varied greatly. Hence, the peso equivalent of such assistance, at the time each allocation
was extended to the Philippine Government, was simply added up.
[15]
This total amount covers the years 1993 - 2002.
[16]
The study was conducted in 2001 and the nominal exchange rate was p50.99 = US $ 1.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
The nominal exchange rate in 1998 was p40.54 = US $ 1.

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4/15/2021 Impact of access to land on food security and poverty: the case of Philippine agrarian reform [11] - EA Guardian
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
The nominal exchange rate in 1999 was p39.09 = US $ 1.
[21]
The nominal exchange rate for 2002 is not available, but for 2001, the nominal exchange rate
was p50.99 = US $ 1.
[22]
The nominal exchange rate of p40.54 = US $ 1 for 1998 may be used here to compute the US
dollar equivalent.

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